Social, Ethical, Political, and Policy Implications Of

Interpretations Of Islams Foundational Text: The Quran

REPORT OF THE SYMPOSIUM ORGANIZED BY THE NYU CENTER FOR DIALOGUES: ISLAMIC WORLD
U.S.THE WEST
New York Universitys Casa Italiana
November 10, 2010

Directors Preface
In November 2010 when the NYU Center for Dialogues convened its symposium on the Social, Ethical,
Political and Policy Implications of Interpretations of Islams Foundational Text: the Quran, I could not
have predicted the powerful transformations that have taken place across the Muslim world these past few
months. As these events continue to unfold, analysts and journalists have repeatedly raised the question:
what role will Islam play? How will Islam influence the governments and societies that blossom from these
revolutions? These questions relate in a direct way to the central question and challenge of the symposium:
what are the practical implications of contemporary interpretations of Islams foundational text, the Quran?
Believed by Muslims to have been revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century, the Quran
constitutes the root of Islam the foundation upon which the Islamic religion (as it is practiced in various
forms today) was built. Far from being a purely religious text, the Quran lays the groundwork for ethical,
political, and social foundations of society. Unlike Catholicism, there is no one person in Islamic tradition with
the ultimate authority to mandate how the Quran and its ethical, political, and social injunctions should be
interpreted. Religious schools of thought that vary widely in their theoretical and theological approaches to
the Quran have been established throughout the Muslim world, not only across the Arab Middle East and
North Africa, but also in Central Asia, South Asia, subSaharan Africa, and China.
Despite the relative freedom of interpretation permitted by the lack of a central authority, various groups
and individuals throughout history have tried to claim that authority and have prohibited different
interpretations, sometimes violently. Today Muslims and nonMuslims alike are faced with the challenge of
Muslim fundamentalists who claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims and who view the world through the
narrow lens of an interminable clash of civilizations between the West and an Islamic East.
The symposium on the Social, Ethical, Political and Policy Implications of Interpretations of Islams
Foundational Text: the Quran was conceived as a forum for progressive Muslim intellectuals to discuss and
disseminate their methods of interpreting the Quran and reflect upon the positive, practical implications of
their work. By initiating an intraMuslim debate, the NYU Center for Dialogues sought to illuminate the work
of a number of innovative Muslim scholars who have found new and constructive meanings in the Quran
that widen the traditional boundaries of Islamic exegesis.
The symposiums agenda was divided into two sessions. In the first session, participants discussed the
critical differentiation between normative Islam and historical Islam, as well as the methods they employ in
interpreting the Quran as a historical text. This discussion naturally segued into the second session, in
which participants explained how they apply contemporary interpretations of the Quran to challenges facing
the Muslim world today challenges such as curricular reform and Islamic fundamentalism.
There are several individuals who deserve acknowledgement and thanks; this symposium would not have
been possible without them.

First and foremost I would like to thank the symposiums participants: Robert Lee, Professor of
Political Science at Colorado College (United States); Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer of Contemporary
Islam at the University of Manchester (United Kingdom); Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab
Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis (Tunisia); Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi, political
scientists published together under the pseudonym Mahmoud Hussein (Egypt); Amin Abdullah, Professor
of Islamic Studies at Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga (Indonesia); Dale Eickelman, Professor of
Anthropology and Human Relations at Dartmouth College (United States); and Stefan Wild, Professor
Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn (Germany). The participants
outstanding presentations at the symposium are evidence of their rigorous research, and their firm
commitment to both challenge previously held assumptions and broaden the field of Quranic interpretation
for a new generation.
As the idea of this symposium was forming in my head, I was fortunate to have the encouragement of
Ambassador Heidrun Tempel, then Special Representative for Dialogue among Civilizations at the German
Federal Foreign Office and now Deputy Head of the German Mission in Jakarta. It was through Ambassador
Tempel that we were able to secure the generous grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Germany, which made this symposium possible. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to
Ambassador Tempel and to her colleagues: Stephen Buchwald, Julia Fugel, Elmar Jakobs, and the rest of the
staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Permanent Mission of
Germany to the United Nations.
Finally, I would like to thank the indefatigable NYU Center for Dialogues staff, most especially Helena Zeweri,
until recently an Assistant Research Scholar; Reema Hijazi, Assistant Research Scholar; Joanna Taylor,
Junior Research Scholar; and Liz Behrend, Consultant. They all dedicated a significant amount of time during
and after office hours to ensure the success of this symposium and I am very grateful for their outstanding
work and proud to have them as colleagues. Finally, as has been the case with many other reports produced
by the Center since its inception eight years ago, my thanks go to Shara Kay. We are fortunate to have her
as our editorial advisor and we appreciate her intellectual and stylistic rigor.
The publication of this report comes at a significant moment in the history of the Muslim world. Over the
past two months revolutions have overthrown old, despotic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and there have
been widespread protests across the region demanding change and reform. As is already being seen with
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islam will be an integral part of the discussion as these countries form
new governments. We hope that this report, in its various translations, will serve as a valuable resource for
the regions emerging leaders and policymakers, as well as its citizens, and will aid the region in deciding
how to best consider Islam in relation to government and civic life.
March 3, 2011

Mustapha Tlili
Founder and Director
Center for Dialogues: Islamic WorldU.S.The West
New York University

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The international symposium on the Social, Ethical, Political, and Policy Implications of Islams
Foundational Text: the Quran was convened on November 10, 2010 in New York, New York, by the New
York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World U.S. the West. This symposium brought together
an international group of scholars to participate in an intraMuslim debate on the methods and practical
implications of contemporary interpretations of the Quran.
Founder and Director of the NYU Center for Dialogues, Mustapha Tlili, opened the symposium by reminding
the audience of the troubling Islamophobic events, in particular the demonstrations against the ground
zero mosque, that shook New York and the United States in the final months of 2010. Now more than ever,
Tlili stated, there is a need for intraMuslim debate and dialogue with the twofold aim of challenging the
misconceptions of Islam in the West and encouraging Muslimmajority countries to face the problematic
realities of their own societies.
Before the start of the first session, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, Abdelmajid
Charfi, briefly reflected on the important legacy of Algerian scholar Mohamed Arkoun who had intended to
participate in the symposium but sadly passed away in the fall of 2010.
The participants in the first session explored the critical distinction between normative Islam and historical
Islam, and discussed the methods they employ to interpret the Quran as a historical text.
Professor of Political Science at Colorado College, Robert Lee, presented the ideas of the late Mohamed
Arkoun. According to Lee, Arkoun was primarily opposed to what he titled Islamic Reason, or the
monopolistic hold of Muslim governments, theulama, and Islamist movements on Quranic interpretation. In
contrast to these groups, Arkoun believed that the Quran is an open and dynamic text and he argued that it
should be submitted to analysis from a variety of different literary, anthropological, sociological, and
historical perspectives. For Arkoun, the entirety of the Quran can not be understood as containing a singular
meaning. Instead, the truth of the Quran can be found in the plurality of meanings yielded by critical
interpretations of the text.
Following Professor Lees presentation, Senior Lecturer on Contemporary Islam at the University of
Manchester, Andreas Christmann, presented the ideas of Muhammad Shahrur who was unable to attend
the symposium for health reasons. Often compared to Protestant reformer Martin Luther, Shahrur argues in
his work that political leaders and the ulama have monopolized interpretations of the Quran and have
used religious institutions and practice in a way that poses the least resistance to political tyranny.
However, according to Christmann, Shahrur firmly believes that Islam can and should be reformed and that
it can provide a necessary third way between radical fundamentalism and secular nationalism. He
envisions an Islam that is entirely depoliticized, but forms the moral force of politics and society as a sort of
civil religion.
The last speaker in the first session, Professor Emeritus Abdelmajid Charfi, approaches the Quran from a
historical perspective. He argued that the historical context in which the Quran is read and interpreted has
immense implications for the ways the text is understood. For Charfi, the differing interpretations that have
emerged throughout history necessarily suggest that the Quran does not and could never have one singular
meaning or truth. Charfi summarized his subsequent arguments in three main points:

Muslims interpreting the Quran today need to acknowledge the limits imposed by traditional
exegesis.

The relationship between exegesis and jurisprudence should be reversed. In other words, traditional
exegesis should not inform contemporary interpretations of the Quran, but instead contemporary
interpretations of the Quran should pave the way for new forms of exegesis.

Finally, Charfi argued against a strictly linear interpretation of the Quran as the revelations were
assembled according to length and not according to a continuous narrative.
The panelists in the second session focused on how they combine theory with practice to address challenges
the Muslim world is facing today.
Political scientist and author, Adel Rifaat presented on behalf of Mahmoud Hussein, the pseudonym under
which he publishes with coauthor Bahgat El Nadi. In their most recent book Penser le Coran (Grasset et
Fasquelle, 2009), the authors seek to expose the historicity of the Quran using the original sacred texts,
especially the testimonies of the Companions of the Prophet, in order to prevent radical fundamentalists and
other literalists from claiming that historicity is imposed on the Quran by foreign intellectual traditions.
Rifaat cited three main examples of this historicity:

The Quran distinguishes God from his Word. God is eternal but his Word is timebound and
dependant upon the context in which it is revealed.

God is constantly in dialogue with the Prophet and the Companions and He allows for explanation
based on the context of the situation.

Finally, God does not weigh each of his revelations equally. What God says in one verse is
occasionally abrogated in a later verse.
Amin Abdullah was unfortunately unable to attend the symposium because his request for an entry visa to
the United States was rejected. His ideas were presented by a member of the NYU Center for Dialogues
staff. As a professor of Islamic studies at the Universitas Negari Islam Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta,
Abdullah has spearheaded many curricular reform efforts including moving oversight of his Islamic
University from the Ministry of Religion to the Ministry of Education when he was the universitys president.
Abdullah explained that many Islamic universities in Indonesia are now required to integrate
multidisciplinary approaches into their courses, including using social science methodologies to interpret the
Quran and other sacred texts. He acknowledged, however, that many departments still remain rooted in
traditional methodologies and practices.
Abdullah argued that the main project for the field of Islamic Studies today is eliminating
misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between Islamic Studies, Islamic Thought and Islamic Religious
Knowledge.
In his closing remarks, Mustapha Tlili underscored the need for a stronger dialogue between the West and
the Muslim world. He encouraged universities and scholars in the West to realize the implications of this
dialogue and to engage their peers in the Muslim world in order to continue the long, and too often
obscured, history of intellectual crossfertilization between the Muslim world and the West.

OPENING SESSION
Opening Remarks: Mustapha Tlili, Founder and Director, NYU Center for Dialogues (U.S.)
Mustapha Tlili, the symposiums organizer, welcomed participants and remarked on the particular importance
and timeliness of the event. This past summer, the Quran was to be burned by an obscure pastor of a non
denominational church in Florida until President Obama and other U.S. administration officials personally
intervened. Even more recently, New York City witnessed huge demonstrations for and against the socalled

Ground Zero mosque. Misunderstandings about the Muslim faith abound in the West. Meanwhile, Muslims
themselves, in the U.S. in particular, do not seem to agree on what being Muslim is about. Those who speak
in their name are often driven by a quest for power, and project conflicting images of Islam and different
understandings of its holy texts.
The absence of a central authority in Islamic theology and tradition heightens the anxieties of Muslims and
nonMuslims alike regarding Islam, Tlili explained. History tells us, however, that the search for a universally
recognized truth has been part of Islamic tradition since the advent of the faith more than 14 centuries ago.
To Tlilis mind, if you strip Islamic history of its competition forpolitical power, what remains can all be
articulated in terms of interpretation of the faith, its tenets, and its underpinning fundamental texts above
all, the Quran.
What makes the current moment unique, Tlili continued, is the weight and challenge of globalization, which
requires the Muslim world to confront its realities to look in the mirror of modernity and answer the
question of how to be Muslim in the 21st century. In the flat world of today in contrast to the times of
AlMutazila 1 and AlMuwahiddin 2 information is transmitted globally in an instant. The Muslim world can
no longer hide certain truths, he said, about its lack of economic development, education, womens rights,
freedom of expression, rule of law, and regard for our shared humanity.
Tlili claimed that while Islam may have a bad name in todays world, its not all the fault of its enemies.
Islam, for him, is what Muslims make it to be and, thus, the importance of this symposium: how we
interpret the Quran is not simply a matter of piety. It has real implications on how Muslimmajority
societies, whether those of yesterday or today, build states, economies, ethical systems, legal systems,
and relationships with the nonMuslim world. The science of Quranic interpretation has evolved through
the centuries. But, if we admit that it, as any science, relies on intellectual tools and categories, we should
not Tlili said hesitate to apply the modern human and social sciences to its interpretation. In fact, this
is, according to Tlili, the most important challenge that the Muslim world faces today.
Tlili then paused to mourn the deaths of two major thinkers who had planned to attend the symposium: the
first, his former teacher, dear friend, and colleague, Mohamed Arkoun (19282010), who passed away two
months ago, and the second, the other giant of modern Islamic thought, Professor Nasr Abu Zayd (1943
2010), who passed away last spring. Tlili hoped the symposium would pay homage to their lives, their
intellectual struggles, and to the extraordinary importance of the body of rigorous research they left
behind. He also acknowledged two other important absences: the Syrian thinker, Muhammad Shahrur,
author of the seminal book, The Book and the Quran: A Contemporary Reading, who was prevented from
coming for health reasons, and Mohammad Amin Abdullah, the eminent Indonesian scholar of Islam and of
the Quran, who was denied an entry visa to the U.S.
Tlili concluded by stating that as intellectuals, the participants foremost duty was to rigorous and clear
thought. Piety serves its purpose, he said, but critical intellect has a different function one in which the
sacred becomes an object for rigorous and clear examination. With everything that we know in the world
today, must Islam be simply the Islam of piety? Or can it be the Islam to which Abdelmajid Charfi, Mahmoud
Hussein, Amin Abdullah, Muhammad Shahrur, and the late Mohammed Arkoun and Nasr Abu Zayd apply the
tools of critical thought? He submitted that this is the preeminent question facing the symposium and the
Muslim world today.

In Memory of Mohamed Arkoun

Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of
Tunis (Tunisia)
Dr. Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis (Tunisia),
spoke in memory of Mohamed Arkoun as a respected colleague and valued friend. Charfi described his
difficulty in preparing this speech, both because of the close nature of his friendship with Arkoun, and
because of the erudition of Arkouns work.
Charfi knew Arkoun for four decades and they often met in Paris and at academic conferences in Europe and
the Middle East. When Arkoun would visit Tunis, Charfi welcomed him as a houseguest. Drawn together by
intellectual affinity and a shared love of long walks, they enjoyed frank discussions on a range of personal
and professional matters. Charfi learned to recognize the fragility and anxiety Arkoun hid beneath his
intellectual brilliance.
Charfi described how Arkouns background and personal experiences informed his friends academic
perspective. Arkoun acquired French nationality after Algerian independence, when he was dismissed from
his university post in Algeria on the grounds that his teaching was subversive. The benefit of this experience,
Charfi postulated, was that it gave Arkoun the opportunity to combine intimate knowledge of both Islamic
and Western cultures. Despite living in France, Arkoun always identified as Kabil, Algerian, and Maghrebi.
Moreover, his encounters with authorities from the Front de Libration Nationale in Algeria taught him to
remain aloof from political rhetoric. Instead, he adopted an overview of the problems in Maghrebi societies
and sought to analyze their underlying causes. Because Arkoun avoided taking a public position on such
political matters, he was often reproached for lacking compassion. Yet, as Charfi witnessed, Arkoun was
consumed by the topics he studied and believed that his work was capable of effecting change.
Charfi commented on the difficulty of discussing Arkouns work due to its richness and depth. Leaving more
indepth treatment to presenters later in the symposium, Charfi said he would limit his comments to a few
aspects of Arkouns work. He first noted Arkouns brilliant speaking ability in three nonnative languages:
French, English, and Arabic, which he learned relatively late in life (at the age of 17). He then outlined
Arkouns primary contributions to the history of Islamic thinking.
Above all, Charfi said, Arkoun was adept at deconstructing established dogmas and critiquing seemingly
selfevident beliefs. Even if one disagrees with his concepts, or finds them destabilizing, one cannot remain
untouched after reading an Arkoun text, Charfi observed, for Arkouns approach encourages readers to think
critically for themselves.
Arkoun employed ideas from the modern social sciences and also developed his own concepts, many of
which Charfi said have become indispensable for understanding religion in general and the Quran and
Islam in particular. Some of these original concepts have been popularized, such
as demythication,demystication and demytholigization, as well as unthought andunthinkable.3 Other
concepts have met with objection. For example, Arkouns admonitions to transgress and displace certain
theological constructs previously regarded as sacred have been widely resisted. Notably, Arkoun believed
that religious texts must be reinterpreted in a new light to overcome the early official closing of
the mushaf the standardized collection of Quranic verses in a single volume.
Charfi concluded by summarizing the implications of Arkouns approach beyond its importance to Islamic
studies alone. Arkouns assessment of the need to criticize and question everything is relevant, Charfi said,
in a modern world characterized by dehumanization and the creation of docile consumers. Regardless of
whether we agree with Arkouns own ideas, he continued, believers and nonbelievers alike must take
responsibility for developing their own intellectual and spiritual potential. Charfi suggested that this is where
Arkoun has often been misunderstood. Olivier Carr, for example, compared Arkoun to Sayyid Qutb in his
fundamentalist fixation on original texts and in his claims about the performative nature of prophetic

religious discourse.4 Indeed, both Qutb and Arkoun see the Quran as unique in being highly performative
and allencompassing. However, Carr attacked Arkoun for rejecting positive rationalism and questioning
the original text as a product and source of religion.

SESSION I Normative Islam versus Historical Islam: A

Critical Distinction for Our Times and the Modern
Epistemological Tools that Make it Possible
Tlili introduced the session, crediting modern epistemologicaltools with making possible the critical
distinction between normative and historical Islam, a distinction found in the work of both Arkoun and
Charfi. Tlili introduced Robert Lee, Professor ofPolitical Science at Colorado College, as eminently qualified
to present Arkouns work. Lee is immersed in the intellectual world of Islamic civilization, Middle Eastern
societies and Islamic intellectual movements. From this perspective, and as a translator of Arkouns work, he
has much to say about Arkoun.

SESSION I The Ideas of Mohamed Arkoun:

Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science, Colorado College (U.S.)
Lee began by claiming that he was illsuited to speak on Arkouns behalf. As a student of the politics of
the Middle East, he said, he lacked the insight to Arkouns work that philosophers, anthropologists,
semioticians and historians of Islam have. However, he has read much of Arkouns writing, heard him
lecture, translated one of his books, written about the political implications of his work, and enjoyed his
friendship.
Lee defended Arkoun against claims that he was an uncommitted scholar; despite Arkouns postmodernist
terminology, his passion and the volume of his output belied a deeply felt commitment.
Lee explained Arkouns opposition to what he called Islamic Reason, the application of methodologies,
based on Greek logic, which contributed to rigid orthodoxies in Islam. Arkoun decried the monopolization of
religious interpretation by modern governments, the ulama Muslim leaders classically trained in Quranic
interpretation and Islamist movements, all in the service of their respective political projects. Though he
sympathized with reformers, he also criticized them for failing to address the root of the problem: the
repression of innovative thought in the Muslim world. Because of these positions, some perceived Arkoun
to be against Islam itself, and few Muslimmajority countries welcomed him to speak or sell his books.
It is more difficult to understand what Arkoun was for than what he was against, Lee said. Lee believed him
to be an idealist, motivated by faith in the truth of his ideas and in their ability to resurrect a unified Muslim
consciousness, or perhaps even a unified human consciousness.
Arkoun expressed this idea through the term remembrer, which Lee translated as putting back together.
Arkoun hoped his ideas could help make the Muslim consciousness whole again, and inclusive of all
believers. Arkoun extended his inclusiveness to the Peoples of the Bookmeaning Muslims, Jews, and
Christianswho he saw as fundamentally united in belief.

Asking how Arkouns treatment of the Quran fit into his objective of putting back together Islam, Lee
pointed to the critical distinction Arkoun made between the prophetic moment of Quranic revelation, and
the ensuing compilation of the mushaf, or Closed Official Corpus (in Arkouns terminology). Because of the
gap between revelation and text, Arkoun approached the Quranic text as a literary document to be analyzed
with modern interpretive tools, in order to remembrer the truth of the prophetic moment that preceded it.
Lee used two examples of Arkouns exegesis to illustrate his application of theory in practice: the Fatihathe
statement of faith that begins the Quranand sura 18 (The Cave).
Summarizing Arkouns reading of the Fatiha, Lee emphasized his multilayered analysis. Arkoun applied
linguistic, historical, and anthropological analyses to understand the language of the text, its changing
interpretations over time, and the society in which it was revealed. Arkoun concluded that the text holds a
plurality of equally valid meanings and that the truth is found in infinite plurality itself.
Lees second example, The Cave, yielded a different set of observations from Arkoun. Observing that the
long sura does not cohere in theme or narrative, Arkoun problematized traditional readings, such as al
Tabaris, which sought a unified interpretation. Arkoun blamed such forced readings on Islamic Reason,
which sacrificed rich symbolism in favor of logic and rationale.
Based on his own readings of the text, Arkoun concluded that Quranic interpretation and its edifice of
Islamic Reason have historically been related to worldly power struggles. By contextualizing those
interpretations in history, without denying their validity, he sought to liberate the Quran.
Lees concluding remarks drew attention to the intellectual risks Arkoun took by attacking the inherited
tradition of interpretation, as well as contemporary political regimes and movements that appropriate
religion for ideological aims. Opposed to these abuses of Islam, Arkoun urged Muslims to challenge received
knowledge and reopen the realm of ideas that Islamic tradition has rendered unthought and unthinkable,
such as the distinction between the compiled Quran and the original revelation. Arkoun believed that,
through reassembling (remembrer) Muslim tradition by accepting all its past and potential iterations, the
Peoples of the Book and humanity as a whole could be brought together.

SESSION I The Ideas of Muhammad Shahrur (Syria):

Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam, University of Manchester, U.K.
(Germany)
Thanking Lee for an illuminating presentation, Tlili introduced Muhammad Shahrur as a thinker in the same
spirit as Arkoun. Shahrur is the author of The Book and the Quran: A Contemporary Reading, one of the
most widely disseminatedand controversialcontemporary books on interpreting the Quran. Though
the Syrian thinkers work represents a different school, Shahrur, like Arkoun, applies the tools of critical
thought to the Quran and the tradition of interpretation. Tlili explained that Shahrur was unable to
participate in the symposium because of health reasons, and invited Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in
Contemporary Islam at the University of Manchester, to present Shahrurs ideas in his place. A scholar of
Islamic civilization and thought, Christmann published an English translation of Shahrurs writings in
20095.
Christmann opened his presentation with a brief overview of Muhammad Shahrurs biography and
professional background. Shahrur was not trained in traditional Islamic studies or in the modern study of
Islam, but is a retired professor of soil engineering. His laymans Quranic interpretations, which

Christmann characterized as modern, scientific, liberal, and progressive, are therefore from a quite different
perspective than the usual scholars.
Christmann contextualized Shahrurs work in contemporary Islamic discourse by explaining that it responds
to both radical Islamists, who politicize Islam for rightwing ideological aims, and to Leftists and secular
nationalists, who seek to eliminate religion from public life. Shahrurs interpretations of the Quran offer a
third alternative: an Islam that is progressive and liberal and which he believes should be the source of
universal moral values and the foundation for political leadership.
Christmann proceeded to summarize Shahrurs work by distilling it into ten theses, drawing a comparison to
the NinetyFive Thesesof Martin Luther and suggesting that Shahrurs work has the potential to similarly
reform institutionalized Islam. Christmann noted that many of Shahrurs readings of the Quran entail
redefining Islamic terms as universal ethical principals.
Christmann articulated a first thesis that he determined to be the most prioritized of Shahrurs ideas: the
necessity of separating state and religion, while reinvesting public life with Religion. Christmann used
lowercase religion to denote Shahrurs concept of historical and institutional Islam, as distinguished from
Religion, capitalized, which refers to Shahrurs ideal of a universal civic religion. The separation of state and
religion, Christmann clarified, means that state authorities must not manipulate religion for their political
agendas, nor should institutional religion coopt state power in pursuit of theocracy. Shahrur is concerned
that combining state and religion (din wadawla) obstructs religious freedom by privileging one religious
faction over others. Yet he is equally concerned by the prospect of state without religion (dawla bidun din),
which he believes leads to authoritarianism. Instead, the moral values of Religion, writ large, should
reconnect state and society.
The second thesis Christmann enumerated was Shahrurs observation that Historical Islam (religion) has
been politicized and demoralized by the ulama. To achieve Universal Islam (Religion), Shahrur contends, it
must be depoliticized and remoralized. According to Shahrur, the religious classes have interpreted Islamic
beliefs and practices in ways that impose the least resistance to political tyranny and despotism. Christmann
described Shahrurs third thesis as his proposed solution: civil society and civil Religion. Objecting to
Islamist calls for achieving the Islamization of Muslim society by collapsing public and private spheres,
Shahrur emphasizes the importance of a sphere of civil society that can operate alongside private religion
and public politics. This sphere will provide an ethical model that overshadows both state politics and private
religion while allowing dissent and freedom of thought, speech and religion.
According to the fourth thesis Christmann described, in order to achieve this solution, religious reform must
precede political reform. Because Shahrur believes that both politics without religion and politics with the
current form of Islam lead to authoritarianism, religious reform must come first. Shahrur envisions religious
reform as the reshaping of Islam into a civil religion, in which freedom of thought, human rights, democracy
and social justice are valued as religious imperatives.
In his fifth thesis, Christmann clarifies that Shahrur does not view this religious reform as a new
interpretation of Islam, but as the recuperation of essential Quranic principles that have been obscured by
traditional Islam. Shahrur draws a distinction between the Islam passed down by religious scholars and the
Islam found in the text of the Quran. This Universal Islam of the Quran, according to thesis six, does not
include the sunna of the Prophetstories of the Prophets life, apart from the prophecies that became the
Quran. Shahrur sees Islam as a natural religion for all humankind, while the sunna are bound to a particular
time and place that cannot be accepted as normative. Abandoning thesunna and relying only on the Quran,
Shahrur concludes that Islam has only three, not five, pillars: belief in God, belief in the Last Day, and doing
good work.

Christmanns seventh thesis discussed the distinction Shahrur makes between general Religion, which is
global, human and universal, and particular religion, which refers to specific culture and contextbound
institutional religions. According to Shahrur, the latter is against human instinct and therefore unsuitable for
being the religion of public life. It is the former, therefore, that should be politicized and publicized.
Moving from the general to the specific, Christmann illustrated how Shahrurs views on religion are reflected
in his views on religious law, religious duties and jihad. His eighth thesis addressed Shahrurs treatment
of sharia Islamic law which Christmann described as being at the heart of Shahrurs reform project.
Observing that sharia law and hudud penalties are notfixed, Shahrur concludes that sharia law only refers
to theupper and lower limits of human legislation. Therefore, shariacan and should to Shahrurs mind
be implemented everywhere, but should be limited to the requirement that human societies legislate laws
to uphold justice, equality and morality. Specific laws, such as criminal, family and commercial law, should
remain the provenance of parliamentary legislation.
In his ninth thesis, Christmann described Shahrurs reinterpretation of the slogan, AlAmr bi alMaruf wa
alNahy an alMunkar, which is frequently used by Islamists to justify religious policing and their literal
implementation of sharia rules.6By contrast, Shahrur does not see the phrase as pertaining to individual
conduct in matters regarding dress, but as a general imperative to care about the democratic norms and
liberal values of civil religion in society; in short, as an obligation of good civil citizenship. He therefore
places NGOs and human rights groups under this rubric.
Lastly, Christmanns tenth thesis articulated Shahrurs interpretation of jihad as a nonviolent fight against
political tyranny, injustice and the oppression of human rights, as well as the duty to do charitable work for
ones family, neighborhood and society at large. Christmann summed it up as human rights jihad: the
religious obligation of good civil citizenship. He further explained that Shahrur arrived at this view by
reinterpreting not as martyrdom but as the process of giving witness. Jihad fi sabil Allah thus becomes a
struggle for the sake of Gods covenant with humankind, rather than a military fight against kufr
disbelief.

SESSION I Abdelmajid Charf

Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis (Tunisia)
Tlili observed that Christmanns presentation provided a natural transition to Abdelmajid Charfis intervention
in the discourse on Quranic interpretation. Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought,
University of Tunis, Charfi distinguishes between Islam as history and as message. That distinction is made
possible, Tlili continued, by the application of critical tools borrowed from the humanities and social
sciences. Both Arkoun and Shahrur arrive at the same distinction, yet Charfi has dedicated most of his
scholarly work to this particular issue. Moreover, Tlili stressed, Charfi is the head of a school of
thought and has mentored an entire generation of young scholars, equipping them with the tools of modern
critique. Tlili concluded by highlighting Charfis important book, Islam Between Message and History (LIslam
entre le message et lhistoire) , translated into French in 2004 and English in 2009, and encouraging all to
read it. 7
Charfi began by discussing his initial approach to the topic of the symposium. He first tried to list all the
social, ethical andpolitical implications of interpreting the Quran as a foundational text. Yet he
immediately realized this approach was futile because Muslims living under different conditions necessarily
approach the text from diverse perspectives. As an example, Charfi compared a wealthy young Malaysian
man with a poor Nigerian, or a Saudi woman living in tribal conditions with an Iranian who has internalized

the dominant ideology of the theocratic state. Each would clearly arrive at a different, even completely
contradictory, interpretation. The only trait shared among them is the influence of a particular social,
political, and cultural context. Based on this observation, Charfi revised his approach, deciding instead to
focus on the historical and epistemological aspects of interpreting the Quran. With this framework, he
sought to avoid timebound polemics and encompass the entire range of interpretation, from extremism to
mysticism.
Charfi pointed out that, while it may seem natural to acknowledge the external factors affecting
interpretation, in fact this notion is informed by modern linguistics and semiotics. Moreover, he said, it
contradicts traditional assertions about Quranic interpretation that are upheld by the overwhelming majority
of Muslims today. He described his presentation as an attempt to reveal truths often overlooked and clarify
the terms of debate about Quranic interpretation and its legitimacy.
Before delving into these truths, Charfi noted that it is first necessary to understand the role of the Quran
in Islam and the history of Quranic exegesis. To illustrate the importance of the Quran, he contrasted it
with the Bible in Catholicism. In Catholicism, church teachings inform the understanding of the gospels,
whereas, in Islam, the Quranic text is sacred and preeminent. Charfi asked rhetorically: do modern
approaches, such as those that use recently developed critical tools, therefore challenge the sacredness of
the text or its interpretations? In answer, he argued that even traditional interpretation was based on
contemporary culture and historical conditions, contending that modern readers are no different.
Taking a historical view, Charfi said, it is possible to see the twostage process whereby Islam evolved from
a spontaneous, oral, prophetic message into an institutionalized, dogmatic, and ritualized religion. Charfi
said that this process was driven by theulama, whose readings of the Quran were inflected by their
particular social position. Unlike the majority of Muslims, theulama were urban, had a direct relationship to
the ruling power, and were heavily influenced by Greek philosophy. By the 11th or 12th Century, their
Quranic readings, rooted in their specific class interests, were firmly established. This resulted, according to
Charfi, in the formation of Sciences of the Quran the opinions and methods of the ulama that go
unquestioned as orthodoxy.
Charfi opined that the entrenchment of orthodox interpretations abrogated alternate readings. Becoming
aware of the historical processes by which such interpretations evolved allows us to consider those other
possibilities. Charfi outlined three such alternate readings: the Quran as created, the theory of revelation,
and the idea that the Quranic message can stand alone without the hadith (stories of the Prophets life).
According to dominant Muslim belief, the Quran is the uncreated word of God. In an alternate
interpretation, Charfi proposed the idea that the Quran is created, explaining that this view would
acknowledge the texts historical as well as divine dimensions. Rather than assuming the Quran exists
outside of history, such a reading would allow Quranic moral injunctions to be understood in light of the
particular historical context in which they were revealed.
The second idea, which Charfi described as having been rejected by orthodox belief, pertains to the theory
of revelation. The Prophet is traditionally understood to have been a passive recipient of Gabriels message.
An alternative, Charfi suggested, would be to understand his role as active, implying a stage of mediation
between the direct word of God and the Quran. In another formulation, Charfi added, we might describe
the Prophets role as expressing the divine message in human language.
Finally, Charfi described the possibility that the Quranic message is sufficient without the hadith of the
Prophet. Though today this idea is widely considered heretical, it had proponents in earlyIslamic history.
Charfi claimed that this idea was suppressed because the Quran did not provide an answer to every
problem encountered in Muslim societies. Social institutions were formed to legislate for societies, and
the hadith provided necessary religious legitimacy.

Charfi noted that these three positions can be considered from a perspective of modern rationality without
being seen as an attack on the sacred nature of the Quran. Yet they are often suppressed for breaking with
orthodox belief. Thus, in Charfis view, they are fertile avenues of inquiry and consistent with the spirit of the
text.
Charfi reasoned that the Quran should no longer be considered a text of law, but a text of faith. Indeed,
despite traditional assertions to the contrary, Quranic commandments are primarily moral in nature and not
legal. Legal commandments in the Quran, Charfi continued, responded to concrete problems in the
contemporary social order. For example, when the Quran portrays the law of retaliation as necessary, it
must be understood in a context in which the state did not have a monopoly on violence. Such
commandments, Charfi claimed, are therefore not ahistorical or normative, and Muslims should remain free
to legislate on the basis of general Quranic values rather than taking literally the specific cases depicted in
the text.
In another example, Charfi pointed to the idea of shura, or consultation, which Islamists now consider a
central Quranic concept. Historically, because there was a separation between the political and religious
spheres, traditional exegetes did not treat shura as an imperative in governance. Charfi again pointed out
that modern readings find in the text what traditional readings did not.
Charfi concluded by summarizing his four main points: first, that the Quran does not contain a single
meaning, but addresses readers in all times and places with multiple meanings that renew themselves on
the basis of changing historical conditions. Therefore, as Charfi himself demonstrated, readers should seek a
hermeneutic interpretation rather than follow a single exegesis. Second, in order to free Quranic
interpretation from the dogmatic straitjacket of orthodoxy, it is necessary to acknowledge the limits imposed
on traditional exegesis by the Sciences of the Quran. Third, the relationship between exegesis and
jurisprudence should be reversed. Instead of subjecting the Quran to theologicallybased interpretations, as
has traditionally been done, the text should be the basis for new theological constructs. Finally, the linear
method of exegesisreading the Quran from beginning to endis neither rational nor necessary. suras
were not compiled in order of revelation, but according to their length. Charfi elaborated on this point by
dismissing all idealogical models of interpretation, including that of Shahrur. Instead, he admonished
Muslims to find their own relationship with the Quran, a relationship that takes into account the interactions
between sacred text, history, and truth. It is futile, he argued, to propose ideas that are only valid to
Muslims today, as opposed to Muslims of the future, or, for that matter, the past. Muslims must struggle
individually and collectively to find a peaceful relationship with the text. The implications will differ from
traditional interpretations, which do not account for the logic of the Qurans organization and its spiritual
value.

SESSION I Discussant: Stefan Wild

Professor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn
(Germany)
Tlili invited the sessions discussant, Stefan Wild, a major Arabist and scholar of Islamic thought in Germany,
to comment on the diverse material presented by Lee, Christmann, and Charfi. Wild declined to summarize
what he described as an already condensed series of papers on complex ideas. He instead limited his
remarks to a few observations designed to facilitate discussion on the panel and with the audience.
Referring to the letter of invitation, which described the symposium as an intraMuslim debate, Wild
remarked that he was glad that criterion had not been rigidly enforced, therefore allowing his participation.

Yet he acknowledged the importance of the sentiment behind it. However, he opined, dialogue
andresearch are different things. While dialogue is important, it may have nothing to do with academic
research and may even be in conflict with it.
Turning to the subject of Arkoun, Wild discussed a point of difference he had with the thinker. Wild explained
his belief that Muslim scholars should first develop ideas of how to apply exegesis to real world matters
such as gender issues and shariabefore nonMuslims are invited to join the conversation. Arkoun disagreed,
arguing that Muslim universities should start by incorporating nonMuslim ideas into their curricula. He
advocated fervently for a joint effort by scholars from the West and theMuslim world. Wild justified his own
position by pointing to the crisis of organized religion in Europe and expressing sympathy with Muslim
scholars who are reluctant to follow the path of Western intellectual history.
Wild then introduced the ideas of the late the Egyptian Quranic scholar, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who Wild
said would have loved to participate in the symposium. A friend and early follower of Abu Zayds, Wild
discussed Abu Zayds importance in the history of Islamic exegesis and described the hardships Abu Zayd
endured for his work, including being accused of heresy, having his marriage forcibly dissolved, and fleeing
to exile. Wild described Abu Zayds approach to Quranic interpretation as a theory of
communication based on sender (God), recipient (Prophet), and coded message (Quran).
Abu Zayd was famous for his attempt to create a humanistic hermeneutics of the Quran, preferring to
examine not what a verse literally says but the direction in which it points. For example, where the text says
women inherit half what men do, Abu Zayd saw a direction towards greater freedom and equality of
genders, when one keeps in mind the rights women lacked at the time the verse was revealed. Wild noted
that some of Abu Zayds books were first published in German, suggesting they could not have been
published in Egypt. Yet they were also published in Syria. Wild concluded by posing a question to the
audience and panelists: why did the liberal Quranic interpretations of Abu Zayd find publication in an
oppressive state like Syria?

SESSION I Floor Discussion

Tlili opened the discussion to the audience. An Arabic andIslamic Studies professor from The New School
(a university inNew York City) observed that a common theme running through the presentations was
frustration at how the weight of tradition defines Muslim learning and practice. She asked whether there is
evidence of premodern interventions in the hegemony of exegetical literature and suggested that such an
avenue of inquiry might be more fruitful if it looked to nonArabic language heritages.
Charfi answered, explaining that scholarly work has focused on the circumstances of the revelation because
thats where the greatest amount of historical material is available for study. In scholarship, he said, it used
to be believed that one must understand the circumstances surrounding the revelation in order to
understand the Quranic text. Now, on the basis of many studies, it is clear that the narratives describing
those circumstances were developed by exegetes decades and centuries after the fact. Referring back to
Wilds comments, Charfi stated that he agreed with Arkoun that nonMuslim scholars should participate in
these inquiries, for their researchand perspective can offer a more balanced understanding than research
by Muslims alone.
An audience member asked the panelists to discuss the extent to which new Quranic interpretations had
made an impact on the larger Muslim world, or what impact they might potentially have on social and
political outcomes in Muslim societies.

The question drew responses from each panelist, beginning with Christmann, who said it was a very difficult
question but one often asked about academic work. He contended that it is not possible to measure the
effect of words in practical and social terms. The only notable measure of Shahrurs influence, according to
Christmann, is in the number of his followers, which Christmann said was not large enough to constitute a
social movement in the Middle East. Though interest is growing, Shahrurs readership, he explained, is
largely limited to intellectuals and university graduates, in particular natural scientists and engineers. In
sum, in Christmanns view, it is not possible to see the implications of scholarship on policies.
Wild spoke up to say he was not as pessimistic as Christmann. He pointed out that the strong censorship in
many Arabic countries is an indication that thinkers like Abu Zayd and Shahrur are taken seriously. Wild
mentioned seeing Abu Zayds book in a Jedda bookstore, anecdotal proof that there is an audience for such
ideas. He cautioned that theological faculties in the Arabic world are not a good indicator of new trends in
thought. Explaining that such institutions do not even recognize 19th Century reformists, Wild opined that
change is more likely to come from academic centers outside the Arab world.
Lee had earlier described Arkoun as being pessimistic about his own influence. Lee qualified that description
by saying he believed Arkoun had underestimated himself. Lee added that if Arkouns followers in the Muslim
world were small in number, it could be attributed to the fact that he wrote in French and his texts were so
dense, so his ideas were not accessible to the general public. Lee suggested that Charfi and others would be
more likely to have an effect on mainstream thought.
Charfi cautioned that we must distinguish between the effects of scholarly efforts in different Muslim
countries. He offered Tunisia as an example where reformist approaches are taught in universities and
people are receptive to modern approaches and theories; in Yemen, on the other hand, they are less
developed. The greatest impediment to reform comes from Wahhabism, a movement centered in Saudi
Arabia, whose adherents, according to Charfi, use their resources to spread hostility to modernist ideas.
Their influence is especially significant at the popular level, he said.
The next questioner wondered if the lively debate about the historicity of the Old and New Testaments, seen
in Christian and Jewish circles since the 19th Century, had any parallel in Muslim discourse.
Lee answered, referencing Charfis book Islam Between Message and History, which he described as an
argument for differentiating Islam from the message of the religion, a position similar to Arkouns. However,
Lee conceded, such an approach is not widely embraced in the Muslim world.
The audience member spoke again to clarify his original question. He described how, in recent Jewish and
Christian discourses, even people of faith acknowledge evolution and eclecticism in the gospels. There is
evidence of the same processes at work in thesuras, but have Muslims been similarly attuned to this
historicity of the Quranic text?
Christmann answered that such work is being done in Europe, particularly in Berlin (including Corpus
Coranicum , a research project of the BerlinBrandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities under the
directorship of Angelika Neuwirth), precisely because it is not yet embraced in the Muslim world. There are
Muslim scholars who approach the Quran using historical criticism, such as Sayyid Muhammad Al Qimni,
and others. However, they do not use such methods to the same extent as applied to the Bible by Western
thinkers in the 19th Century. The main difference, according to Christmann, is that the Muslim thinkers still
approach the reading of the text as, in Charfis words, a reading of faith. A truly historical critical reading
would see the Quran as an expression of human tradition rather than divine intervention, but among
Muslim believers, Gods power is not separated from that of the historical/human.
Wild suggested that the Wahhabi influence is partly responsible for the suppression of historical criticism.
Although exegesis from the 1st through 3rd Centuries incorporated historicity, as in their treatment of

abrogated verses, the tradition was not developed further. Today, Wild said, petroIslam controls much of
the intellectual production of Muslim theological centers, not only in Saudi Arabia but in places like Bosnia
and the former Soviet Union.
Charfi had a more positive outlook on the issue of historicity, pointing out that many studies have already
been made on the issue. Yet he cautioned against applying the Biblical approach of historical criticism to the
Quran without accounting for the different nature of the Islamic text.
A City University of New York (CUNY) professor in the audience turned the conversation toward literary
analysis, asking whether the Qurans treatment as a literary text was considered a threat to its status as a
sacred religious text.
Lee responded by referencing Arkoun. Arkoun, he said, believed that the Quran should be treated as a
literary text. The literary approach is not denigrating because it preserves the sanctity of the oral revelation
as distinct from its written iteration. In this view, the text is an avenue by which to better understand the
original prophetic moment. However, there are many who disagree; they see the Quranic text as sanctified,
and therefore object to it being treated like the Bible or other literary texts.
Charfi agreed, describing the Quran as a text of human language that must be approached through human
language. He again referenced historical exegesis, explaining that Muslims throughout history have analyzed
the grammatical, linguistic, and poetic aspects of the Quran. Moreover, Charfi said, not only would it would
be impossible not to approach it as a literary text, but reading it through that lens has not prevented
Muslims from appreciating other aspects of the text. The literary aspect is only one level of analysis and
does not preclude existential, moral, ethical, anthropological and theological dimensions. As a point of
entrance into the text, linguistic analysis is less contentious than deeper levels of analysis, where exegetes
are more likely to disagree and project their own ambitions, concerns, and traditions onto the text.
The next question was posed to Christmann concerning Shahrurs dismissal of the sunna (the sixth thesis in
Christmanns summary); how did Shahrur reconcile the fact that God sent a book and a messenger? If the
Prophets practices were his interpretation of how to live Gods message, how do we notentangle
the sunna in our own interpretations of the Quran?
Christmann explained that Shahrurs treatment of the Quranic text divides it into two categories: one
universally applicable, absolute and, eternal (prophethood), and the other temporal, historical, and relative
(messengerhood). In his dissection of Islamic concepts, Shahrur categorizes each word as belonging to one
of the two categories, then distinguishes the eternally divine from the historically contingent. For example,
Christmann explained, Shahrur cannot reconcile the idea of Mohammed being human and divine, for if
divine, he would be a god (which constitutes shirk ). Therefore, Shahrur concludes that as a human,
Mohammed and everything related to him is contingent, historical, and temporal. Shahrur then addresses
each verse in turn, showing what is eternally divine and what is historically contingent, and concludes that
obedience to God is different from obedience to the Prophet.
A woman in the audience asked if thinkers like Shahrur and Abu Zayd could be convinced to appeal to a
larger, less elite audience in order to instigate grassroots movements for reform. She argued that such an
effort would defend against claims that the reform movement is driven by the West.
She also commented that, as a secular Muslim, she objected to Shahrurs claim that Islam has only three
Pillars of the Faith rather than five. Such arguments, she opined, were a manipulation of language and can
be blamed for alienating mainstream Muslims and marginalizing reformist ideas. She asked for Christmanns
opinion on this problem.

Responding to the first comment, Christmann replied that Shahrur is aware of such critiques and has been
asked by his own friends and followers to clarify his arguments by simplifying them and using illustrative
examples. However, he added, Shahrur already believes that his language is broadly accessible, for as a
natural scientist he does not speak in the language of philosophers and the ulama. As for the accusation that
Shahrur manipulates language, Christmann said it was such a frequent charge that it constituted a clich.
In response to the issue of the Pillars of Islam, Christmann said Shahrur would ask for a Quranic verse that
specifically mentions five. The woman retorted, believers are those who believe xyz, referring indirectly to
the doctrinal rational for the Five Pillars profession of faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage.
Christmann explained that those are rather tenets of aqida, while the explicit mentioning of Islam as based
on Five Pillars is only to be found in the hadith (Jibril), not in the Quran. He said that the Quranic verses do
refer to only three items of Islam, which Shahrur sees as the Pillars; he considers the sum of five to be an
imposed number not intrinsic to the text but attributed to it by theulama (through the hadith). Christmann
described the accusation of textual manipulation as a killer argument, meaning it can be used against any
interpreter of the Quran who subjectively chooses between several opinions on a given verse. Christmann
asserted that the accusation of Shahrurs linguistic manipulation is weak and without merit.
Christmann then returned to the topic of literary exegesis, reiterating Charfis point that it has a long history
in Islam and a designated technical term in Arabic (altafsir aladabi). Ironically, the first person who
revitalized this classical tradition in the 20th Century was the Islamist Sayyid Qutb, in the 1930s and 40s.
After Qutb began using a purely literary perspective, other schools followed.
An audience member interjected asking how Shahrur can be considered an authentic Muslim voice if the
Quran itself comes from God in its entirety? How can aspects of the text be distinguished as historical or
literary versus divine?
Christmann responded that the question encompassed two issues: origin and interpretation. Within the
Muslim world, the Quran is always considered the divine word of God, Christmann agreed, even if the text
also contains things that are historically contingent and not universally applicable. But this belief does not
preclude applying various interpretive methodologies to the text; divinity is irrelevant to the literary
approach.
Charfi illustrated the discussion about linguistic analysis with an example. Observing that many suras
narrate the speech of human personages, he contended that those sentences should not be read literally as
the divine word of God, since they are being reported from a nondivine source.
Charfi also addressed the earlier comment about applying Western methodologies to the Quran. He urged
that we must stop defining modern civilization as exclusively Western. While many modern ideas may have
Western origins, what is more important is the universality of values such as freedom, equality, justice, and
democracy. Charfi criticized the fear of Western influences, defending the universality and applicability of
modern criteria to all languages and texts. He tempered his position by agreeing that Muslims should take a
critical position visvis Western elements, though not because of apparent Western hypocrisy in
implementing their own values.
Most importantly, Charfi said, it is necessary to be wary of the antiintellectualism found in much Islamic
thinking, which adheres to tradition, consensus, and what is considered invariable in Islam. It is the right
and obligation of each believer to examine ideas that are considered selfevident, and to free himself or
herself from the intellectual constraints of traditional thought.

Charfi concluded his comments, and the first panel, by reiterating the connection between the mutually
reinforcing spheres of traditional Islam and nondemocratic Muslim regimes, which repress critical
approaches that threaten their claims to religious legitimacy.

SESSION II INTERPRETING THE QURAN, RESPONDING

TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE MODERN WORLD: Muslim
Societies at a Crossroads
Tlili described the focus of the second session as applied interpretation; an occasion to translate the ideas
discussed in Session One to real world scenarios. Before introducing thespeakers, he invited discussant
Dale Eickelman to speak about an unanticipated absence on the panel.
Eickelman explained that the empty seat on the stage was intended for Mohammad Amin Abdullah, the
rector of Indonesias Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. The day before the symposium,
organizers learned that, despite several appeals, U.S. Homeland Security had denied Abdullah a visa.
Eickelman had hoped that, after Secretary of State Hillary Clintons recent apology for refusing entry to Tariq
Ramadan, fewer mistakes would be made in the screening of distinguished scholars hoping to visit the U.S.
He reminded the audience that the objection to Ramadan was based on a small donation he had made to an
organization years before it was labeled a supporter of terrorism.
Eickelman spoke scathingly about the failure of authorities to recognize Abdullahs credentials, which include
a higher degree from Canada. Abdullah also succeeded in moving oversight of hisIslamic university from
the Ministry of Religious Affairs to theMinistry of Education based on his belief that Islamic education
should be mainstreamed. Eickelman recounted his recent visit to the university, where he saw visible efforts
to disseminate broader knowledge about Islam, including materials censored in many other Muslim
countries. Eickelman described the goal of Abdullahs lifes work as mainstreaming Islam, and concluded
with an apology to the audience that Abdullah was unable to attend the symposium.

SESSION II Mohammad Amin Abdullah

Professor of Islamic Studies, Universitas Islam Negari Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (Indonesia)
In Abdullahs absence, his speech was presented by a staffmember of the NYU Center for Dialogues.
Abdullahs comments focused on the recent expansion of Islamic studies to include not only historical and
doctrinal aspects, but also Islam as a culture, civilization, community, and political, economic, and
globalizing force. Nevertheless, he acknowledged, many Islamic studies departments remain rooted in
uncritical tradition, often leading to conflict among Muslims of different denominations and beliefs.
So how does the field of Islamic studies, Abdullah asked, compete with other scientific disciplines in
addressing contemporary issues in areas such as human rights, gender equity,international relations, and
the environment? To Abdullahs mind, this is where the tools of modern epistemology find their relevance.
He cited the works of Richard C. Martin (an outsider to Islam) and of Mohammed Arkoun (an insider) as
good examples. Richard C. Martins book, Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies,8 presents Islam as a
historical entity subject to scientific study beyond sacred theological interpretation. Abdullah cited the work
of Khaled M. Abou ElFadl 9 and Jasser Auda 10 as representing a new generation of interdisciplinary

approaches to Islamic studies that still rigorously maintain the discipline of Islamic Religious Knowledge, or
Ulum alDiin.
Abdullahs speech also covered the development of Islamic studies in the context of Indonesia, where inter
disciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches have been put into practice since the establishment of Islamic
State Universities in 2002. At the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, a new scientific
paradigm called integratedinterconnected science 11recognizes that a scholar must analyze his field by
integrating other disciplines and recognizing their interconnectivity.
Abdullahs remarks then delved deeper into the ontology of contemporary Islamic studies, and the
importance of differentiating between Islamic Studies (Dirasat Islamiyyah), Islamic Thought (alFikr al
Islamy), and Islamic Religious Knowledge ( Ulum alDiin ). He emphasized that Islamic Thought or alFikr
alIslamy has a scientific and systematic structure, and a strong and comprehensive body of
knowledge on Islam, while Ulum alDiin often emphasizes certain parts rather than the full body of
knowledge. He also discussed how certain religious groups, sects, or organizations may intentionally or
unintentionally skew this knowledge set to suit their own purposes and perspectives. In his opinion, the
presence of alFikr alIslamy, which is more historical, systematical, comprehensive, nonsectarian, non
provincial, and nonparochial, helps students complete their knowledge of Ulum alDiin .
Pointing to the proliferation of Islamic scientific journals, symposiums, seminars, encyclopedia, and new
books published by both insiders and outsiders, Abdullah concluded that the Islamic academic world keeps
growing and follows the development of research methods in general. He remarked that contemporary
Islamic studies, or Dirasat Islamiyyah, always uses and collaborates with methods of thought and research
in social sciences and contemporary humanities to reveal Islamic religiosity in daily life, not only limited in
circle of foundational texts. These new approaches have surprised and sometimes offended students
of Ulum alDiin who are still implementing old scientific paradigms and perspectives. Some Islamic studies
approaches have been criticized as secular, liberal, apostate, and the like. 12
Looking to the future, Abdullah described the main project of the contemporary Islamic Studies as
eliminating misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between Islamic Studies (Dirasat Islamiyyah), Islamic
Thought (alFikr alIslamy), and Islamic Religious Knowledge ( Ulum alDiin ). Their only true differences,
he believes, are in methods (process and procedure), horizon of observation and theoretical framework
(approaches), and sources of data. Abdullah called for the present generation of students, scholars, and
other stakeholders to unite these three clusters.
Tlili then introduced Mahmoud Hussein as two men with a shared mind. Mahmoud Hussein is the nom de
plume of Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi, political scientists who have coauthored a number of books and
articles. Their most recent book, not yet translated into English, raises the implications of interpretation for
the social, political, cultural, and ethical issues faced by Muslim communities today. Tlili added that their
work also carries implications for the relationships between Muslim and nonMuslim communities around
the world, on issues ranging from the status of women to freedom of expression. Adel Rifaat gave the
presentation on behalf of the pair.

SESSION II Mahmoud Hussein

(Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi), Authors (Egypt/France)
Over the course of Islams history, Rifaat began, religious conformity has too often stifled intellectual
curiosity. Unfortunately, in world opinion it is widely assumed that this is an intrinsic quality of Islam. Yet
the current state dates only to the last 30 years and followed a period of great intellectual and political
progress in the Muslim world. During this Muslim Renaissance, thinkers were freed from the literalist
interpretations that had bound them for years. It paved the way for the national liberation movements that

characterized the first half of the 20th Century in the Muslim world, during which the regions emergent
middle classes adopted a political discourse of secular rationalism. Yet after a period of economic and social
gains, the progressive momentum gave way to corruption and unequal development. From the 1980s, the
tide turned and the religious orthodoxy that had waned during years of secularization took hold once again.
Rifaat assessed the current situation thus: in this new century, Muslims are inextricably drawn into the
orbit of globalization where their only hope for success is to adapt by regaining intellectual freedom and
mastering the tools of criticism and innovation. However, fundamentalist thought, which counteracts those
needs, is again dominant. In the face of this dilemma, Rifaat stressed the importance of recent reformist
thought, which furnishes the tools necessary to address the modern world.
Rifaat honored the recently deceased thinkers Arkoun and Abu Zayd, and welcomed symposium panelist
Charfi as a preeminent representative of their school of thought. He praised their representation of Islam
as both a divine message and a human story, thereby lighting a path for believers to combine faith in God
with knowledge of the world.
Such thinking, Rifaat said, is considered by dogmatists to be an affront to the sacred nature of revelation
because it connects the divine with temporal events. Dogmatists react violently to the idea that a text of
revelation was influenced by its historical context. Fundamentalists refuse to debate the reformers regarding
these objections, instead condemning the reformers interpretive methodologies as illegitimate.
Rifaat described Mahmoud Husseins recent work as a powerful defense of reformist thought against such
attacks, since it exposes the historicity of the Quran without relying on illegitimate, profane disciplines.
Their critique uses the testimony of the Companions of the Prophet a source unassailable by traditional
standards of exegesis. By relating a Quranic verse to the reported circumstances of its revelation, they
prove that the historicity of revelation is not imposed from the outside, but is contained within the Quran
and is the very will of God.
Rifaat expanded on this conclusion by elaborating three related findings. First, the Quran distinguishes God
from his Word; while God transcends time, his Word is timebound and linked to the context in which it was
revealed. Second, the Word of God is not presented in monologue, but through exchanges betweenheaven
and earth. God dialogues in real time, through the Prophet, with the first community of Muslims. Third, God
does not weigh each of his revelations equally but has truths of different orders: absolute and relative,
perpetual and circumstantial.
In light of these conclusions, Rifaat asked rhetorically how literalist dogma was able to impose itself despite
counterfactual evidence in the Quran? In answer, Rifaat described the process of the Qurans revelation,
which took place intermittently over the course of 22 years, in changing circumstances, and touched on a
diverse range of topics. The Prophet and Companions memorized these revelations through recitation. Only
after the Prophets death was the Quran systematically committed to writing. Under the Caliph Uthmann,
verses were standardized and grouped in a single volume, the mushaf. Their grouping was ordered not by
chronology of revelation but by length of verse, creating problems for the texts intelligibility. Yet the
literalist approach treats the order of verses as if decreed by God, and the text is traditionally studied in
strictly that order, verse by verse.
Rifaat described this approach as severing any causal link between verse and the circumstances of
revelation. In the absence of such connections, many verses are difficult or impossible to decipher. The
difficulty of finding meaning is a feature in the earliest Quranic commentaries and in all schools of
interpretation. From the beginning, it was clear that the context of revelation held the key to understanding,
and efforts were made to reconstruct those circumstances by gathering the testimony of the Companions.
This material, called alasbab nuzul, is used by all exegetes and actually constitutes its own branch of
exegesis.

Given this tradition, Rifaat asked, how do literalists justify their reliance on temporal events while rejecting a
connection between the Word of God and human time? In fact, Rifaat argued, theyfailed to explain the
contradiction and merely issued decrees justifying their approach. Thus their work is premised on an a priori
belief that the Word of God transcends time, though they are unable to explain the logic of the argument.
Rifaat dismissed this position as outmoded. If one reads the Quran using those same external sources, it is
possible to use the testimony of the Companions to rationally rediscover the connection between text and
context. The verses become morethan phrases to be recited in order: they are moments of revelation
connected by temporal continuity.
Rifaat acknowledged that the chronicles of companion testimony contain contradictory accounts, and are of
debatable veracity. Rifaat argued that their analysis, then, is a task for historians rather than religious
scholars, who accept the authoritativeness of all hadith without question. Rifaat explained that they are
nevertheless significant not because they are necessarily accurate, but because they constitute a critical
mass of evidence regarding the historicity of the revelation. Most importantly, literalists cannot object to
their use.
Rifaats examples showed that the Quran has a clear time dimension in which moments are relational; some
are more important than others; and a subsequent event may override a precedent. God is both always
right, and yet says contradictory things. Rifaat resolved this seeming dilemma by emphasizing the historicity
of Gods declarations. Gods interventions exist in time, making truths relative and contingent on particular
but changing circumstances. Therefore, Quranic verses cannot be read as though they all have the same
weight, and are absolute and eternal, for God made them situational. Lessons and inspiration can always be
found in verses, but they are not mandatory lessons for all times and places. Jettisoning the literalist
assumptions about the Quran frees believers to read it not as a set of commandments and prohibitions, but
as a guide to help find Gods way on the path of life.

SESSION II Discussant: Dale Eickelman

Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations,Dartmouth College (U.S.)
The discussant Dale Eickelman thanked Tlili again for organizing the symposium despite the setbacks cause
by visa problems, deaths, and other challenges.
Eickelman reflected on both sessions and drew out the common threads running through all of the
presentations. He said each of the speakers combined thinking with practice, which is a courageous act in
much of the Muslim world. Even if their work is not fully accepted in public, it is referred to in private
discussions. The fear of public opinion on these issues is a characteristic of the current political moment, and
can change over time.
The discussant observed that another theme common to the presentations was the difficulty of defining what
it means to be a Muslim, for there is no agreement on the question among Muslims. Although the text of the
Quran is stable, its interpretation is not. As one delves deeper, Eickelman added, even the text becomes
unstable. For example, when early fragments of the Quran were found in Yemen, containing aberrations
from the standard text, they were destroyed at the behest of conservative Islamic factions.
Eickelman compared Arkouns embrace of the multiplicity of meaning to Shahrurs. Both are resolutely
modernist although in different ways. Shahrur argues that since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, we live
in a postprophetic world. Since prophecy is at an end, humankind must rely on reason to understand

revelation. In their separate ways, both thinkers, together with the late Nasr Abu Zayd, illustrate that the
Quran is a defiantly open text that cannot be closed by anyone. One way of thinking about the debate over
what it means to be Muslim is to invoke Oxford philosopher Walter Gallies notion of essentially contested
concepts. 13
Eickelman commented that the stated intent of the symposium was to foster a dialogue among Muslims,
with nonMuslims serving as discussants. This was also the model that Wild advocated in his comments
during the first session. Yet, without identifying names, a reader of the symposiums transcript would be
unable to distinguish Muslim from nonMuslim participants. All share a passionate rapport with the text. As
Charfi indicated, a passionate rapport is necessary.
Eickelman then commented on efforts to censor Shahrurs first book when it was published in 1990. State
authorities refused to censor him, responding to Shahrurs attackers by suggesting that they simply publish
their criticisms. Eickelman also recalled the experiences of El Nadi and Rifaat, who served prison time during
their leftist student days. Their presentation today made a passionate rereading of their texts and approach
to Quranic interpretation accessible to a wider audience.
Eickelman emphasized the importance of Amin Abdullahs proposition for curricular reform in Indonesia. His
presentation, the discussant said, like the others, reminded us how ideas and practices are inscribed in the
times in which they occur, and of the limits of speech in many places in the Middle East.
Finally, Eickelman suggested the importance of what is not said in public. The Arabian Peninsula, for
example, has a number of think tanks, but the approach to critical studies of religion is morerestrained.
While part of the Arabian Peninsula inspires forward thinking, many Gulf leaders are wary of publicly
attaching their names to projects involving religious issues and prefer to donate privately. Westerners must
pay closer attention to grey areas and layers of meaning. For instance, if explicit feminist statements are
ineffectual in the Middle East, there is possibility in more subtle approaches that may not be initially noticed
by outsiders less attuned to the realities and practices of contemporary censorship. Thus in the new Islamic
Studies (Dirasat Islamiyya) curriculum used in the primary and secondary schools of the United
ArabEmirates, textbook images depict women and men as equals, at least up to the age of eight, without
heavyhanded explanations of how such images differ from predecessor textbooks in which representations
of young girls were absent. There is a strong tradition of saying things indirectly in the Arab world and
elsewhere in the Middle East, and outsiders would benefit from comprehending such local social norms.
To begin the floor discussion, Eickelman reviewed his main points, beginning with the idea that Quranic
interpretation is not an arcane topic but one that engages practical reason and often occupies the center
stage of public debate. It has implications for how believers think about their faith and its role in society.
Because of the different audiences for interpretation, we must take an ethnographic approach and be
sensitive to the grey areas, understanding that even if ideas are not publicly embraced, they may still
resonate in private.

SESSION II Floor Discussion

The floor discussion opened with a conversation among the panelists, who returned to the issue of who is
entitled to carry on this debate about Islam and whether their ideas are marked by their identity as Muslims
or nonMuslims. Wild responded to the opinion expressed earlier that the commentary by Muslim and non
Muslim panelists was indistinguishable. He referred to Abu Zayds declaration that he would not longer speak
of God per se but instead about the divine. Abu Zayd wrote that he wanted to be inclusive of readers who
are uncomfortable personalizing divinity. Yet, Wild contended, this notion cannot be translated into Arabic,

both linguistically and culturally. Muslim readers would not accept the idea and as a result, he predicted, the
book would remain untranslated.
There was a brief discussion of what the Arabic translationfor the divine in this context would be,
whether alilahi or almuqaddas, until Charfi said the important thing was not how the concept is translated
but how it is explained. Frequently in translation, words do not correspond exactly, but a writer is free to
develop his own critical terminology by explaining his use of a word. The importance is not the translation
but the context.
Tlili spoke about the importance of the social and political credibility that come from having an intraMuslim
debate. In the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war, the discussion about what being a Muslim means and how to
reconcile Islam with democracy is problematic in the Muslim world; the imposition of these ideas from
without has failed materially and poisoned Muslims understanding of themselves and their relationship to
the nonMuslim world. For this reason, debates on issues fundamental to the faith and to Muslim identity
must be nurtured from the inside to have social and political value and a chance of influencing the Muslim
community. Hence the invitation to this symposium was intended to draw voices from the Muslim world and
nurture this debate, but also to offer an opportunity for exchanging ideas with colleagues from the West,
who share epistemological tools.
The next question drew a distinction between theory and practice and the questioner opined that,
although the ideas discussed on the panels have practical implications, they were insufficiently illustrated.
Muslims implement practical interpretations of religion on a daily basis, she said, and there are vibrant
interpretations in the area of gender equity, which was not reflected in todays presentations. She said it was
an especially important area for discussion because of Western criticism. She suggested that it would be
fruitful to ask how practice gets theorized, rather than vice versa.
El Nadi disagreed that we should discuss the details and applicability of the Quran, for people find in religion
whatever they are seeking. He advocated instead examining the relationship between the Prophet/the
divine/God and the Companions. By asking how they treated the verses, we can derive a model for practice.
The Companions did not accept the revelation as a fait accompli, but discussed it and requested changes,
and God complied. If the Companions had freedom and authority, why must believers today see the text as
unchangeable?
Rifaat expanded on El Nadis comments, observing that practice has not remained unchanged over the
centuries, especially in the area of gender relations. As an example, he pointed out that todays women are
wearing the veil in countries where 50 years ago, it did not exist. So, when talking about practice, Rifaat
said, we have to be aware that practice is constantly changing, especially in the last century. A change in
practice can be justified through Quranic interpretation, and in different cultural contexts, different practices
will be justified by the text.
Rifaat continued, commenting on how reformers treat the text. Despite differences of opinion among
reformers, they are united in an effort to think differently about the relationship between the word of God
and the reality in which that word resonates with human beings. Today, reformers confront a restriction on
critical thought in the Muslim world, with anyone who questions the status of the Quran as the word of God
being shut out of the conversation. He and El Nadi therefore take as their starting point that the Quran is
the word of God, yet question the implications of this assumption. According to literalist thinking, since God
is eternal and makes no mistakes, then His word is inalienable and applicable in every time and place. Yet
this line of thought presupposes that God and his words are one and the same. Rifaat and El Nadis work
argues that the word of God is not the essence of God, but is timebound. This approach gives Muslim
believers the freedom to take responsibility of their own reading of the Quran, and to live as citizens of a
pluralist world without renouncing their faith.

Eickelman agreed that gender is a central issue, but cautioned that it is also frequently a conversation
stopper in the West, where stereotypes of women in Islam are entrenched. However, the reality of gender
relations is far more complex, he said. Interesting debates are taking place in the Arabian Peninsula about
the role of women. In the Saudi press last year, the argument was made that the separation of the sexes
was bida forbidden citing hadiths that indicate it was not original to early Islam. Such conversations are
made possible by the accessibility of the hadiths on the Internet. According to Ziba Mir Hosseini, women in
Iran learn to imitate mens voices to be taken seriously in magazines. In Kuwait, where classrooms have
been integrated since the 1960s, people argue against separation by saying that womens higher academic
performance raises the level of education for men as well. On the Internet, women can enter the public
sphere without being marked by gender.
Lee, a panelist from the first session, objected to Rifaats claim that the current climate of intellectual
repression dates back only 30 years. Lee cited Arkoun, who commented on the problem as early as the
1960s and believed that the solidification of Islamic interpretation began long before. Lee argued that Islam
had not disappeared under secular movements, mentioning by way of example that the Muslim Brotherhood
was founded in 1928 and was a factor in Egyptian society even under Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypts President
from 1956 to 1970). Moreover, he said, many Middle Eastern states attained independence through religious
projects. Arkoun himself was restricted from speaking in Algeria, where seminars were run as indoctrination
sessions on behalf of the state. Lee concluded that the problem is of longstanding duration and cannot be
attributed to recent Islamist movement or policies of the Western powers in the Middle East.
El Nadi clarified Mahmoud Husseins position, agreeing with Lee that Islam had not disappeared under
Nasser. Yet, he maintained, Islam was not as powerful a force in that era as it is today. Nasser was free to
impose at will on the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas now it is the religious faction that imposes on the
government. For example, in Tunisia during Ramadan you used to see leaders on television drinking orange
juice. Such a thing is unthinkable today. When the socialists disappeared, the new power regimes of Anwar
Sadat and Husni Mubarak and others based themselves on religious trends as a tactic to counteract leftists.
Rifaat added that it is in vogue today to talk about the Muslim Brotherhood as the only mass movement in
the early 20th Century. However, there was a more powerful movement, the Wafd Party, which had its roots
in the masses. The question of whether national movements should be religious or secular was a major
debate in the interwar period and a key element of postcolonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood retreated not
only because of acts of state repression but because of the popular sensibilities of an emerging middle class
that expressed a clear preference for secularization in public affairs.
Charfi suggested that, despite a clear movement backwards on issues like the status of women and veiling,
at a deeper level there is secularization and even Westernization happening throughout the Muslim world.
Even movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Phalangists in Lebanon were modeled on European
Fascist movements of the same era. This speaks to the tension between secularization and religion; even
when religion is dominant, it responds to external secular influences.
In conclusion, Eickelman noted that neither secularization nor religion can be isolated as singularly
representative of a period. For example, Israels opposition to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and support of Hamas created a scenario in which the religious movement reflected the sensitivity among
the people. In other situations, religion is more ideological than moral or ethical. It is misleading to look
closely at religious movements in isolation. In some instances, womens veils may allow them to participate
more openly in public space. For those who wear the veil, religion is often not their primary motivation, as
many research studies have shown. People take what they want from religion and from modern values,
forming a kind of bricolage. They may be pious in certain areas but impious in others. The search is
underway to find a new balance to relieve this tension.

SESSION II Closing
In his closing remarks, Tlili thanked the speakers for sharing many perspectives that warrant further
exploration andacademic research. He described the symposium as the beginning of an ongoing debate,
and raised the question of why such a debate can take place in the West but not the Muslim world. This is a
major problem, as discussed by Wild; many Muslims do not have the benefit of the discourse developed
here.
Ideas can influence progress and impact lives, Tlili stated. Unlike Charfi, who suggested that Islamism is
losing its force, Tlili believes Islamism is still the dominant political discourse, and that there is a dangerous
polarization between Western radical discourse and Islamist radical discourse. Because of this, regimes in
the Muslim world are increasingly retreating from a commitment to openness and secularization, a trend
seen in places like Turkey and Tunisia. New mosques are drawing large crowds and there are
ever more social taboos in the name of religion. Yet these phenomena are too new and complex to be fully
analyzed yet, Tlili said. The Muslim world is caught between the state and the Islamists: two forces of
confused religiosity.
Tlili asked how we can reopen the conversation and give universities and intellectuals a renewed sense of
possibility in light of the obstacles posed by the media and political structures. In answer, he stressed the
need for stronger dialogue between the West and the Muslim world, and enjoined the West to recognize its
stake in the outcome. Granting that all civilizations have contributed to global culture over the course of
history, but that the last three centuries have been dominated by the Enlightenment, Tlili suggested that the
West has a moral responsibility to engage the Muslim world intellectually by, for instance, opening their
doors to figures like Abdullah. The MuslimWestern dialogue has tremendous implications for all. If we leave
the Muslim world to choose between oppressive regimes, radical Islamists, and a confusing religiosity
divorced from modernity, the future is not bright. Tlili closed by expressing the hope that all present felt a
need for this conversation to continue, and that the symposium had made them feel more engaged in the
dialogue.

NOTES TO SESSIONS
AlMutazila (8th 10th Centuries) was a theological school, which argued that human reason could be
applied alongside Quranic revelation.
1

AlMuwahiddin (12th 13th Centuries) was a theological school, which advocated a strictly literal
interpretation of the Quran and the hadith and condemned polytheism and the worship of saints as these
practices contradicted the schools belief in the absolute oneness of God (tawhid).
2

Mohammed Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought (London: The Institute of Ismaili
Studies, 2002).
3

Olivier Carr, Mysticism and Politics: A Reading of Fi Zilal alQuran by Sayyid Qutb (Boston/Leiden: Brill,
2003). For Carrs discussion of Arkoun, see p. 50.
4

Andreas Christmann (Trans., Ed.), The Quran, Morality, and CritiPenser le Coran cal Reason: The Essential
Muhammad Shahrur (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2009).
5

Literally translated as promoting the good and preventing evil, Shahrur interprets the phrase as an
obligation of good civil citizenship. Ibid.
6

Abdelmajid Charfi, Islam Between Message and History, trans. David Bond (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2009).
7

Richard C. Martin (Ed.), Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies (Arizona: The University of
Arizona Press, l985).
8

Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, Speaking in Gods Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women, (Oxford:
Oneworld Publications, 2003).
9

Jasser Auda, Maqasid alSyariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach (Herndon: The
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008).
10

Pokja Akademik, Kerangka Dasar Keilmuan & Pengembangan Kurikulum Universitas islam Negeri
(Fundamental Scientific Theory and Curriculum Development in the State Islamic University) (Yogyakarta:
Sunan Kalijaga, 2006). See also M. Amin Abdullah, Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi: Pendekatan
IntegratifInterkonektif (Islamic Studies in Higher Education: IntegrativeInterconnective
Approaches) (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006).
11

Khaled Abou ElFadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco: Harper
Collins Publishers, 2005); also Roel Meijer (Ed.), Global Salafism: Islams New Religious
Movement (London: C. Hurst 7 Co. Ltd., 2009).
12

Gallie argued that it is impossible to conclusively define concepts such as social justice, democracy, or
moral goodness. Clarification of such concepts involves considering how the concept has been used by
different parties throughout its history. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 56 (1956).
13

APPENDIX I: CONFERENCE PROGRAM

November 10, 2010
9:00AM 9:30AM

Registration
9:30AM 10:00AM

Opening Session

Mustapha Tlili, Founder and Director, NYU Center for Dialogues (U.S.)

In Memory of Mohamed Arkoun, Professor Emeritus of the History Islamic Thought, Sorbonne
(Algeria/France, 19282010)

Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of Tunis
(Tunisia)

10:00AM 1:00PM

Session I
Normative Islam Versus Historical Islam: A Critical Distinction for Our Times and the Modern Epistemological
Tools that Make It Possible

The ideas of Mohamed Arkoun (Algeria/France): Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science, Colorado
College (U.S.)

The ideas of Muhammad Shahrur (Syria): Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary
Islam,University of Manchester, U.K. (Germany)

Abdelmajid Charfi

Discussant:

Stefan Wild, Professor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies, University of Bonn
(Germany)

Floor Discussion
1:00PM 2:30PM

Lunch
2:30PM 5:30PM

Session II
Interpreting the Quran, Responding to the Challenges of theModern World: Muslim Societies at a
Crossroads

Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Professor of Islamic Studies, Sunan K. Islamic State University,
Yogyakarta (Indonesia)

Mahmoud Hussein (Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi),Political Scientists and Islamologists
(Egypt/France)

Discussant:

Dale Eickelman, Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations, Dartmouth College (U.S.)

Floor Discussion
5:30PM 6:00PM

Closing

APPENDIX II: PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought, University of
Tunis (Tunisia)
Abdelmajid Charfi is Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis.
Prior to this, he was Professor of Arab civilization and Islamic Thought first at the cole Normale Superior in
Tunis and then at the University of Manouba from 1969 to 2002. Between 2003 and 2005, he served as a
member of the Council of the Arab Foundation for Modern Thought. He was a fellow of the
Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin from 1999 to 2000 and held the Chair of Comparative Religions at UNESCO
from 1999 to 2003. He is currently the Director of the collection Maalim al Hadatha and is a member of
the editorial board of several journals including IBLA (Tunis); Revue Arabe des Droits de lHomme (Tunis);
Islamochristiana (Rome); and Prologues, Etudes Maghrbines (Casablanca). Charfi is the author of
numerous internationally acclaimed works including: LAvenir de l islam en Occident et en Orient; Damas,
Dr alfikr (2008, in collaboration with Murad W. Hofmann); LIslam un et multiple (Beirut, 20062009);
Lislam entre le message et lhistoire (Beirut, 2001, 2nd ed. 2008; French translation, Paris: Albin Michel;
Tunis: Sud Editions, 2004; English translation, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010; German and
Persian language translations in progress); Modernisation de la pense islamique (Casablanca, 1998 ; 2nd
ed. Beirut, 2009; Persian translation, Tehran, 2003); and Islam et modernit (Tunis, 1990; 5th ed. Beirut,
2009; Persian translation, Tehran, 2005). He has also published several articles on modern Islamic thought
in various journals in both French and Arabic and has lectured extensively at universities throughout Europe.
Robert Lee, Professor of Political Science, Colorado College (U.S.)
Professor Robert Lee has taught in the Political ScienceDepartment at Colorado College since 1971. He
received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1972, having previously received an M.S.
in Journalism and an M. A. in Political Science from Columbia, and a B.A. with a major in history from
Carleton College. He is a member of the Middle East Studies Association, the American Institute for
Maghrib Studies, and the Middle East Institute. His specialty is comparative politics, especially the politics of
the Middle East and North Africa, but he also teaches courses on the international relations of the region and
other courses in Political Science. Lees first book, Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for
Islamic Authenticity (Boulder: Westview, 1997), treats the thought of Muhammad Iqbal, Sayyid Qutb, Ali
Shariati, and Mohamed Arkoun. Lee also edited and translated Mohamed Arkouns Ouvertures sur lIslam
(Paris: Grancher, 1992), which was published as Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers
(Boulder: Westview, 1994). His most recent book, Religion and Politics in the Middle East (Boulder:
Westview, 2010), surveys comparative approaches to the understanding of religion and politics, focusing on
four countries: Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Israel.
Andreas Christmann, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam, University of Manchester (U.K.)
Andreas Christmann received his M.A. (1993) and Ph.D. (1999) from the University of Leipzig where he
studied Arabic, Islamic Studies, and Comparative Religion. During his Ph.D. period he was awarded the
VolkswagenResearchFellowship and prepared at St. Antonys College in Oxford (19951997) to do field
work in Syria. Since 1999, he has taught in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Manchester
University and is currently Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Islam and Director of Postgraduate Studies. He
has participated in several national and international research groups including a twoyear research project
on The Islamic World and Modernity organized by the Social Science Research Council and the
Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, where he took part in the working group on Islamic Discourse and Modern
Muslim scholarship. He was also a participant in the workshop Multiple Modernities: Between Nation
Building and Muslim Traditions sponsored by the GermanAmerican Research Network and coorganized by
the working group on Muslims, Practices, and the Public Sphere (Florence, 1999). He is a member of the
German Association for the History of Religion (DVRG) and the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
(BRISMES). He has been a member of the Journal of Semitic Studies (JSS) editorial board since the year
2000. His most recent publications are The Quran, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad
Shahrur (Leiden, 2009) and Der Fastenmonat Ramadan und das Fastenabschlussfest id alfitr in Damaskus
(Munich, 2009). He has worked intermittently on the writings of Muhammad Shahrur since his first stay in
Damascus in 1995, and in a more focused and systematic way since their first meeting in 2001. The Quran,
Morality and Critical Reason is the first comprehensive introduction in English of Muhammad Shahrurs

writings on Islam and the Quran, resulting from close collaboration with Muhammad Shahrur since the
autumn of 2006.
Stefan Wild, Professor Emeritus of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies, University of Bonn
(Germany)
Stefan Wild was Director of the German Oriental Institute in Beirut, Lebanon from 1968 to 1973, Professor
of Semitic Languages and Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn from 1974 to 1977, and is now Professor
Emeritus at Bonn University. He has written a study on Lebanese place names, has worked on classical
Arabic lexicography, on classical and modern Arabic thought and literature, and worked extensively on the
Quranic text. He was editor and coeditor of Die Welt des Islams: International Journal for the Study of
Modern Islam (Leiden) from 1982 to 2009. In 20032004 he was a Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg in
Berlin and in 2005 was awarded the Prize of the Helga and Edzard Reuter Foundation. In October 2010, he
gave the H.A.R. GibbLectures at the Center of Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University on the topic
of the Quran.
Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Professor of Islamic Studies, Universitas Islam Negari Sunan
Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (Indonesia)
Mohammad Amin Abdullah is currently serving his second termas the Rector of Sunan Kalijaga Islamic
State University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia the first of all the Islamic State Universities, and one of the
leading Islamic universities in Indonesia. Dr. Abdullah is well known as an Islamic philosopher who
distinguishes normative Islam from historical Islam. Internationally recognized for his role in promoting a
modern, pluralistic and tolerant understanding of Islam, Dr. Abdullah helped lead the worlds secondlargest
Muslim organization, the Muhammadiyah, from 20002005, when he served as Vice Chairman of its
governing board. Born in the regency of Pati, Central Java in 1953, Dr. Abdullah received his Baccalaureate
degree from Pesantren Gontor Ponorogo; his Ph.D. in Islamic Philosophy from the Middle East Technical
University in Ankara, Turkey; and conducted his postdoctoral study at McGill University in Toronto, Canada.
He is the author of numerous books, including Religious Education in a MultiCultural and MultiReligious
Era; Between alGhazali and Kant: Islamic Ethical Philosophy; The Dynamism of Cultural Islam; and Islamic
Studies in Higher Education. He is also the author of dozens of articles, and frequently speaks at
international seminars in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Dr. Abdullah is currently engaged in the process
of modernizing his institutions curriculum, and expanding its relationships with other leading universities
worldwide, while maintaining its links with the past.
Mahmoud Hussein: Adel Rifaat and Bahgat El Nadi, Political Scientists and Islamologists (France)
Mahmoud Hussein is the shared pseudonym of Bahgat El Nadi and Adel Rifaat, EgyptianFrench political
scientists and Islamic scholars born in Egypt, in 1936 and 1938 respectively. El Nadi and Rifaat met for the
first time in 1955 during the student demonstrations that shook Egypt after the Bandung Conference. They
were both active in the Egyptian democratic leftist movement from 1959 to 1964 and were subsequently
incarcerated in Nassers concentration camps in 1966. Arriving in France, where they established themselves
as political refugees, they proceeded to enroll in the Sorbonne and at the cole des Hautes tudes en
Sciences Sociales. In 1975 they jointly received their doctorate in Political Philosophy. From 1978 to 1998, El
Nadi and Rifaat were senior officials at UNESCO, first as members of the cabinet of the Director General,
then as codirectors of UNESCO Courier, an international cultural monthly published in 30 languages. They
are the authors of several internationallyrenowned books including: La luttes des classes en Egypte (Paris:
Maspro, 1969); Arabes et Israliens, un premier dialogue: avec Sal Friedlander et Jean Lacouture (Paris:
Le Seuil, 1974); Versant sud de la libert: essai sur lmergence de lindividu dans le TiersMonde (Paris: La
Dcouverte, 1989); Sur lexpdition de Bonaparte en Egypte (Paris: Actes Sud, 1998); and ALSRA, le
Prophète de lislam racont par ses compagnons (2 vol.) (Paris: Grasset, 2005 and 2007); and
Penser le Coran: La Parole de Dieu contre LIntgrisme (Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 2009). They have also
participated in the creation of several film documentaries including: Versant sud de la libert (France2,
1993); Sur lexpdition de Bonaparte en Egypte (France3, 1998); Lorsque le monde parlait arabe, ou
lge dor de lislam (France5, 2000).

Dale F. Eickelman, Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations, Dartmouth College (U.S.)
Dale F. Eickelman is Ralph and Richard Lazarus Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations at
Dartmouth College. He has a M.A. in Islamic Studies from McGill University (Montral) and a Ph.D. in
Anthropology from the University of Chicago. Among hispublications are Public Islam and the Common
Good, coedited with Armando Salvatore (Boston: Brill, 2004); Muslim Politics, coauthored with James
Piscatori (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, new ed. 2003); The Middle East and Central Asia: An
Anthropological Approach (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 4th ed. 2002); and New Media in the Muslim
World: The Emerging Public Sphere, coedited with Jon Anderson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2nd ed. 2003). Eickelman is also a former President of the Middle East Studies Association, and since 2003
has served as Senior Advisor to Kuwaits first private liberal arts university, the American University of
Kuwait. He was named a Carnegie Scholar in 2009 for a twoyear project, Mainstreaming Islam: Taking
Charge of the Faith, and for the first part of 2010 was concurrently a Fellow at the Institute for Advanced
Study, Berlin.

APPENDIX III: MUSTAPHA TLILIS OPENING STATEMENT

No one here today will doubt that Islam has, in the West, a bad name. I leave it to you to conjure all the
dramatic instances that prove this statement. The last, you may recall, occurred this summer in Florida
where, if not for the intervention of world leaders including President Obama, the Quran was to be burned
by an obscure pastor of a nondenominational church. The socalled groundzero mosque heightened the
drama for weeks this summer to the point where New York City witnessed huge demonstrations for and
against the project; political leaders in the City and beyond made their positions part of their bid for office;
and, as customary in this country, pundits filled the airwaves with incendiary and often ignorant
pronouncements.
Muslims themselves, in this country in particular, do not seem to agree on what being Muslim is about.
Those who speak in their name are often driven by a quest for power, and project conflicting images of
Islam and different understandings of its holy texts. Whether in this country or in Europe, the nonMuslim
public can feel bewildered by the moral, ethical and legal positions articulated by socalled authorized voices
of Islam in the West. The multitude of points of view available on the internet amplifies the confusion to an
extent unimaginable only a few years ago.
The absence of a central authority in Islamic theology and tradition heightens the anxieties of Muslims and
nonMuslims alike regarding Islam. Unsurprisingly, there is a thriving fatwa stock market (as I call it) in
the Muslim world that often relies on the internet to communicate its message, and intentionally frustrates
dialogue with other cultures and faiths.
History tells us, however, that the search for a universally recognized truth has been part of Islamic tradition
since the advent of the faith more than 14 centuries ago. One can even venture to say that if you strip
Islamic history of its competition for political power, what remains can all be articulated in terms of
interpretation of the faith, its tenets, and its underpinning fundamental textsabove all, the Quran. Various
dimensions of Islamic civilization and culture cannot be properly understood if they are not interpreted in
light of the context that produced them, whether the impressive openness of AlMutazila, the
fundamentalism of AlMuwahiddin, or the political and religious agendas of todays Wahabbis.
What makes our moment different is the weight and challenge of globalization, which requires the Muslim
world to confront its realitiesto look in the mirror of modernity and answer the question of how to be
Muslim while being part of world civilization in the 21st century. In the flat world of todayin contrast to
the times of AlMutazila or AlMuwahiddin, or the Wahabbis of the 18th century, or even that of the Islamic
reform movement of the 19th centuryinformation is transmitted globally in an instant. The Muslim world
can no longer hide certain truths about its lack of economic development, education, womens rights,
freedom ofexpression, rule of law, and regard for our shared humanity. Any openminded Muslim

intellectual or ruler would easily recognize these lacks as plaguing the umma today, from Malaysia to
Nigeria, from Morocco to Azerbaijan.
Yes, Islam has a bad name but lets be truthful, its not all the fault of its enemies. Islam, I submit, is
what Muslims make it to be and, thus, the importance of this symposium. This event could not be happening
at a more opportune time, considering the stakes of the relationship between the Muslim and the non
Muslim world, particularly the West. Reading and interpreting the Quran, the foundational text of Islam, has
always been and will remain the ultimate basis for building an understanding of what it means to be a
Muslim. Islam is a faith and a way of life informed by an understanding of the faith. How we interpret the
Quran is not simply a matter of piety. It has real implications on how Muslim societies, whether yesterday or
today, build states, economies, ethical systems, legal systems, and relationships with the nonMuslim
world. The science of Quranic interpretation has evolved through the centuries. But, if we admit that, as
any science, it relies on intellectual tools and categories, we should not hesitate to apply what French
philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls the sciences of suspicionthe modern human and social sciencesto its
interpretation. In fact, I submit that this is the most important challenge that the Muslim world faces today.
Two major thinkers who took up this challenge in the most impressive way and who had planned to be with
us here have sadly departed this world. I speak of my former teacher, dear friend, and colleague, Mohamed
Arkoun, who passed away two months ago, and the other giant of modern Islamic thought, Professor Nasr
Abu Zayd, who I did not know personally but only through his works and correspondence; he passed away
last spring. We mourn their deaths and we pay homage to their lives, their intellectual struggles, and to the
extraordinary importance of the body of rigorous research they left behind. Generations of Muslims and
nonMuslims will look to the work of these two eminent scholars when it is time to ponder the question,
what does it mean to be Muslim in the 21st century? There are two other important voices absent from our
discussion: the Syrian thinker, Muhammad Shahrur, author of the seminal book, The Book and the Quran: A
Contemporary Reading, and Mohammad Amin Abdullah, the eminent Indonesian scholar of Islam and of the
Quran in particular. Muhammad Shahrur could not be with us today for health reasons. As for Professor
Amin Abdullah, we had hoped until yesterday that he would be present, but he was denied an entry visa.
I intended for these remarks to be both general and provocative, to challenge us to measure up to the task
before us; as intellectuals, our foremost duty is to rigorous and clear thought or, as you might say in French,
une pens sans fard. Piety serves its purpose, although nobody can ultimately know its role in our salvation.
Critical intellect has a different functionone in which the sacred becomes an object for rigorous and clear
examination. With everything that we know in the world today, must Islam be simply the Islam of piety? Or
can it be the Islam to which Abdelmajid Charfi, Mahmoud Hussein, Amin Abdullah, Muhammad Shahrur, and
the late Mohamed Arkoun and Nasr Abu Zayd apply the tools of critical thought? I submit, ladies and
gentlemen, that this is the most important question before us in this symposium and before the Muslim
world today.

Islam and modernity: how to be Muslim and modern

today
A roundtable discussion with:
Abdelmajid Charfi, Emeritus Professor of Arab Civilization and Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis
and author of lIslam entre le message et lhistoire (Islam between the Message and History).
Hamadi Redissi, Professor of Political Science at the University of Tunis and author of lException
islamique (The Islamic Exception).
Boutheina Cheriet, Quillian Visiting International Professor at Randolph-Macon Woman s College,
Professor of Sociology at the University of Algiers, and former Minister in charge of Women s Affairs and
the Family (2002-2003, Algeria).
The three panelists stand at the forefront of an emerging school of thought within the Muslim world. Using
the tools of contemporary social science, they have undertaken to critique Islam from within. Their work
turns on several fundamental questions: Is it legitimate to question the timelessness of the Quran? Are
certain key elements of Islamic heritage a product of history and thus no longer relevant today? Why has
the Islamic world long stagnated in semi-modernity? What roles can women play as catalysts for reform? In
raising these questions, our panelists offer a vision of what it means to be at once Muslim and modern
today.
Presented by NYUs Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West and the Institute of French Studies with the
generous support of Air France.
Wednesday, May 3rd, 2006 at 6:30 pm at La Maison Franaise of NYU, 16 Washington Mews
(at University Place), New York, New York.

Islam and modernity: how to be Muslim and modern

today
By Shaanti Kapila
On May 3, 2006 Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West and NYUs Institute of French Studies (IFS)
presented, Islam and modernity: how to be Muslim and modern today? a roundtable discussion at
La Maison Franaise of NYU. The roundtable was jointly moderated by Dialogues Director Mustapha Tlili
and IFS Director Ed Berenson and featured Abdelmajid Charfi, Emeritus Professor of Arab Civilization and
Islamic Thought at the University of Tunis; Hamadi Redissi, Professor of Political Scienceat the University of
Tunis; and Boutheina Cheriet, Professor of Sociology at the University of Algiers, and Algerias former
Minister in charge of Womens Affairs and the Family. The event was made possible by the generous support
of Air France.

Ed Berenson began the evening by welcoming guests to the roundtable, the second event in a series cosponsored byDialogues and IFS and supported by Air France, featuring innovative thinkers from the
Francophone Muslim world. Mustapha Tlili then introduced the three panelists and emphasized the
importance of their contributions to the slowly emerging, yet important trend of self-criticism within Islamic
intellectual circles. Tlili emphasized self-criticism as a necessary means to reconcile Islamic heritage and
scripture with the challenges of modernity.
Abdelmajid Charfi spoke first and began by underlining what he sees as the three essential contrasts that
define modernity versus pre-modernity: (i) the dominance of authority in pre-modern thought and practice
versus the individual rights and freedoms upon which modernity is based; (ii) the prevalence of faith and
superstition in pre-modern times compared to the predominance of rationalism in modern times; and (iii)
the closed nature of the pre-modern world in contrast to the openness of the modern world to innovative
ideas and knowledge.
Insofar as religion is concerned, Charfi proposed that while religiosity today may not be so different than it
was in the past, the shift from traditional to modern religiosity has proven complicated in Muslim societies,
where vast economic, social, and political disparities cause many Muslims to look to religion as a source of
legitimacy and identity. The important task for Muslims today is to chart a path by which they can be faithful
to their religion and live in modern times.
Muslim thinkers, Charfi insisted, must meet the challenge of constructing a new interpretation of Islam that
is compatible with modernity and that ensures that the religious experience of the Prophet has meaning
today. This should lead to a new readingof Islam whereby the Prophet will remain the model, but many of
the traditions attributed to him since the Revelation will lose their normative, constraining aspects.
According to Charfi, the Prophet, through the Revelation, opened new horizons for man that enabled him to
assume liberty and responsibility for himself and entrusted him with adapting to changing situations using
his own free will. For example the Quran explicitly states that man has complete liberty with regard to
belief. Charfi emphasized the centrality of the notion of the prophecy in Islam, Mohammed being the final in
a long line of prophets revered in the Abrahamic tradition; therefore, Muslims believe that in transmitting
the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed has transmitted the final word of God.
Charfi concluded by adding that Muslim thinkers must renounce the institutionalization of religion, which has
again and again proven detrimental in the history of Islam. The Islamic faith cannot flourish in the 21st
century, Charfi said, if Muslims do not eschew the institutionalization and dogmatization of religion.
Boutheina Cheriet spoke next and began by describing the recent turbulent political history of Algeria.
During a bloody civil war that lasted throughout the 1990s, the country was terrorized by radical Islamist
groups that sought to create an ideal, pure Islamic state free from all Western influence. The Islamist groups
with FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) at the helm had particularly conservative views on the rights of
women, confining them to strictly domestic roles. Cheriet traced the origins of this harshgender bias to the
first moments of Algerias independence when the country was plunged in a modernizing socialist
movement that was Islamic in outlook. In Algeria, as in other Arab and Muslim countries, the political elites
embraced Islams role in modernization, without permitting public debate concerning what elements of
religion should remain salient in Algerian life. As in most Muslim countries, women in Algeria were never
considered equal, Cheriet said. Although the first post-independence governments encouraged womens
participation in all domains, they did not introduce perfect legal equality for women. The
Algerian Family Code adopted in 1984 evidences womens inequality within the family, for example with
regard to divorce and in matters of inheritance.
Cheriet attributed the gender bias against women in Algeria, and Muslim societies in general, to a reverence
of the houri (the virgins of Paradise described in the Quran). Women will never be permitted to be
completely liberated and modern so long as they are linked to a mythological pure standard, she said.
Cheriet agreed with Abdelmajid Charfi that it is Muslim thought and not Islam itself that is resistant to

modernity. Once Muslims begin to modernize Islamic thought on a broad scale, radical groups professing an
ideology of Islamic salvation will lose their appeal, she said.
The final panelist to speak was Hamadi Redissi, who summarized the thesis from his book, lException
islamique (Paris: Seuil, 2004). He maintained that it is not Islam per se, but rather the ways in which
Muslims have interpreted and instrumentalized Islam that have led to the current schism between Islam and
modernity. Redissi offered four points about the exception to which he refers in his book. First, the Islamic
exception is a historical, theological statement. Because it was in the interest of early caliphs to cloak
political activities under the mantle of religion, Islamic polities tended early on toward a theocratic form of
government. Second, Islamic societies have not fully incorporated the tenets of modern capitalism, which
creates an exception to the prevailing norms of the international economic system. Third, ideas like
democracy were introduced into the Islamic world in an authoritarian manner (for example with the
Napoleonic invasions of Egypt, or European colonialism), and were therefore greeted with skepticism.
Fourth, Islam has been interpreted as a total way of life and thus non-religious elements, like culture and
political systems, tend to become synthesized to conform to an Islamic standard.

Redissi then went on to elaborate the ideological, cultural, economic, social, and political aspects of the
Islamic exception. With regard to ideology, Redissi said that Islam has not been able to surpass the
temptation to fundamentalism, which has wavered over the past two and a half centuries
between jihad (struggle, both internally and against impious Muslims), limited-scale holy war (against nonbelievers), and planetary holy war (as embodied by Osama bin Laden's calls to kill Westerners).
Moving on to culture, Redissi contrasted Islamic civilization withJapanese civilization to highlight the stark
differences in the way each has been able to adapt to changing circumstances. The Japanese have adopted
a model of co-habitation, remaining faithful to their traditional values while becoming technologically
modern. Islamic civilization, on the other hand, has tended toward synthesis in the form of an
Islamicization of modernity. However, Redissi noted, it is impossible to synthesize the modern into the
medieval and thus Islam has become a prisoner of its own model.
Redissi held that the predominance of tribal societies throughout Islamic history has created economic and
social exceptions. Many Islamic societies were tribal well into the 20th century, which hindered the advance
of capitalism within these lands. Likewise, absent a strong middle class historically a driver of change
Islamic societies have tended to remain fractious and susceptible to authoritarian rule.
Redissi noted that the political exception stems from the lack of secularism in the majority of Islamic
societies (with the notable exception of Turkey). Whereas the Protestant Reformation encouraged a clear
delineation between church and state in the West, there has been no similar reformation in Islam,
andpolitical systems within most Islamic countries continue to be dominated by religious tenets.
In conclusion, Redissi affirmed that Islam is indeed compatible with modernity, but that it is the
responsibility of Muslims to break with the characteristics that have created the Islamic exception and to
encourage new interpretations of Islam that will enable Muslims to be faithful to their religion and productive
citizens of an increasingly globalized planet.
Following the three panelists presentations, the floor was opened to questions from the audience. The first
question asked whether there exist centers of research exist in the Muslim world at which thinkers work to
reinterpret the Qur'an. Abdelmajid Charfi responded that although researchers with modern training who are
interested in Islamic sciences are rare in the Muslim world, Tunisia is an exception. In Tunisia, teams of
researchers composed mainly of young thinkers with good knowledge of Islamic texts and modern
methodologies approach questions of scriptural and historical interpretation. The study of religion is taught
as a human science in Tunisia, whereas elsewhere it is approached as a dogmatic science and is considered
the purview of 'ulema. Boutheina Cheriet added that some individual research on improving the condition of
women in Islam is being done by scholars in Morocco, but that there are no real centers and no systematic

approach to the discipline. She reminded the audience that most Muslims live in authoritarian states and
that any attempts toward democratization are closely monitored.
The second question asked how fundamentalism in the Muslim world can be defeated. Abdelmajid Charfi
replied that he and his colleagues were not equipped with the political power to conquer fundamentalism.
The fight against fundamentalism must begin upstream, he said, by offering youth a credible alternative.
The new interpretations of Islam that are conceived by scholars in universities must be introduced into the
educational systems through textbooks and curricular reforms.
A third question was posed about the ideology of the Islamist group FIS in Algeria. Hamadi Redissi replied
first, maintaining that FIS cannot move away from the idea that the state is responsible for upholding
religion. Although he insisted that religion should remain in the private sphere, the concept of separation of
church and state does not exist in the Muslim world, he said. Rather, Muslims talk of a more subtle
distinction between religion and political and civil life. Boutheina Cheriet added that it was never clear to
what extent Algerians actually supported FIS, which attempted to gain power through democratic means in
the early 1990s.* Youcef Yousfi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations
and a guest at the roundtable, interjected that, had FIS come to power, there would no longer be an
Algerian state today.
The fourth question considered whether Islam itself can be blamed for the deficit of democracy in the Muslim
world, given the lack of democracy in non-Islamic regions like Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Hamadi Redissi answered that the failures of democracy are linked to the colonial experience, which weighed
heavily on the Muslim world; his book, in fact, begins with the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt. While there are
many variables affecting systems of government, a common variable throughout the Muslim world is Islam.
Redissi acknowledged that there are different types of Islam some of which may be considered more
conducive to democracy than others yet when a positive comment is made about Islam few distinctions
are demanded.
Abdelmajid Charfi insisted that distinctions should be made on three levels. First, there is the Quranic level
the level of the message which is open to infinite interpretations. Second, there is the level of historical
practice, which has differed widely from state to state and which can be submitted to analysis. Finally, there
is the personal level whereby each Muslim carves out a unique vision or practice of Islam.
A fifth audience member offered that the challenge of modernity is not confronting Islam, the religion, but
rather Islamic societies and states. This questioner compared the panelists to a doctor who has offered a
diagnosis of a problem (reconciling Islam with modernity), but has not suggested a course of treatment. If
some of the major Islamic states Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, for example were
to form an economic union, would this spark changes in Muslim societies that would reverse
the symptoms? Mustapha Tlili referred the question to Abdul Wahab, Ambassador and Permanent Observer
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to the United Nations and present among the guests,
who responded that this is precisely what the D8 (Developing Eight) countries of the OIC have sought to do.
The D8 members Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey have
sought to cooperate on trade and economic issues to improve their countries' welfare and economies.
The final question was whether there is something intrinsic to Christianity that enabled the West to become
a model of modernization for the Muslim world. Likewise, should Muslim women strive to emulate women in
the West even though religious values in the West seem to be in decline? Hamadi Redissi was the first to
reply, stating that the West, modernity, and democracy are all part of a common heritage. Boutheina Cheriet
responded to the second question, maintaining that it is offensive to say that the emancipation of women
would lead to the decay of religious values. The problem for Muslims, she said, is that most are stuck living
under authoritarian political regimes, and this is what should cause them concern.
Ed Berenson then brought the evening to a close, with thanks to panelists, the sponsors, and the assembled
guests.

* Algeria adopted a new constitution in 1989, which wrested power from the FLN (National Liberation Front),
the party that had dominated the country since independence in 1962, and established a multi-party
democracy. In the first national elections that were contested under the new constitution in December 1991,
the Islamist FIS party, formed in 1989, won a majority of votes in the first cycle of voting. Faced with a
likely FIS victory in the conclusive round of voting, the military intervened, postponing the subsequent
elections and disbanding the National Assembly. This touched off a civil war between FIS and the secular
Algerian military, which has resulted in more than 100,000 deaths since 1992. In 1996 a referendum on the
constitution was passed that banned Islamist parties in Algeria.

Saturday, 4 August 2012

Islam: the Test of Globalization

Abdelmajid Charfi*

Globalization has consequences for the religious sphere, but it does not constitute a
break with the previous situation. It constitutes rather an acceleration of a process begun
with the birth of nation-states. The impact of the values of modernity in general, since
even those in power, whatever their tendency, invoke values of democracy, progress,
freedom and justice, whereas submission is what was required of subjects.
Nevertheless, people today look to religion for fixed reference points, because of the
brutal transition from the Middle Ages to the 20th and 21st centuries, and because
modernity is not an endogenous phenomenon. Islam then is playing the role of bulwark
against western hegemony. It is also instrumentalized both by the powers that be and by
the oppositions, all of whom give themselves over to displays of one-upmanship over
fidelity to Islam. Does Islam then maintain its relevance in the context of globalization?
The fact is that the bases on which social relations are now founded no
longer permit discrimination on the ground of sex or religion, and that there is a
loosening of the grip of traditional ritualism and thatmore and more Muslims are looking
for an understanding of the faith that is freed from old-fashioned dogmas. These new
givens are being demonstrated particularly when it comes to the exercise of power and
the condition of women. As a result, traditional conceptions are destined to evolve,
particularly concerning the status of the Koran, the growing awareness of the historical
process that made the Koran into a juridical code, the archetype that has been stuck to
the person of the Prophet, and the alienation that consists in the sacralization of every
human act.

We shall not linger, in this lecture, over the principal characteristics of the globalization that we have all
been experiencing for about twenty year. Let it suffice to recall that this is a universal phenomenon
possessing at once unarguably positive dimensions, as well as negative, not to say dangerous

dimensions for the future of humanity. While the economy is the primary object of globalization, its
unintended consequences for the religious domain are not negligible. And it is from this perspective that
we are interested in that which, in this phenomenon, affects Islam in particular, the religion of one fifth of
the world population. Its followers are mostly to be found in the geographical area stretching from
Morocco to Indonesia, but large Muslim minorities live in different regions of the globe, North as well as
South.
Let us begin by observing that historically, geographically and sociologically, Islam has never been
monolithic. It is both one and many: one, by the creed which unites Muslims, that God is one and that
Mohammed is his prophet; and many, by the multiple ways of understanding the Islamic faith, of formal
practice of its recommendations concerning prayer, fasting, tithing and pilgrimage, as well as those
concerning ethical behavior, right down to the deepest mystical experiences, and with the most varied
intellectual expressions and all sorts of instrumentalizations along the way.
Let us add that Islam recognizes no intermediaries between God and man. The relation to divinity
famously passes through the Koran as revealed to the Prophet, and accessorily, for the Shiites, through
the Imam and his qualified representatives. This is the reason why the Ulemas, or doctors of Islam,
refuse to be called holy men. Their task is limited, in theory, to the interpretation of the sacred texts for
everyday believers, and to defining the duties incumbent upon them. And yet, this did not prevent the
establishment of a religious institution to regulate the sacred, which considers itself qualified to the
exclusion of simple believers and of women altogether to define dogmas and to distribute certificates of
conformity or non-conformity with the demands of the religion.
The representatives of this institution receive, as a general rule, the same training, and are traditionally
destined for the roles of cadis, or judges, of muftis, of prayer imams, of udls, or notaries, and other more
or less official functions according to country and historical period. Although, in certain circumstances,
they played a counter-balancing role in relation to the political powers, acting in favor of what might today
be called the rule of law, by defending their prerogatives against the abuses of political power in the
jurisdictional arena, they were basically in step with governments. These latter guaranteed them moral
and material privileges, and relied on them for the administration of the population. In exchange,
the Ulemas provided the political authorities with the legitimacy that they needed and that they lacked,
being most often acquired by inheritance or by brute force, and conserved independently of the will of
their subjects.
It is in these terms that the relations between religion and politics manifested themselves in Muslim
societies, with the exception of the relatively rare cases where there was connivance between the two
functions, when the political authorities intervened directly in religious affairs, or when the clerics
imposed an orientation of some sort on politicians, as was the case, for example, in the age of the
Abbasid Caliph Al-Mamn, of the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hkim, or during the reign of Almoravides. This
situation was seriously disrupted by the emergence of modern Nation-States in the Muslim world. The
monopoly previously enjoyed by the Ulemas in the legal domain was demolished by the introduction of
positive law during the colonial period, and then since the political independence occurring between the
end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1960s. Moreover, the modern State tends to be an
intrusive one, reaching into areas that never used to interest it, such as the economy, education or health.
As a consequence, it tries to subordinate the religious authorities and to control them closely in order to
be sure that they always provide it with an appearance, a surplus, or a decisive contribution of legitimacy.
What new does globalization bring to this picture? It is tempting to answer that what has occurred is not a
radical break with the previously reigning situation, that there has merely been an acceleration of
processes already at work at the economic, social, political, cultural, and therefore also religious, levels.
At any rate, these levels are interwoven and connected among one another in a dialectical relation, to
such a degree that it is sometimes difficult to affirm, despite appearances and notwithstanding the
declarations of the actors involved, that such or such question has to do with one level rather than with
another.
At the economic level, every country has seen a modernization of the means of production, at different

speeds, but pursued everywhere with unequal success. Thus, the tractor, the automobile and the
machine in general are supplanting the animal and human physical effort; services are occupying an ever
growing place of importance in economies; and the same, or almost the same, industrial products are
invading the markets of every country.
At the social level, nomadism loses ground each day, and the countryside is increasingly depopulated, in
favor of a breakneck urbanization. The diminution or the disappearance of traditional social constraint
exercised by the tribal group follows from this. The patriarchal family is giving way to the nuclear family,
with all the consequences that come with it concerning the means of socializing young people. In sum, it
is a mechanical solidarity, in the Durkheimian sense, that is replacing organic solidarity little by little
which is a source of conflicts and dramas due to this difficult transition.
At the political level, what is remarkably novel is that political personnel of every ideological slant
constantly invokes the previously unknown values of democracy, progress, freedom and justice, even if in
practice they distance themselves from them to a greater or lesser degree.
And finally at the cultural level, the tidal wave of secularization affects contemporary Muslim societies the
same as it does other modernized or modernizing human societies, whatever their culture or their religion
might be. What some observers consider to be a resurgence of the religious is unsurprising since the
transition from the Middle Ages to 20th century modernity happened brutally. This resurgence of the
religious sometimes in an aberrant form or rather its persistence, is in fact nothing but a reaction of
defensiveness or of fear in the face of the rapid and disorienting mutations for which minds had not at all
been prepared by traditional dominant structures. It is therefore unsurprising that, following the ceaseless
movement that characterizes our era, more or less disoriented people look to religion for the fixed
reference points which they have lost in other spheres of life, all the more since the novelties modernity
has introduced, fascinating as they may be, are perceived as having been imposed by the West. The fact
that modernity and now globalization is not an endogenous process obviously feeds into this attitude,
with its apparent preference for a return to the past and for the preservation of cultural identity.
In such conditions, Islam plays the role of bulwark against Western hegemony in general and American
hegemony in particular. It is obviously not a matter of passing judgment on the effectiveness of this
bulwark, or of determining whether it constitutes the best defense. Islam is equally instrumentalized by
anachronistic and/or despotic regimes in search of legitimacy, just as it is solicited by opposition
movements to justify their struggle against the established order, which is perceived as being impious and
contrary to Islamic norms. Here too, it is not a matter of passing judgment on the validity of this
upmanship emanating from two antagonistic clans. It is preferable, in our judgment, to analyze the
challenges with which Islam is confronted today, similar in this to all the religious systems that bear the
weight of a long history from which they do not manage to liberate themselves.
In our book Islam Between Message and History, we analyzed the institutionalization of the prophetic
message that occurred shortly after the death of Mohammed. This process, in its complementary form of
confessionalization, ritualization and dogmatization, has resisted the accidents of history and the different
conjunctures Muslims have experienced. The question to be asked in our time concerning this fact is the
following: is it still relevant in the current context of globalization? Again, not because the latter is a novel
and positive phenomenon in every aspect, but because it is the end result of a multiform movement
begun with the European Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, pursued by the Enlightenment,
and crowned by the scientific and technical advances of the last two centuries whose repercussions on
the functioning of societies, on the ways of believing and the content of these beliefs, and on the new
world-views these have generated, are undeniable.
Confessionalization was inevitable insofar as it allowed Muslims to recognize one another and distinguish
themselves from non-Muslims, through clothing, food and general behavior. Let us not forget that in the
early days of Islam, they were a minority in the countries they conquered, and that although the ancient
societies were far from uniform, everyone and each social and religious category had to stay in its specific
place, which was perceived as natural in the clearly hierarchical general structure of society as a whole.
This rule, accepted and interiorized by practically everyone, explained not only the privileged status of

Muslims but also the inferior status of women and non-Muslims, to say nothing of slaves. The different
statuses brought both exclusive duties that were not binding for other groups and equally exclusive rights
hardly enjoyed by others, all of this being justified by concerns of a religious nature. Today, the bases on
which social relations are founded no longer permit discrimination between members of different social
groups, be it because of differences of religion, color, or sex.
Regarding ritualization, which consisted in a uniformization of the ways of performing rites, especially
prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, it seemed natural given the fact that the institutionalized religions did not
tolerate the flexibility and the freedom to which the Muslims contemporary to Mohammed were
accustomed. It matters little, from this point of view, that the Koran does not go into detail about
devotional acts and is content to incite believers to carry them out; the nascent dogma of the normativity
of the Prophets actions, as they were transmitted by certain Companions usually second-order ones
like Abu Hurayra, known only by his sobriquet and then entrusted to the first collections of theHadth, is
sufficient to come to its aid as a supplement. What was happening was in fact a gradual downward
egalitarianization that took account of the dispositions of the greatest number, but left the strongest
personalities, those who would find refuge from the 3rd century of the Hijra in mysticism, dissatisfied. Now
that the believer is no longer perceived as a member of a group with no autonomy, the loosening of the
vise of ritualization has become quite imaginable.
Dogmatization, the third form that institutionalization took, does not have the same importance in Islam as
it has in Christianity, which has seen, especially in the Eastern Churches, incessant and virulent quarrels
over the definitions of the faith, especially concerning the trinity and the incarnation. The absolute
transcendence of God in Islam shielded him from parallel dogmatic disputes. The Koran remains
nevertheless a theological book, and theology, insofar as it is the attempted rationalization of faith, could
not but institute intangible dogmas. The first Muslim theologians, the mutakallimn, defended as a general
rule the principle of free will in human actions, but the combined opposition of the politicians and the
specialists of the Hadth wound up imposing the dogma of the divine determination of mans acts in their
minutest detail. Other dogmas were similarly imposed, among which we might especially cite, in the case
of Sunnism, the normativity of the Tradition just mentioned, the honorability of all the Companions without
exception, the preeminence of the first four rightly guided Caliphs in the order of their accession to the
head of the Caliphate, etc. Without a doubt, the contemporary Muslim is no longer comfortable with this
dogma; he seeks an understanding of the faith that is free of dogmas bearing the mark of their bygone
era.
The institutionalization of Islam in question had to wed itself to the reigning forms of social organization,
and yield to the norms accepted in every pre-modern civilization. It therefore permitted the religious
justification and legitimization of the eras values and institutions, and could not in any case extract itself
from the categories imposed by the mental horizon that has been fashioned by the common estate,
shared by all peoples, of the available science and knowledge.
It is at this level that it seems necessary to us to locate the problem of the difficult relationship between
modernity and globalization, on the one hand, and historical Islam, i.e. the concrete applications of the
prophetic message, on the other. We do no more here than point out a few of the difficulties that seem
most significant in this regard, always keeping in mind that the problems that arise for an Islamic thinking
confronted with globalization, when expressed in purely religious terms, obscure the other, strictly profane
and historical, dimensions of these difficulties.
Let us take as an example the question of power. The latter had systematic recourse to religious
legitimacy to ground the monopoly on violence it enjoyed. And this legitimacy was almost never
questioned by the believers of any branch whatsoever. And yet, the amazing advances of the human and
social sciences caused the mask to fall from the face of power, which was shown in truth to be that of a
regulating institution of society, neither more nor less. From then on it could no longer receive its
legitimacy from any source but the consent of the populations in question and the popular will. The
interiorization of this new conception of power made headway in the West in a context that favored the
transition from absolute power to democracy, i.e., the rise of the bourgeoisie, industrialization, scientific
and technical progress, the birth of Nation-States, etc.

No such things took place in the Muslim world. One is, since the acquisition of political independence,
therefore in the presence of autocratic regimes that perpetuate the notorious postponing of democracy.
This situation is not confined to Islamic countries; it has existed and continues still in Latin America, in
Africa and elsewhere. What is deserving of attention regarding this is that religious thought is torn
between the attraction of freedom and democracy, on the one hand, and nostalgia for the regime of the
Caliphate, on the other. The socio-economic conditions do not help it to free itself from the tar pit of this
nostalgia; conceptual confusion and an ideological hodge-podge win the day.
And yet, a new factor, which is of a nature such as to turn completely on its head the classical schema of
the evolution of political power, is the emergence, thanks to the more or less advanced generalization of
teaching and to the lightening progress of information and communication technologies, the possibility of
divulging in real time any event whatsoever in any part of the world. Ordinary citizens now have the ability
to know the unspeakable and formerly well-kept secrets of the regimes in place, which strips these
regimes of a formidable weapon in the manipulation and indoctrination of the masses. Of course, states
today possess means of control and coercion of which yesterdays dictatorships could not even dream.
Nevertheless, they must take ever greater account of a public opinion that is not eternally duped by their
lies, and which aspires to take part in strategic choices, in decision making, and in the control of public
agents, from bottom to top. Thus, the religiously colored justifications of submission to despotism (the
famousTaat l-amr) tend to lose the incontestable authority that they used to enjoy. And it is extremely
rare now to find declared enemies of democracy, whether it is called by the termshra or taken for what it
really is: a mode of government that was born in the West and that has become a universal value and an
integral part of the rights of man, and as an aspiration to the concrete realization of the corresponding
ethics and institutions.
The question of condition of women supplies us with another example of the difficulties of the adaptation
of religious thought to the new conditions imposed by globalization. Indeed, it is well known that in every
civilizations past, and with the exception, more or less widespread in space and time, of the upper
classes, women were considered ontologically and sociologically inferior to men. Concerning dress
codes, which revealed social distinctions and discriminations, it was the case that in each town, even
each village, and each region women would dress according to the tradition of their milieu and to climatic
considerations. And, as on might expect, this situation was justified by religious considerations. Those
whose job it was to manage the sacred began, moreover, with a consideration of their own interests and
excluded women from the high sacerdotal offices and forbade them access to certain functions, which
varied from one context to another.
Women did not obtain a theoretical equality with men, still put only partially into practice, even in many
advanced societies, until after a difficult struggle and all sorts of sacrifices. It is nevertheless necessary to
insist on the fact that this equality, obtained and consented to at such a high cost, would not have been
able to establish itself, despite womens struggle on behalf of their basic rights, and in face of the
ferocious opposition of clerics and conservatives of every stripe, without industrialization and the need it
created to resort to the female labor pool, and without as a result the financial autonomy that this allowed
women to acquire, thus throwing off the yoke of the inferior status which had previously been theirs.
In the history of Islamic societies, in the very absence of the notion of original sin and of its correlate, the
stigmatization of sex, women enjoyed, just like everywhere else, only inferior rights to those enjoyed by
men. The reformist movements in the Muslim world, since the end of the 19th century, have made the
improvement of the status and the education of Muslim women one of their principal battle cries, but
almost entirely in vain. The modes of production and socio-economic structures did not change
accordingly. And mentalities could not change without radical changes in these structures. In other words,
the opposition to womens liberation and to their juridical equality with men, although expressed in
religious terms, in fact reflect a reality and a balance of power that religion does nothing but justify. The
proof of this is that wherever modernization has attained a certain level of advancement, the situation of
women has evolved despite every opposition. Tunisia, Turkey, and recently Morocco are a good
illustration of this rule.

As in the case of democracy, gender equality has today become, thanks to globalization, development of
the means of information and communication, and the generalization of education, a general aspiration of
the younger generation, whom traditionally trained clerics and Islamist no longer dare confront directly.
They are therefore leading a rear-guard fight by remaining attached, under false pretexts, to polygamy
and to inequality of inheritance rights, and by passing judgment on unveiled women and those who
bravely refuse prohibitions on interaction between the sexes and on participation in public life, all the
while affirming the fundamental equality of men and women in Islam, without realizing the blatant
contradiction in which they find themselves.
The two examples that we have mentioned the conception of power and the condition of women
perfectly show that the spokesmen for Islam, whether an official, traditional Islam or an activist,
revolutionary one, are up against this globalization over which they have no control. The conspicuous
ritualistic religiosity dissimulates poorly a profound secularization of Islamic societies, along the lines of
what all contemporary societies have known. What appears as a return to religiosity is nothing more, in
most cases, than the expression of a return to communitarian identities. On the one hand, as we have
said, it is more a matter of the search for certainty in a world that is losing its familiar orientation. On the
other hand, it is a question of reaction to historical backwardness and to humiliation, to
underdevelopment, to the despotism of local governments, and to the warlike and arrogant policies the
United States of America in particular, and to the West in general, which supports the Israeli occupation of
Palestine without reserve and is deaf to the legitimate complaints and suffering of the Palestinians, and
which participates actively or through its silent complicity in the occupation of the Muslim lands of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
As a consequence, holding Islam as such to be responsible for the evils that are eating away at Muslim
societies betrays an essentialist vision of religion that the history of religions and religious anthropology
have completely dispensed with. Islam, like any other belief system, can, paradoxically and varying with
each case, be either a cause of alienation or of its opposite. Our hypothesis is that globalization, because
a certain number of its manifestations is notoriously alienating, is of a nature such as to push Islam to play
an de-alienating role concerning money, the rule of the law of the market, merciless competition, egotism,
and everything dehumanizing in relations between groups and individuals. From another angle, through
the means that it puts at the disposal of a greater number of people, globalization offers to humanity as a
whole an opportunity to leave the material and symbolic ghettos into which it had been shut, and thus to
enlarge its intellectual horizons, which were dramatically limited for preceding generations.
In this sense, we are all at a crossroads, and thanks to the digital revolution we are going through a
privileged moment, one that incites us to redouble our efforts to keep religious thought from lagging
behind cognitive progress, and to allow it to help us to assume responsibility for the fullness of our
condition. To this end, the revision of our relation with the interpretative tradition of the prophetic message
is a necessary, although insufficient, condition. It is obviously impossible to embrace every domain in
which this tradition exercises incontestable authority. We shall as a result limit ourselves to the essential
traditional conceptions that determine all the others in a certain way, and that seem destined by the force
of things to evolve.
The first conception, and by far the most sensitive, concerns the status of the Koran. Is it, as the tradition
proclaims, an exclusively divine text in both content and form, supernaturally dictated to the prophet
Mohammed, whose role was purely that of passive transmitter? Or is the Koran, written in human
language, for the believer divine in its origin and its inspiration but equally eminently human, to the extent
that the personality of the Prophet, his culture and the conditions of his individual and communal life could
not help but intervene in the elaboration of this sacred text? Can the believer allow that the Prophet had a
privileged relation with divinity, an uncommon experience of the divine which the Koranic discourse, which
was originally oral before being set down in the Mushaf, would perfectly account for?
Once it became canonical, the Koran served as a reference for the religious justification and for the
legitimation of customary social relations and institutions of the Muslim empire. In other words, the
interpretations of the Koran that come down to us in the first exegeses and date back to the 3rd century
after the Hijla reflect the preoccupations of Muslims after the movement of the conquests and the

constitution, in the vast fields of the empire, of Muslim communities of Arab or convert origin, much more
than the preoccupations and ways of understanding that were proper to the first audience of the prophetic
message. The attachment to the literalness of the text, in particular, was not universal until the point at
which the Koran became practically a binding juridical code, which it in fact was more in theory than in
reality.
One of the priorities of a critique internal to Islam consists in becoming and in making others aware of this
historical process. This is a difficult operation which requires all sorts of competences, whose objective is
to traverse the thick and successive layers of interpretations and manipulations that have been imposed
on the Text in order to get back to the original message and apprehend it in all its richness and depth. On
the way, one can cast aside philosophical concepts inherited for the most part from the dominant mythical
consciousness and from efforts to rationalize the givenness of revelation. In sum, it can be hoped to seize
what was given in revelation in its universality and in its intentions, and not in its circumstantial
injunctions.
This way of proceeding would first of all question, and even contradict, the very widespread idea that the
first generations of Muslims, the pious ancients (as-salaf as slih), had better knowledge of the precepts
of Islam and applied them perfectly, and that the following generations are destined to drift ever further
away. This idea is no longer acceptable to the degree that at its birth Islam needed time in order to be
interiorized, that it did not go about this though brain-washing, and that the minds of the first Muslims
were still soaked in the beliefs and perceptions of the world and society that were impossible to erase all
at once and to replace them with new ones. Furthermore, it does not take account of the accumulation,
which is larger with every passing day, of human knowledge and of elements of universal culture,
especially today. In fact, the first Muslims whose task it was to apply what they understood of Islam could
only do so in the framework of the cognitive and social systems at their disposition. Their solutions were
dictated by imperatives which are no longer ours. To conform to them would amount to cutting religion off
definitively from life, while the maintenance of this connection is paradoxically the declared objective of
those who are attached to the veneration of the past and of the ancients, closer in their eyes (although
they would never admit this) to angels than to humans, who are burdened by a multitude of constraints
and subject, among other things, to desires, ambitions, loves and hates.
In the same order of ideas, we have witnessed a veritable transfiguration of the person of the Prophet,
who has become super human over the years, a being to whom each attributes all the ideals and all the
aspirations of the men of his time, and even their fantasies, including sexual, despite the Korans
affirmation that he is certainly an example to follow, but that he is just a simple mortal charged with
transmitting the divine message.
The living message was therefore not sufficient to feed this archetype in all the Islamic lands. It is
therefore the textual tradition that took its place. The Hadith was born of this need, as well as the
normativity of the acts and words of the Prophet, i.e., the necessity of conformity to the smallest of deeds
and gestures of Mohammed recorded in the 3rd/9th century in the collections of prophetic traditions said
to be authentic.
To revise the historical interpretations is also, as a result, to unmask the illusory character of these
traditions which claim to reflect faithfully the will of the Prophet, while they are in fact and can be nothing
but representations influenced, in good or in bad faith, by historical factors that it is possible to analyze
and clarify, at least in large outline and in their general texture, by the methods of modern human and
social sciences.
It is the same not only when it comes to other foundations of Muslim law, in particular concerning
consensus (igm) and analogy ( qiyas), but above all concerning the postulates which form the basis of
the entire edifice of the jurisprudential rules inaccurately referred to as the Shara. To take an example, to
affirm, with Shfi (204/820), who is only translating a common conception of his contemporaries, that all
human acts without exception must all necessarily obey one of the five legal qualifications or statutes
(ahkm) which are, in descending order, the obligatory, the recommended, the permissible, the
reprehensible and the illicit, is nothing more than the expression of a situation in which every aspect of life

is sacralized, in other words characterized by an alienation that it is urgent to leave behind.

In the same vein, to consider that it is necessary to take Koranic verses literally, not taking into
consideration the particular circumstances at their origin, or that the effort of personal reflection, (ijtihd)
only applies in the absence of an explicit text, or that the tawtur, i.e. the presence of several
transmitters of the same tradition, leads to certain knowledge, or that it is forbidden to revise a consensus
elaborated by a previous generation, and so many other similar presuppositions, to consider that they are
still valid today is to ignore that they are the pieces of a human, juridical, social and political edifice which
fully played its role in the past, but which has now fallen into complete ruin under the effects of modernity.
To think Islam according to the imperatives of globalization is therefore also to admit that this type of
organization in no longer valid, and that it is vain to pursue the chimera of restoration, such as was
attempted by the Afghan Taliban, and as Islamist movements of every persuasion dream, whether they be
Wahhabis, Khomeynists, Muslim Brothers or something else.
It is not appropriate, regarding this, to put into doubt the authentic aspiration of these groups, in the face
of ever-present despotic regimes set up after the fall of the Caliphate and the end of colonization, to limit
the powers of the State in favor of the application of their conception of the Law of God. And yet, this
aspiration, legitimate as it may be, does not take account of two essential factors, without which it
collapses without any chance of success:
The first is that the modern Nation State is an organization that has imposed itself everywhere in the
world, and that even if one tries to escape it this will only be by means of assimilation into a larger political
entity, such as the European Union, or by means of supra-national international conventions, but never
through a return to the system of Empire whose frontiers expand and contract as a function of the balance
of power, and which allows for the coexistence of different legislations, particularly on a sectarian basis,
within it.
The second factor is the fiction of a Divine Law of which only the experts, the Ulemas, are the faithful
interpreters. Modern historical knowledge, which is more refined every day, has taken it upon itself to
destroy this fiction, by showing the all too human character of theFiqh whose prescriptions are determined
by the cultural, social and economic contexts of a bygone era.
Following these considerations, it appears that what is called globalization (if one is looking for brevity),
but more fundamentally, that the structural changes at every level, the progress of human knowledge in
the area of the human and social sciences, and the universal aspiration towards a spectrum of values
falling under the description of inalienable human rights, effectively put Islam and the other great
historic religions to the test. Will it be up to the task with which it is confronted? No one, in our opinion,
has managed to give a convincing response one way or another. What is certain, however, is that
religious thought is never disembodied, and that it is in the final analysis the historical conditions which
shape and condition its adequation with reality in all its dimensions.
Translated by John Rogove
----------------------------------------------------------------------The final/definitive version of Abdelmajid Charfis essay was published inPhilosophy&Social Criticism, vol
36 nos 3-4 March and May 2010, SAGE Publications Ltd, (LA, London, New Delhi, Singapore and
Washington DC), all rights reserved, p. 295-307, Special Issue: "Postsecularism and multicultural
Jusirdictions", Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations Istanbul Seminars 2008-2009, Edited by: Alessandro
Ferrara, Volker Kaul and David Rasmussen. Link to the issue http://psc.sagepub.com/content/36/3-4.toc
------------------------------------------------------------------------*Abdelmajid Charfi is a leading Tunisian scholar on Islam, he teaches at the Faculty of Arts, University of
Manouba, Tunis.

 l'heure o les islamistes qui contrlent le Nord-Mali dtruisent les mausoles de saints et les mosques historiques de
Tombouctou, l'islamologue et universitaire tunisien Abdelmajid Charf dcrypte l'idologie des djihadistes. Quels rapports
entretiennent-ils avec le wahhabisme des pays du Golfe ? Qu'est-ce que la charia ? Quelle place cette dernire rserve-telle aux chtiments corporels ? lments de rponse.
Jeune Afrique : Pourquoi les islamistes d'Ansar Eddine s'attaquent-ils aux mausoles de saints
Tombouctou ?
Abdelmajid Charfi : Je pense que linfluence du wahhabisme est luvre chez Ansar Eddine [dfenseur de lislam,
NDLR] au Mali. Depuis ses dbuts, au XVIIIe sicle, le wahhabisme a toujours lutt contre la vnration des saints. Cest
pour a quen Arabie saoudite on a dtruit tous les mausoles qui existaient, mme ceux des compagnons du Prophte
Donc cest vraiment lislam bdouin, lislam trs rigoriste, qui explique cette attitude destructrice. Ce qui est sr, cest
quAnsar Eddine est sous influence directe du wahhabisme, il ny a pas dautre secte en islam qui a la mme attitude vis-vis de la vnration des saints et du maraboutisme.

Capture d'cran d'une vido de militants islamistes dtruisant le 1er juillet 2012 des btiments religieux Tombouctou.
AFP
Comment dfiniriez-vous la charia que les islamistes veulent imposer ?
Il y a le sens originel du mot, qui indique la voix , et il y a lutilisation trs rcente du mot charia. Dans lhistoire
islamique, ce terme ntait pas utilis, ntait pas du tout courant. Cest surtout depuis lapparition des Frres musulmans,
dans la premire moiti du XXe sicle, quon utilise le mot charia pour indiquer la jurisprudence islamique. Elle repose sur
des interprtations humaines de versets coraniques, mais galement sur toute une laboration de rgles strictes, qui
concernent autant la vie prive que la vie publique du croyant. Enfn, la charia touche aussi bien les actes cultuels, c'est-dire les actes rituels du culte, que les actes de la vie courante.
Quelles sont ses origines ? La charia est-elle clairement mentionne dans les textes fondateurs de l'islam ?
La charia repose sur les quatre fondements du droit islamique : le Coran, la Sunna (la tradition du prophte), le
consensus et lanalogie. Pour les tenants de lapplication de la charia, cest le consensus qui prvaut, beaucoup plus que
le Coran et la Sunna, parce que le Coran peut tre sujet a beaucoup dinterprtations Quant la Sunna, nen parlons pas,
vous pouvez trouver des hadiths dans tous les sens qui affirment des choses et leur contraire ! Donc cest vraiment le
consensus au sein de la communaut qui est le vritable fondement de cette doctrine.

Quid des chtiments corporels (main coupe, coups de fouet, lapidation...) que les
partisans de la charia entendent infliger ? Sont-ils mentionns dans le Coran ?
Non, ils sont plus anciens que lislam lui-mme ! On les retrouve notamment dans des rgles
de droit chrtien datant du IVe sicle, avec les mmes peines infliges aujourdhui par les
prtendus dfenseurs de la charia. Donc ce ne sont pas des peines proprement musulmanes,
ce sont des peines valables dans des socits tribales, traditionnelles, o couper la main du
voleur est, par exemple, tout fait normal .
Peut-on isoler certains principes de base de la charia ?
Ce ne sont pas des principes, plutt des attitudes de conservatisme. Il existe une certaine
nostalgie de lge dor o les choses taient simples, o les relations taient bien
traces dans la communaut des musulmans : il y avait ceux qui connaissaient et ceux qui
devaient se fer aux savants. Il y avait donc une hirarchie bien organise, les gens taient
heureux. Cest du moins comme a quon peroit lhistoire islamique. Mais en fait cette
nostalgie est une forme de conservatisme. Cest la nostalgie dun idal tout fait fctif, mais
cest surtout, mon avis, une raction tous les bouleversements que connaissent les
socits modernes. Il y a une raction de repli : au lieu daffronter les difficults du prsent, on prfre se rapporter au
pass. Cest pour cela que je qualife cette attitude de conservatrice.
La charia dfendue par les islamistes dAnsar Eddine, au Mali, a-t-elle des caractristiques particulires ?
Ce sont des talibans, il ny a pas de diffrences entre ces derniers et les islamistes maliens. Les talibans ont suivi le
wahhabisme, Ansar Eddine fait pareil aujourdhui. Vous verrez : sils sont au pouvoir pendant quelque temps, ils vont
interdire aux gens daller lcole, ils vont interdire le thtre, la musique, etc Je dirais quils appliquent un islam
primaire. Aujourdhui, ce sont les coups de fouets, mais demain cela pourrait tre couper la main du voleur ou lapider la
femme adultre, comme les talibans ont pu le faire en Afghanistan.

Capture d'cran d'une vido AFP montrant un militant islamiste clbrant la destruction de mausoles au Mali le 1er juillet
2012.
AFP
Conue comme cela, la charia ne mnerait donc quaux chtiments corporels
Comme je vous lai dit, la charia concerne aussi bien les actes cultuels que les actes de la vie courante. Mais lorsque ces
ignares, parce quil faut bien les appeler comme a, veulent appliquer la charia, ils ne retiennent que lapplication des
peines corporelles et un certain ordre moral traditionnel.
Y a-t-il tout de mme des spcificits rgionales dans l'application de la charia, notamment dans
les pays africains ?
Avant, les diffrences dinterprtation taient lies aux coles juridiques de lislam : malikisme, hanafsme, hanbalisme,
et chafisme. Mais aujourdhui, ces diffrences sestompent. Cest linterprtation rigoriste wahhabite qui, avec les moyens
dont dispose lislam du ptrole, prend le dessus. La charia est prsente comme tant une, dans le sens rigoriste que les
wahhabites comprennent. Maintenant, ce sont eux qui disent ce qui est dans la charia et ce qui ne lest pas.

___
Propos recueillis par Benjamin Roger

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Vol. 12, No 2&3, 2005 /

Anti - Semitism & Islamophobia

Focus

Islam and Democracy: Are They Compatible?

There is no direct correlation between the absence of democracy and Islam.
by Abdelmajid Charfi
Ever since September 11, 2001, the question of the connections between Islam and
democracy, between Islam and terrorism and, more generally, violence has been very
much on the agenda. In the booming colonial literature of a century ago, it was
another question that was more frequently posed: that of the responsibility of Islam in
the backwardness of the Muslim people, especially since it promotes fatalism and is
allegedly opposed to freedom of choice and the spirit of initiative. We should ask
ourselves whether these questions or rather accusations are pertinent, and
whether Islam as a religion is effectively at the source of the obvious lack of
democracy in many Muslim countries and, particularly, in the Arab world.
To start with, it should be pointed out, as an example, that Latin America has long
suffered under dictatorial regimes run by corrupt military juntas and nobody, at least
in the West, has thought of holding Christianity, the majority religion of the Latin
American people, responsible for these dictatorships. Neither has anyone judged that
the Orthodox religion of the Russians who had allowed Communism to take root in
their countries was to blame for their unrelenting autocratic rule over the peoples
of the defunct Soviet Union.
Why then this essentialist view of Islam which, supposedly, is incapable of evolution
or change? And why also overlook the fact that the majority of Muslims are living
today in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and elsewhere under democratic
regimes within the limits permitted by their socioeconomic conditions.

Those who label Islam a violent religion are on the wrong track.

Fueled by Islamist Literature

It is true that a whole body of Islamist literature exists that is financed and encouraged
in part by the Islam of petrol which feeds this essentialist view of Islam. It provides it
with irrefutable arguments concerning the predilection of a fringe of Muslims for a
caliphate regime and political systems that fall far short of the criteria for democracy.
However, the general tendency is to take such a view at face value and to regard it as
representative of a prevalent Muslim attitude, instead of placing it within its proper
context. It is equally true that, throughout history, political power in the countries of
Islam did not usually allow for citizen participation in civic affairs. But which power
in pre-modern history was democratic in the sense that we understand it today?
This negative perception of Islam is without doubt being fueled by ideological rather
than religious motives. It manifestly provides its detractors with a clean conscience to
implement their policies of hegemony and exploitation under the guise of the struggle
of good against evil, and the propagation of democracy, liberty, and human rights.

They overlook the discrepancy posed by such justification with their selfish economic
and strategic interests, and with their arrogant and criminal conduct, even according
to international law and the basic principles of ethics. Nevertheless, although it is
material interests which guide the politics of the big powers, neither the cultural nor
the psychological dimensions are to be disregarded. In certain instances, they can be
very important, albeit never determining. They serve rather to justify hegemonic and
belligerent machinations, and to give a semblance of legitimacy for actions that are
devoid of it.
A Degree of Nostalgia
Even if todays West has ceased to be the Christianity of the Middle Ages and is now
largely secularized, its attitude towards the Muslim world remains tinged with the
animosity and strife that have marked the shared history of both Muslims and
Christians around the Mediterranean since the inception of Islam. The former
remember with nostalgia the period when they were masters of Spain, the south of
France and Sicily. The latter do not forget that countries which once were the cradle
and centers of Christianity Palestine in the first place, but also Syria, Egypt, Turkey,
with towns charged with history and Christian symbols like Jerusalem, Antioch,
Alexandria or Constantinople have fallen under the rule of Islam. The religion of
Christ has forever been banished from these lands, while its followers have dwindled
to a minority.
It is not then by chance that the West, traditionally anti-Semitic, has installed Israel in
the heart of the Arab world.1 It was one way for the West to rid itself of the Jews; at
the same time it was able to throw a western bridgehead in a part of the world it often
perceived as basically hostile. And it is not the least paradoxical to see the
traditionally anti-Jewish religious extreme right and ultra-conservatives currently
in the ascendance in the U.S.A. give their unstinting support to the Zionist entity,
as they believe this would hasten the Second Coming of Christ. In such a unique
situation, not one leader has seen fit to decry the blatant denial of justice of which the
Palestinians are victim, or the alleged Israeli democracy which treats the latter as
second class citizens and practices a segregationist policy based on religion and race.
Why then does the West give such an importance to the establishment of democracy in
Muslim countries? Everybody is familiar with the scores of analyses asserting that
democracy is the best defense against the terrorism carried out by certain Islamist
groups, operating almost everywhere around the world and striking blindly against
innocent victims. These analyses can be accepted without reservation, provided Islam
is not associated with such terrorist acts, even if their perpetrators insist on the fact.
In the name of Christian values, some militants of the pro-life movement in the U.S.A.
have attacked doctors and clinics that practice abortions. The Irish Catholics have
perpetrated several terrorist acts against their Protestant enemies. It does not mean that

Christianity which has been abusively invoked in these cases should be held
responsible for the reprehensible acts one commits in its name. Similarly, ultraOrthodox Jewish settlers and Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth kill with impunity
peaceful citizens of the occupied territories, expel others from their homes, blow up
their houses, uproot their millenary trees and destroy their crops under the false
pretence of the fight against terrorism and their religious right over the land of
Palestine. It would be wrong, however, to see in Judaism a religious or systematic
hatred towards non-Jews. The same measure should apply to Islam.
Understanding the Historical Context
One must always seek to understand the historical conditions which lead to the
reading of sacred texts in one way rather than in another. It is in the nature of sacred
texts to be susceptible to divergent, even contradictory, interpretations, arising from a
specific context, from the expectations of the readers, or from the underlying cultural
framework. It is not possible then to assert that Islam is for or against democracy, or
for the equality of the sexes, freedom of conscience or any other value. The
mainstream readings, called orthodox, are in effect nothing but the reflection of the
preoccupation of the faithful during a certain period. They may change; the faithful,
however, need not recognize the changes. This is completely justified, to the extent
that the Prophetic messages are systematically perverted under the influence of sociohistorical factors, and because religion, in getting institutionalized, is transformed into
a congealed and dogmatic system of beliefs and non-beliefs. The believers are then
called upon to cut across successive layers of historical interpretations in order to
arrive at the original meaning of the founding texts.
If militant Islamism, which is essentially political and is responsible for a number of
contemporary terrorist acts in and outside Muslim countries, claims its action springs
from a reading of the Quran and the Prophetic Tradition which it considers as the
only valid sources, it is because religious teaching in the majority of the traditional
religious centers is far behind the modern advances grounded in the scientific
achievements of the past two centuries. The Catholic Church had held anti-modernist
attitudes until the Vatican II Council. The Muslims do not dispose of a clergy like that
of Catholicism. With a historical retard in the religious domain as indeed in other
domains, it is normal that we should witness among them all sorts of religiosities,
each trying in its way to be faithful to the teachings of Islam. We are, in effect, in the
presence of a manipulative process which profits those who have the means to
influence public opinions through television satellites and other media that spout all
day long a discourse both reactionary and retrograde.
Sunni Islam which is in the majority has always held a legitimistic position vis-vis the established powers. The Muslim clerics were ready to recognize any regime,
even despotic, provided it conceded to them the monopoly of social control through

the prerogatives of religious law which they are supposed to apply. Today, this
position has become anachronistic by the fact that religious law is essentially
universal, whereas the Muslims live in countries where the law is by nature territorial.
The modern Muslim nation-states follow then a law where the reference to the sharia
is most tenuous if not totally absent, except in what relates to the personal status
which remains in most cases subject to the rules of classical jurisprudence.
Not Unlike Other Religions
In other words, Islam is not free from the manipulation by the religious for social
ends. All the traditional and pre-modern societies have experienced the system of laws
justified by religion, which was considered the ultimate authority for the
legitimization of the established order, including the political. Today, the aspirations
of Muslims for democracy and the participation of citizens in the public sphere do not
differ from the aspirations of other people, irrespective of creed, language or color.
The maintaining of undemocratic regimes, or frankly anti-democratic ones, that claim
more or less openly a religious legitimacy, should be explained only by the fact that
Muslim societies have not yet generally succeeded in modernizing their production
and social systems, or in acquiring institutions that guarantee popular sovereignty.
Agriculture, breeding, handicrafts and small businesses are the most widespread
means of production. Income from petrol is enough to cater to the needs of the
population in certain countries. But almost in all Muslim countries, industrialization is
either insufficient or simply inexistent. This shapes, directly and indirectly, the social
configurations of the countries, not to mention that it is a necessary condition, albeit
not sufficient, for the establishment of a democratic system.
Consequently, dealing with the question of democracy in terms of its compatibility or
incompatibility with Islam is not a valid approach. Like all religions, Islam adapts to
any political regime. This does not mean that all regimes are comparable in measuring
up to its principles, far from it. To the contrary, our reading of the Muhammedian
message leads to the assertion that in dispensing with intermediaries between man and
the Divine, and ending the dependence of man on supernatural powers, human beings
are enabled to fully exercise their freedom and responsibility. And what better system
than democracy through which to exercise these two fundamentals? Consequently,
any position at variance with this is nothing but a hang-over from the past, doomed
sooner or later to disappear or to be marginalized.
Those who seek to label Islam as a violent or despotic religion are on the wrong track.
They would better be advised to address the origin of injustices and frustrations
experienced by Muslims and to help in the emergence or the consolidation of
conditions that are promote the establishment of democracy, instead of pretending to
impose it by the force of arms. They should also start by practicing democracy in their
own international relations and the functioning of such institutions as the World Bank,

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the UN Security Council. And finally, they
could show their serious concern for democracy by ending their support, especially by
covert means, in the Muslim world and elsewhere, for dictatorial regimes, since these
tend to facilitate the exploitation, by foreign powers, of the riches of their own
people.
1.The hunting of Jews has always been a European sport. Now, the Palestinians, who
had never practiced it, are paying the price, Eduardo Galeano, Le Monde
diplomatique, August 2005, p. 10.