Republic

of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES,
in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his
capacity as Acting Chairman of the National labor Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO,
respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employees spirit and
her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CAs
Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing
from the service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment
complained of, thus:
x x x x
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito
habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako.
Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga
sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba
sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko.
Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez.
Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol
sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?

Lourdes: Nainip po.

Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang
Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera
ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa
posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I dont give them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet.
Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin
ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang
sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang
nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit
hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes,
Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko
masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine
ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso
nito noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa
dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib
tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay
Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang
diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si
Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si
Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang
kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang
kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking
leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng
aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at
inis na nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately transferred.

Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential
appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate
the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary
Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,5 constituting a Committee on Decorum and
Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee
submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as
suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP,
but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in
accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of the Committee as to the culpability
of the respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, I
disagree with the recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day considering the circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondents situation is the undeniable circumstance that he took advantage of his position as
the superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As
head of said office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the others as to how they should
conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat
each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited (City
Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99
[1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost
devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public
office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondents acts not just [as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to
his co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and behavior but defiance of the basic norms or
virtues which a government official must at all times uphold, one that is contrary to law and "public sense of
morality." Otherwise stated, respondent to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest official [of] the
NLRC had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the
service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations
Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED
from the service effective upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution
dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26
Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to create
moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not
emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their
stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust
petitioner from office. Save for his empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived

conspiracy. It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence (People
v. Noroa, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct a story of sexual
harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself to the possibility of losing her job,
or be the subject of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and
immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that Rayalas acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National Labor Relations Commission,
entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such an exalted position,
Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that the conduct of his everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any
impropriety. That the acts complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the
objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the solitude of his chambers,
Commissioner Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants
his removal from office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as
well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED
IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14
Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a Special Division of Five was
constituted.17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is
DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY
IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for
having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the petition
was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of
sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied
the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CAs resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President. She raises this
issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to suspension from service
for the maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be
imposed on an erring Presidential appointee. The President was well within his power when he fittingly used that
prerogative in deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who has control
of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs decision was arrived at after affording Rayala
due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases against presidential
appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the disciplining authority, and
thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an erring presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT

CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE OF AQUINO vs.
ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT
IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual
harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request,
or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued
employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner
in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are
without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos perception of malice in his alleged acts a "product of
her own imagination"25 that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that
the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a
particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an essential element of the offense
because the law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to
achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with the perpetrators deliberate intent to commit
the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition of
the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the
same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying,
disgusting or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual
harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in
Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the power
to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its
own definition of sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the
NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome
or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or
offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayalas
dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests
upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the
OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a presidential
appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.32 The Republic
adds that Rayalas position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be
dismissed from the service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that the
Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good behavior.33 Since Rayalas
security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has
failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari.34 It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties
who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the
latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on
October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2002. On the other hand,
Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the Republics Motion for Reconsideration
was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file its Comment on
Rayalas petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for Review with this Court
on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic), that there was a case
involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingos
petition, the same had already been dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingos petition was reinstated on June
16, 2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must point out that it was
Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala himself filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CAs December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of
the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the
Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition
for Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was
merely exercising a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away
this right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, it had to comply,
even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings of
the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a "meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their
respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the common
factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be
remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates
that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to review the
factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the Court.
And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her

complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued
employment or for her promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v.
Acosta.42
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual
harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another
in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of
said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for
damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. It shall be the
duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to
prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution,
settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation
or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper
decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct
meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors
and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also
conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative each
from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file
employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or
trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for
the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA
7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It
should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be

administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor."
But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral
or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and
squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate
conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity
the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents acts
result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala
generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of
the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the
last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is different from that
in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She
complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around her
shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga
found that "the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her
with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were
motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on
festive and special occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other people and the same was by reason of
the exaltation or happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be understood
in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she
was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and
innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the
'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms.
Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on
occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it
does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who
belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would
likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of
Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty.
Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to
sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious
connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably,
there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted
the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special
occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, Rayalas acts of holding and squeezing Domingos
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made
in the confines of Rayalas office when no other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment
for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a
leave of absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which,
at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy coordination. Second, he
posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he is a
presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The events
of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that

the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the
Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of the
parties, preparation of the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP.
AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary
procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues
that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly
without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of
sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and
thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. His
bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts
imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo
and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is
belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that time stood to lose their jobs
or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee on
Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision finding him guilty of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and
total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones
favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in
the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he appeared, personally and with counsel,
and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not
controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law
or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description
of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in
the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus, any
finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now
determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He
also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus

Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct
is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by
dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or she reaches
the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to
discharge the duties of the office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine
whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by
the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other
than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of
either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon
Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it still
could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance57 and where
only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.58 Hence, the
maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not
unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,59 this Court, in
upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he
exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in
order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate
employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher
standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is
perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and
confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct themselves in
public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should
set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingos
character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who ordered, albeit erroneously, his
dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It
is his character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are
DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, G.R. No. 164733
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

September 21, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:


Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular clause of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child)


This is a petition for review[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] dated July 30, 2004
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming with modification the decision[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
of Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 00-0691 which found petitioner
Michael John Z. Malto guilty for violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] as
amended.

Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a
minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with him as in fact
said accused had carnal knowledge.

Contrary to law.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]

This was subsequently amended as follows:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of

VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as
follows:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral
ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a
minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several
times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.

Contrary to law.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty.
After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.

The prosecution established the following:


At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] She was a
college student at the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioner, then 28, was her
professor in her Philosophy II class in the first semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.

On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their group. He told
them to address him simply as Mike. He handed them his organizer and asked them to list down their names and
contact numbers.

On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner butted
in and bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxx-rated films. To the shock of AAAs group, he
lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced. He then invited the group to view his
collection.

On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch his collection of
pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her friends went with him. They rode in his car
and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in at a calesa room. Petitioner
was disappointed when he found out there was neither a video cassette player (on which he could play his video
tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit television. He suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA
and her friends ignored him but he pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted until he
relented.

AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioners invitation. For fear of embarrassment in case
their classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile, petitioner apologized
for his actuations.

Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the phone and paged[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break came, his calls and messages
became more frequent. Their conversation always started innocently but he had a way of veering the subject to
sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by petitioners persistence and
slowly got attracted to him. He was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a mutual understanding and
became sweethearts.

When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second semester, petitioner told her
that he gave her a final grade of 3. She protested, stating that her mid-term grade was 1.2. He gave her a grade of
1.5 when she promised not to disclose his intimate messages to her to anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell
anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.

On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the
premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked her to lie down in the backseat of his
car. She was surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] on Harrison St. in Pasay City.
Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her
blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got angry at him.

On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private. He
again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt, lay down in bed
and told her, halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap. She refused but he dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips,
neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he overpowered her. He went on top
of her, lowered her pants and touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her but she pushed him away
forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying, Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I wont hurt you. She
refused and said, Mike, ayoko. He angrily stood up saying, Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Dont come to the faculty
room anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give it to me, let us end this. She replied, Mike,
hindi pa ako ready and it was you who said it will be after my debut on December 3, 1997. He insisted that there
was no difference between having sex then and after her debut. He told her, kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon,
tapusin na natin ngayon. Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she hesitantly replied Fine. On

hearing this, he quickly undressed while commenting ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako and laughed.
They had sexual intercourse.

In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either intimately
involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges where he taught.
In particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations with a
student and sexually harassing three other students. His employment was also terminated by Assumption College
for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that AAA realized that she was actually abused by petitioner.
Depressed and distressed, she confided all that happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.

On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative
complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.

In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the alleged incidents on October 3,
1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph Hipolito and AJ
Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and computing grades on October 10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA
during the first semester was when she submitted her final paper on October 18, 1997.

On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of class schedules for
the second semester at the Assumption College. On November 26, 1997, he was at St. Scholasticas College (where
he was also teaching) preparing a faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he attended the
birthday treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.

On November 29, 1997, he attended AAAs 18th birthday party. That was the last time he saw her.

According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old and after he was dismissed
from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent time together, shared their worries, problems
and dreams and kissed each other. On January 3, 1999, he brought her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual
intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least 20 times from January 1999 until they broke up in July
1999, some of which were done at either his or her house when no one was around.

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. On
March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] The dispositive portion read:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as
amended and hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium period or an
imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages
of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]

Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30, 2004,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] the
appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It further observed that the trial court failed to fix the minimum

term of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court erred in awarding P75,000 civil
indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under
which the death penalty was authorized by law.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Hence, the CA modified the decision of the
trial court as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that (1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum,
to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and (2) the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is DELETED.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that he did not rape
AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that he and AAA were
sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was consensual.

Petitioner is wrong.

THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE INFORMATION WAS WRONGLY DESIGNATED

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be
sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was
committed.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]

The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif] If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]

The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed from violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 to violation of Section 5(a), Article III thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who, for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:

[if !supportLists](a) [endif]Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution
which include, but are not limited to, the following:

[if !supportLists]1. [endif]Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means;

Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution.

Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2.]the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
3. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

[if !supportLists]b. [endif]inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;

[if !supportLists]c. [endif]taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

[if !supportLists]d. [endif]threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or

[if !supportLists]e. [endif]giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution;

3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4.the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse and
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is
abused primarily for profit.

On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]

The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that petitioner had carnal
knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by
petitioner who was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year
old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article
III, RA 7610.

THE REAL NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IS
DETERMINED BY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION, NOT BY THE DESIGNATION

The designation in the information of the specific

statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to
prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure
to
designate
the
offense
by
statute,[if
!supportFootnotes][21][endif] or to mention the specific
provision penalizing the act,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] or
an erroneous specification of the law violated[if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] does not vitiate the information if
the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting
the crime charged.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] What
controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited
in the information.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of
the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that
determines the crime being charged in the
information.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]

The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for violation of Section
5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense,
petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven
during trial.

PETITIONER VIOLATED SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610, AS AMENDED

The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the
accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds
to the minority or age of the offended party.

The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct against and had
sexual intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when he kissed her at the back
and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November 26, 1997,
when, with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the motel room and forcibly kissed her on the lips,
neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her and pressured her until she surrendered herself
to him on November 26, 1997. His acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:

(g) Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of
a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;

(h) Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a
person. (emphasis supplied)

The second element was likewise present here. The following pronouncement in People v. Larin[if
!supportFootnotes][27][endif] is significant:

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse,
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,

syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)

On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or
allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which date AAA also
indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latters influence and moral ascendancy. Thus, she
was deemed to be a child subjected to other sexual abuse as the concept is defined in the opening paragraph of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.

The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.

(a) Children refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)

On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18 years of age. She
was therefore within the protective mantle of the law.

Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.


VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CRIMES

Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The
offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal
Code.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] They have different elements.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] The two are separate and distinct
crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that
he did not commit rape.


CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING VIOLATION OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE III OF RA 7610



Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse
with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the sweetheart theory be invoked in
cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.

The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without
the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the
accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly
give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.

The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish

[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to
those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] Those
of tender years deserve its protection.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]

The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences[if
!supportFootnotes][34][endif] of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] For this reason, a child should
not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate
physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the
law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif]

This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] This is consistent
with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of
and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.[if

!supportFootnotes][38][endif] (emphasis supplied)

as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody
of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif]
(emphasis supplied)

This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the childs best interests in all actions
concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning
them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call
for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every
effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] (emphasis supplied)

PETITIONER MAY ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW


The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed
by the law.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the
range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the
proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months).

THE AWARD OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE MODIFIED

The trial court awarded AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages. The
CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned that the award was proper only in a conviction for
rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law. Consistent, however,
with the objective of RA 7610 to afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination
and with the principle that every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another
shall indemnify the latter for the same,[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case
involving violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.[if
!supportFootnotes][45][endif] The rule is that, in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] Thus,
P50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.[if
!supportFootnotes][47][endif]

Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages. The rule is
that, in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of damages and make a finding thereon in the
body of the decision.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif] Thus, moral damages and exemplary damages should be separate items
of award.

AAA testified that she was emotionally devastated and lost touch of her inner self as a result of what
petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded feelings caused by petitioner to her, she had
several sessions with the dean for student affairs[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] and the guidance counselor of Assumption
College as well as with a psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her mother and the dean of student affairs of
Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of P50,000. However, in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is unwarranted.[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif]

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto is hereby found guilty of
violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which he is sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 for moral damages.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice


THIRD DIVISION




[G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002]
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de
Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment, thusly:
That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then the City Health
Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his position, did there and then,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-
old woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the office
of the accused, namely: by demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow her private parts to
be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms.
Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual harassment.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her father
accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father and
petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled
up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and they were
informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into
putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine
oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there
was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for
the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not
she already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could
afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then
inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He
hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch her.
Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a research program. She was requested to be
back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine
guidance as she felt so confused. When she got to the office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some
hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a
job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include
hugging her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling.
Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car together.
Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and
told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so in a hurry
that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said no. Petitioner
told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the
research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty
until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner
then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch
her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but,
eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she
lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the

research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car,
petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the money he gave her but she
did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and instructed her to return it. In
the morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but she was not
able to see him until about one oclock in the afternoon. She tried to give back the money but petitioner refused to
accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she attempted to slash her wrist
with a fastener right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some
psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify
that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be
emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza
concluded that Juliets frustration was due to post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28 November 1995 he had a couple of
people who went to see him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a boyhood
friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed her wish
to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City
Mayor really had the power to appoint city personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged
incident happened, he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City Mayor. On 04
December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he
was scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao. He submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for sexual
harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela
Rodis, were but forms of political harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999, penned by
Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under
Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of
Sexual Harassment, defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the same Act, properly
known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of
Exemplary damages and to pay the cost of suit.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
In the instant recourse, it is contended that -
I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No.
7877 to the case at bar.
II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law and presumption of innocence on
account of the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant, a newly
graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her
plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about

accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of
the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would be a part of a research,
accused asked complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be seen. Accused assured her
that with her cooperation in the research, she would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked upon the
accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to undergo the physical examination. At
this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon of the same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon,
but did not proceed immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a nearby church to ask divine
guidance, as she was confused and at a loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once inside, accused called up a certain Madonna,
inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept a registered nurse. Complainant was
about to leave the office of the accused when the latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call one more
hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to
look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in
the Family Planning Program where there would be physical examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two
(2) secretaries to go out of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if she would agree
to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree because the research included hugging. He then assured her
that he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been subjected to such
examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to the research, for she is now
convinced that she would be of help to the research and would gain knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked
her if she was a tomboy, she answered in the negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he would first
play bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical examination). On the understanding of the
complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the
accused. But accused instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for
people to see them riding in a car together. She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as
instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was instructed by the
accused to come inside. Inside the car, he called her attention why she was in a pensive mood. She retorted she was
not. As they were seated side by side, the accused held her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her
that he would go home for a while to put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car and
asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly.
Still while inside the car, accused directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on
her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but she
protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half of her legs. But
then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling
as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka!
because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused then held her abdomen, saying, you are like my
daughter, Day! (Visayan word of endearment), and let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the
traditional way of making the young respect their elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed
and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her breast. He then
fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar while silently asking God what
was happening to her and asking the courage to resist accuseds physical advances. After a short while, she asked
him if there could be a right place for physical examination where there would be many doctors. He just exclaimed,
so you like that there are many doctors! Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to
kiss her, she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated. Finally, she
informed him that she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that complainant was
entertaining malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what
happened. He then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She was about to open
the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant instantly parried his hand with
her bag.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason,
nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health
office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and
actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to
take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of

Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners
secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a
city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner, i.e., that he was at a meeting
of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:
There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence adduced by the defense,
particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by witness Myrna Maagad on
September 8, 1998.
First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna Maagad. The Notices to hold
the meeting (Exh. 3-A and 3-B) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting, Exh. 5, was signed
by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. 3-A and 3-B certify that the officially
designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita Rozabal.
Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how was she able to personally bring
the same in court when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted during her testimony that
she retired from the government service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be the
custodian of the logbook when she testified.
And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the attendance of those who attended was
individually handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro
and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin.
However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to attending individuals inside the
conference room.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] no cogent reasons having
been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left
to the trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence
on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the
Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant
but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings
sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the result of passion or
undue prejudice,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] and it must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F.
Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed and
suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to
award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y
Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly
Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to
indemnify the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively,
moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.



SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Chicks mo dong?1

With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the fate of many
desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of two minors
from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a
deplorable crime. It is committed even though the minor knew about or consented to the act of
trafficking.

This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003.3

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by
Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated May 5, 2008, states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 oclock A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to
gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of
prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for money, profit
or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208
(Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a non-governmental organization, coordinated with
the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City.6

Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy
Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as
decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with
marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.9

The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each
other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team.10

PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu Citys red
light district. Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying Chicks mo dong? (Do you like
girls, guys?).11

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused went as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)


PO1
Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They
Luardo: must be young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)


Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and Ill get them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a prospective subject.13

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this case.14
Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)


PO1
Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?)15
Veloso:
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how much their
services would cost. Accused replied, Tag kinientos (P500.00).16

PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland Motel. Upon
proceeding to Room 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to accused.17

As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was their pre-arranged
signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her of her
constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and
BBB were brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the representatives from the IJM and the
DSWD.19

During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was supported by a
copy of her certificate of live birth.20

AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped
working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin, but she
subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew
that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was no longer a virgin, she
offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the money in order to help her father. AAA recalled
that she had sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 and given an additional P500.00 as tip.
For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to
Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers in that area.21

AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her pimping girls to
customers in Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008, accused solicited her
services for a customer. That was the first time that she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her,
BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24

AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It was in Room 24
where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA and BBB to go to the other room.
AAA was then met by the Department of Social Welfare and Development personnel who informed her
that she was rescued and not arrested.25

AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other girls, between
7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received P400.00 for every customer who selected her.26

The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1
Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they rushed to Room 24
and arrested the accused.27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from accuseds
right hand and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at the police blotter prior
operation. . . .28

The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM in conducting the operation against
the accused.29

Version of the accused

In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman. On the evening of May 2, 2008, she
went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue car. The two men

asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but not
Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper
with a number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived
home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be given
money by the two males.30

Ruling of the trial court

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
held31 that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph (a), Section
3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in prostitution as defined under paragraph [c] of the
same Section; the act of sexual intercourse need not have been consummated for the mere
transaction i.e. the solicitation for sex and the handing over of the bust money of Php1,000.00
already consummated the said act.

. . . .

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A.
9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION
(Php1,000,000.00).

Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and awarded moral
damages. The dispositive portion of the decision33 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim.
Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay
each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted and gave due
course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014.

The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17, 2014.37

In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the Superintendent
of the Correctional Institution for Women to confirm the confinement of accused.39

Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective manifestations,
stating that they would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all issues had been discussed
in the appellants brief and appellees brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated
June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed accuseds confinement at the Correctional
Institution for Women since October 27, 2010.

The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

However, based on the arguments raised in accuseds brief, the sole issue may be dissected into the
following:

(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there was no pri
surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation;43


(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt even though there was
evidence presented to show that accused has a history of engaging in human trafficking;44 and


(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA admitted that she works as
prostitute.45

Arguments of accused

Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into committing the
crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their subject was.47
Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged victims.

Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because the prosecution
did not present evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging in human trafficking or any
other offense. She denied being a pimp and asserted that she was a laundrywoman.48 In addition, AAA
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to display herself to solicit
customers.49

Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, argued that
the trial court did not err in convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her as the person
who solicited customers and received money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and
have been recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court
was correct in stating that accused had fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . .53

We affirm accused Shirley A. Casios conviction.

I.

Background of Republic Act No. 9208

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was adopted and
opened for signature, ratification and accession54 on November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented
by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3)
the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components
and Ammunition.55

On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified
by the Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocols entry into force was on
December 25, 2003.58

In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 3

Use of terms

For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a)
have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall be considered trafficking in persons even if this does not involve any of the means set
forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) Child shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the
enabling law of the countrys commitment to [the] protocol.59

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described trafficking in persons
as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is tantamount to
modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence against
human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion,
deception, abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and
indentured servitude.

. . . .

As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations
Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families; and the United Nations Resolution
on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations Convention Against Organized
Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.

At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.

Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall squarely address
human trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator
Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when other laws exist that
cover trafficking.61

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised Penal Code, Republic
Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-
Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues
such as illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public documents and the mail-order bride
scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons resulting in
prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one or some elements of

trafficking independent of their results or consequence.62 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human trafficking.
Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.

II.

Elements of trafficking in persons

The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders.
(2) The means used which include threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
of organs.63
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was amended by Republic Act
No. 10364 as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum,
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall
also be considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the
following acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The act of recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;
(2) The means used include by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person,
or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were
peddled to the police who acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her
services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute because she needed money.67 Accused
took advantage of AAAs vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the

testimonies of the witnesses.68

III.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She concludes that
AAA was predisposed to having sex with customers for money.69 For liability under our law, this
argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can
still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
a Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
b
c The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
shall also be considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of the means set
forth in the preceding paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)
The victims consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed
by perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a
minors consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in persons. Accused was
charged under Section 4(a), which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or judicial, to commit
any of the following acts.

a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those
done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in persons is
qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
a When the trafficked person is a child;
b
c When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995 and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
d
e When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group;
f
g When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over
the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
h
i When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or
law enforcement agencies;

j
k When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
l
m When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes
insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines child as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:

. . . .

b. Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is
unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons,
accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she peddled AAA and BBB
and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was
also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.

Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at Queensland
Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her certificate of live
birth was presented as evidence to show that she was born on January 27, 1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the offense of
trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the trial
court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he act of sexual intercourse need not have been consummated for the mere transaction i.e. that
solicitation for sex and the handing over of the bust money of Php.1,000.00 already consummated the
said act.75
IV.

Validity of the entrapment operation

In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to determine whether
there was a valid entrapment operation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the subjective or origin of intent test
laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents. All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and
character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc.,
are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the
accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects an attempt
to draw a line between a trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. If the
accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity,
the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.

Some states, however, have adopted the objective test. . . . Here, the court considers the nature of the
police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements
used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the
crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether
the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than
one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-
abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in determining the

whether there was an entrapment operation or an instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test
should not preclude courts from also applying the subjective test. She pointed out
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applying the subjective test it is worth invoking that accused-appellant procures income from being a
laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-appellants history in
human trafficking or engagement in any offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic]
been apprehending human traffickers for quite some time.79 (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance before the
entrapment operation.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation. In Chang v.
People,80 this court explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to
commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit
the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police to commit the
offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a laundrywoman. On this
argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by
calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the officers responded, it
was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the transaction. As
testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by saying Chicks mo dong? If
accused had no predisposition to commit the offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.

The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to D.
Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted girls.
There was no illicit inducement on the part of the police for the accused to commit the crime.

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights.83 The marked money
retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was
presented in court as evidence.84

On accuseds alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of Appeals noted that
accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot be given
credence.85

With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment
operations validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of flexibility in police
operations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the
conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the
police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated
in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is
of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing
the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.

V.

Imposition of fine and award of damages


The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No.
9208 provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the
offenses enumerated in this Act:

. . . .

c.
Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also
award exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance with the
ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of
Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

. . . .
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without ones
consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and
atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was
trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being
committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its accompanying
desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that society
even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the
best of our world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last resort taken
just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a foundation
for two human beings to face lifes joys and challenges while continually growing together with many
shared experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the world that we create also for
others.


Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of
our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in environments free of the
vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the
conviction of accused in this case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope that our people
and our government unite against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to finally stamp
out slavery and human trafficking.

There are more AAAs and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too, need to be shown
that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27,
2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a), qualified
by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:

(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and

(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.