CRUZ, ROLANDO JR., T.

CE31FA2

WRITTEN REPORT ON JOB SAFETY ANALYSIS AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

JOB SAFETY ANALYSIS
A Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is one of the risk assessment tools used to identify and control
workplace hazards. A JSA is a second tier risk assessment with the aim of preventing personal
injury to a person, or their colleagues, and any other person passing or working adjacent, above
or below. JSAs are also known as Activity Hazard Analysis (AHA), Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) and
Task Hazard Analysis (THA).
Purpose
The purpose of a JSA is to identify workplace hazards with a 'Likelihood' of possible or
greater. Controls are then selected and applied to reduce the risk associated with the identified
hazards to acceptable levels in accordance with the principles of 'ALARP' and using the 'Hierarchy
of Control'.
Workplace Hazard Definition
A workplace hazard is defined as anything that has the potential to injure or harm.
Workplace Hazard Categories
1. Types,
2. Groups
3. Families.
Workplace Hazard Types
1. Hazards to Safety - Anything assessed as 'possible', or greater, to cause an immediate
injury
2. Hazards to Health - Anything assessed as 'possible', or greater, to cause harm by exposure
over time.
Workplace Hazard Groups
1. Physical Object Hazard Touch or inhale it.
2. Hazardous Work Type Requires a permit, qualification etc.
3. Duty of Care Breaches - Legislative &/or company contraventions.
Hazard Families
There are many hazard families. The following list is not exhaustive. Many hazards will fit
into more than one family.
Physical, Chemical, Electrical, Mechanical, Hydraulic, Pneumatic, Biological, Magnetic, Thermal,
Gravitational, Environmental, Psychological, Invisible, Visible, and Developing.

Workplace Hazard Criterion

The criterion is a set of standards to assist in deciding to include, or exclude, certain
identified hazards related to our task.
The workplace hazard criterion used to identify genuine workplace hazards is:
1. It is clearly identifiable - Clearly identifiable means that we are specific about the hazard
to the point where the hazard type, group and family are instantly linked to it.
2. A scenario is not required for its articulation - It can be clearly described in five, or less,
words. If you cannot, it probably is not a hazard.
3. It has an inherent likelihood of possible or greater - If the hazard you are applying the criteria
to does not have an inherent likelihood of Possible, or greater, then drop it and move on.
4. It is without judgmental adjectives - Judgmental adjectives are negative and sometimes
overlap with descriptions of absence. Adjectives such as poor, deficient, defective, scant, weak,
unsound, faulty are not to be used in the hazard column.
5. It contains no descriptions of absence - Descriptions of absence are usually negative and
sometimes overlap with Judgmental adjectives. They include: Without, lack of, minimal,
unsuitable, unavailable, inadequate, missing, non-existent.
When a JSA is required
- Workplace hazard identification and an assessment of those hazards should be performed
before every job.
- JSAs are usually developed when directed to by a supervisor, when indicated by the use
of a first tier risk assessment and whenever a hazard associated with a task has a
likelihood rating of 'possible' or greater.
- A JSA is a documented risk assessment developed when company policy directs people to
do so.
- Generally, high consequence, high likelihood tasks are addressed by way of a JSA.
- High consequence, high likelihood tasks include, but are not limited to, those with:
A history of, or potential for, injury, harm or damage such as those involving:
1. Fire, chemicals or a toxic or oxygen deficient atmosphere.
2. Tasks carried out in new environments.
3. Rarely performed tasks.
4. Tasks that may impact on the integrity or output of a processing system.

How a JSA is created

The JSA or JHA should be created by the work group performing the task. Sometimes it is
expedient to review a JSA that has been prepared when the same task has been performed
before but the work group must take special care to review all of the steps thoroughly to ensure
that they are controlling all of the hazards for this job this time. The JSA is usually completed on
a form. The most common form is a table with three columns (although each company has a
variation with many having five or six columns). The headings of the three columns are (1) Job
Step (2) Hazard (3) Controls. A Hazard is any factor that can cause damage to personnel, property
or the environment (some companies include loss of production or downtime in the definition as
well). A Control is any process for controlling a hazard. The work group firstly breaks down the
entire job into its component steps. Then, for each step, hazards are identified. Finally, for each
hazard identified, controls are recorded in the 3rd column.
After the JSA worksheet is completed
After the JSA worksheet is completed, the work group that is about to perform the task
should have a toolbox talk, and discuss the hazards and controls, delegate responsibilities, ensure
that all equipment and PPE described in the JSA are available, that contingencies such as fire
fighting are understood, communication channels and hand signals are agreed etcetera. Then, if
everybody in the work group feels that it is safe to proceed with task, work should commence.
If at any time during the task circumstances change, then work should be stopped
(sometimes called a "time-out for safety"), and the hazards and controls described in the JSA
should be reassessed and additional controls used or alternative methods devised. Again, work
should only recommence when every member of the work group feels it is safe to do so.
When the task is complete it is often of benefit to have a close-out or "tailgate" meeting,
to discuss any lessons learned so that they may be incorporated into the JSA the next time the
task is undertaken.

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Accident analysis is carried out in order to determine the cause or causes of an accident
or series of accidents so as to prevent further incidents of a similar kind. It is also known as
accident investigation. It may be performed by a range of experts, including forensic scientists,
forensic engineers or health and safety advisers. Accident investigators, particularly those in the
aircraft industry, are colloquially known as "tin-kickers".
Accident analysis is performed in four steps:
1. Fact gathering: After an accident happened a forensic process starts to gather all possibly
relevant facts that may contribute to understanding the accident.
2. Fact Analysis: After the forensic process has been completed or at least delivered some
results, the facts are put together to give a "big picture." The history of the accident is
reconstructed and checked for consistency and plausibility.
3. Conclusion Drawing: If the accident history is sufficiently informative, conclusions can be
drawn about causation and contributing factors.
4. Counter-measures: In some cases the development of counter-measures is desired or
recommendations have to be issued to prevent further accidents of the same kind.
There exist numerous forms of Accident Analysis methods. These can be divided into three
categories
1. Causal Analysis uses the principle of causality to determine the course of events. Though
people casually speak of a "chain of events", results from Causal Analysis usually have the
form of directed a-cyclic graphs the nodes being events and the edges the cause-effect
relations. Methods of Causal Analysis differ in their respective notion of causation.
2. Expert Analysis relies on the knowledge and experience of field experts. This form of
analysis usually lacks a rigorous (formal/semiformal) methodological approach. This
usually affects falsify-ability and objectivity of analyses. This is of importance when
conclusions are heavily disputed among experts.
3. Organizational Analysis relies on systemic theories of organization. Most theories imply
that if a system's behaviour stayed within the bounds of the ideal organization then no
accidents can occur. Organizational Analysis can be falsified and results from analyses can
be checked for objectivity. Choosing an organizational theory for accident analysis comes
from the assumption that the system to be analysed conforms to that theory.