.... . .

WHAT IS THEORY?

of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Popper himself - in his defence certainly recognized this difficulty: 'There are no pure obseryations: they
are pervaded by theories and guided by both problems and theories, (Popper,
1
Logik der Forschung, p. 76; original emphass). He too emphasized that every
account of an observation, every statement about an event, every 'basic statement', uses concepts that cannot be corroborated by unmediated sensory data.
He was thus also of the opinion that every attempt to test a theory must conelude or begin with sorne sort of basic statements upon whose correctness
researchers must agree on the basis of convention or by mak.ing a decision.
Scence, for Popper, is thus not built upon a rock, but in a certain sen se on (provisional) dogmas, on conventions or scientists, (more or less) arbitrary deci . .
sions to recognize as correct basic statements about observations. But this was no
great problem for Popper since he was of the opinion that we may in turn - if any

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doubt arises as to their correctness- subject these basic statements to scrutiny)

that is, test them .
As it turned out, philosophers of science and scientists carrying out research
on how scientists actually work were dissatisfied with this Popperian defence

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of the method of falsification. One book, which was to become almost as

famous as Popper's Logic, carne to play a particularly important role in this
debate: Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions from 1962 .
Kuhn (1922-96), an American originally trained as a physicist) investigated
the process of research in his home discipline in quasi-sociological fashion,
focusing primarily on the historical development of physics (and chemistry)
and more generally the way in which new theories come into being in the natural sciences. Kuhn made an astonishing discovery quite out of synch with the
principie of falsification championed by Popper. The history of science certainly features countless cases in which specific scientific statements were falsified. Howevert what Kuhn observed in his historicalsociological analyses
was that as a rule this did not then lead to the rejection of entire theories, from
which these statements were derived or to their replacement by others. Kuhn
showed. that the history of the natural sciences was replete with new discover-

ies. inventions, etc. which fundamentally contradicted the major theories of

the day: LavoJsiers discovery of oxygen, for example~ fundamentally contra
d-cted the reigning theory of phlogiston, according to which this csubstance,
is gJven otfby all burning bodies. Yet Lavoisler's discovery did not lead to the
immediate rejection of the ~old and - as we now know - incorrect theory of
phlogiston. On the contraryl it was made more specific, modified and reconstructed i.n order to render comprehensible Lavoisier~s discovery; this discovery was not regarded as a falslfication~ but merely as a problematic observation,
a

The quotation from Poppera Logik dtr Forschung. the German version of The Logic of
Scientific Di~cov1ry, appearsln an addendum inserted by -the author in 1968 this was not
included ln the EnUah translatlon .

ll

SOCIAL THEORY: TWENTY lNTRODUCTORY LECTURES

a tt~pora.ry puzzle, an anomali within a proven theory. Kuhn documented a

~ultttude o such or s~~ cases in th.e history of science~ drawing our attenti~n to the fact - and this 1s the key potnt - that this adberence to the old theon~s was by no rneans an expression of dogmatism or irra.tionality. Again and
aga1n. tbere have been good reasons for this conservatism: the old theories
have ~roved their worth in the past; it may be possible to integrate the new discovenes by further developing the old theories, by means of auxiliary hypotheses ~or exa~ple; the new theory has not yet been fully worked out and is often
deficJent or 1ncomplete; it is possible that we are dealing merely with faulty
measurements rather than genuine falsification, and so on. In brief~ in the context of scientific practice. there has often been a complete lack of clear criteria
by which to ascertain when a tbeory should be considered falsified.
Kuhn,s book deals exdusively with the history of the natural sciences. But
very similar accounts of the research process can of course al so be found in
the humanities and social sciences. where it seems to be even more difficult
to destroy a theory, that is, to falsify it as a whole, by means of an empiric.al observation. We need only think of the history of Marxism. As a social
scientific theory, Marxism can of course - and it itself demands no less - be
tested against social reality. Now, many of the theoretical statements formulated or defended by Marx or Marxists, to put it carefully, conflict with empirical reality. Much of what Marx predicted never happened: the polarization of
the population into a rich capitalist class on the one hand and a numerically
hu~ proletariat on the otber failed to occur; the socialist revolutions forecast
by Marx and Engels did not take place or at least not where they were supposed t~ namely in the industrially advanced countries under the leadership
of the working dass; successful revolutions took place at best on the global
peripheries and with a significa.nt role being played by the peasantry. that is,
the 'wrong' group of people; the dissolution of all particularistic ties. predicted
by Marx and Engels in t.he Communist Manifesto, supposedly propelled by
the economy- among other things, they predicted that nation-states would
disap~ar - did not hap~n either. In fact, the late nineteenth and twentieth
unturies turned the assumptions of Marx and Engels upside down: this was
the great age of nationalism and nation-states. If one adhered to the Popperian
principie of falsifkation. all these observations would have inevitably led to
conclusive refutation of Marxism and thus its defi.nitive rejection. But this
did not occur. Those convinced of the vadity of Marxism as an approach to
research aJways managed to persuade themselves, and dearly others too, of
the productivity of the Marxist paradigm by means of a series of auxiliary
bypoth~ses. The proletarianization of tbe majority of the population in the
highJy industriaud countrie-&, so the argument goes, failed to occur becaus.e
capitaJj$m managed to relieve poverty at home by intensifying exploitation

iild Workf; this was also the reason why revolutions failed to take
place in the Western countries, in which theworkers were (bought' by 'capital',
o{ the

13

WHAT IS THEORY?

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through welfare benefits for example, but took place instead in the countries
of the impoverished and exploited Third World; and Marx and Engels m~y
indeed have been too quick to forecast the end of the nation-state, but today- In
the age of globalization - things were happening precisely as they had always
predicted, and so on. In brief, Marxian t~eor.y is said .~ot to be wrong, but
merely to require adaptation to changed histoncal condittons.
.
You can decide for yourselves what you make of this defence of Marx1sm.
For our purposes, all that rnatters is the insight that the natural and social
sciences in general, and by no means only Marxism, appear to entall a fairly
large number of defensive lines from which the proponents of a theory can
shield it against empirical falsification. In fact, theories in the social sciences
have in sorne ways proved even more resistant to unambiguous falsification
than in the natural sciences. The former not only feature disagreements over
precisely wbat falsification entails, but even about what exactly a theory is saying. While natural scienti.fic theories are for the most part relatively clearly
formulated, the social sciences and humanities are more often confronted with
the problem that there is no real agreement over precisely what the content of
a theory is. You may be familiar with this phenomenon from your seminars on
the dassical sociological authors or from reading the secondary literature on
them. What did Marx, Durkheim, Weber, etc. really say? What is the correct ,
once-and-for-all interpretation of the theories of Marx, Durkheim, Weber,
and others? But a theory whose very content is contested is, logically, scarcely
amenable to unambiguous empirical falsifi.cation.
But let us return to Kuhn and his book The Structure ofScientific Revolutions.
According to him, in the natural sciences at any rate, there are no compelling
logical arguments against a theory; there can be no unambiguous falsification.
And, Kuhn suggests, we should not be surprised ifthe daily routine of research
passes off without much sign of criticism. Exlsting theories are u sed for long
periods without being scrutinized, precisely because scholars are convinced
of their fundamental fruitfulness. This routinized type of research Kuhn calls
'normal science'. Puzzling or contradictory occurrences, problematic experiments, etc. are not regarded as falsification in the course of ~normal sdence',
but rather~ to repeat, as anomalies, which one hopes to be able to remove or
resolve at sorne point with existing theoretical means. 'Normal science, is
research

firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that sorne particular scientific community acknowledges for a
time as supplying the fuundation for its fu r ther practice .

(Kuhn, Structure. p. 10)

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Further, the history of science, according to Kuhn, only very ra.rely features
instances of individual sdentists suddenly embracing a new theoretical edi

fice in response to a persuasive argument or impressive experiment. The

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'".c.N 1 y lNTROOUCTORY LECTURBS

In any case, Kuhn's works were the point of departure for a vehement debate
within the philosophy of science on the status of science, particularly in the
19~0s and 1970s. While sorne criticized Kuhn for giving free rein to relativism
(hts t~k of the ~n.commensur~biliti of theories, whose quality could not be
estabbshed tmplrtcally, was sa1d to place science on tbe same Ievel as any old
world view, making ratonal discussion impossible}, others welcomed the rela..
tivistic conclusions which - so they beiieved - could be drawn from Kuhn's
analyses. The 'anarchistic' and for a time highly fashionable philosopher of
science Paul Feyerabend stated, for example, that neither their methods nor
results legitimate the ambitions of scientists: 'Science is one [i]deology among
many' (Science in a Free Society, p. 106), tbat is, merely one form ofknowledge
among others (such as rnagic) . .
But both the orthodox defenders of science and their anarchistc critics interpreted Kuhn wrongly or at least in a very individual fashion. Kuhn
did n.ot assert that competing paradigms constitute totalities or world views
hermetically sealed off from one another, between which, and with respect to
their empirical fruitfulness, it is impossible to rationally choose, but in which
one could at best profess one~s faith- as with different religions. He merely
argued that in many cases no truly clear empirica/ .criterion exists enabling us
to decide why we have to choose one paradigm rather than another. This is,
however, not the same as saying that no arguments at all may be put forward
for accepting or rejecting a theory (on this line of reasoning, see Bernstein>
The Restructuring ofSodal and Political Theory, pp. 152-67). By no means did
Kuhn launch a frontal attac.k on the rationality of 'science' in his account of
the history of science. In bis view, the transition from one theory to another
is neither an unfounded choice.between vocabularies nora mysterious shift
from one theoretical discourse to another. There certainly are reasons why
it is necessary to adopt a new paradigm. lt is possible to discuss rationally the
paradigm shift to which one aspires or which one rejects; the pros and cons of
the particular theory can be weighed up, even if we must give up the hope that
there is one crucial experiment, that will make the decision for us.
What is more) Kuhns analyses of the history of science- though his radical
and problematical notjon of the 'incommensurabiliti of paradigrns appears
to exdude this - almost always show that paradigms overlap substantiaUy.
The various theoretical edifices are connected by many corridors. In reality,
not just the history ofthe natural sciences, but also that ofthe social sclences,
shows that certain tmpirical findings are unanlmously endorsed by the rep
resentatives oC dlfering pandigms, and that even a fair number of theorttical
statements meet with general approval beyond the boundaries of paradigms.
What does alJ tbis mean for the social sciences or for social theoryf We can

draw two 'onclualons from our discuasion of the philotophy of sclence so far.
particulady from the Kuhnian analyaea, whieh are of great significance to the
foUowi.na lecturea. First: the fact that thc current theoretical landsc:ape of the

WHAT IS THEORY?

17

social sciences appears confusing, the fact that many dfferent social theores
or paradigms exist, some of which are at extreme variance with one anot~er,
does not mean tbat these theories or their theorists are incapable of engag1ng
in a rational debate. In the nneteen lectures to come we will be introducing
you to an array of theories. Yo u will see - and this is one of the central theses of
this lecture series - that the various theorists communicate with one another,
that they make critical reference to one another, such that their theores ove:lap, resemble and complement one another to sorne d~gree. ~e fact that soctology, for example, is not based on one single parad1gm arnved at through
abstraction (as applies, for example, to economics, in which a spedfic theoretical school is dearly dom.inant or hegemonic), the fact that a much lamented,
confusing theoretical diversity prevails within sociology, does not mean that
the subject is fragmenting, or is bound to fragment, into a collection of disconnected approaches.
For you, who are now being introduced to the world of modern social
theory, this leads to one inescapable conclusion. You will not, presumably,
become experts on all the theoretical schools presented here during the course
of your studies; no one could expect yo u to, especially since yo u would be hard
pushed to find a professor of the social sciences who is truly up to speed with
all these theoretical currents. But do not escape from this confusion by taking
refuge in the fi.rst theory that takes your fancy. There are already too many students who know only one single theory really well and who are so enthusiastic
about it that they disdainfully ignore all other approaches. Unfortunately, a
fair number ofyour professors, who have not infrequently specializ.ed in one
and only one theory and consider all other theories in principie 'bad ' or useless, are also a living example of such behaviour. As we have said, the vari
ous approaches that exist within sociology have much potential for mutual
exchange. For this reason we advise yo u toen gage in dialogue with different
theoretical schools as you proceed with your studies. This will help you
avoid one-sidedness and blindness to other perspectives. Given that, as we
have shown, empirical and theoretical knowledge are very much connected,
these are pitfalls that would surely rub off on your emprica! work.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the 'debate, between Popper and
Kuhn is directly relevant to the following lectures. If it is true that theoretical
issues cannot be settled solely with empirical means, that the levels of empirical and theoretical knowledge cannot be clearly separated, that - as Figure 1.1
on page 10 produced by Jeffrey Alexander elucidates - we must work on the
assumption that empirical and metaphysical environments are ranged along a
continuum, then lt is also clear that theoretical work within the social sciences
must be more than the mere creation and falsificatlon of laws or universal
statements, as should be the case acco.rding to Popper and the rational choice
theorJsts. Social theory must also concern itself with what are called 'general
presuppositions' in Ale~anders diagram. Theoretical issues thus range from

sic~JI authora o( ICX'ioloic&l

thfllt)' u wellaa modtrn social thtorista - h&vt

taktn up thtae thret qutaUon. We should ldd that theae art ol count always
cJOtely Unktd: thf tuttons ofhuman bflnas are nevet tntinly random. Socld
ordu1alwaya ~Jop. and tht~ ar~ tubject to hlttorical chanp. Though cbt
wrttinga of the the()~ta dbcuud in what (ollowa approach thtae qutstlona
ln markedly di.fhr~nt way - tornr '"re more lnteretted in actfon tban order,
many wtrt O(:~upied mQrt with aocjaf atablUty than social change - theae
muhUJJy entwined questions ha\'e aJwayt bern preunt. What mak~s these
question110 particuJarly Jntercsting u tbe ftct that the proceas of anawerlng
tbtm almoit inevttably leadl thtorlsta to makt ccrtain dtagnoaea eftbefr timt.
The various theori1u' oft.en hithJy abttract idea about social action, tocial
order and social tha.n p find exprewon - howtvtr dlrectly or indfrectly - in
vtry conc:rttt appralsab of tht state of conttmporry sodttics, thelr future
'devdopmmtaJ pctht' and ewn of thtir putt. Getting to grip1 wJth theu thrte
quettiona ia thUI not a purely fom,alistic tutciJf or an end in lUeJf. but leada
'" ctraihr to tbt htut of tbe ficld of actvty which maktJ the sodalaciencea
10 intdlectuaUy ltimulazing and anractlve to a broad publk: thdr atrtvins to
eodet~a aod detect future tremb.

...'

'

WHA'l' IS THEO&T!

SOCIAL THIO&Y: TW!NTY INT.IOD\JCTO&Y L.ICTUitES

aenuazations to
iaterptetive syst~nlS wbicb link
basic pbi~ic&L metapbyskal. political and moral a ttitu&s to the world..
A.n)OOt wishin to bt put of the social sdentific worJd cannot. therefo~.
~ enps.inl in critial d~t~ oo all thts(' ltwols. Th0$e hoping to stick with
purdy tmpricaJ ~ will bt disappointtd. (lt i$ surdy unnecessary for us
to repeat apio lhat out conaptioo oftheory Js not unconttsttd. As Wle havc
said. achute~ of rationaJ choice theori~s would not describe many of theo thc
ories pnsented in what follows u 'th~ies' in th~ first place. Should you wish
ro tW. look at tbe conttoversy sua rounding t~ queltioo 'What u (sodal)
t.beorr.. )'0'1 are advi~ to compart tht fint chapter of }eft'rt')' Alexander's
book lWf~try Ltctt4ns: Sociolotfcal11ttory sirtct World War JI with the com
nxnu ml<kby Hartmut Esser. one of Ge.rmany's lndlni rational choice thcoriJts, in bis book Soziologit. AllgtJtttiltt. GrvndiRgtn. chs. 3 and 4.)
Jf wr tk~ as our basis thls broad concept of theory. dots this QOt mtan tht
tbe debate must ntuuarily run out .o f control. with t\ttry scholar biS .own
th~ldln and nothinJ stand!n jn the way of an arbitra.ry incrt~ in tht
tu1mber ol thtorifd Quitf aimply~ tbc anawtr b -no~ It hu in fut ~e
appa~nt witbin t.M socJal sdenti6c disdplines- and this brings U$ badt to
our fint roncl:ulion- that dt'splt~ tb~ areat tht-oreUcal divenUy, scholan art
Ja.ratly Jn arerment about wbat thc fundamental or cott rrsearch topica ve.
And tt la posuble to i<WnUfy t ht'se. Wt btllew that tht thtorftict) d~vtlopm~nt
of the aocial acitnc~a can be undettood asttvolvln atound tbrte \'ery spt
cific qutsUons. Thcsc art 'What 11 actlonf'; 'What b aocial ordert: and wht
dtttrn1Jnes IOclal changef' AJI thtorbtl .. and thls applics to both tht dt$

"Ibis vuy fac1 furDL\bts us W.ith a basis <JO wbdl to ~ tbe followi"'
kc~ Our tbesis is that the
ol modeJ n social the:ory ~ be
understoOd a.s an unttasing search fur aftssJUs to tlw 1b1ee q1Kstions a:wa
tiooed above a.nd that tbe coowquent M-bateo -...s moved to a ~-
m tbt
l930s by a great Ame-rican sodolosist" to ra-bom succeDJ tbeists r~peet
edly reu - implkitly or explkitly. qprovinsly ~ .;~iticallr - to thi.s day. \\e
~ rtfwin to Tlkott Patsoos; in J.isbt ol~ si&
oi his. work ilc
nlodern social theoey the next thf< ltuns ~ ~'rote'd to bim~ lb<- bist~
.ofthe reption ofl'lkott Panons work dlo~"S "ith th<- ut~ dvt~ .t be
~t}' point '"bich W< ha\~ al~ad)' tout"hed upon and ~rlin abo'~ b~ no
mtans has socioJosy simp.l) disint~gnt~ into various ~vetkal ~ nor
hs tbis t~r bffi\ its C.tt. Ratbt.r. it b a dtscipline in "--hidt the ik,~ml
olthcy W.$ propelll tbrward throu~h romnl\lnkati\'\J\.. r.ttl\."\NJ di~tt'<' ..
m(nt 1nd contro,~rs.ial d~btt<-$. Arnong otht:r thi~ ~hobt$-\ t~n.knc~ ~
constalltly ~~r b.Kk to th(' S}'$t('nl of t~uaht l'f\~\k~ b~'! Ta"'""')tt ~lOs
Clftttd tht unit)t whicll \\~ n~)W w\~ "-" d~pict b\ tht su~~t ni~~n
l~turos.

Wt $hall 'n~y to youin A$ n'lU\1\ d~t1il a$. th< {\tt$<1\\ ~~~t l~"~ ~~
Parsoos undtrstuod St.xl~lacth.)n, h(\w h(l "'\~~h~ "\!. sil ~\1'\l~t\ "'ht ~
had ro ty about $udal d\a~, how ht tn~rpfft~ 'ht$~fllo "" ,nJ h\'wnJ "~l
tht othtr thtortUtaJ W\ools <-ontrtsttd wi~h hi$ ~it"~ \\'~al$\' ah~ l\) hrw1h
lntrod\l(<! you t() tht anost lmpt"tt<\nl tu\h\'"~ th~ fuunJ<.rs \)ft~ vttk,..a$ \~, ..
rttl~al s(hools. \1../e int.tnd t() lVt you tn QVt.ra\l \' \~\\~ ~\ftht 1\~\.j~ ~\f tl\\l'\tkt
~st&t(h in whkh the vtrlQus theo~tk. l S<hools WtN M$t hl~ t\) dt\~,'\~
thtir particular st~nthl, b\lt also t.h~~c that eltx\Std th~'r wttkn~sstl.. 1hu
last sht')Uld bt ofptrtleular int-erest to thost o()\lU whost inttrtst' ttnJ at wU
ultlmately t.end towards thf empirkal. lt wiU br.tng htn~ to you <>n<t ~iil
putnt w~ haw addrt&std on several occasb.1n&~ tht ulthnatt itnpos~ibility t
drawlng a d~ar d!vld.ln ltne betwetn en1pirkal and th~o~t.ical know\tdgt.
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