Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
C:. Pu
i-:11 \\I
r\ndrcws Lnivcrsity
compatible with free will and moral rcsponsil>ility. Some compatibilists favor a narrow
compatibilism (e.g., semicompati,bilism) wherein agents may be determined such that
they lack free will but nevertheless possess morn! responsibility. On the various forms
and contemporary issues regarding compatibilism, see the essays in Robert Kane, ed.
Tbc O.'\fnrd 1-landhook of free lr'iJI, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford Universiry Press, 201 l),
195
196
(entirely) determined by divine or other causes. Accordingly, h11mam h;H'e the
freedom to choose otherwise than they do.' That is, the1 possess libertarian
and signilicant freedom.'
The crux of the debate between compatibilists and libertarians, then,
depends on whether God unil:iterallr determim:s rhc outcome of all e\ents.
Can creatures will otherwise than they do, as many libertarians aflirm, or does
(;0<1 arbitrarily and unil:tternlly determine all occurrences such that creatures
only do what Cod has eternally determined? For many scholars, the outcn1rn:
of this debate hinges upon Scriptural support. However, many derenninists
and indeterminists claim biblical support for their positions while denying
that the opposite position docs justice w the biblical data.'
l.'i'.\..242 .
.:osrnr1c libertarians define human free will in a way that docs nnt l'ClJUin- rhc
freedom to do otherwise. ()n one such view (source incompatihilis111), alttrnatl
possibility is not l"ClJLiircd for fret:dom but merely "the absence of cxlcrnal causal
constr:lints determining one's action." \Villiam Lane Craig, "Response to Boyd," in
h111r I 'icll'.r 011 /)iti11c l'roridma, ed. Dennis .Jowers ((;rand Rapids, Ml: Zondcrnn,
2011), 226. This Yicw that altcrnare possibility is not a necessary condition of genuine
freedom accepts the upshot of l'rnnkfurtlype examples that aim ro demonstrate that
rhe abilicy ro do otherwise is nor :1 necessary condition of moral rcspnn~ihiliry. Since
Harry l'rnnkfurt's seminal article (",\lccrnatc Possibilities and l\loral ResponsibiLitl","
Jo11mal o/ l'hilosopl!J' 6(,/23 Jl %9]: 829839) such examples ha\c been the suhject of
ongoing debate. Sec the various positions esplaincrl in David Widerker and :\!ichacl
~fcKcnua, eds., 1.\loral Rl'.1-po11.ithili(J' mu/ /llknwtin: t>oJJibi/i/ie.r: Er.rt(J'.f 011 lhe fo1po1111;1c1 rf
,ll!t:moliri l'o.r.rihilities (Burling1on, \IT: A:digate, 200:\); Robert l\:anc, ed. "/"he 0.':jiml
l-l1111dbook 1!f het lr'i/I, 243-::ms. [ am among thosc not con\inccd rhat l :rnnkfurr-rypc
examples succcssfullr refute the principle of alternate possibili1r (PAP). Sec, fur <Ill'
example of the philosophical defense of p,\P, Carl Ginct, "In Defense of the Principle
of AlrcrnaLi\'C Possibilities: \'(/h~- J Don't Find hanl.Jurr's Ar;umcnr Corn-incing-,"
in ;\ lort1! l\1:.rpo11.rihih!1 tmd /l//cr11olin Possihih.lics: f-isst!J'J" 011 the IJJJporlana: t?l ..UknMli1:t
l'o.r.rihditic.r, ed. D:l\'id \Viderkcr and f\lidrnd 1\lcKenna (l3urling1on, \'T: ,\sh;atc,
2003), 5374. Nc,crrhclcss, the conclusion of this essar dncs not hinge upon rhe
P1\P \"Crsion of libertarian free will. t\ slighrl~- more modest definition of crearurcly
libcrrnrian freedom is sufftcienc, Howing from the fact of di,jne unfulfilled desire:-.
in Scripture, \vhich suggc:-;.t that crc1uun.:s possess (at lcasr) rhc freedom to choo:-.c
<>thenvise than ( ;od desires.
197
The indetcrminist who supports the significant freedom of humam
might ;1ppcal to numerous passages d1at explicitly describe human choice.
for example, in Deur. 30:19, God proclaims, "I ha\e set before you life and
death, the blessing and the curst-. So choose lit(; in order that )'OU may live."'
J .ikewise, Joshua stated, "choose for yourselves roday \\'horn you will serve"
whether Yl-1\V'H or the fobe gods llf Canaan (Josh 24: 15; cf. l f-.:.gs 18:21).
;\ccordingly, Cod proclaims judgment against his people because they ''chose
l;n:I that in which" c;od '\lid not ddight li''li"?I" (ls 65:12; cf. Ps 78:22).
Further, Scripture repeatnlly points to the conditionalit)' innihed in the
c;od-h1111rnn relationship. For instance, in Deur 11:20-28, God Sl'ales, "[am
setting before you today a blessing and a curse: the blessing if niu listen to
rite commandments of the: I .ORD your God ... and the curse, if you do not
liste11" (cf. 2 Chron 15:2;Jer 18:7-10). Lik<:wise, in Rom 1U:9, Paul states, "if
you confess with your mouth .Jesus as l.onL and believe in )'Our heart that
(;ml raised l lim from the dead, you will bes.wed" (cf. Acts 16:31; 1-leh 3:8,
12). Accordingly, Christ srates, "[ sta11d at the door and knock; if anyone
hears f\Iy \oice and opens the door, l \\'ill CllnH.: in to him and will dine wi1h
h?111, and he with f\k" (Rev 3:20; cflohn l: 12; :l: 16-18; 8:31-32).
In my \iew, the n;rses abm-e and many c,thcrs do refer to the freedom
of human agents to will otherwise than they do. f-lowC\-cr, the compatibilist
responds to these passages by claiming that human freedom docs not exclude
determinism, and docs so br defining freedom as merely the absence of
external compubion, nor the freedom to choose otherwise than one docs.
That is, human free \\ill and divine determinism ;ire compatible if free will
means rhat llne's will is not externally compelled but is ne\Trthde:;s determined
by the unilatcralh- efficacious di\'ine will. Compatibilists freL1uently appeal to
p>1ssages such as Gen 50:20, where .Joseph states of his brothers' c\il in selling
him into slavery, "you mcallt evil against me, but (;od meant it for good
in order to hring about this present rt:sult, t> pnsc!Tc manr people ali\'e."
Likewise, compatibilists point to Phil 2: 12- l:l, which states, "work out rnur
saharion with fear and trembling; for it is (;od who is at work in you, both to
\\'ill and to work for Hi.r good pleasure." [n 1hcse texts (and others like them),
the comparibilist claims that the free will of humans (secondary causation)
acts in subordination to God's mernrching dcrerminism (primary causation).
Corncrsely, the indetcrminist maintains that these texts (and others like them)
do not support compatibilism but mcrcl1 assert that Cod's prmidcntial
actions, which do not preclude the libertarian freedom nf humans, can
bring good out of e\'il (Gen 50:20) and work out the s:ilv;nion of those who
respond positi\-cly LO his free gift (Phil 2: 12-1.'i).''
dctenninin)!; that Joseph be sold into slmcn to meet the problem of the famine \\'hen
( ;od could ~imply L"emo,-c rhc famine unilatcrall~) le appcar:-; that :-;omc other factor
or factors were operative.
198
52
(,\1 11 'I~
2014)
This brings the debate between the compatibilist and the advocate of
significant freedom to an apparent impasse. Both claim that their arguments
arc based on Scriptural p~ssages that negate the perspectin; of the other.
However, it seems to me that the discussion migln remain on the basis of a
canonical approach ro theological method and yet be advanced by approaching
the issue from a rheocenrric perspccri,c.' Thal is, rather than focusing on
human freedom
human freedom, the discussion might be advanced by
focusing on the logically prior tiuestion, is God's will always efficacious' Thar
is, does God alwars get what he wants?"
'!""
r\n abundance of biblical e1idencc suggests that God docs not always get
what he wants. That is, there are some things that God wills tlrnt do not
come to fruition. Scripture displars a number of instances where God's will
is unfulfilled because creatures reject or resisL that which God desires.'' For
instance, Isaiah speaks of God's desire to save his people, saying that he
"longs [;i::::n] to be gracious" to them and "waits on high to ha\e compassion,"
but they were "not willing" (;i:iK; Isa 30:15, 18). 10 Likewise, God "called, but
no one answer[ed]," and he "spoke, but they did not listen. And they did
evil in [11is] sight and chose that in which [he] did not delight" (Isa 66:4; cf.
65:12;Jer 19:5). In these instances, God desires to redeem his people but they
themselves reject his will for them. The rejection of Gu<l's will by humans
is also explicit in Luke 7:30, which states that "the Pharisees an<l the lawyers
rejected God's purpose !Pou.A.~] for themselves" (cf. l\lark 7:24). 11 Further,
"The canonical approach l hm-c in mind here gi''es methodological priority to the
canonical data. See John C. Peckham, "The Analogr of Scripture Revisited: ,\ Final
Form Canonical Approach to Systematic Theologl'," Mid-A111erirn Jnuma/ of Thnil~~)'
22 (2011), 41-53.
KJ-lerc and throughout the article, to cwant" refers ro the desire or \vish for some
outcome (without connoting need), and that which God wants (or desires) is defined
as that which God would bri11g about if he were to unilaternlll' and causally determine
the outcome.
''Of course, a full discussion of the divine will is far berond the scope of this essay.
For further information on the canonical data regarding the divine will, particularly
with regard to divine unfullilled desires and human freedom, see the extensive survey
in John C. Peckham, The Colll~f'I of /)iritte Lo/!e itt the Co11lexl of' the God-IVodd Relationship
(New York: Peter Lang), forthcoming. Sec also the discussion in John C. Peckham,
"Providence and God's Unfulfilled Desires," l'hilosopbia Chn:rti 15/2 (2013), 453-462.
i.'That God "waits" (;i~n) on the people suggests that (iud makes his action(s)
dependent upon contingencies.
11 As Joseph Fitzmyer comments, "the Pharisees and lawyers thwarted God's
design on their behalf." lJike I-TX, rnl. 28 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981). 670.
Cf. Joel B. (;rccn, The Gospel of' f .11ke, NTCNT (Grand Rapids, 1\ll: Eerdmans, 1997),
301; Darrell L. Bock, f .Jth: I:/ .9:50, BECNT (Grnnd Rapids, i\11: Baker, 1994), 678. H .
.J. Ritz adds that this assumes "that the ~OUAl'J of c;od can be hindered." "PouA.11," in
199
Jesus frec1uentl)' refers to those who do "the will" [8~A:r1aJ of the Father
with the implication that God's will is not always done (Matt 7:21; 12:50;
18:14; Mark 3:35;John 6:40; cf. i\latt 6:10;.John 7:17; 9:31). 12
Various Christological examples parallel the wider examples of Go<l's
unfulfilled desires.''
example, Jesus's will is explicitly thwarted or rejected
when Jesus wanted (8EAW) no 0;1e to know of his location but "he could
not escape notice" (Mark 7:24; cf. Luke 12:49)." fourther, Jesus poignantly
laments, "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who
are sent to her! !-low.often I wanted [8EA.W] to gather your children together,
the way a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling
[8EA.W]" (Matt 23:37; cf. Luke 13:34; John 5:40). 1' Notice that, lw the same
verb (8EA<v), Christ's will is directly opposed by the will of huma1;s.
In many other instances, God's will is unfulfilled. (io<l does not desire
or have "pleasure" [y;:mj in the death of the wicked but desires repentance
(Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11). However, many reject him."' Therefore, God's will
ror
Excgeti{(I/ Diction"!)' of the Nell' Test"111ent, ed. Horst Robert Baiz and Gerhard Schneider
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 224. Piper, howe\er, claims that "themselves" does
not modify "God's purpose" but modifies "rejected" such that "Luke would be saying
that the plan of salvation preached br John the Baptist was accepted br some and
rejected by others 'for themselves."' Piper, "Are There Two Wills in God?" 119, no.
26. However, this interpretation is not convincing.
"See R. T. France, The Gospel of M"tthew, NICNT (Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmans,
2007), 246. Cf. John Nolland, The Gospel of Ma1the11, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, l\!I:
Eerdmans, 2005), 288. Cf Matt 21:31; Luke 12:47; 1 John 3:22. Marshall comments,
"It is as we freely yield oursel,es to God that he is able to accomplish his will through
us and our prayers. In a very real sense, therefore, the accomplishment of God's will
in the world docs depend on our prayers." I. Howard i\larshall, The Epistle.r of John,
NICNT (Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmans, 1978), 245.
"The relevance of such instances from the life of Christ to the present study
depends upon the Christological perspectiYc that one takes regarding the nature of
the will of the person of Christ, an a<lequate treatment of which is far beyond the
scope of this essay. Suffice it to say here that I consider the texts referenced here to
he relevant examples on the affirmation of the full divinity and full humanity of the
single person of Christ, on the basis of which I resist the tendency to assign particulor
actions of Christ to either his divine or human nature. Yet, those who guestion whether
these might be properly taken as examples of the divine will might nevertheless see
them as (minimally) relevant in that they parallel the earlier an<l later examples of
divine unfullille<l desires.
"See Robert I-I. Stein, Luke, NAC (Nash\ille: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 364.
Cf. C.l'D. Moule, An Jdio111 ./look of Nc111 TesfaJJtellf Creek, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 137, 87; I. Howard Marshall, 'O;c Gospel
of I Jtke, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MT: Eerdmans, 1978), 546.
"Human \\"ills e.xplicitly rejected the will of Jesus. Sec l'rance, "/Y>e Cn.rpd of
M,111hm-, 883; Nolland, The Gn.rpd of Ma1thc11, 951.
"'Although God bas no pleasure in anyone's death, "Yahweh \\"ill not impose his
200
52
(AL TDl1'
2014)
grace on a rebellious people. The)' must accept rcsponsibilir1 for both the course of
their lives and their destiny. \V'ithout repentance Goll cannot forgive an<l the death
sentence remains ine,itable." Daniel I. Block, The Hook o/ hzekiel.- Chapters 1-24
(NICOT; Grand Rapids,/\!!: Ecrdmans, 1997), 589.
,-Anton Viigtle contends that this Yerse excludes the Calvinist/Determinist
perspectiYe. J)erj11daslm'ej; der l. />elm.rb1icj; EKK (Diisseldorf: Benziger Verlag, 1994),
231-232. Cf. D. ~ll'iller, "9fAC.J," N/})NJT 3: 1020. Further, a number of exhortations
to prove, understand, and do the will of God imply that humans mar will otherwise
than they do (Rom 12:2; Eph 5:17; Eph 6:6; cf. Col 1:9; 4:12; I Thess 4:3; 5:18; cf.
Phlm 14). While such exhortations are not positi\e examples of (;od's unfulfilled will,
such exhortations would be superAuous if God's will were always rnrried our.
J.
"Cf. Richard J. Bauckham, 2 Prle1; Jude, WBC (Dallas: \\'ord, 2002), 313; Douglas
2 J>,/crnt11!J1ull', NIV application commentarr (Grand Rnpids, l\11: Zondcnan,
~[oo,
1996), 188.
201
mine).''' Go<l does indeed desire the salvation of every individual, yet some
are lost.
The biblical data thus demonstrate that God's will is sometimes
unfulfilled. The question, then, is il~Y God's desires sometimes go unfulfilled.
That is, why docs God sometimes not get what he wants? As explained below,
an appeal to compatibilism docs not adequately explain these texts, because if
God unilaterally determines all events, he should be able to bring to fruition
c\erything that he desires without anrthing that he does not desire. The
existence of unfulfilled divine desires does not make sense from a determinist
perspective but is perfectly coherent from an indeterminist perspective.
God'.r Ideal and Effective IV'i/ls
Because God is omnipotent, that some of his desires do not come to pass
suggests a distinction between rwo kinds of divine wills: ideal and effcctive. 211
God's ideal will refers to that which woul<l take place if all agents acted in
perfect accor<lance with God's desires, whereas God's effective will refers to
God's will that has already taken into account all factors, including the wills
'''Manr indeterminist interpreters agree. Thus, Davids states that God wants
"'cveryonc'/'all' to come to repentance .. .. God's will n1ay not be done, but it will not
be for lack of trying on his p:irt." Peter 1-1. Davids, The Lettm of 2 Peter aJ1d]J1de, PNTC
(Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmans, 2006), 281. Similarly, Eric Fuchs and Pierre Reymond
belieYe this text argues against determinism. I.a deuxicme Epitrc de Saint Pierre. L'epitre de
St1inl )11de, Commentaire du Nomeau Testament (Neuchatel, Switzerland: Delachaux
& Niestle, 1980), 115-116. Likewise, some of the foremost <leterminist interpreters
belieYe I Tim 2:4 and others describe God's genuine desire for the salvation of all. See
Piper, "Arc There Two Wills in God?" 108; Thomas R. Schreiner, /, 2 Peter, )11de, NAC
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2007), 382.
'"Manr others have also recognized some distinction in the will or wills of God.
For example, I. Howard Marshall states, "We must certainly dis.tinguish between what
God would like to see happen and what he actuallr does will to happen, and both of
these things can be spoken of as God's will." l. Howard Marshall, "Universal Grace
and Atonement in the Pastoral Epistles," in The Grace of God, the IVill of Man: A Cruc
for An111i1it111i.r111, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis, MN: llethanr House, 1995), 56.
Consider also Kenneth Keathley's summary of the four primary positions on God's
will, specificallr as it relates ro God's desire to save all or the lack thereof. Two major
perspectives-universalism and decretal theologr-vicw God's will as simple. The
former view conrends that God desires to save all and does so, whereas the latter
contends that Gnd desires to save only some. The other two major perspectivesrhe hidden/ revealed wills paradigm and the antecedent/ consequent wills paradigm''iew God's will as complex. The former is represented by Schreiner and Piper in this
essay, whereas my view corresponds more closely to the latter paradigm. Kenneth
Keathley, S11h>1lion a11d Jmueig11ty: A Molinist Approt1ch (Naslwille, TN: B&H Academic,
2010), 44-62.
202
S1.\11>..11n S'ILl>ll-'
52
(AtTl'.\I~
2014)
of significantly free creatures.~' t\s such, it includes not only the actin: di,ine
will but also th<lt which God merely allows (his permissive will).
For example, although God's ideal desire was that ,\dam and E\c
not disobey him and cat the forbidden fruit, God also desired the kind of
reciprocal divine-human love relationship that is predicated on the significant
freedom of both parties. Therefore, God permitted i\<lam and Eve to depart
from his ideal will in favor of allowing significant freedom. To take another
example, God did not sadistically delight in, or ideally desire, the crucifixion
of Christ (cf. Lam .1:32-.13). Rather, it was his "pleasure" only in the wider
context of the plan of salvation. That is, because of. his Ion: for his creatures,
and because the death of his Son was the means of their redemption, God
was "pleased to crush Hirn" (cf. Isa .53: lO). ldeall)', however, there would han
never been sin and thus no occasion for such suffering and sacrifice. As such,
when God is said to pleasure in things that arc themselves distasteful to him,
God's pleasure is in the wider result rather than the things themselves (cf. Isa
53:10; Matt 11 :25-26; Luke 10:21).n In this manner, such passages do not
contradict the clear meaning of passages that state that God has no pleasure
in the death of anyone (cf. Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11).
This distinction between that which God ideally desires (ideal will)
and that which often actually takes place (effective will) is supported by the
primary word groups of God's will in both the OT (y;:in) and NT (8EAul
and pouAocn). In some instances these terms refer to God's unfulfilled will
1
:? In od1er \vords it is that which God wills in accordance with the \Vidcr malrix
of creaturely freedom. This distinction is similar to the t\rminian distinction between
antecedent and conse<1uent wills. I have elected not to use these terms, to avoid anr
unintended connotations of untologr, especially with regard to the operation of the
divine will as it relates to providence (specifically the theoretical order of the divine
decrees). Fur a discussion of Arminius' ,-icw of the antecedent and conse<1uenr wills
of God and their implications for divine smereignt)', see Roger E. Olson, Ar1JJinia11
"J"heologr Myths and !valities (Downers Gro,e, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 23. See also
Alvin Plantinga's distinction between strong and weak actualization in his argument for
the significant freedom of creatures and divine 01nnipotcnce and omnibenen>lcnce.
Plantinga, The Nature of Nl'cmi(r, 172-173. Cf. Peckham, "Providence and God's
Unfulfilled Desires."
1
"God's permissive will (as a subset of God's effective will) thus may function
in accordance with wide principles of the extent of freedom afforded to creaturely
agents. However, it is well beyond the scope of this work to delve more deeply into
this issue of divine providence. Consider, for a brief oveniew of these issues of
divine providence, Pernando Canale, "Doctrine of God," in Handbook of .\"e1enth-rla_J'
Arfi.c11ti.rt Theolo!J', ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, [\,fD: Review and Herald, 2000),
118-120; Thomas P. Flint, "Divine Providence," in The O_-jorrl Ha11rlhook of Philosophical
ThcolqP,J', ed. Thomas P. Flint and !\[ichael C. Rea (New York: Oxford Cniversity Press,
2008), 262-285. Cf. Francesca i\rno i\lurphr and Philip Gurdon Ziegler, eds., l'rol'ldc11cc
of C:orl (New York: T&T Clark, 2009); Dennis Jowers, ed. Four r 'inn 011 Piri11e l'mr-ide11ce
((;rand lbpids, ~IT: Zondervan, 2011); Peckham, "Prmidcnce and God's Unfulfilled
Desires.,.
203
and/or desires (Ezck 18:23, 32; :B:l l; Isa 65:12; 66:4; Prov 21:3; Matt 22:37;
Mark 7:24; I .uke 7:30; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Pct 3:9), whereas elsewhere the terms
mav refer to (;0t!'s effective will rather than his ideal will (cf. Isa 46: 10; 53:10;
,\c;s 2:23; 1 C:or 4: 19; James 4:15). 2 ' Thus, whereas theologians continue to
debate the operation of the divine will, the biblical data demonstrate that
chere is nothing inherent in the terminology of will chat rec1uires or suggests
unilateral efficaciousness.2' In fact, as seen above, the biblical data show that,
since many things occur that God does not want to occur, the divine will
mar be unfulfilled. The distinction b<:tween (;od's ideal and effective wills,
the.n, corresponds to the data of Scripture and provides a compelling and
internally coherent explanation for the texts that depict God's unfulfilled
wishes, especially regarding God's actual desire to save everyone, which docs
not come to fruition despite God's genuine efforts (e.g., Isa 5:1-7).
"J. Howard Marshall thus correctly comments that assuming that God's will is
always done in "deterministic rcnns is mconsistcnc \i.irh the freedom which the Bible
itself assigns to God's children." l\larshall, Fhe Epistle.r of john, 245. This is contra the
srnncti1ncs misleading statements regarding these terms such as the contention that the
204
51.,11~ 11tY
S-rrn11:s S2
(1\LTDJ~
2014)
refer to God's genuine desire that all will be smcc.l, while both nevertheless
maintain the idea of c.louble. predestination." To coherently maintain God's
genuine desire that all be saved anti double predestination, both Piper
and Schreiner recogni7.e a distinction between two divine wills. Schreiner
distinguishes between Goe.l's "dccreci1e will" and his "desired will," such chat
"God genuinely desires in one sense that all will be saved" and yet "he has
not ultimately decreed that all will be saictl." 1'' 1\s Piper puts it, "God chooses
for behavior to come about that he commands not to happen" such that
God's Jesires arc "complex" and one may distinguish between God's "will of
command" and his "will of decree.",Piper points to a number of examples to support the complexitr of
the di,ine will. For instance, he claims rhat in the Exodus account, "there
is a sense in which God does will that Pharaoh go on refusing to let the
peopk go" (will of decree) and "there is a sense in which he docs will that
"As Thomas Schreiner (himself a dctcrrninist) puts it, 'Br extension \\e should
understand 2 Pct ):'J in the same war as Ezrk 18:12. It refers to (;od's desire that
e1eryone \\ithom exception be saved." Schreiner, I, 2 l'dei; J11de, 382. I le adds that,
in Ezek 18::12, "God's rcgrcr ewer the perishing of anyone is clear." Ibid., 381. Piper
notes that it is possible that I Tim 2:4 docs not refer to (;ncI's desir<' to ""'call but
personally belic\'cs tl1at it is the 111ost likely interpretation, cspcciallr in light nf l'.zck
18:23, 18:32, and 33:11, and thus states that "as a hearty believer in unconditional,
indil'idual election I rejoice to affirm that Cod docs not delight in the perishing of
the impenitent, and that he has compassion on all people. 1'1 y aim is to show that
this is nor double talk" Piper, '~\re There Two \X-'ills in c;od?" 108. I le further states,
"I affirm with John 3: 16 and I Timothy 2:4 that Cod lo\'es the world \\ith a deep
compassion and desires the salvation of all men. Yet I aiso affirm that (;od has chosen
fro111 the foundation of the world whom he will sa\'e from sin" (ibid., DO). However,
Piper contends of 1 Tim 2:4, "When free will is fou11d in this l'crse, it is philosophical,
metaphpical assumption, not an exegetical conclusion" (ibid., 124).
"Schreiner, /, 2 l'eter, Jude, 381-382. l'.lscwhcrc, he states. "Goe.I desires 1he
salvation of all in one sense, but he does not ultimately ordain that all will be smed."
Ibid., 381. In his view, "the Scriptures, if accepted as. a harmonious. whole, compel
us to make such distinctions." Ibid., 382. This solution rn111plements the traditional
Reformed distinction between (;od's hidden and reYcaled wills, but with considerable
nuance. Sec John Cah-in, Co11111tmtmirs 011 the Catholic l'.pirtkr ((;rand Rapids, ;\II:
f.Zerclmans, 1948), 419-420; 1'1artin I,uthcr, Fhe llondt(~C o/ the w;11, trans. ( l.R. Johnston
((;rand Rapids, Ml: Baker Books, 2003), llJI. Sec also, i11 this regard, Paul Kjnss
I Idscth'~ trcarmcnt in "God Causes All Thinp;s," in Fo1tr l /ic1rs 011 })icim.: Pro!'idn1re, ed.
Dennis Jowers (Grnncl Rapids, 1\11: L.ondenan, 2011), 25-52, I 6S-169.
"Piper, "Are There Twn Wills in (;od?" 114, 118. i\s Piper describes, 'When
c;od looks at a painful or wicked event through his narrow lens, he secs the trage<ly
or the siu for wlrnt ir is in itself ond he is angered and grie1cc.l" (ibid., 126). Cf. Ezck
18:32. "Hut when (;ocl looks at a painful or wicked event throu)!;h his widc-m1glc lens,
he secs the 1ragcdy or the sin in relation to all the connections and effect that form a
patrcrn or n10s;iic stretching into etcrnicy. This mosaic, with all ics (good and c\il) parts
he docs delight in (l's. l 15:3)" (ibid).
20'i
Pharaoh release his people" as he commands (will "f command)."" Likewise,
Piper explains that while Judas's betrayal of Jesus was "inspired immediately
br Satan (Luke 22:.1)" the Bible also declares that "Jesus !was] deli\'ercd up
a~cording to the ddinite plan (!J011/e) and foreknc;wledge of God" (r\cts
2:23).''' For Piper, this is the "most compelling example of God's willing for
sin co come to pass while at the same time disapprming the sin."'" Yet, Piper
explains, "in ordering all things, including sinful acts, God is not sinning,"
because "God can will that a sinful act com<: to pass without willing it as
an act of sin himscl["" Finally, Piper contrasts God's "desire" (i';:") to kill
Eli's sons (I Sam 2:25; cf. Ol:ut 28:63) with rhc statements that God takes
no pleasure in (j';:l"') the death of the wicked (Ezek 18:2:\, 32: :B: 11). ;_~Thus,
"in om: semc Cod mar desire the death of the wicked and in another sense:
he may not."" Thus, both Piper and Schreiner agree: that God's de~;ircs are
complex and some Jo nor come to fruition, especially with regard to his
desire to save all. f Iowc:ver, all of this cnikes rhe <1uesrion, Why would (;od's
will be complex?;.,
"Ibid., 114. As Piper puts it, "The good thing that God commands he prev<:nts.
,\nd the thing he brings about inn1hes sin" (ibid). Significamly, however, according to
the ordering of the texts in Exodus, Pharaoh hardened his own heart (l'xrnl 8:15, .12)
hejorc (;od hardened it. Piper, to his credit, recognizes that the text tlocs nor explicitly
sav that God hardened Pharaoh's heart until the sixth plague (Esod 9: 12; 10:20, 27;
11:10; 14:4). Howe\"er, he contends that e,en if "Cod was not willing for Pharaoh's
heart to be hardened during the first five plagues ... for the last live plagues Cod
docs
\Viii
this,, and
Lhat
self-proclaimed "sin" (Exod l0:17). Ibid. Cf. Deur 2:26-27, .JO; Josh 11:19-20; Rom
11 :25-26, 31-32.
~''J.ikc,visc, Piper points ro cxmnplcs in i\fark where Christ wills that sinners "turn
and be forgi,cn (Mark 1:15), but he acrs in a way to restrict the fullillment of that.
will" by speaking in parables such that they may see but nor perceive and hear hut not
undersrnnd (cf. i\lark 4: I 1-12). !bid., 115. Further, he contends, (;od "wills a condition
(hardness of heart)" in Rnrn I l:25-2(i "that he commands people to strive against
('Do not harden your heart' !Heb .):8, 15; 4:7])." Ibid., 116.
"Ibid., 11 l.
;'Ibid., 122-123. Cf.Jas 1:13.
'~Jn fact, he emphasizes rhar Cod is said to ace rhc \\.ay he docs
to
''because" of his
'1fbid. r k claims 1har again '\n; ate faced \\'ith thL' inescapable biblical fact rhat
in some sense Cot! docs not delight in the death of the \\"ickcd (Ezck 18), and in
some sense he docs (Deut 28:63; 2 Sam 2:2S)." Ibid., 118-119. On the other lrnnd, the
<J"'"tion is not whether Cod finallr desired the death or [ 'li's sons but why he desired
it. Fron1 an indcccrminist pcrspccLivc, (;od's "desire" co put Eli's sons to dc;tth was a
result of their freely willed and pnsistent wickedness.
"It is important to note that each of the c~amples that Piper sutTC)'S in his
argumcnls in favor of his conception of cwn \vills (above) can be accounted for by the
distinction between God's ideal and cffcctiYe "ills.
S1""'\ltY
STl'l)IES
52
(i\tTDlN
2014)
the discussion in ibid., 67-73. David Bentley Hart adds, in this regard, that "freedom
lies not in an action's logical conditions, but in the action itself; and if an action is
causally necessitated or infallibly predetermined, its imleterminacy with rq~ard to its
proximate cause in no way makes it free." "Impassibility as Transcendence: Un the
Infinite Innocence of God," in /)uine lmpassihilify and the Mptcry of I lum1111 J111firi% ed.
James Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmans, 2009), 309.
1''1'1per, "Arc There Two Wills in Cod?" 123.
207
Jn my view, God's highest value is love, which is itself essential to his
character and requires justice:' 2 Since freedom is a prcrel1uisite of love, God
cannot unilaterally determine that creatures love him or one another.'' Thus,
chough he never desires evil to occur, God allows humans the freedom to
choose evil, including the human decision to reject salvation, because to
exclude freedom would be to exclude love, which would run counter to God's
own character, since "God is love" (I John 4:8, 16)." Notice that, in this view,
God's higher commitment to love is one that he cannot bring about without
allowing freedom and, thus, the possibility of evil. God, in acccmhmce with
his universal love, wanted to save those who are finally lost but ther are not
wilLing (cf. Isa 66:4; Ezek 3:7; Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34).
For Piper's Calvinistic determinism, on the other hand, "the greater value
is the manifestation of the full range of God's glory in wrath and mercy (Rom
9:22-23) am! the humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for
his salvation (I Cor 1:29)."' 5 However, according to the logical conclusions of
Piper's determinism, couldn't God accompLish this without the possibility, or
reality, of evil? Could not God simply determine that all creatures recognize
his glory to the utmost? If God unilaterally determines everything, as Piper
and others suppose, then he could have willed the recognition "of the full
range" of his glory and grace immediately.
One wonders, in this regard, why God would want to manifest his "glory
in wrath," especially when the Bible contends that he does not afllict willingly
nor desire that any perish (Lam 3:32-33; Ezek 18:32; 33:11; 2 Pet 3:9). Further,
I sec no rationale, from a determinist perspective, for viewing God's will as
''I categorically reject the way Piper frames the indeterrninist view of this
higher commitment. He states, "The answer given by Arminians is that human sclfdetermination and the possible resulting love relationship with God arc more valuable
than saving all people by sovereign, efficacious grace." Ibid., 124. I am not concerned
about "human self-determination" in and of itself, but I do care about the character
of God as described by Scripture, and the significant freedom of humans provides the
key to understanding God's character in light of the questions of theodicy.
"Many theologians, like Vincent Brummer, believe that "love is necessarily free.''
The Model of L.1Jve: A S11ufy i11 Philo1ophiml Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 177. Likewise numerous exegetes contend that "coerced love is not lme."
See James D. G. Dunn, Ronu1111 1-8 (Dallas: Word, 2002), 481. Thus, "God ne,er
imposes His love by overriding human will." Craig Blomberg, Ma11he1v (Nashville:
Broadman & Holman, 2001), 350. Of course, many question whether "love" actually
requires freedom since the nature of love is itself debated. This <1uestion far exceeds
the scope of this essay. See, in this regard, Peckham, The CoHccpt of /)i1ine L.1Jt'e iH the
Context o/ the Gorf.11/'orld Relatiomhip.
"Accordingl)', thc "fact that all arc not saved can be attributed to the stubbornness
of the h111na11 will rather than to rhc wcak11css of the di,inc intent." Thonrns D. I .ca
and I lar11c I'. ( ;rii'li11, Jr., I, l '/i'111olhy, '/i't11r (NAC: :14; Nashville: llroadman &. I lolman,
7.1)() I), H'J. Sn Jr"IT)' I .. Wnlls 1111rl )ml'ph l>o11y,cll, ll"/11 I /1111 Not" (.ii/1iJ1i.rt; idem, "Wh)"
Not 'l11,,;i1.dTlwb1," 'Jli.
'"l''i"'' "l\11 Th"'" 'l\v,, Willi. i11 < ;,,,(<" lhl.
SF..\llN.lllY Sn'lllFS 52
2118
(A1 Tl'.\IN
2014)
'"'l'lirn11a"
1'11"
1,"
1,,,,,,,,
209
E\en if such a powerful analogy can be effecrivcly answere<l, Piper's
accounr faces further difficulty. Spccificallr. if God unilaterally derermirn:d
everyrhing, he would not need evil things to occur to bring him glory in
the first place. I-le could will the full recognition of his glory immediately.
l\foreo\'Cr, even if one could provide a rationale for why a God who unilatcrallr
determines c\crytbing could not efficaciously will rhe full manifc~aation of his
glory immediately, if God needed to will evil to arrive ar the manifestation of
his glory, then we must say that God needed all of the evil that has occurred
in order to glorify his goodness. i\s David Bentley I !art puts it, "If God
needs the supplement nf evil to accomplish anr good he intends" then "he is
dependent upon evil in an absolute sense."''' This presents a massive problem
for the moral character of God and appears to contradict the deterministic
umlersranding of God's sm-crcign, e flicacious will.'"
The free-will defense, on the orher liand, agrees that God's overarching
desire for the universal harmony of all beings in loving rehl!ionship trumps
his desire, in the short-term, to exclude all suffering and evil. However, this
dererministic ''iew holds thar even the movement of the human will is caused br (;od.
God moves people to choose evil, and they c:u1not do otherwise. God Jcrcrmincs
their choices and makes them do wrong. If iris evil to make anorher person do wrong,
then in chis ,-iew Goel not only is rhc cause of sin and e,il, bur he becomes evil
himself, which is absurd." William Lane Craig, "Response to 1-lclseth," in I'our Viell'.r
011 )Di1i11e l'rorit!mce, ed. Dennis .Jowers (Grand Rapids, Ml: Zonden-an, 2011), 6 I.
1'1oreover, "[i]t is deeply insulting to God ro think char he would create beings chat
are in everr respccr causally determined by him and then rreat them as though ther
were free! agents, punishing them for the wrung actions he made them do or loving
chem as though they were freely responding agents." Ibid., 62. Cf. Jerry L. Walls, "Why
No Classical Theist," 98; Stephen T. Davis, "Universalism, I Jell, and the Fate of the
Ignorant," Modem
Thcol~gy
conclu~ions,
upon the actualization of this world. Ibid., 219-220. Further, Piper's accoum leaves
one "wondering jusr whr we should sec sin and suffering as finally reprehensible." If
evil is "that imporranr for God" and his maximal glory, rhen "whr should we deresr
sin, dcarh, and the devil?" Ibid .. 217. See Piper's response wherein he affirms divine
aseity, saying that "Cod was fully God with no deficiencies before he created rhc
world" and gualilies his earlier statements !O say thar God's '"maximal glorification' is
essential to God" only ''as he is acting in creation" such that ((it docs not contradict
God's aseiry to sar that in the act of creation and redemption and judgment it is God's
narure and glory and name to act freely in rhe display of grace and wrarh." Piper, "I
Believe in God's Self-Sufficiency," 229-230. Cf. Waker Schultz, "Jonathan Edwards's
End of Creation: An Exposition and Defense," JETS 49/2 (2006): 269.
'on the moral goodness of God, see Bagge re and Walls, Good God.
210
SL.\11"""' snn11.s
52 (/\!TUI" 2014)
perspective claims that this is the case emir because there is no other way to
bring about his overarching purpose, and no other way exists precisely because
his overarching purpose of love rn1uires signilicant crearurely freedom."
That is, God could not have brought his ultimate purpose to fruition without
at least the possibility of such suffering anJ evil, because doing so would
have required eliminating significant creaturely freedom, which would itself
remove the possibility of genuine love that was the higher commitment in
the first place.' 2 However, the free-will defense does not ret1uire that any c\il
and sufferin?; actually take place in order to bring about God's purpose. That
is, evil did noL need to occm but occurred only bemuse creatures exercised
their freedom negatively. It would have been better had Satan never fallen,
had i\dam and Eve never sinned. Although God did not need evil to arise in
order to manifest his character, God is manifesting his character of perfect
love in dealing with evil once and for all, so that sin will never arise again and
his ultimate purpose of eternal, universal harmony of lcwe will ultimately
come to fruition.
In all this, God calls for creatures to "judge" between himself and his
people: What more could God have done that he has not done? (Isa 5:34). The indeterminist perspective answers unequivocally that God has
done everything he could. He did not desire evil and he docs not desire the
destruction of anyone. This brings us back to perhaps the most crucial point
regarding the validity of divine determinism: that God's desires are not always
fulfilled is apparent in that God has no pleasure in the death of the wicked
(cf. Ezek 18:23, 12; 33:11) and desires that none would perish (2 Pet 3:9; cf.
1 Tim 2:4-6). However, not all people will be saved, because God eventually
gives people over to their desires (cf. John 3:18; Rom 1:24, 26, 28; 2:4-12;
1 John 2:17).' 1 While Go<l trul; desires the salvation of each individual and
works toward saving each one, some are lost because they reject God's gift of
salvation through Jesus Christ (cf. John 3:18).
In contrast, the <leterminist view lacks a compelling answer to the
question, If God possesses the power to save everyone and wants to save
everyone, why does he not do so?" Indeed, why is there any evil at all? The
51
As Gregory Boyd puts it, "God gme us the capaciLy freely to reject his loving
will hecau.re it was necessary far love" (emphasis his). "God Limits His Control," in r:o11r
Views 011 Divine l'rovide11ce, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, Ml: Zondervan, 2011),
190. Cf. Brummer, The Model of Lote, 177.
"As William Lane Craig puts it, "It is logically impossible to make someone freely
<lo something." "The Coherence of Theism: Introduction," in Philosophy of Religion:
A Reader and G111de, ed. WilLiam Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 2002), 211.
11
l'nr a compelling biblical argument against universalism, see I. Howard Marshall,
"The New Testament Does Not Teach Universal Sah-ation,'' in Universal Salvation?
The Current Debate, ecl. Robin Parry and Christopher Partridge (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2003), 55-76.
"If, as Calvinists say, God deems it wise and good to elect unconditionally some
211
appeal to God's two wills fails to answer these l]uestions, because it raises
another question; that is, why would a God who unilaterallr determines
eYcrything haYc two conflicting wills? That is, a God whose will docs not take
into account the wills of others should not have complex desires because he
could unilaterally will that only good occur, never evil. i\s such, the existence
of unfulfilled divine desires throughout Scripture docs not make sense from
a determinist perspective but is pcrfcctlr coherent within an indetcrmini>e
pcrspecti\'e, based on the understanding of significant creaturely freedom.
212
willingly took the sins of the world on himself and, in doing so, has preserved
both his justice and his Ion: (cf. Rom 3:23-26; Rom 5:8). To God alone be the
glory (.roli deo glo1ia), because God is kwc!