DONATIONS

1. LIGUEZ V. CA
Facts: Petitioner-appellant Conchita Liguez filed a complaint against the
widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land.
Liguez averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of
said land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez. The
defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an
illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiffs entering into marital
relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had
been adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First
Instance.
Issue: WON the motive may be regarded as causa when it predetermines
the purpose of the contract.
Held: Yes. In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would
not have conveyed the property in question had he known that appellant
would refuse to cohabit with him; so that the cohabitation was an implied
condition to the donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the
donation itself.
2. REPUBLIC V. AFP

Consequently, 16 original certificates of title (OCTs) covering Lot X were

issued in the names of the heirs, Flaviano and several others. These 16
titles were simultaneously conveyed to respondent AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines a complaint for reversion,
cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles, on the thesis that they
were issued over a public park which is classified as inalienable and nondisposable public land.
The heirs and Flaviano intervened, and, together with the AFP-RSBS,
argued that their predecessor-in-interest Kusop had acquired vested
interests over Lot X for having occupied the same for more than 30 years.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Republic.
The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the lands in dispute are alienable
and disposable lands. Hence this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the lands in question
are alienable and disposable lands?
HELD: The Court grants the Petition.

FACTS:
Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 were lands of the public domain pursuant to
Proclamation No. 168 (Proc. 168). In 1983, Proclamation No. 2273 (Proc.
2273) was issued which removed and segregated Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from
the reservation and declaring them open for disposition to qualified
applicants. As a result, only Lot X which consists of 15,020 square meters
remained part of the reservation now known as Magsaysay Park.
The record discloses that the heirs of CabaloKusop and Atty. Flaviano
petitioned the President to have Lots Y-1 and Y-2 taken out of the
reservation for the reason that through their predecessor CabaloKusop
(Kusop), they have acquired vested private rights over these lots. This
campaign resulted in Proc. 2273, which re-classified and returned Lots Y-1
and Y-2 to their original alienable and disposable state.
In 1997, the heirs and Flaviano filed applications for the issuance of
individual miscellaneous sales patents over the whole of Lot X.

CIVIL LAW: alienable and disposable lands; estoppel

From the wording of Proc. 168, the land it comprises is subject to sale or
settlement, and thus alienable and disposable. However, this alienable
and disposable character of the land covered by the proclamation was
subsequently withdrawn, and the land was re-classified by then President
Macapagal to pave the way for the establishment of a park reservation,
subject only to previously acquired private rights. The heirs then lobbied
for the exclusion of certain portions of the reservation which they claimed
to be theirs, allegedly acquired by their predecessor Kusop through
prescription. They were successful, for in 1983, then President Marcos
issued Proc. 2273, which excluded and segregated Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from
the coverage of Proc. 168. In addition, Proc. 2273 declared Lots Y-1 and Y2 open for distribution to qualified beneficiaries which included the heirs.
However, Lot X was retained as part of the reservation.

The heirs did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the
beneficiaries thereof; nor did they object to the retention of Lot X as part
of the park reserve. Instead, in 1997, they applied for, and were granted,
sales patents over Lot X.
Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time
the sales patents were applied for and granted, the land had lost its
alienable and disposable character. It was set aside and was being utilized
for a public purpose, that is, as a recreational park. And under the present
Constitution, national parks are declared part of the public domain, and
shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by
law.
The government, as the agent of the State, is possessed of the plenary
power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way
of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
The heirs and Flavianos actions betray their claim of ownership to Lot X.
When Proc. 168 was issued, they did not institute action to question its
validity, using as cause of action their claimed ownership and title over
the land. The same is true when Proc. 2273 came out. They did not file
suit to invalidate it because it contravenes their claimed ownership over
Lot X. They simply sat and waited for the good graces of the government
to fall on their laps. They simply waited for the State to declare them
beneficiaries of the land.
The principle of estoppel bars one from denying the truth of a fact which
has, in the contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and
proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party
himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or
implied or in pais.
Finally, as regards AFP-RSBS rights, the Court sustains the petitioners view
that any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.
The Court cannot ignore the basic principle that a spring cannot rise
higher than its source; as successor-in-interest, AFP-RSBS cannot acquire a
better title than its predecessor, the herein respondents-intervenors.

Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the Court of Appeals is ANNULLED and

SET ASIDE.

3. REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN
Three essential elements of a donation:
1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor;
2. Increase in the patrimony of the done;
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
It is also required that the donation be made in a public document and
that its acceptance be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, which has to be recorded as well.
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the
spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers
Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs,
Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in
Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property,
and registered it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and
conveying her share of the properties to David. But since it was not
registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents
showing that Davids ownership of of the estate was defective. He
argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire
private lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may
acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he was
formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover,
it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really
donations inter vivos.

Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that of Davids
interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD: NO.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the
properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of
her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony
of David as donee. However, Helens (3) intention to perform an act of
liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2
Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels
of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her
rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a
waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, not a
donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and
registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by
David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an
acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he
authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. Further, there was
nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of
Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as
Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she,
together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By
virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their names
and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus,
the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns of the
property.
4. GRONIFILIO V. CA
5. BETTS V. CA

extrajudicial/extra judicial partition) for the inventory and partition of all

the spouses present and existing properties. In the provision of said extra
judicial partition, each of the four children was allotted with the properties
considered as their share in the estate or as inheritance left by the
deceased where they will be the absolute owner of the properties
assigned in case of death of one of the spouses. (2)Don Jesus and Doa
Tinay also separately executed holographic will with exactly the same
terms and conditions in conformity with the executed extra judicial
partition naming each other as an executor without having to post any
bond. That in case new properties be acquired same shall be partitioned
one half to the surviving spouse and the other half to children of equal
parts. (3).Spouses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly
the same terms and conditions, amending and supplementing their
holographic wills stating that they reserved for themselves the other half
not disposed of to their legitimate heirs under the agreement of partition
and mutually and reciprocally bequeathed each other their participation
as well all properties which might be acquired subsequently.
Doa Tinay died in effect Don Jesus by order of the probate court was
name as executor. Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will
in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary and instructed his lawyer
to draft a new will. This was a notarial will and testament of 3 essential
features as follows; 1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the
provisions of his holographic will and codicil. 2. It provided for the collation
of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the
Escritura de Partition Extra judicial.
It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific properties, and
as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently
acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and
Pablo naming Francisca as executor to serve without a bond.
ISSUE:
1. W/N oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the
competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.

FACTS:

2. Whether testator Don Jesus can or cannot revoke his previous will.

Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Tinay, together with all their living
children, entered into a duly notarized agreement, (escritura de particion

HELD:

1.The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings ( case

of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs.
Remedios Obispo, Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the
application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over and
above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that
testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed
conformably to law.
2. We rule that Don Jesus was not forever bound of his previous
holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his
discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked
by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of
this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his
absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously
made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the
case at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739).
For in the first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass
upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to
the succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of the
decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the
liberty of disposing of his property before his death to whomsoever he
chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which
is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the
whole Alsua estate is being contested.
6. LAGAZO V. CA
FACTS: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of
plaintiff-appellee, was awarded a 60.10-square meter lot which is a
portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and
distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless
program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident,
Catalina Jacob executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son-inlaw Eduardo B. Espaol authorizing him to execute all documents
necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.

Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Espaol to accomplish the purpose of the

power of attorney granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in
an instrument executed in Canada. Simultaneous with the revocation,
Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in
favor plaintiff-appellee.
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot
in favor of plaintiff-appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee
checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in
the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the
remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name
of Catalina Jacob.
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant
asking him to vacate the premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiffappellees counsel to defendant. However, defendant-appellant refused
to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiffappellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against defendant-appellant.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon
a donation need not be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus,
although the deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or
condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact
and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining
balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance
thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil
Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the
same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion
of his right of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his
acceptance of the donation.
ISSUES:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden the
expressed consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity
but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property like land
taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous
and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts?

2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument

but not formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be
nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting?

HELD:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an
onerous one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure
liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is
subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value
than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with
an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the
formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that
petitioners full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been
a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as
a condition for the donation.

It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge
petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a
pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments made
by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered
from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden
or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of
attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson,
authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her
obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be
a burden in the donation.
2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply.
The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code),
is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee. Furthermore, [i]f the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its
absence makes the donation null and void.