1. [A.C. No. 4943.

January 26, 2001]

DIANA D. DE GUZMAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS,
respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a complaint i[1] for disbarment against Atty.
Lourdes I. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
code of Professional Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests,
and of Article 1491 Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation.
In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in
order to form a corporation, which would engage in hotel and restaurant
business in Olongapo City.
On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. De Dios, complainant
registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.ii[2] Complainant paid on respondent a monthly
retainer fee of P5,000.00.
On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant to pay her
unpaid subscribed shares of stock amounting to two million two hundred
and thirty five thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or
before December 30, 1997.
On January 29, 1998,iii[3] complainant received notice of the public auction
sale of her delinquent shares and a copy of a board resolution dated
January 6, 1998 authorizing such sale.iv[4] Complainant soon learned that
her shares had been acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the
incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted complainant from the corporation
completely. While respondent rose to be president of the corporation,
complainant lost all her lifes savings invested therein.
Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. De Dios and
believed that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with
the management of the corporation.
Complainant pointed out that respondent appeared as her counsel and
signed pleadings in a case where complainant was one of the parties. v[5]
Respondent, however, explained that she only appeared because the
property involved belonged to SBHI. Respondent alleged that complainant
misunderstood the role of respondent as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach
Hotel, Inc. Respondent manifested that her appearance as counsel for
complainant Diana de Guzman was to protect the rights and interest of
SBHI since the latter was real owner of the land in controversy.

Respondent further said that the land on which the resort was established
belonged to the Japanese incorporators, not to complainant.
The
relationship of the complainant and the Japanese investors turned sour
because complainant misappropriated the funds and property of the
corporation. To save the corporation from bankruptcy, respondent advised
all concerned stockholders that it was proper to call for the payment of
unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the delinquent shares. These
lead to the auction of the unpaid shares of complainant and hence, the
ouster of complainant from the corporation.
Meantime, Mr. Del Rosario transferred one hundred (100) shares to
respondent in payment of legal services as evidenced by a Deed of Waiver
and Transfer of corporate Shares of Stock.
On October 22, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
resolutionvi[6] finding that the acts of respondent were not motivated by ill
will as she acts in the best interest of her client, SBHI. The IBP found that
complainant failed to present convincing proof of her attorney-client
relationship with respondent other than the pleadings respondent filed in
the trial court where complainant was one of the parties.
We disagree.
We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts presented before us
that created doubt on the propriety of the declaration of delinquent shares
and subsequent sale of complainants entire subscription. Complainant
subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to two million nine hundred and
eighty thousand pesos (P2,980,000.00). She was the majority stockholder.
Out of the subscribed shares, she paid up seven hundred forty-five
thousand pesos (P745,000.00) during the stage of incorporation.
How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount
she had invested in it is beyond us. Granting that the sale of her
delinquent shares was valid, what happened to her original shares? This,
at least, should have been explained.
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between
her and complainant. The claim has no merit. It was complainant who
retained respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in
behalf of complainant.
There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and
respondent. Indeed, the board of directors nowe included respondent as
the president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman,
Agnes Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director. vii[7] The
present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interest of the
respondent.

Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their

clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.viii[8]

obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, xi

[11] or other disciplinary action. xii[12] The acts of respondent Atty. De Dios
are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will
not tolerate.

We said:
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to
state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law.
Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful
conduct have no place in the legal profession.ix[9]
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.x[10]
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or
consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to
the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios remiss in

her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS
her from the practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a
repetition of the charges will be dealth with more severely.
Let a copy ofthis decision be entered in the personal records of respondent
as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

ii

iii

iv2.

[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER
CABANTING, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavit-complaint for
disbarment with conduct unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May
1992[1] over a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.[2]
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to comply despite service
upon him of our Resolution together with copy of the complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment
as waiver of his right to do so and directed the case submitted for decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient legal basis for
disciplinary action against respondent for making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim
in question that the affiant therein signed the document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him
as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so.

The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly executed by one
Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
[3] The subject document was notarized by respondent on the same date. The document was apparently
used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of
title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus
damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and notarized on 5 May
1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[4] Moreover, Irene
Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb
mark in every transaction she entered." [5]
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [6] provides
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same
is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document specifically provides "BEFORE ME
personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" [7] Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally
appear before the Notary Public or any other person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments
or documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to
have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its
authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April
1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of the person
executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act of malpractice in
violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[8] the Court suspended respondent Atty.
Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his
client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition
stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the
circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of law is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end
a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. [9]
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and
protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries
public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the administrative offices generally. [10] Notarization
of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now
accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. [11] Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of
his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension
from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal
profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct
rendering him unworthy of his continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima Jr., Panganiban, and Torres Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.
3.

[G.R.

No.

95026.

October

4,

1991.]

SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and
SPOUSES
VICENTE
and
VIRGINIA
TELAN,
Respondents.
Peter

Donnely

A.

Barot,

for

Petitioners.

Monsanto Law Office for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; DENIED, WHEN A PERSON LOST ITS RIGHT
TO APPEAL WHEN HE WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. We hold that they had not been accorded
due process of law because they lost their right to appeal when they were deprived of the right to counsel.
The right to counsel in civil case exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. In criminal cases, the right
of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave
denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled,
and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. There is no reason why the rule
in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law
applied not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in
danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of
livelihood,
is
given
the
right
to
be
heard
by
himself
and
counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; ABSOLUTE AND MAY BE INVOKED AT ALL TIMES. Even the most experienced
lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle
intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual
may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not
know how to establish such right. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in
the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer
faithfully keeping his client company. No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the
position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the
pursuit of the appeal. This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse
anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 of the Court of Appeals 1 which
considered the appeal of the herein petitioners, spouses Pedro and Angelina Telan (hereinafter PEDRO and
ANGELINA), ABANDONED and DISMISSED, for their failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary
period,
pursuant
to
Section
I(f),
Rule
50
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
The only issue involved in this petition for review on certiorari is:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to
counsel
and
hence
a
lack
of
due
process.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
The

circumstances

under

which

the

case

arose

are

as

follows:chanrob1es

virtual

1aw

library

The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who settled in 1973 on a
property
abutting
the
national
highway
in
Guibang,
Gamu,
Isabela.
2
In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his residence to the other
side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a
month.
3
Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO
set up business enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the
herein private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and Virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO,
VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot. 4
On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouse ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). This was followed by a letter from VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said
demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with
Sia
over
the
said
lot
shared
by
PEDRO
and
ANGELINA.
5
Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sias lot, foreclosed the mortgage.chanrobles law library : red
On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the Regional Trial
Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELANs family from the lot. The case was dismissed.
Meanwhile, on September 22, 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a Certificate of Title in his name
over
the
contested
lot.
6
With the new Transfer Certificate of Title, ROBERTO and the spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA filed a complaint
denominated as Accion Publiciana against the petitioners, Spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA. 7
At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran to defend them in the suit. 8
On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the property in question to ROBERTO and
Spouses
VICENTE
and
VIRGINIA
TELAN.
PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case, but since Atty. Paguiran
was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked another person to sign for them. 9
In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became acquainted with Ernesto Palma
who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked
"Atty. Palma" to handle their case. He consented and the petitioners paid his "lawyers fees." 10
In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while he was getting off from a passenger
jeepney. On September 5, 1988, unable to withstand the pain, he went to the Philippine General Hospital for
treatment where he was diagnosed to have a "fractured, closed, complete, femoral neck garden type IV (R)
femur." 11 On the spot, the doctors recommended an operation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Another operation followed on September 22, 1988. All the while, from September 5, 1988 up to October 2,
1988, PEDRO was confined at the PGH. He had to go back to PGH several times for check-up even after he
was
released
from
the
hospital.
12

It was only by January 1990 that PEDRO managed to walk again although still with much difficulty.chanrobles
law
library
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal
interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for failure . . . to file an appeal brief within the
reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court." 13
The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to know about it on May
1990, when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN about the Court of
Appeals
Resolution.
14
PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer be found. PEDRO engaged the
services of the new counsel, Peter Donnely A. Barot, who filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Admit Attached Appellants Brief Atty. Barot assisted PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the
Roll of Attorneys with the Bar Confidants Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 38990 for
Estafa against "Atty. Palma." 15 By now PEDRO had realized that "Atty. Palma" was a fake.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 27, 1990 ruled as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

It should be recalled that the instant appeal was dismissed only on December 28, 1989 (p. 13, rollo). Prior
thereto, appellants counsel received on July 25, 1989 this Courts letter-notice dated July 14, 1989 requiring
him to file the appellants brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof. Per report dated October 18,
1989 of the brief, none has yet been filed as of said date and hence, this Court issued a Resolution dated
October 20, 1989 for appellants to show cause, within ten (10) days, why the appeal should not be dismissed
for failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period. Hence from July 25, 1989 when
appellants counsel received this Courts letter-notice to file brief until the JRDs report on December 15, 1989
that no appellants brief has been filed, a period of about four (4) months and twenty-three (23) days have
elapsed, thus giving appellants enough to time to file their brief. Unfortunately, no appellants brief was ever
filed during said period. Let it be stressed that the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must
be done or certain proceedings taken are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delay and
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. (FJR Garment Industries v. CA, 130 SCRA 216, 218). 16
On January 24, 1990, the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 became final and was entered on May 24,
1990
in
the
Book
of
Entries
of
Judgment.
On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of Demolition for the
enforcement
of
the
decision.
17
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18, 1990 by the spouses PEDRO
and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. 18
On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on certiorari, the Court without giving due
course required the respondents to COMMENT within ten (10) days from notice thereof. At the same time, as
prayed for, effective "immediately" and "continuing until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER was issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order dated September 12,
1990
issued
in
Civil
Case
No.
279.chanrobles.com
:
virtual
law
library
In due time, after the filing of the necessary pleadings, the petition was given due course and the parties
were ordered to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. The petitioners filed their memorandum
while the private respondents manifested to adopt their Comments dated November 5, 1990. However, after
the filing of the petitioners memorandum, the private respondents filed on June 10, 1991, a pleading they
denominated as Addendum. Apparently, changing their minds, on July 23, 1991, the private respondents filed
their
memorandum.chanrobles.com.ph
:
virtual
law
library
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of law because they lost
their
right
to
appeal
when
they
were
deprived
of
the
right
to
counsel.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied
the
equal
protection
of
the
laws.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, 19 specially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.
20
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent
right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair
hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he
has established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much from ordinary
citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating
monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the
property
but
because
he
does
not
know
how
to
establish
such
right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going
litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his
client
company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists
only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse anyone the counsel that
only
the
exercise
of
his
office
can
impart.
21
Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN and spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA,
would still insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, had lost their right to appeal
because of the negligence of their counsel, referring to "Atty. Palma."cralaw virtua1aw library
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by the
attorneys mistake or negligence in procedural technique. 22 But how can there be negligence by the counsel
in the case at bar when the "lawyer", "Atty. Palma," turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner
PEDRO TELAN, the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidants Office and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more than sufficiently establish the
existence
of
an
Ernesto
Palma
who
misrepresented
himself
as
a
lawyer.
23
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R. CV No. 20786 are hereby REINSTATED and
the respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the
merits.cralawnad
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE
LAWYER'S
ASSOCIATION,
petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo
A.
Alafriz
for
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

petitioner.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957
an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of
the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent
cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent
cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic
Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent
Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as
that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent
Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as
regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere
and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the
question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court ; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.

These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139,
144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well
as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law.
Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence
and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if
it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall
not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention
thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than
one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the
Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the
right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25
and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of
a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is
authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for
cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by
the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such
as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in
the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's
refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license,
purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the
establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates
to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications
of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel
a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the
acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather
to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head
of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and
delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the
proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also
questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60
C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the
Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he
deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing
or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan
and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar.
He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and
of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules
of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in
the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall
apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner
and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable
service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a
person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be
taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has
served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe
rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they
are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent
to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further

practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall,
with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The
reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner
may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the
district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law
just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to
practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act
No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States
Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to
practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service
to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or
examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our
attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine
the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration
of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of
his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for
the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been
promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are
allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated,
such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation,
these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs
duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer
practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an
examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal
to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason
that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that
appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.
5. January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its
[the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine
Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible
through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after
due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted
leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of
the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of
Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in
the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains
all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also
embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted
by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient
basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine
Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population
of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a
national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of
Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized
action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to
the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in
order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new
power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the
Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the
effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of
speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration
pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts
have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

 Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that
the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there
can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available
to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control.
Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority
to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a
tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an
exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar
far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he
wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar
to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue.
Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended,
might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement
to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system
which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive
benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a
more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement
to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally
to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages
of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and
ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities
of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are
envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective
lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed
to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all
the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on
the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized
the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the

matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who
have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while
only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total
of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions
and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local
Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual
lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission,
12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per
cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration
at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report
of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE,
effective on January 16, 1973.

6. [A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant,
vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN,
JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/5212667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property
or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that
similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5,
2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising;

that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him
and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding
respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by
this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C.
No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on
April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the
case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a moneymaking venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2.

A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3.

A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4.

A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to

resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence,
his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts
authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of
Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the
name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards
is now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of
his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references;
and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name
to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

7. [A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings,
respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in
the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of
the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent
assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a
lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by
complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in
the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason:
Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the
face value of the check.[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal
complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City
Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent
for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton
Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from
notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved.[5] The Assistant National Secretary
of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed
against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation:
Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty
of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of
settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have
sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his
complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit
and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.[8] Such an act
constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since
this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance
thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross
misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law.[9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest
standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the
bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. [13] Her conduct
not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more
sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to
the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor
to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and
foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1.

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even
an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully
performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any
misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be
entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
8. [A.C. No. 2797. October 4, 2002]

ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant, vs. JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After respondents comment to the
complaint and complainants reply thereto, this Court, on March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90
days from notice. Commissioner George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked
to investigate the case. Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato Cunanan.
Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon, the parties filed
their respective position papers.
Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant alleged the
following facts:
When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her daughter Rosemarie
inherited the properties left by the said decedent. All in all, complainant and her daughter inherited 21
parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her late husband
was respondent Jesus Balicanta.
Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a
corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a beautiful
penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently sincere proposals, complainant and her daughter
assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly registered
corporation in which they assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then registered in
the name of the corporation.
Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also made complainant sign a document
which turned out to be a voting trust agreement. Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant sign
a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from her deceased
husband. She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain Tion Suy
Ong who became the new registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for the proceeds of said
transfers.
In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) using as
collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her daughter contributed to the corporation. The
respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for
brevity). Complainant later on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco
lumber and bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan
secured.
For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single installment. As
a result, the LBP, in a letter dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent that the past due amortizations and
interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred Twenty-nine Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and
Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25). The LBP made a demand on respondent for payment for the tenth time.
Meanwhile, when the BCC commenced its operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the rentals of
BCCs tenants. On October 28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due to non-payment
of the loan.
Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold the corporations
right to redeem the mortgaged properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud Jammang through a fake board
resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with the authority to do so. Complainant and her
daughter, the majority stockholders, were never informed of the alleged meeting held on that date. Again,
respondent never accounted for the proceeds of the sale of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to
Jammang a parcel of land belonging to complainant and her daughter which was contiguous to the foreclosed
properties and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted for the proceeds of

the sale.
Sometime in 1983, complainants daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home had been
demolished and that her mother, herein complainant, was being detained in a small nipa shack in a place
called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie was able to locate her mother. Rosemarie
later learned that respondent took complainant away from her house on the pretext that said ancestral home
was going to be remodeled and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to
Tion Suy Ong, using another spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series of 1992.
The resolution contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting of the directors of the corporation
and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin Fernando and Gabriel Solivar. Complainant and her
daughter did not know how these persons became stockholders and directors of the corporation. Respondent
again did not account for the proceeds of the sale.
Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of the real properties
they allegedly assigned to the corporation, for an accounting of the proceeds of the LBP loan and as well as
the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by BCC. But the demands remained unheeded. Hence,
complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as their
lawyer and repeated their demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the
19 titles that respondent transferred to the corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in a letter
dated August 3, 1985.
Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) that
Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to respondents refusal and neglect, failed to submit the corporations annual
financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General Information Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984;
Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and 1984; and Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for 1982,
1983 and 1984.
Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants of BCC and issued
handwritten receipts which he signed, not as an officer of the corporation but as the attorney-at-law of
complainant. Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to dry his palay and did not keep the buildings in
a satisfactory state, so much so that the divisions were losing plywood and other materials to thieves.
Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and relatives that she had
become insane to prevent them from believing whatever complainant said. According to complainant,
respondent proposed that she legally separate from her present husband so that the latter would not inherit
from her and that respondent be adopted as her son.
For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing deceit and machination in
convincing complainant and her daughter to assign their real properties to the corporation; that they freely
and voluntary executed the deeds of assignment and the voting trust agreement that they signed; that he did
not single-handedly manage the corporation as evidenced by certifications of the officers and directors of the
corporation; that he did not use spurious board resolutions authorizing him to contract a loan or sell the
properties assigned by the complainant and her daughter; that complainant and her daughter should be the
ones who should render an accounting of the records and revenues inasmuch as, since 1984 up to the
present, the part-time corporate book-keeper, with the connivance of the complainant and her daughter, had
custody of the corporate records; that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the operation of BCC when
they illegally took control of it in 1986; that he never pocketed any of the proceeds of the properties
contributed by the complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the ancestral home followed legal
procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan but she freely and voluntarily lived with the
family of P03 Joel Constantino as evidenced by complainants own letter denying she was kidnapped; and
that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed for being premature, considering the pendency of cases
before the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.
Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner Renato Cunanan, in his
report[1] dated July 1, 1999, recommended respondents disbarment based on the following findings:
A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were stockholders of a corporation,
together with respondent, named Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.
Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex A of Complainants Position Paper, complainants
subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding capital stock while her daughters consists of 18%, giving

them a total of 73%. Respondents holdings consist of 24% while three other incorporators, Rosauro L.
Alvarez, Vicente T. Maalac and Darhan S. Graciano each held 1% of the capital stock of the corporation.
B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two Deeds of Transfer and
Assignment conveying and transferring to the corporation 19 parcels of land in exchange for shares of stock
in the corporation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent accepted said assignment
of properties and titles in behalf of the corporation as Treasurer. The deeds were signed on April 5, 1981.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750 shares comprising the
authorized capital stock of the corporation of 97% thereof.
No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.
F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on April 4, 1981 he was elected
as Chairman and Director and on April 5, 1981 he was elected President of the corporation. Respondents
own Annexes marked as G and G-1 of his Comment show that on April 4, 1981 he was not only elected as
Chairman and Director as he claims but as Director, Board Chairman and President. The purported minutes
was only signed by respondent and an acting Secretary by the name of Vicente Maalac.
Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.
Respondents Annex H and H-1 shows that in the alleged organizational meeting of the directors on April
5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was elected Treasurer. Bucoys name does not appear as an incorporator
nor a stockholder anywhere in the documents submitted.
The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed only by respondent
Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo Martin.
G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4, 1981 as respondents own
Annexes G to G-1 would show, then complainants claim that respondent was likewise acting as Treasurer
of two corporations bear truth and credence as respondent signed and accepted the titles to 19 parcels of
land ceded by the complainant and her daughter, as Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was already
purportedly elected as Chairman, President and Director.
H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed the minutes marked as
Exhibit H to H-1 by stating that the same was duly signed by all the Board of Directors when the
document itself shows that only he and one Verisimo Martin signed the same.
He also claims that all the stockholders signed the minutes of organizational meeting marked as Annexes
G and G-1 of his Comment yet the same shows that only the acting Chairman and acting Secretary signed.
I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the stockholders comprising 2/3
of the outstanding capital stock, as required by law, to mortgage the parcels of land belonging to the
corporation, which were all assigned to the corporation by complainant and her daughter, by virtue of Annex
I and I-1: attached to his Comment.
The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their conformity to the said
resolution: respondent Balicanta who owned 109 shares, Vicente Maalac (1 share), Daihan Graciano (1
share).
Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of the 1,750 outstanding capital stock of the
corporation were not represented in the purported stockholders meeting authorizing the mortgage of the
subject properties.

The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent proceeded to mortgage the
subject 9 parcels of land by the corporation.
J. Respondent further relies on Annex J of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of a special meeting of the
Board of Directors authorizing him to obtain a loan and mortgage the properties of the corporation dated
August 29, 1981. This claim is baseless. The required ratification of 2/3 by the stockholders of records was
not met. Again, respondent attempts to mislead the Commission and Court.
K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the organizational meeting of the
stockholders electing the members of the Board, have not been duly signed by the stockholders as shown in
respondents annex G which was purportedly the organizational meeting of the stockholders.
L. Also, Annex J of respondents Comment which purportedly authorized him to obtain a loan and to
mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only signed by himself and a secretary.
M. In said Annex 'J' of respondents Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura Cordon was on leave by
virtue of a voting trust agreement allegedly executed by complainant in his favor covering all her shares of
stock. The claim is baseless. The voting trust referred to by respondent (annex D of his Comment), even if it
were assumed to be valid, covered only 266 shares of complainants yet she owned a total of 1,039 shares
after she and her daughter ceded in favor of the corporation 19 parcels of land.
Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her interest was safeguarded.
Yet, complainant was apparently and deliberately left our (sic) on the pretext that, she had executed a voting
trust agreement in favor of respondent.
It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21 August 1981 and
immediately thereafter, the resolutions authorizing respondent to obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels
of land were passed and approved.
N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to happen where, with the
exclusion of complainant as director the result was that there remained only 4 members of the Board,.
O. Respondents own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.
1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed deceit and machination in
convincing the complainant and her daughter to sign the articles of incorporation of Rosaura Enterprises and
in ceding to the corporation 19 parcels of land in Zamboanga City, because they freely, intelligently and
voluntarily signed the same, yet, in his Position Paper, respondent took another stance.
In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12 years later, respondent claimed that
it was actually the idea of Atty. Rosaura L. Alvarez that a corporation be put up to incorporate the estate of
the late Felixberto D. Jaldon.
2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not directors, hence they were not
notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6 (c) of his Comment he blamed the other stockholders and directors for
the corporations inability to comply with the Land Banks demands saying that they have consistently failed
since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual stockholders meetings and (i.i) for the monthly board meeting.
His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since 1981 to the present. If (sic) so, it
was his duty to convene the stockholders and the directors for meetings.
Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he needed to make a loan of
p2.2 million; when he sold the corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the
corporation to Jammang, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT 62,807 to Jammang in addition to
the 9 parcels of land which were foreclosed, and when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by
TCT No. 72,004.
It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do anything to save the corporations
properties from being foreclosed because the stockholders and directors did not convene.

This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and immoral conduct especially
because, in all his acts constituting conveyances of corporate property, respondent used minutes of
stockholders and directors meetings signed only by him and a secretary or signed by him and persons who
were not incorporators much less stockholders.
It is worthy of note that in respondents Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his position paper, there were 7 new
stockholders and complainant appeared to have only 266 shares to her name while her daughter Rosemarie
had no shares at all. Respondent did not present any proof of conveyance of shares by complainant and her
daughter.
It is further worth noting that complainants voting trust (annex D of respondents Comment) where she
allegedly entrusted 266 shares to respondent on August 21, 1981 had only a validity of 5 years. Thus, she
should have had her entire holdings of 1,283 shares back in her name in August 1986.
Respondents purported minutes of stockholders meeting (Exhs. 15 and 17) do not reflect this.
There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant and her daughter lost their 97%
control holding in the corporation.
3. As a further contradiction in respondents pleadings, we note that in paragraph 2.7.C of his Comment he
said that only recently, this year, 1985, the complainant and her aforenamed daughter examined said
voluminous supporting receipts/documents which had previously been examined by the Land Bank for loan
releases, during which occasion respondent suggested to them that the corporation will have to hire a fulltime book-keeper to put in order said voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to which they adversely
reacted due to lack of corporate money to pay for said book-keeper. But in respondents Position Paper par.
6.3 he stated that:
Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should render a detailed
accounting to the corporation of the corporate records as well as corporate revenues/income
precisely because since 1994 to the present:
(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the indispensable
connivance and instigation of the complainant and her daughter, among others, has custody of
the corporate records, xxx
4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position paper that complainant and
her daughter sabotaged the BCC operations of the corporation by illegally taking over actual control and
supervision thereof sometime in 1986, xxx
Yet respondents own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15 and 16 where the subject of the
foreclosed properties of the corporation comprising the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC) was taken up,
complainant and her daughter were not even present nor were they the subject of the discussion, belying
respondents claim that the complainant and her daughter illegally took actual control of BCC.
5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of
the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are
temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were issued. On their face however the
receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing
his printed name.
It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only
meant to issue temporary ones.
6. With regard to respondents claim that the complainant consented to the sale of her ancestral home,
covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion Suy Ong for which he attached as Exhibit 22 to his Position Paper the
minutes of an annual meeting of the stockholders, it behooves this Commission why complainants signature
had to be accompanied by her thumb mark. Furthermore, complainants signature appears unstable and
shaky. This Office is thus persuaded to believe complainants allegation in paragraph 3b of her position paper
that since September 1992 up to March 1993 she was being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel
Constantino and his wife under instructions from respondent Balicanta.

This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993, Annex H of complainants
position paper, where respondent ordered Police Officer Constantino to allow Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie
Jaldon to talk to Tita Rosing.
The complainants thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky signature lends credence to her
claim that she was detained in the far flung barrio of Culianan under instructions of respondent while her
ancestral home was demolished and the lot sold to one Tion Suy Ong.
It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainants consent by getting her to affix her
thumb mark in addition to her signature.
7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in addition to being the Chairman,
President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet, respondent submitted to this commission documents which
are supported to be in the possession of the Corporate Secretary such as the stock and transfer book and
minutes of meetings.
The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that prove on no uncertain terms that
respondent, who was the legal counsel of complainant in the latter part of the settlement of the estate of her
deceased husband, committed unlawful, immoral and deceitful conduct proscribed by Rule 1.01 of the code
of professional responsibility.
Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same code which provides that A
lawyer should observe candor fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
Respondents acts gravely diminish the publics respect for the integrity of the profession of law for which
this Commission recommends that he be meted the penalty of disbarment.
The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga filed by complainant
against respondent does not preclude a determination of respondents culpability as a lawyer.
This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in 1985 by complainant, and old
widow who deserves to find hope and recover her confidence in the judicial system.
The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by both parties lead to only one
rather unpalatable conclusion. That respondent Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, in his professional relations with
herein complainant did in fact employ unlawful, dishonest, and immoral conduct proscribed in no uncertain
terms by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, respondents actions clearly violated
Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code.
It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having committed acts in violation of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, thereby causing a great disservice to the profession, be meted the
ultimate sanction of disbarment.[2]
On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanans recommendation for respondents disbarment was
pending review before Executive Vice-President and Northern Luzon Governor Teofilo Pilando, respondent filed
a motion requesting for a full-blown investigation and for invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or
remedial action under Section 11, Rule 139-B, Revised Rules of Court, alleging that he had evidence that
Commissioner Cunanans report was drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita
Linda Jimeno. He presented two unsigned anonymous letters allegedly coming from a disgruntled employee
of Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received these letters in his mailbox.[3]
Respondents motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted Commissioner
Cunanans report was accompanied by a complaint praying for the disbarment of said lawyers including
Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658. After Attys. Cope and Jimeno
and Commissioner Cunanan filed their answers, a hearing was conducted by the Investigating Committee of
the IBP Board of Governors.
On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution[4] dismissing for lack of merit the complaint
for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan. And in Adm. Case No. 2797, the
Board adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against

herein respondent Balicanta the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 5 years for commission of
acts of misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a lawyer to
gain material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-Cordon and caused serious
damage to the complainant.[5]
To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondents fraudulent acts in the very same documents he
presented to exonerate himself. It also took note of respondents contradictory and irreconcilable statements
in the pleadings and position papers he submitted. However, it regarded the penalty of disbarment as too
severe for respondents misdeeds, considering that the same were his first offense.[6]
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,[7] the said resolution in Administrative Case No.
2797 imposing the penalty of suspension for 5 years on respondent was automatically elevated to this Court
for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and
Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of any
petition for review.
This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent committed condemnable
acts of deceit against his client. The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought
of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. At the very outset, he
embarked on his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and
Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and
Treasurer at the same time.[8] As Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19 titles that
complainant and her daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed, Farnacio Bucoy, did not appear to
be a stockholder or director in the corporate records. The minutes of the meetings supposedly electing him
and Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore the signatures of respondent and the secretary only,
contrary to his claim that they were signed by the directors and stockholders.
He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9 of the properties of
the corporation previously belonging to complainant and her daughter was ratified by the stockholders
owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock when in fact only three stockholders owning 111
out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3% assented thereto. The alleged authorization granting him the power
to contract the LBP loan for Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by the
required minimum of two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock despite respondents claim to the contrary. In
all these transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned 1,711 out of the 1,750 outstanding
shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation. Neither were they informed thereof.
Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of these transactions.
Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly executed by complainant
and her daughter for the reason that it authorized respondent to represent complainant for only 266 shares.
Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham resolutions, he failed to
explain several discrepancies in his version of the facts. We hereby reiterate some of these statements noted
by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.
First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for the required annual
meetings since 1982. However, respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when
he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang the corporations right of redemption over the
foreclosed properties of the corporation, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to
Jammang, when he mortgaged the 9 parcels of land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and
when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.
Second, the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board, disclosed that
complainant and her daughter own 1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the outstanding capital stock of the
corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds of transfer of the properties. But respondents
evidence showed that complainant had only 266 shares of stock in the corporation while her daughter had
none, notwithstanding the fact that there was nothing to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever
conveyed their shares to others.
Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing the 266 shares after
the lapse of 5 years from the time the voting trust certificate was executed in 1981.[9]

The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the outstanding shares but
respondent never bothered to explain why they were never asked to participate in or why they were never
informed of important corporate decisions.
Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and her daughter to his
proposal to hire an accountant, the corporation had no formal accounting of its revenues and income.
However, respondents position paper maintained that there was no accounting because the part-time
bookkeeper of the corporation connived with complainant and her daughter in keeping the corporate records.
Fourth, respondents claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the operations of the
corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact that complainant and her daughter were not even present in the
alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to discuss the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties. The truth is that he never informed them of such meeting and he never gave control of the
corporation to them.
Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:
5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of the
corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are
temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were issued. On their face however the
receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing
his printed name.
It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondents stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only
meant to issue temporary ones.[10]
Sixth, respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the Chairman, President and
Treasurer of the corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the investigating commission documents which
were supposed to be in the official possession of the Corporate Secretary alone such as the stock and transfer
book and minutes of meetings.
Seventh, he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the establishment of the corporation
that would invest the properties of the complainant but, in his position paper, he said that it was a certain
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to put up the corporation.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that
casts dishonor on the legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as
a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her
daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he thought could
exculpate him were the very same documents that revealed his immoral and shameless ways. These
documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man who knew the law and abused it for his
personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and
opportunism beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[11] If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets
and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.[12] Thus, the requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.[13] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain ones good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity.[14] Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong.[15] This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all.[16]

Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz cannot find a more
relevant application than in this case:
There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their selfish ends. In
this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law who has no conscience. He has, in the arsenal of
his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison and disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble end.[17]
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.[18] He is bound to account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.[19] The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.[20]
This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him
from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly used the
corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent
conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction.
The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set aside the
veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered in the name of the
corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant and her daughter. The respondent merely
held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter. The properties conveyed
fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold
or mortgaged at all. Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who may have
contracted with him in good faith.
Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondents offenses cannot be
adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended by the IBP. Instead, his wrongdoings deserve the
severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal and civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to
strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
9. SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and
Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband,
Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a
daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of
the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent
at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was
over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things
would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child.
Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying
on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that
she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been
estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live
with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent
and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before
they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to
the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in
June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the
lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent
then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2)
children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected
with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to
know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married
abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her
ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26
Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which
belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million
Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well
that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started
and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were
still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or

later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact
of cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the
same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent
and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She
alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others,
that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate
her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of
the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to
impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.[12] It is the
contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations
in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack
of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did not have
the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that
she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage
certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she
has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of
good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not
Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact,
respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to
doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time
with her, and he was so open in his courtship.[18]

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to
have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to
Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos
Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the
person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did
not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures
of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS
313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car
bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an
immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the
respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the
complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the
offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In
fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct
cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love
with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted
ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of
Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother,
Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were
clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that
respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother
that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect
towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to
show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult
to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is
not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos
Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When
she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children
whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance
of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for
Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition
to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and
believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such
marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left
him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from
simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of
social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case
lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was
amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she
never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite
their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is
simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct
that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself
from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants
bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any
normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride,
especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In
attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that
point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality,
is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

10. [A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer
fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to
practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint [1] for disbarment against her
husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Ethics for Lawyers.[2]
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early
seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the
Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in
subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of
the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted
Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but which they
managed to keep from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable
grief and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly
scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and
Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita
agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a
member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us,
his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.][3]
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[4]
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant another letter
seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the
allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the
respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from emotional confusion arising from
extreme jealousy. The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible
family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina
Espita nor abandoned his family.[5] Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance[6] and a Motion to
Dismiss,[7] attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. [8]
In a Decision dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors [9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for
failure to prosecute.[10]
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court[11] received another letter[12]
from the complainant, with her seven children[13] as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of

her husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous
threats against her.[14]
In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this Courts
Resolution issued on July 6, 1992,[15] respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be
affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had
voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance[16] and Motion to Dismiss,[17] even appearing before the
investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss
and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof.
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live with
his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz.:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman,
and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her
husband in every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the
consuming demands of her loving jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when
her jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when
she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of
jealousy.[18]
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the IBP.[19]
In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following:[20]
2.Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of
land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant
comes from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than
education and the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love, forgiveness,
humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different
environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years
of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home,
love, education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle
and compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and
never inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and
gainfully employed. x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.

On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been
systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family.
Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly
BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and
emotionally, by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with
dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this
is not to be.
The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and
understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. The
darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman
in Death and the Maiden, can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?

Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession
now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great
sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent never
revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his
wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for
worse, in sickness and in health. . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything
derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend
himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone,
everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges
and universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and all other sectors of the
community to tell them how evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as
professor, as Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this
love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a mans dearest possession in life - his
good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, employing every
unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and
irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he
who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant.[21]
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as evidence the
following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita:
3.1

Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x

3.2

Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x x

3.3

Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. x
xx

3.4

Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No.
1-92-0083. x x x

3.5

Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.

3.6

Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109.
DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x x).

3.7

Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x x). DISMISSED

by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).

3.8

Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.

3.9

Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. x x
x[22]

In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:

I.
That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are inadmissible in
evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.,
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).

xxx

xxx

xxx

II.
That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the
Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI.
He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived
with her as husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its
barangays, or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

III.
Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove
respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the
conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family
from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the
hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag.
But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x x x
IV.
Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous,
virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered,
brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically,
mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, x x x.
V.
Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to
the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained
through force and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely,
voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of
stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge
Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag,
et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. x x x.
xxx

xxx

xxx

VI.
Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior citizen of 63 years - sickly,
abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and
arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and
economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him by the
complainant. Please see the attached medical certificates, x x x, among many other similar
certificates touching on the same ailments.
Respondent is also suffering from
hypertension.[23]
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report,[24] recommending the indefinite suspension
of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending
parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:
a)
Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of
respondents own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;
b)
Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of
respondents Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and
contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly
forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and
offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the
complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering
everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify

and be cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina
Espita, to disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their
illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondents denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v.
Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a
member of the legal profession.[25]
In its Resolution[26] issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating
commissioners recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent.[27] Subsequently, the
complainant sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20,
1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, we find
that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01--

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7--

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03--

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[28] to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred.[29]
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[30] Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree[31] or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[32]
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol[33] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita.
The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[34]
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself,[35] were: Charlie Espita,[36] Magdalena Bautista,
[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B. Narag,[40] Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41] and Nieves F.
Reyes.[42]
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainants charge against
respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer:
Q

Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?

Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?

Yes, sir.

(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)

Q

Why do you know Atty. Narag?

ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A
Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband and
wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
xxx

xxx

x x x [43]

During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his account that his
sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q
that?

Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You claim

Yes, sir.

Why do you say that?

A
Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two children
and I know that that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values
dont allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you.
Q

How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house?

Yes, si[r].

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador,
is it not?
A

Yes, sir.

How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?

Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.[44]

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters respondent
had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment
proceedings.[45]
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:

Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?

I know him very well, sir.

Could you please tell us why do you know him?

Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita.

xxx

xxx

Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?

At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.

And this is located where?

Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.

And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag?

Yes, sir.

xxx

xxx

Q
not?

And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is it

Yes, sir.[46]

xxx

xxx

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned from the
Narag children -- Randy, Bong and Rowena -- that their father left his family, that she and her husband
prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the
respondent went back to his woman, and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife.[47]
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that respondent
abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had
an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these
letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his
own. In addition, complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him.
Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those
admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by
one and the same person.[48] Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters
were not really written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to
the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus,
when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating
body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[49] This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time, he depicts
his wife as a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending, and as an insanely and pathologically jealous
woman, whose only obsession was to destroy, destroy and destroy him as shown by her filing of a series of
allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninetyeight (98) pieces of documentary evidence[50] and ten (10) witnesses.[51]

We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he
maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue practicing
law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his
family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on matters which
they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent himself or other
people, while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children finished
their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But
these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble
profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate and
instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship
and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance.[52] As a husband, he is also obliged to live with
his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support.[53]
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the evidence
shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with his
paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good
husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have
scarcely felt the warmth of their fathers love.
Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his fathers moral frailties in his testimony:
Q
My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is so
serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A
That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself, I
suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a
lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened criminal
on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A
With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this point
in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered for quite
sometime.
Q
Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones are
your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are saying.
A

Sort of, sir.

Q
You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have no
more father, am I correct?
A
Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my father is
not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure,
sir, you did not give me love.[54]
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went through:

Q
In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is maintaining a
paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you?
A
This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my married
life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I
and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us.
Q

Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?

A
Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the
people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community.
Q

How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.

A
Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my
mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Why did your wife leave you?

The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.

In your wifes family?

In our family, sir.

And what do you mean by that?

A
What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent of
scolding my wife and calling my wife a puta in provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated him so
much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor.[55]
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A
husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn
to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56] The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution
of marriage.
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58] the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had
abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in
Maligsa vs. Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
11. A.C. No. 376

April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA
ROYONG,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

complainant,

BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the
respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in
the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the
allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred
the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the
respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left
her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a
newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand
dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not
shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on
the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows
on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to
report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She
resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster
mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did
not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands
for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia
Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal,
and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January,
1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing
and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had
their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one
week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all,
they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house

whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract
marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot
ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.'
After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to
Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp.
14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the
undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and
with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been
more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because
of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child,
he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by
means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the
woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle
and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not
resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22,
1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme
Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or
at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to
the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still
alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact
permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or
thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is
submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and
another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J.
Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged
rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint
which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with
Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business

of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ...
from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not
merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128
of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the
complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence.
Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was
filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was
committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the
respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit
to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who
testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16,
1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to
Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n.
24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores
registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she
was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house,
respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will
talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and
respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked
her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti
2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had
already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her
hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he
told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate
husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She
then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent
eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent
(t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also
granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter
was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958,
when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to
alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia
on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he
found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the
other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living
together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry
him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in
Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he
urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to
separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with
him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's

father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines)
was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again;
that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest
intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia
Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the
petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and
believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he
first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he
filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of
the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing
immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality
by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and
3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar
examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,
a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record,
the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant
several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously
cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the
complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of
rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is
based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may
be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the
courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper
cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give
the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.]
698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme
Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment,
the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it,
and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its
officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States,
where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional
character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law
for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may
consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of
the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be
broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar,
the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed
her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal
liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and
sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took
advantage of, for his lurid purpose.

Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his commonlaw wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor
General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission
of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts,
proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court
quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be
equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis
supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his
acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality,
one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we
concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did
not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring
moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its
eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in
that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity"
did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are
hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself
from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with
her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means
he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue
maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous
relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore
renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from
those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a
report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent
shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against
the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since
according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character.
This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral
character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral
character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really
is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal
and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such
conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42
P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v.
Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied
for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew
him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no
moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the
bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the
roll of attorneys.
12. [A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004]
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the
jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good
moral character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard.
In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[1] to the practice of law, but an
unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly
immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[2]
In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T.
Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality,
abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships
with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents
illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing
complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of
respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to
the community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his
answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the
complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate
eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to
San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she
insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was
forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for
their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant
adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of
his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her
evidence, both oral and documentary,[6] to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant
and respondent were married[7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent
was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business
and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20,
1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs.[11] Sometime in
1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had
failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant
asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the
Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her,
that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and
Christian Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour[13] to prove the
fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters
of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.[14]
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however,
submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the
Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings[15] on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already
presented her evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003.
Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which
was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he
argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite[18] filed against
him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the instant administrative
case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution
No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be

suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. [22] To
be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That
is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree[23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.[24]
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If
the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to
them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to
protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer
added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26]
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
[27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.[28]
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition
appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent
had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[29]
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another
woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife
and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar.[33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.[34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents
record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

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