G.R. No.

L-31083 September 30, 1975

URSULA FRANCISCO v. JULIAN RODRIGUEZ, MONINA
RODRIGUEZ
MARTIN, J.:
In a span of more than two decades now, this case has
been appealed to us for the third time, with the plaintiffappellant inquiring into the extent and coverage of the
reversion order of the Court in its anterior decision.
Sometime in 1932, the plaintiff-appellant, Ursula Francisco,
applied for the purchase of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102
of L-102 of Davao Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185
hectares, situated in barrio Bunawan, Davao City, through
Sales Application No. 15774.
Unfortunately, the Director of Lands rejected the sales
application, for the reason that the plaintiff-appellant had
permitted herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of the
land.
Ursula Francisco continued in possession and in June,
1940 she conveyed 29.3298 hectares of the land to her
former lawyer, defendant Julian Rodriguez.
Later, upon discovering that the document she signed was
a deed of absolute sale, she filed civil case 9-R in the CFI
of Davao and sought for the annulment of the deed.
The deed was declared null and void, but the land was
considered Government property and not plaintiffappellant's.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Lands reinstated plaintiffappellant's sales application, but stayed the execution
thereof.
Plaintiff-appellant then sued defendant Julian Rodriguez in
the CFI of Davao, docketed as Civil Case 268, for recovery
of possession, sum of money, and damages. Defendant
Monina Rodriguez, Julian's daughter, was allowed to
intervene.
After trial, the lower court adjudged plaintiff Ursula
Francisco and defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina
Rodriguez not entitled to the possession of the disputed
land and left the disposition thereof to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Both parties appealed
to this Court.
On May 21, 1956, the judgment of the lower court was
affirmed, the Court holding that the land dispute between
the parties may well be left to the action of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The parties separately moved for reconsideration,
believing that the decision of the Court had restored to them
their status ante litem motan, to obtain possession of the

property and the fruits thereof pendente lite, but the motions
were denied.
When the records of the case were returned to the lower
court, the parties reiterated their motions, which the trial
court also denied on the ground that it is either the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Director of Lands who
should ask for the possession of the property.
On October 22, 1956, after the Bureau of Lands had
completed its investigation of the land controversy ordered
by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary denied the
claims of Julian Rodriguez and his daughter Monina to
the 29.3298 hectares and it improvements. Further, it
declared the land in question vacant, the steps leading to
its sale, including the improvements, in a public bidding to
be forthwith taken.
The Office of the President affirmed the Secretary's ruling
in toto.
On December 8 1958, the Director of Lands moved to
intervene in Civil Case 268 before the lower court and
prayed that the receivership be dissolved after the
receiver shall have rendered an accounting. The motion
was granted and the final accounts of the receiver were
approved.
Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez filed a
motion asking for the possession of the property and
discharge of the receiver and later, together with the
plaintiff-appellant, moved that the proceeds of the property
be delivered to and divided between them equally. The
motions were denied.
Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez
appealed to SC, imputing that the trial court erred in
declaring the litigated land already reverted to the
State; the State's ownership of the land as carrying with it
the right to possession; in not declaring defendants entitled
to the material and physical possession of the land; and in
not terminating the receivership.
On October 31, 1962, the Court affirmed the judgment
appealed from, ruling that the reversion is self-operative
and separate action need not be instituted by the
Government for that purpose.
Neither could the parties claim for the proceeds of the
property pendente lite because "all rights in and interest to,
and the improvements and crops upon, land for which an
application has been denied or cancelled or a patent or
grant refused, or a contract or concession rescinded or
annulled, shall also be forfeited to the Government."
(Section 98, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Instead, the
property as well as the fruits thereof pendente lite should be
delivered to the Director of Lands, who had intervened in
Civil Case 268.

On March 17, 1966, the Director of Lands sought the

execution of the decision of the Court before the lower
court.

eliminated the very source (Sales Application) of her claim

to Lot No. 595, as a consequence of which, she cannot
later on assert any right or interest thereon.

Plaintiff Ursula Francisco opposed the petition, contending

that only twenty-nine (29) hectares of the 33-hectare Lot
No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao Cadastre, was
reverted to the State, excluding the four (4) hectares
which she claims to have been in her possession even
during the pendency of Civil Case 268.

The invalidity of the conveyance plaintiff-appellant

"produced as a consequence the reversion of the
property with all rights thereto to the State."

Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez

followed, claiming that an independent suit is necessary
for the execution of the judgment since more than five
(5) years have already elapsed from its finality.
Opposition also came from claimants-oppositors Alejo
Dugasa, et al., pressing on the impropriety of execution by
mere motion and asserting their possessory right over the
land in question.
The lower court denied the oppositions in its Order of
September 18, 1967 and directed the issuance of a writ
of execution placing the Government thru the Director
of Lands and the District Land Officer in Davao in
complete possession of the land in question.
In a subsequent order of November 10, 1967, the lower
court also enjoined the receiver in the proceedings to
submit its final accounting, after which the Motion for
Dissolution of Receivership filed by the Director of Lands
would be heard.
Hence, on November 20, 1967, plaintiff-appellant filed her
Notice of Appeal against the September 18, 1967 Order of
the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether the reversion ordered in G.R. No. L15605, October 31, 1962, refers to the whole Lot No. 595,
Cadastral No. 102 of Davao, consisting of 33.1185
hectares, or only to the 29.3298 hectares, the conveyance
of which by the plaintiff-appellant to defendant Julian
Rodriguez had been annulled.
HELD: The appealed order of the court a quo, dated
September 18, 1967, ordering the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of the Government, thru the Director of
Lands, of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao
Cadastre (for the whole area of 33.1185 hectares)

As a matter of fact, Section 29 of the Public Land Law

(Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that any
sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval
of the Secretary Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall
be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling
the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights
thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase
price theretofore made to the Government shall be
forfeited."
Thus, in Republic v. Garcia, quoted in Republic v. Ruiz,
supra, it was held that "even if only 19 out of the 23.21
hectares of the homestead land had been sold or alienated
within the prohibitive period of five years living date of
issuance of the patent to the grantee, such alienation is a
sufficient cause for reversion to the State of the whole
grant."
Much more, when even the mere application is denied by
the Bureau of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
Even if a sales application were already given due course
by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby
conferred any right over the land covered by the
application. It is the award made by the Director to the
applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon him
a certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession of
the land so that he could comply with the requirements
prescribed by law."
It is at this stage, when the award is made, that the land
can be considered "disposed of by the Government", since
the aforestated right of the applicant has the effect of
withdrawing the land from the public domain that is
"disposable" by the Director of Lands under the provisions
of the Public Land Act.
However, the disposition is merely provisional because
the applicant has still to comply with the requirements
prescribed by law before any patent is issued.

The only basis of the plaintiff-appellant's claim to the

property in question is her Sales Application No. 15774,
wherein she applied for the purchase of Lot No. 595,
Cadastral No. 102, Davao Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185
hectares. However, the application was rejected by the
Director of Lands on August 10, 1935, because she
"permitted herself to be a dummy."

After the requisites of the law are complied with by the

applicant to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, the
patent is issued. It is then that the land covered by the
application may be considered "permanently disposed of by
the Government." In case the applicant is found not to
possess the qualifications necessary for the award of the
land, the application is revoked.

By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a

dummy in the acquisition of the land and selling the same
without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant herself has

Furthermore, the finding of the Court in its previous

decisions that the Director of Lands and finally the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had
rejected plaintiff-appellant's sales application for Lot No.
595 may well be considered as the law of the case between

the parties herein, to the effect that the resulting absence of

plaintiff-appellant's rights or interests to the entire Lot No.
595 constitutes controlling legal rule between them.
Summary of Facts: The only basis of the plaintiffappellant's claim to the property in question is her Sales
Application No. 15774, wherein she applied for the
purchase of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102, Davao
Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185 hectares. However, the
application was rejected by the Director of Lands on
August 10, 1935, because she "permitted herself to be a
dummy." She continued to possess the property though and
then sold 29 hectares thereof to her previous lawyer,
defendant Julian Rodriguez. Later, the sale was declared
null and void by this Court in G.R. No. L-8263, May 26,
1952, not only because plaintiff-appellant's rights under her
sales applications had been cancelled by the Bureau of
Lands but especially because the convenyance was made
without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
as required by law (Section 29, Commonwealth Act No.
141), The nullity of such sale produced as a consequence
"the reversion of the property with all the rights thereto to
the State."
The subsequent reinstatement of plaintiff-appellant's sales
application by the Director of Lands did not redeem her
claim to Lot 595, Cadastral No. 102 from its incipient nullity
because the application was finally denied by the Secretary
of Agriculture on October 22, 1956 after formal investigation
by the Bureau of Lands, a ruling now beyond judicial
interference. 11 As a result, whatever rights or interests
plaintiff-appellant may have in Lot No. 595 had thus frittered
away and the entire lot reverted to the mass of public lands,
such reversion being even imprescriptible.

Application of Fermin Guy Yoche by decreeing that they

shall be "given further action in accordance with standing
rules and regulations on the matter."
On May 22, 1951, plaintiff Urbana Tapiador Vda. de Guy
Yoche, in her own behalf and in behalf of the other heirs of
Fermin Guy Yoche, filed with the Bureau of Lands their
Final Proof on the homestead application of her deceased
husband.
In connection therewith, a final investigation report
recommending the survey and the issuance of a homestead
patent to and in favor of the Heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche was
submitted to the Director of Lands. (last action of the
Bureau of Lands taken in so far as the homestead
application of Guy Yoche is concerned)
G.R. No. L-67935

March 18, 1991

BENITO QUINSAY, MELITON CABERTO and PASTOR

OLALAN
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FOURTH
CIVIL CASES DIVISION, and URBANA GUY YOCHE,
LETICIA GUY YOCHE, ANITA GUY YOCHE, ADELA GUY
YOCHE, BEATRIZ GUY YOCHE, VIVENCIO GUY YOCHE,
NOLASCO GUY YOCHE (deceased), substituted by his
legal heirs URSULA ENRIQUEZ, NERISSA, NOEL, and
NOEMI, all surnamed GUY YOCHE
REGALADO, J.:
Beatriz Bayle filed with the Bureau of Lands a Homestead
Application for Lot No. 1105, Cad. 211, situated at Divisoria,
Santiago, Isabela.
Later, she transferred her rights thereto to Sylverio Valdez
who, on January 2, 1950, in turn transferred his rights to
Fermin Guy Yoche.
These transfers were approved by the Undersecretary of
Agri. & Nat. Res. in his Order of January 31, 1951.
Guy Yoche's homestead application was opposed by
defendant Benito Quinsay who was occupying the lot.
Fermin Guy Yoche and Benito Quinsay entered into an
amicable settlement concerning the land, agreeing that the
northeast comer of the lot, with an area of 1,500 square
meters, designated as portion B, shall pertain to Benito
Quinsay while the rest of the lot, with an area of 48,765
square meters, designated as portion A, shall pertain to
Fermin Guy Yoche.
By virtue of such agreement, Benito Quinsay filed on
January 20, 1950 a Miscellaneous Sales Application over
portion B of the lot while Fermin Guy Yoche filed on
January 2, 1950 a Homestead Application over portion A.
The Director of Lands approved the amicable settlement on
January 8, 1951 and accepted both the Miscellaneous
Sales (new) Application of Quinsay and the Homestead

Urbana Guy Yoche intervened during an investigation

conducted on January 6, 1975 of a separate claim filed by
several persons, namely: Valeriano Galeste, Nemesio
Lalas, Ernesto Bucasas, Ciriaco Lagazon, Mariano de la
Cruz, German Barroga, Benjamin Ulep, Timoteo Martinez,
Celestino Campos and Laureto Arconsil against the
application of Benito Quinsay.
It further appears that a directive was issued on February
22, 1977 to Land Investigator Luis Salatan to conduct a
hearing on the homestead application of the Heirs of
Fermin Guy Yoche as against Free Patent Application No.
II-2 14875 of Julio Quinsay.
In the meantime, Benito Quinsay and his children,
intervenor Julio Quinsay and Florida Quinsay,
continued to occupy and possess the whole Lot 1105.
Fermin Guy Yoche or any of his heirs never attempted
to take possession thereof.
Quinsay and his children cultivated and converted into
Riceland portions thereof in which they planted palay.
They also planted vegetables and fruit trees thereon.
Then, on March 6, 1972, Benito Quinsay sold to Pastor
Olalan 1,250 square meters portion of the land.
Likewise, on January 31, 1974, he again sold another
portion, with an area of 3,013 square meters, to Meliton
Caberto.
There is no showing that Pastor Olalan and Meliton Caberto
knew of the homestead application of Fermin Guy Yoche
over the land, much more the existence of any amicable
settlement over it. What was established is that during all
the time that Olalan and Caberto stayed in Divisoria (and
they are still there), they only saw Benito Quinsay to be the
owner and in possession of the land. After the sales, Olalan
and Caberto took actual possession of the portions bought
by them, declared their respective portions in their names
for taxation purposes and paid real estate taxes thereof.
Afterwards, they filed their separate free patent applications
over their individual portions with the Bureau of Lands on
March 23, 1974 and March 1, 1974, respectively. For

purposes of their applications, they submitted the plans of

the portions they bought.
The District Land Officer of Isabela acted favorably on their
applications and in due time issued the corresponding
patents thereto. Register of Deeds of Isabela issued OCT
No. P-26759 to Meliton Caberto on May 24, 1974. OCT No.
P-27214 was issued to Pastor Olalan on August 16, 1974.
In a verified complaint dated January 27, 1975, herein
private respondents filed Civil Case No. Br. V-216 in the
former CFI of Isabela for annulment of patent,
reconveyance and damages against herein petitioners
Benito Quinsay, Meliton Caberto and Pastor Olalan, and
impleading therein the Director of Lands as a co-defendant
of the said petitioners.
The Heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche alleged that the portions c
sold by Benito Quinsay to the titled holders was in violation
of the amicable settlement entered into between him and
their predecessor-in-interest.
Benito Quinsay failed to deny under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the amicable settlement, reason for
which its genuineness and due execution are now deemed
admitted. He was not able to present any evidence
surrounding the execution thereof to impugn it. He, together
with his co-defendants, put up the defenses of laches and
abandonment, contending that the failure of the plaintiffs to
take possession of the land from the time of the execution
of the amicable settlement to the present resulted in the
forfeiture through laches of any right that they may have
over the land.
The court a quo ruled to dismiss the complaint of private
respondents and upheld the validity of Free Patents and
OCTs issued in favor of petitioner Pastor Olalan and Meliton
Caberto.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the plaintiffs
already submitted final proof, the same has not yet
been approved by the Director of Lands. As a matter
of fact, the Bureau of Lands is still investigating the
contending claims of several persons over the land.
With more reason then, that the plaintiffs cannot say
that they have any vested right over the land.
Moreover, the right of the homesteader to a patent
does not become absolute until after he has
complied with all the requirements of the law
Private respondents elevated their case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court seeking reversal of said
decision on the contention that the trial court erred in not
holding that they and their predecessors had acquired
vested rights to the homestead in question.
There appears to be two (2) schools of thought on the
matter.
The first is for vested rights to exist the final proof must
be not only filed but must be approved by the Director
of Lands,

The second, merely requires a finding by the Bureau

of Lands through its proper officials that the
homesteader has complied with all the terms and
conditions which entitle him to a patent,
When a homesteader has complied with all the
terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for
a particular tract of land, he acquires a vested
interest therein, and is regarded as the equitable
owner thereof. Where the right to patent has once
become vested in a purchaser of public land, it is
equivalent to patent actually issued. The execution
and delivery of the patent, after the right to a
particular parcel of land has become complete, are
the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with
that duty. Even without a patent, a perfected
homestead is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the permanent title to the
land is still in the Government. Such land may be
conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can
deprive him of that vested right.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Plaintiffs-appellants have already submitted their final proof

of possession, residence and cultivation. They have paid
the legal fees and charges. Hilarion Briones of the Bureau
of Lands in Ilagan, Isabela has recommended survey of the
land and the issuance of patent to the heirs of Fermin Guy
Yoche, it appearing that all the requirements of law on the
matter have been complied with.
The IAC reversed and set aside the decision appealed from
and render another one annulling as null and void the Free
Patents and Original Certificates of Title issued in the
names of defendants-appellees Pastor Olalan and Meliton
Caberto, ordering defendant-appellee Director of Lands to
approve the final proof submitted by plaintiffs-appellants
and issue a patent covering Lot "B", Lot 1105, Cad. Lot No.
211 situated in Divisoria, Santiago, Isabela, with an area of
48,765 square meters, more or less, in the name of the
Heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche, and ordering private
defendants-appellees, jointly and severally to pay plaintiffsappellants the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Hence the present appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the
1. Private respondents have acquired a vested right
over the lots in question; NO
2. The amicable settlement entered into between
Fermin Guy Yoche and Benito Quinsay lost its
validity through laches; YES
3. The conveyances of the lots in question by Benito
Quinsay in favor of Pastor Olalan and Meliton
Caberto are valid; YES
4. The Director of Lands may dispose in favor of
petitioners Olalan and Caberto of any portion of Lot

B allegedly covered by private respondents' valid

and subsisting homestead application after the latter
have already complied with all the requirements of
the law to entitle them to a patent; YES
5. There was fraud, imposition or mistake in the
issuance of free patents to petitioners Olalan and
Caberto, thus affecting the validity of said patents
and the corresponding certificates of title; NO and
6. Petitioners Olalan and Caberto are liable to private
respondents for monthly rentals over the lots. NO
HELD:
On the first issue, the homestead application and the final
proof submitted by the heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche on May
22, 1951 remain unapproved up to the present. Therefore,
vested rights over the land cannot be validly claimed by
private respondents since the approval by the Director of
Lands of their final proof for a homestead patent is now a
condition sine qua non for the existence of such vested
right.
The second issue is whether the amicable settlement
entered into between Fermin Guy Yoche and Benito
Quinsay lost its validity through laches.

The court held that it was only raised in issue by

private respondents only after the issuance of the
aforesaid free patents and original certificates of title
over the land in 1974.
A period of twenty-three years is definitely a long time
to wait for one to finally claim his due.
Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a
court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of
merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a
person to enforce his right when the same is
threatened or invaded.
Thus, he is estopped by laches from questioning the
ownership of the questioned land.

Third and fourth issues, on whether or not Benito Quinsay

can validly convey portions of the lot to his co-petitioners,
the court held in the affirmative, and that the Director of
Lands acted correctly in confirming such dispositions,
finding that private respondents never really came into
possession of the lot and neither did they actually cultivate
the same, only to belatedly assert their right thereto after
a long period of time, it is only legal and equitable that
Benito Quinsay be entitled to the land. That Quinsay
never abandoned the lot and even his children actively
participated in the lot's development are revealed and
affirmed by the records.
Fifth issue, on the imputation of fraud, imposition or mistake
in the issuance of the free patents of Pastor Olalan and
Meliton Caberto, to the extent of affecting the validity of the
same and the certificates of title issued pursuant thereto,
does not deserve any consideration. The court have
repeatedly held that fraud is a question of fact which
must be alleged and proved. Fraud is a serious charge

and, to be sustained, it must be supported by clear and

convincing proof, especially in the registration of title to
land. No evidence has been presented nor is any extant in
the records of this case showing that there was fraud
committed in the issuance of the patents and the titles
sought to be annulled.
Neither were petitioners Meliton Caberto and Pastor Olalan
aware of any prior claim of private respondents. They relied
in good faith on the knowledge that Quinsay is the exclusive
occupant of the land since 1944 when they arrived in
Divisoria. Fermin Guy Yoche never set foot nor laid any
claim on the land. How were Olalan and Caberto to know
that Guy Yoche had any right to the land? On these
considerations, the Court must perforce respect and uphold
their patents and titles over the portions acquired by them.
22

Sixth issue, on the claim of private respondents for rentals

over the lots in question is necessarily gratuitous for the
simple reason that they have utterly failed to establish any
vested right there over.
Summary: Since no patent was ever actually issued to
private respondents, consequent to prior approval of their
final proof, there was no violation of any right which, in the
first place, never vested in them. Furthermore, prior to the
issuance of the patents in favor of Olalan and Caberto,
private respondents never exercised any of their alleged
rights to the land, thus rendering their claim baseless and
exposing the dubiety thereof. On the other hand, the titles
of Olalan and Caberto were acquired through free patent
applications in accordance with the procedure therefor.
Therefore, the patents and titles issued to petitioners Pastor
Olalan and Meliton Caberto should be upheld as valid and
should be extended the corresponding protection by the
authorities and respected by private respondents.

For these reasons, Mesina prays that said decree and

title be cancelled in his action before the CFI of Nueva
Ecija.
Defendants De Sonza filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the
statute of limitations.
The reasons advanced are:

G.R. No. L-14722

May 25, 1960

IGNACIO MESINA,
vs.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.,
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Ignacio Mesina claims

that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259,

with improvements thereon, situated in San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
that he has been in actual possession thereof
since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against
the whole world and up to the present time he is
the only one who benefits from the produce
thereof;
that said lot is at present the subject of registration
proceedings pending in the same court known as
Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record
No. N-12238;
that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director
of Lands, without exercising due care, and in spite
of his knowledge that the De Sonzas had not
complied with the requirements of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their
favor as a consequence of which a certificate of
title was issued in their name by the register of
deeds;
that said title was procured by defendants through
frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they
knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff;
and that the Director of Lands has no authority nor
jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land
because it is a private property of plaintiff.

The complaint was filed on March 25, 1958.

The decree of registration or issuance of patent
over the property was issued "sometime on
September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while the
transfer certificate of title covering the same was
issued on September 16, 1953.
The present action which calls for the
cancellation of said decree and title has,
therefore, been filed after the elapse of more
than four years, which cannot be done,
because the title has already become
indefeasible and incontrovertible.

The court sustained this motion and dismissed the

complaint. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs action has prescribe.
NO.
HELD: The court held that the theory that a decree of
registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of
fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,
does not apply in the case at bar, because the property
involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to
be part of the public domain.
Under Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141 (as
amended by RA No. 1942), Mesina by legal fiction, who
was in actual possession of the subject land since 1914, is
deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State. It
follows that the subject land had ceased to be part of the
public domain and had become private property and,
therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the homestead patent and the original
certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of
Lands in favor of the defendants is null and void, for having
been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without
giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have
been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the
ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable,
rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial
court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.

Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957
(amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141),
provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceeding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

Bukidnon of the two (2) parcels of land known as Lot No.

1017 and Lot No. 1015 with areas of 117,744 square
meters and 69,974 square meters respectively, located in
Pongol, Libona, Bukidnon.
In support of their causes of action for declaration of nullity
of titles and reconveyance, private respondents claimed
absolute ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to
the issuance of the corresponding free patents and
certificates of title. They further alleged in their complaint

G.R. No. 147379

February 27, 2002

HEIRS OF AMBROCIO KIONISALA, namely, ANA,

ISABEL, GRACE, JOVEN and CARMELO, all surnamed
KIONISALA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HONORIO DACUT, namely: VISAMINDA D.
OREVILLO, VIOLETA DACUT, JOSEPHINE DACUT and
ELIZABETH DACUT, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 7 September 1990 Lot No. 1017 was granted a free
patent to petitioners Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala under Free
Patent No. 603393.
And on 13 November 1991 Lot 1015 was bestowed upon
Isabel Kionisala, one of the impleaded heirs of Ambrocio
Kionisala under Free Patent No. 101311-91-904.
Thereafter, on 19 November 1990 Lot 1017 was registered
under the Torrens system and was issued OCT No. P19819 in petitioners name, while on 5 December 1991 Lot
No. 1015 was registered in the name of Isabel Kionisala
under OCT No. P-20229.
On 19 December 1995 Heirs of Dacut filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages
against Heirs of Kionisala, with the RTC of Manolo Fortich,

Are absolute and exclusive owners by virtue of

inheritance from their late father, Honorio Dacut
In actual possession and cultivation of two parcels
of agricultural lands for more than thirty (30) years.
They discovered that the petitioners, without their
knowledge and consent, fraudulently applied for
patent the said parcels of land and as a result
thereof certificates of titles had been issued to
them
That the patents issued to defendants are null and
void
That in the remote possibility that said certificates
of title cannot be declared as null and void,
plaintiffs, being the absolute and exclusive owners
of the parcels of land titled by the defendants, are
entitled to reconveyance

On 7 February 1996 petitioners filed their answer to

the complaint and asserted the following affirmative
defenses

That the complaint states no cause of action;

That the cause of action, if any, is barred by
statute of limitations, prescription of action or by
equitable principle of laches;
10. That x x x it is only the Director of Lands (now
DENR) through the Office of the Solicitor General
that has the authority to file annulment of Free
Patent or Homestead Patent issued by the
Director of Lands or DENR;

On 3 December 1996 the trial court dismissed the

complaint on the ground that the cause of action of
private respondents was truly for reversion so that only
the Director of Lands could have filed the complaint.
On 23 December 1996 private respondents moved for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal but on 3 June
1997 the motion was denied by the trial court.
On 7 June 1997 private respondents appealed the order of
dismissal to the Court of Appeals.
On 15 February 2000 the appellate court reversed the
order of dismissal. It ruled that while the allegations in the
complaint were insufficient for purposes of an ordinary civil
action for declaration of nullity of a certificate of title since
the actual date when private respondents became owners
of Lots 1015 and 1017 prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title was not

specifically indicated in the complaint, nonetheless the

allegations therein were comprehensive enough to
constitute a cause of action for reconveyance.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision
but the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit,
hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint state a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of the free patents and certificates of
title for Lot 1015 and Lot 1017, or alternatively a cause of
action for reconveyance of these two lots.
Whether the cause of action, has prescribed.
First issue: The court ruled that the complaint does not
allege an action for reversion which private respondents
would obviously have no right to initiate, but that it
sufficiently states either a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patents and certificates of title over Lot 1015
and Lot 1017 or alternatively a cause of action for
reconveyance of these two pieces of realty, wherein in
either case private respondents are the real parties in
interest.
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action
for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty
whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land. On the other
hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patent and certificate of title would require allegations of
the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the
issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well
as the defendants fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the
parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the
nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but
from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or
certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently
void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State but
the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership
over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of
title to the defendant.
It is obvious that private respondents allege in their
complaint all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of
the free patents as well as the certificates of title covering
Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in
interest in light of their allegations that they have always
been the owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of
land even prior to the issuance of the documents of title in
petitioners favor, hence the latter could only have
committed fraud in securing them.
It is not essential for private respondents to specifically
state in the complaint the actual date when they became
owners and possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017.

With respect to the purported cause of action for

reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the free
patent and the certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of
the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants
name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2)
facts which admitting them to be true would entitle the
plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that
the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the
defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same. 17
The Court ruled that private respondents have sufficiently
pleaded (in addition to the cause of action for declaration of
free patents and certificates of title) an action for
reconveyance, more specifically, one which is based on
implied trust. An implied trust arises where the defendant
allegedly acquires the disputed property through mistake or
fraud so that he would be bound to hold and reconvey the
property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to
it.
In the complaint, private respondents clearly assert that
they have long been the absolute and exclusive owners and
in actual possession and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot
1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership
thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and
certificates of title in their names. These allegations
certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to
constitute an action for reconveyance.
Second. The court ruled that neither the action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title
of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 nor the action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust of the same lots has prescribed.
"A free patent issued over private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quos nullum est,
nullum producit effectum."
Moreover, private respondents claim of open, public,
peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two (2)
parcels of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of
petitioners and in their original certificates of title, also
amounts to an action for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible.
The action for reconveyance based on implied trust, on
the other hand, prescribes only after ten (10) years from
1990 and 1991 when the free patents and the certificates of
title over Lot 1017 and Lot 1015, respectively, were
registered. Obviously the action had not prescribed when
private respondents filed their complaint against
petitioners on 19 December 1995. At any rate, the action
for reconveyance in the case at bar is also significantly
deemed to be an action to quiet title for purposes of
determining the prescriptive period on account of private
respondents allegations of actual possession of the
disputed lots. In such a case, the cause of action is truly
imprescriptible.
In sum, the grounds relied upon in petitioners desire to
dismiss the complaint of private respondents in Civil Case

No. 95-312 cannot be impressed with merit. By this

decision, however, the court is not foreclosing the
presentation of evidence during trial on the merits that Lot
1015 and Lot 1017 are not private property and that private
respondents are not truly the owners thereof. This and other
issues on the merits must follow where the preponderant
evidence lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
15 February 2000 reversing the Order dismissing the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-312 entitled Heirs of
Honorio Dacut, namely, Visaminda Orevillo, Violeta Dacut,
Josephine Dacut and Elizabeth Dacut v. Heirs of Ambrocio
Kionisala, namely, Ana, Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and
Camilo, all surnamed Kionisala, and Isabel Kionisala is
AFFIRMED with the understanding that private respondents
Heirs of Honorio Dacut as plaintiffs therein may proceed on
the basis of their causes of action of declaration of nullity of
free patents and certificates of titles and/or reconveyance
based on an implied trust, with claim for damages. The
proceedings in the trial court shall commence forthwith
within thirty (30) days from notice of the finality of this
Decision without unnecessary delay.

Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No.
473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cebu issued OCT No. 0-6667 over the said
lot.1
Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD AgroIndustries, Inc. by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of title
and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No. 473408
and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that
the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No.
1434 was irregular and erroneous, following the
discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland
and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.
The discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a lettercomplaint with the Regional Executive Director of the Forest
Management Sector, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII, Cebu City, about
the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and
construction of dikes within the area covered by
Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.
On 14 July 1995, Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention
against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the allegations of
respondent.
However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the
complaint and were thus declared in default.

G.R. No. 152570

September 27, 2006

On 15 May 1999, the trial court dismissed the complaint,

finding that respondent failed to show that the subject lot
is part of the timberland or forest reserve or that it has
been classified as such before the issuance of the free
patent and the original title.

SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC.,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

According to the trial court, the issuance of the free patent

and title was regular and in order, and must be accorded full
faith.

x------------------------------------------------x

Considering the validity of the free patent and the OCT,

petitioner's purchase of the property was also declared
legal and valid. The trial court also denied the complaint-inintervention filed by Urgello.

PEDRO URGELLO, intervenor-appellant.

TINGA, J.:
The instant petition for review assails the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July 2001 and
18 March 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64097, reversing and
setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 11, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-17173.
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo filed her application
for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of
land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay
Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's

judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which the
subject lot belongs, are not subject to private ownership,
unless these are first classified as agricultural lands. Thus,
absent any declassification of the subject lot from
forest to alienable and disposable land for agricultural
purposes, the officers erred in approving Orcullo's free
patent application and in issuing the OCT; hence, title
to the lot must be cancelled.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals invalidated the sale of
the lot to petitioner. However, it declared that Urgello's
Fishpond Lease Agreement may continue until its

expiration because lease does not pass title to the

lessee; but thereafter, the lease should not be renewed.

Free Patent No. 473408 and the corresponding OCT

[No.] 0-6667 as NULL and VOID ab initio.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT [No.] 0-6667 to the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered
to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667 and all other transfer
certificates of title that may have been subsequently
issued.
Lot No. 1434, CAD 315[-]D located at Barangay
Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu, subject matter of this case, is
hereby REVERTED as part of [the] public domain and
to be classified as timberland.11

Petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration,
claiming
insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider pertinent
laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals categorically stated that there was a
preponderance of evidence showing that the subject lot is
within the timberland area.
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
relying on the DENR officer's testimony. It claims that the
testimony was a mere opinion. Such opinion was premised
on the officer's construction of a provision of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Those still to be classified under the present system
shall continue to remain as part of the public forest.14
Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May
1975, or long after the issuance of the free patent and title
in question. Thus, the provision stating that all public lands
should be considered as "part of the public forests" until a
land classification team has declassified them is applicable
only after the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot be
made retroactive to cover and prejudice vested rights
acquired prior to the effectivity of said law, petitioner
concludes.
It adds that if the subject lot was encompassed by the term
"public forest," the same should have been designated as a
"Timberland Block," not as Cadastral Lot No. 1434, CAF315-D, Sibonga Cadastre which was the designation made
by the Republic prior to 1972.
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals' reliance on
the land classification map (L.C. Map) presented by
respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C.
Map No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that "the plaintiff has
not duly proved the authenticity and contents." According to
petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither a
certified true copy nor one attested to be a true copy by any
DENR official having legal custody of the original thereof,
and thus should not have been made the basis of the
cancellation of the free patent and title.

Petitioner further contends that the projection survey

conducted by the DENR to determine if the subject lot falls
within the forest area "is not clear, precise and conclusive,"
since the foresters who conducted the survey used a
magnetic box compass, an unreliable and inaccurate
instrument, whose results are easily affected by high
tension wires and stones with iron minerals.18
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent failed to overcome
the presumption of regularity of the issuance of the free
patent and title in favor of Socorro Orcullo.
In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show
that the subject lot is inside the timberland block, thereby
casting doubt on the accuracy of the survey conducted by
the Bureau of Forestry and the opinions of DENR officers.
Since respondent is the original plaintiff in the reversion
case, the burden is on it to prove that the subject lot is part
of the timberland block, petitioner adds.
ISSUE: Whether the subject lot is a timberland.
HELD: Respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part
of timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. Free Patent
No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular
issuances, respondent's insistence on the classification of
the lot as part of the forest reserve was rejected.
Considering that the land subject of the action originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.
The State, as the party alleging the fraud and
misrepresentation that attended the application of the free
patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent
and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the
free patent and original title were truly erroneously and
irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed
to do so.
Reliance on the provision of P.D. No. 705 particularly
Section 13 is highly misplaced.
P.D. No. 705 was promulgated only on 19 May 1975, or four
(4) years after the free patent and title were awarded to
Orcullo. Thus, it finds no application in the instant case.
Prior forestry laws, including P.D. No. 389, which was
revised by P.D. No. 705, does not contain a similar
provision. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided."
The subject parcel was unclassified at the time Orcullo
applied for a free patent thereto, the fact remains that
when the free patent and title were issued thereon in
1971, respondent in essence segregated said parcel

from the mass of public domain. Thus, it can no longer

be considered unclassified and forming part of the public
forest as provided in P.D. No. 705.
Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject lot is
part of the timberland or forest reserve is a purported L.C.
Map No. 2961. Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted
by respondent is admissible in evidence, still the land in
question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or
forest reserve.
L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the "correct map
of the areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of
the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended" was made
only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made
nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent
over the subject lot.
Private interests have intervened before classification was
made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by
herself and through her predecessors-in-interest cultivated
and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a free patent was
also awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early
as 1971.
In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and
certificate of title was regular and in order.
Orcullo complied with the requisites for the acquisition of
free patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141
(Public Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Besides, the records do not show that respondent has
considered the lot in question as forest reserve prior to the
issuance of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667.
To declare the land now as forest land on the authority of
L.C. Map No. 2961 approved only in 1980, and opinions
based on the said map, would unduly deprive petitioner of
their registered property.

Both oppositions were stricken from the records since the

opposition of Dizon was filed after the expiration of the
period given by the court, and the opposition of the Director
of Lands was filed after the entry of the order of general
default.
After considering the evidence, the trial court rendered its
April 26, 1974 Decision. It declared the applicant, Fermina
Castro, the true and absolute owner of the land applied for
xxx and ordered the registration of said parcel of land in her
name xxx.
The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal
from the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI.
Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration
became final, and Decree No. N-150912 was issued by the
Land Registration Commission (LRC). OCT No. 10215 was
issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal on May 29, 1974.
The land was then sold to Jesus S. Yujuico. On May 31,
1974, TCT No. 445863 was issued in Yujuicos name.
The land was subdivided into two lots.

TCT No. 446386 over Lot 1 was issued in his name,

while TCT No. S-29361 over Lot 2 was issued in the
name of petitioner Augusto Y. Carpio.

Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that

Yujuico had, at one time or another, mortgaged the lot to
the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and
Citibank, N.A.
Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot
was mortgaged in favor of Private Development
Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (PCIB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) to secure various loans.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 168661

October 26, 2007

ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS S. YUJUICO, represented

by ADMINISTRATORS BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO and
EDILBERTO V. YUJUICO; and AUGUSTO Y. CARPIO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF
APPEALS
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the
registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of
land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan
(LRC) Psu-964, located in Paraaque City, in the PasigRizal Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 22.
The application was opposed by the OSG on behalf of the
Director of Lands, and by Mercedes Dizon, a private party.

Sometime in 1977, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 was

issued. Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas
of Manila Bay became the properties of the Public Estates
Authority (PEA), a government corporation that undertook
the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed
lands.
The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal
Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio
discovered
that
a
verification
survey
they
commissioned showed that the road directly
overlapped their property, and that they owned a
portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC (1989).
On July 24, 1996, Yujuico and Carpio filed before the
Paraaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for
the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages
against the PEA.

On May 15, 1998 the parties entered into a compromise

agreement approved by the trial court in a Resolution
dated May 18, 1998.

On September 13, 2001, Yujuico and Carpio filed a Motion

to Dismiss (With Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens), on
the grounds that:

On June 17, 1998, the parties executed a Deed of

Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise
agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007
hectares would be conveyed to Jesus Yujuico and petitioner
Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area
of 1.7343 hectares.

(1) The cause of action was barred by prior judgment;

(2) The claim had been waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(3) A condition precedent for the filing of the complaint was
not complied with; and
(4) The complaint was not verified and the certification
against forum shopping was not duly executed by the
plaintiff or principal party.

On July 31, 1998, the incumbent PEA General Manager,

Carlos P. Doble, informed the OSG that the new PEA board
and management had reviewed the compromise agreement
and had decided to defer its implementation and hold it in
abeyance following the view of the former PEA General
Manager, Atty. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., that the compromise
agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA
Board, requiring the approval of the Office of the President.
The new PEA management then filed a petition for relief
from the resolution approving the compromise agreement
on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence.
The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the
ground that it was filed out of time and that the
allegation of mistake and excusable negligence lacked
basis.
In appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the petition was
dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fees and for
lack of merit.
The matter was raised to the Supreme Court in Public
Estates Authority v. Yujuico but PEAs petition was denied,
upholding the trial courts dismissal of the petition for
relief for having been filed out of time.
On June 8, 2001, in a Complaint for Annulment and
Cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its Derivative
Titles was filed with the Paraaque City RTC, by
respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG.
Alleging that when the land registered to Castro was
surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and
subsequently approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the
land was still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by
Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243, xxx that Fermina
Castro had no registrable rights over the property.
Respondent Republic argued that

Since the subject land was still underwater, it could not

be registered in the name of Fermina Castro.
The land registration court did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision
adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina
Castro was void.
And the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from
a void title, were likewise void.

On November 27, 2001, respondent Republic filed an

Opposition to the motion to dismiss to which defendants
filed a Reply on January 14, 2002, reiterating the grounds
for the motion to dismiss.
In the August 7, 2002 Order of the RTC, Civil Case No. 010222 was dismissed.
The trial court stated that the matter had already been
decided in LRC Case No. N-8239, and that after 28 years
without being contested, the case had already become
final and executory.1wphi
The trial court also found that the OSG had participated in
the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of
the decision but did not. Civil Case No. 01-0222 was thus
found barred by prior judgment.
On appeal to the CA, the CA set aside the lower courts
decision. It observed that shores are properties of the
public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not
registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does
not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title upon the registrant.
Further, according to the appellate court res judicata does
not apply to lands of public domain, nor does
possession of the land automatically divest the land of its
public character.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a reversion suit proper in this case. NO
Whether the present petition estopped by laches. YES
Whether the action for reversion is already barred by res
judicata. YES
An action for reversion seeks to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
or corporations to the mass of public domain. This remedy
is provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 (Public
Land Act) which became effective on December 1, 1936.
Said law recognized the power of the state to recover lands
of public domain.

(1) The Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and

cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative
titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Paraaque City
RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was
erroneously instituted in the Paraaque RTC and
should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
proper court is the CA which is the body mandated
by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle
annulment of judgments of RTCs.
Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paraaque
RTC. It should have been filed with the CA as required
by Rule 47. Evidently, the Paraaque RTC had no
jurisdiction over the instant reversion case.
(2) Assuming that the Paraaque RTC has jurisdiction over
the reversion case, still the lapse of almost three
decades in filing the instant case, the inexplicable
lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would
cause constrain us to rule for petitioners.
While it may be true that estoppel does not operate
against the state or its agents, deviations have been
allowed.

and the title declared null and void, such declaration cannot
nullify the mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.
All told, a reversion suit will no longer be allowed at
this stage.
(3) The court found that the instant action for reversion is
already barred by res judicata. Res judicata now
effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of
registrability of petitioners lot.
Whether the land covered by the titles of petitioners is
under water and forms part of Manila Bay at the time of
the land registration application in 1974. If the land was
within Manila Bay, then res judicata does not apply.
Otherwise, the decision of the land registration court is a
bar to the instant reversion suit.

Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public

authorities when as in this case, the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value and the
government did not undertake any act to contest the
title for an unreasonable length of time.

Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico

bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had
elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then said
action is now barred by laches.

While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of

public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by
laches or estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the
rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and above
the interests of the government.
In this petition, the LRC on May 30, 1974, issued Decree
No. N-150912 in favor of Fermina Castro and OCT No.
10215 was issued by the Rizal Registrar of Deeds on May
29, 1974. OCT No. 10215 does not show any annotation,
lien, or encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean
title, Yujuico bought the same in good faith and for
value from her. He was issued TCT No. 445863 on May
31, 1974. There is no allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in
bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently. He thus
had the protection of the Torrens System that every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate
of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate
and any of the x x x encumbrances which may be
subsisting. The same legal shield redounds to his
successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos and Carpio, more
particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from Jesus
Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith.
Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees
for value, the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB, and
DBP. Even if the mortgagors title was proved fraudulent

The court rulee that the land of Fermina Castro is

registrable and not part of Manila Bay at the time of the
filing of the land registration application.
The trial courts Decision in 1974 easily reveals the
basis for its conclusion that the subject matter was a
dry land.
a report dated April 25, 1974, stating among other
things, that upon ocular inspection conducted by Land
Inspector and the subsequent joint ocular inspection, it
was established that the parcel of land covered by plan
(LRC) Psu-964 no longer forms part of the Manila Bay
but is definitely solid and dry land.
A report dated March 22, 1974 have also stated that
the land applied for cannot be reached by water even in
the highest tide and that the said land is occupied by
squatter families who have erected makeshift shanties
and a basketball court which only prove that the same
is dry and solid land away from the shores of Manila
Bay.
A letter-report dated November 28, 1973 has also
stated that there is a house of pre-war vintage owned
by the applicant on the land in question which in effect
corroborates the testimony of the applicant and her
witness that they have lived on the land in question
even prior to the outbreak of the second world war and
that the applicant has been in possession of the land in
question long time ago.
On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No.
4243 does not reveal what portion of Manila Bay was
Castros lot located in 1974. Moreover, a hydrographic
map is not the best evidence to show the nature and
location of the lot subject of a land registration
application. It is derived from a hydrographic survey
which is mainly used for navigation purposes, thus:

In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Paraaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case
nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already
barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the
suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.