Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11908

January 30, 1960

FLORA COMPAERO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
APOLONIO T. COLOMA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
F. S. Galutera for appellees.
Constancio Padilla for appellants.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya in civil case No.
642, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
In view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter to surrender the possession of the parcel of land in question
to the plaintiffs; and ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2398 in the
name of the defendant and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another transfer certificate of title
in the name of the herein plaintiffs in equal shares, upon reimbursement by them to the
defendants of the sum of P700.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
this decision has become final. And without special pronouncement as to costs.
In its decision the Court states that
The parties have submitted a stipulation of facts quoted as follows:
1. That the defendants admit pars. 1, 2, 3 (except the worse "within the five-years prohibitory
period"), 4, 5, 6, 7 (except that the crop is 70 cavans instead of 120 ) and 8.
2. The plaintiffs admit that they have no allegation that the defendants purchased not in good
faith.
3. They submit also that the only issue is one of law, whether the deed of sale in favor of the
defendants can be annulled when they purchased the land from the transfer we of the
original owner, Ismael Asuncion.
It appears from the allegation of the complaint that Filemeno Campanero was the registered
owner of the parcel of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint, his title thereto is
shown by Free Patent No. 10746, issued on September 2, 1925, and registered in the office
of the Register of Deeds for Nueva Vizcaya, on January 26, 1962, for which Original
Certificate of Title No. 116 was issued in his name. On August 12, 1927, or to be exact one
(1) year, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days, after the issuance of the Free Patent, said
Filomeno Campanero conveyed in a definite sale to Ismael Asuncion (on) the said parcel of

land the latter caused the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 116 and the
issuance in his favor of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 438. On March 4, 1932 said Ismael
Asuncion, sold to the herein defendants Apolonio T. Coloma and Abdulia Doronio, for
P700.00 the aforesaid described parcel of land and by virtue of said sale Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 438 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2398 was issued in favor
of the said defendants.
On November 19, 1944, Filomeno Campanero above-referred to died inestate without debts
in barrio of San Antonio, municipality of Bambang, province of Nueva Vizcaya, leaving the
plaintiffs herein ad his only heirs.
The question to be determined is whether the rule that the purchaser of a parcel of land registered
under Act No. 496 need not make inquiries as to the legitimacy and legality of the title of the
registered owner but may rely upon the title of such owner as it appears in the certificate of title
issued to him by the Register of Deeds, can be invoked to defeat the express policy of the State that
no agricultural land of the public domain acquired under the provisions on the Public Land Act can
be alienated or encumbered within five years from the date of the issuance of the patent.
After a careful study and consideration of all the phases of the question raised, involved and
submitted for determination, this Court has arrived at the conclusion that the rule mentioned above,
though sound as applied to lands registered under the Land Registration Act through judicial
proceedings, cannot defeat the express policy of the state prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance
of lands of the Public Lands Act within five years from and after the date of the issuance of the
patent. The lofty aim, purpose wisdom of the prohibition cannot be gainsaid. Landless citizens
acquiring land of the public domain would soon revert to their formers condition if not for the
prohibition. The appellants and their predecessor-in-interest cannot be deemed to be innocent
purchasers of the free patent land sold by the appellee's late ancestor, because in original certificate
of title No. 116 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Nueva Vizcaya to
Filomeno Campanero, the patentee, the following appears: "Surveyed under authority of sections 41
to 43, Act No. 2874," and "subject to the provisions of sections 116, 119, 120 and 122 of Act No.
2874 of the Philippine Legislature which provide that the land thereby acquired shall be inalienable
and shall not be subject to incumbrance for a period of five (5) years from the date of this
patent, . . .;" and in transfer certificates of title Nos. 438 and 2398 issued by the Registrar of Deeds
to Ismael Asuncion and Apolonio T. Coloma, the following appears: "Surveyed under authority of
sections 41 to 43, Act No. 2874 . . .," which clearly indicate that the land was acquired under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. Such being the case the alienation of the land by Filomeno
Campanero, the patentee, was null and void. The alienation being null and void, Ismael Asuncion,
the first purchaser, acquired no title to the land. As he acquired no title thereto, he could not transmit
any to Apolonio T. Coloma, the second purchaser and one of the appellants herein.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez
David, JJ.,concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result

G.R. No. L-11024, Angeles et al. v.

CA, Ines and Divino, 102 Phil. 1006
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 31, 1958
G.R. No. L-11024
ALFONSO ANGELES, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO STA. INES and
ANASTACIA DIVINO,respondents.
Ernesto Angeles and Ildefonso M. Bleza for petitioners.
Pedro D. Maldia for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in Civil Case No. 631, entitled Alfonso Angeles, et al., vs. Gregorio
Santa Ines, et al., and dismissing the complaint and counterclaim,
without pronouncement as to costs.
On March 12, 1935, homestead patent No. 31613 was issued for a
parcel of land in the municipality of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
containing an area 13.6696hectares more or less. Pursuant to the
issuance of this homestead patent, original certificate of title No.
4906 was issued to the patentee Juan Angeles on March 28, 1935.

On May 28, 1937, Juan Angeles said the above land to defendants
Gregorio Santa Ines and Anastacia Divino, who thereupon took
possession thereof. Juan Angeles died in the year 1938, and
thereafter his heirs, the petitioner herein, sought to recover the land
from the defendantson the ground that the sale was null and void
(Sec. 116, Act No. 2874). The defendants refused to re turn the land,
so daid heirs, petitioner herein, brought this action in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
In the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs the allegation is
made thatdefendants' possession of the land was the virtue of the
sale which isagainst the law and therefore did not convey title to
them. It is alsoalleged that the homestead produces an average of
200 cavans per year as share for the owner. Prayer is made that the
defendants be ordered to vacatethe land and the possession thereof
returned to the plaintiffs, and thatthe defendants be condemned to
pay damages at the rate of 200 cavans of palayper year from 1938,
valued at P12 per cavan, until the return of the land.Defendants
answered the amended complaint alleging that the purchase was for
a valuable consideration, in outmost good faith, and that the
defendants tookpossession of the land with the knowledge, consent
of plaintiffs. They deniedthat the harvest of the land is 200 cavans
per year for the ownerand that the alleged price is P12 per cavan.
As special defenses, they alleged that the plaintiffs are guilty of
laches for having allowed 12 years to pass, after the death of the
original homesteader, before they brought the action; that the
plaintiff's right of action had prescribed; but more than five yearshad
elapsed from the date of the final approval of the homestead, when
the sale was made on May 28, 1937; etc. It is, therefore, prayed that
the complaint be dismissed that the sale be declared valid and
defendant's be declared owners of the property; and that the
certificate of title be cancelled and one issued in the name of the
defendants. As an alternative remedy, it was prayed that should the

court declare the sale null and void the defendants be reimbursed in
the amount of P6,000 which they incurred incleaning the land, etc.
That trial court found that when the sale was made by the deceased
Angeles,five years had not passed from the issuance of the
certificate of title tothe homestead; that both vendor and vendee
knew that the sale was void because the five-year period prescribed
by law had not yet elapsed; as a consequence of this bad faith of
both parties, they should be considered ashaving acted in good faith
(Art. 364 Civil Code of Spain), and that defendants are entitled to
the fruits of the land. The court further held that the right of action
of plaintiffs had already prescribed before the complaint was filed on
June 12, 1950, in accordance with Section 40 of Act No. 190. The
trial court also found that the land was levied and a dike was built
thereon at a coast of P3,000.00 to prevent it from being flooded
everyyear; that defendants paid P2,500.00 for the homestead.
Wherefore, the court declared that the sale of the homestead is null
and void and ordered plaintiffs to return the price of the land of
P2,500.00 to the defendants andto reimburse the latter in the
amount of P3,000, for expenses incurred in levelling the land and
the construction of the dike thereon. The court ordered the
defendants to return the homestead to the plaintiffs upon the
payment to the defendants of P2,500.00 and that the P3,000.00,
value of theimprovements, should consititute a lien on the land.
Tha case having been appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter
held thatArticle 1306, paragraph 1 of the Spanish Civil Code, which
provides:
. . . When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what
he mayhave given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the
performance of the undertaking of the other party;

which legal provisions is founded on the principle of in pari delicto, is

applicable, it held that none of the parties should be given any
remedy dueto the fact that they did not only violate the prohibition
contained in thePublic Land but because they knowingly tried to
cheat the prohibition (by theinsertion of a prohibition for the
execution of another deed of sale afterfive years). The decision of
the lower court was, therefore, reversed and theaction dismissed.
In this Court it is claimed by the petitioners that the application of
Article 1306, par. 1, of the Spanish Civil Code is null and void,; and
thatthe heirs of the homesteader should be declared entitled to the
possessionof the homeasted and the fruits of the same.
The most important issue raised in the appeal is whether the
doctrine of in pari delictois applicable to sales of homesteads. This
question was squarelydecided in the case ofCatalina de los Santos
vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al., 94 Phil., 405; 50 Off.
Gaz. 1588, in the negative. In the case we held that the principle
of in pari delicto is not applicable to ahomestead which has been
illegally sold, in violation of the homestead law. Reason for the rule
is that the policy of the law is to give land to a familyfor home and
cultivation and the law allows the homesteader to reacquire theland
even if it has been sold; hence, the right may not be waived. This
principle was again confirmed in the case of Ancierto, et al. vs. De
los Santos, et al., (95 Phil. 887) in which, through Mr.Justice Alex,
Reyes, we said:
Appelants, however, contended that the voiding of the Act may not
be invoked in favor of plaintiffs as their predecessor in interest
was in pari delcto, since the same provision says the illegal sale
shall have the effect of annuling the grant and cause the reversion
of the property and its improvements to the State, plaintiffs may no
longer claim the homestead.Similar contentions were made in the
case of Catalina de los Santos, vs. Roman Catholic Church of
Midsayap et al., 94 Phil., 405, 50 Off. Gaz., 1588, but they were

overrruled, this Court holding that the in pari delictodoctrine may

not be invoked in a case of this kind since it would turn counter to
an avowed fundamental policy of the State that the forfeiture of the
homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee of his
heirs, and that until the State has taken steps to annul the grant and
asserts titleto the homestead the purchaser is, as grant the vendor
or his heirs, 'no more entitled to keep the land any intruder.
Consistent with the above decisions, we must hold that in the case
at bar the sale of the homestead by the deceased homesteader was
null and void and his heirs have the right to recover the homestead
illegally disposed of.
It now becomes necessary to determine if the defense of
prescription raisedin the answer to the amended complaint can be
sustained, it appearing thatwhen the action was brought in the year
1950, about 13 years had elapsed since the date of the sale. The
precise question was also passed upon by Usadversely to the
defendant's respondents in the case of Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido,
et al., 97 Phil., 41. In that case we held, thru Mr. JusticeBengzon:
There is no question that the sale in March 1932 having clean made
withinfive years from 'the date of the issuance of the patent' was
'unlawful andnull and void from its execution', by expressed
provision of sections 116 and122 of Act No. 2874(Now Com. Act No.
141).
Under the existing classification, such contract would be 'in existent'
and'the action or defense for declaration' of such inexistence 'does
notprescribed'. (Art. 1410 new Civil Code). While it is true that this is
a newprovision of the new Civil Code, it is nevertheless a principle
recognized seems Tipton V. Velasco, 6 Phil., 67 that 'mere lapse of
time cannot giveefficacy to contracts that are null and void'.
Having found that the sale of the homestead is null and void, and
that the action to recover the same does not prescribe, we now
come to the effectsof these rulings on the price paid for the sale and

the value of the improvements made on the homestead and of the

products realized from thehomestead by the buyer. The stipulation
of the parties (pp. 39-40, R.O.A.)shows that the deed after the
expiration of five years, and that this factwas explained by the
notary to the parties. The notary must have informed the latter that
renewal of the deed was necessary to avoid the prohibition against
the sale of the homestead within five years after the issuance of
thetitle. This circumstance shows that the parties to the were aware
of theexistence of the prohibition such knowledge. As a matter of
fact, the Court of Appeals predicated its decision on the finding that
the parties to the sale where both guilty of bad faith.
The question that no possess is whether the return of the value of
the products gathered from the land by the defendants and the
expenses incurredin the construction of the dike?all useful and
necessary expenses?should be odered to be retuned by the
defendants of the plaintiffs. While we believethat the rule of in pari
delicto should not apply to the sale of the homestead, because such
sale is contrary to the public poliuvy enunciated in the hometsead
law, the loss of the produts realized by the defendants andthe value
of the necessary improvements made by them on the land should
notbe expected from the application of the said rule because no
cause or reason can be cited to justify an exception. It has been held
that the rule of in pari delicto is inapplicable only where the same
violates a well established public policy.
. . . But we doubt if these principles can now be involved considering
thephilosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land
Act. The principle underlying pari delicto has known here and in the
United Statesis not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain
exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application
runs counter to an avowedfundamental policy or public interest. As
stated by us in the Rellosa case,"This doctrine is subject to one
important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is considered

advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the

transaction. (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827; 49 Off. Gaz.
4345.) (De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94
Phil. 405; 50 Off. Gaz. 1588).
We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should
be declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the products
gathered fromthe land, and so should the defendants lose the value
of the necessary improvements that they have made thereon.
With respect to the price that the defendants had paid for the land
P2,500, in view of the rule that no one should enrich himself at the
expense of another, the return of the said amount by the plaintiffs
should be decreed,before the plaintiffs may be allowed to recover
back the possession of thehomestead, subject to the action.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and
judgment is hereby entered declaring the sale of the homestead null
and void, orderingthe defendants to return the same to the plaintiffs
upon payment by the latter to them of the sum of P2,500. The claim
of the plaintiffs for value of the products of the land and that of
defendants for the expenses in theconstruction of the dike are both
dismissed. Without costs in this appeal.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and
CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC.
represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO
MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA
VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING
CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS
CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE
LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by
its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO
M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.;
EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate
consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the
Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to
understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping
his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual
personal interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development,
Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency
is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies
for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of
Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the
suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of
the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of
the Government and the general public over: the environment impact of development on the
water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from
the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake;
the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the
floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system
of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its
river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to
promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the

region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social
and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake
region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven
new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which
shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna
de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in
pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments,
whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of
improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until
modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the
following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or
authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities
in Laguna de Bay,the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals
and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality
control and management and to collect necessary fees for said
activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries
may be shared between the Authority and other government
agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be
determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation
of the Authority's Board:
Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new
areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under
the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
taking into account the overall development plans and programs for
Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That
the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern
fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take
into consideration among others the following: socio-economic
amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or
collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development,
a master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal
fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake
shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects;

(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region
to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory
measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and
enforce the same with the assistance of the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay
region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in
establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and
municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said
existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing
such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty
actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality
standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA
Board. 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though
Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling
that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious
management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance,
the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses
having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the
limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927
which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake
Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region,
the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer
to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan,
Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in
Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of
Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa,
and Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the
use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation,
and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and
the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary,
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in

the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be
administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of
LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna
Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as
follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be
retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its
corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake"
in this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the
same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when
it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred
to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at
and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the
provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or
other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the
municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry
or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal
waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free
from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive

privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or
catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any
species or fish within the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen
permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to
the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied
almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from
7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens
and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen
zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in
the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake
and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens,
thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS
given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended
by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with
the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and
Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay
Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or
permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993
are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal
shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as
illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in
accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for
violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment
of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the
discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as
illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before
27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.

One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective
structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before
various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito
Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by
IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c)
Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig,
filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case
No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal,
filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and
Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken
Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79,
Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and
(g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR
Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to
dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary
mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority
from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed
by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts
and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan,
Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction
issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction
over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not
repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the
Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated
petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of
government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA
charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the
provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the

power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the
following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT
A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927
SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID
RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA
DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which
agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said
region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.
The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned
laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the
part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws
should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a
special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic
in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special
statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,

although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law." 3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental
protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the
legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that
"Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900
km lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain
into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces,
constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an
exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious management and
optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards
the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due
regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The
authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the
special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies
where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the
lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom
or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the
entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource
management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de
Bay." 5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue
purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code
empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue
Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the
Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the

charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper
sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our
holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities
of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among
others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the
Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court
of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions

affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to
the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of
this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended
to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as
they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges
within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio
Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to
construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake
Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by
Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and
Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and
ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits
issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet
Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by,
Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J.
Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation,
BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and
ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat;
SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing
Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake
Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress
what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are
not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local
government units. In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not
projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be
subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units
concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended,
with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and
municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress
what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are
not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local
government units. In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not
projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be
subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units
concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended,
with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and
municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.
Footnotes
1 Section 1, PD No. 813.
2 At pages 64-65.
3 Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phils. 225; National Power
Corporation vs. Arca, 25 SCRA 935; Province of Misamis Oriental vs.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., 181 SCRA 43.
4 Fajardo vs. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 89135, December 21, 1989.
5 Petition, under caption, "Nature of Petition".
6 Section 3 (k), Presidential Decree No. 813.