Aguilar vs. Siasat, G.R. No.

200169, January 28, 2015

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
The Facts:
Spouses Alfredo and Cadelaria (Aguilar) died without will and
without debts in 1983 and 1994, respectively, leaving two parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. T-25896 and T-(156462) 1070. Rodolfo
Aguilar) filed a petition for mandatory injunction with damages
against Edna (Siasat) in 1996, alleging that he is the only son of the
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria; that when he searched for the two
tiles the same cannot be found, and suspected that someone from
the Siasat clan stole it,hence he executed an affidavit of loss, and
later filed a petition for issuance of duplicate owners copy of the
titles, which Edna (Siasat) opposed, claiming that the titles were in
her possession, were not stolen, and entrusted to her by her aunt
Candelaria, and refused to surrender the titles. Rodolfo thus filed
the instant case to compel Edna to surrender the titles to him. In
her defense, Edna claimed that Rodolfo is not the son of the
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria but a stranger raised by them
merely out of generosity and kind heart; that Alfredo predeceased
Candelaria, thus the latter inherited his conjugal share; upon her
death, her brothers and sisters inherited the estate of Candelaria,
and the titles were entrusted to her by Candelaria. At trial Rodoldo
presented documentary exhibits such as his school records, where
Alfredo was indicated as his father; his ITR which listed Candelaria
as her mother, Alfredos SSS E-1 Form which listed Rodolfo as his
son; and other pertinent documents to show his filiation to the
spouses. He also presented his wife Luz Marie, to prove the fact
that he is the son of Alfredo and Candelaria; and his aunt, Ester,
sister of Alfredo, who testified that Rodolfo is the only son of Alfredo
and Candelaria, born at BMMC, and they knew of this fact hence
she and her siblings did not anymore claim on Alfredos properties
because they recognised rodolfo as Alfredos son. After his release
from prison, Rodolfo lived with his mother Candelaria at one of the
properties and continues to live there. Edna on the other hand
presented the testimonies of Aurea, a sister of Candelaria, who
stated that the spouses does not have a son, though he know of a
certain Rodofo with a nickname Mait and that Alfredo had a
sister named Ester. Edna also presented an Affidavit executed by
Candelaria announcing that she and Alfredo had no issue, and she
is the sole heir to Alfredos estate.
The RTC, after trial, rendered judgment in favour of Edna. It ruled
that Rodolfo failed to present any evidence that he is the biological
son of Alfredo and Edna, further complicated by the lack of a
certificate of live birth and the affidavit of Candelaria that she had
no issue.
In his appeal to the CA, Rodolfo argued that his failure to present a
Certificate of Live Birth was by reason of the destruction of all
records at the Local Civil Registry Bacolod City for the period
1941-45 as shown by Exhibit Q3; that under Article 172 of the
Family Code, an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten document signed by the parent constitute proof

of filiation, which he sufficiently proved by his documentary exhibits.

The CA ruled otherwise, averring that the documents presented by
Rodolfo by itself did not prove that he is the son of Alfredo and
Candelaria; that use of the family surname does not establish
pedigree. Having failed to establish his filiation to the spouses,
Rodolfo failed to prove that he had a clear and unmistakable right
that had been violated.
Rodolfo elevated his case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
documents he presented satisfy the requirements of Article 172 in
relation to Sections 19 and 23 of Rule 132; that Edna had no
personality to assail his paternity and foliation; and that the action
to impugn his legitimacy had already prescribed pursuant to Articles
170 and 171 of the Family Code.
The Courts ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon[1], has held
that
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact
that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article
170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable[2].
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it
must be concluded that petitioner who was born on March 5,
1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar[3] and before their respective deaths[4] has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS
Form E-1 (Exhibit G) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation
and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live
Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the
Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which
necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence

particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G) to prove

filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as
mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and
such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. And, relative to said form of
acknowledgment, the Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to
adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him.
Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children x x x. Too, (t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.[5] (Emphasis
supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he
obtained a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy
thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the
trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy
would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City
Civil Registry (Exhibit Q) contained just such an advice for
petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at
the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth,
since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of the
Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioners argument that respondent has no personality to
impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy,
and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has
held before that
Article 263[6] refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
to assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all[7].
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the
Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latters estate.
Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars estate, since succession pertains, in
the first place, to the descending direct line[8].

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006

Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17,
1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to
the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owners duplicates of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing
the decision [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on April 28, 1989, which affirmed the decision[if !
supportFootnotes][2][endif] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,
dated, August 31, 1987. The appealed decision granted private
respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname, from
Vicencio to Yu.
As found by the trial court, hereunder are the facts and
circumstances of the case:
Petitioners evidence is to the effect that she was born on 19
January 1971 at the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City, to the
spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega
Leabres (Exh. C, also marked Annex A of Petition); that on 10
January 1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal
abode then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan; that since then Pablo
Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was
Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres (sic)
and her children; that on 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza Leabres filed
a petition in the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, Civil Case No.
E-02009, which was granted in a decision rendered by the Hon.
Regina C. Ordoez Benitez on 11 July 1977 (Exhs. D, D-1 to D-3);
that sometime in 1983, petitioners mother filed another petition for
change of name, Sp. Proc. No. 83-16346, that is to drop the
surname of her husband therefrom, and after hearing a decision
was rendered on 5 July 1983 by the Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of
Branch XXV of this Court approving the petition (Exh. E); that in
1984, petitioners mother again filed another petition with this Court,
Sp. Proc. No. 84-22605, for the declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an
absentee, and which petition was granted on 26 April 1984 in a
decision rendered by the Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera (Exh. F & F-1);
that on 15 April 1986, petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu were
joined in matrimony in a ceremony solemnized by Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (Exh. G).
It was also established that evern (sic) since her childhood,
petitioner had not known much less remembered her real father
Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto
Yu; that despite of which she had been using the family name
Vicencio in her school and other related activities therein; that in
view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and she
had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her
family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors, causing
her extreme embarrassment; that on two (2) occassions when she
ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a Manila
Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu; that
her step-father had been priorly consulted about this petition and
had given his consent thereto; that in fact Ernesto Yu testified for
petitioner and confirmed his consent to the petition as he had
always treated petitioner as his own daughter ever since.[if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]

At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court,
the OSG manifested that it was opposing the petition. It participated
in the proceedings by cross-examining the private respondent
Cynthia Vicencio, (petitioner a quo) and her witnesses.

Disregarding the OSGs contention, the trial court ruled that there is
no valid cause for denying the petition. Further, the trial court stated
that it could not compel private respondents step-father to adopt
her, as adoption is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption
should not be a cause for disallowing private respondent to legally
change her name.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Hence, it granted the
change of surname of private respondent from Vicencio to Yu.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court,
which held that it is for the best interest of petitioner that her
surname be changed. The appellate court took into account the
testimonies of private respondent and her witnesses that allowing
the change of surname would give her an opportunity to improve
her personality and welfare.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] It likewise noted
that the discrepancy between her original surname, taken from her
biological father; and the surname of her step-father, who has been
socially recognized as her father, caused her embarrassment and
inferiority complex.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The main issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial courts decision allowing the change of private
respondents surname to that of her step-fathers surname.
In Republic vs. Hernandez [if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] , we have
recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant
a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a
legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire
to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the
justifiable grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen
as to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has
acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and
supporting her. Since she is known in society as the daughter of
Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to inquiries
regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much
humiliation and embarrassment. However, it is not denied that
private respondent has used Vicencio as her surname in her school
records and related documents. But she had used the surname of
her step-father, Yu, when she participated in public functions, such
as entering beauty contests, namely, with the Lions Club and the
Manila Red Cross, and when she celebrated her debut at the
Manila Hotel.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and
reasonable cause to warrant private respondents change of
surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise
to legal complications due to the fact that private respondents stepfather has two (2) children with her mother. In the event of her stepfathers death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim
inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. In his memorandum, the
Solicitor General, opines that Ernesto Yu has no intention of
making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made
before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court
that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved
by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.[if !supportFootnotes][9]
[endif]

We find merit in the Solicitor Generals contention.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.[if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif] The assailed decision as affirmed by the
appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the
applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames[if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif] , specifically the law which requires that
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father[if !
supportFootnotes][12][endif].
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of
Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate

child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be

stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty
to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to
deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.[if !supportFootnotes][13]
[endif]

Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents

parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with
grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private
respondent to bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not
legally adopted by him. While previous decisions have allowed
children to bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even
without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be
distinguished from the present case. In Calderon vs. Republic,[if !
supportFootnotes][14][endif] and Llaneta vs. Agrava,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
this Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the
step-father, but unlike the situation in the present case where
private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases the children
were not of legitimate parentage. In Moore vs. Republic,[if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif] where the circumstances appears to be similar
to the present case before us, the Court upheld the Republics
position:
We find tenable this observation of governments counsel. Indeed, if
a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname
of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die
or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a
confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may
redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible
and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship
that pervades among the members of the Moore family, our hand is
deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or
brush aside.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] the Court
ruled that:
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second
husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their
paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who
were born during the coverture of their mother with her first
husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their
legitimate status into discredit.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar
to that of her step-fathers legitimate children, a plausible reason the
petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it
is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own
daughter, providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh
and blood. However, legal constraints lead us to reject private
respondents desire to use her stepfathers surname. Further, there
is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental
to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very
change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries
regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private
respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a minor
because Republic Act 6809,[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] lowering the age
of majority, was then in effect. However, regardless of private
respondents age, our conclusion remains considering the
circumstances before us and the lack of any legally justifiable
cause for allowing the change of her surname.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; and the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is
the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed
a petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie
was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga
be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this
Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive
parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and
educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would
redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of
Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is
GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby
freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall
henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local
Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office
for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an
illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of
a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is
no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in
case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every
Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the
middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4)
adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child,
hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by
either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as
her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the
following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation
with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family

Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to

prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law
does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name,
which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has
been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so
that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family
name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive
rules which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual
whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a
previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she
is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is
the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as
though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger
person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as
will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by
a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating
the use of a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,
is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in
Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case,
the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of
the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the
use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the
fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which
reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the
child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the
surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice
Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the
father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by
the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no
choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers
surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers
surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be
modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to
use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of
the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use
of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just
enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can
be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification
suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father
should always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name
and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese
wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the
Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of

the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion. [12]
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted
shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether
he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.
[14]

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether
related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The
modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is
geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant
to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of
RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is
a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued
use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of
the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/
her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana,
San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs.
Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She
calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted
child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so
that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is

doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the

courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to
use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be
entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 16902 : March 5, 2010
Maria Virginia V. Remo, Petitioner, vs. The Honorable Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Respondent.
Ponente: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
MATERIAL FACTS

Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose

passport was then expiring on October 27, 2000

Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following

entries appear:
surname: Rallonza
given name: Maria Virginia
middle name: Remo

Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage

still subsists) applied for renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois,
U.S.A. with a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport

Petitioners request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel

Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote on the
Secretary of DFA expressing a similar request

On August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F.

Anota, denied (#2) the request, stating:
it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands
name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only
if the married name has not been used in previous application. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of
1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may
revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case
does not meet any of these conditions.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter

resolution was denied (#3) in a letter dated October 13,
2000
On November 15, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the
Office of the President. On July 27, 2004, the Office of the
President dismissed (#4) the appeal with the same
argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239)
The Office of the President further held that in case of
conflict between a general and special law, the latter will
control over the former regardless of the respective dates
of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general rule, it
should yield to RA 8239.
The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on
October 28, 2004, the Office of the President denied (#5)
the motion.
Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for
review and on May 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied
(#6) the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the
President.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of
Appeals denied (#7) in its Resolution dated August 2,
2005.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husbands

surname in her passport, can revert to the use of her
maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.

Whether there is a conflict between the general law (Civil

Code Article 370) and the special law (RA 8239).
RULES/LAW
1. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames.
In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil
Code provides:
A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
husbands surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husbands surname, or
(3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word
indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
2.

RA 8239: The Implementing Rules and Regulations for

Philippine Passport Act of 1996

Section 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport

shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino
citizen who has complied with the following requirements: xxx
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced, or
widowed, or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by
court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of
separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the
deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of
the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce
decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman
applicant may revert the use of her maiden name: Provided,
further, That such divorce is recognized under the existing laws of
the Philippines; xxx
3. Section I, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 8239
The passport can be amended only in the
following cases:
(a) Amendment of womans name due to marriage
(b) Amendment of womans name due to death of spouse,
annulment of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
(c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a
subsequent marriage of his parents
4.

The DFA allows a married woman who applies for a

passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such
an applicant is not required to adopt to her husbands
name

5.

In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may

either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use
her maiden name.

6.

Once a the woman adopted her husbands surname in her

passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA
8239.

APPLICATION
1. The petitioner used her maiden first name and her
husbands last name, thus, Maria Virginia V. Remo. This is
in accord to Article 370(2), Title XIII of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
2. it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The Implementing

Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of

1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a
woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in
cases nnulment of marriage, divorce and death of the
husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these
conditions. DFA Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota
CONCLUSION

No. Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden

name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage because she used her
husbands last name when she applied for her passport
for the first time. According to the rule, upon renewal of
passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husbands surname or continuously use her maiden
name. And once a the woman adopted her husbands
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of
her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in section
5(d) of RA 8239.

No. There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil

Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing
with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII
of the Civil Code which is a general law on the use of surnames. A
basic tenet in statutory construction is that special law prevails over
a general law.

The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the May 27,
2005 Decision and August 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.