COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND THE

PHASE TRANSITIONS OF THEIR

GENESIS
TRISTAN ROBERTS
INTRODUCTION

Natural selection has become one of the primary explanatory forces within
biology. With this heuristic nearly any change in a biological system has possible
meaning, as that changes can be interpreted according to evolutionary fitness
rather than randomness. While a rather substantial number of experimental
findings have been unified using this framework, the uniqueness of our tree of
life has led some to question just how generalizable our conception of evolution
and natural selection is. In order to test the universality of our understanding of
natural selection, we need either alien life or artificial life. The latter is the
approach most focused on currently.
In An Evolutionary Approach to Synthetic Biology, Thomas Ray argues
that incorporating what we know about biological life into a digital medium is
necessary in order to evaluate what qualities are universal to life and which are
just common to Earth-based life. He recognizes that this shift from a
physical/chemical medium to a logical/informational medium leads to markedly
different physical laws but believes that this shouldnt interfere with
uncovering underlying fundamental truths. In this paper, I build upon Rays
premise by examining the similarities and differences between biological,
cognitive, and artificial systems to determine if and how natural selection is
shared by these different contexts for the ultimate purpose of evaluating
whether current artificial life implementations are actually alive.
COMPLEX SYSTEMS

Typically, systems that repeat for some duration fall under one of
two types. Periodic systems are cyclical and repeat in self-similar patterns before
eventually terminating. In contrast, chaotically behaving systems feature no
discernible pattern amongst their seemingly random outputs. However, a third
type of system is the focus of this investigation. Complex systems feature both
periodicity and randomness; chaos and order. Minds, bodies, and some types of
artificial life fall under this latter category of systems.

Any system has two essential elements: a set of initial values and a
set of rules for determining subsequent values. Systems are incapable of being
reduced to spatial OR temporal definitions as they are comprised of both. In
order to capture the spatiotemporal quality of systems, the term behavior will
be used to describe the fundamental unit of a system. Furthermore, we will
deem behavior as intelligent if it leads to the system being maintained within
its environment, especially so if the environment is itself changing. If a context
or environment evaluates information positively, that information is recurred
for an additional period of time. In the biological context, this process of
evaluation is identical to natural selection, but the more general term will be
used throughout the remainder of this paper.
Some systems have been demonstrated to be capable of universal
computation, the most complex class of information processing currently known.
To do so, constructive proofs are used by creating basic elements such as NOT,
OR, and AND gates that are known to be foundational steps in the creation of
Turing machines and their equivalents. All of the known computational systems
that occur naturally are of the complex type, as a correlation of behavior
between subsequent states is necessary in order for a signal to travel over time.
ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS

For current purposes, the term artificial system will refer to

cellular automata (although whether or not the conclusions of this inquiry are
generalizable to other artificial systems will be evaluated later). Cellular
automata (CA) typically take the form of one or two dimensional grids. The initial
state describes which parts of the grid are negative and which are positive while
the rules determine what the first pattern morphs into in subsequent iterations.
Depending on the rule set and initial state, CA can demonstrate all types of
system dynamics. In Life at the Edge of Chaos, Christopher Langton formalizes
CA to demonstrate some fundamental properties of artificial systems that seem
to be applicable to natural systems as well.
When a single parameter is used to navigate axes for sets of rules
and initial states, and the resulting types of systems are plotted, some
contiguous patterns form. Initial states and rule sets that produce periodic
patterns, when tweaked slightly, typically produce other periodic patterns. Thus,
periodic patterns form nearly half of the plot of possible systems, while chaotic
patterns form the other half. The area between the chaotic and periodic systems
does not feature a smooth transition from one type to the other, but rather
serves as the domain of complex systems. This area, in which systems feature
both chaos and order, is referred to by Langton as the phase transition.
Using measures of mutual information and entropy, Langton
identified the phase transition region as being home to the most complex
information dynamics. Remarkably, the same pattern of periodic systems
increasing in complexity, reaching an apex, and then descending into

randomness was also discovered by Crutchfield using physical rather than

artificial systems, suggesting that phase transitions are a feature of systems
regardless of the substrate. Langton claims that solid matter is a periodic
system, while gases are chaotically behaving systems. Matter that is in the
phase transition between the two is liquid; the dynamics of which remain the
least well-understood due to their complexity.
However, as nature is in a constant state of flux, it seems unlikely
that a phase transition would be held constant long enough for life to develop to
where we are now. Langton speculates that the advent of life featured
informational dynamics that gained some control over external parameters,
permitting them to stay within the realm of the phase transition. In other words,
homeostasis was born. With this in mind, Langton characterizes the process of
evolution as the process of gaining control over more and more external
parameters that affect a systems relationship to the vital phase transition. In
this way, information processing can emerge spontaneously and then come to
determine the dynamics of the physical system in the vicinity of a critical phase
transition.
Langton provides some explanation for how computational capacity arises
in systems by noting that systems in the phase transition area diverge in their
susceptibility, in that their outcomes become much more sensitive to minute
details in their start state. The dynamics of complex CA parallel the general
dynamics of computational processors in one last fundamental way: decidability.
Periodic patterns will eventually halt their process, while chaotic systems
typically are non-halting. Systems of the phase transition are undecidable, in
that it cannot be determined whether or not the system will halt or continue
infinitely judging just from the rule set and the first states. Langton proposes
that complex systems are engaged in solving an intractable problem, and
thusly they may not be treatable by a theory in principle because they deal with
inherently undecidable problems.
THE COGNITIVE SYSTEM

The cognitive system features elements that are competing signals of

information based off of coalitions of neurons. Clusters of information that
outcompete other patterns of activation can enter the global neuronal
workspace, a distributed module that facilitates multi-modal processing. These
clusters can be identified by high amounts of mutual information that are more
self-referential than they are related to the rest of the cognitive information. The
most powerful globally-distributed signal at any given moment is rendered
consciously. This system in its totality has many parallels to the biological and
natural systems. Like the biological systems, cognition engages in an intelligent
budgeting of available resources and partially determines the intake of
additional energy.Like other complex systems, cognition is heavily dependent on
a context in order to maintain phase transition properties. Langton notes that

fevers lead to chaotic thought patterns while severe chills lead to shakes and
seizures which are essentially periodical.
Many theories about consciousness have been generated, but very few
have become as influential as Tononi& Edelmans dynamic core hypothesis.
Instead of trying to localize consciousness to an anatomical structure or
neurotransmitter, they examined the informational processing dynamics
accompanying consciousness in order to craft a model of consciousness that
actually has some predictive power. Their proposal is based off of the premise
that consciousness features immense amounts of both integration and
differentiation of information, and because of their general informational
dynamics approach many of their claims may be applicable to complex systems
besides cognition. They propose that consciousness is best understood by the
term dynamic core because it is a non-localized body of highly self-referential
information within the cognitive context.
Their claim about the integrative quality of consciousness stems
from noting that each conscious scene is unified and not decomposable into its
constituent elements. From this they conclude that conscious processing is
constituted by the largest active functional cluster, which they define as the
subset of neural activity that shares more information with itself than with the
rest of the system. Thus, consciousness is the subset of global cognitive
information that is the mostly highly self-referential, or integrated, at a given
time.
Tononi& Edelman also noted that each conscious scene is the result
of a selection from a seemingly infinite number of possible states. Thus, the
occurrence of one conscious state over countless others constitutes a
correspondingly large amount of information, in the classical reduction of
uncertainty sense of the term1. They view this body of information as
deterministic, in that it may lead to different consequences in terms of thought
or action.
From these conceptions of integration and differentiation, Tononi&
Edelman put forth a definition of neuronal complexity as a function of the
average mutual information between each subset and the rest of the system,
believing that this term reflects the number of states of a system that result
from interactions among its elements. While the complexity and informational

1They use this premise to explain a recurring question in philosophy of the mind:

what is the difference between a human and a light diode when both are given
the task of discriminating between light and dark? As a photodiode only has two
states, this represents a very small amount of information. In the case of
cognition, the number of possible states trends towards infinity, leading to a
correspondingly large amount of information.

content of a functional cluster that rises to conscious awareness seems to

approach infinity, it is integrated through functional clustering.
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

Working backwards from how these interrelated systems developed

chronologically, we finally arrive at the biological system. According to Langtons
analysis, RNA and DNA suspended in primordial ooze formed a system located
at a phase transition, and through the evolutionary process, became
increasingly adept at constructing a local environment (first cell wall and later a
body) that serves to maintain conditions necessary for the emergent properties
of life.
Like cognition, biological systems feature a functional cluster of
information that is highly self-referential: the genome. This functional cluster of
information not only provides the necessary instructions for self-replication, but
also features pointers to other portions of the genome for multi-step
transcriptional processes. As each haploid chromosome contains roughly 800 MB
of data, its safe to say that genetic information is also highly differentiated with
multiple layers of co-dependency in order to form the metabolic processes and
anatomic structures of life.
In the genomic functional, functional clusters are often studied in the form
of individual genes. Despite the illusion of linearity between gene and protein,
recent synthetic biology experiments confirm that non-necessary junk DNA
still provide some functional role. When the core proteins of a metabolic process
are identified along with their corresponding genes, and these genes are
isolated to a barebones organism, their effective functionality diminishes
substantially. This demonstrates that eukaryotic genomes that are laden with
junk-DNA feature both linear and non-linear referentiality, or in other terms,
periodic and chaotic dynamics. Periodic dynamics characterizes the gene to
protein relationship, complex dynamics describe the interplay between genes to
form metabolic processes and anatomical structures, and chaotic behavior
adequately describes the role that junk-DNA plays in shaping the genomes
informational content.
FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

In order to determine whether or not current artificial life (AL)

implementations are actually living, comparisons must be made between the
cognitive and biological systems (under the assumption that they both
characterize the essential process of living) before assessing whether or not
these properties are present in AL.
It is not known whether or not all complex systems are capable of
universal computation, as a proof must be constructed for each case. However,
it is known that the biological and cognitive systems are capable of universal

computation. The capacity for computation is likely a necessary feature of any

complex system capable of self-preservation for a length of time. At the very
least, some quantity of external information processing is necessary in order to
intelligently respond to the environment so that the phase-transition criteria can
be maintained. Some artificial systems, or at least CA, have been constructively
demonstrated to possess this quality.
Underlying all of these systems is the enigmatic force of time. In
biological systems, genetic data that is evaluated by the environment positively
is rewarded through recurrence in a process more commonly known as natural
selection. In cognition, the term attention captures much of the same process
that natural selection does. In cognition, information that is evaluated based
upon saliency to future behavior. Information that is inherently salient or related
to top-down goals is referred to as being attended. Paralleling natural selection,
attention determines which information will be recurred in future states. AL also
features selective processes that determine which information is recurred,
satisfying this requirement.
As Langton noted, living systems seem to feature a precarious balance
between order and chaos. In biological systems, order is embodied by the
genetic code and chaos generates new mutations. In cognitive systems, the
order inherent to a signal is constantly at odds with the stochastic firing of
neurons. Chaos stems from two possible forces in the cognitive system.
Theoretically, a neuron connected to no meaningful inputs would fire in a
random manner. Furthermore, signals not related to a specific signal would
effectively constitute noise or randomness in relationship to the specific signal.
However, the forces of entropy may behave in a manner unlike the virtual
randomness of artificial systems.
Whether or not AL actually featurerandomness in a sufficient manner for
the creative process of life is a difficult question. As soft AL implementations are
based off of universal computers, and since these machines are incapable of
generating true randomness, AL may be lacking in this quality. In some ways,
the complexity of neighboring information seems to be random in that there is
no linear relationship between programs. However, since all of these programs
are subject to the limitations of the same environment, the information that they
share is always greater than true randomness (Monte Carlo method only
partially alleviates this concern). For this reason, we will identify the lack of true
randomness as a critical shortcoming of current AL implementations (albeit one
easily corrected by random.org).
There is one other major gap between AL implementations and real life
for which this analysis has provided some basis. Similar to the above reason,
this stems from a lack of true variability but on a more fundamental level.
Biological systems contain a quantity of minimally-self-referential information
(junk DNA, the body) and a functional cluster of highly-self-referential
information (the genome). Cognition is similar, but the self-referentiality of
neural information is contrasted with the non-referentiality of its context, the

body. In contrast, programs or creatures in AL implementations are entirely selfreferential. Their code is their form and their form is their code. This is perhaps
equivalent to strands of DNA or RNA floating in primordial ooze, devoid of any
body (which are just as questionably living as virus particles). For biological
systems, a body provides an intermediary layer on which natural selection acts
upon. Whether or not an intermediary body is necessary for real natural
selection and real life remains an open question, as the well-studied examples
of cognition and biology do not exclude what possible forms alien systems might
possess. With biological systems, the physical world provides a Euclidean space
in which forms can interact. In cognition, this space is perhaps of higher
dimensionality but is none the less just as capable of hosting competitions
between different patterns of activation. Whether or not a space is necessary for
a proper context is currently unknown, as programs like Tierra may develop
complex dynamics regardless of their arbitrary, non-Euclidean arrangement in
earlier implementations.
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of current AL implementations is their
inability to generate truly novel functions. Every possible action that a bug or
program can take has already been defined by the designer, and thus any
novelty generated can only occur within the realm of possibility afforded by this
set of functions. Better models of life, again, requires intermediary levels of
information, such that basic elements without single functions, which can be
recombined in a near infinite fashion to perform tasks not designed by the
programmer. This problem is compounded by having narrow definitions of
reproduction, energy consumption, and death. Without generalized causes for
these processes, novel adaptations of evolutionary value cannot be formed in
other words, the solution can be determined.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS

All of these complex systems have been evaluated independently and

have been shown to have common themes: information is evaluated by a
context which determines what is recurred and what dissipates from existence.
These systems do not exist in tidy vacuums, however. The biological system is
dependent on the physical system, both of which the cognitive system is
dependent upon, all of which the artificial system is dependent on. The
anthropocentric telling of the history of the universe is marked by a number of
phase transitions, in which complex information dynamics come to determine a
subset of physical reality, before repeating the process. As Langton describes
the process of evolution:
climbing out of one attractor just pushes the problem back to ahigher-dimensional
phase space, in which the system is again in the basin of some attractor it is therefore
possible to view evolution as a repeated iteration of a process whereby a system climbs out
of one attractor into a higher-dimensional phase space, only to find itself in the basin of a
higher-dimensional attractor

These vectors of determinism are often interpreted as being

unidirectional. For instance, evolutionary psychology tries to evaluate the

cognitive system in terms of biological values, leading to a series of half-truths.

Our perspectivesfor the biological and physical phase transition dynamics are
still at the very least partially occluded. And the fact that our state may not be
determinable, in the computational sense of the term, from the perspective of
Nature may say some on the matter of free will.
CONCLUSION

Phase transition systems interact in a complex, computationally

productive manner. The cognitive and biological systems have similarities in
information dynamics that may not be present in current soft artificial life
implementations. These systems are able to maintain vectors of determinism in
physical space while existent that share a number of fundamental similarities,
such as context, evaluation, and recurrence of information over time. Current alife implementations have not been demonstrated to form the emergent
functions that would be characteristic of phase transition systems.