Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Outline
Part 1:
Quebec Bridge
1800 ft. main span, collapsed Aug 29, 1907
Financial pressures
Project Management issues
Ceding to Consulting Engineer reputation
Lack of experience on site
Communication failures
Williamsburg Bridge
-1903
1600 ft. span, 40 ft.
deep stiffening truss
(Depth: span = 1:
40)
1930s--Landmark Bridges
Bronx Whitestone
Bridge -1939
-- 2300 ft. span
-- 11 ft. girder
-- d:s = 1: 209
--77 ft. wide, w:s = 1:31
Tacoma-Narrows Bridge--1940
--2800 ft. span
--8 ft. girder
--d:s = 1: 350
--39 ft. width, w:s = 1:72
Lessons Learned
Tacoma-Narrows Bridge
Replacement - 1950
Bronx-Whitestone Bridge
retrofits
Tower stays
Stiffening truss retrofit
Tuned mass Damper
at midspan
Replaced Concrete
deck with Orthotropic
steel deck
Removed Stiffening
Trusses
Added lateral bracing
to lower flanges
Added wind fairings
on stiffening girders
Diagonal stays and
tuned mass damper
remain
Last 30 years
Had Significant impact on Federal and State agency
bridge management and safety practices
NTSB findings and recommendations
Mianus Bridge
I-95 over Mianus River, Greenwich, CT.
Built 1958 , collapsed June 1983
A near collapse
Shows importance
of load ratings
Bridge should have
been closed
Follow Up Actions in NY
Improved hydraulic and scour evaluations
Post flood inspections
Flood warning action plan
Vulnerability Assessments
Sytematic evaluations of bridges based on individual
failure modes.
Hydraulics
Overload
Collision
Steel Details
Concrete Details
Earthquake
BSA Retrofits
Scour repairs
Steel Detail Retrofits
Add Redundancy
NTSB Findings
NTSB
NTSB
NYSDOT actions
Inspected 50 deck truss bridges in NYS
Analyzed Gusset Plates on 133 Trusses that had undergone a
substantial change in load.
Developed analytical tools for gusset plate design and load
capacity checks (LFD and LRFD)
Did not find design errors
similar to I-35W
Found problems due to
deterioration
Developed gusset repair and
replacement procedures
Closed / replaced 1 bridge
due to gusset evaluations
NYSDOT Gusset
repairs
Seismic research,
AASHTO seismic specifications
AASHTO Guide specs. for Vessel Collision
AAHSTO Guide specs. For Bridges Vulnerable to Coastal Storms
--NCHRP 12-85:
Highway Bridge Fire
Hazard Assessment
--NCHRP 12-72:
Blast Resistant Highway
Bridges- Design and
Detailing Guidelines
Questions?
BIN 109299A
Overview of Failure
1987
Inspection
Temp. @ 45
1999
Inspection
Temp. @ 70
Temp @ 45 F
Lifted 0.25 ft.(3 in.) - Eccentricity = 3.4 in.
8
Superstructure Displacements:
Survey of adjacent piers (w/ fixed bearings)
Pier 10 displaced north 1.6 inches.
Pier 12 displaced north 1.0 in (avg.) 1.7 inches on
east side.
History of Pier 13 joint
Joints reset (vertical) in 1990
Joint was closed in 1990
Closed in 1995 thru present
Longitudinal forces due to braking, centrifugal force
9
Corrosion &
Flattening
11
Frozen Pins
12
13
Pier 11
Height: 82.3 feet
13.9 x 6.44 at
base
9 x 4 at top of
stem
Stem rebar: 46 # 8 bars
14
15
HGT.
BASE
67.47
131.4 x 71.2
42 - # 8
10
72.79
132.6 x 72.6
36 - #11
56.16
Fix
11
82.31
166.6 x 77.3
46 - # 8
36.34
Exp - Exp
12
83.38
155.3 x 77.6
42 #11
65.52
Fix
13
84.75
156.4 x 84.2
65.52
Exp - Exp
42 - #11
33.18
Fix - Exp
16
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
fc=9
210
Limited elastic range - yields at 5.5 deflection
psi
Cracking at 2.5 deflection
0
10
15
20
Corrosion Build-up:
Develops horizontal component of vertical dead, live
load reactions
Larger range of movement
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
34
35
Follow up actions
Reviewed all high rocker bearings with low
inspection ratings (CR 3 or less)
Inspected those overextended
Preventive interim retrofits bolsters
Technical Advisory: INSP 05-001
36
Follow up actions
Bolsters installed as an extraordinary
precautionary measures on 10 bridges
Alerted other owners of bridges not under
DOTs inspection jurisdiction
Corrective action:
Dunn Complex, bearing replacements
37
Bracket
Field Splice
North Abutment
Acknowledgements
Sponsored by New York State DOT
P.I.Weidlinger Associates, Inc.
Material testing and weld inspections by
ATLSS Research Engineering Center, Lehigh
University
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Collapsed Bridge
Review of Bridge Design
Analysis of Bridge Failure
Demolition
Laboratory Testing
Conclusions
Recommendations
NYSDOT Actions
ApplicationsTub girders and beyond
6.3 ft (1.93 m)
14.0 ft (4.27 m)
Intermediate
Diaphragm
4.3 ft (1.3 m)
Collapsed Bridge
South Abutment
Screed
North Abutment
Collapsed Bridge
Exp. Bearing
South Abutment
Collapsed Bridge
North Abutment
Fixed Bearing
Intermediate
Diaphragm
Failure Modes:
b/t of top flange;
Top flange buckling (between
intermediate diaphragms)
C.L. Bridge
Engine
Screed
Form/Catwalk
Drum
Web Concrete
West
Tie-rod
(4' apart)
Top Flange
Hanger
Angle
Metal Form
East
Web
Bottom Flange
Bracket
(3' apart)
Steel
Plates
Steel Pin
Bottom Steel Plate
Top
Y
kEC
kES
Y
kES
kEC
kFS
Z
a). Expansion Bearing
kPIN
D
Nonlinear Spring
X
kBRG=kES+kPIN
Force, N
94mm
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0
Deformation, mm
Fixed
Boundary
Steel
Plate
Force-Deformation Curve
10
Top Flange
Web
Strut
Diaphragm
Top Flange
End
Diaphragm
Concrete
North
Abutment
Steel girder
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
As-designed (ideal)
-3.0
-4.0
-5.0
As-built
-6.0
-7.0
Rotation
-8.0
-9.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
42'
20.0
30.0
105'
40.0
50.0
Edge Screw
Location
Middle Screw
Location
Top Flange
Fixed Boundary
As-designed (ideal),
No form
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
-4.0
-5.0
-6.0
-7.0
-8.0
-9.0
-10.0
Rotation
Strong form,
as-built
As-built
No form
Weak
form,
as-built
95' 105'
42'
0.0
5.0
82'
4. Demolition
Objectives
Remove debris safely;
Sample materials;
Preserve evidence
Cut Location
Temp. Support
5. Laboratory Testing
Objectives:
Verify Analysis Assumptions
Check whether materials conform to contract specifications
Lab Results
10000
Gage 12
Steel PL
Force, N
8000
4000
Screw
2000
Form
0
0
2.5
7.5
10
12.5
15
17.5
20
Lateral Deformation, mm
Force-Deformation Curve
of Form Connections
22.5
25
Lab Results
10000
Gage 12
Steel PL
Force, N
8000
4000
Screw
2000
Form
0
0
2.5
7.5
10
12.5
15
17.5
20
Lateral Deformation, mm
Force-Deformation Curve
of Form Connections
22.5
25
Fixed Boundary
b. Bearing Model
6. Conclusions
The bridge failed in a global torsional mode;
Stay-in-place forms greatly delayed the
collapse, but were not strong enough to
prevent it;
7. Recommendations
Clarify applicable codes;
Add a new code provision that requires full
length lateral bracing to be installed between
top flanges unless proven unnecessary by
analysis
8. NYSDOT Actions
Reviewed similar ongoing projects in NYS.
Required bracing systems for similar bridges in
NYS(NYSDOT Blue Page)
Sought recommendations from AASHTO
regarding code revisions.
Centroid @ +36.3
Shear Ctr. @ -36.0
Izz = 36 in^4
Iyy = 205,817 in^4
Centroid @ +37.3
Shear Ctr. @ -12.2
Izz = 114,870 in^4
Iyy = 212,572 in^4
Centroid @ +19.96
Shear Ctr. @ -19.06
Izz = 472 in^4
Iyy = 296,426 in^4
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
11
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
Questions?