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DISASTER CENTRE
SCADA / DMS
Load Shed Application (LSA)
Contents
Introduction
Historical Developments
Over view of Power Networks
Protection Systems
Contents (Contd.)
Distribution Automation
Quality Assurance
Utility IT Requirements
Case Study
Q & A Discussions
Introduction
66-33 kV
11kV
11kV
11kV-440 V
440-220 V
Distribution Operations
Monitoring the power system
Making adjustments and maintaining the system so
that it can be used reliably, efficiently, and safely
Repairing the system as quickly as possible in
response to incidents such as equipment faults
Objectives
Consistent with National Electricity Policy, to improve
reliability and quality of service of distribution system by
Reducing frequency and duration of power
interruptions to targets consistent with best
international practice
SCADA/DMS
Decision
Support
Systems
Functional/Architectural
Overview
OMS
DMS
Applications
Maintenance
Management
GIS
Crew
Management
Corporate Data
Accessibility and
Availability
DMS
SCADA
SCADA
Functions
COMMUNICATIONS
SCADA Platform
Environment
User
Interface
Data
Acquisition
Other
Applications
RTU
Control Room
Operators
R
T
U
Communications
MPLS / MLLN
Town Master
Station
Substation
Line
Operational analysis,
decisions, issue controls
Outage Analysis
F
R
T
U
GPRS/
CDMA
Reporting
Analysis
MPLS
MPLS/MLLN
DR Centre SLDC
R
T
U
Primary Plant
Interface
5
2
3
RTU
CPRI-UARC
Communications
4
5
Master Station
Control Room,
Corporate
Usage,Backup, LD
Historical Developments
Historical Developments
SCADA system is in use since a long time (with
conventional telephone technology)
Deployment of SCADA system accelerated with the
development of microprocessors
Present day SCADA system are based on compact
RTUs and latest communication technology including
mobile communication system.
Protective Relays
that protect power systems from
faults:
Short circuits
other abnormal conditions
underfrequency, overvoltage, etc.
PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS:
Protective relays should be :
RELIABILITY
DEPENDABILITY
SECURITY
SELECTIVITY
SENSITIVITY
STABILITY
SPEED
COST
Design should achieve balance
51
B2
51
B3
51
Fault
Differential Protection
Differential protection is a unit type of protection.
It is a very reliable type of protection used for protection of Transformers,
Bus bar and Transmission lines.
Protected
Equipment
Relay
Distance Protection
A distance relay operates based on the measurement of the impedance.
Impedance measuring relays are used when over current relays do not
provide adequate protection or short circuit current is low, the operating time
is independent of the current magnitude.
Quadrilateral characteristic
Zone3
Zone 2
Zone1
t2
t3
PROTECTIVE RELAY
TECHNOLOGY
NUMERICAL
ELECTRO
MECHANICAL
STATIC
DIGITAL
Self-supervision
Setting groups
Programmable logic
Adaptive schemes
Multiple protection characteristics
Communication capability
Instrumentation features
Electro magnetic
Solid state
Microprocessor
Numerical
Modern Numerical relays are built with integrated functions. Advantages of
Numerical relays are:
Reliability
Multi-functionality
Self diagnosis
Events and disturbance recording facility
Communication capabilities
Adaptive protection
Numerical Relays
On-line relay settings and fault data record down loading is possible.
Faster tripping diagnosis makes faster restoration of system and
immediate corrective actions possible.
SCADA Functions:
Time synchronization of RTUs,, FRTUs & FPIs(if time synch is
supported in FPI)
Data Exchange among the various SCADA/DMS subsystem(legacy), IT systems, State load dispatch centres.
Data Processing
Continuous real-time data storage and playback
Sequence of event processing
Supervisory Control
Fail-soft capability
Remote database downloading ,diagnostics & configuration
GIS adaptor
Information Storage & Retrieval (ISR)
Historical Data information & Retrieval and
Data recovery (DR)
Data Acquisition
RemoteTerminal Unit
TRANSDUCER PANEL
MAIN
CPU
BOARD
COMMN
BOARD
PT
SEC
110VAC
PSU
MW
MVAR
VOLT
CT SEC
1 AMPS
A
N
A
L
O
G
D
I
G
T
A
L
I/P
I/P
TERMINAL
BLOCK
TERMINAL
BLOCK
C
O
R
N
T
T
R
O
U
L
O/P
TERMINAL
BLOCK
EVENT LOGGER
PANEL
D
R
I
V
E
R
R
E
L
A
Y
F
R
O
M
S
W
I
T
C
H
Y
A
R
D
F
I
E
L
D
Pictorial view
Communication Systems
Communication Systems
Communication system is vital for any SCADA / DMS
system
Communication between Master Controller Centre
and RTUs (substations) and FRTUs (at feeder
RMU/Sectionlizer/Autoreclosure locations)
Control signal flow, status (digital) and analogue
signals (measurends like bus voltage, feeder current,
power, reactive power, energy consumption etc.)
SYSTEMS
REQUIRING COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS
REQUIRING COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
SCADA FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
SCADA TOPOLOGY
COMMUNICATIONS
REQUIREMENT OF STANDARDS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
OPTIONS
Communication Technologies
Public communications
Protective outer jacket with one messenger and one fiber cable
which contains 4 /6/8 strands of multimode fibers.
within
Substation
Modem
IBM Compatible
FO
N LI
ATIO
C
I
N
MU
COM
NK
Standard Protocols
IEC 60870-5 -101 (Serial Communication)
IEC 60870 5-104 (Ethernet compatible
Network communication)
IEC 61850 Network compatible
communication for IEDs
DNP 3
Vulnerable due to
Adoption of open standards for protocols & open
solutions and moving out from the proprietary
technologies
Increased number of connections between SCADA
systems and office IT networks
Web interface to SCADA Systems
the lack of concern about security and authentication
in the design, deployment and operation of some
existing SCADA networks
Myths
SCADA systems have the benefit of security through
obscurity through the use of specialized protocols and
proprietary interfaces
SCADA networks are secure because they are physically
secured
SCADA networks are secure because they are
disconnected from the Internet.
Contd.
12. Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for
managers, system administrators, and users.
13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical
functions or contain sensitive information that require additional levels of
protection.
14. Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process.
15. Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of
defense-in-depth.
16. Clearly identify cyber security requirements.
17. Establish effective configuration management processes.
18. Conduct routine self-assessments.
19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans.
20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber
security performance and hold individuals accountable for their
performance.
21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that
organizational personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information
regarding SCADA system design, operations, or security controls.
Distribution Operations
Monitoring the power system
Making adjustments and maintaining the
system so that it can be used reliably,
efficiently, and safely
Repairing the system as quickly as possible in
response to incidents such as equipment faults
Tracking and maintaining system reliability data
System planning and expansion to serve new
customers
Objectives
Consistent with Indias National Electricity
Policy, to improve reliability and quality of
service of distribution system by
Reducing frequency and duration of power
interruptions to targets consistent with best
international practice
Maintaining power quality with respect to
voltage and frequency excursions
Reliability Factors
Reliability depends on many factors which
include
What causes faults such as
Equipment malfunction, animals and vegetation overgrowth
causing short-circuits, human error (e.g., cable strikes, cars
hitting poles), storms/earthquakes, etc.
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
462
90
77
58
11
Example (without
DAS)
USA
UK
FRANCE
JAPAN
re
Er
ro
r
O
th
er
Ci
rc
O
pe
ra
tin
pr
op
ui
t
er
Co
ns
tru
ct
io
n
Im
Fa
ilu
ve
rlo
ad
pp
ly
W
ea
th
er
Ve
ge
ta
tio
n
ca
lO
ec
tri
El
Su
O
bj
ec
t
Un
kn
ow
/F
or
ei
gn
ity
Di
st
rib
ut
io
Ac
tiv
lu
re
Eq
ui
pm
en
tF
ai
ExampleEquipment
CausesFailures
of Failure
(Resulting
Sustained Outages)
(From
a USInElectric
Utility)
160
Average (1996-2001)
140
120
6 Year Average
100
80
60
40
20
Circuit
km
Failures
Over
5 Years
Failures
Per km
Per Year
12kV
Voltage
Circuit
km
Failures
Over
5 Years
Failures
Per km
Per Year
12kV
Main
309
190
0.123
XLPE
360
33
0.018
Lateral
217
201
0.185
EPR
116
0.016
PILC
231
64
0.055
242
13
0.011
XLPE
28
0.007
EPR
12
0.033
PILC
160
30
0.038
PE
10
0.000
4kV
Main
241
111
0.092
PE
Lateral
161
70
0.087
4kV
Circuit km
No. of Failures
Failures Per km
Per Year
XLPE
18,316
127
0.0069
PILC
105,970
1,125
0.0106
Basic Scenario
Consider the following scenario where
distribution operations as at rely on manual
operations
Fault indication and/or trouble call received
Crew dispatched by radio and/or telephone to
Locate fault by inspection and/or other check-out procedures
Repair damage and return system to pre-fault state
Reliability Strategies
Given the basic scenario just discussed,
strategies for improving reliability fall into
two basic categories
Reducing frequency of fault occurrence
Use properly selected and maintained distribution equipment
Reconfigure, replace, or upgrade equipment as necessary
Use appropriate devices to prevent faults from occurring or at least
reduce the number of customers affected
R/S feeder
R/S feeder
Circuit
Breaker
RMU / DT
Supply restored
manually for part
network typical time
15 20 mins
Circuit
Breaker
Normally open
point
CB Trips on fault
Circuit
Breaker
R/S feeder
RMU / DT
Normally open
point
Normally open
point
R/S feeder
R/S feeder
R/S feeder
Additional
network restored R/S feeder
manually, total
time 40 mins
R/S feeder
Circuit
Breaker
Faulty
Section
After Automation ( Average time to restore Power Supply to healthy section 1-2 Minutes)
Automation Philosophy
R/S feeder
R/S feeder
Circuit
Breaker
Automated RMU /
DT with FPI
R/S feeder
Normally open
point
R/S feeder
Remote Operation of
RMU Switch & Partial
Restoration of supply
typically 1-2 mins
Normally open
point
CB Trips
R/S feeder
Circuit
Breaker
Normally open
point
Circuit
Breaker
R/S feeder
FPI indicates
passage of fault
current
R/S feeder
R/S feeder
Circuit
Breaker
Additional network
restored, total time
11-18 mins
Remote operation to
close switch
Open
Tie-Switch
Sub A
Feeder B010
from Sub B
Feeder A007
from Sub A
Distribution
Transformers
Inferred Fault
Location
Customer
trouble calls
Open
Tie-Switch
Sub A
Feeder A007
from Sub A
Feeder B010
from Sub B
Inferred Fault
Location
Distribution
Transformers
Customer
trouble calls
Customer
trouble calls
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
As is now
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
As is now
Fault here
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
SE
SE
AR
AR
Improvement
Way
AR
SE
AR
SE
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
SE
SE
AR
AR
Improvement
Way
AR
SE
AR
SE
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
AR
Improvement
Way
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
SE
SE
AR
AR
Improvement
Way
AR
SE
AR
SE
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
SE
SE
AR
AR
Improvement
Way
AR
SE
AR
SE
11 kV Overhead Distribution
33/11kV S/S
SE
SE
AR
AR
Improvement
Way
AR
SE
AR
SE
Fault
Occurs
5 10
minutes
Power Restored
to Customers on
Healthy Sections
of Feeder
Fault
Located
Travel Time
Investigation
& Patrol Time
Time to Perform
Manual Switching
15 30
minutes
15 20
minutes
10 - 15
minutes
45 75
minutes
Power Restored
to Customers on
Healthy Sections
of Feeder
Fault
Occurs
1 2
minutes
Customer
Reports
Outage
With Automation
Feeder
Back to
Normal
Field
Crews
On- Scene
Travel Time
Patrol
Time
15 30
minutes
5 - 10
minutes
Repair Time
1- 4
Hours
Feeder
Back to
Normal
Repair Time
1- 4
Hours
Index Definitions
System Average Interruption Frequency Index
SAIFI
Interruptions/Customer/Yr
Minutes/Customer/Yr
CAIDI
Minutes/Interruption/Yr
SAIDI in
Minutes/Customre/Year
140.00
EnergyAustralia
120.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
ConEd
CEM
HKE
CLP
ETSA Utilities
Western Australia
0.00
SAIFI Comparison
SAIFI in #
Times/Customer/Year
1.20
EnergyAustralia
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
CEM
ConEd
Feeder Automation
Rather than rely on manual switching by field crews,
automated feeder devices can be used to
Detect and isolate a faulted feeder section
Restore power to customers upstream of the fault
Restore power to customers downstream of the fault
SAIDI (hr/yr)
3.0
2.0
0
1
1.0
Cost (MUSD)
3
FCIs
Reconfiguration
Automation
New Feeder
Tree Wire
4.0
Aggressive Switching
Fuse Saving
0.0
4
20000
40000
60000
Cost
80000
100000
Stage 3:
Supply and install distribution system upgrades
including automation equipment
Supply and install control center facilities
Supply, install, and commission DAS including remote
terminal units and communications equipment
Single
Line Diagram
automation
component
Single Linde
Diagramshowing
of F1 Feeder
of 'A' Station
(W4 SD)
Axis HT
Krubara Sangha
RMU
SJM RMU
Janatha RMU
W5 SD
Sagar RMU
Jwala
Complex
Arya
Vysya
SJM HT
Central
College
Heritage
Green House
CTO
Lakshmi
Keshava
Nivasa
Adarsh Inn
F01
Mourya
Brigade
Majestic
SS
M
U
#1
S
S
brigade Plaza
Janatha
Bazaar
Simha
GLM M
Palmodi
Sagar
Tallam
KPC
F06
Janatha
Bazaar
Kamat
HT
Vijaya
Samraj
UBI
F08
Adigas
Rajamma
Era
F11
Arya
Vysya
Kamat
FP
A.R Circle
S.N Bazaar
A
Churchill
Bajaj
Vectra
Sukh Sagar
HT (New)
V
Sn
Pancha
Rathna
Sapna
Sukh Sagar
Sukh Sagar
HT(Old)
Park RMU
Syndicate RMU
SS#
VH
MUSS
2
Auto Reclosures
Sectionalisers
Fault Passage
Indicators
10km
Control
room
10km
10km
10km
10km
20km
10km
10km
10km
10km
10km
10km
33/11kV Substation
Substation CBs
Telecontrolled Switches
Normally-open point
Optical Fiber
Communications
10km
10km
Fault
Feeder 2
10km
17.5km
10km
12.5km
10km
Control
room
10km
10km
10km
10km
20km
10km
10km
10km
10km
10km
10km
33/11kV Substation
Substation CBs
Sectionalisers
Normally-open point
Radio Communications
10km
10km
Feeder
2
Fault
10km
10km
12.5km
7.5km
5km
12.5km
10km
FA
tim
e
10km
Tie closes
Control
room
10km
5km
10km
5km
10km
10km
5km
33/11kV Substation
10km
10km
10km
7.5km
5km
5km
5km
Reclosers
Feeder Automation Sectionalisers
Normally-open point
Fault
5km
FA Sectionalises
Feeder 2
Recloser
Protection Direction
Trips
Changes
10km
Reliability Analysis
DRAKE (Distribution Reliability Analysis KEMA) is
a software tool that allows a reliability assessment
model to be defined and then used to
Visualizatio n of Re sults
Risk Assessme nt
Re liability Indice s
Custo m Histog ra ms
DAS functions
Conductors
Grounding devices
Fault detectors
IEDs
Operational limits for components such as lines, transformers, and switching
devices
The database of the network model of the utility system can have interface with the GIS system of
the area for better visual decisions for crew management and asset information. The Customer
Interface Management can also integrate with the distribution automation system for effective
utilisation.
The NCA will be useful in determining the network topology for the
network.
The NCA also assists the power system operator to know the operating state of the distribution
network indicating radial mode, loops and parallels in the network. Distribution networks which are
normally operated in radial mode; loops and/or parallel may be intentionally or inadvertently formed.
Autoregressive.
Least Squares Method
Time Series Method.
Neural Networks.
Kalman filter
Weighted Combination of these method
Example of Automated
Load Break Switches/Line Reclosers
SF6 LBS
Air-Break LBS
Vacuum LBS
Line Recloser
Example of RMU
(Pad-Mounted Switches)
Centralized System
Switches controlled by central DAS/DMS
Peer-to-Peer Arrangement
Groups of switches communicate to determine
appropriate switching actions
Can be manually,
semi-automatic, or
fully-automatic
Workstation
Comm. Tower
Central
DAS/DMS
Real-Time
Data
Geogaphic
Information
System
(GIS)
Feeder
Equipment
Data, Topology
Information
DAS/DMS Server
Feeder Models
Power Flow
Load Estimator
Topology Processor
Feeder Automation
Switch Order
Management
Equipment
Status and
Loading
Dispatcher Console
Fault indicator
status, currents,
voltages
Substation
and Feeder
Devices
SCADA Server
Switching
Actions
Device Control
Commands
No unnecessary switching
Additional functionality possible
Non-outage switching
Feeder load balancing
Cons
Requires DAS
Requires extensive communications infrastructure
Requires distribution system (network) models to be created
and maintained
SCADA EMS
OP
TI
ON
AL
Local HMI
RTU/PLC
Comm. Tower
Substation
- Cons
- Difficulty in handling complex situations as in case
of heavily loaded feeders where load must be split
up
- Limited number of switches controlled
- Requires substation/feeder communications
Peer-to-Peer Approach
Work as a team
Acquire local data via
local sensors
Acquire remote data
via peer-to-peer
communications with
other controllers
Process data locally
Open/close associated
switch as needed
Peer-to-Peer Pros
Pros
Does not require
Central SCADA system
Feeder models supported by GIS interface
Extensive communications infrastructure
Peer-to-Peer Cons
Cons
Lack of operator visibility and control
Can add SCADA interface (most utilities do!)
Communication difficulties
Peer-to-peer communications among pole top units can be a
challenge!
Load Shedding
Can shed one feeder section if necessary
Feeder Reconfiguration
Can balance load between feeders and reduce losses
Control Room
Operators
R
T
U
Communications
Operational analysis,
decisions, issue controls
Outage Analysis
Master
Station
Substation
R
T
U
Line
Radio
Optical Fibre,
Cable
5
Microwave
R
T
U
Primary Plant
Interface
Reporting
Analysis
2
3
RTU
Communications
4
5
Master Station
Control Room,
Corporate Usage
DMS
Applications
Maintenance
Management
GIS
Crew
Management
Corporate Data
Accessibility and
Availability
DMS
SCADA
SCADA
Functions
COMMUNICATIONS
SCADA Platform
Environment
User
Interface
Data
Acquisition
Other
Applications
RTU
ERP, GIS
Corporate
Asset Data
and
Model
Crew Management
Current State
Analysis
(Incorporates Load
Modelling and
Network Analysis
Future
State
Analysis
Outage
Management
Updates to
Network Model
and Diagrams
Network
Operational
Model
NOM
Outage Analysis
r/t state
Switching
Management
Switching
Planning
r/t state
SCADA
Outage Reporting
Operational
Diagrams
Reports and
History
CIS
Design
IVR
Calls
Asset
Maintenance
Crew Management
Current State
Analysis
(Incorporates Load
Modelling and
Network Analysis
Corporate
Asset Data
and
Model
Future
State
Analysis
Outage
Management
Design
Updates to
Network Model
and Diagrams
Network
Operational
Model
NOM
Outage Analysis
r/t state
Switching
Management
Switching
Planning
r/t state
SCADA
Outage Reporting
Operational
Diagrams
Reports and
History
CIS
Planning
ERP, GIS
IVR
Calls
Asset
Maintenance
DAS Vision
Conceptual Architecture
The DAS system will have a distributed architecture with an ability to support Control
Centres and remote data acquisition
It will incorporate rapid disaster recovery capability including a backup control centre.
Scope of Control
There will be a designed level of System-Wide DAS Control capability e.g., Load
switching, Fault Location Isolation and System Restoration (FLISR)
Performance and Expandability
The system will provide operationally acceptable performance as its domain of influence
grows or changes. It will support expansion as operational or corporate needs grow or
change
Interfaces and Integration
The DAS will provide for relevant interfaces necessary to support the suite of
applications and in accord with the principle of elimination of duplication in particular
data entry
Corporate Data Visibility
The DAS will provide for corporate visibility and accessibility to SCADA/DMS data
Operational Flexibility
The DAS will provide flexible support of roles and responsibilities of personnel
(Operators, System Engineers, Maintainers, Crews, Crew Managers, etc.)
DMS Applications
The DAS will include a DMS suite of capabilities within its bounds of influence
Capability building is core to its success,
Core DAS+
Distributed Control Desks (Main Control Room, Backup CR, Remote Consoles)
DAS Core
Network Operational Model & tools to build + incrementally update the
NOM from corporate data sources
Connectivity
Electrical Attributes
Intelligent Views (Operational Diagrams)
Switching
Planning/scheduling all network switching linked to work management
Planning detailed switching steps - obeying processes + rules
Support the plan/check/approval process + access permit process for work in progress
Record the execution of switching actions and record network state in NOM
Support processes to update NOM as network asset added/removed/changed
Distribution Network State Analysis
Current State
Live/Dead Analysis (including effect of jumpers, cuts, and grounds)
Check proposed switching
Routinely check impact of selected contingencies
Future Possible State
Develop/check proposed switching
Check worst case scenarios
Check potential contingencies
Crew Management
Assign and close out trouble tickets (e.g., allows statistics to be maintained)
Track field resources and facilities return to service.
ABB Houston
C&DS Users
Historian Users
Internet
VPN Access
ABB Support
Controllers
Rockhampton
Control Centre
Garbutt
Control Centre
RAID Array
Controllers
RAID Array
SAN Switches
FC
FC
NETWORK MANAGER
Applications Servers
FC
FC
SAN Switches
FC
Rockhampton
DAFE
AlphaServer DS 25
2CPU
4GB Memory
288GB Disk
FC
NETWORK MANAGER
Applications Servers
Ergon NOC
AlphaServer DS 25
1CPU
4GB Memory
432GB Disk
AlphaServer DS 25
2CPU
4GB Memory
288GB Disk
SCADA LAN
FC
FC
Townsville
DAFE
AlphaServer DS 25
1CPU
4GB Memory
432GB Disk
IS&R LAN
SCADA LAN
SBS PCI
Expansion
IS&R LAN
DMZ LAN
SBS PCI
Expansion
NOC Support
SBS PCI
Expansion
DMZ LAN
SBS PCI
Expansion
Rockhampton Master
Station (RMS)
Garbutt Master
Station (GMS)
Operational
Communicaitons
Network
Remote Access
via PSTN
Remote Access
via PSTN
SBS PCI
Expansion
Toowoomba
DAFE
ICP B/O Panels
Operational
Communicaitons
Network
SBS PCI
Expansion
SBS PCI
Expansion
Maryborough
DAFE
ICP B/O Panels
Operational
Communicaitons
Network
SBS PCI
Expansion
SBS PCI
Expansion
Mackay
DAFE
ICP B/O Panels
Operational
Communicaitons
Network
SBS PCI
Expansion
SBS PCI
Expansion
Cairns
DAFE
ICP B/O Panels
Operational
Communicaitons
Network
SBS PCI
Expansion
HMI (LCC)
IEC 60870-5-104
to Control Centre
SICAM
AK1703 Data
Concentrator
Inverter
ET Switch
Electro
Mechanical
Relays
RTU
IEC 61850
FO Link
Numerical
Relays
IEDs
Laptop
Feeder 1
Feeder 2
Feeder 12
Feeder 13
Feeder n
Hard Wiring
FEP
Poll
Data
DEC
Alpha
Servers
Modem
IBM Compatible
Repeaters
N LI
ATIO
C
I
N
MU
COM
NK
Radio - TDMA
Modem
Limited
applications
Quality Assurance
Introduction
SCADA / DMS systems and components needs to undergo various
tests and inspection methodologies as per well-established national
and international standards.
The testing ensures the procured systems / components meets the
safety,
reliability and other requirements to ensure proper
functioning of the system.
Any large utility with an on going SCADA program and which over
time intends to install a number of discrete SCADA systems, must
eventually integrate these systems.
The SCADA program will involve multiple vendors over time and
they will face problems due to the SCADA industry's use of
proprietary hardware, software and communications protocols.
A smaller utility may be able to install in one go a SCADA system
that encompasses the majority of their operations.
- The utility will buy a proprietary system and rely on that vendor
for continued upgrades and support.
- But this approach will be cost intensive and highly dependent on
the vendor support.
The prime difference between these two situations is that the
smaller utility can standardise by installing a single system whereas
the larger utility is necessarily faced with a lengthy program, with
relatively small expansions at any time (compared to the overall
system).
Standardizing Bodies
There are many national and international standardizing bodies:
International Electro technical Commission (IEC)
IS (Indian Standard)
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
American National Standard Institution (ANSI)
British Standards (BS)
European Committee for Electro technical Standardization
(CENELEC) etc
Protocols
Modbus communication protocol is extremely used in process
instrumentation. Even though it is used in power sector, it is not
amenable for wide power sector automation requirements.
DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol) is a set of communication
protocols used between components in process automation systems
and is emerged from the electricity industry.
RTU programming standards is IEC-61131-3 programming
languages. These have been developed for PLC programming, and
are increasingly being mandated for use by large manufacturing
concerns.
ICCP Functionality
Basic ICCP functionality is specified as Conformance Blocks. The objects that are used
to convey the data are defined in various parts of IEC 60870-6.
IEC TC 57 WG3 also generated standards for telecontrol protocols compatible with
ISO standards and ITU-T recommendations.
These standards include:
IEC 60870-6-1 Application context and organization of standards
IEC 60870-6-2 Use of basic standards (OSI layers 14)
IEC 60870-6-501 TASE.1 Service definitions
IEC 60870-6-502 TASE.1 Protocol definitions
IEC 60870-6-503 TASE.2 Services and protocol
IEC 60870-6-504 TASE.1 User conventions
IEC 60870-6-601 Functional profile for providing the connection-oriented
transport service in an end system connected via permanent access to a packet
switched data network
IEC 60870-6-602 TASE transport profiles
IEC 60870-6-701 Functional profile for providing the TASE.1 application service
in end systems
IEC 60870-6-702 Functional profile for providing the TASE.2 application service
in end systems
IEC 60870-6-802 TASE.2 Object models
Security standards
IEC 62351 series:
IEC 62351 is a standard developed by WG15 of IEC TC57.
This is developed for handling the security of TC 57 series of
protocols including IEC 60870-5 series, IEC 608706 series, IEC 61850 series, IEC 61970 series & IEC
61968 series.
Other Standards
IEEE C37.1-2007 Standard for SCADA and Automation Systems
This standard applies to, and provides the basis for, the definition,
specification, performance analysis, and application of systems used
for supervisory control data acquisition or automatic control or both,
in attended or unattended electric substations, including those
associated with generating stations; and power utilization and
conversion facilities.
The standard is generic and comprehensive enough to cover the
most of the aspects of system design, interface & processing
requirements and environmental requirements.
DNP 3.0:
The main use of this standard is in utilities such as
electric and water companies.
It was developed for communications between various
types of data acquisition and control equipment.
It is primarily used for communications between a master
station and RTUs or IEDs.
The DNP3 protocol is also referenced in IEEE13792000, which recommends a set of best practices for
implementing
modern
SCADA
Master-RTU/IED
communication links.
The IEEE adopted DNP 3.0 as IEEE 1815-2010 in the
year 2010.
The Indian standard for Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) System for Power System
Applications is IS 15953- 2011. This standard covers
generic requirements of Power System SCADA.
TESTING
Testing on automation components is conducted to
evaluate
the
system's
compliance
with
its
specified requirements.
Testing
is
done
at
various
levels
and
purposes/applications.
Testing is required:
- Throughout the development and use cycle (life
cycle) of a system (product, process or service) and it
is more rigorous, it is for evaluation.
- During design (simulation), fabrication, assembly,
transfer of technology & field use.
- By independent accredited test laboratories like
CPRI, ETDC/ ERTL etc. generally for a third party
certification.
- For marking purposes such as BIS, CE, UL and many
others.
Type test:
Series of tests carried out on the samples of the
same type having identical characteristics, selected
by manufacturer to prove conformity with all the
requirements of the standard.
Automation components shall conform to the type
tests.
A complete integrated unit shall be tested to assure
full compliance with the functional and technical
requirements of the Specification including
functional requirement.
The testing sample shall include one of each type of
cards/modules and devices.
Type testing shall be conducted in NABL accredited
Labs or internationally accredited labs.
Table 1
Test Nos.
FUNCTIONAL TESTS
Check for BOQ, Technical details, Construction & Wiring.
Check for database & configuration settings
Check the operation of all Analog inputs, Status input & Control output points.
Check operation of all communication ports.
Check for communication with master stations including remote database downloading from master
station
Check for auto restoration of RTU/FRTU on DC power recovery after its failure
Test for self-diagnostic feature
Test for time synchronization from Master
Test for SOE feature
End to end test (between RTU/FRTU & Master station) for all I/O points
Test for MODBUS protocol implemented for acquiring data from MFT/ transducers and updation time
demonstration in daisy chain configuration
Test for IEC 60870-5 -104,101 protocol implemented
Test for supporting other protocol
Contd..
Test Nos.
Test Nos.
Field Tests :
After automation components are installed and
commissioned in field, the Contractor shall carry out the
field-testing.
Availability Tests:
After field testing, automation components shall exhibit a
98% availability during test period.
Availability tests shall be performed along with Master
station.
The RTU/FRTU
shall be considered available only
when all its functionality and hardware is operational.
The non-available period due to external factors such as
failure of DC power supply, communication link etc., shall
be treated as hold-time & availability test duration shall
be extended by such hold time.
Utility IT Requirements
Conclusion
SCADA / DMS improves the quality of service
by reduction in number of outages & outage
durations
Quick isolation of faulty section & fast
restoration of healthy section so that only
least customers are affected during outage
period.
All data are available in real time and historical
data archive for planning
Conclusion (contd.)
Sharing of data with all stakeholders and MIS
Though requires capital investment, but a
good SCADA / DMS system implemented in a
phased manner brings returns in a shorter
period.
All data are available in real time and historical
data in archive for planning and other
applications of utility
THANK YOU