Security Bank and Trust Co. v.

Mar Tierra Corp

Respondent Mar Tierra Corp applied for a 12m credit
accommodation with Security Bank. It was secured by
individual respondents Wilfrido, Miguel, Ricardo who
bound themselves jointly and severally with Security
bank for the payment of the loan. Respondents were not
able to pay all its debt so petitioner filed a complaint
against the corporation and individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real & personal
properties of the corp and individual respondent Martinez
including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but
found out that it did not redound to the family therefore
ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal
house and lot. Petitioner appealed to CA, it affirmed RTC
decision. Petitioned to SC.
Conjugal partnership is not liable because accdg to Art
161(1) of CC, it should be for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. In acting as a guarantor or surety for
another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for
a 3rd party. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety of his family. Security Bank has the
burden to prove that conjugal partnership benefited from
transaction. However it failed to discharge that burden.
Villanueva v. CA
Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint against husband
Nicolas, his mistress Pacita Villanueva and their
illegitimate son Procopio. Nicolas then was the only one
who is receiving income of the properties. But from the
time he suffered stroke until present, Procopio is already
the one who has been receiving. TC ruled in favor of
Eusebia. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died and was
substituted by heirs. CA upheld TC. Whether or not the
subject properties are conjugal? Yes they are because the
properties are acquired during the marriage, therefor the
presumption under Art. 116 of FC is that it is conjugal. N
and E married 1926, N and P cohabited 1936. Eusebia
died Nov 1996, N & P married Dec 1996. Petitioners
themselves admit that the subject properties were
purchased on Oct 1957 which is during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.

Villanueva v. IAC
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land
from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos
illegitimate children, borrowed money from Bernas,
mortgaging as collateral their fathers property. In the
loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the
absolute co-owners and signed by Raymundo as witness.
They were not able to pay resulting to the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage and thereafter Bernas acquired
the land as the highest bidder. Afterwards, the Aranases
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in which they
adjudication the same land unto themselves in equal
share pro-indiviso. Bernas consolidated his ownership
when mortgagors failed to redeem the land w/in the
reglementary period and had the title in the name of
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
The witnesses in the deed of mortgage, Consolacion and
Raymundo filed a complaint w RTC against spouses
Bernas. They prayed that the latters title over the

subject property be cancelled and they be declared as

co-owners because they found out of the 2 wills executed
by Modesto then Victorias. Victorias will allegedly
bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and to
Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of
said Victorias shares from the conjugal partnership
property. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring
herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed
property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower courts decision.
The land was not a conjugal partnership property of
Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos exclusive property
since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since
Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit
said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to
bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion. The land on
which the improvements stand was the exclusive
property of Modesto and that where the property is
registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no
showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the
presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse.
It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements
to be conjugal in character. No proof where the source of
funds came from so as to determine the character of the
improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership
or to one spouse separately.
Genato v. de Lorenzo
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares
of stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation, which has
P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato
(Director and secretary-treasurer of the said company).
The petitioners herein, 2 heirs of Simona, are claiming
that they own 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercal
Corporation because of the donation made by Simona to
them. Respondents (other remaining heirs), however, are
trying to recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs, the
said stocks so they can include it in the intestate estate
which should later be distributed among all the surviving
children of the decedent. Four or five days after having
Florentino Genato elected and designated as Assitant
Secretary-Treasurer of the Corporation, 265 shares were
issued in favour of Florentino Genato and another 265
were issued in favour of Francisco G. Genato. These were
not presented as evidence in the course of the trial; they
were merely mentioned by Florentino Genato in the
course of his testimony as a witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid donation?
RULING: NO. There was no valid donation for lack of
proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees
was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing
that Francisco Genato had authorized his brother,
Florentino to accept for both of them. The delivery by the
donor and the acceptance by done must be simultaneous
and the acceptance by a person other than the true done
must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set
forth in a public document. None has been claimed to
exist in this case.
BPI vs. Posadas
Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the
solebeneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for
$10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada. During the following five years the insured
paidthe premiums at the Manila branch of the company.

Thedeceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the

plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano. The plaintiff-appellant,
theBank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed
administrator
of
the
late
Adolphe
Oscar
Schuetze'stestamentary estate by an order, entered by
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in
Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze
uponher arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was
the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said
deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same
date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered
themoney to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered itin
the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then
returned the money to said widow. The appellee alleges
that it is a fundamental principle that a life-insurance
policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the
death of the person insured.
Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to
the conjugal partnership.
Ruling: SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the
premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
constitute community property, and belong one-half to
the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively;
and (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with
paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and
conjugal in part. That the proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary,
if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the
former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax
according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the
assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured
was domiciled in these Islands or outside
JOCSON V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and
wife. The wife died first intestate then the husband
followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto
Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3)
documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime.
These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost
all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in
the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails
these documents and prays that they be declared null
and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs
of their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in
Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties
of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former,
therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete,
because they were registered in the name of Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of

Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete is conjugal
property or exclusive property.
HELD: Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC provides that All
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly
invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first
present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See
Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties
under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he
was still a bachelor but were registered only after his
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he
was described in the certificates of title as married to the
latter.
Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of title
show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively
Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner. This is so because
the words married to preceding Alejandra Poblete are
merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In
other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the
same having been registered in his name alone, and that
he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
Maramba v. Lozano
Facts: On November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action
against the defendant Nieves de Lozano and her husband
Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. After
trial, the court a quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its
decision, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment,
sentencing the defendants herein, Nieves de Lozano and
Pascual Lozano, to pay unto the herein plaintiff,
Hermogenes Maramba, the total sum of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07),
with legal interest thereon from date of the filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid.
Not satisfied with the judgment, the defendants
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but the
appeal was dismissed on March 30, 1960 for failure of the
defendants to file their brief on time. After the record the
case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ of
execution was issued, and on August 18, 1960 levy was
made upon a parcel of land covered by transfer
certificate title No. 8192 of Pangasinan in the name of
Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction

was published in accordance with law and scheduled for

September 16, 1960.
On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano
made a partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount
P2,000.00, and requested for an adjournment of the sale
to October 26, 1960. On October 17, 1960, she filed
amended motion, dated October 14, alleging that on
November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case,
defendant Pascual Lozano died and that the property
levied upon was her paraphernal property, and praying
that her liability be fixed at one-half () of the amount
awarded in the judgment and that pending the resolution
of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff
from carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October
26, 1960. On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and
the property of Nieves de Lozano which has been levied
upon was sold to the judgment creditor, as the highest
bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the balance of the
judgment debt.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the decision of the lower court dated
June 23, 1959 could still be questioned;
2. Whether or not the judgment was joint; and
3. Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied
from the proceeds of the properties sold at public
auction.
Held:
1. NO. It would entail a substantial amendment of the
decision of June 23, 1959, which has long become final
and in fact partially executed. A decision which has
become final and executory can no longer be amended or
corrected by the court except for clerical errors or
mistakes, and however erroneous it may be, cannot be
disobeyed; otherwise litigations would be endless and no
questions could be considered finally settled. The
amendment sought by appellee involves not merely

clerical errors but the very substance of the controversy.

And it cannot be accomplished by the issuance of a "nunc
pro tunc" order such as that sought in this case. The
purpose of an "nunc pro tunc" is to make a present
record of an which the court made at a previous term,
but which not then recorded. It can only be made when
the ordered has previously been made, but by
inadvertence not been entered.
Now then, it is clear that the decision of June 23, 1959
does not specify the extent of the liability of each
defendant. The rule is that when the judgment does not
order the defendants to pay jointly and severally their
liability is merely joint, and none of them may be
compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. This is in
harmony with Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.
2. YES. The rule is that when the judgment does not order
the defendants to pay jointly and severally their liability
is merely joint, and none of them may be compelled to
satisfy the judgment in full. This is in harmony with
Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.
3. NO. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil
Code to property acquired during the marriage. But in the
instant case there is no showing as to when the property
in question was acquired and hence the fact that the title
is in the wife's name alone is determinative. Furthermore,
appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
Appellant next points out that even if the land levied
upon were originally paraphernal, it became conjugal
property by virtue of the construction of a house thereon
at the expense of the common fund, pursuant to Article
158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has been
by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal
expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses
does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that
meantime the conjugal partnership may use both in the
land and the building, but it does so not as owner but in
the exercise of the right of usufruct.