Court Rules Tax Declaration Not Enough to Prove Ownership of Titled Land

G.R. No. 107903. May 22, 1995.
MARILOU RIVERA, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

HEIRS OF CLAUDIO GABALONES AND BENITA ROLDAN,
respondents.
Evidence; Land Titles;Ownership; Tax Declarations; A tax declaration,
by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.Petitioner
anchors her claim on the alleged titles of her predecessors-in-interest, i.e.,
that the land was initially sold by deceased Gabalones spouses to Generoso
Reyes, who sold it to spouses Taio and Leron, who later sold the same to
her. Petitioner also introduced in evidence two (2) deeds of sale covering the
subject lot: the first deed was executed between Reyes and the Taio
spouses, the second deed was executed by the Taio spouses in her favor.
Significantly, the deed of sale supposedly made by the Gabalones spouses to
Reyes was not presented in the trial court. All that was introduced during
the hearing to prove this vital fact was a tax declaration in the name of
Generoso Reyes for the year 1948. The respondent court correctly found this
proof inadequate. In a number of cases, we have ruled that a tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
219
VOL. 244, MAY 22,

1995
19
Rivera vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Prescription;Reconstitution of Titles; Titled land
cannot be acquired by prescription; The fact that the title to the lot was lost
does not mean that the lot ceased to be a registered land before the
reconstitution of its title.We also hold that the respondent court did not
err in ruling that petitioner cannot invoke acquisitive prescription

considering that the subject land is titled land. Petitioner contends that the
subject land was not covered by any title when Reyes acquired it in 1947 up
to the time the petition for reconstitution was filed by private respondents
in 1989. She submits that prior to the reconstitution of private respondents
title, she could acquire it by prescription. We reject this submission. The
fact that the title to the lot was lost does not mean that the lot ceased to be
a registered land before the reconstitution of its title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Words and Phrases; Reconstitution,
Explained.Reconstitution is simply the restoration of the instrument or
title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.
Indeed,the order granting reconstitution of title confirms the fact that the
subject land has been previously registered and covered by a torrens title. As
the subject land did not cease to be titled, it cannot be acquired by
acquisitive prescription. To hold otherwise is to wreak havoc on the
stability of our torrens system.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Laches, Defined.Finally,
the respondent court rightly rejected petitioners invocation of the equitable
principle of laches. Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it. Laches thus amounts to an implied waiver arising from knowledge of
existing conditions and an acquiescence in them. There is nothing in the
records proving that private respondents, despite discovery or knowledge of
the successive transfer of their parents land, omitted to assert their claim
over it for an unreasonable length of time. In the absence of this proof,
laches cannot be applied against private respondents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
1
Leopoldo M. Consunto, Jr.for petitioner.

Vicente R. Redor for private respondents.
220
220
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
PUNO, J.:
In this petition, we are asked to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 7, 1992, declaring private respondents as the
owners of Lot No. 3876 of the Cadastral Survey of Pagsanjan,
Laguna.
The petition at bench stems from the complaint to quiet title and
for delivery of owners duplicate of reconstituted title filed by
petitioner Marilou Rivera against private respondents, heirs of
Claudio Gabalones and Benita Roldan, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The reconstituted title involves a parcel of land with an area of
sixty (60) square meters at Pagsanjan, Laguna. This land was
originally registered in the name of deceased spouses Claudio
Gabalones and Benita Roldan. Allegedly, the Gabalones spouses sold
the land to Generoso Reyes in 1947. The deed of sale was not
presented to prove the sale. Tax Declaration No. 4304 in the name of
the Gabalones spouses appears to have been cancelled and a new tax
declaration was issued in the name of Generoso Reyes for the year
1948.
On April 22, 1969, the land was sold by Reyes to spouses Rogelio
Taio and Corazon Leron. The transaction was covered by a deed of
sale, duly registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna.
1
On February 21, 1977, spouses Taio sold the land to petitioner.

The deed of sale executed by the parties was also registered on
September 11, 1981.
On August 20, 1989, petitioner discovered that Paz Gabalones, one
of the heirs of spouses Gabalones (the original owners of the land),
filed a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed original title
covering the subject land. Notwithstanding, petitioner failed to file
an opposition to the petition for reconstitution. The petition was
granted and a reconstituted title was issued.
Petitioner then filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Office of
the Register of Deeds which was annotated on the title of
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua and concurred by then Associate
Justice Jose A.R. Melo and Associate Justice Ricardo P. Galvez; Rollo, pp. 52-60.
221
VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995

221
the land. She also filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, for quieting of title and delivery of the
reconstituted title. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SC-2698.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
Decision declaring petitioner as the absolute owner of the subject
land.
Aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court, private respondent heirs
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On August 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court, holding that petitioner had no equitable or legal title
over the subject lot. The dispositive portion reads:
2
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is

hereby reversed, and the complaint ordered DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
2
Register of Deeds of Laguna is directed to cancel the adverse claim filed by

the plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this

recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends
that:
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING AND

CONCLUDING THAT THE NON-PRESENTATION OF THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL OWNERS AND
GENEROSO REYES IS FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE PETITIONER.
II
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED
IN
CONCLUDING
THAT
PETITIONER CANNOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER THE DISPUTED
LOT BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE PROPERTY IS
TITLED.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF
LACHES.
________________
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

COMPLAINT AND DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, AND IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE RTC IN TOTO.
We affirm.
The respondent court did not err when it ruled that petitioners
failure to present the deed of sale evidencing the initial transfer of
the subject land from the original owners to Generoso Reyes was
fatal. Petitioner anchors her claim on the alleged titles of her
predecessors-in-interest, i.e., that the land was initially sold by
deceased Gabalones spouses to Generoso Reyes, who sold it to
spouses Taio and Leron, who later sold the same to her. Petitioner
also introduced in evidence two (2) deeds of sale covering the subject
lot: the first deed was executed between Reyes and the Taio spouses,
the second deed was executed by the Taio spouses in her favor.
Significantly, the deed of sale supposedly made by the Gabalones
spouses to Reyes was not presented in the trial court. All that was
introduced during the hearing to prove this vital fact was a tax
declaration in the name of Generoso Reyes for the year 1948. The
respondent court correctly found this proof inadequate. In a number
of cases, we have ruled that a tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership.
Petitioner cites the case ofBautista v. Court of Appeals, where it
was held that tax declarations are strong evidence of ownership of
land acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession. Petitioners reliance on said case is misplaced. In
the Bautista case, the subject lot was anunregistered land. Private
respondent del Rio who was applying for registration of a parcel of
land asserted ownership over said land
3
Penned by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.
222
222
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
IV
_______________
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74830, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA
285; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, March 2,
1993, 219 SCRA 339; De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57092, January 21,
1993, 217 SCRA 307; Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189, November 27,
1992, 216 SCRA 78.
4
G.R. No. L-43190, August 31, 1984,131 SCRA 532.
223
VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995

223
and traced the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor
of his father from whom he inherited the land. In the case at bench,
however, the subject land is covered by a title and has been registered
in the name of the original owners, the Gabalones spouses. It is also
undisputed that, unlike in the Bautista case,petitioner traces her
roots of title to a mere tax declaration in the name of Generoso Reyes.
The sale between the Gabalones spouses and Reyes was not
satisfactorily established.
We also hold that the respondent court did not err in ruling that
petitioner cannot invoke acquisitive prescription considering that the
subject land is titled land. Petitioner contends that the subject land
was not covered by any title when Reyes acquired it in 1947 up to the
time the petition for reconstitution was filed by private respondents
in 1989. She submits that prior to the reconstitution of private
respondents title, she could acquire it by prescription.
We reject this submission. The fact that the title to the lot was lost
does not mean that the lot ceased to be a registered land before the
reconstitution of its title. Reconstitution is simply the restoration of
the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form
and condition. Indeed, the order granting reconstitution of title
confirms the fact that the subject land has been previously registered
and covered by a torrens title. As the subject land did not cease to be
5
titled, it cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. To hold

otherwise is to wreak havoc on the stability of our torrens system.
Finally, the respondent court rightly rejected petitioners
invocation of the equitable principle of laches. Laches has been
defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Laches thus
amounts to animplied waiver arising from knowledge of existing
conditions and an acquiescence in them. There is
6
_______________
5
Anciano v. Caballes, No. L-5040, September 29, 1953, 93 Phil. 876.
Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 35.
Gutierrez v. Bachrach Motor Co., 105 Phil. 29.
224
224
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quibal vs. Sandiganbayan (Second
Division)
nothing in the records proving that private respondents, despite
discovery or knowledge of the successive transfer of their parents
land, omitted to assert their claim over it for an unreasonable length
of time. In the absence of this proof, laches cannot be applied against
private respondents.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.,
Chairman),Regalado and Mendoza,
JJ. ,
concur.
Judgment affirmed in toto.
4
Notes.It is an elementary principle that the owner of land

registered under the Torrens System cannot lose it by prescription.
(Bishop vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 636 [1992]) Title to
registered land is not lost through ignorance. (Jacob vs. Court of
Appeals, 224 SCRA 189[1993])
o0o
appellant,vs. FRANCISCO
appellees.
T.
ESTACIO,
ET
AL.,
oppositors-
Land Titles and Deeds; Petition for issuance of owners duplicate copy
of certificate of title; When publication of notice not necessary.Notice of the
hearing of a petition for the issuance of an owners duplicate copy of a
certificate of title need not be published if the complete record of the
original of the certificate of title is intact in the Register of Deeds. Likewise,
there is no need to first secure the appointment of a legal representative of
the estate and the declaration of the lawful heirs of the decedent if the
petition, which does not seek the distribution of the estate, comes under the
provisions of Section 109 of Act No. 496.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga

del Sur. Canonoy, J.
Climaco & Azcarraga for petitioner-appellant.
Antonio M. Ceniza for oppositors-appellees.
PAREDES, J.:
Cesario Gocheco is a legitimate son of Paulino P. Gocheco, registered
owner of a parcel of land, with improvements, in Margosatubig,
Zamboanga del Sur, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
O-1385 of the Register of Deeds for the said province. The owners
duplicate
279
No. L-15183. October 30, 1962.

IN RE:ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. O-1385, SP. No.
695,
BOOK
NO.1-5,
PATENTEEPAULINO
P.
GOCHECO,CESARIO
GOCHECO,
petitioner-
VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962

Gocheco vs. Estacio
279
copy of the said original certificate of title was lost, and

notwithstanding diligent search to ascertain its whereabouts, the
said owners duplicate copy has not been found. However, in the
5
records of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, the original of

the above number certificate No. O-1385 of title is found intact and
complete in Sp. No. 695, Book No. 1-5patentee Paulino P. Gocheco.
On January 18, 1957, Cesario Gocheco, in his capacity as heir of
the registered owner, filed a petition before the trial court to require
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur to issue another owners
duplicate copy of the O.C.T. No. O-1385, in lieu of the owners copy
which was lost, copy of which petition was served to the Register of
Deeds, thru the Provincial Fiscal, on April 30, 1957. Francisco T.
Estacio and others opposed the petition, claiming that they have been
in continuous, peaceful, lawful, public and adverse possession of the
property covered by O.C.T. No. O-1385. On June 1, 1957, petitioner
replied, stating that the oppositors can not intervene in the petition
for want of personality and that to allow them to claim ownership
and/or possession of the subject property would defeat and destroy
the indefeasibility of title guaranteed and protected by Act No. 496.
On June 29, 1957 petitioner appeared in Court and submitted his
oral and documentary evidence. Notwithstanding notice of hearing
served upon them, the oppositors or their counsel failed to appear.
On the same day, however, the trial court entered an order
suspending hearing of the petition and required the petitioner to
publish within 30 days his petition or to file a testate or intestate
proceeding, and to secure the appointment of a legal representative
to the estate of registered owner and the ultimate declaration of
heirs. For failure of petitioners to comply with the order, on August
23, 1957, the oppositors filed an ex-parte motion to dismiss the
petition. The Court, instead, on August 24, 1957 gave the petitioner
10 days within which to show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed. On September 3, 1957, petitioner filed his constancia
manifesting that he was submitting his case, on the evidences

adduced in the hearing. On September
280
280
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gocheco vs. Estacio
9, 1957, the trial court dismissed the petition against which

petitioner interposed the present appeal.
Petitioner-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in requiring
him to publish the petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. O-1385; in requiring him to secure the
appointment of a legal representative to the estate of the original
registered owner, Paulino P. Gocheco and to obtain a judicial
declaration of his lawful heirs before giving due course to his petition
and (3) in dismissing the petition.
The petition is only for the issuance of an owners duplicate copy of
O.C.T. No. O-1385, in lieu of the one that was lost. Section 109 of Act
No. 496, as amended, provides:
SEC. 109. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced by a grantee, heir, devisee, assignee, or other person applying for
the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any
instrument, a suggestion of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed
by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered. The
court may thereupon, upon the petition of the registered owner or other
person in interest, after notice and hearing direct the issue of a new
duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it
is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate for all the purposes
of this act.
In view of the existence of the complete record in the Register of

Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, of the original of the certificate of title
6
in question, which appears in Book No. 1-5 of the said Register of

Deeds Office (Exh. A) and of the fact that the present petition is not
one for reconstitution as provided by Republic Act No. 26, there is no
necessity for publishing notice of the hearing thereof. And the
petition, coming as it does, under the provisions of Section 109,
aforequoted, there is likewise no need to first secure the appointment
of a legal representative of the estate and the declaration of the
lawful heirs of the deceased Paulino P. Gocheco. The petition does not
at all seek the distribution of the decedents estate. The owners
duplicate copy to be issued will be only an
281
VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962 281

Kabigting vs. Acting Director of
Prisons
owners duplicate copy of the O.C.T. No. O-1385 and the petitioner is
a person in interest as he is a legal heir, according to his
uncontroverted verified petition.
The oppositors-appellees, who had not chosen to file their brief,
have no personality to intervene and their grounds of intervention,
namely, that they have been in public, continuous, peaceful, adverse
and lawful possession of the property is immaterial, impertinent and
of no consequence, in the present proceeding. Their claim of
ownership or possession of the property can be properly instituted in
a separate, independent and ordinary civil action.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the order of June 29, 1957 of the Trial Court,
appealed from, is set aside, and another entered, directing the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, to issue to the petitioner a
new owners duplicate copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. O1385, in lieu of the owners copy which was lost. With costs on the
oppositors-appellees.
Bengzon,
C.J., Padilla,Bautista
Angelo, Labrador,Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L.,Barrera, Dizon, Regala andMakalintal, JJ., concur.
Order set aside.
Note.See Cayanan
v.
De
los
Santos, 21
SCRA
1348 and
theannotation on Jurisdiction over Land Registration and Cadastral

Cases as Distinguished from the General Jurisdiction of Courts in
Ordinary Civil Actions. 21 SCRA 1353-1358.
________________
G.R. No. 101690. August 23, 1995.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES FERNANDO DAYAO and REMEDIOS
NICODEMUS, respondents.
*
Actions; Land Titles; R.A. No. 26;Reconstitution of Title; Reconstitution

of title under R.A. No. 26 is an action in rem which means that it is one
directed not only against particular persons but against the thing itself.
Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act Providing
A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates Of
Title Lost Or Destroyed) is an action in rem, which means it is one
directed not only against particular persons, but against the thing itself. Its
object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection
against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is
binding theoretically upon the whole world.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
jurisdictional
requirements
of
publication, posting and service of notice provide constructive notice to the
whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings.The jurisdictional
requirements of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in
7
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26. They seek to provide constructive notice to the
whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to
apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action and to give
them ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole
world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Elements of the publication requirement
under R.A. No. 26.Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26
obligates the petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that:
(1) its Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting
it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. In the case at bench, private respondents were able to
show both elements through the certification of the Director of the National
Printing Office, a government official who enjoys the undisputed
presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office.
We note that, on the other
______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
552
5
52
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
hand, mere submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would

have evidenced only the first element.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Official Gazette; Evidence; Best Evidence
Rule; What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the0 content
of the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time
publication in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the
hearing date.Petitioners reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous.
What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the content of the
Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication
in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the hearing date.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; The Supreme Court has
consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of
the National Printing Office in reconstitution casesand there is no reason
for it to deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now the submission of
Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.This court
has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the
Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. We have, on
two separate occasions, adjudicated cases with factual backgrounds similar
to the one at bench. In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM,
Br. 170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking reconstitution
did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in evidence, but merely relied
on certifications comparable to the one at bench. In both cases, the granting
of reconstitution by the trial court was reversed. But the reversals were not
made on the basis of the failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They
were, instead, both grounded on the factas clearly evidenced by the
National Printing Office Directors certificationthat the publications were
made less than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no
reason for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the
submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement in reconstitution cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of
1983 mandates the Land Registration Commission Administrator and the
Register of Deeds concerned to submit to the court their reports and
recommendations regarding the petition for reconstitution, it attaches no
concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said officials.
It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the Land
Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of Deeds
concerned to submit their reports and recommendations regarding the
petition for reconstitution to the court. But, it attaches no
553
VOL. 247, AUGUST 23,

1995
53
concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said
officials. It would, thus, be illogical in the case at bench to require such
showing by private respondents before their petition may be acted upon.
Let a copy of this order be published twice in two (2) successive issues
of the Official Gazette, at the expense of the (private respondents), and that
copies thereof be posted by the Deputy Sheriff of this
_____________
1
Through its Sixteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.
(ponente and chairman), Nicolas P. Lapea, Jr., and Fermin A. Martin, Jr.

Appeals.
Division, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration from the impugned Decision.

Roberto S. Dionisio for private respondents.
554
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated February 28, 1991, affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 16, dated October 9, 1989,
granting the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-304198.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 7, 1987, fire gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. On March 16, 1989, private respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Petition for Reconstitution of TCT
No. T-304198, on the ground that its original was among the
documents destroyed in the conflagration. The trial court set it for
initial hearing through an Order which reads, as follows:
1
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,

let the hearing of the petition be set on September 13, 1989 at 8:30 oclock
in the morning.
Also impugned is the August 29, 1991 Order of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth
554
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Branch at the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building at Malolos

and on the Municipal Hall of Malolos, Bulacan where the parcel of land
covered by the subject title is situated for a period of thirty (30) days prior
to the date of hearing.
Finally, let copies of this order be also sent by registered mail to the
Office of the Solicitor General, the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration, the Bureau of Lands, the Provincial Fiscal,
the Register of Deeds, and the boundary owners, in order that they may
appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.
During the hearing, private respondents submitted in evidence,

among others, the following Certification of Publication issued by
the Director of the National Printing Office:
Order relative to LRC No. F-504-84 In Re: Petition for Judicial
Reconstitution of the Burned/Destroyed Original Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-304198, SPS. FERNANDO DAYAO and
REMEDIOS NICODEMUS, x x x was published in the Official Gazette, to
wit:
VOLUM
E
NUMBE PAGE DAT

R
S
E OF
9
85
24
25
ISSU
E
June
12,
1989
June
19,
1989
June 19, 1989 issue was released for publication on June 28, 1989.
They did not submit nor offer in evidence actual copies of the June
12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of the Official Gazette.
On October 9, 1989, the trial court issued an Order granting
private respondents petition for reconstitution. The Order was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 28, 1991. It held:
x x x
According to the Republic, the certification of publication issued by the
National Printing Office is not sufficient proof of publication, the best
evidence being the presentation of the copies of the Official Gazette where
the notice was included.
We are not convinced. The certification clearly states that the notice
was published in the June 12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of the Official
Gazette, the second notice being released for publication on June 28, 1989.
Be it stressed that the official acts of public officers enjoy the presumption
of regularity and this has not been overcome in this case.
555

555
1995
Besides, the Official Gazette is an official publication of the government
and consequently, We can take judicial notice of its contents in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, as recently amended.
Indeed, Our examination readily reveals that the first notice of hearing in
this case appeared on page 3908 of Volume 85, No. 24 issue while the
second notice appeared on page 4028 of Volume 85, No. 24 issue of the
Official Gazette. As the last issue was released for publication on June 28,
1989, as stated in the certification of the National Printing Office, or three
months prior to the hearing of September 13, 1989, the requirement of
Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 35, which provide that the notice be
published at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, was complied
with.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration from the above Decision was denied
in a Resolution, dated August 29, 1991.
Petitioner now puts forth a single reason for warranting review,
viz., that in affirming the Order of the Trial Court granting the
petition for reconstitution in LRC No. P-504-89, public respondent
Court of Appeals grievously disregarded: (a) the inadequate evidence
submitted by private respondents; and the (b) explicit provisions of
L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983.
We affirm the Decision.
Petitioner argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the petition for reconstitution of TCT No. T-304198 because
private respondents failed to prove actual publication of the trial
courts Order setting the petition for initial hearing. Petitioner posits
the view that a mere certification of publication is utterly
inadequate to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of
publication x x x; (t)he best evidence to prove (the fact of publication)
is the presentation of the actual copies of the Official Gazette x x x,
duly marked and offered as evidence in Court. We are not
persuaded.
3
____________
10
Petition for Review, p. 9; Rollo, p. 14.
Ibid.
Id., at pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 16-17.
ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole

world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the
petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its
Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting
it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made
8
556
556
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act

Providing A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution
Of Torrens Certificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed) is an actionin
rem, which means it is one directed not only against particular
persons, but against the thing itself. Its object is to bar indifferently
all who might be minded to make any objection against the right
sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is binding
theoretically upon the whole world. The jurisdictional requirements
of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in Section
13 of R.A. No. 26, as follows:
_____________
6
Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 900.
F.D. REGALADO, 1 Remedial Law Compendium, p. 16 (1988).
See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 773 (1993).
See Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC of Malabon, MM, Br. 170, 181 SCRA
788 (1990).
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior
to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to
be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to
every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. x x x The petitioner shall, at the hearing,
submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed
by the court.
They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in

rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to apprise all
interested parties of the existence of such action and to give them
557

557
1995
at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. In the case at bench,
private respondents were able to show both elements through the
certification of the Director of the National Printing Office, a
government official who enjoys the undisputed presumption of
regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. We note
that, on the other hand, mere submission of the subject Official
Gazette issues would have evidenced only the first element.
Petitioners reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous. What
must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the content of
the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time
hearing date.
11
This court has consistently accepted the probative value of

certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in
reconstitution cases. We have, on two separate occasions, adjudicated
cases with factual backgrounds similar to the one at bench.
In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br.
170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking
reconstitution did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in
evidence, but merely relied on certifications comparable to the one at
bench. In both cases, the granting of reconstitution by the trial court
was reversed. But the reversals were not made on the basis of the
failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They were, instead, both
grounded on the factas clearly evidenced by the National Printing
Office Directors certificationthat the publications were made less
than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no reason
for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the
Petitioner next argues that private respondents failed to comply
with Land Registration Commission (L.R.C.) Circular No. 35, Series
of 1983, particularly Section 13 thereof which reads as follows:
10
11
12
____________
10
Op. cit.
11
Op. cit.
12
558
558
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
13. The Court, after considering the report of the Land Registration
Commission and comments and findings of the Register of Deeds
concerned, as well as the documentary and parole evidence presented by

the petitioner, may take such action on the petition as it may deem proper.
Petitioner believes that the report of the Administrator of the

NALTDRA (now LRCA) and the comments and findings of the
Register of Deeds are conditions sine qua non before a petition for
reconstitution could be granted so as to forestall, if not eliminate,
anomalous or irregular reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates
of title. Thus, it argues, private respondents failure to show
compliance with these requirements is fatal to their petition for
reconstitution.
We disagree.
It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the
Land Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of
Deeds concerned to submit their reports and recommendations
regarding the petition for reconstitution to the court. But, it attaches
no concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by
said officials. It would, thus, be illogical in the case at bench to
require such showing by private respondents before their petition
may be acted upon. More so, in light of the provisions of Section 15 of
R.A. No. 26, thus:
13
14
Sec. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as
supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to
warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and
that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest
therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost
or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property
are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of
court shall forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and
all the documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis
12
of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence

or basis to justify the reconstitu-
o0o
____________
13
Ibid., at p. 20; Rollo, p. 25.
14
See Sections 7 and 13, L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983, dated June 13, 1983.
559

559
1995
tion, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal shall not preclude
the right of the party or parties entitled thereto to file an application for
confirmation of his or their title under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. (Emphasis supplied)
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Court of Appeals Decision, dated February 28, 1991, as well as its
Resolution, dated August 29, 1991, are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza andFrancisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman),On leave.
Petition denied. Judgment affirmed in toto.
Notes.The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but
only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he has
purchased the property. (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA
705[1991])
The torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible,
should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 113 [1991])
13
No. L-29073. April 18, 1980.

ESPIRITU BUNAGAN, PERPETUA INSO, and GUADALUPE
LUMONGSOD, petitioners, vs. BRANCH VI, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CEBU, FILEMON OMPAD, ARSENIO OMPAD,
NAPOLEON OMPAD, and DIONISIA ICONG, respondents.
*
Land Registration; Torrens Certificate of Title; Reconstitution of title

under Republic Act No. 26;Purpose of Reconstitution.The reconstitution
or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of
Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is
supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.
The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have
the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in
the same form they were when the loss or destruction occured.
Same; Same; Same; Land Registration Act; Change in the name of the
owners of land than the name decreed in the lost or destroyed title sought to
be reconstituted constitutes a material change in the certificate of title;
Material change in the Certificate of Title should be ventilated in a separate
ordinary civil action, not in the proceedings for reconstitution of title.If
the certificate of title covering the lot was decreed in the form of Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia lcong, as in this case, the reconstituted certificate of
title should likewise be in the name of owners as they appeared in the lost
or destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Any change that
should be made in the ownership of the property should be the subject of a
separate suit. In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed on
December 19, 1966 is not merely for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
certificate of title. Dionisia lcong and her children also wanted the
correction of the name of the owners of the lost from Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia lcong to spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia lcong which
involves a material change in the certificate of title, a change which, not
being consented to by the herein petitioners whose interests are affected
thereby, cannot be authorized under the summary proceedings for
reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act No. 26. A change of this nature
raises an issue which should be ventilated and decided in an ordinary civil
action.
____________
*
SECOND DIVISION
73
VOL. 97, APRIL 18,

1980
3
Bunagan vs. CFI of Cebu,
Branch VI
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Material change in certificate of title
not authorized under the summary proceedings for reconstitution under
Republic Act No. 26 nor under Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act; When
Sec. 112 of the Act availed of.The claim of Dionisia Icong that the change
is authorized under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act is without
merit. The proceedings authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of in
view of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for such proceedings apply
only if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in interest.
14
PETITION for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of

Cebu.
Lapulapu City; Napoleon Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident

of Lapulapu City; and Dionisia Icong, surviving spouse of Antonio
Ompad, of legal age and resident of Lapulapu City.
The petition was opposed by the herein petitioner, Espiritu
Bunagan, upon the ground that he is the owner of the lot in question,
having bought the same from Guadalupe Lumongsod and Perpetua
Inso, legitimate heirs of the late Antonio Ompad; and that Dionisia
Icong is merely a trustee of the lot in behalf of Antonio Ompad.
On April 22, 1967, the petitioners therein moved to dismiss the
opposition, contending that the said opposition constitute an adverse
claim against the rights of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong which
cannot be entertained by the cadastral court.
Acting upon the petition and the opposition, the cadastral court
ruled that it could not entertain the claim of the oppositor which
should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action, and gave due course
to the petition. After hearing, the court issued an order, dated June
17, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
1
The facts are stated in the opinion of Court.

Pedro T. Garcia for petitioners.
Pedro L. Albino & Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, dated June 17, 1967, in Cadastral
Case No. 17, LRC Record No. 946, Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre,
directing the reconstitution of the original certificate of title in the
name ofspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong. as well as the
order dated January 4, 1968, denying the motion to correct the order
of June 17, 1967, and the original certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto.
The record shows that on December 19, 1966, the herein private
respondents Dionisia Icong and her children named Filemon,
Manuel, Arsenio, and Napoleon, all surnamed Ompad, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the reconstitution of the
original certificate of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in
the name of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, spouses, and once
reconstituted, to cancel the same and another one issued in the name
of Filemon Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of
74
7
SUPREME COURT
4
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bunagan vs. CFI of Cebu, Branch
VI
Lapulapu City; Manuel Ompad, widower, of legal age, and resident of
Lapulapu City; Arsenio Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of
WHEREFORE, upon payment of the prescribed fees, the Register of Deeds

of Lapulapu City is ordered to reconstitute the original certificate of title of
Lot No. 1660, Opon Cadastre, located at Basak, Lapulapu City, in the
names of the original ownersspouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,
based on its corresponding plan and technical description, Exhs. P and Q.
4
Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 was issued in

the name of spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.
_____________
1
Rollo, p. 8.
Id., p. 11.
Id., p. 15.
Id., p. 17.
75
15
VOL. 97, APRIL 18, 1980

75
VI
On November 22, 1967, Espiritu Bunagan filed an urgent motion to
correct the order of June 17, 1967 and the original certificate of title
No. RO-9675, by substituting, as the registered owners of Lot
1660. Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Iconginstead of spouses
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong upon the ground that upon the
evidence presented (plan and technical description and the certificate
of the Clerk of Court) the lot was adjudicated toAntonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong during the cadastral proceedings, and not to spouses
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.
Dionisia Icong filed her opposition thereto on December 8, 1967,
claiming that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name
of spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong is warranted under
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act which authorizes alteration
or amendment of the title upon proper petition.
On January 4, 1968, the respondent Court issued an order,
denying the motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967, saying:
5
Considering that the court, sitting as a cadastral court, did not entertain
the claim of the oppositor which, according to then Judge Jose N. Mendoza,
may be ventilated in a separate civil action this Court, likewise, cannot
entertain the Urgent Motion to Correct Order of Honorable Court dated
June 17, 1967 and Entry of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 by the
Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City, for the same reason.
7
Now claiming that the orders dated June 17, 1967 and January 4,
1968 have been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the petitioners have filed the instant recourse to annul
and set aside the said orders.
There is merit in the petition. The reconstitution or reconstruction

of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic
Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed
to have been lost or destroyed in
_____________
5
Id., p. 24.
Id., p. 32.
Id., p. 35.
76
7
SUPREME COURT
6
REPORTS ANNOTATED
VI
its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of
any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after
observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they
were when the loss or destruction occured. If the certificate of title
covering the lot was decreed in the form of Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong, as in this case, the reconstituted certificate of title
should likewise be in the name of the owners as they appeared in the
lost or destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Any
change that should be made in the ownership of the property should
be the subject of a separate suit.
In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed on December
19, 1966 is not merely for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
certificate of title. Dionisia Icong and her children also wanted the
correction of the name of the owners of the lot fromAntonio Ompad
and Dionisia Icong to spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia
Icong which involves a material change in the certificate of title, a
change which, not being consented to by the herein petitioners whose
8
16
interests are affected thereby, cannot be authorized under the

summary proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act
No. 26. A change of this nature raises an issue which should be
ventilated and decided in an ordinary civil action.
The claim of Dionisia Icong that the change is authorized under
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act is without merit. The
proceedings authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of in view
of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for such proceedings apply
only if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.
It would result that the respondent Court committed an error in
re-registering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name ofspouses
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.
Barredo (Chairman),Antonio, Aquino, Santos andAbad

Santos, JJ., concur.
Petition granted
Notes.When an area is erroneously included in a relocation
10
11
_____________
8
Vda. de Anciano vs. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875.
Govt. of P. I. vs. Abada, 48 O. G. No. 4, April 1952, p. 1372.
10
Bachoco vs. Esperancialla, 105 Phil. 404.
11
Enriquez vs. Atienza, 100 Phil. 1072and other cases cited therein.
77
VOL. 97, APRIL 18, 1980

77
VI
WHEREFORE, the orders of June 17, 1967 and January 4, 1968 are
modified in the sense that the petition for reeonstitation is granted
only insofar as it orders the reconstitution of the original certificate
of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name
of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong and the Register of Deeds of
Lapulapu City is hereby ordered to correct the name of the registered
owners in Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 accordingly.
survey and in the title subsequently issued, the said inclusion is null
and void. The Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act cannot be
made a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of
another. (Vda. de Recinto vs. Inciong, 77 SCRA 196).
Mangrove lands are not included in the term timber or mineral
lands as used in the Revised Administrative Code. (Tongson vs.
Director of Forestry,79 SCRA 130).
Foreshore lease application pending award is not covered by a
presidential ban on grant pf foreshore leases all along Manila Bay
towards Cavite and Bataan. (Santulan vs. Executive Secretary,80
SCRA 548).
Section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is not different from
Section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law, C. A. 141. (Santulan vs.
Executive Secretary, 80 SCRA 548).
Though there is no formal deed of transfer over a piece of land, the
fact that a deed of confirmation of applicants title was executed by
the heirs of the former owner of the land without opposition
whatsoever is enough to prove the transfer of the land to the
applicant. (Reyes-Talag vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna, 22 SCRA
1388).
Registration of titles by owners of private woodlands with the
Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption from the pay78
78
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
17
Gokongwei, Jr. vs. Securities and

Exchange Commission
ment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or
industrial purposes. (Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
Where the title invoked by a party is a reconstituted title and it is
not disputed that the Certificate of Title considered lost or destroyed,
and subsequently found or recovered is not in the name of the same
person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate has been issued
the adverse party may avail of section 19 of Republic Act 26 to prove
their rights. (Supio vs. Garde, 45 SCRA 429).
So long as a decree of registration has not been issued,
registration proceedings are still pending for the purposes of the preCommonwealth Act 3110, and, when lost or destroyed, must be
reconstituted in conformity with said Act. (Villegas vs. Fernando, 27
SCRA 1119;Sampedro vs. Director of Lands,27 SCRA 1119).
A judicially reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity
and legal effect as the original thereof (Section 7, Republic Act No.
26). Unlike in the extrajudicial reconstitution of titles, where there is
the statutory reservation that the new title shall be without
prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was
duly noted in the original, at the same time it was lost or destroyed
(Section 7, Republic Act No. 26)., a judicially reconstituted title, by
express provisions of the statute (Section 10, Ibid). shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in Section 2 of Republic Act
26. (Municipality of Legaspi vs. A. L Ammen Transportation Co.,
Inc.,26 SCRA 218).
o0o
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
No. L-22377. November 29, 1968.

MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. A. L.
AMMEN TRANSPORTATION Co., INC., respondent.
Torrens system; Judicial and extrajudicial reconstitution of certificate
of title; Validity and legal effect; When reconstitution of liens and other
encumbrances may not be allowed.A judicially reconstituted certificate of
title has the same validity and legal effect as the original thereof (Sec. 7,
Rep. Act No. 26). Unlike in the extrajudicial reconstitution of titles,
wherein there is the statutory reservation that the new title "shall be
without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was
duly noted in the original, at the same time it was lost or destroyed" (Sec. 7,
Rep. Act No. 26), a judicially reconstituted title, by express provisions of the
statute (Sec. 10, Ibid), "shall not be subject to the encumbrance" referred to
in section 2 of Republic Act 26. Evidently, the statute would not ordinarily
allow the reconstitution of liens and other encumbrances not noted in the
judicially reconstituted owner's certificate of title (Philippine National
Bank v. De la Via, L-14601, Aug. 31, 1960).
Same; Judicial reconstitution of title; Nature of proceedings; How
jurisdiction to hear and decide petition for reconstitution of title is acquired.
Proceedings for judicial reconstitution of certificate of title arein rem and
as such no individual notice need be sent to any particular person who has
18
an interest in the property covered by the title; and failure to send such
notice would not amount to a jurisdictional defect. The
219
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER

2
29, 1968
19
Municipality (now City) of
Legazpi vs. A. L. Ammen
Transportation Co., Inc.
land registration or cadastral court acquires jurisdiction to hear and
decide a petition for reconstitution of an owner's title upon compliance with
the required posting of notices and the publication in the Official Gazette
(Philippine National Bank v. De la Via, supra; Cf. Wright, Jr. v.Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., L-18904, July 11, 1964; Arches v.Billanes, L20452, April 30, 1965).
Same; Torrens title; Right of registered owner to recover possession at
any time; When restoration of possession to registered owner may not be
granted; Relief available where property covered by Torrens title have long
been converted into, and used as, public road; Conflict between right of
registered owner and public interest; Appropriate solution; Case at bar.
Where the property (registered under the Torrens system) sought to be
recovered, have long been converted into, and used as, a public road, the
problem of recovery thereof thus gives rise to a matter of public interest.
Fortunately, it is not a new one in this jurisdiction. The appropriate
solution was indicated in the leading case of Alfonso v. Pasay City where
this Court held: "In the present case, Alfonso remains up to now the owner
of the land in question, Lot No. 4368 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay,
because being registered land, the City of Pasay or its predecessor,
Municipality of Pasay, did not and could not acquire it thru prescription. As
registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at any time
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land. However,
said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor
feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes. So, the only
relief available is for the City of Pasay to make due compensation, which it
could and should have done years ago since 1925" (106 Phil. 1017, 1022
[1960]).
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has given the petitioner a
period of one year within which to expropriate the portion occupied by the
road if it does not want to return the portion in question to the respondent,
ALATCO.
PETITION f or review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

City Fiscal Aquilino P. Bonto and Assistant City Fiscal E. V.
Serra for petitioner.
Ramon C. Fernandez for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
There is a need for an inquiry into the jural consequences attaching
to the reconstitution of a title in this petition for the review of a
decision of the Court of Ap220
220
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality (now City) of Legazpi
vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation
Co., Inc.
peals. The case had its origin in an action before the Court of First
Instance of Albay a complaint being filed by now respondent A. L.
Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. for the recovery of the possession of
a piece of land against the Province of Albay, the Municipality of
Legaspi, and twenty-four private individuals occupying portions
thereof. Earlier, it was shown that said respondent, as plaintiff, filed
a petition for the reconstitution of its Transfer Certificate of Title
covering said lot on the ground that it lost its previous title. It was
19
successful, the Court of First Instance of Albay issuing an order

authorizing such reconstitution. The reconstitution notwithstanding,
one of the defendants, and now sole appellant, petitioner City of
Legaspi, did not surrender possession. Hence the filing of such
complaint. Respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. as
plaintiff, was unsuccessful, its complaint for the recovery having been
dismissed.
It elevated the matter on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the judgment of the lower court, declaring that the
reconstituted certificate of title "is valid and that [respondent A. L.
Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.] is the registered owner of Lot No.
1114 of the Legaspi Cadastre." The City of Legaspi in turn instituted
a petition for certiorari to review such decision of the Court of
Appeals. On the facts as found by it, which we are not at liberty to
alter, we sustain the Court of Appeals.
What were the facts as found by the Court of Appeals? According
to its decision now under review: "We note that the issues raised and
the evidence adduced on behalf of appellee city and even the findings
of the trial court relate to the acquisition or ownership of the lot, its
alleged registration as a result of a cadastral survey and hearing,
and the reconstitution of the title to the land. Since,
1
________________
1
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Annex A, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 22. In a
resolution dated January 22, 1964, acting on a motion for reconsideration of respondent
A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals modified this decision by
ordering now petitioner City of Legaspi to pay plaintiff P200.00 a year as rental
beginning January, 1948.
221
VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29,

1968
221

Co., Inc.
however, the fact of reconstitution is not in dispute, there is no need
in this action to go into the question of acquisition or ownership of
the property or to determine whether the reconstituted title thereof
was obtained in bad faith or in a fraudulent manner. In fact, as far as
the reconstitution is concerned, it is unsafe for this Court at this
instance to make any finding as to whether it was procured in bad
faith or fraudulently since the record of the reconstitution proceeding
is not before us; besides there is the presumption of regularity in the
granting of the reconstituted title."
To show why the appeal of respondent A. L. Ammen
Transportation Co., Inc. from the decision of the lower court was
meritorious, the Court of Appeals referred to the applicable statutory
provision which leaves no doubt that the reconstituted certificate of
title has the same validity and legal effect as the original
thereof. The force to which such statutory language is entitled was
clearly set forth in the leading case of Philippine National Bank v. De
la Via, where this Court, speaking through Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
stated: "It appears that prior to the institution of these proceedings
with the court below, there had already been a judicial reconstitution
of the original certificates of title upon petition of the registered
owner. Unlike in the extrajudicial reconstitution of titles, wherein
there is the statutory reservation that the new title 'shall be without
prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was
duly noted in the original, at the same time it was lost or destroyed'
(Sec. 7, Republic
2
________________
2
Ibid, p. 20.
20
Section 7, Republic Act 26, provides: "Reconstituted certificates of title shall have
the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof: Provided, however,That
certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections five
and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the
properly was duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or
notation of which has not been made on the reconstituted certificate of title. This
reservation shall be noted as an 'encumbrance on the reconstituted certificate of title."
4
L-14601, August 31, 1060.
222
222
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Co., Inc.
Act No. 26), a judicially reconstituted title, by express provisions of
the statute (Sec. 10,ibid), 'shall not be subject to the encumbrance
referred to in section T of the Act. Evidently, the statute would not
ordinarily allow the reconstitution of liens and other encumbrances
not noted in the judicially reconstituted owner's certificate of title."
Even the objection based on procedure on due process grounds
could not prosper for as clearly set forth in the above decision: "While
it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to the
petitioner bank when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought,
such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. The
proceedings therein being in rem, the cadastral court acquired
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for the reconstitution of
the owner's title upon compliance with the required posting of notices
and publication in the Official Gazette."
With the above conclusive pronouncement of this Court to which,
as was to be expected, the Court of Appeals paid deference, the first
three assigned errors of the City of Legaspi, the sole appellant, could
5
thus be disposed of. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that
the fact of reconstitution of title to the land in question is not in
dispute, in concluding that the proceedings before the lower court
was not in the nature of a direct attack on the legality of the issuance
of the reconstituted title, and in declaring respondent A. L. Ammen
Transportation Co., Inc. as the owner of Lot No. 1114 on the basis of
the reconstituted title. As the fourth error deals with the alleged
"overwhelming evidence" to rebut the presumption of legality in the
issuance of the reconstituted title is factual, it cannot be inquired
into in this petition for review.
Necessarily, likewise, the fifth alleged error to the effect that
petitioner should vacate the premises within a
_________________
5
Ibid. Cf. Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-18904, July 11,
1964; Arches v, Billanes, L-20452, April 30, 1965.

223

223
1968
Co., Inc.
period of one year and to pay damages would be unavailing. It may
require further reservation though. The ably written brief of
petitioner, represented by City Fiscal Aquilino P. Bonto, "emphasized
that the land in dispute is now a public road (Quezon Avenue)
making up one of the vital arteries of commerce and trade in Legaspi
City. It is the principal outlet to and from the Pier Area where
vessels both coastwise and unload their cargoes; from the Pier Area
it leads to the market and the commercial sector of the City; and
from various points it is the most convenient road to the Post Office,
21
the frontage of which abuts the land in litigation. Ordering the

petitioner to vacate the property would in effect cut off access to the
areas of trade and commerce, thereby adversely affecting the
economic potential of petitioner and its inhabitants. Generally the
closing of the road would otherwise create serious inconvenience to
vehicular pedestrian traffic to which Quezon Avenue has been
devoted since 1947, or a period of seventeen years."
Such a problem thus gives rise to a matter of public interest.
Fortunately, it is not a new one in this jurisdiction. The appropriate
solution was indicated in the leading case of Alfonso v. Pasay City
where this Court, through Justice Montemayor, held: "In the present
case, Alfonso remains up to now the owner of the land in question,
Lot No. 4368 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, because being
registered land, the City of Pasay or its predecessor, Municipality of
Pasay, did not and could not acquire it thru prescription. As
registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at
any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of
land. However, said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is
neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used
for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay
to make due compensation, which it could and should have done
years ago since 1925."
That respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.
6
Congress of Labor-Ramie United

Farm Workers? Association
with an equally well-written brief prepared by its counsel, Atty.
Ramon C. Fernandez, is not insensible to such a solution is indicated
therein, where the following is set forth: "In the instant case, the
Court of Appeals has given the petitioner a period of one year within
which to expropriate the portion occupied by the road if it does not
want to return the portion in question to the respondent, ALATCO."
It is thus obvious why the last assignment of error is equally not
persuasive.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals of
November 18, 1963, as modified by its resolution of January 22,
1964, is affirmed. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,Zaldivar, S
anchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Capistrano, J., did not take part.
8
Decision affirmed.
________________
6
Brief for the Petitioner, p. 13.
106 Phil. 1017, 1022 (1960).
224
224
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rileco, Inc. vs. Mindanao
22
No. L-31885. December 27, 1982.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO-BENGUET, BRANCH
III, HONORABLE FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge,
and MARIA LORETO DIAZ, respondents.
*
Civil Law; Land Registration;Section 112 of Act 496; Proceedings in

Sec. 112 summary in nature and allowable only when issues in pleadings
are insubstantial and the case is not controversial.In the case of
Sangalang vs. Caingat, 25 SCRA 180, this Court, speaking through then
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that the proceedings under Section
112 of Act No. 496 are summary in nature and are allowed only when a
scrutiny of the allegations discloses that the issues presented by the
pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently insubstantial as
not to be genuine issues. The relief provided in said section can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest, for otherwise
the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary
case or in the case where the incident properly belongs and because
controversies arising after the entry of the original decree of registration
are beyond the limited authority of a land registration court to pass upon.
Same; Same; Same; Petition for insertion of the civil status of a person
and other personal circumstances in the certificate of title should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding; Section 112 of Act 496 and Art 411 of
the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court partake of
summary proceedings and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes
only clerical in nature and not those affecting civil status or citizenship
which can be granted only in an adversary suit.In the case at bar, there is
no question about the controversial nature of the petition before the
respondent court. The civil status and more importantly, the citizenship of
Chaoli should be threshed out in a proper proceeding where all the persons
who may be affected therein are notified and represented. Section 112 of
Act No. 496 is similar to the proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which calls for
correction of mere clerical, innocuous or harmless error in a per_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION
406
4
06
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. CFI of BaguioBenguet
sons certificate of birth. The proceedings therein are summary in

nature and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes which are
only clerical in nature, but certainly not controversial issues, such as
citizenship. Corrections of substantial errors such as those that affect civil
status or citizenship cannot be granted except only in an adversary suit.
Same; Same; Same; Petition to insert civil status and citizenship in an
administrative case not an adversary suit; Case at bar.Administrative
Case No. 1426, re-petition to insert civil status and other personal
circumstances in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet
Registry of Deeds is not an adversary suit. It is not a proper action in which
an alleged omission regarding civil status and citizenship may be inserted.
There was no issue, dispute or controversy between contending parties
which the lower court was called upon to decide. The mere naming of the
Benguet Registry of Deeds and the Solicitor General, as respondents, did
not ipso facto convert the same into an adversary suit.
PETITION for review on certiorari the orders of the Court of First

Instance of Baguio-Benguet, Br. III. Chanco, J.
23

Solicitor General for petitioner.
Virgilio F. Bautista for private respondent.
RELOVA, J.:
On December 9, 1969, respondent Maria Loreto Diaz, as the
surviving legitimate child of the late Chaoli, filed with respondent
court a petition for the insertion in the Original Certificate of Title
No. 1324, after the registered owners name CHAOLI, the following
phrase and words Filipino citizen, of legal age, widow and a resident
of Gumatdang, Itogon, Benguet Province, which phrase and words
do not appear and/or are not contained in the aforementioned
Original Certificate of Title No. 1324.
Petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Benguet Province, entered its oral opposition to the petition.
After the hearing on March 2, 1970, respondent court issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
407
VOL. 119, DECEMBER 27, 407

1982
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Benguet is hereby
ordered to amend the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324, in such a
manner that after the word and name CHAOLI the following phrase
Filipino Citizen, of legal age, widow and a resident of Gumatdang, Itogon,
Benguet Province, be inserted in the said certificate of title upon payment
by the Petitioner (herein private respondent) of the necessary fees in
accordance with law. This Court, before the finalization of this Order,
welcomes as stated previously any authorities which the Fiscal may submit
and which may aid this Court to reverse this Order. Let the Original
Certificate of Title be returned to the Petitioner and/or her counsel for the
above-stated purpose.
Petitioner Republic filed with respondent court a motion for

reconsideration of the latters order, dated March 2, 1970, on the
ground that there is no action or proceeding provided for by law for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship or status of a person, and
that the petition states no cause of action.
Respondent court, for lack of merit, denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with
prayer that the orders, dated March 2, 1970 and March 24, 1970, in
Administrative Case No. 1426, B. L. No. F-49844, Patent No. 16499,
of respondent Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet, be set aside
and that the petition for respondent Maria Loreto Diaz in said case,
be dismissed.
Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) in exercising
jurisdiction over the petition filed before it and in finding that
petitioner herein had a cause of action; and, (2) in ordering the
amendment of Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 which, in effect
declared private respondents mother a Filipino, when there is no
proceedings available for the purpose of obtaining such a declaration
of citizenship.
It is the position of the petitioner Republic that the petition in the
lower court partakes of the nature of a summary proceeding where
the parties affected were not notified and afforded protection on
whatever interest they have; and that the insertions sought in the
Certificate of Title are controversial, and such being the case,
respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition in said
summary proceeding.
408
408
SUPREME COURT
24
REPORTS ANNOTATED
On the other hand, the respondents contend that pursuant to Section
112 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
respondent court is legally vested with power to act as a land
registration court; that pursuant also to said Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act, private respondent Maria Loreto Diaz, as the only
surviving legitimate child of Chaoli, filed with respondent court a
petition to insert the civil status and other personal circumstances of
Chaoli in OCT No. 1324 (Free Patent); and that the citizenship, civil
status and other personal circumstances of the late Chaoli are not in
issue in the case, inasmuch as the same had already been considered
in the administrative proceedings which resulted in the issuance of
said certificate of title in the name of the late Chaoli.
We find merit in the petition. In the case of Sangalang vs.
Caingat, 25 SCRA 180, this Court, speaking through then Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that the proceedings under Section
112 of Act No. 496 are summary in nature and are allowed only when
a scrutiny of the allegations discloses that the issues presented by
the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently
insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The relief provided in said
section can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties
or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest, for otherwise the case becomes controversial and
should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs and because controversies arising after the
entry of the original decree of registration are beyond the limited
authority of a land registration court to pass upon.
In the case at bar, there is no question about the controversial

nature of the petition before the respondent court. The civil status
and more importantly, the citizenship of Chaoli should be threshed
out in a proper proceeding where all the persons who may be affected
therein are notified and represented. Section 112 of Act No. 496 is
similar to the proceeding under Article 412 of the New Civil Code in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which calls for
correction of mere clerical, innocuous or harmless error in a persons
certificate of birth. The proceedings therein are summary in
409
VOL. 119, DECEMBER 27, 409

1982
nature and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes which
are only clerical in nature, but certainly not controversial issues,
such as citizenship. Corrections of substantial errors such as those
that affect civil status or citizenship cannot be granted except only in
an adversary suit.
Administrative Case No. 1426, re-petition to insert civil status
and other personal circumstances in the Original Certificate of Title
No. 1324 of the Benguet Registry of Deeds is not an adversary suit. It
is not a proper action in which an alleged omission regarding civil
status and citizenship may be inserted. There was no issue, dispute
or controversy between contending parties which the lower court was
called upon to decide. The mere naming of the Benguet Registry of
Deeds and the Solicitor General, as respondents, did not ipso
factoconvert the same into an adversary suit.
WHEREFORE, the Orders, dated March 2, 1970 and March 24,
1970, in Administrative Case No. 1426 of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio and Benguet are SET ASIDE and the petition of private
25
respondent Maria Loreto Diaz to insert the civil status and other
personal circumstances of her mother Chaoli in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet Registry of Deeds is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez andGutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., reserves his votes.
Melencio-Herrera, J., in the result.
Orders set aside.
Notes.The failure to perform all conditions essential to a
government grant of a portion of a public domain does not entitle the
applicant to confirmation of an imperfect title. (Director of Lands vs.
Datu, 115 SCRA 25.)
A decree of registration can no longer be impugned even on the
ground of fraud after the lapse of one year from its issuance.
(Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals,115 SCRA 63.)
410
410
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in

tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in
right) is followed in land registration matters (La Urbana vs.
Bernardo, 62 Phil. 790.)
There is a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
registration. In involuntary registration, such as the registration of
an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the
like, an entry thereof in the day book is sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owners duplicate certificate of title is not
presented to the register of deeds. On the other hand, in voluntary
registration, an innocent purchaser for value becomes the registered
owner the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid
deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same
time he surrenders or presents the owners duplicate certificate of
title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees because
what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform, (Levin
vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 420;Potenciano vs. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196.)
o0o
Although the general rule is that a land registration court has no

power to decide cases involving issues properly litigated in ordinary
actions, yet inasmuch as in this jurisdiction it is the courts of first
instance that also function as courts of land registration, our
jurisprudence recognizes exceptions to said rule, where the parties
have acquiesced in submitting the issues for determination in the
registration proceedings and they were given full opportunity to
present their respective sides and submit their evidence. (Franco vs.
Monte de Piedad, L-17610, April 22, 1963.)
26
* FIRST DIVISION
371
VOL. 102, JANUARY 27,

371
1981
Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals
CORP., intervenor, ALABANG DEVELOPMENT
RAMON D. BAGATSING, intervenors.
No. L-45168. January 27, 1981.*

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and DEMETRIA STA. MARIA VDA. DE BERNAL,
respondents, GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT
_______________
CORP.
and
Land Registration; In successive registration, the person with the prior

certificate is entitled to the estate.In successive registration, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
the land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived, directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly
coyer the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide
that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continue to hold the title.
Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and
by law.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by will of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission
of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
Same; Same; Where the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory
it must be strictly complied with. In petition for reconstitution of title under
R.A. 26 the procedural requirements, especially the statements in the
petition of and the giving of notices to, persons in possession of the property
in litis, and with claims thereto, should be strictly complied with, otherwise
the entire proceeding is utterly void.To ascertain whether a court has
jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into
27
(Auyong vs. Hon. Court of Tax Appeals, L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967, 19 SCRA
10). In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by
a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and
must strictly be complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void
(Caltex, et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-28472, April 30 1968 23 SCRA 492). So that
where there is defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the
court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, L-27443, July 19, 1971, 40 SCRA 37).
And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case,
the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects
(Development Bank
372
3
72
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
of the Phils. Employees Union vs. Juan Perez, L-22584 and L-23083,
May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 179, 187). Further, absent jurisdiction the court
cannot pass upon the merits of the petition (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA
220, 224).
Same; Same; Same.In the case at bar, the jurisdiction or authority of
the Court of First Instance is conferred upon it by Republic Act 26 entitled
An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Title lost or destroyed, approved on September 25, 1946.
The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of
procedure that must be followed before the court can act on the petition and
grant to the petitioner the remedy sought for. These requirements and
procedure are mandatory. The petition for reconstitution must allege the
jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must also be published and posted
in particular places and the same sent to specified persons.
Same; Same; Same.In the Notice of Hearing of the amended petition,
copies of the Notice were required to be posted only in the bulletin board of
the Provincial Capitol of Rizal and on Lots 1 and 3. The Notice now omits
the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Rizal which the Court order of

December 7, 1970 had specifically directed. Likewise, in said Notice of
Hearing of the Amended Petition, no person was named to whom copies of
the Notice should be sent by registered mail so that the names of Manuela
Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, the Director of Lands, the Land
Registration Commissioner, the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, and the Office of the Solicitor General were now omitted,
whereas the order of the Court required notices to the alleged boundary
owners, namely: Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, Director of Lands,
Director of Forestry, Atty. Casiano P. Laguihon, and Atty. Josefina
Nepomuceno.
Same; Same; Same.And since the above data do not appear in the
Amended Petition, the same data does not also appear in the Notice of
Hearing of the petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the
provisions of Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of the
Petition for Reconsideration and Section 13 which similarly require the
contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these
multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above-cited
sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court
with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of
373
VOL. 102, JANUARY

27, 1981
73
Appeals
obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory
has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that all interested parties are
hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition
should not be granted is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted
strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. We
28
agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to amend the
original petition provided all the requisites for publication and posting of
notices be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite
substantial in nature. As We have pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for
publication and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction
of the Court.
Same; Same; Same.The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose. M. Moya, et al., supra is rightly so
because one who seeks the reconstitution of his title to property is dutybound to know who are the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons
having an interest in the property involved, specially where the property is
so vast and situated in a suitable residential and commercial location,
where buildings and improvements have been or are being constructed
openly and publicly. As stated earlier, indispensable parties have appeared,
claiming ownership, possession, and valuable interests in the property,
which are not only numerous but also patently conspicuous that private
respondent cannot fiegn ignorance, much less unawareness, nor blindness
as to their existence on her or within her claimed property.
Same; Supreme Court; Evidence;Appeal; The Final Report of the
Bureau of Lands on the relocation survey is admitted, on appeal/petition
for certiorari, as evidence of the Supreme Court.We accept and approve
this Final Report on the relocation verification survey ordered by Us on the
properties in question, further admitting the same as evidence of this
Court. Private respondent was given all the opportunity to attend and
participate in said survey and inspite of due notice to her of the time and
place of the survey, she manifested no interest in the same. On the
contrary, she preferred to stand pat on the certification of the Land
Registration Commissioner that there was no conflict of the boundaries as
platted and besides she has no financial means to defray her share of the
survey cost. We reject these objections of private respondent as without
merit.
374
SUPREME COURT
74
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Waiver;Private respondent, who wanted her
alleged title reconstituted, cannot now complain of the propriety of the
survey as evidence having refused, and thus waived her right to participate
in the survey/relocation.It is too late in the day for private respondent to
complain that the survey report is not proper evidence for not having been
presented at the trial of the case nor passed upon by the said Court and the
Court of Appeals. Private respondent has waived her right to object to said
report by refusing to attend and participate in the relocation and
verification survey. She is now estopped to claim that they were net
furnished copies of the report after the Court directed the parties to secure
copies of the same at their expense. She is likewise estopped to claim that
she is not bound by the results of said report. The Final Report is evidence
obtained by the Supreme Court upon its own authority inherent in the
exercise of its judicial function and power to ferret and establish the truth
upon due notice to the litigants and to be present by person, representative
or counsel in the conduct of the relocation-verification survey.
Same; Evidence; The identification of the signature of the Land
Registration Commission on a certain certification is merely an
authentication of the genuineness of the Commissions signature, not the
correctness and truth of its contents.Besides, private respondents
reliance on the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration (Exhibit
R) is misplaced, unsupported by competent official action which should
have been shown to the satisfaction of the Court, such as the surveyor of
the Land Registration Commission who actually verified and examined the
plan submitted by private respondent, or the (LRC) Plan PR-2887 which
allegedly approved Plan II-4374, Lots 1 and 3. The mere identification of
Exhibit R by a subordinate employee of the Land Registration
Commission, Ricardo Arandilla, merely authenticated the genuineness of
the signature of Commissioner Bilog but not the correctness and truth of
29
its contents. The report was made ex parte, even without the order of the
Court nor with notice and attendance of the oppositors.
Same; Same; Before submitting his report to the Judge on the
correctness of the technical description of a property whose title is being
sought for reconstitution, the Land Registration Commissioner must require
the petitioner to submit his documents of transfer and other files in the
Registry of Deeds, not merely the plan and technical description of the
property in question.Pursuant to said regulation, the Land Registration
Commissioner should have required the
375
VOL. 102, JANUARY

27, 1981
75
Appeals
private respondent to submit the deed of transfer or other documents
on file in the Registry of Deeds containing the description of the property or
an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been
registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate
of title was issued. If the deed of sale executed in favor of private
respondent by her mother was also lost or destroyed by reason of the war,
there are authenticated copies of said deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds
where the transfer certificate of title was issued based on said deed of sale.
It is quite evident that private respondent has not exhausted all steps and
remedies to secure certified copies of documents or papers that may be
necessary in the reconstitution of her certificate of title or to corroborate,
confirm and attest to her claim that a sales patent was issued to her
mother, that the sales patent was forwarded to the Register of Deeds and
that the latter issued the corresponding original certificate of title to the
said mother.
Same; Same; Reports of handwriting experts of the N.B.I. are
sometimes rendered of doubtful integrity in the light of their admissions
that forgers possess better skills than the genuine writers themselves.We
have noted the conflicting evidence presented in the records, to prove or
disprove the alleged authenticity of TCT No. 42449, the inconsistent

testimonies of government officials testifying for the private respondent or
for the oppositor Director of Lands, including contradictory documents
presented to support the respective positions of the parties therein. There
conflicts, and inconsistencies may be ascribed to the failings of human
memory, trying to recall events that occurred many, many years past or to
the changing practice and procedure by government officials themselves
including employees in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Manila and
Rizal. Even reports certified by handwriting experts of the NBI are
rendered of doubtful integrity in the light of their own admissions that
forgers possess better skills than the genuine writers themselves. Because
of the long passage of time and the frailty of human recollections, much of
the evidence on record are difficult to confirm and verify.
Same; Even at the initial stage there was an attempt to foist a fictitious
title through a fraudulent act.Thus, at the initial stage of the petition and
before the actual hearing thereof, there was patently an attempt to foist a
forged and fictitious title through a fraudulent act. Law and justice always
abhor fraud. Fraud and justice never dwell or exist side by side. Fraus et
jus nunquam cohabitant. For376
SUPREME COURT
76
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
tunately, the attempt was thwarted and foiled. The data appearing in
the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 attached to the original petition
has as its source Accession No. 195551. These technical descriptions were
issued on May 15, 1970 by Angel Sogueco, a retired surveyor. But Accession
No. 195551 refers to Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the
land is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan,
Province of Leyte. (See Annex A, paragraph 2, Final Report of RelocationVerification Survey).
30
Same; Evidence; The private respondents failure to state the number of

the Sales Patent allegedly awarded to the original owner, or present any
evidence showing a sales application was processed and approved and a
sales patent, with the technical descriptions issued, demonstrate lack of
credibility of the petition for reconstitution.The evidence for the private
respondent tend to trace her ownership over the vast properties in question
through a transfer, a deed of sale in her favor executed sometime in
November, 1943 in consideration of the price of P10,000.00 paid to her
mother Olimpia Sta. Maria, the original owner who bought the property
from the Philippine Government under a sales patent issued on September
15, 1942 and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 on
September 29, 1942. OCT No. 42392 must contain the technical
descriptions of the property sold, which descriptions are copied or derived
from the data contained in the Sales Patent issued by the Government. Yet,
We find no proof presented by private respondent to support and
corroborate the authenticity of her title or the source of her title which can
be traced back to OCT No. 42392 and the Sales Patent awarded to her
mother. The number of the alleged Sales Patent is not cited by her nor any
certificate showing or signed by a competent officer that a sales application
was processed and approved, that a sales patent to the property in question
with technical descriptions therein stated was issued to her mother, had
been presented as evidence. It could have been easy for private respondent
to obtain any certified copy of documents or paper that may be necessary in
the reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act 26 because
said copies are furnished free of charge under Section 23 of the Act.
Same; A parcel of land registered under the Torrens Act cannot have
two occasion numbers nor can two titles have the same accession number.
Yet, the technical descriptions in Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 are exactly the same. For the
property herein involved to have the same
377
VOL. 102, JANUARY
27, 1981
77
Appeals
technical descriptions but coming from different accession numbers is
not only irregular but highly incredible. The technical descriptions cannot
have two accession numbers as sources thereof.
Same; On July 25, 1971 a sales patent application could not have been
approved for 186.69 hectares in favor of an individual as the Philippine Bill
of 1902 limited the area of public land that can be disposed of to 16 hectares
only.From this caption alone, it is clear that the survey was made not for
the purpose of acquiring the properties by sales patent from the
Government during the Japanese Occupation or in 1943. If said parcels of
land were surveyed and approved on July 25, 1911, a maximum area of 16
hectares could have been legally acquired by sales patent only, pursuant to
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The same maximum area of 16 hectares was
allowed until 1919 when the maximum area of acquisition by sales patent
was increased to 100 hectares under Act 2874, and upon the adoption of the
1935 Constitution, it was further increased to 144 hectares. Yet, the survey
conducted and approved on July 25, 1911 for Olimpia B. Sta. Maria,
predecessor in interest of private respondent herein, shows that the
property surveyed compromises an area of 1,866,979 square meters, or
186.69 hectares, more or less. This survey, if undertaken for purposes of
sales application, would not and could not have been approved by the
Director of Lands because it is clearly against the law.
Same; Public Land Act; It is simply unbelievable that a survey plan
allegedly approved in 1911 could have been the basis of a sales patent issued
in 1942 or 31 years later.Under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 41) which governs the disposition of lands of the public domain by sales
patent, it is therein provided in Section 108 that no patent shall issue nor
shall any concession or contract be finally approved unless the land has
been surveyed and an accurate plat made thereof by the Bureau of Lands.
It is simply unbelievable that the survey Plan II-4374 conducted January 929, 1911 and approved by the Director of Lands on July 25, 1911 was the
31
basic survey upon which the sales patent applied for by Olimpia B. Sta.
Maria was approved and issued on September 15, 1942, some 31 years
thereafter.
Same; Where two certificates of title were issued to different persons
over the same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original
parties.The Torrens Titles of the Intervenors Greenfield Development
Corp., Alabang Development Corp., and Ramon
378
SUPREME COURT
78
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
D. Bagatsing which are derived from Certificate of Title No. 684 issued
in September 20, 1913 clearly antedate that of the private respondent who
can trace her title only to an alleged sales patent awarded to her mother on
September 15, 1942 and to Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 issued
September 29, 1942 pursuant to said sales patent. Under these facts, the
applicable and governing rule or doctrine which is well-established in this
jurisdiction is that when two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive
registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the
person holding under prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the
person who relies on the second certificate.
Same; The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System must be
protected.The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System must be
protected and preserved to ensure the stability and security of land titles
for otherwise land ownership in the country would be rendered erratic and
restless and can certainly be a potent and veritable cause of social unrest
and agrarian agitation. The courts must exercise caution and vigilance in
order to guard the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Torrens
Registration System against spurious claims and forged documents
concocted and foisted upon the destruction and loss of many public records
as a result of the last World War. The real purpose of the Torrens System
which is to quiet title to the land must be upheld and defended, and once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84;
Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).
Same; Every applicant for sales patent goes through a long procedure
and the records thereof are several. Presentation of a mere approved survey
plan for purposes of reconstitution is no evidence that a patent was issued to
the alleged original owner of the land those papers or authenticated copies
thereof should be presented in the reconstitution proceedings.Except
private respondents Exhibit G (Plan of Property of Olimpia B. Sta.
Maria, et al. which is a survey of an area of 1,866.79 sq. meters in Barrio
San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, surveyed January 9-29, 1911 and approved
July 25, 1911 by the Director of Lands), private respondent has not
presented in evidence a copy or copies of any official record, entry, receipt,
certification, paper or document by any government officer
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who has acted on any of the numerous steps which have been outlined
above in obtaining the sales patent to the property in question from the
government. All the material evidence of private respondent relate to acts
and circumstances which occurred, in point of time after OCT No. 42392
was allegedly issued on September 29, 1942 and after TCT No. 42449 was
likewise issued on November 19, 1943 after the sale of the property to the
private respondent by her mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria. There is
absolutely no evidence to prove or tending to prove that private
respondents mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, was duly issued a sales patent
32
or even applied to purchase the property from the government on or before

Sept. 15, 1942 when the said sales patent was allegedly awarded.
Same; Same.The private respondent claims that the original
certificate, OCT No. 42392, was issued pursuant to a sales patent issued by
the government on Sept. 15, 1942, hence the authenticity and genuineness
of the sales patent becomes very material and vital to whether the title,
either originally emanating therefrom or transferred from the original
certificate of title was in force at the time the title was lost or destroyed.
But since the sales patent is seriously questioned and disputed by the
Director of Lands, the very government official who by law is charged and
duty-bound to act on sales application, appraise the properly and accept the
bid offered, approve the survey plan, verify the occupancy and
improvements made by the applicant, then prepare and sign the sales
patent, on the ground that no sales patent was issued by reason, among
others, that the area sold was in excess and beyond that allowed by law, the
lack of the sales patent number and the apparent irregularities appearing
on the survey plan, the original of which is not subsisting in the files and
records of the Bureau of Lands, it becomes the compelling duty of private
respondent to prove that said sales patent was property approved and
issued and thereafter recorded in the office of the register of deeds, the
officer required by law to issue the original certificate of title to the
patentee, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, private respondents mother, who
allegedly transferred the property to her daughter, private respondent
herein, by virtue of an alleged deed of sale executed between them in
November, 1943.
Same; Same; In reconstitution proceedings based on alleged fact that
the copy of the duplicate certificate of petition was burned, lost or destroyed,
the petitioner must present an authenticated copy in the office of the Register
of Deeds which was not burned.Under the Land Registration Act, when
the land is transferred by the
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80
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
registered owner by reason of sale or otherwise, the deed of sale must

be recorded and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. It must be
assumed then that such deed of sale referred to above was duly recorded
and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for TCT No. 42449 was
issued in the name of the transferee, private respondent herein. Although
the latter claims that her copy of the deed of sale was burned during the
fire in Pasig during the occupation, she could have obtained a copy thereof
from the Register of Deeds where the original was registered, but she did
not and there is no showing why she failed to do so and present the same in
court to corroborate and support the authenticity of her title, TCT No.
42449, and the regularity of the transfer from OCT No. 42392.
Same; The alleged title of private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria vda.
de Bernal is non-existent, fictitious and imaginary.The failure of the
private respondent to obtain and present in evidence any document or
prove any act, deed, fact or circumstance supporting and corroborating the
issuance of the sales patent to her mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, as well
as any proof to support and corroborate the execution and registration of
the deed of sale in favor of private respondent with no satisfactory
explanation of such failure impel Us to make the conclusion that no sales
patent was duly and regularly issued by the government covering the
property in question to her mother. We hold that the sales patent claimed
by private respondent as the source of TCT No. 42449 is non-existent,
fictitious and imaginary.
Same; Mere notation on the TCT that it was issued by virtue of a sales
patent is insufficient to justify reconstitution.The mere notation in TCT
No. 42449 that the same was issued by virtue of a sales patent is
insufficient and improper to warrant reconstitution. Said sales patent is
non-existent as the land allegedly subject of the sale as found in the
relocationverification survey ordered by this Court. Consequently, OCT
No. 42392 is not authentic and genuine and private respondents TCT No.
33
42449 being a transfer from the fake and spurious original title, is likewise
fake and spurious. We rule that TCT No. 42449 was not in force at the time
it was allegedly lost or destroyed or at any time at all. Hence, the same
cannot be reconstituted.
Same; In reconstitution proceedings the petitioner must prove that the
title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.Under Section 15 of
Republic Act 26, if the Court after hearing, finds that
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Appeals
the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or
otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost
or destroyed certificate of title, and that the petitioner is the registered
owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate of
title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the
description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same
as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of
reconstitution shall be issued. Conversely, where the said certificate of title
was not in force at the time it was lost or destroyed as it is clearly shown
and established by the evidence on record in the instant case, the petition
for reconstitution shall be as it is hereby denied.
Teehankee, J., concurring:

Land Registration; The commission of a litany of perjury and.
falsification is evidence in this case, on the part of Demetria Sta. Maria vda.
de Bernal, from beginning to end.I concur fully with the Courts judgment
ably penned by Mr. Justice Guerrero. I wish to stress only that the record
shows from beginning(where respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal claimed to be a widow when she was in fact married to Angel Cruz
who opposed her petition) to end, a conspiracy and litany of falsification and
perjury (see pages 62 - 69 of the decision) whereby said private respondent

Bernal, on a petition for reconstitution of title filed in 1970, twenty-five (25)
years after the alleged loss or destruction of her alleged title to some 143.5
hectares or 1,435,000 square meters of prime commercial land
encompassing a part of the South Superhighway, numerous residential
subdivisions such as Alabang Hills Subdivision, Cielito Homes Subdivision,
Tahanan Village, factories, roads and infrastructures, all of which had been
developed, built and occupied without airy contest or protest from anyone,
much less private respondent (since the properties were duly covered by
duly issued Torrens Certificates of Title issued since 1913 or earlier) almost
succeeded through respondent Court of Appeals decision reversing that of
the trial court in obtaining such reconstitution of her alleged title based on
a supposed sales patentissued in favor of respondents mother and
predecessor which this Court has found to be non-existent, fictitious and
imaginary (see page 68 of the decision). The lands claimed to be covered by
her lost title have been determined to be likewise fictitious and do not
actually exist on the ground (see page 59, idem).
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SUPREME COURT
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Same; Courts must exercise great caution in entertaining petitions for
reconstitution of title.The first lesson to be drawn here is that courts must
exercise the greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title, particularly where the
petitions are filed, as in this case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years
after the alleged loss. Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure
that indispensable parties, i.e. theactual owners and possessors of the lands
involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of the
petition (not by mere general publication), particularly where the lands
involved constitute prime developed commercial land including a part of the
34
South Superhighway. The stability and indefeasibility of the Torrens

system would have been greatly imperiled had the appellate courts
judgment granting reconstitution prevailed, resulting in two holders of
Torrens Certificates over the same lands.
PETITION for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of

Appeals.
Estelito P. Mendoza,Assistant Solicitor General, Jose F. Racela,
Jr., and Antonio G. Castro, counsel for the petitioner.
GUERRERO, J.:
Petition for Review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45, Rules of Court,
in relation to Republic Act 5440 and/or a Special Civil Action of
Certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, petitioner
claiming no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioner prays this Court to reverse the decision dated October
1, 1976 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 56729R entitled Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, petitioner-appellant,
versus Director of Lands, Pedro de la
1
_______________
1
Ninth Division, Pascual, J., ponente, Bautista and Santiago, Jr., JJ., concurring.
383

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1981
Appeals
Pea, Leodegario R. Alba, Jr., Aurora R. Favila, Democrito R. Favila,

Eufracia R. Favila and Angel Cruz, oppositors-appellants Re:
Petition for Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. T42449, Rizal Registry of Deeds and in lieu thereof to dismiss the
petition for reconstitution of title, to declare null and void the
Resolution dated November 11, 1976 denying petitioners Motion for
a New Period or Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration and further denying the Motion to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration.
In a petition dated and filed June 6, 1970 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal sought the reconstitution of the original of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
covering two (2) parcels of land located in Barrio San Dionisio,
Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (now the Municipality
of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal) containing an aggregate area of
143.5062 hectares, more or less. Attached to the petition are the
photostat copy of the supposed owners copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12/T-79, the plan of the property together with the technical
description thereof, approved by the Chief of the Survey Division of
the Bureau of Lands.
The petition for reconstitution was set for hearing on November
28, 1970 at 8:30 A.M. after due publication of the required notice was
made. The required notice of hearing was duly published in two
successive issues of the Official Gazette, Vol. 66, No. 31, pp. 72267227, Aug. 3, 1970, and Vol. 66, No. 32, p. 7493, Aug. 10, 1970, as
follows:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
35
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BRANCH XIII
Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 12/T-79, Land Records of Rizal
DEMETRIA STA. MARIA VDA. DE BERNAL, Petitioner
384
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
NOTICE OF HEARING
In her verified petition, Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal prays for the
reconstitution of TCT No. 12/T-79 covering Lots 1 and 3 of plan II-4374
situated in San Dionisio, Paraaque (now Muntinlupa) Rizal with an area
of 1,866,979 square meters registered in her name.
She alleges, among others, that the original of the aforesaid title in the
custody and possession of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was either lost or
destroyed during the last war and diligent efforts to locate the same proved
futile; that the owners copy of said certificate of title, however, had been
preserved by petitioner; that her owners duplicate of TCT No. 12/T-29 has
never been encumbered and that the technical descriptions of said lots are
as follows:
Lot 1, II-4374
A parcel of land (Lot 1 of plan II-4374, LRC Record No.), situated in
the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque (now Muntinlupa),
Province of Rizal, Bounded on the E., and N., along lines 1-2-3-4-5 by Public
Lands; on the NW., along lines 5-6-7-8-9 by property of Manuela Aquial
(Lot 2 of plan II-4374) on the W., and S., along lines 9-10-11 by public
lands; on the SE., SW., and SE., along lines 11-12-13-14-15 by property of
Olimpia B. Santamaria (Lot 3 of plan II-4374); on the SE., SW., along lines
15-16-1 by property of Manuela Aquial (Lot 4 of plan II-4374). Containing

an area of seven hundred seventeen thousand five hundred twenty-three
(717,523) square meters.
Lot 3, II-4374
the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal.
Bounded on the NW., and NE., along lines 1-2-3-4 by property of Manuela
Aquial (Lot 4 of plan II-4374); on the NW., NE., and NW., along lines 4-5-67-8 by property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria (Lot 1 of plan II-4374); and on the
NW, SW., SE., and E., along lines 9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-1 by Public
Land. Containing an area of seven hundred seventeen thousand five
hundred thirty-nine square meters (717,539).
Wherefore, notice is hereby given that said petition will be heard before
this Court at Pasig, Rizal on November 28, 1970 at 8:30 A.M.
385

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1981
Appeals
at which place, date and hour aforesaid, all interested persons are hereby
cited to appear and show cause, if any they have, why said petition should
not be granted.
Let this notice be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in the
Daily Mirror, as well as twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette.
Likewise, copies of this notice must be posted in the bulletin board of the
Provincial Capitol of Rizal, Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Rizal, and
on Lot 1 and 3 before the hearing. Furthermore, let copies of this notice be
sent by registered mail to Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta Maria, The
Director of Lands, the Land Registration Commissioner, the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and the Office of the Solicitor
General.
36
Witness the Hon. Pedro A. Revilla, Judge of this Court, this 18th day of
July, 1970 at Pasig, Rizal.
(Sgd.) MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS
Branch Clerk of Court
Before the hearing of the case on its merits, however, the Court
required the Registry of Deeds to submit his report regarding the
status of Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79, the original of which was
sought to be reconstituted. In his report, Atty. Jose D. Santos, the
Register of Deeds, indicated that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12/T-79 is not filed in Registry Book No. T-79; that Certificate of Title
No. 12 according to the records is under Registration Book No. T-1
issued in the name of Edwin Warnes and that said title refers to a
property situated in Pasay City; that said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12 was already cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
19, Book II of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. The report also stated
that Registration Book No. T-79 embraces Transfer Certificates of
Title with numbers of five (5) digits; and that there are no available
records of the Registry of Deeds which might indicate whether or not
there is such Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 in the name of
petitioner (Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal). (See Decision, CFI,
pp. 67-68, Record on Appeal)
In view of the report of the Register of Deeds of Rizal cited above,
private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal was allowed
by the Court on November 12, 1970 to file an
386
386
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
amended petition wherein the number of her Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 12/T-79 was changed to Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. The amended petition reads
as follows:
(CAPTION & TITLE OMITTED)
Petitioner, thru counsel, respectfully alleges:

1. 1.That petitioner is of legal age, widow, Filipino citizen, and
resident of and with postal address at 102 Sixto Antonio St., Bo.
Rosario, Paraaque, Rizal;
2. 2.That she is the owner of certain parcels of land located at Barrio
San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, before, now Muntinlupa,
Province of Rizal as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449 of the Land Records of Rizal, which property is described as
follows:
Lot I
II-4374
A parcel of land (Lot I of plan II-4374 LRC Record No.), situated in
the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, (now Muntinlupa),
Province of Rizal. Bounded on the E., and N., along lines 1-2-3-4-5 by Public
Land; on the NW., along lines 5-6-7-8-9 by property of Manuela Aquial (Lot
2 of plan II-4374); on the W., and S., along lines 9-10-11 by Public Land; on
the SE., SW., and SE., along lines 11-12-13-14-15 by property of Olimpia B.
Santamaria (Lot 3 of plan II-4374); on the SE., SW., along lines 15-16-1 by
property of Manuela Aquial (Lot 4 of plan II-4374). Containing an area of
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE (717,523) SQUARE METERS.
Lot 3, II-4374
37

Bounded on the NW., and NE., along lines 1-2-3-4 by property of Manuela
Aquial (Lot 4 of plan II-4374); on the NW., NE., and NW., along lines 4-5-67-8 by property of Olimpia B. Santamaria (Lot 1 of plan II-4374), and on
the NW., SW., and SE., along lines 9-10-11-12-13-14-14-16-17-1 by Public
Lands. Containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE (717,539) SQUARE
METERS.
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Appeals
1. 3.That on the occasion of the military operations during the last
world war, the original of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42449 in the Office of the Register of Deeds was either
lost or destroyed and despite diligent efforts exerted, proved to no
avail; however, the Owners Duplicate of said Transfer Certificate
of Title had been preserved by the herein petitioner and could be
the basis of this petition;
2. 4.That the boundary owners of the property above-described are
as follows: Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria and Public
Land, with known residence at Paraaque, Rizal;
3. 5.That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title does not appear
to have been encumbered except to those persons who might in the
future appear to have interest during the pendency of this petition;
4. 6.That the following documents are hereto attached as an integral
part hereof, to wit:
Four (4) photostat copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 in the
name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal.
Four (4) copies in white print of plan II-4374, which is a survey approved
on July 25, 1911.
Four (4) copies of the Technical Description of Lots 1 and 3 of plan II4374.
Other documents which may be required will be submitted during the
proceedings.)
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice and
hearing, an order be issued to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
to reconstitute the Original Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
in the name of the herein petitioner; that petitioner be granted such other
relief which may be just and equitable in the premises.
Manila, for Pasig, Rizal, Philippines, Nov. 12, 1970.
(Sgd.) CESAREO A. FABRICANTE
Counsel for the Petitioner
Suite 413 Shurdut Bldg.
Intramuros, Manila
(Verification by Petitioner Omitted)
388
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
The above amended petition was admitted by the Court in its Order
of December 7, 1970 and it directed the Publication of Notice in the
following order:
Considering the motion for permission to amend petition, the Court
resolves to grant the same provided all the requisites for publication and
posting of notices be complied with it appearing that the amendment is
quite substantial in nature.
38
IN VIEW THEREOF, the amended petition dated November 12, 1970

attached to the motion is hereby admitted; and the Branch Clerk of this
Court is directed to cause the publication of the notice once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Daily Mirror as well as twice in successive issues
of the Official Gazette; and to post the same notices in the bulletin board of
the Provincial Capitol Building; Municipal Building of Muntinlupa; and
lots 1 and 3; and to serve copies of the same by registered mail to the
alleged boundary owners, namely. Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria,
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, Atty. Casiano P. Laquihon, and
Atty. Josefina Nepomuceno.
SO ORDERED.
Pasig, Rizal, December 7, 1970.
(Sgd.) PEDRO A. REVILLA
Judge
Pursuant to the Order of the Court quoted above, the Deputy Clerk of
Court ordered the following Notice published:
In her verified petition, Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal prays for the
reconstitution of TCT No. 42449 covering Lots 1 and 3 of plan II-4374
situated in San Dionisio, Paraaque (now Muntinlupa) Rizal with an area
of 1,866,979 square meters registered in her name.
She alleges, among other things, that the original of the aforesaid title
in the custody and possession of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was either
lost or destroyed during the last war and diligent efforts to locate the same
proved futile; that the owners duplicate copy of said certificate of title
however, had been preserved by petitioner; that her owners duplicate of
TCT No. 42449 has never been
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1981
Appeals
encumbered and that the technical descriptions of said lots are as follows:
Lot 1, II-4374
the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque (now Muntinlupa),
Province of Rizal. Bounded on the E., and N., along lines 1-2-3-4-5 by Public
Land; on the NW., along lines 5-6-7-8-9 by property of Manuela Aquial (Lot
2 of plan II-4374) of the W., and S., along lines 9-10-11 by public land; on
the SE., SW., and SE., along lines 11-12-13-14-15 by property of Olimpia B.
Santamaria (Lot 3 of plan II-4374); on the SE., and SW., along lines 15-16-1
by property of Manuela Aquial (Lot 4 of plan II-4374). Containing an area
of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE (717,523) SQUARE METERS.
Lot 3, II-4374
Bounded on the NE., and NW., along lines 1-2-3-4 by property of Manuela
Aquial (Lot 4 of plan II-4374); on the NW., NE., and NW., along lines 4-5-67-8 by property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria (Lot 1 of plan II-4374); and on the
NW., SW., SE., and E., along lines 0-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-1 by Public
Land. Containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE (717,539) SQUARE
METERS.
WHEREFORE, notice is hereby given that said petition will be heard
before this court at Pasig, Rizal on March 22, 1971 at 8:30 A.M. at which
place, date and hour aforesaid, all interested persons are hereby cited to
appear and show cause, if any they have why said petition should not be
granted.
Let this notice be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in the
Daily Mirror, as well as twice in successive issues of the Of-ficial
Gazette. Likewise, copies of this notice must be posted in the bulletin
board of the Provincial Capitol of Rizal, and on Lots 1 and 3 before the
hearing.
39
WITNESS the Hon. Pedro A. Revilla, Judge of this Court, this 7th day of
December, 1970 at Pasig, Rizal.
(Sgd.) MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
On November 9, 1970, oppositors Pedro de la Pena and Leodegario R.

Alba, Jr. filed an opposition which they amended on April 12, 1971 by
adopting the opposition of the Director of Lands, but was later
withdrawn on June 15, 1973, approved by the Court on January 23,
1974.
On June 20, 1970, Angel Cruz also filed an opposition alleging:
1. 1.That he specifically denies the allegations of paragraphs 1 to 6
the truth of the matter being that below stated as:
1. a.That petitioner is not a widow, she being the spouse of herein
Oppositor Angel Cruz;
2. b.That the Certificate of Title mentioned in the petition is fake
together with all evidences mentioned in said petition;
3. c.That the oppositor is the true owner of the parcel of land whose
certificate of title is sought to be reconstituted.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the petition be dismissed.
Quezon City for Pasig, Rizal, December 20, 1970.
Oppositor Cruz, however, never appeared at the hearing and

abandoned his opposition.
Oppositors Aurora Favila, et al. also filed an opposition which was

amended on April 1, 1971 but after Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal presented part of her evidence, said oppositors abandoned
their opposition and never appeared at subsequent hearings.
On March 16, 1971, the Director of Lands filed the opposition in
behalf of the government, which was adopted as the Opposition also
to the Amended Petition for Reconstitution. The Opposition alleges:
1. 1.That Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal of Rosario,
Pasig, Rizal seeks the reconstitution of the Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 or 42449, covering two (2)
parcels of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, and which is shown in Plan II-4374, allegedly approved
on July 25, 1911 by the Director of Lands and described in
the Technical Descriptions also
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1. allegedly issued by the Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands,
under Accession No. 195551, and containing an area of
143.5062 hectares, more or less and which said plan and
technical descriptions are attached to the petition;
2. 2.That by reconstituting the Original Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12/T-79, now 42449 in the name of the Petitioner
using the said Owners Transfer Certificate of Title as the
basic source, is not feasible, because:
40
1. (A)The genuineness and authenticity of the Owners duplicate

copy of the title is seriously of doubtful origin.
2. (B)That the said Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by the
Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila and not by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal Province, who is authorized by law
to issue the same and who at the time of the issuance was
holding his Office at Pasig, Rizal;
3. (C)That the basic Original Certificate of Title No. 12 which
was cancelled by the alleged Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12/T-79, was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
Province in the name of Edwin Warnes and Company, and the
property is situated in Pasay City, contrary to the statements
in the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 of
petitioner;
4. (D)That the said Transfer Certificate of Title was issued under
Judicial Form No. 140-D, GLRO Form No. 68-D and not the
revised Judicial Form No. 41, GLRO Form No. 109, which
was being used ever since 1931, hence, said title is patently
irregular, if not spurious;
5. (E)That the Owners Duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12/T-79 does not reflect the NUMBER of the SALES
PATENT upon which the Original Certificate of Title was
derived from;
6. (F)That the Bureau of Lands during the year 1941-1944
(Japanese Occupation) had only an skeleton force at work and
did not issue patents or patent-titles;
7. (G)That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 in the name

of the petitioner does not contain the imprint of the Official
Seal of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila where the
same was issued;
8. (H)That Book No. T-79 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
Province contains only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
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SUPREME COURT
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Appeals
1. 19453 to 19700, Series of 1931 and does not show that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 was duly registered
therein;
2. (I)That the Owners Duplicate transfer Certificate of Title No.
12/T-79 is partially damaged, so much so that some of the
bearings and distances are missing or could not be read;
1. 3.That Plan II-4374 in the name of the petitioner and the
Technical Descriptions could not be the basis for the
reconstitution of the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12/T-79 nay 42449 on the following grounds:
1. (A)That the Original Plan II-4374 is not subsisting in the files
and records of the Bureau of Lands, hence petitioners plan
cannot be considered official reproduction copy of the same;
41
2. (B)That there is no basis for the issuance of the Technical

Descriptions covering Lots Nos. 1 and 3, Plan II-4374;
3. (C)That the Director of Lands who supposedly approved plan
II-4374 on July 25, 1911, is not the same Director of Lands
during the same period;
4. (D)That the public official who signed the controverted
Technical Descriptions was not duly authorized to sign and
issue the same;
5. (E)That the Accession No. 195551, appearing in the Technical
Descriptions of Lots Nos. 1 and 3 of plan II-4374 is fake,
because it pertains to Plan II-4005, the land being the
property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan,
Province of Leyte, containing an area of 3838 square meters,
surveyed on December 19, 1910 and approved on February 7,
1911; obviously Plan II-4374 is also a fake; and
6. (F)That plan II-4374 as described in the alleged Technical
Descriptions when projected in cadastral maps falls outside
Paraaque Cadastre, Paraaque, Rizal.
1. 4.That the aggregate areas of Lots Nos. 1 and 3, Plan II4374 is 143.5062 hectares and it is not improbable that it will
encroach other titled properties including roads, public
highways and even the Municipal Hall of Muntinlupa, Rizal;
hence a relocation survey is necessary to establish the metes
and bounds of the controverted lands and its relative position
in the locality;
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1. 5.That as alleged by the petitioners counsel in his Motion
for Permission to Amend Petition dated November 12, 1970,
that the Owners Duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12/T-79 was tampered and that the real number appearing on
the same is 42449, only creates the impression that both
alleged titles are fake, together with the plan and technical
descriptions, much more so that the said Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42449 is not attached and made part of the
petition in the expediente;
2. 6.That the petition for reconstitution of the Original
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 nay 42449 is not in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Republic Act No.
26.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the
Petition to Reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 now 42449,
be denied with costs against the petitioner.
Manila, for Pasig, Rizal, March 16, 1971.
On September 11, 1972, Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal prayed

the Court for the withdrawal of the photostat copy of TCT No. 12/T79 and copies of the Daily Mirror together with the affidavit of
publication found on pages 22-25 inclusive of the expediente, for
having become irrelevant, immaterial and of no further use in the
proceedings.
42
In a Manifestation dated September 11, 1972, counsel for

Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal manifested that at the time of
the filing of the petition for reconstitution of her duplicate Owners
Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the land records of Rizal Province,
said certificate was considered lost and its whereabouts, could not be
ascertained; that said certificate has been finally recovered recently
and is now in her possession; that according to information furnished
her by the Register of Deeds Office of Rizal after some query, the
original of petitioners duplicate TCT No. 42449 is among those
missing in the Book of Certificates of Titles turned over by the
Register of Deeds of Manila to the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
Counsel thereupon prayed that the petition be treated as one for the
reconstitution of petitioners Original Certificate of Title No. 42449.
The Court having ordered on November 16, 1972 the examination
of the genuineness of the signature of Mariano
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
Villanueva, Register of Deeds of Manila, in the Owners duplicate

copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of petitioner by the
National Bureau of Investigation, the NBI submitted on November
24, 1972 to the court Questioned Documents Report No. 166-1172,
finding that the signature of Mariano Villanueva appearing in TCT
No. 42449 of petitioner is genuine.
On November 19, 1973, the Court issued its Order denying
reconstitution of petitioners Original Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42449. The Court, dwelling on the change in the number of
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernals Certificate of Title from No.
12/T-79 to TCT No. 42449, said:
During the hearing of this case, petitioner Dernetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal explained the circumstances leading to the erroneous title sought to
be reconstituted under her original petition. She testified that she and her
husband, Angel Cruz, were separated. During the time that they were
living together, she entrusted to her husband the owners copy of the title
covering this property. Sometime after their separation, she demanded
from her estranged husband the owners copy of her title over the property
allegedly owned by her at San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal (now
Muntinlupa). She did not notice that the title delivered to her by her
alleged husband was fake. As a matter of fact, she caused a photostat copy
thereof to be attached to the original petition. After discovering that the
title given to her by her husband is spurious, she again demanded from her
husband the delivery of the title which she had entrusted to him. After
much effort, she was able to retrieve from her husband Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42449 which is now the subject of her amended petition.
Petitioner is now sure that this is the same title which she had left in the
custody of her erstwhile husband Angel Cruz.
A comparison of the technical descriptions appearing in the original title
No. 12/T-79 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 shows that the
parcels of land described in both titles are exactly the same.
And analyzing the evidence for Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal,
the Court continued:
The evidence of the petitioner tended to show that the property embraced
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42449, was originally
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Appeals
covered by a sales patent, Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 in the
hame of Olimpia Sta. Maria, the mother of the present petitioner; that the
said property was sold to petitioner for the sum of P10,000.00 during the
43
Japanese time and that in consequence of said sale, Transfer Certificate of

Title No. T-42449 was issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of
Manila since the location of the property involved was comprised within the
Greater Manila area during the Japanese Occupation; it was also testified
to that the copy of the deed of sale was lost during the fire which occurred
in Pasig during the occupation where petitioner was then residing;
petitioner also claimed that she and her mother were and are presently in
possession of the property which is planted to palay and fruitbearing trees;
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 was delivered to the Register of
Deeds of Rizal Province by the Register of Deeds of Manila (Exhibits J, J-1,
J-2 and K) and that this original title was allegedly lost in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal (Exhibits D and D-1).
The signature of Mr. Mariano Villanueva appearing at the bottom of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C) was attested by an NBI
document examiner, Atty. Narciso Pea, former Register of Deeds of the
City of Manila and Mr. Ricardo Obispo, an oldtimer in the office of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila to be the authentic signature of Mr. Mariano
Villanueva who was the Register of Deeds of Manila during the occupation.
The petitioner sought to establish the correctness of the technical
descriptions appearing in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42449 from the
minutes of the reading of the microfilm of the plan of the property at the
Bureau of Lands on November 25, 1972 signed by Engineer Modesto
Eloriaga, Chief, Reproduction Section of the Bureau of Lands, Atty. Pedro
Flores for the Director of Lands, and Atty. Fortunato de Leon, counsel for
the petitioner (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and N). Offered in evidence also by the
petitioner were the tax declarations of the property under the name of the
petitioner together with tax receipts evidencing payment of the same
(Exhibits L, L-1, M, M-1 and M-2).
Mr. Oscar T. Eusebio in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Rizal
vigorously opposed the petitioner and in the course of his testimony, he
identified his written report in pursuance to an order of this court. He
testified that according to their records Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449, Book T-214 (pre-war records) was issued in the name of Esmeralda
Pabustan covering a property located at Pasay City; that this certificate of

title was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Manila sometime on
September 14, 1943 as
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
evidenced by a receipt signed by Mr. Mariano Villanueva, Register of Deeds

of Manila. Eusebio testified that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449,
Book T-489 of post-war vintage existing in their files is under the name of
Pilar Paterno covering a property situated in sitio Ibayong Malaque, Las
Pias, Rizal, with an area of 2,450 square meters which was cancelled by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56515, Book T-559.
In spite of the impressive array of the evidence presented by the
petitioner both oral and documentary, there are circumstances in this case
which impel the Court to deny the present petition.
To begin with, it appears that there are three (3) transfer certificates of
title allegedly covering the two (2) lots under consideration viz. (1) Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12/T-79 in the name of herein petitioner Demetria
Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal attached to the original petition; (2) Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42449 which is the subject of the amended petition
in this case, also in the name of the petitioner; and (3) Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-76 under the name of petitioners estranged husband Angel V.
Cruz attached to another Reconstitution Case (No. 70) filed by one Jose
Polinag, alleged attorney-in-fact of Angel V. Cruz, estranged husband of
petitioner Bernal, before Branch XXV of this Court and of which case this
Court has taken judicial notice of. In Reconstitution Case No. 70, it is noted
that the Presiding Judge of said Court granted the petition of Jose Polinag
notwithstanding the opposition and motion to dismiss filed by the herein
petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal. It is apparent, therefore,
that if this Court were to grant the present petition, there may be more
44
than one (1) title issued under different names for the same lots. While
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal claims that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-76 is fake, her husband Angel V. Cruz who failed an opposition
in the case at bar although he did not pursue the same under this
proceeding, alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 sought to be
reconstituted by his wife Bernal is also fake.
In the instant case, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 in the name
of the petitioner is sought to be reconstituted by petitioner Bernal. There is
not a scintilla of evidence presented by the petitioner to show that this
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 issued during the Japanese time
was ever received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal Province. What the
records of the Registry of Deeds disclose is that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42449 (pre-war records) was issued in the name of Esmeralda
Pabustan, covering a property located at Pasay, Rizal Province. After the
war, Transfer Certificate
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of Title No. 42449, Book T-489 was issued in the name of Pilar Paterno on
January 6, 1956, covering a property situated in sitio Ibayong Malaque,
Las Pinas, Rizal with an area of 7,450 square meters and which was
cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56515, Book T-559. On the
other hand, Certificate of Title No. 42392 from which Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C) of the petitioner appears to have been derived
from does not exist in the files of the Register of Deeds of Rizal although
there is in the records of the Register of Deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42392 in the name of Paz Bravo de Perfecto covering a property located
at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
Among the exhibits presented by the petitioner are Exhibits J, J-1 and
J-2. Exhibit J purports to show a list contained in eleven (11) photostatic
sheets of titles supposedly transmitted by the Register of Deeds of Manila

to the Register of Deeds of Rizal Province wherein is listed among the titles
supposedly sent to Pasig, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 42392.
The Court has noted certain glaring irregularities in these exhibits
which were not explained during the hearing of this case. For example,
under Volume T-342 where Exhibit J-1, Title No. 42449 is listed, the
number of the titles appearing thereunder are all of five (5) digits
beginning with the number 4, whereas under Volume T-343 the numbers of
the titles listed thereunder are also of five (5) digits but beginning with the
number 1. The Court finds it strange if not irregular why an earlier volume
should embrace higher numbered titles than a later volume (see page 10 of
Exhibit J, last column).
A close scrutiny of pages 10 and 11 of Exhibit J will show that the last
columns of the list of titles appearing thereon were typed with a different
typewriter from that used with respect to the other columns listed on the
same pages. It will be noted that the spacing of the figures shown on page
10 of Exhibit J is narrower than those of the figures appearing in the other
columns of said page. On the other hand, the last column on page 11 shows
that the figures appearing on the last column are of larger print than the
figures of the other columns on the same page. By a strange coincidence or
otherwise, both the titles sought to be reconstituted by the petitioner as
well as the alleged mother title thereof are listed in the last columns of
pages 10 and 11 of Exhibit J.
While almost all of the titles listed in this exhibit does not bear the
names of the registered owners, Title No. 42449 shows in handwriting the
name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal (Exhibit J-1) and after
Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 there appears the
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
45
Appeals
handwritten name of Olimpia Sta. Maria, the alleged predecessor-ininterest of the petitioner (Exhibits J-1 and J-2). There is no testimony in
the record to explain who made these intercalations. The person who
certified that the eleven photostatic copies constituting Exhibit J are
reproductions of the original existing in the files of the Register of Deeds
was not presented as a witness. The Court, therefore, cannot attach much
weight to these exhibits.
The original of this list contained in Exhibit J was never presented in
Court and it has not been shown that the original of this list is not
available in the office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal where said Exhibit J
is alleged to have been forwarded on April 5, 1949. The certifying employee
of the Manila Register of Deeds was not presented to verify whether the list
attached to his certification has not been tampered.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 which is the subject of this
reconstitution (Exhibit C) appears to have been signed by Register of Deeds
Mr. Mariano Villanueva of Manila for the Register of Deeds of Rizal
Province. This alleged title was supposed to have been signed by the
Register of Deeds of Manila on the 19th day of November in the year 1943,
when the Municipality of Paranaque where the land covered by the abovedescribed title is located was part of Greater Manila. The Court finds it
rather unusual why the Register of Deeds of Manila should sign the said
title for and in behalf of the Register of Deeds of Rizal when the property
covered by said title was within the radius of the Greater Manila area. That
the Register of Deeds of Manila did not affix his signature in such capacity
during the Japanese time is a matter which is capable of verification.
Tax Declaration No. 7046, Exhibit L, which purports to have been issued
sometime in 1943 does not bear the signature of the Provincial Assessor.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 shows on its face that the lots
described therein were originally registered on the 29th day of September,
1942 by virtue of a sales patent issued on September 15, 1942 under Act
141. Exhibit H which appears to be an official receipt representing payment
for real estate taxes corresponding to Tax Declaration No. 7046 is supposed
to be in payment of the taxes for the property in question for the period
from 1941 to 1946. On the basis of the title relied upon by the petitioner,
the original ti-tle therefor was issued only on September 29, 1942 and yet
petitioner claims by this document, Exhibit H to have paid the taxes
corresponding to this property for the year 1941 before her predecessor-ininterest had allegedly acquired the same in 1942. Tax Declaration
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No. 15340 (Exhibit L-1) on the other hand shows that said tax declaration
is new and began only in the year 1970. If it not supersede any previous tax
declaration.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court
finds the evidence submitted by the petitioner insufficient to warrant the
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C) and,
therefore, hereby denies instant petition.
SO ORDERED.
Pasig, Rizal, November 19, 1973.
Judge
On September 11, 1973, Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal filed a

Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial with supporting affidavit
of merits within the reglementary period, based on the following
grounds, to wit:
1. A.That the order is not supported and is at variance with
the evidence and is contrary to law;
46
2. B.That petitioner has newly-discovered evidence consisting

of material facts discovered after the trial which could not
have been discovered even with due diligence at the time, and
that such evidence is of such a nature as to alter the result of
the case in favor of your petitioner, and are not merely
cumulative;
3. C.That petitioner is a victim of excusable negligence and
mistake engendered by oppositors who interposed no
objection to various exhibits during their presentation
leading her to believe they were already admissible in
evidence at their face value without further proof; that
oppositors interposed no objection when offered in evidence
and petitioner rested her case.
In support of the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial, counsel
for Demetria argued that TCT No. 12/T-79 and TCT No. 42449 are
one and the same certificate of title covering the same identical
property of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal; that what is fake
and false is merely No. 12/T-79 which was the product of machination
of Angel Cruz, the estranged husband of Demetria and oppositor in
the case who did not pursue his opposition and instead filed a
petition for
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reconstitution of TCT T-12 before Branch XXV in Reconstitution

Case No. 70; that TCT T-76 being reconstituted in Reconstitution
Case No. 70 before Branch XXV is definitely a fake title and that it
overlaps some 8 hectares of Demetrias property covered by TCT

42449; that TCT No. 42449 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Greater Manila was delivered and received by the Register of Deeds
of Rizal; that there are many TCT Nos. 42449 is borne by the practice
of the office before the war, during the Japanese occupation, and
after liberation for the simple reason that each Register of Deeds
Office carries separate series from No. 1 up so that the same
identical number of TCT may be issued by different Register of Deeds
covering different properties in the name of different persons in
different provinces.
Counsel for Demetria further argued that discussion about TCT
No. 12/T-79 is beside the point of issue; that the only issue is whether
there is TCT No. 42449 to be reconstituted; that the seeming
irregularities noted by the Court are natural consequences of
reconstitution records; that the Court committed the error of
considering records of Reconstitution No. 70; that the Courts fear
that more than one certificate of title for the same property will be
issued is without foundation in fact.
The alleged newly-discovered evidence which may alter the result
of the decision is recited in the affidavit of merit of Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal, thus:
1. 2.That subsequent to the trial of this case, she discovered
the following new evidence, which briefly stated will establish
the following facts to wit: that the property supposedly
covered by OCT No. 76 involved in the decision of Judge
Reynaldo P. Honrado in Reconstitution Case No. 70 is
different from her property covered by TCT No. 42449, object
of this reconstitution proceedings; (h)ow the fake Number
TCT No. 12/T-79 was superimposed through fraudulent series
47
of copying; newly-discovered approved plan of the Land

Registration Commission showing petitioners properties
described in TCT No. 42449 has no conflict; reconstitution
and plotting by an expert surveyor that the properties
covered by TCT No. 42449 is different than that represented
in TCT No. 12/T-76 in Reconstitution Case No. 70; and
others;
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Considering the grounds set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration
and New Trial and in view of the manifestation of Atty. Pedro Flores
of the Bureau of Lands that they have no objection to the motion and
there being no objection on the part of the other oppositors, the Court
on January 14, 1974, set aside its Order of November 19, 1973 and
set the case for reception of additional evidence on the part of
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal on February 21, 1974.
Meantime, the Court on March 14, 1974 issued an Order directing
the NBI to examine the genuineness of the signature of Jose Pueblo
in the receipt Exhibit J for the reason that Jose Pueblo can no
longer remember whether or not the signature is his signature (he
died in the course of the hearing on new trial) and accordingly, on
May 3, 1974, the NBI submitted its Questioned Document Report
No. 396-374 finding said signature to be genuine.
Hearings were conducted and thereafter, on September 18, 1974,
the Court denied reconstitution of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernals Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42449. In its
denial order, the Court said:
Fundamentally, the additional evidence presented by petitioner in support

of their motion for new trial failed to augment their original proof to
warrant the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449. It
merely clarified certain aspects surrounding the transmittal of various
certificates of title from the Register of Deeds of Manila to the Register of
Deeds of Rizal in Pasig. There is still no clear and convincing evidence to
establish or to prove that the original of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449 in the name of petitioner which is sought to be reconstituted actually
existed. The Court still entertains a grave and serious doubt as to the
authenticity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449, Exhibit C, submitted
by petitioner to support their stand. The lists of certificates of title
supposedly received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal from the Register of
Deeds of Manila on its face appears to be subject to question. Two (2)
receipts were produced in Court to show the alleged receipt. One receipt in
the possession of the Register of Deeds of Manila signed by Jose Pueblo, a
former employee of the Register of Deeds of Rizal (Exhibit J), and another
receipt in the possession of the Register of Deeds of Rizal signed by the
Register of Deeds himself, Gregorio
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Appeals
Velasquez (Exhibits 5, 5-A to 5-G). While in the receipt, Exhibit J, there is

listed therein a certificate of title with number 42449 which petitioner
claims to cover their certificate of title, the receipt in the possession of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal does not contain this number. The reliability of
the two (2) receipts cannot be assumed in view of this existing variance.
The findings and conclusion of this Court in its order dated November 19,
1973 remain unchanged. The Court still entertains doubt as to the
authenticity and genuineness of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
(Exhibit C) which is sought to be reconstituted.
48
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the Court is constrained to deny

the instant petition and to maintain its order of November 19, 1973.
SO ORDERED.
Pasig, Rizal, September 18, 1974.
Judge
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal appealed to the Court of

Appeals on ten (10) assigned errors, to wit:
Error I.The Trial Court erred in expressing doubt as to the
existence of the Original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and the authenticity of the
owners copy of said TCT No. 42449 Exhibit C contrary to the
overwhelming evidence of record, and in not finding categorically
that the original of said TCT No. 42449 was lost in the Register of
Deeds Office of Rizal, and that the owners copy of said TCT No.
42449, Exhibit C is genuine and authentic.
Error II.The Trial Court erred in not accepting at its face value the
authenticity of Owners Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449,
Exhibit C, and Exhibit J of petitioner-appellant and in not
ordering the reconstitution of the original of TCT No. 42449 on the
face of overwhelming evidence establishing their authenticity and
genuineness, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 26;
Error III.The Trial Court erred in considering the original petition
in its order of November 19, 1973 which is revived in its final
order of September 18, 1974 when same was amended and
proceedings was had on the basis of the Amended Petition of peti403

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tioner, and in drawing unwarranted adverse conclusions on the
basis of the original petition without any evidentiary support.
Error IV.The Trial Court erred in denying petitioner-appellants
petition to withdraw all annexes to the original petition after the
admission of the Amended Petition which replaced the original
filed by her former counsel.
Error V.The Trial Court erred in not sustaining petitionerappellants Motion to Dismiss all Oppositions and in not holding
that the Director of Lands has neither interest in the case nor
legal personality to oppose the reconstitution of petitioners lost
original Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42449 of the Rizal
Registry.
Error VI.The Trial Court erred in admitting over petitioners
objection Exhibits I to 5-C. inclusive of lone oppositor Director
of Lands and in drawing conclusions therefrom adverse to herein
petitioner-appellant.
Error VII.The Trial Court erred in taking judicial notice of
Reconstitution Case No. 70 for reconstitution of & supposed lost
TCT No. T-76 of Angel V. Cruz, estranged husband of herein
appellant, before Branch XXV, Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado,
presiding, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its original
order of November 19, 1973 and its final order of September 18,
1974, when same was never involved in the hearing of this case;
and in undertaking a private investigation of the case in violation
of appellants constitutional right to due process, and settled
jurisprudence on the matter.
Error VIII.The Trial Court, by the series of its unwarranted
actuations in the case at bar has abused its judicial power and
49
discretion to the great damage and prejudice of herein petitionerappellant.

Error IX.The Trial Court erred in making various unwarranted
conclusions adverse to herein petitioner-appellant without basis in
fact and in law in its two challenged orders subject of this appeal.
Error X.The Trial Court erred in concluding petitioners evidence
is insufficient and in not ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
reconstitute petitioner-appellants lost original Certificate of Title
No. T-42449 of the Rizal Registry pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 26.
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
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The Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated October 1, 1976

reversed and set aside the orders of the lower Court issued November
19, 1973 and September 18, 1975, and ordered the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal to reconstitute the original of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42449 in the records of this Office in the name
of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal based upon her duplicate
copy of said title marked as Exhibit C, taking into consideration the
technical descriptions of the two (2) parcels of land therein covered by
and marked as Exhibits F and F-1 respectively.
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the lower Court on the
principal issue of whether petitioner has adduced sufficient and
convincing evidence to warrant the reconstitution of the original of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42449 under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 26. Said the appellate Court:
The evidence shows that sometime in November, 1943, during the

Japanese Occupation, the petitioner purchased from her mother, Olimpia
Bautista Vda. de Sta. Maria, now deceased, the two parcels of land
mentioned and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal (Exhibit C, Folder of Exhibits, p. 7)
for the sum of P10,000.00. Her mothers title to the two parcels of land was
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 42392. The deed of sale, which
her mother executed in her favor was destroyed in a fire which occurred
during the fight for the liberation of Pasig, Rizal. The two parcels of land
was assessed in 1943 at P16,950.00 (Exhibit L, Ibid., p. 21) and she paid
realty taxes and penalties thereon (Exhibits L-2 and M, Ibid., p. 24). This
assessment was later revised at P313,140.00 (Exhibit L-1, Ibid., p. 22) on
which she paid realty taxes (Exhibits M-1 and M-2, Ibid., pp. 25-26). She
discovered subsequently that her husband, Angel V. Cruz, with whom she
has been estranged for many years, did not pay the subsequent taxes on the
lands with the money she had given him.
Her suspicion having been aroused, petitioner demanded the return of
her title which happened to be in her husbands possession. He gave her a
photostat of Transfer Certificate of Title with No. 12/T-79. This was the
copy she attached to her original petition. It turned out that this was the
wrong title. She threatened her husband
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with a criminal prosecution for bigamy if he did not return her the real title
to her aforesaid property. She succeeded and her husband returned to her
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449. She then amended her original
petition for reconstitution by annexing to her amended petition a photostat
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C, ibid., p. 7).
50
In the hearing in the court below, the petitioner presented documents

and witnesses, most of whom were former and present government officials
and employees of the offices of the Register of Deeds of Manila and Rizal to
prove her claim that the original of TCT No. 42449 was lost in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal and that her duplicate copy of said title
(Exhibit C) is genuine.
Narciso Pea, former Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, then Acting
Register of Deeds of Manila and Assistant Commissioner of the Land
Registration Commission, testified that the signature of Register of Deeds
Mariano Villanueva on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449, Exhibit C, is
genuine and authentic. Narciso Pena declared that he was familiar with
the signature of Mariano Villanueva; that the signatures appearing on the
front and dorsal sides of Exhibit C were those of Mariano Villanueva; that
the initial P to the left of Mariano Villanuevas signature belonged to the
chief typist of the Office by the name of Padilla; that during the Japanese
Occupation, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila issued certificates
of title for lands outside the territorial limits of Manila so long as they are
within Greater Manila, like Paraaque, Rizal, which was incorporated
within Greater Manila; that when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
was issued, the form and type of certificates of title issued by the Register
of Deeds of Manila was the same as the form and type of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42449; that the certification of Mariano Villanueva
appearing at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C),
shows that the certificates of title covering properties in Greater Manila,
which were outside of Manila proper, were, on the date appearing therein,
i.e., April 5, 1949, transmitted after liberation to their respective places, in
this case, Pasig, Rizal. (t.s.n., September 25, 1972, pp. 1-7 and 10-16)
On November 16, 1972, during the hearing of this case, the trial court
itself ordered the examination of the genuineness of the signatures of
Mariano Villanueva appearing in the owners duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42449 (Exhibit C) by the National Bureau of
Investigation. On November 24, 1972, the National Bureau of Investigation
submitted to the court below Report No.
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
166-1172 (Exhibit I, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 16-17, also Exhibits H and H-1
in separate covers.) In view of its importance, we copy in full the pertinent
findings and conclusions of the Questioned Documents Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation, as follows:
FINDINGS:
Comparative examination between the questioned and the standard signatures
MARIANO VILLANUEVA under the stereoscopic binocular microscope, hand lens
and with the aid of enlarged photographs reveals the existence of significant
identifying habit writing characteristics between them, to wit:
1. 1.Writing strokes are made in careless, free and unconscious movement.
2. 2.The absence of fraudulent tremors, retouching and/or patching and
addition of strokes on the lines.
3. 3.The existence of natural variation characteristics of natural writing.
4. 4.The presence of flying starts and vanishing points in careless manner.
5. 5.The existence of natural gradual evolution of development of the
signatures as years passed.
6. 6.The existence of natural pen pressures and shadings.
7. 7.The idiosyncracies of proportion of the letters as to size, height and
lateral spacing.
8. 8.The habitual tendency of the letter designs to decrease their sizes as they
approach the terminus of the signatures.
9. 9.The consistent general proximity of the typewritten name.
51
10. 10.And other more significant similarities that may be amplified while in
the witness stand.
CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the inevitable scientific conclusion that can be arrived
at, is that the two (2) questioned signatures MARIANO VILLANUEVA marked O
and Q-1 respectively, appearing in Exhibit C ARE GENUINE.
The transmittal of the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.

42449 by the Register of Deeds of Manila to the Register of
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Deeds of Rizal is shown by the certification of Mariano Villanueva
appearing on the dorsal side of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
(Exhibit C), as follows:
I hereby certify that the original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 which
covered by Two (2) parcels of land (Lots 1 and 3) of Plan II-4374 located at San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, in the name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
was among those certificates of titles which had been forwarded to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal, on April 5, 1949.
Manila, Philippines, 15th day of July, 1949.
(Sgd.) MARIANO VILLANUEVA
(Register of Deeds/pmr)
Moreover, Lorenzo C. Gella, Register of Deeds of Manila, issued

November 6, 1970 a certification that the document consisting of eleven
photostat pages attached to his certificate are the true and correct copies of
the original of the lists of titles in the files of this office which were
delivered to the Pasig Registry, and received by said Registry on April 5,
1949 by one Mr. Jose Pueblo. (Exhibit J, Folder of Exhibits, p. 18; t.s.n.,
February 21, 1974, pp. 3 and 4, 8-9).
Exhibit J was admitted by the trial court without any objection from the
Government lawyers (t.s.n., April 5, 1973, pp. 18-19, 28-29). Among the
numerous certificates of title covered by the certification is TCT No. 42449
and opposite it is the name Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the
herein petitioner (Exhibit J-1, Ibid., p. 18-J). This is further bolstered by
another certification issued by the above-named Register of Deeds of
Manila on November 12, 1970, that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
was among those Certificates of Title forwarded to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal on April 5, 1949. (Exhibit K,
Ibid., p. 19). Even Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 in the name of
petitioners mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, from whom petitioner
purchased the two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42449, was among those forwarded by the Register of Deeds of Manila
to the Register of Deeds of Rizal on April 5, 1949 (Exhibit J-2, Ibid., p. 18K).
As evidence of the fact that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 were actually received by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Dioscoro S. Dumalaog,
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
former vault keeper in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila,

identified the signature of Jose Pueblo and testified that the latter
personally received the said titles for and in behalf of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal, together with the other certificates of title mentioned in the list,
Exhibit J (t.s.n., May 17, 1974, pp. 4-5).
Testifying in court even while he was weak (and died soon after), Jose
Pueblo stated that he was formerly an employee in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal at the time Gregorio Velasquez was the Register
of Deeds thereat; that he was authorized to receive certificates of title from
52
the Register of Deeds of Manila for the Register of Deeds of Rizal and to
receipt for them; that all the certificates of ti-tle delivered to him by the
Register of Deeds of Manila for the Register of Deeds of Rizal were in turn
delivered by him to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal; that he
signed a receipt for the certificates of title he received from the Register of
Deeds of Manila; that he was the sole representative of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal for that purpose. (t.s.n., March 11, 1974, pp. 5-7, 8-9, 19-20).
To obviate any doubt as to the genuineness of the signature of Jose
Pueblo on Exhibit J, the lower court itself issued an order on March 14,
1974 (Record on Appeal, pp. 124-125) directing the National Bureau of
Investigation to examine Jose Pueblos signature for its genuineness. The
National Bureau of Investigation submitted to the court below its report,
dated May 3, 1974 (Exhibit U, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 28-30 and Exhibits S,
S-1 to S-7 under separate covers), the pertinent portions thereof are copied
in full because of their importance, as follows:
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination between the questioned and the standard
signatures under stereoscopic microscope, had (sic) lens and with the aid of
enlarged photographs (Comparison Chart) reveals the existence of significant
identifying habit writing characteristics between them as follows:
1. 1.Pictorial letter designs;
2. 2.Presence of natural variations;
3. 3.Pen pressures, from light to heavy and vice-versa and approximate
location;
4. 4.Careless vanishing lines;
5. 5.Slant, normal lateral spacing and proportion of size and height of letter
designs as well as base alignment;
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1. 6.Presence of habitual embellishments peculiar characteristic
of the signature;
2. 7.Proportion of loops in relation to their size and slant and
length; and
3. 8.Direction of writing movement in relation to the process of
constructing letter designs and embellishments.
Through scientific analysis and comparison likewise reveals no earmarks of forgery
of whatever kind in said questioned signature.
CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the scientific conclusion arrived at is that the
questioned signature JOSE P. PUEBLO appearing in the aforementioned
RECEIPT dated April 1, 1949 is GENUINE.
Notwithstanding all these disinterested testimonial and documentary

evidence regarding Exhibit J, the trial court still doubted its genuineness
and authenticity because of the existence of another alleged 8-page receipt
of certain certificates of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal Gregorio Velasquez (Record on Appeal, p. 128). But we find that the
original of the photostat copies of the alleged 8-page receipt was not
presented in court and no explanation was given as to the absence of the
said original and neither was the purpose for its admission given. On the
other hand, the original of the 11-page receipt of certificates of title
delivered to the Pasig Registry covered by Exhibit J was produced and
exhibited twice in open court and the xerox copies of the eleven pages of
53
said receipt were duly admitted by the government counsel without any
objection (t.s.n., April 5, 1973, pp. 18-19), aside from the fact that Jose
Pueblos signature thereon evidencing receipt was found genuine and
authentic by the Questioned Document Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation. It must also be noted that no evidence has contradicted the
aforesaid reports of the handwriting experts of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
In order to verify and confirm the genuineness and correctness of the
plan (Exhibit G, Folder of Exhibits, p. 14) presented by the petitioner for
the two lots covered by her Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449, and
pursuant to the order of the lower court dated November 10, 1972, the
parties referred on November 25, 1972 to the Office of Modesto Eloriaga,
Chief of the Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands, for the express
purpose of reading Microfilm Reel
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
No.-560, covering the plan of the property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria,

petitioners mother, from whom petitioner had purchased the lots covered
by the latters Plan (Exhibit G) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
(Exhibit C). The following specific findings appear in the certified minutes
of said proceedings, to wit:
The film encased in cardboard bearing No.-560, was taken from the steel cabinet
housing other microfilms of the Bureau of Lands by Mr. Cana, employee of the
Bureau, detailed at the Reproduction Section; fitted to the apparatus and rolled by
Mr. Eloriaga in the presence of everybody in the room. The film shows clearly the
plan of the property except the upper left hand corner where the data of the
different lots appear listed which was a little blurred. The legend of the plan
among others, is very clear. The name of the party for whom the survey was made
OLIMPIA B. STA. MARIA ET AL.; the area of all lots surveyed186,6979 sq.
m.; the date of surveyJuly 25, 1911; location of propertyBarrio of San
Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon; the

position and boundary lines of the various lots; the accession numberNo.
385637; and the signatures of the Director of Lands at the time, were all clear
from the screen.
Atty. Flores manipulated the lever of the Reader in various positions, intending
apparently to discover any possible irregularity, but nothing unusual in a plan
projected in similar microfilm appeared in the picture. Otherwise, the plan as
reflected in the picture thru Microfilm Reel No. -560 appear regular and in order.
And the plan, Exhibit G which was signed and certified true and correct by Chief
Modesto Eloriaga of the Reproduction Section of the Bureau of Lands in his
testimony of November 10, 1972, reflected the true, correct and faithful
reproduction of the film as shown in the Reader. The proceedings were over at
11:50 A.M. (Exhibit N, Ibid., pp. 26A-26B).
On January 16, 1974, Commissioner Gregorio Bilog, Jr. of the Land

Registration Commission issued his report (Exhibit R, Ibid., p. 27), duly
identified by witness Rizardo Arandilla, an employee thereat, which, in
view of its importance to the present case, we have also decided to quote in
full, as follows:
COMES NOW the undersigned Commissioner of Land Registration and in
connection with the request of petitioner, through counsel, for this Commission to
render a report
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relative to the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully reports
That the amended petition filed in the above-entitled case has been forwarded
to this Commission for the purpose of having the plan and technical description of
Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, approved pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 26.
That after verification and examination, it has been found out that the plan
submitted by the petitioner represents Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, and has
therefore been approved under plan (LRC) PR-2887.
54
That by way of further elucidation, it appears that the amended petition is

based principally on the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449, the genuineness and authenticity of which has been passed upon by the
National Bureau of Investigation as per its Questioned Documents Report No. 1661172, dated November 24, 1972.
WHEREFORE, said plan of Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374, together with its
corresponding technical descriptions having been approved pursuant to Section 12
of Republic Act No. 26, and there being no conflict as plotted, this Commission
interposes no objection to the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449.
No. 42449 are very different from the technical descriptions and areas of
the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. T-76, the subject matter
of Reconstitution Case No. 70 (See Appellants Brief, p. 11). Besides, the
former oppositors to the instant petition had either withdrawn or
abandoned their respective claims, leaving only the Director of Lands as
the sole oppositor.
The Director of Lands, however, did not adduce any testimonial
evidence, except the report dated December 13, 1972, of Oscar T. Eusebio,
Register of Deeds of Rizal, to the effect:
In the case at bar, even the trial court admitted that the petitioner has
presented an impressive array of evidence, both oral and documentary.
(Record on Appeal, p. 73) We are of the same mind. The petitioner has
strongly and satisfactorily proven the aforestated requirements of Section
15 of Republic Act No. 26 to warrant the issuance of an order of
reconstitution. There is no other party claiming the same property covered
by petitioners TCT No. 42449. Her estranged husband tried to file his own
petition for reconstitution though not clearly covering the same land. But
his petition was ordered archived. (LRC No. 72, See Appendix A of
Appellants Brief.) Frankly, we dont share the fear of the court below that
there may be more than one title issued under different names for the
same lots if the instant petition was granted. (Record on Appeal, p. 74)
There is simply no basis for this apprehension and anxiety. The other
Reconstitution Case No. 70, filed with another branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by the petitioners estranged husband does not deal with
the property involved in the present case. The technical descriptions of the
two lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
1. 1.That a verification of our records show that T.C.T. No. 42449,

Book T-214 (Pre-War Records) was issued in the name of
Esmeralda Fabustan, covering a property located at Pasay, Rizal.
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SUPREME COURT
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Appeals
2. 2.That said certificate of title is not on file in our Registration Book,

but according to a receipt dated September 14, 1943, signed by
Mariano Villanueva, Register of Deeds of Manila, same was
forwarded to Manila.
3. 3.Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449, Book T-489 (Postwar
Records) existing in our records was issued in the name of Pilar
Paterno on January 6, 1956, covering a property situated in Sitio
Ibayong Malaque, Las Pias, Rizal, with an area of 7,450 square
meters and which was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 56515, Book T-559.
4. 4.That the allegations in our previous report dated August 24, 1970
on T.C.T. No. 12, Book T-79 is hereby incorporated as part of this
report. (Exhibit 1-Register of Deeds.)
The fact that two transfer certificates of title bear the same number
42449 is not unusual under the very facts of Oscar T. Eusebios report. The
transfer certificate of title in the name of Esmeralda Fabustan covered a
piece of property located in Pasay, Rizal, and her title is found in Book T-24
55
which belongs to the Pre-War Records of the Registry. On the other hand,
the transfer certificate of title in the name of Pilar Paterno covered a
property in Sitio Ibayong Malaque, Las Pias, Rizal and her title is found
in Book T-489 which belongs to the Post-War Records of the Registry. But
herein petitioners transfer certificate of title was issued on November 19,
1943 and the original certificate of title on September 15, 1942, both during
the Japanese Occupation. Hence, neither of them is of pre-war or postwar vintage. As explained
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by witness Narciso Pea, the jurisdiction of Manila during the Japanese
Occupation was expanded to cover the Greater Manila area, which included
the Municipality of Paraaque, Rizal; and that the Register of Deeds of
Manila was issuing during the Japanese Occupation the type and form of
title as TCT No. 42449 in the name of the petitioner. There is nothing
surprising about the two certificates of title bearing the same number but
in the names of different owners, covering properties in different places,
and issued at different periods of time, as in the case at bar. On this point,
Oscar T. Eusebio himself, testifying as a witness for the court, admitted on
cross-examination that there is nothing unusual about this situation. He
testified:
ATTY. DE LEON (cross-examination of Reg. of Deeds Eusebio):
Q Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that each province before, during and after the
war are carrying numbers of certificates of titles with serial (numbers) so that a
title bearing 1000 issued in Rizal may have a title issued in Manila bearing the
same number, and another title in Bataan bearing the same number?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q Is it not also a practice in the office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, when
titles are missing from the book they list those numbers of title missing in the
book?
A Yes. (t.s.n., pp. 22-23, Sept. 10, 1973)
Q I am showing you this cover of Book T-214, Register of Deeds Office and the
face of the hard back cover there appears the following annotation: Missing titles
42449, which for purposes of identification I request to be marked Exhibit L. We
will invite counsel that we agree that on the face of the back cover of Book 214 of
the Register of Deeds Office, there appears among missing titles, Title No. 42449.
FISCAL:
We will have no objection, your Honor to the proposed stipulation, but we would
like, however, to make it of record that in the so-called list of missing titles there
are twenty four (24) others corresponding to titles indicated and below is date 1210-47, index verified May 26, 1961.
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
ATTY. FLORES:
Same manifestation, (t.s.n., September 10, 1973, pp. 30, 31)
If the original copy of petitioners transfer certificate of title was lost in the
office of the Register of Deeds, it having been amply proven that the said
original title was transmitted from Manila to Rizal, then, that is not the
fault of the petitioner and she should not be made to bear the burden.
We do not see any reason to doubt the credibility of petitioners
witnesses. There is no showing whatsoever that they are biased or
prejudiced, or that they testified to favor the petitioner for any ulterior
motive. They were, as stated before, mostly former and present government
officials and employees of the Offices of the Registers of Deeds of Manila
and Rizal and of the Bureau of Lands. Neither do we see any reason to
56
doubt the credibility of the petitioner who simply wanted to reconstitute the
lost original of her transfer certificate of title and be entitled to the
protection and benefits thereof as the absolute and exclusive owner of the
parcels of land therein described. The selfish interest of her husband Angel
V. Cruz, with whom the petitioner has been separated for many years, is
apparent and his attempt to confuse and mislead her as well as the courts,
by previously returning to her a certificate of title with number T-12/T-79 is
obvious. While we have said it before, we repeat it here for emphasis that
her documents, as supported by parol evidence, are indeed more than
sufficient to warrant the reconstitution of the lost original of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42449 issued in her name. She has correctly invoked
the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 26. She is entitled to the
benefits prescribed therein.
Copy of the above decision of the Court of Appeals was received by

the Solicitor General on October 5, 1976 and the 15-day period after
which judgment becomes final expires Oc-tober 20, 1976. It was,
however, only on October 21, 1976 that the Solicitor General filed a
Motion for New Period to File Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that the trial attorney, Antonio G. Castro, had prepared on October
19, 1976 a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration but unfortunately, the said Motion for Extension
was not actually filed with the Court as Appeals as it was
inadvertently attached
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to other papers, as per the affidavit dated October 21 of said trial
attorney, attached to the Motion for New Period.
A Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration was also filed by

the Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands on November
2, 1976 on the following grounds:
1. I.Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 is not authentic.
2. II.It was not proven that the original of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 42449 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila was
transmitted to the Registry of Deeds of Rizal; and
3. III.The owner s duplicate of the Transfer Certificate of Ti-tle
No. 42449, marked Exhibit C, cannot be the basis for
judicial reconstitution.
In the Resolution dated November 11, 1976, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for a New Period of 30 days to file a Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit, same having been filed beyond the
reglementary period and the reason advanced being frail and
unsubstantial, and accordingly the Motion to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review and/or a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court, there being no
appeal, nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In the Resolution of December 13, 1976, the Supreme Court
resolved to require respondents to comment on the petition which the
latter filed on January 24, 1977. Petitioner Director of Lands, filed
his Reply on March 17, 1977 and on April 22, 1977, the Supreme
Court resolved to give due course to the petition. Private respondent
moved to reconsider which We also denied for lack of merit in Our
Resolution of June 11, 1977.
57
After numerous extensions, the Solicitor General filed the Brief

for the Director of Lands on November 28, 1977 on the following
assignments of errors:
1. I.The respondent court erred in holding that private
respondents copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, marked Exhibit C, was
proven to be authentic.
416
416
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. II.The respondent court erred in holding that the original of
said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 was proven to
have been transmitted to and received by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal.
2. III.The respondent court erred in granting the reconstitution
of private respondents Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal despite the absence of any
finding that said title was in force at the time it was allegedly
lost.
3. IV.The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners Motion for a New Period to File Motion
for Reconsideration and the Motion for Reconsideration
subsequently filed.
Private respondent filed her Brief on Dec. 27, 1977, the Solicitor
General his Reply Brief on May 11, 1978. Private respondent
thereafter filed an Urgent Petition to Strike All Annexes and/or
Consider Same Striken Out dated May 20, 1978 followed by
Additional and Supplemental Argument in Support of Petition to
Strike filed May 25, 1978 contending that petitioners Annexes A to
B-18 inclusive present purely questions of fact and are forgotten
evidence and should not be considered in the decision of this case on
the merits.
We noted the above Urgent Petition to Strike and in Our
Resolution of June 14, 1978, We resolved to declare the case
submitted for decision.
On December 7, 1978, a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
was filed by Intervenor Greenfield Development Corp. alleging inter
alia, the following:
1. 1.That intervenor Greenfield Development Corporation is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philip-pines with office address at IRC Building, 82 E. de los
Santos Avenue, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila;
2. 2.That intervenor is the registered owner of seven (7) parcels of
adjoining land, situated in the Barrio of Cupang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal (now, portion of Metro Manila), with
an aggregate area of 783,367 square meters, certified xerox copies
of the certificates of titles, covering and embracing the said parcels
of land and issued in the name of the intervenor are attached to
and made an integral part hereof as follows:
417

1981
417
58
virtue of a sales patent issued on September 29, 1942 in the name

of Olimpia Sta. Maria, mother of the respondent;

Appeals
Annex T.C.T. No. 366292
1
Annex T.C.T. No. S-38660
2
3
4
5
Annex T.C.T. No. 93980
6
1. 3.That the land covered by the foregoing certificates of titles was
originally registered on the 20th day of September, 1913, in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume A-7, page 84, as Original Certificate of Title No. 684, pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued on August 27, 1910; in the name of
the Government of the Philippine Islands covering and embracing
the land otherwise known as the Muntinlupa Estate; a copy of
said O.C.T. No. 684 is attached hereto as Annex 7;
2. 4.That the intervenor and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in actual, open, continuous, adverse, notorious, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the parcels of land registered in its
name since time immemorial up to the present time;
3. 5.That respondent, Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, is seeking
reconstitution of an allegedly lost original T.C.T. No. T-12/T-79
later amended to reconstitution of lost original T.C.T. No. T-42449
which was allegedly a transfer from O.C.T. No. 42392 issued by
4. 6.That the land supposedly covered by the certificate of title sought

to be reconstituted appears to consist of two (2) parcels of land
located in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, with an
aggregate area of 143 hectares, more or less, and designated as
Lots 1 & 3 of plan II-4374, the technical descriptions of which are
set forth in the alleged T.C.T. No. 42449;
5. 7.That upon comparison of said technical descriptions with those
described in the certificates of title; Annexes 1 to 6 of the herein
intervenor, it appear that the land supposedly covered by the
certificate sought to be reconstituted overlap and include
substantial portions of Intervenors land covered by the certificates
of title, Annexes 1 to 6; the location and extent of the
overlapping, as plat-ted on the basis of the respective technical
descriptions referred to, is shown on the plan, marked Annex 8,
which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof;
418
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. 8.That intervenor, therefore, has a substantial, material,
proprietary, and legal interest in the subject matter of these
proceedings which will be directly and adversely affected should
the petition for reconstitution of the respondent be granted;
2. 9.That intervenor, as well as other owners and possessors of lands
not only adjacent to, but in fact overlapped by, the land supposedly
covered by the title sought to be reconstituted, were entitled to
59
personal notice of the petition for reconstitution; such requirement

of notice is jurisdictional, being mandated by Section 13, of
Republic Act No. 26, and the consequence of failure to comply
therewith is that the court never acquires jurisdiction to entertain
and hear the petition or render valid judgment thereon.
The salient feature of this method of judicial reconstitution under Republic Act
No. 26 is a petition and a hearing after two successive insertion in the Official
Gazette of the notice of hearing. It partakes of the nature of an original
registration proceedings, personal service of the notice of hear-ing to the adjoining
owners and occupants being essential, as well as posting of the notice in main
entrance of the Provincial and Municipal Buildings where the land lies at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. (Ponce, the Philippine Torrens System, p.
272)
And when the jurisdictional foundation is absent, there is also absent

jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by the law. It cannot
be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived,
enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it
conferred by acquiescence of the court. Congress cannot delegate its power
to apportion jurisdiction of the courts (De Jesus, et al. vs. Garcia, et al.,
G.R. No. L-26816, Feb. 28, 1967)
1. 10.That the failure of the respondent to give notice to the herein
intervenor and to the other owners and possessor of the land
overlapped by an adjacent to the land supposedly covered by the
title to be reconstituted militates against the existence of the title
sought to be reconstituted and cast serious doubts as to whether
the title really existed or not;
2. 11.That among those overlapped by and adjacent to the land
supposedly covered by the title to be reconstituted, aside from the
in-tervenor, are
Subdivision,
the
residences
within
the
Alabang
Hills
419

419
1981
Appeals
1. Cielito Homes Subdivision, Tahanan Village, portion of the South
Superhighway, Meralco substation, factories, as well as roads and
infrastructures, the existence of which cannot be denied by the
respondent, and their omission to name them in their petition, and
to give notice to, is by all indications by deliberate design to conceal
such facts and mislead the court in granting their petition.
2. 12.The gravity and inexcusable conduct of the respondent made
manifest by the fact that for several years now these residences,
subdivisions, Meralco substation, factories, as well as roads and
infrastructures, have been visible to all, and it is inconceivable that
respondent who hold herself out as actual possessor of the property
involved could have omitted the existence of these facts:
3. 13.That the title sought to be reconstituted purports to have been
originally issued pursuant to a sales patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on September 15, 1942, and it is
highly doubtful whether the government will issue a patent over a
parcel of land which is within Muntinlupa Estate and already
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 684 issued way back in
1913, and hence no longer a part of the public domain. Proceedings
for the acquisition of a patent are notin rem and when a patent is
issued the same is deemed to be subject to any and all vested and
accrued rights, this doctrine having been held to mean that a
patent which purports to convey land which is no longer public
60
land at the time of its issuance does not vest any title at all in the
patentee as against the true owners. (PNB vs. Ruiz XXXVIII Off.
Gazette 1650).
4. 14.That a very disturbing note in the instant proceeding is the lapse
of considerable length of time from the date the alleged title was
lost or destroyed during the last war and the date the petition was
filed in court sometime in 1970, a period of twenty five (25) long
years! Why did it take the respondent so long a time to file the
petition? Why did she not take any steps when the government
built the South Superhighway and took a sizable portion of her
land? Why did she not take steps to protect her land, easily worth
millions of pesos, when people begun constructing residences,
factories, roads, and infrastructures inside her property? There can
only be one conclusion,that the title sought to be reconstituted
does not exist at all, and the petition for reconstitution should be
denied;
5. 15.That even granting arguendo, but not admitting, that the title
sought to be reconstituted really existed, the same cannot prevail
over the earlier title of the herein intervenor. Respondents
420
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. alleged title was originally issued on September 29, 1942, while the
title of the intervenor was originally issued on September 20, 1913,
and undoubtedly, the intervenors certificate of title was issued
very much earlier than that of the respondent. And because these
two certificates of title purports to include the same land, the
earlier certificate of the intervenor should prevail over the later
certificate of the respondent, as decided by the Supreme Court in

the leading case of Legarda vs. Saleeby,31 Phil. 595-596:
In successive registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in the land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived, directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the
issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner
shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continue
to hold the title.
1. 16.That if reconstitution is granted, the intervenor and other title

holders and possessors overlapped by the land covered by the title
sought to be reconstituted stand to be deprived of their property
and suffer irreparable injury in their proprietary rights. But the
greater injury shall be inflicted in the Torrens Systems of
registration, for there will be two holders of certificates of title
overlapping each other, thus, the very purpose of the Torrens
System of Registration shall be negated. The indefeasibility and
stability of the Torrens System will be in peril. And when this
happened, the chaos that it will create will be unimaginable.
Another Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene was likewise filed on

December 29, 1978 by Intervenors Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing on the following grounds:
1. I.That the Honorable Court a quo has no jurisdiction to grant the
Petition for Reconstitution;
61
2. II.That granting arguendo, that the title sought to be reconstituted

is valid, which it is not, the same cannot prevail ove? the earlier
title of herein intervenors or their precedessors-in-interest;
421

421
1981
Appeals
1. III.That intervenors stand to be divested of their property and
thereby suffer special, immediate, direct and irreparable injury in
their proprietary right, if reconstitution is granted.
Private respondent opposed both motions for intervention. In the

Resolution of September 25, 1978, the Supreme Court granted the
intervention sought for and ruled in the dispositive portion, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in view of the higher and greater interest of

the public and in order to administer justice consistent with a just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the parties and
their numerous successors-in-interest, the motions for intervention are
hereby granted.
The Court directs the Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of
Lands or his duly authorized representative with due notice to the parties
and in their presence or that of their duly authorized representatives to
conduct a relocation of the respective boundaries of the properties claimed
by the movants and the private respondent within 90 days after notice and
his fees shall be borne equally by the parties and thereafter to submit to
this Court the result of such relocation survey, indicating therein such
overlapping as he may have found and determined and the location of such
industries, factories, warehouses, plants and other commercial
infrastructures, residential buildings and other constructions, public or
private roads, and other landmarks found within the areas concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution

referred to above was denied by Us for lack of merit on October 15,
1979.
Pursuant to said Resolution of September 25, 1978, the Chief of
the Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands, informed in-tervenor Ramon
D. Bagatsing that the relocation-verification survey will be conducted
on October 18, 1979 and to furnish the geodetic engineer all
pertinent information in his possession relating to said survey.
Similar notices were likewise sent to Atty. Dennis Angeles, counsel
for intervenor Greenfield Development Corp., and. to Atty. Fortunato
de Leon and Associates as counsel for private respondent. The latter,
422
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
however, informed the Supreme Court in his Exception and

Manifestation filed October 24, 1979 that private respondent is
financially incapable for the present to share in the ex-penses of the
survey because of tremendous expense incurred by her already and
trouble during all these years that the case had been pending and
that no question on the identity of her property was ever raised and
so far as she is concerned, there is no need of a survey or relocation
after the Land Registration Commission had verified the plan and
certified that there is no conflict.
On November 4, 1979, the Officer In-Charge, National Capital
Region, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila filed in behalf of the Director
of Lands a Report to the Supreme informing that the Director of
Lands issued a directive to the Chief, Surveys Division, NCR, Bureau
62
of Lands, Manila, for the relocation survey of the properties involved

in the case which was implemented by the Chief, Technical Service
Division, who submitted a project profile thereon; that Atty.
Fortunato de Leon, counsel for the private respondent, was advised
to remit the amount of P24,000.00 to the Regional Officer as survey
deposit and also to furnish the Survey Team with all pertinent
information which may be used in connection with the survey, but
Atty, de Leon replied, stating that they are not interested in the
matter as the property of his client has been properly surveyed and
the survey has been duly approved by the Land Registration Office.
Under date of December 9, 1979, a Motion for Leave to Intervene
was filed by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation and
Francisco G. Artigo, alleging to have legal interest in the matter in
litigation in the above-entitled case and in the success of the private
respondent who is their vendor and are situated as to be adversely
affected by the claim of in-tervenors, Alabang Development Corp.
and Ramon D. Bagat-sing. The motion was opposed by private
respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal and in Our
Resolution of March 19, 1980, We denied the Motion for Intervention
as well as the Motion for Reconsideration.
A Final Report dated February 25, 1980 was submitted to the
Supreme Court by Amante R. Dumag, Officer-In-Charge,
423

423
1981
Appeals
NCR, Bureau of Lands, Manila, in compliance with Our Resolution of
September 25, 1979. Said Final Report states:
FINAL REPORT
COMES NOW the Officer-in-Charge, National Capital Region, Bureau of

Lands, Manila, and unto this Honorable Court in compliance with the
Resolution dated September 25, 1979 respectfully submit his following final
report:
1. 1.That this report supplements the previous report he has
submitted to the Honorable Court dated November 10, 1979.
2. 2.That as so directed in the resolution of the court the private
respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, thru the counsel,
was notified and assessed of her corresponding share of the
surveying fees prescribed by the rules and regulation of the Bureau
of Lands, but notwithstanding the notice sent to her she failed to
deposit the required fees;
3. 3.That while making a research on the survey data of the lands
involved in this case the surveyors of the Bureau of Lands found
out that the properties claimed by private respondent Demetria
Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting of Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374,
does not have an original copy of a plan in the Records Division of
the Bureau of Lands. Attached with this Report is a certified photo
copy of a letter dated January 30, 1978 marked as Annex A to
form an integral part of this Report sent by the Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plan and Standards, Bureau of Lands, Manila,
addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Region IV, Bureau of Lands,
Metro Manila informing the latter of the non-existence of the
original copy of plan II-4374. However, he further informed that
there exist a microfilm copy of plan II-4375 with Accession No.
385637, but he expressed his doubts as to its source and
authenticity, and give his reasons for his apprehension in his
aforementioned letter dated January 30, 1978 to the Officer-InCharge of Region IV, Metro Manila;
63
4. 4.That all the parties in the above-entitled case were notified by the
Bureau of Lands Survey Teams of the date and time of the
verification/relocation survey of the lands involved, but only
Greenfield Development Corporation and Alabang Development
Corporation thru their representatives, attended the field survey
being conducted. Private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal did not appear as requested during the survey;
424
424
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. 5.That attached also with this Report are the certified photo copies
of the survey reports dated December 28, 1979 and January 2,
1980 marked as Annexes B and. C respectively submitted by the
two Survey Teams of the Bureau of Lands. National Capital
Region, Manila, and white print copies (2 sheets) of verification
survey plans Vs-04-000153 duly approved by the Bureau of Lands
marked as An-nex D submitted also by the Survey Teams of the
Bureau of Lands, showing the relative positions of subdivision
plans Pcs-5878, Pcs-12745, Lot 398-B-2-A-2-A, Psd-55942, Lot 398B, Psd-49864, Lot 2 (LRC) Pcs 12618, Lot 1-D (LRC) Psd-231231,
Lot 1-C (LRC) Psd-230231, Lot 1 (LRC) Pcs-19806, Lot 1 and 3
(LRC) Pcs-19807 and Lot 398-B-2-B (LRC) Psd-16651 and Lots 1
and 3 plan II-4374 to form as integral parts of this Report;
2. 6.That it was ascertained during the verification survey that the
lands known as Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374 claimed by private
respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal does not actually
exist on the ground;
3. 7.That the properties claimed by private respondent Sta. Maria Vda.

de Bernal consisting of Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, were platted on
the plan Vs-04-000153 using the xerox copies of uncer-tified
technical descriptions furnished by the Office of the Solicitor
General;
4. 8.That as directed by this Honorable Court, the location of
industries, factories, warehouses, plants and other commercial
infrastructures, residential buildings, public or private roads and
other landmarks found inside the areas concerned are properly
indicated on the white print copies of plan Vs-04-000153 (Annex
D).
WHEREFORE, this Report is respectfully submitted in compliance with
the Resolution of the Honorable Court dated September 25, 1979.
Manila, Philippines, February 25, 1980.
(Sgd.) AMANTE R. DUMAG
Officer-in-Charge
National Capital Region,
Bureau of Lands,
Plaza Cervantes
Manila
425

425
1981
Appeals
ANNEX A
SUBJECT: Plan II-4374
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
Paraaque, Rizal
64
30 January 1978
as part of the petition for constitution of title (pp. 1 and 2 of folio).

As to how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of
Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy of the
plan is not known. This is not our standard operating procedure
since we always issue technical descriptions based on available
approved survey records.
Mr. Amante Dumag

Officer-in-Charge
Region IV, Metro Manila
Anent your Memorandum of 17 January 1978 requesting for an
authenticated plan of II-4374 Lot 1 and Lot 3 situated in Paraaque, Metro
Manila, please be informed of the following:
1. 1.Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the
last world war and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz,
Alien and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374
was not among those salvaged. Indeed, there is no copy of this plan
in the file of Techical Reference Section which records were
recently turned over to the Records Division. A perusal of the
folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July
17, 1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the records
division certified that his division (Survey Records Section in
particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).
2. 2.A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May
15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued techical
descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July
25, 1911. This record was submitted to the Court. Stated therein is
the alleged source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns
out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land
is the property of Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan,
Province of Leyte.
3. 3.Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr.
Anselmo Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction Section upon
request of the interested party, issued technical descriptions for
Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This document was submitted to the Court
426
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. 4.It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto
Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section, certified a copy of the
microfilm enlargement of a frame with Accession No. 385637 which
frame bears the survey number II-4374. As to how a record that
was not salvaged after the war got microfilmed is a mystery.
Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the
locator card indeed confound us. We are not now privy to the
testimonies made in Court regarding this microfilm.
2. 5.We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For
this reason, we caused the preparation of an enlargement of said
microfilm for further examination and evaluation.
3. 6.A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the
following significant discrepancies and deviations from similar
survey plans on record:
1. a)The data of approval appears to be July 25, 1911 and the
signature appearing as the approving official (Director of Lands) of
the alleged plan II-4374 is not the same official approving plans
during the period. Samples of surveys and inven-toried original
65
survey plans on file in this Bureau clearly show that on July 25,
1911 or thereabouts the Acting Director of Lands and therefore
proper approving official for survey plans was John R. Wilson. The
following original plans (partial list) available in our records and
approved within the month of July 1911 or thereabouts all bear the
signature of Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson.
Survey
No.
1. I
1817
2. II
4142
3. II
4141
4. II
4110
5. II
4110
6. II
4110
7. II
4110
8. II
4110
9. II
4110
10. II
4897
11. II
41696
12. II
4172
13. I
1415
Accession
No.
369826
385736
Date of
Approval
July 25,
1911
-do-
385735
-do-
385833
-do-
385832
-do-
385834
-do-
385830
-do-
385829
-do
385828
-do-
186222
-do-
July 11,
1911
July 5, 1911
379513
July 25,
1911
14. II
1410
446936
Aug. 22
1911
427

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1981
Appeals
1. b)Authentic plans like that of II-4858 (original copy on file) approved
on December 19, 1911 show the BL Form No. 52 and the format
then in use during the period. Likewise, this plan (marked O)
shows the signature of the Director of Lands at that time, Chas H.
Sleeper as Director of Lands on the microfilm of II-4374 appears to
be very far from the genuine signature of Chas H. Sleeper
appearing on original plans on file. Chas H. Sleeper was the
incumbent Director of Lands from November 1, 1905 up to October
15, 1913. However, during his term of office, the then Assistant
Director of Lands in the person of John R. Wilson had occasion to
assume duties as Acting Director of Lands as evidenced by the
above-listed survey plans mostly approved on July 25, 1911 by
Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson. Considering the fact that
on various dates within the month of July 1911, specifically those
of July 25, 1911, the original survey plans available in the file show
John H. Wilson as the approving official in his capacity as Acting
Director of Lands, and the observation that the signature
appearing on microfilm II-4374 is very far from the genuine
signature of the incumbent Director of Lands Chas H. Sleeper, the
appearance now of the microfilm of II-4374 purportedly approved
on July 25, 1911 showing Chas H. Sleeper as the approving official
is highly questionable. For this reason and the facts stated
elsewhere in this memorandum, we cannot certify authenticity of
the microfilm copy of II-4374.
66
2. c)The form used for the questionable plan II-4374 differs from the
standard survey plans approved during the time (year 1911) in the
following respects:
2. 8.Nevertheless, our investigation is still continuing purposely to find

out how the frame of such microfilm got inserted into microfilm
Reel No. 560 of this Bureau.
1. (1)Authentic plans during the time are prepared on B.L. Form No.
52 which is on upper left hand corner; the questionable plan (II4374) was prepared on B.L. Form No. 52-A which appears on upper
left hand corner and on upper center which is unusual.
3. 9.Records of the Case show that this was handled by the late Atty.
Pedro Flores in collaboration with Assistant Solicitor General
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Trial Attorney Antonio G. Castro. This
pertains to the petition of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal for
the reconstitution of T.C.T. (12/T-79) 42449 (Sales Patent) covering
area of 143.5062 hectares. This case is opposed in the sala of CFI,
Seventh Judicial District, Branch XIII. of Rizal by the Director of
Lands and Aurora R. Favila, et al. In cases like this, we take action
in close collaboration with the Legal Division.
2. (2)Authentic plans indicate the name of the surveyor immediately

below the line that shows the date of survey, followed by the
designation (surveyor) and thereunder Bureau of Lands; the
questionable plan, on the other hand, does not conform with the
said format.
3. (3)Authentic plans do not contain the paragraph The original field
notes, x x x as in the case of the questioned plan II-4374 but
immediately Bureau of Lands
428
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. below the surveyors name is Approved: (date) followed by the title
and signature of the approving official.
1. 7.Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm
enlargement of the frame that purports to be that of survey plan
II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said
plan is not authentic and does not and has never represented any
parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau.
4. 10.Enclosed for your ready reference are

1. a)Enlargement copy of alleged II-4374 whose original copy was not
inventoried as salvaged after the war;
2. b)Microfilm copies of Authentic Plans;
3. c)Xerox copies of relevant papers in the Folio:
1. 1)Certification of Mr. Gabriel Sansano, dated 17 July 1972
2. 2)Petition for Reconstitution of Title (filed with the Court)
3. 3)Opposition of the Director of Lands
4. 4)Motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution of title filed by the
other oppositors.
For the Director of Lands:
67
(Sgd.) PRIVADI JG. DALIRE

Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plans & Standards
2. 2.That on 11 October 1979, Atty. Dennis E. Angeles, Counsel for

Greenfield Development Corporation, Atty. Ramon D. Bagat-sing,
Sr. and Associates, Counsel for Alabang Development Corporation
and Fortunato de Leon and Associates were notified to deposit
their share to be incurred in the execution of verification-relocation
survey.
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1981
Appeals
3. 3.That on 16 October 1979, Greenfield Development Corporation

deposited their share of survey deposit to the National Capital
Region, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila, likewise, Alabang
Development Corporation also deposited their share of survey
deposit. However, the private respondent failed to deposit any
amount to this Region as of this date.
ANNEX B
SUBJECT: VerificationRelocation Survey of the boundaries claimed
by the movant and private respondent as per resolution of the Supreme
Court, First Division, Metro Manila under G.R. No. L-45168 dated 15
September 1979.
4. 4.That on October 1979, the private respondent and in-tervenors

were notified by letter as to the time and date, this survey team
shall commence its actual field verification survey. It is noted
28 December 1979
The Regional Director
Thru the OIC, Surveys Division
Bureau of Lands, NCR, Metro Manila
Sir:
With reference to your Office Memo dated 5 October 1979 as per survey
order dated 4 October 1979, issued by the Director of Lands pursuant to
the Order of the Supreme Court, this team was directed to execute the
verification-relocation survey of the lots involved relative to the above-noted
subject, has the honor to submit its activities, findings and report to wit:
1. 1.That immediately after receiving the Office Memo dated 6 October
1979, the data needed were gathered and researched in order to
determine the survey deposit to be shouldered by the private
respondent and intervenors.
430
430
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. that only Atty. Reynaldo B. Tatoy of Alabang Development
Corporation who acts as representative was present together with
Atty. Dennis E. Angeles, Counsel for Greenfield Development
Corporation. In this instance, no representatives of the private
respondent were present to witness our verification and relocation
survey. Due to this, the Alabang Development Corporation and
Greenfield Development Corporation properties were surveyed and
verified as per their claim pinpointed by them.
68
2. 5.That the verification-relocation survey was executed in accordance

with the existing rules and regulations of the Philippine Land
Surveyors Manual.
3. 6.That the survey was tied to a reference point of known geographic
positions. Solar observation were observed to get the true direction,
of the tertiary traverse stations which control the different
properties affected by Lots 1 & 3, II-4374.
4. 7.That the survey was started last October 24, 1979 and was
finished last December 24, 1979.
5. 8.However, that Lots I & 3, II-4374 were also surveyed and verified
even without the presence of the movant or any of her authorized
representatives to pinpoint the extent of her properties. And as per
our verification survey, it was ascertained in the premises that the
parcels of land described in the technical descriptions of Lots 1 & 3,
II-4374 could not be located in the locality by all technical means.
6. 9.That Lots 1 & 3, II-4374, were plotted basing only on the
typewritten and xerox copies of uncertified technical descriptions
furnished to this Office by the Office of the Solicitor General. 10.
That the complete survey returns is in progress and will be
submitted for final approval.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ANACLETO S. VILLONES
Chief, Tech. Services Section
ANNEX C
SUBJECT: Final Report on the Relocation-Verification Survey of

Greenfield Development Corporation Properties subject of G.R. No. L45168, dated 25 Sept. 1979.
431

431
1981
Appeals
2 January 1980
The Officer-in-Charge
National Capital Region
Bureau of Lands
Plaza Cervantes, Manila
(The OIC, Surveys Division)
Sir:
I have the honor to render the following report of ray findings relative to
the relocation-verification survey of Lot 2, Pcs-125618; Lot 1-D, (LRC) Psd230231; Lot 1-C, (LRC) Psd-230231; Lot 1, (LRC) Pcs-19806; Lot 1, (LRC)
Pcs-19807; Lot 3, (LRC) Pcs-19807 and Lot 398-B-2-D, (LRC) Psd-16651
which comprise the Greenfield Development Corporation properties subject
of G.R. No. L-45168, dated 25 September 1979.
The aforesaid relocation-verification survey was conducted on Oc-tober
25 to December 24, 1979 simultaneously with the reloca-tion/verification
survey of Alabang Development Corporation properties situated in the
same locality and also subject of the aforementioned Supreme Court
Resolution, which was undertaken by another survey party headed by
Engr. Anacleto Villones, also of NCR, Bureau of Lands. The work was
successfully carried out as per the attached Operation Plan of Activities
69
previously prepared and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the

Philippine Land Surveyors Manual.
At the start, the two survey parties adopted a common tertiary traverse
line where all succeeding necessary traverses had to start. Also in the
computation of the subject lots a common system was adopted for
Greenfield Development Corporation and Alabang Development
Corporation. It was also agreed that the verification-relocation survey of
the alleged Lots 1 & 3, II-4374 had to be undertaken by the survey team
headed by Engr. Villones. During the survey of Greenfield Development
Corporation properties, Atty. Dennis Angeles appeared on behalf of the
corporation. With respect to the instruction of indicating/whether
infrastructure and other developments/improvements there are within the
area subject of the survey, the undersigned found out that aside from two
concrete buildings, one a school-house and the other a factory, all the rest of
the area is either cogonal or planted to sugarcane.
432
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
All the lots comprising the Greenfield Development Corporation

properties are adjacent to each other and as a whole it is delineated along
the western, northern boundaries and a portion of its southern boundary
by concrete walls.
It is to be mentioned also that during the survey no hostile interruption
of whatever kind or manner had been experienced by anyone in the survey
party. To this, we humbly express our sincere appreciation.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) HENRY G. BRIONES
Sr. Geodetic Engineer
Thereafter, We required the parties, and intervenors to comment on

the aforesaid Final Report. On April 14, 1980, private respondent
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal commented that they had
nothing to do with the survey, refused to be bound thereby and
objected from the beginning to share in the expense as in their
opinion she should not be made to spend for something unnecessary
after the certification of the Land Registration Commission that
there is no conflict whatsoever insofar as her property is concerned
and that the final report of the survey and all prior reports of which
respondent were not furnished, are mere scraps of paper and deserve
no consideration for the reason that it is not proper evidence duly
presented at the hearing and therefore, not passed upon by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals which reviewed this case.
Intervenor Greenfield Development Corporation, also commenting
on said Report, manifested that the report of the Bureau of Lands
confirms the intervenors claim that the land supposedly covered by
the Certificate of Title sought to be reconstituted overlap substantial
portions of the land registered in the name of said intervenor, as well
as the Alabang Hills Subdivision, Ignacio H. Liwag Subdivision, ICS
Realty Corporation, Pacific Malayan Subdivision, portion of South
Superhighway, numerous factory sites and infrastructures, and
portions of Muntinlupa Estate and Philippine National Railways
right of way. Said intervenors emphasize that the owners of these
affected areas are indispensable parties to
433

433
1981
Appeals
this proceedings and should have been impleaded for they have such
an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
70
adjudication cannot be made in their absence without affecting such

interests.
Similarly, intervenors Alabang Development Corp. and Ramon D.
Bagatsing, commented that said report confirms that the parcels of
land of the intervenors duly registered in their names and which
have been in their possession since time immemorial, actually,
continuously, adversely, openly, notoriously and peacefully and for
which they have been paying realty taxes up to the present time, are
overlapped by the parcels of land allegedly owned by the respondent
whose title thereto is being sought to be reconstituted.
To respondents Comment that the basis of the survey is
erroneous for they were looking for the record, microfilm, and the
plan in the name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, and not the
original grantee Olimpia Bautista Vda. de Sta. Maria, intervenor
Greenfield Development Corp. interposed a Rejoinder, pointing out
that the basis of the survey is Plan II-4374 from which the
descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 were taken and made the basis of
respondents petition for reconstitution and that the name of
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal is mentioned in the report only
to identify the claimant.
Greenfields Rejoinder also disputes respondents claim that the
Final Report is incomplete and unreliable, stressing that the
continuing investigation was to find out how the forgery was
committed for the report concluded that the forgery was already an
accomplished fact. Greenfield also explains that the reportsimply
means that Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 exist only on paper but when
located on the ground, using the technical description as basis, will
fall and overlap the land of the intervenors and other parties.
Furthermore, the protest of respondent Sta. Maria that her property
was platted using the xerox copies of uncertified technical
description furnished by the Office of the Solicitor General, is

unfounded for the simple reason that the technical description
furnished by the Solicitor General is but a plain copy of Exhibits G
and G-2 (Annexes 2 & 3).
434
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
The basic and primary legal principle upon which the validity and
legality of all the proceedings taken and conducted upon the filing of
the original petition for reconstitution of the alleged lost Certificate
of Title No. TCT 12/T-79 which was subsequently amended to change
the number of the said certificate of title to TCT No. 42449 is
jurisdictionthe power of the court to act on said petition for
reconstitution. The question of jurisdiction is always fundamental; it
is basically one of law, involving the determination by the court of its
right to proceed with the litigation or petition. Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and determine a causethe right to act in a
particular case. Its existence does not depend upon the regularity of
its exercise or upon the correctness or righteousness of the decision
or ruling made by the court (Palma & Ignacio vs. Q. & S., Inc. and
Jose F. Ureta, No. L-20366, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 97). Jurisdiction
may be challenged at any stage of the proceedings except where
sound public policy dictates that to do so would be to speculate on the
fortunes of litigation (Crisostomo, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-21766,
March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 54). Jurisdiction likewise cannot be
conferred by laches, estoppel or even consent of the parties (Otibar &
Otibar vs. Hon. Demetrio Vinson, et al., L-18023, May 30, 1962, 5
SCRA 270, 273).
71
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the

Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by will of the parties; it cannot
be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or
omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the
court. (Molina vs. de la Riva, 6 Phil. 12, 15-16;Manila Railroad
Company vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 531; see also
Concurring opinion of Justice Pablo in Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration in Avelino vs. Cuen-co, 83 Phil. 17, 74; Squillantini
vs. Republic, 88 Phil. 135, 137; Cruzcosa vs. Concepcion, 101 Phil.
146, 150;Lumpay vs. Moscoso, L-14723, May 29, 1959; Espiritu vs.
David,L-13135-36, May 31, 1961).
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, supra, the Supreme
Court speaking thru Justice Moreland elucidates the very fine
distinctions on the concept of jurisdiction, thus:
435

435
1981
Appeals
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power or authority. Others provide for
the procedure by which that power or authority is projected into judgment.
The one class deals with the powers of the court in the real and substantive
sense; the other with the procedure by which such powers are put into
action. The one is the thing itself: the other is the vehicle by which the
thing is transferred from the court to the parties.
To ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of

the law should be inquired into (Auyong vs. Hon. Court of Tax
Appeals, L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967,19 SCRA 10). In all cases where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when
the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and must strictly
be complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void (Caltex, et
al. vs. CIR, et al., L-28472, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 492). So that
where there is defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives
the court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, L-27443, July 19, 1971, 40
SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case
and all its aspects (Development Bank of the Phils. Employees Union
vs. Juan Perez,L-22584 and L-23083, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 179,
187). Further, absent jurisdiction the court cannot pass upon the
merits of the petition (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220, 224).
In the case at bar, the jurisdiction or authority of the Court of
First Instance is conferred upon it by Republic Act 26 entitled An
act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Title lost or destroyed, approved on September 25,
1946. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and
mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can act on
the petition and grant to the petitioner the remedy sought for. These
requirements and procedure are mandatory. The petition for
reconstitution must allege the jurisdictional facts; the notice of
hearing must also be published and posted in particular places and
the same sent to specified persons. Specifically, the requirements and
procedure are set forth in
436
436
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
detail under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act which read as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2

(c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or
72
contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of
the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners
mortgagees or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings
or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and
the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements;
(e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons
who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall
be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section
2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a
plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the
description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same
property.
prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the
number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in posses-
437

437
1981
Appeals
sion of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and
the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and
file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court.
Earlier, We had quoted in full the Amended Petition for

reconstitution. As to the original petition, the original records and
the Record on Appeal do not contain nor include said original
petition. We have also reproduced in full the Notice of Hearing of the
original petition as published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 66, No. 31,
pp. 7226-7227, Aug. 3, 1970; and Vol. 66, No. 32, p. 7493, Aug. 10,
1970 as well as the Notice of Hearing of the amended petition
published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 67, Nos. 5 and 6, with date of
issue of Feb. 1, 1971 and Feb. 8, 1971, respectively, purposely to
check and verify whether the strict and mandatory requirements of
the law have been complied with by the petitioner, now the
respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal. It is Our finding
that in the Notice of Hearing of the original petition the following
were listed to be notified by registered mail, namely: Olimpia B. Sta.
Maria, The Director of Lands, The Land Registration Commissioner,
The Register of Deeds of Rizal, The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, and
The Office of the Solicitor General. According to the Notice, copies
were required to be posted in the bulletin board of the Provincial
Capitol of Rizal, the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Rizal, and on
Lots 1 and 3.
73
In the Notice of Hearing of the amended petition, copies of the

Notice were required to be posted only in the bulletin board of the
Provincial Capitol of Rizal and on Lots 1 and 3. The Notice now omits
the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Rizal which the Court order
of December 7, 1970 had specifically directed. Likewise, in said
Notice of Hearing of the Amended Petition, no person was named to
whom copies of the Notice should be sent by registered mail so that
the names of Manuela Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, the Director of
Lands, the Land Registration Commissioner, the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, and the Office of the Solicitor
General were now omitted, whereas the order of the Court re438
438
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
quired notices to the alleged boundary owners, namely: Manuela

Aquial, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, Director of Lands, Director of
Forestry, Atty. Casiano P. Laquihon, and Atty. Josefina Nepomuceno.
We also find that the Amended Petition does not state or contain
the nature and description of the buildings or improvements on the
land not belonging to Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal. It also
does not state or contain the names and addresses of the owners of
such buildings or improvements. The names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property and the names
and addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties are not also
stated in the petition.
And since the above date do not appear in the Amended Petition,
the same data does not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the
petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of
Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of the
Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require

the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of
these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the
above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with
the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly
followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We
hold that the mere Notice that all interested parties are hereby cited
to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should
not be granted is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted
strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to
amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication
and posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the
amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We have pointed above,
respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply
with all the requirements for publication and posting of notices,
which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court.
439

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1981
Appeals
The rule on notification to the possessor or one having interest in the
property whose title is sought to be reconstituted is laid down
explicitly in Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et
al., L-17913, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title

reconstituted from the plans and technical descriptions of the lots involved,
which sources may fall properly under section 3 (e) or 3 (f) of Republic Act
74
No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in
the property should be sent a copy of the notice of the petition at the
expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a
possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of
his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not
sufficient but such notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties
affected by the petition for reconstitution.
In the instant case, the change in the number of the certificate of

title sought to be reconstituted from T-12/79 to TCT No. 42449
rendered at once the authenticity or genuineness of respondents
certificate of title under suspicion or cloud of doubt. And since
respondent alleges that the technical descriptions under both
certificates of title are identical and the same, which the trial court
also finds and affirms in its Decision (Record on Appeal, p. 70), We
hold that the instant petition for judicial reconstitution falls squarely
under Section 3 (f), Republic Act. No. 26, because the Director of
Lands claims that the respondents duplicate of the Certificate of
Title No. T-12/79 or TCT No. 42449 are both fake and fictitious.
The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad
Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., supra is rightly so because
one who seeks the reconstitution of his title to property is dutybound to know who are the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons
having an interest in the property involved, specially where the
property is so vast and situated in a
440
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Appeals
suitable residential and commercial location, where buildings and
improvements have been or are being constructed openly and
publicly. As stated earlier, indispensable parties have appeared,
claiming ownership, possession, and valuable interests in the
property, which are not only numerous but also patently conspicuous
that private respondent cannot feign ignorance, much less
unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence on her or within her
claimed property.
For the reasons stated in Our Resolution of September 25, 1979,
We had directed the relocation of the respective boundaries of the
properties claimed by the intervenors and the private respondent
with due notice to said parties and in their presence or that of their
duly authorized representatives. We required the Chief of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands or his duly authorized
representative to conduct said relocation survey and submit to this
Court the results of such relocation survey, indicating therein such
overlapping as he may have found and determined and the location of
such industries, factories, warehouses, plants and other commercial
infrastructures, residential buildings and other constructions, public
or private roads, and other landmarks found within the areas
concerned.
In compliance with said Resolution, a Final Report was submitted
dated February 25, 1980 by Amante R. Dumag, Officer In-Charge,
NCR, Bureau of Lands, informing the Court that after notifying all
the parties on October 17, 1979 and making preparations for the
survey by research, computation and procurement of equipment, the
actual survey started on October 24, 1979 and was finished on
December 24, 1979 in accordance with existing rules and regulations
75
of the Philippine Land Surveyors Manual. The survey was tied to a

reference point of known geographic position. Solar observation was
observed to get the true direction of the tertiary traverse stations
which control the different properties affected by Lot 1 and 3, II4374. Present during the survey were Atty. Reynaldo B. Tatoy of
Alabang Development Corporation and Atty. Dennis E. Angeles,
counsel of Greenfield Development Corporation. No representative of
private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal attended the
survey, instead, her counsel in441

441
1981
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formed Director Dumag in his letter of October 18, 1979 that they
were not interested to attend said survey and hence made no deposit
as their share in the survey costs.
It appears from the Final Report that the relocationverification
survey of the properties of Alabang Development Corporation was
undertaken by a survey party headed by Engr. Anacleto Villones,
Chief, Technical Services Section, NCR, Bureau of Lands,
simultaneously with the relocationverification survey of the
properties of Greenfield Development Corporation conducted by the
survey party headed by Henry G. Briones, Sr., Geodetic Engineer,
NCR, Bureau of Lands, particularly Lot 2, Pcs-12618; Lot 1-D. (LRC)
Psd-230231; Lot 1-C, (LRC) Psd-230231; Lot 1 (LRC) Pcs-19806; Lot
1, (LRC) Pcs-19807; Lot 3, (LRC) Pcs-19807 and Lot 398-B-2-D,
(LRC) Psd-16651.
The survey team reported that the Alabang Development
Corporation and Greenfield Development Corporation properties
were surveyed and verified as per their claim pinpointed by them.

(Annex B, p. 2 of the Final Report)
The relocation-verification survey of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374
claimed by respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal was also
undertaken by the survey team headed by Engr. Villones. The result
of the survey shows that the parcels of land described in the
technical descriptions of 1 Lotsand 3, II-4374 could not be located in
the locality by all technical means. (Annex B, p. 2 of the Final
Report).
The survey report on the Greenfield properties submitted by Sr.
Geodetic Engr. Henry G. Briones show that there are within the
area two concrete buildings, one a schoolhouse and the other a
factory, all the rest of the area is either cogonal or planted to
sugarcane. All the lots comprising the Greenfield Development
Corporation properties are adjacent to each other and as a whole it is
delineated along the western, northern and eastern boundaries and a
portion of its southern boundary by concrete walls.
Attached to the Final Report are the survey reports of the survey
teams dated December 28, 1979 and January 2, 1980 marked
Annexes B and C and white print copies of
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
verification survey plan V5-04-000153 (2 sheets) duly approved by

the Bureau of Lands and marked Annex D showing the relative
positions of subdivision plans Pcs-5878, Pcs-12745, Lot 398-B-2-A-2A, Psd-55942, Lot 398-B, Psd-49864, Lot 2 (LRC) Pcs-12618, Lot 1-D
(LRC) Psd 231231, Lot 1-C (LRC) Psd-230231, Lot 1 (LRC) Pcs76
19806, Lot 1 and 3 (LRC) Pcs-19807 and Lot 398-B-2-B (LRC) Psd16651 and Lots 1 and 3 plan II-4374.
According to the Final Report, it was ascertained during the
verification survey that the lands known as Lots 1 and 3, Plan II4374 claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal does not actually exist on the ground (paragraph 6 of Final
Report). On paper however, the positions of Lots 1 and 3, Plan II4374 were platted on the verification survey plan V5-04-000153, the
boundaries of which are in red line and We can see with the naked
eye that their boundaries encroach and occupy big portions of the
properties of Alabang Development Corporation whose boundaries
are indicated in heavy purple lines and also properties of Greenfield
Develop ment Corporation which were transfers from intervenor
Ramon D. Bagatsing.
On the verification survey plan V5-04-000153, We can see that Lot
1, II-4374 covers and overlaps many lots of Mun-tinlupa Estate like
Lots 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 87, 42, 1308-D, 1308-9, 1308-E, 44-C,
the Manila South Superhighway portion, Lot 2 (LRC)-Pcs-12618 of
Greenfield Dev. Corp., Lot 1-D (LRC) Psd-231230, a shopping center,
the COMPEX ELECT, AMSPEC IND. and others.
Lot 3, II-4374, on the same verification plan can be seen to cover
and overlap among others Lot 1-D (LRC) Psd-231230 (Pacific
Malayan Subd), Annies Farm (Psd-55942, Lot 398-B-2-A-2-A,
Muntinlupa Estate), ICS Realty Corp., Lots 121, 123, 124, and inside
are the residence of Ramon Bagatsing, Chemical Disp., Inc., The
Ideal Condominium, Don Jesus Blvd., an asphalt road and portions
of the Manila South Super Highway. Among the boundary owners
are Ignacio H. Liwag, the Muntinlupa Estate, and Alabang Dev.
Corp.
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1981
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The above visible findings on V5-04-000153 confirm the contents of
Annexes A, A-1, A-2 listing the properties of the Muntinlupa
Estate that are encroached by Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374 found and
attached in the Reply Brief of petitioner, pp. 28-34 wherein some 57
lots were listed as covered by Lot 1, II-4374 and some 107 lots
covered by Lot 3, II-4374, prepared by Anacleto S. Villones, Chief,
Technical Services Section, Bureau of Lands, Regional Office No. IV,
Metro Manila.
We accept and approve this Final Report on the relocation
verification survey ordered by Us on the properties in question,
further admitting the same as evidence of this Court. Private
respondent was given all the opportunity to attend and participate in
said survey and inspite of due notice to her of the time and place of
the survey, she manifested no interest in the same. On the contrary,
she preferred to stand pat on the certification of the Land
Registration Commissioner that there was no conflict of the
boundaries as platted and besides she has no financial means to
defray her share of the survey cost. We reject these objections of
private respondent as without merit.
It is too late in the day for private respondent to complain that the
survey report is not proper evidence for not having been presented at
the trial of the case nor passed upon by the said Court and the Court
of Appeals. Private respondent has waived her right to object to said
report by refusing to attend and participate in the relocation and
verification survey. She is now estopped to claim that they were not
furnished copies of the report after the Court directed the parties to
secure copies of the same at their expense. She is likewise estopped
77
to claim that she is not bound by the results of said report. The Final
Report is evidence obtained by the Supreme Court upon its own
authority inherent in the exercise of its judicial function and power
to ferret and establish the truth upon due notice to the litigants and
to be present by person, representative or counsel in the conduct of
the relocation-verification survey.
That private respondent is not financially able to share in the
expenses of the survey costs is puerile, if not sham and
444
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
flimsy, considering that as the records show she had disposed a large
portion of the litigated property to certain parties for P200,000.00 on
August 25, 1973 and thereafter she ceded 40% of the area for
development to a developer corporation for P1,000,000.00 on August
25, 1973 and another portion for P200,000.00 to the same
corporation also on August 25, 1973. Moreover, since the total area of
the two lots, Lots 1 and 3, is very extensive comprising around 143
hectares, more or less, the survey cost is fair and reasonable and
private respondents share of the same is just and equitable. And
more importantly, such verification relocation survey would redound
to her benefit if her claim is actually correct and true.
Besides, private respondents reliance on the report of the
Commissioner of Land Registration (Exhibit R) is misplaced,
unsupported by competent official action which should have been
shown to the satisfaction of the Court, such as the surveyor of the
Land Registration Commission who actually verified and examined
the plan submitted by private respondent, or the (LRC) Plan PR2887 which allegedly approved Plan II-4374, Lots 1 and 3. The mere
identification of Exhibit R by a subordinate employee of the Land

Registration Commission, Ricardo Arandilla, merely authenticated
the genuineness of the signature of Commissioner Bilog but not the
correctness and truth of its contents. The report was made ex parte,
even without the order of the Court nor with notice and attendance of
the oppositors.
Furthermore, under Section 24 of Republic Act 26, the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, now the Land Registration
Commissioner, is required to issue rules, regulations, circulars and
instructions, and prescribe such books and blank forms as may be
necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the Act. The rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to Sec. 24, R.A. 26 explicitly
provide that the petition for reconstitution of a transfer certificate of
title shall also be accompanied by any of the following documents, as
a source of reconstitution, and such other documents as may
constitute evidence in support of said petition:
(j) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an
445

445
1981
Appeals
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered,
and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued. (This to serve only where the title to be reconstituted is a transfer
certificate of title). (Italics supplied; par. (j), GLRO Circular No. 17,
February 19, 1947, 43 O.G. 825). (Reply Brief of Petitioner, p. 2)
Pursuant to said regulation, the Land Registration Commissioner

should have required the private respondent to submit the deed of
78
transfer or other documents on file in the Registry of Deeds

containing the description of the property or an authenticated copy
thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant
to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued.
If the deed of sale executed in favor of private respondent by her
mother was also lost or destroyed by reason of the war, there are
authenticated copies of said deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds
where the transfer certificate of title was issued based on said deed
of sale. It is quite evident that private respondent has not exhausted
all steps and remedies to secure certified copies of documents or
papers that may be necessary in the reconstitution of her certificate
of title or to corroborate, confirm and attest to her claim that a sales
patent was issued to her mother, that the sales patent was forwarded
to the Register of Deeds and that the latter issued the corresponding
original certificate of title to the said mother.
We have noted the conflicting evidence presented in the records to
prove or disprove the alleged authenticity of TCT No. 42449, the
inconsistent testimonies of government officials testifying for the
private respondent or for the oppositor Director of Lands, including
contradictory documents presented to support the respective
positions of the parties therein. These conflicts and inconsistencies
may be ascribed to the failings of human memory, trying to recall
events that occurred many, many years past or to the changing
practice and procedure by government officials themselves including
employees in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Manila and Rizal.
Even reports certified by handwriting experts of the NBI are
rendered of doubtful integrity in the light of their own
446
446
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
admissions that forgers possess better skills than the genuine
writers themselves. Because of the long passage of time and the
frailty of human recollections, much of the evidence on record are
difficult to confirm and verify. Fortunately, however, there is the data
of technical descriptions of the lots indicated in the survey plan
which are constant and unchanging. These technical descriptions are
the fundamental basis or readings of land surveys indicated by
longitudinal and latitude bearings in relation to solar positions. They
are, therefore, permanent and fixed and they can be and are
verifiable by scientific and precision instruments using and applying
the principles of geometry and trigonometry.
Upon the foregoing premises, We lay down the following findings
and conclusions:
1. 1.In the original petition for reconstitution, the Transfer
Certificate of Title sought to be reconstituted by private
respondent was T-12/79. Upon a report of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal that said title is not filed in Registry Book T79; that Certificate of Title No. 12 is under Registration Book
No. T-1 issued in the name of Edwin Warnes and that said
title refers to a property situated in Pasay City; that TCT 12
was already cancelled by TCT No. 19, Book II of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal, private respondent alleging mistake and
fraud committed by her common-law husband Angel Cruz,
amended her petition, changing the number of her title from
T-12/79 to TCT 42449 but with the same technical
description. We quote a portion of the trial courts decision in
this regard, thus:
79
A comparison of the technical descriptions appearing in the original title

No. 12/T-79 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 shows that the
parcels of land described in both titles are exactly the same. (Record on
Appeal, p. 70).
Thus, at the initial stage of the petition and before the actual hearing
thereof, there was patently an attempt to foist a forged and fictitious
title through a fraudulent act. Law and justice always abhor fraud.
Fraud and justice never dwell or exist side by side. Fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant. Fortunately, the attempt was thwarted and
foiled.
447

447
1981
Appeals
1. 2.The date appearing in the technical descriptions of Lots 1
and 3 attached to the original petition has as its source
Accession No. 195551. These technical descriptions were
issued on May 15, 1970 by Angel Sogueco, a retired surveyor.
But Accession No. 195551 refers to Plan II-4005 approved on
February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of the
Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
(See Annex A, paragraph 2, Final Report of RelocationVerification Survey).
The opposition of the Director of Lands to the original petition for
reconstitution clearly states and mentions as fake the Accession No.
195551 cited as the source of the technical descriptions, which We
quote, thus:
(E) That the Accession No. 195551, appearing in the Technical

Descriptions of Lots Nos. 1 and 3 of plan II-4374 is fake, because it pertains
to Plan II-4005, the land being the property of the Municipality of Liloan,
Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte, containing an area of 3838 square
meters, surveyed on December 19, 1910 and approved on February 7, 1911;
Obviously, Plan II-4374 is also a fake; (Record on Appeal, p. 16)
That the source of the technical descriptions allegedly issued by the

Survey Division, Bureau of Lands of the two parcels of land, Lots 1
and 3 in Plan II-4374 is Accession No. 195551 was earlier mentioned
and alleged by the Director of Lands in his Opposition dated March
16, 1971. (Record on Appeal, p. 12).
The Accession No. mentioned in the original petition as No.
195551 is important and vital, not only because the Record on Appeal
and the original records do not contain the original petition for
reconstitution but also because We find that when the petition was
amended, the source of the technical descriptions became Accession
No. 385637. Yet, the technical descriptions in Certificate of Title No.
12/T-79 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 are exactly the
same. For the property herein involved to have the same technical
descriptions but coming from different accession numbers is not only
irregular but highly incredible. The technical descriptions cannot
have two accession numbers as sources thereof.
448
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
1. 3.The evidence for the private respondent tend to trace her
ownership over the vast properties in question through a
transfer, a deed of sale in her favor executed sometime in
80
November, 1943 in consideration of the price of P10,000.00

paid to her mother Olimpia Sta. Maria, the original owner
who bought the property from the Philippine Government
under a sales patent issued on September 15, 1942 and was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 on September
29, 1942. OCT No. 42392 must contain the technical
descriptions of the property sold, which descriptions are
copied or derived from the data contained in the Sales Patent
issued by the Government. Yet, We find no proof presented by
private respondent to support and corroborate the
authenticity of her title or the source of her title which can be
traced back to OCT No. 42392 and the Sales Patent awarded
to her mother. The number of the alleged Sales Patent is not
cited by her nor any certificate showing or signed by a
competent officer that a sales application was processed and
approved, that a sales patent to the property in question with
technical descriptions therein stated was issued to her
mother, had been presented as evidence. It could have been
easy for private respondent to obtain any certified copy of
documents or paper that may be necessary in the
reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act 26
because said copies are furnished free of charge under
Section 23 of the Act.
2. 4.A close scrutiny of Exhibit G which is a reproduction of the
Plan of property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al. gives the
following data: Case No. , Court of Land Registration.
Unperfected Title No. , Bureau of Lands. Situated in the
Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Island of
Luzon, Province of Rizal. Containing an area of 1866979 sq.
meters. Scale of 1:8000. Bearings true. Declination 030E.

Surveyed Jan. 9-29, 1911.
From this caption alone, it is clear that the survey was made not for
the purpose of acquiring the properties by sales patent from the
Government during the Japanese Occupation or in 1943. If said
parcels of land were surveyed and approved on July 25, 1911, a
maximum area of 16 hectares could have been legally acquired by
sales patent only, pursuant to the Philip449

449
1981
Appeals
pine Bill of 1902. The same maximum area of 16 hectares was
allowed until 1919 when the maximum area of acquisition by sales
patent was increased to 100 hectares under Act 2874, and upon the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution, it was further increased to 144
hectares. Yet, the survey conducted and approved on July 25, 1911
for Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, predecessor in interest of private
respondent herein, shows that the property surveyed comprises an
area of 1,866,979 square meters, or 186.69 hectares, more or less.
This survey, if undertaken for purposes of sales application, would
not and could not have been approved by the Director of Lands
because it is clearly against the law.
Under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 41) which
governs the disposition of lands of the public domain by sales patent,
it is therein provided in Section 108 that no patent shall issue nor
shall any concession or contract be finally approved unless the land
has been surveyed and an accurate plat made thereof by the Bureau
of Lands. It is simply unbelievable that the survey Plan II-4374
81
conducted January 9-29, 1911 and approved by the Director of Lands

on July 25, 1911 was the basic survey upon which the sales patent
applied for by Olimpia B. Sta. Maria was approved and issued on
September 15, 1942, some 31 years thereafter.
1. transferred portions of his property under TCT No. 45397 to

MERALCO, to Intervenor Alabang Development Corp., which
in turn sold to some 36 purchasers for value in the Alabang
Hills Subdivision.
1. 5.The properties of the intervenors are shown to have been

derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 684, originally
registered September 20, 1913 in the Registration Book,
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Vol. A-7, page 84 and issued
pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued August 27, 1910 in the
name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, which title
covers and embraces the land otherwise known as the
Muntinlupa Estate. The seven (7) parcels of land belonging
to Intervenor Greenfield Development Corp. with TCT Nos.
366292, S-38660, S-38661, S-43229, 43230 and 93980 are
transfers from the said Original Certificate of Title No. 684.
On the other hand Intervenor Ramon D. Bagatsing derives
his titles to the properties from TCT No. 14812 in the name
of Toribio G. Reyes which in turn was a transfer from the
original title, OCT No. 684 in the name of the Government of
the Philippine Islands. Intervenor Bagatsing subsequently
The series of transfers from the original certificate of title No. 684 in
the name of the Government of the Phil. Islands gave rise to the
transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds upon the
registration of the transfer deeds after surveys of the subdivision lots
or portions of the original area were undertaken and approved by the
Court. The technical descriptions indicated in the surveys and
appearing on the face of the titles themselves have been duly
relocated and verified in the relocation-verification survey which We
had ordered. The Final Report submitted to the Court concluded that
the properties of the Intervenors Greenfield Development Corp.,
Alabang Development Corp., and Ramon D. Bagatsing were
relocated and verified correct, but that Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374
claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
cannot be located on the ground by all technical means.
The Torrens Titles of the Intervenors Greenfield Development
Corp., Alabang Development Corp., and Ramon D. Bagatsing which
are derived from Certificate of Title No. 684 issued in September 20,
1913 clearly antedate that of the private respondent who can trace
her title only to an alleged sales patent awarded to her mother on
September 15, 1942 and to Original Certificate of Title No. 42392
issued September 29, 1942 pursuant to said sales patent. Under
these facts, the applicable and governing rule or doctrine which is
well-established in this jurisdiction is that when two certificates of
title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original
450
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
82
parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one

certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on
the second certificate. (Pajomayo vs. Manipon, L-33676, June 30,
1971, 39 SCRA 676; Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; De Villa vs.
Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1167, 1174.
See also Hodges vs. Dy
451

451
1981
Appeals
Buncio, G.R. No. L-16096, Oct. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 287; Register of
Deeds vs. PNB, L-17641, Jan. 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 46; Alzate vs.
PNB, L-20068, Jan. 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 422).
The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System must be
protected and preserved to ensure the stability and security of land
titles for otherwise land ownership in the country would be rendered
erratic and restless and can certainly be a potent and veritable cause
of social unrest and agrarian agitation. The courts must exercise
caution and vigilance in order to guard the indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility of the Torrens Registration System against
spurious claims and forged documents concocted and foisted upon the
destruction and loss of many public records as a result of the last
World War. The real purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet
title to the land must be upheld and defended, and once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, with out the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su
casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. (Salao vs. Salao, 70
SCRA 65, 84;Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby,31 Phil. 590, 593).
Claims of ownership and title to lands previously of the public

domain which as in the instant case private respon-dents
predecessor in interest, her own mother, admittedly acquired by a
sales patent issued during the Japanese Occupation on September
15, 1942 can be verified, checked and counterchecked from
government offices or agencies entrusted with the filing, acceptance,
processing and approval of sales application as well as the sales
award, the recording and registration of the patent itself, the
issuance and filing of the Torrens Title based on the sales patent
itself. We have not been shown a scintilla or shred of evidence
proving that private respondents predecessor in interest had
acquired the properties herein involved, much less the slightest
showing that private respondents predecessor in interest had in
truth and in fact acquired the properties from the Government under
a sales application duly processed, approved and granted.
Every applicant for a sales patent must go through a long
procedure, both complicated and cumbersome, which begins
452
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
with the filing of the application with the Director of Lands; the
Director of Lands makes appraisal of the land applied for and
publishes the necessary notices and posting regarding the sale; the
applicant as well as anyone desiring to buy the land submit to the
Director of Lands a sealed bid equivalent to 10% of the amount of the
bid; payment of the purchase price in full upon the making of the
award or in ten equal annual installments; the purchaser cultivates
not less than one-fifth of the property within five years after the date
of the award; the purchaser must show actual occupancy, cultivation
83
and improvements of at least one-fifth of the land applied for until

the date of final payment; the Director of Land orders the survey of
the land and when the plan thereof is finished, the sales pa-tent is
prepared and signed; and certified copy of the same is sent to the
register of deeds, who issues the corresponding certificate of title to
the patentee in accordance with Section 107 of the Public Land Law
in relation to Section 122 of the Land Registration Law. (Land Titles
and Deeds by Noblejas, Revised Ed., 1968, pp. 285-286).
Except private respondents Exhibit G (Plan of Property of
Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al. which is a survey of an area of 1,866,979
sq. meters in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, surveyed
January 9-29, 1911 and approved July 25, 1911 by the Director of
Lands), private respondent has not presented in evidence a copy or
copies of any official record, entry, receipt, certification, paper or
document by any government officer who has acted on any of the
numerous steps which have been outlined above in obtaining the
sales patent to the property in question from the government. All the
material evidence of private respondent relate to acts and
circumstances which occurred, in point of time after OCT No. 42392
was allegedly issued on Sept. 29, 1942 and after TCT No. 42449 was
likewise issued on November 19, 1943 after the sale of the property
to the private respondent by her mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria.
There is absolutely no evidence to prove or tending to prove that
private respondents mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, was duly issued
a sales patent or even applied to purchase the property from the
government on or before Sept. 15, 1942 when the said sales patent
was allegedly awarded.
453

453
1981
Appeals
The private respondent claims that the original certificate, OCT No.
42392, was issued pursuant to a sales patent issued by the
government on Sept. 15, 1942, hence the authenticity and
genuineness of the sales patent becomes very material and vital to
whether the title, either originally emanating therefrom or
transferred from the original certificate of title was in force at the
time the title was lost or destroyed. But since the sales patent is
seriously questioned and disputed by the Director of Lands, the very
government official who by law is charged and duty-bound to act on
sales application, appraise the property and accept the bid offered,
approve the survey plan, verify the occupancy and improvements
made by the applicant, then prepare and sign the sales patent, on
the ground that no sales patent was issued by reason, among others,
that the area sold was in excess and beyond that allowed by law, the
lack of the sales patent number and the apparent irregularities
appearing on the survey plan, the original of which is not subsisting
in the files and records of the Bureau of Lands, it becomes the
compelling duty of private respondent to prove that said sales patent
was property approved and issued and thereafter recorded in the
office of the register of deeds, the officer required by law to issue the
original certificate of title to the patentee, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria,
private respondents mother, who allegedly transferred the property
to her daughter, private respondent herein, by virtue of an alleged
deed of sale executed between them in November, 1943.
Under the Land Registration Act, when the land is transferred by
the registered owner by reason of sale or otherwise, the deed of sale
must be recorded and registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds. It must be assumed then that such deed of sale referred to
above was duly recorded and registered in the Office of the Register
84
of Deeds for TCT No. 42449 was issued in the name of the transferee,
private respondent herein. Although the latter claims that her copy
of the deed of sale was burned during the fire in Pasig during the
occupation, she could have obtained a copy thereof from the Register
of Deeds where the original was registered but she did not and there
is no showing why she failed to do so and present the same in court
to corroborate and support the authenticity
454
454
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
of her title, TCT No. 42449, and the regularity of the transfer from
OCT No. 42392.
The failure of the private respondent to obtain and present in
evidence any document or prove any act, deed, fact or circumstance
supporting and corroborating the issuance of the sales patent to her
mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, as well as any proof to support and
corroborate the execution and registration of the deed of sale in favor
of private respondent with no satisfactory explanation of such failure
impel Us to make the conclusion that no sales patent was duly and
regularly issued by the government covering the property in question
to her mother. We hold that the sales patent claimed by private
respondent as the source of TCT No. 42449 is nonexistent, fictitious
and imaginary. The mere notation in TCT No. 42449 that the same
was issued by virtue of a sales patent is insufficient and improper to
warrant reconstitution. Said sales patent is non-existent as the land
allegedly subject of the sale as found in the relocation-verification
survey ordered by this Court. Consequently, OCT No. 42392 is not
authentic and genuine and private respondents TCT No. 42449
being a transfer from the fake and spurious original title, is likewise
fake and spurious. We rule that TCT No. 42449 was not in force at
the time it was allegedly lost or destroyed or at any time at all.
Hence, the same cannot be reconstituted.
Under Section 15 of Republic Act 26, if the Court after hearing,
finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence
or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution
of the lost or destroyed certificate of ti-tle, and that the petitioner is
the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that
the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be
issued. Conversely, where the said certificate of title was not in force
at the time it was lost or destroyed as it is clearly shown and
established by the evidence on record in the instant case, the petition
for reconstitution shall be as it is hereby denied.
455

455
1981
Appeals
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside and reversed, and for lack
of jurisdiction, the petition for reconstitution is hereby DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez andMelencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, (Chairman),J., concurs in a separate opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
85
I concur fully with the Courts judgment ably penned by Mr. Justice
Guerrero. I wish to stress only that the record shows from
beginning (where respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
claimed to be a widow when she was in fact married to Angel Cruz
who opposed her petition) to end, a conspiracy and litany of
falsification and perjury (see pages 62-69 of the decision) whereby
said private respondent Bernal, on a petition for reconstitution of
title filed in 1970, twenty-five (25) years after the alleged loss or
destruction of her alleged title to some 143.5 hectares or 1,435,000
square meters of prime commercial land encompassing a part of the
South Superhighway, numerous residential subdivisions such as
Alabang Hills Subdivision, Cielito Homes Subdivision, Tahanan
Village, factories, roads and infrastructures, all of which has been
developed, built and occupied without any contest or protest from
anyone, much less private respondent (since the properties were duly
covered by duly issued Torrens Certificates of Title issued since 1913
or earlier) almost succeeded through respondent Court of Appeals
decision reversing that of the trial court in obtaining such
reconstitution of her alleged title based on a supposed sales
patentissued in favor of respondents mother and predecessor which
this Court has found to be non-existent, fictitious and
imaginary(see page 68 of the decision). The lands claimed to be
covered by her lost title
456
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
have been determined to be likewise fictitious and do not actually

exist on the ground (see page 59, idem).
The first lesson to be drawn here is that courts must exercise

the greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for reconstitution
of allegedly lost certificates of title, particularly where the petitions
are filed, as in this case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after
the alleged loss. Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure
thatindispensable parties, i.e. theactual owners and possessors of the
lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of the
petition (not by mere general publication), particularly where the
lands involved constitute prime developed commercial land including
a part of the South Superhighway. The stability and in-defeasibility
of the Torrens system would have been greatly imperiled had the
appellate courts judgment granting reconstitution prevailed,
resulting in two holders of Torrens Certificates over the same lands.
We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and
controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and has-ty
grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as well
as of the numerous purchasers who have been victimized only to find
that the lands purchased by them were covered by forged or fake
titles or their areas simply expand-ed through table surveys with
the cooperation of unscrupulous officials.
Let a copy of the decision be furnished the Honorable Minister of
Justice for the institution of appropriate criminal proceedings
against respondent and those who have assisted or conspired with
her as may be warranted by the evidence of record.
Judgment set aside and reversed. Petition dismissed.
Notes.Appellants cannot be considered exactly as possessors in
good faith because they knew at the time they entered into
possession that petitioner was the registered owner of the disputed
land. (J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Court of Ap-peals, 93 SCRA 146).
457
86

1981
People vs. Lacson
457
The herein movants, x x x x are indispensable parties in the instant

petition for reconstitution of title as it has been shown affirmatively
that they have such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in their absence, without
injuring or affecting such interest. A valid judgment cannot be
rendered for want of indispensable parties. (Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 248).
Where the party in physical possession of the land acknowledges
in a public instrument the ownership thereof in another, it follows
that the latter has, as of that time, come to be in constructive
possession of said land through the former. (Viacrucis vs. Orais, 44
SCRA 176).
Title of ownership of real property annotated in the Register of
Property constitutes notice to third person and affords protection in
favor of him who in good faith relies upon what appears in the
registry. (Dacasin vs. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 89).
o0o
87
notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted in

particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons.
Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory
requirements and procedure to be followed.
No. L-55771. November 15, 1982.

TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F.
PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F. PASCUAL,
PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL,
and CATALINA S. PASCUAL, respondents.
*
Certiorari; Appeal; A petition for review requires a more extended

discussion than in a special civil action for certiorari.Whereas the third
case categorically ruled and decided the questions of law raised therein, the
proceedings being the special civil action of certiorari attacking the
jurisdiction of the lower court, the petition at bar being a petition for
review, a more extended discussion of the issues on the merits is necessary
and more appropriate.
Land Registration; Due Process;The notice and procedural
requirements of Art. 26 on reconstitution of titles are mandatory.Republic
Act No. 26 entitled An act providing a special procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed approved on
September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First
Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act
specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that
must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire
jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition
for Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the
Same; Same; A petitioner for reconstitution of Title is duty-bound to

know the adjacent boundary owners or owners with claims overlapping the
property covered by the title to be reconstituted.The Pascuals are dutybound to know who are their actual adjacent boundary owners on all sides
and directions of their
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
274
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tahanan Development Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals
neighbors are in actual possession and occupancy not only of

porproperty. They are charged with the obligation to inquire who their
tions of their own property but also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or
obligation cannot be ignored or simply brushed aside where the location or
the properties involved is a prime site for land development, expansion,
suitable for residential, commercial and industrial purposes and where
every square inch of real estate becomes a valuable and profitable
investment. It is of public knowledge in the community of Paraaque that
Tahanan Village is a privatelyowned and occupied residential
subdivision, plainly visible to the general public by reason of the perimeter
fence or wall separating it from adjacent estates, the roads and streets
therein and leading thereto, the numerous home constructions and
buildings going on, the visible electrical, lighting and water supply
installations, the presence of private security guards thereat and the
numerous signs and billboards advertising the estate as a housing
88
development owned and/or managed by petitioner Tahanan. It is

preposterous to claim that the area is public land.
Same; Same; Posting of notice of reconstitution of title at the entrance
of the CFI is not enough; The notice of hearing must be posted also at the
main entrance of the municipal building.We also find that the Notice of
Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin board of
the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law
specifically require that the notice of the petition shall be posted on the
main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land is situated, at
the provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30 days prior
to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy Sheriff
Arsenio C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on the bulletin
board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at
the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice of
Hearing was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial building in
Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main entrance of the municipal
building of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang,
or at least in the municipal building of Paraaque where Barrio San
Dionisio was then embraced.
Same; Same; Effect of failure to notify one adjacent boundary owner
and one post notice at the entrance to the municipal building.The failure
or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of
property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having an interest, title
or claim to a substantial portion
275
VOL. 118,
NOVEMBER 15, 1982
75
(about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or
omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the
municipality on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and

at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise
of jurisdiction by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same.Having resolved the fundamental issue that the
trial court had not properly acquired nor was it duly invested with
jurisdiction to hear, determine and decide the petition for reconstitution
and accordingly all proceedings conducted thereon were rendered null and
void including the judgment issued granting the reconstitution, the
resolution of the corollary issues need no extended discussion but
considering the obvious intent to circumvent the ruling of the Supreme
Court laid down in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
93 SCRA 238, We find it imperative to make a reiteration of the pertinent
doctrines applicable to the case at bar.
Same; Action; Appeal;Intervention on appeal may be allowed in the
interest of justice.In the above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of
adjacent owners even during the pendency of the appeal from the decision
granting reconstitution, the appeal then in the Supreme Court, in the
paramount interest of justice and as an exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the
court below and alleging material and substantial interest in the property
to which title is sought to be reconstituted, in its Motion To Set Aside
Decision and Re-Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith
xerox copies of its transfer certificates of title of its properties adjoining and
even overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in
area, the trial court ought to have admitted said motion. There was
reversible error in refusing to do so.
Courts; Lower courts must adhere to resolutions of the Supreme Court.
Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the end of
the proceedings, there should and there ought to be no quibbling, much less
hesitation or circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior courts
to abide and conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well89
becoming sense of modesty and a respectful awareness of its inferior

position in the judicial hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the
appellate court to the end that a well-ordered and disciplined
administration of justice may be preserved and maintained. We cannot
allow, permit or
276
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
tolerate inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express

rulings of this Court.
Same; Actions; If movant-intervenor has a real and direct interest in
the case, he must be allowed to intervene, otherwise the proceedings would
be void for mere joinder of an indispensable party.Aside from arbitrarily
refusing to admit Tahanans intervention sought in the trial court below,
We find also grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in
not considering Tahanan as an indispensable party to the proceedings, it
having been shown positively that it has such an interest in the controversy
or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in its absence,
without injuring or affecting such interest. Again, We refer to Our ruling in
Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, and more recently in Alabang
Development Corp. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 54094, Aug.
30, 1982, that. The joinder must be ordered in order to prevent
multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter in dispute may be
determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim and intent of
the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a
complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the
judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want
of indispensable parties.
Land Registration; Courts; The trial court must verify carefully all
documents submitted to it in reconstitution of title proceedings.Time and
again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens titles issued pursuant to
the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and Presidential Decree No. 1529 have
been shaken by the very courts whose unwavering duty should be to protect
the rights and interests of title holders but instead have favored claimants
under the guise of reconstitution filed after a long lapse of time after the
Japanese occupation, alleging the existence of original and duplicate
certificates of title issued pursuant to a court decree but have subsequently
been lost or destroyed including the records of the land registration case on
account of the war and lay claim and title to valuable parcels of land
previously titled and registered under the Torrens registration system and
are even able to dispose these properties to unsuspecting homelot buyers
and speculating land developers. The courts must be cautious and careful
in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title, both
original and duplicate owners, based on documents and decrees made to
ap277
VOL. 118,
NOVEMBER 15, 1982
77
pear authentic from mere xerox copies and certifications of officials
supposedly signed with the seals of their office affixed thereon, considering
the ease and facility with which documents are made to appear as official
and authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and verify carefully
all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact,
circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence and
loss of the title should be examined.
Same; Evidence; Proofs to be submitted for reconstitution of title.
Nowhere in the voluminous records do the Pascuals cite, state, or mention
the number of said certificate of title. Not even in the tax declaration of Lot
90
2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. S and Tax Declaration No. 10187,
Exh. S-1) and Lot No. 4 (Tax Declaration No. 15424, Exh. T and Tax
Declaration No. 10188, Exh. T-1) is the number of the certificate of title
indicated. And there is absolutely no document, private or official,
presented by the Pascuals mentioning the number of the certificate of title.
petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest

Manuela Aquial have been and still are in the actual, public, exclusive,
adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the aforedescribed lands as
owners in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion
thereof to agriculture.
Same; Same; Same.There is also no proof as to when the certificate

of title was issued. Assuming that the certificate of title was issued
pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914, the date of issue of the
certificate of title must be subsequent thereto. Assuming further that her
duplicate copy was lost in 1944 during the Japanese occupation, why did
she wait until 1974 [when the first petition for reconstitution was filed
which was after thirty (30) years] to seek reconstitution of her owners copy.
Same; Same; Same.Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued

Certificate of Title No. 724 pursuant to Decree No. 15170 issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree
number and the same land registration case number, cannot present her
owners duplicate copy nor the original certificate which she claims were
lost or destroyed, including the records of Land Registration Case No. 9368
(which is not true as the Notice of Hearing therein was shown and
exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette), We find and so hold that it is the
Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious, if not non-existent, and not that
of the TuasonChangco Certificate No. 724.
Same; Same; Same.The survey plan allegedly conducted January 929, 1911 and approved July 25, 1911 as shown in Exhibit 0 is titled Plan
of Property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al., Case No.____, Court of Land
Registration. Unperfected Title No.____, Bureau of Lands. In the case of
Director of Lands vs. CA and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, et al.,
102 SCRA 370 which involved the reconstitution of the certificate of title to
Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, Bernal, petitioner therein, claimed ownership
to Lots 1 and 3 by virtue of a sales patent issued to her by the Government,
which patent, however, We ruled as fictitious. In the instant petition at bar,
We find no claim of Aquial nor her successors, the Pascuals, as to how they
acquired title in fee simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales
patent,composicion con el estado, orinformation possessoria. The only
allegation of the basis of their ownership is paragraph 3 of the petition for
reconstitution which alleges That the
278
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78
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same.At the back of Certificate of Title No. 724, We

find annotated therein a number of documents registered by the heirs of
Tuason and also the heirs of co-owner Changco. The deeds or transactions
executed on different dates and registered thereon appear normal and
there is no reason to doubt their authenticity. On the other hand, no deed,
document or transaction had been shown by the Pascuals relating to or
affecting their land from which We can infer or deduce the existence of the
original certificate of title if one was in truth and in fact issued to Aquial.
Same; Same; Same.The Pascuals claim that they have paid taxes on
the land but they can only present Exhibits U, U-1, V and V-1 to
prove their payment in lump sum of the taxes thereon for four (4) years
only, from 1970 to 1973. They have not presented proof of tax payment from
1914 to 1969, more than five (5) decades. All these omissions and failures
cannot but show the spuriousness and falsity of their claim that they were
granted a decree by the Land Registration Court, that a certificate of title
91
was issued in their name and that said certificate of title was existing and
subsisting at the time they filed the petition for reconstitution.
Same; Same; There was no such survey plan No. II-4374 in the archives
of the Bureau of Lands.The oppositor Director of Lands strongly and
stoutly maintains that there is no such plan and in support thereof, Exhibit
7 is submitted to the Court, the same being
279
VOL. 118,
NOVEMBER 15, 1982
79
the official communication of Amante R. Dumag, Officer In-Charge,
Metro Manila Region, Bureau of Lands, stating that Plan II-4374 could
not be the basis for any verification because the original plan thereof is not
subsisting in the files and records of this Bureau. Enclosed with said
communication is the xerox copy of the letter dated 30 January 1978 of
Staff Supervisor Privadi JG. Dalire. Said Exhibit 7 further states:
However, assuming that Plan II-4374 exists and using its technical
description, the same overlaps Muntinlupa Estate and Plan 61581, Lot 1,
Decree No. N-515888, O.C.T.6567 identical to Lot 4762, Cad-299,
Paraaque Cadastre.
Same; Same; Same.From the evidence submitted by the Director of
Lands, it is officially and clearly shown that Plan II-4374 was not among
those salvaged after the last World War and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy; that Plan II-4374
bearing Accession No. 385637 is not authentic and does not and has never
represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by the
Director of lands; that on July 17, 1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then
Chief of the Survey Records Division, certified that his division has no copy
of Plan II-4374 and that on May 15, 1970, Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired
surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the
alleged source of data being Accession No. 195551 which, however, turned
out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land
pertaining thereto is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of
Pandan, Province of Leyte.
Same; The Torrens Title of Tahanan Development Corporation over the
properties at bar must be respected.The Torrens titles of petitioner
Tahanan and the numerous transfers therefrom to innocent purchasers for
value must be respected and protected in order to achieve the real purpose
of the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land x x x and once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84;
Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593; Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).
Aquino, J., concurring in the result:

Land Registration, The decision in the Bagatsing and Alabang cases
has already rendered this Tahanan case moot and
280
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
academic.That decision in theBagatsing and Alabang case rendered

this Tahanancase moot and academic. This case has to be decided in the
same manner as the Alabang and Bagatsing case because this Court had
already set aside Judge Valenzuelas decision and dismissed the petition for
reconstitution. All that is necessary is to set aside the above-mentioned
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1980.
Same; Same.As in the Bernal case, the decree and title sought to be
reconstituted and the land claimed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial are
92
imaginary or pure fabrications. See J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano,
L-33140, October 23, 1978, 85 SCRA 644, where the sisters Manuela and
Maria Aquial unsuccessfully assailed OCT No. 735 covering the Santa
Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo.
PETITION for review the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Rizal, Br. XXIX.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner.
Ramon S. Nievo for private respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
There are three cases recently decided by the Supreme Court that
are directly related to and squarely identified with the petition at
bar, namely, (1) Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., respondents, Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor,
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing,
intervenors, No. L-45168 September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238, (2) The
Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria
Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents, Greenfield Development
Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, L-45168, January 27, 1981 102
SCRA 370, and (3) Alabang Development Corp. and Ramon D.
Bagatsing, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel F. Valen-zuela, et al.,
respondents,G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982.
In the first case, Our Resolution admitted the intervention of the
intervenors filed before the Supreme Court at the stage
281

1982
281
Tahanan Development Corp. vs.

Court of Appeals
of the proceedings where trial of the petition for judicial
reconstitution had already been concluded, the judgment thereon
granting the reconstitution had been promulgated and on appeal by
the losing party, the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
the petition for certiorari to review said judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. The second case is Our
decision on the merits of the certiorari petition wherein We ruled,
among others, that the judgment of the lower court granting the
petition for judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42449 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in the name of Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal covering two parcels of land located in Barrio
San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Rizal (now Barrio Cupang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal) denominated as Lots 1 and 3 of
Plan II-4374 based on a survey approved July 25, 1911 with an area
of 717,523 square meters and 717,539 square meters, respectively,
was null and void for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Republic Act No. 26. We further held that TCT No.
42449 was fake and spurious.
In the third case, the Supreme Court directly ruled that the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch
XXIX, in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P Land Registration Case No.
9368, Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding, ordering the
reconstitution from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical
descriptions, the alleged certificate of title, original and owners
duplicate copy over Lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 situated in
Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, in the name of Manuela Aquial, was null and
void.
93
The instant petition for review similarly assails the validity of the
same judgment ordering the reconstitution of the Certificate of Title,
original and owners duplicate copy, over the same lots, Lots 2 and 4,
of the same plan, Plan II-4374, in the name of the said Manuela
Aquial, promulgated in the same Reconstitution Case No. 504-P,
Land Registration Case No. 9368, Court of First Instance of Pasay
City, Branch XXIX, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding. The said
case at bar was brought by petitioner Tahanan Development
Corporation
282
282
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
while the third case was instituted by Alabang Development

Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioners.
Whereas the third case categorically ruled and decided the
questions of law raised therein, the proceedings being the special
civil action of certiorari attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court,
the petition at bar being a petition for review, a more extended
discussion of the issues on the merits is necessary and more
appropriate. Thus, We start by noting that herein petition for review
seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
promulgated April 30, 1980 reversing an earlier decision of the same
Court dated November 16, 1979 in CA-G.R. No. SP-08680-R entitled
Tahanan Development Corporation, petitioner, versus Hon. Manuel
E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents, as well as the subsequent
resolution dated December 8, 1980 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as TAHANAN, claiming grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent Judge, further seeks the
setting aside of the decision rendered by the latter in Reconstitution

Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368, dated October 5,
1978 in favor of herein private respondents Nicolas A. Pascual and
his co-heirs, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Register of Deeds of Metro

Manila, Makati Branch IV, is hereby ordered to reconstitute from Decree
No. 15170, Exhibit X, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the
Courtthe certificate of title, original and owners duplicate copy, in the
name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence at 307, 15th
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number
which will not conflict with other titles already issued upon payment of the
prescribed fees. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to forward a certified
copy of this decision and all documents necessary for the reconstitution.
(Rollo, p. 66).
The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private

respondents hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals, claiming as
intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967,
filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of lost certificate of title
under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as
283
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1982
Court of Appeals
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City,
presided by respondent Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, alleging that:
x x x
2. That Manuela Aquial, the petitioners predecessor-in-interest, while
yet single and up to the time she got married, was the registered owner of
those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan II-4374, situated in
94
Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
and more particularly bounded as follows:
1). A parcel of land (Lot 2 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. No. ___), situated in the Barrio of
San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now BO. CUPANG,
Muntinlupa, Rizal) (x x x x containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy Five
Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty-Two (375,622) Square Meters. Bounded on the
NE., NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 by Pedro L. Flores who is in occupation
of the same and of which notice maybe served at his office address at No. 959 C.
Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila or at his residence at No. 707 A. Constancia
Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and on the SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot I,
Plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private corporation
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of
the same and of which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B. Maglana, its
President and Chairman of the Board at No. 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills
Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal;
2) A parcel of land (Lot 4 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. Record No. __), situated in the
Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now Bo.
Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal) (x x x x containing an area of Fifty-Six Thousand Two
Hundred Ninety-Five (56,295) Square Meters. Bounded on the NW., and SW., along
lines 1-2-3 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) and on the SE., NE., and NW., along
lines 3-4-5-1 (Portion of Lot 3, Plan II-4374), all by Maglana & Sons Management
Corporation, a private corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of which notice may be served
to it C/O Constancio B. Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board, at No.
513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
284
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
The above lots are more particularly described in herein attached Decree No. 15170
issued on March 4, 1914 with the same boundaries and description contained in
the corresponding original certificate of title (original and owners duplicate copy)
issued therefor in Land Registration Case No. 9368 on file with the Land
Registration Commission; that said lands have not been included in any cadastral
survey;
3. That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-ininterest Manuela Aquial have been and still are in the actual, public,
exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the aforedescribed lands as owners in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a
small portionthereof to agriculture;
4. That the said original certificate of title, original and owners
duplicate copies, covering said lands have been lost or destroyed in the last
World War II and diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain;
that said title was subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances of any kind and nature up to
the present; that the records of the land registration case of the same lots
have likewise been lost and destroyed except such records as hereinafter set
forth;
5. That there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any
land grant over said lands to any person or entity; that no Coowners,
Mortgagees, Lessees or any lien holders copy of said Original Certificate
of Title have ever been issued; that Manuela Aquial as well as her first and
second husbands, Esteban Pascual and Cornelio Mejia and petitioners
herein have not at any time delivered the Owners Duplicate copy of subject
certificate of title to any person or entity to secure the payment of or
performance of any obligation whatsoever nor any transaction entered into
by them by which certain deed or other instruments related to or affecting
the subject lands presented for or pending registration in the office of the
Register of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila;
6. That said Manuela Aquial died intestate in Cubao, Quezon City on
January 26, 1967 leaving the aforementioned estate to the herein
petitioners as her heirs, without debts;
7. That for purposes of said inheritance, the petitioners desire in this
petition to reconstitute the lost original certificate of title, Original and
Owners Duplicate copies, covering said Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 herein
95
above described, on the basis of: (1) Said Decree No. 15170 issued on March
4, 1914 (Annex A) and the certification thereof by the Chief, Docket
Division, Land Registration Commission (Annex A-1); (2) Survey Plan II4374 from microfilm Reel 560
285

1982
Court of Appeals
under Accession No. 385657 on file with the Bureau of Lands (Annex B);
and certification thereof (Annex B-1), and the corresponding affidavit of
the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands, attesting to such fact
(Annex B-2); (3) Certified Technical Description of Lots 2 and 4 under
said Plan II-4374, by the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands
(Annexes C and C-1); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief, Records
Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record of any Sales Patent,
Sales Certificates or any land grant affecting or embracing the subject
lands to any person (Annex D); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes E, E-1,
E-2 and E-3); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes F and F-1); (7) Affidavit of
adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed before Notary Public Atty. F.S.
Guanco for Quezon City (Annex G); (8) White print copy of Relocation
Plan dated July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic Engineer
Restituto L. Beltran who conducted said relocation survey of Lots Nos. 2
and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the adjoining owners (Annex H). All
of which are xerox copies and made integral parts of this petition but the
originals thereof shall be presented at the hearing.
On October 5, 1977, the Notice of Hearing was issued by the Court

and likewise, for its materiality in resolving the issue of jurisdiction,
We quote the material portions thereof below:
NOTICE OF HEARING
A verified petition dated September 2, 1977 has been filed by petitioners,

thru counsel, alleging, among others, that:
(Paragraphs 1 to 7 are omitted, being the same allegations in the Petition for
Reconstitution hereinbefore quoted.)
Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that this petition will be heard
before this Court, sitting on the 2nd floor, New City Hall Building, F.B.
Harrison, Pasay City, Metro Manila, on the 18th day of November, 1977, at
8:30 oclock in the morning, at which date, time and place, all interested
parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause, if any why said petition
should not be granted.
Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official Gazette and in the
Newspaper of general circulation in the Greater Manila Area, once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and
likewise posted in the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay
City.
286
286
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
Let the Office of the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of
Lands be furnished this Notice and copies of the petition, together with its
annexes.
WITNESS the HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, presiding Judge of
this Court, this 5th day of October, 1977.
(SGD.) BASILIO B. BOLANTE
The above notice was published in the Official Gazette in the issues
of November 14, 21 and 28 1977 (Exhibits A, B, B-1. C, C-1,
D, D-1, E and E-1). Copies of the same notice were also posted
by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio de Guzman of Pasay City in the Bulletin
96
Board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch

located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City on
October 5, 1977 (Exhibit F). On the same date, copies of the notice
were served to the Office of the Solicitor General and on November 9,
1977, to the Commissioner of Land Registration by Deputy Sheriff De
Guzman (Exhibit F), together with copies of the petition and its
annexes. The proofs submitted of notice to the adjacent owners
indicated in the Petition and Notice of Hearing, namely, Pedro L.
Flores with address at 959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila and
Constancio B. Maglana as President and Chairman of the Board of
Maglana & Sons Management Corporation with office and postal
address at 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, are their respective affidavits dated July 17,
1974 and August 6, 1974 (Exhibits H and I).
The Director of Lands thru counsel, Atty. Daniel C. Florida, Special

Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed on April 14, 1978 an
Opposition to the petition on the following grounds:
1. That the same petitioners in this Reconstitution Case No. 504-P,
Nicolas A. Pascual, et al. claiming to be the heirs of the late Manuela
Aquial, had previously filed a similar petition for reconstitution of the
alleged lost original certificate of title supposed to have been issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 under Decree No. 15170 in the name of
Manuela Aquial over the same parcels of
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land, Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, which previous petition, docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, appears
to have been dismissed, Oppositor Director of Lands hereby reserves his

right to present later a certified copy of the order of dismissal, as he has not
yet received a reply of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance,
Branch XXXVI, to our letter to him dated March 14, 1978, duplicate copy
hereto attached as Annex A, requesting for a certified copy of the order or
decision resolving said Reconstitution Case No. 77, which order or decision
may be a dismissal with prejudice and may thus be a bar to the filing of the
instant Reconstitution Case No. 504-P based on the principle of res
judicata;
2. That contrary to the claim of petitioners that the aforementioned Lots
2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal were
issued Decree No. 15170 on March 4, 1914 in the name of Manuela Aquial
in Land Registration Case No. 9368 and that the corresponding original
certificate of title for said Decree were registered and issued under the said
Decree, the truth is that said Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case
No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina
Geronimo, and Eugenio T. Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian,
covering a parcel of land with an area of 422 square meters situated at
Bambang; Pasig, Rizal, and not for Lots 2 and 4 Plan II-4374 with a total
area of 431,917 square meters situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal. These facts are evidenced by the letter dated February 28, 1978 of
the Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, the letter dated March 9, 1978 of the
same Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, and the Report dated November 11,
1974 of the then Register of Deeds of Rizal submitted to him as required by
the court in the previous Reconstitution Case No. 77 filed with Branch
XXXVI of this Honorable Court at Makati, Rizal, xerox copies of said letters
and report are hereto attached as ANNEX B, ANNEX C and ANNEX
D, respectively;
3. That from the documents ANNEXES B, C, and D, it is very clear
that no original certificate of title had or has been issued to Manuela
Aquial covering Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374, situated at Bo. San Dionisio,
Paraaque, Rizal; that consequently, no original certificate of title in the
name of Manuela Aquial has been lost; and that therefore, this instant
97
petition for reconstitution of an alleged lost original certificate of title has

no basis in fact and in law, there being no title to be reconstituted under
Republic Act No. 26;
288
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4. That the applicants for land registration in Land Registration Case No.
9368, Decree No. 15170, of the then Court of Land Registration were
Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, and not Manuela Aquial; and that the land
subject thereof was a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, and not a
parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal;
5. That the same Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368
issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, et al. for a parcel of land in Bambang,
Pasig, Rizal could not have been also issued in the name of Manuela Aquial
for a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal;
6. That the genuineness or authenticity of ANNEX A of the petition in
this case which is alleged to be a copy of Decree No. 15170 issued in the
name of Manuela Aquial is very questionable on the following grounds and
points:
(a) ANNEX A is a xerox copy not of the original of Decree No. 15170 or of an
authenticated copy thereof but only of an unauthenticated true copy of said decree
as indicated by the typewritten words A true copy: at the bottom of the left hand
corner of page (2) of said document;
(b) The said typewritten words A true copy: is not signed or even initiated by
any competent officer of the court of the Land Registration Commission to give it
authenticity;
(c) That ANNEX A is a xerox copy of the original of Decree No. 15170 of an
authenticated copy thereof but only of a true copy is also seen from the first line on
top of the document on page 1 which reads: Copy of Decree No. 15170. An original
of a Decree is issued without the words Copy of prefixed before the Decree
Number;
(d) ANNEX A being a mere xerox copy of an authenticated true copy, it is
very questionable why the true copy which was reproduced by the xerox copy
marked ANNEX A bears the written signature of the Clerk of Court, Enrique
Altavas by way of attestation of the decree. It is well known that a mere true copy
of any document, public or private, does not bear the written signature of the party
or officer signing or issuing the document. Only the original or duplicate of the
document may bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or issuing
the document;
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(e) In ANNEX A-1 of the petition in the instant case, alleged to be a certification
of Decree No. 15170, what appears to have been certified by the Chief, Docket
Division of the Land Registration Commission is that the document (Decree No.
15170) is a true and correctreproduction of a true copy of Decree No. 15170. Where
is the original or an authentic signed duplicate of Decree No. 15170?
(f) ANNEX F, either the xerox copy of a true copy, or the true copy reproduced
by the xerox copy, is an UNAUTHENTICATED copy of the alleged decree, and
therefore, it cannot be the valid basis for reconstitution under Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 26;
7. That contrary to the allegation in paragraph 3 of the petition, petitioners

by themselves and thru their predecessor-in-interest Manuela Aquial have
not been in the actual, exclusive and continuous occupation of the lands
subject of their petitions since time immemorial, the truth of the matter
being that their alleged occupation is only of recent vintage, having
declared the lots for taxation only in 1973, beginning with the year 1970
(ANNEXES E, E-1, E-2, and E-3), and paid the taxes for 1970 to
1973 in lump sum on September 6, 1973 (ANNEXES F and F-1);
98
8. That Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 have never been applied for and
registered under the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, the same being
lands of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and
are portions of the adjoining public land as indicated in Plan II-4374,
subject to disposition only under the pertinent and applicable provisions of
the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;
9. That not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case have been
established and therefore, this Honorable Court has not acquired
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case under Republic Act No. 26, for the
reason that petitioners thru counsel have failed to serve notice of the
petition in this case to the owners of the adjoining properties. The affidavits
of the alleged adjoining owners, Constancio B. Maglana and Pedro L. Flores
submitted by petitioners as Exhibits H and I respectively, and which
were executed in 1974 before the petition in the instant case was filed on
November 15, 1977, cannot be validly admitted as substitute for service of
notice of the petition to the adjoining owners as required under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 26; and
290
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
10. That the instant petition for reconstitution should be dismissed

outright for lack of factual and legal basis, the Decree No. 15170 involved
by petitioners having been issued in favor of other persons named Eugenio
Tuason, et al. for a different parcel of land located in another barrio and
municipality.
On November 18, 1977, the date scheduled for the hearing as

indicated in the Notices, the Court re-set the hearing of the case to
February 27, 1978, it appearing that the Notice of Hearing had not
been published in the Official Gazette as per information relayed to
the Court by the petitioners. Again, the hearing set on February 27,
1978 was re-scheduled to April 14, 1978 in view of the manifestation
of the representative of the Bureau of Lands that they have not
received copy of the petition. Once more, the latter setting was
cancelled and re-set to June 2, 1978 on the ground that the counsel
for petitioner informed the Court that they have just received the
Opposition dated April 11, 1978 filed by Solicitor Daniel Florida.
Meanwhile, the Pascuals filed their Reply to the Opposition
alleging, among others, that they had filed a previous petition
docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal which was voluntarily
withdrawn by them on grounds stated by their counsel in his Motion
to Withdraw without prejudice and granted by the Court in its Order
dated May 30, 1975; that the report of the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal mentioning that Decree No. 15170 appears in the name of
Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco in Original Certificate of
Title No. 724 does not preclude the existence of Decree No. 15170
issued in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land Registration Case No.
9368 since, assuming the report of the Register of Pasig to be
accurate, it could have been a clerical error or mistake of the clerk in
the office of the Register of Deeds in typing on the Original
Certificate of Title No. 724 the same Decree No. and the same
Registration No. as that issued in favor of Manuela Aquial; and that
there may be two decrees bearing the same number but involving
different parcels of land is nothing unusual or surprising, in the
same manner that there may be two or three certificates of titles
bearing the same number but
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1982
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Court of Appeals
in the names of different owners covering properties in different
places and issued at different periods of time.
The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution in its
decision dated October 5, 1978. The court said:
The documents presented by the petitioners to establish the existence of
the prerequisites to reconstitution of the title in the name of their
predecessor-in-interests were either admitted or not objected to by Atty.
Rodolfo J. Flores in representation of the Director of Lands, except Exhibits
O and P on Plan II-4374 on the alleged ground that they were reproduced
from a microfilm reel and not from available approved records, as well as
Exhibits X, X-1 and X-2 (Decree No. 15170), on the ground that they were
mere xerox copies not of the original of the Decree or an authenticated copy
thereof.
Counsel for oppositor overlooks the realities that forced the petitioners
to seek reconstitution of the title of their predecessor-in-interests. The
original of the Decree was sent to the register of deeds for the issuance of
the certificate of title. It was in the latter office that it was lost. The copy
left in the Land Registration Commission is authenticated by the signature
of the Clerk of Court of the Land Registration Court, Enrique Altavas. To
limit the bases of reconstitution to originals of the official documents is to
defeat the purpose of the law. Reason and the law would not justify private
properties to remain forever with their titles unreconstituted.
The grounds for the objection disregards the destruction of many
government records during the last world war and defeats the purpose of
the law on reconstitution. If those records were not destroyed, there would
be no need for reconstitution. The loss and destruction underscore the need
for reconstitution. Reconstitution or reconstruction relates to lost original
records in the government offices. Any data available may suffice if the
Court is convinced of the existence of the title being reconstituted. This is
in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Villa vs.
Fabricante, L-5531, June 30, 1953. If the law allows reconstitution from
testimony a fortiori it must allow reconstitution upon xerox copies of

documents microfilmed in anticipation of possible loss thereof. The
microfilm underscores the existence of the documents, for without them
there would be nothing to microfilm. The Government has enjoined by
Decree the microfilming of important documents.
By and large, the presence of the signature of the Clerk of Court of the
land registration court on the Decree attests to its genuineness and
authenticity. He is too dead to falsify the Decree Exhibit X.
292
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
Except Exhibit 5 which is a xerox copy of a cancelled owners duplicate copy

of Certificate of Title No. 724 and which mentions Decree No. 15170, the
oppositors documentary evidence are letters of inquiry and replies thereto.
By their very nature, they are too weak as basis to establish any fact. The
writers thereof were not presented as witnesses to be cross-examined on
their contents. The witness who was presented to identity the exhibits was
not the receiver nor custodian of said communications. He admittedly does
not know the contents thereof.
Exhibit 5, a supposed cancelled owners duplicate of the title of Eugenio
Tuason which mentions Decree No. 15170 refers to a422square meter lot in
Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, which is different from the Decree Exhibit X for the
two lots in Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, having a total area of 431,917
square meters. The existence of the owners duplicate copy in the office of
the register of deeds without the original is a suspicious circumstance
never explained by anybody. The mystery goes deeper if we consider that no
other document, private or public, was presented to support the existence of
the original title or the decree upon which the title was based. Nobody even
testified on the existence of this Exhibit 5 in the office of the register of
deeds.
100
The Decree Exhibit X enjoys the probative value of an official document

existing in the proper depositary unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion. The law reposes probative force upon the official documents as it
presumes fidelity in the discharge of duties of public officers. The
authenticity of the Decree issued in favor of petitioners predecessor having
been established, the Decree Exhibit X shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto and shall be conclusive upon all persons, including the Insular
Government and all branches thereof, and incontrovertible after one year
from the issuance of the Decree (Sec. 30, Act 496).
Reconstitution of destroyed certificates of title is mandatory (Director
vs. Gan Tan, L-2664, May 30, 1951). The bases for judicial reconstitution of
certificates of title are numerous (Secs. 2 and 3, Rep. Act 26). Among them
are:
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration x x x (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 26)
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title (Secs. 2, 3,
Rep. Act 26).
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1982
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In the light of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming evidence
adduced by the petitioners in support of their petition for the reconstitution
of the title in the name of Manuela Aquial, the court has no alternative to
granting the petition. Republic Act 26 provides:
SEC. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as
supported by parole evidence or other wise, are sufficient and proper to warrant
the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that the petitioner
is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the
description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as
those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of

reconstitution shall be issued.
The requirements of Sections 5, 12, and 13 of Republic Act 26 have been

complied with. The Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of the
witnesses for the petitioners, particularly the government officials
subpoenaed who had occasion and reason to know the facts they testified to,
being parts of their functions and duties in their respective offices.
The Court discerns nothing from the opposition which Atty. Florida
filed for the Director of Lands except his seal to protect possible
interests of the Government. From the sparks created by his
opposition, the Court saw the crystal truth.
Copy of the above decision was served the Land Registration
Commission on October 16, 1978.
On November 15, 1978, herein petitioner Tahanan Development
Corporation filed with the Court a quo verified Petition To Set Aside
Decision and Re-Open Proceedings, alleging that:
x x x
2. Sometime in 1971, in the course of its operations, Oppositor acquired
and became the registered owner of six (6) parcels of land situated in
Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal (now MetroManila) and aggregating
some sixty (60) hectares in area; xerox copies of the certificates of title, all
of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, covering said parcels of
land and issued in Op294
294
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
positors name are attached to and made an integral part of this Petition as
follows:
Annex AT.C.T. No. 324558
101
Annex BT.C.T. No. 324559

Annex CT.C.T. No. 324560
Annex DT.C.T. No. 324561
Annex ET.C.T. No. 324562
Annex FT.C.T. No. 351775
All of said certificates of title originated from the mother title Original
Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, issued
pursuant to Decree No. 515888 issued in Land Registration Case No. 776, a
copy of said O.C.T. No. 6567 is attached to and made an integral part of
this Petition as Annex A;
3. The aforementioned certificates of title, Annexes A to F, were later
wholly or partly superseded by individual certificates of title, about one
thousand four hundred (1,400) in all and also in Oppositors name, covering
the individual home lots, street lots and other spaces into which the lands
above referred to were subdivided in the course of the development of what
are now known as Phase I and Phase II of Oppositors Tahanan Village,
and while ownership of, and registered title to, some of the home lots have
since passed to individual buyers by virtue of final sales, a considerable
number of said certificates of title still remain in the name of Oppositor;
4. Under date of October 5, 1978, this Honorable Court rendered a
Decision in the above-entitled proceedings, granting the Petitioners
petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate of title, original and owners
duplicate, allegedly issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4,
1914 in Case No. 9368 of the land Registration Court, and directing the
register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV:
x x x to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit K, the plan and technical
descriptions submitted to the court the certificate of title, original and owners
duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence at
307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number
which will not conflict with other titles already issued upon payment of the
prescribed fees. x x x
5. The land supposedly covered by the certificate of title thus ordered

reconstituted appears to consist of two (2) parcels located in
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Court of Appeals
Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, with an aggregate area of forty
three (43) hectares, more or less, the technical descriptions of which are set
forth in the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land Registration Case No.
9368 relied upon by Petitioners;
6. Upon a comparison of said technical descriptions with those set forth
in the certificates of title, Annexes A to F of the present Petition, it
would appear that the land supposedly covered by the certificate of title
ordered reconstituted overlap and include substantial portions of
Oppositors lands covered by the titles, Annexes A to F; the location and
extent of the overlapping, as plotted on the basis of the respective technical
descriptions referred to, is shown on the sketch plan, marked Annex H,
which is attached to and made an integral part of this Petition;
7. Oppositor, therefore, has a substantial, material and proprietary
interest in the subject matter of these proceedings which is directly and
adversely affected by the Decision already referred to;
8. Oppositor, as the owner of lands not only adjacent to, but in fact
overlapped by, the land supposedly covered by the title sought to be
reconstituted, was entitled to personal notice of the petition for
reconstitution; such requirement of notice is jurisdictional, being mandated
by section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, and the consequence of failure to
comply therewith is that the court never acquires jurisdiction to entertain
and hear the petition or render valid judgment thereon.
The salient feature of this method (of judicial reconstitution under Republic Act
No. 26) is a petition and a hearing after two successive insertions in the Official
Gazette of the notice of hearing. It partakes of the nature of an original registration
proceedings, personal service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and
occupants being essential, as well as posting of the notice in main entrances of the
Provincial and Municipal Buildings where the land lies at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. (Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, p. 272).
102
9. Oppositor, as such adjoining owner, was not given notice of the

petition for reconstitution; these proceedings were instituted, set for
hearing, were heard and went to judgment without Oppositors knowledge;
indeed, it was only on or about November 9, 1978, more than one month
after the date of the Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution, and
only because another adjoining owner similarly
296
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
affected saw fit to so inform it, that Oppositor first learned of the existence
of the present proceedings;
10. Opppositor was denied due process and deprived of its day in court
through fraud, accident or mistake, consisting in that Petitioners, knowing
or being chargeable with knowledge that the Tahanan Village is a
privately-owned and operated residential subdivision and that Oppositor is
the owner/developer thereof, failedand to all indications by deliberate
designto name Oppositor as adjoining owner or occupant in their petition
for reconstitution; and Petitioners did more than fail to name Oppositor as
an adjoining owner and to serve it notice of these proceedings, it would
appear that they actively concealed or sought to conceal such fact; in the
survey plan, Exhibit V, submitted by them to the Court which, by its
terms, is based on a survey made as late as July 7-12, 1974, the area where
Oppositors Tahanan Village would lie is described as public land; and
these circumstances directly led to and produced the results already stated,
namely, that Oppositor, never having been notified of the petition for
reeonstitution, was not able to oppose the same or to be heard thereon;
11. The gravity and inexcusable character of Petitioners conduct above
complained of is made manifest by the fact that for several years now, the
existence of Tahanan Village as a privately-owned and occupied
residential subdivision has been made apparent to all and sundry by such
prominent features as the perimeter fence or wall separating it from

adjacent estates, the roads, streets and constantly increasing volume of
home construction within the subdivision itself, the very visible electrical
lighting and water supply installations, the presence of private security
guards guarding the premises, to mention only a few; moreover, it has a
number of signs of conspicuous size and location identifying and
advertising it as a housing development owned and/or managed by
Oppositor; all of said circumstances render it hardly conceivable that
Petitioners, who hold themselves out as actual possessors of the property
involved in these proceedings (p. 3 Decision), could even innocently
misapprehend the adjoining development (Tahanan Village) as ownerless
and untenanted;
12. Oppositor has good and meritorious grounds to oppose the petition
for reconstitution; one of such groundsand a principal oneis that Land
Registration Case No. 9368 and Decree No. 15170 issued therein, which
Petitioners invoke and rely upon, in actual fact refer, not to the lands
claimed by said Petitioners, but to another parcel of land only some 422
square meters in area and located in Bar297

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rio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, that by virtue of said Decree, Original
Certificate of Title No. 724 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued in
the names of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and that said land
eventually passed to its present owners, Pedro Tuason, et al., under the
current Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77516 (Rizal) and Agripino
Changco, et al., under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77515 (Rizal) which
was later superseded by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 150102 and
150103;
103
13. Oppositor is ready, if its present Petition is granted, to produce

persuasive evidence of the facts above averred, evidence which perforce will
also show the proofs, both oral and documentary, adduced by Petitioners in
support of the petition for reconstitution to be untrustworthy and wanting
in requisite integrity, hence inadequate and insufficient to warrant grant of
the reconstitution sought;
14. The Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution is not yet final,
the Land Registration Commission having been served with copy thereof on
October 16, 1978; the thirty-day period for finality prescribed in section
110, 2nd paragraph, of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has not yet expired;
x x x.
On the same day, November 15, 1978. Alabang Development

Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a Petition To Set Aside
The Decision of October 5, 1978, claiming that the Court has no
jurisdiction to grant the petition for reconstitution since they have
not been personally notified of the pendency of the reconstitution
case to which they are entitled under Republic Act No. 26 not only as
adjoining owners but as actual possessors thereof; that
granting arguendothat the title subject to be reconstituted is valid,
which it is not, the same cannot prevail over the earlier titles of
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing under
TCT No. 45397 and TCT No. 45398 which are transfers from the
Original Certificate of Title No. 684 in the name of the Government
of the Philippine Islands issued on September 20, 1913 pursuant to
Decree No. 4552 issued August 27, 1910; and that the overlapping of
the area of the title sought to be reconstituted on the area of the
parcels of land evidenced by the titles of Alabang Development
Corporation and Bagatsing would result in a case of the same land
registered in the name of two different persons.
298
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed Notice of
Appeal and a Motion for Extension to File Record on Appeal on
November 16, 1978. Respondent Judge in his Order of November 23,
1978 granted the Solicitor Generals motion, extending the period for
appeal for another thirty days from date of its issuance but did not
pass upon nor resolve the petitions to set aside and re-open
proceedings filed by Tahanan, Alabang Development Corporation
and Ramon D. Bagatsing, the Court ruling that:
The oppositor Director of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, was a party in the proceedings before this Court. Said oppositor
had adopted to resort to appeal as the appropriate remedy. The Court finds
it, therefore, unnecessary to resolve the Petition To Set Aside Decision and
To Re-Open Proceedings filed by Tahanan Development Corporation and
the Petition to Set Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978 filed by the
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing.
Copy of the above Order was served on Tahanan thru counsel on

December 12, 1978. On December 14, 1978, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of said Order of November 23, 1978 alleging that
the shelving of its Petition To Set Aside Decision was equivalent to
a denial thereof; that the effect of such shelving if maintained up to
the perfection of the appeal of the Director of Lands would be to deny
petitioner recourse both in the court of the respondent Judge and in
the appellate court, because the respondent Judge would then lose
jurisdiction over the proceedings and petitioner, not yet actually a
party to the proceedings but only seeking to be admitted as such,
could not intervene in the appeal to protect its interest; that the
Petition To Set Aside, the purpose of which was precisely to effect the
104
admission of petitioner as a party and to allow it an opportunity to

present evidence opposing the reconstitution, was sufficient in form
and substance to merit resolution and approval; and that
considerations of justice, fairness, due process and correct procedure
dictated that the Petition To Set-Aside be first resolved before
allowing the appeal of the Director of Lands to proceed to perfection.
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Court of Appeals
The Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing and submitted on
December 19, 1978. As of December 21, 1978, when the period for
appeal extended in favor of oppositor Director of Lands was about to
expire on December 23, 1978 and said Director of Lands had not yet
filed a record on appeal, the possibility that once the record on appeal
is filed, the approval thereof with the consequent perfection of appeal
and transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court can come at any
moment. Since the Petition To Set Aside and the Motion for
Reconsideration were still pending or awaiting resolution, the same
would be rendered moot and academic and petitioner left without
remedy in both the trial court and the appellate court. To forestall
that eventuality and to preserve recourse in the matter, petitioner
opted to file a Petition for Certiorari with the appellate court without
further awaiting resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, the
petition docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08680.
The Director of Lands failed to perfect its appeal with the Court of
Appeals. Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D.
Bagatsing did not interpose any appeal.
Petitioner in its Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP08680)
claiming arbitrariness and grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge for by-passing its Petition To Set Aside, and for not
acting on its Motion for Reconsideration after hearing and
submission despite awareness of the fact that the period of appeal
extended by the Court was about to lapse and raising the issue of
whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution case
despite absence of personal notice to it as adjoining owner, prayed for
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order for the
preservation of the status quo in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P by
prohibiting and restraining the respondent Judge, and his successors
in office, from scheduling, conducting or otherwise entertaining,
setting in motion, or continuing, all and any further proceedings and
incidents in said case, particularly, but not limited to, proceedings
relative or leading to the perfection of the final judgment on the
Petition for Certiorari or until further orders from the Court of
Appeals.
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Respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to Tahanans petition

in the Resolution of December 29, 1978. Respondent Judge was
likewise ordered to resolve petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. A
bond was filed by petitioner on January 9, 1979 and thereupon a
restraining order was issued enjoining the respondent Judge from
taking any action in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P which will make
him lose jurisdiction over said case such that he can no longer act on
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, dated December 14, 1978. If
any such action has already been taken, the same shall be set aside
by respondent Judge.
105
Under legal compulsion, respondent Judge resolved Tahanans

Motion for Reconsideration on January 4, 1979. He denied it.
On November 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of
the petitioner, ruling that respondent Judge did not exercise sound
discretion in refusing to re-open the case below so that Tahanan
could protect its property rights which could possibly be impaired by
the reconstitution. The appellate court granted the Petition for
Certiorari on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The PROPERTY must now be of substantial value because, even at
P100.00 per square meter, its more than 43 hectares could be worth some
P43 million.
According to TAHANAN (Annex H of its Motion to Reopen), Lot No. 2 of
the PROPERTY overlaps a substantial part of its own land. Although the
exact area of the overlap has been given, it can be estimated at about 10
hectares, which can be worth P10 million. The value of the land which
TAHANAN seeks to protect is such as should have induced the lower court
to reopen the CASE BELOW to give an opportunity to TAHANAN to prove
its contentions. Denial of reopening, even if technically possible as a matter
of law, would not be equitable.
2. It is more or less of public knowledge that the Land Registration
Commission has been charged with anomalies. The lower court should have
reopened the CASE BELOW if only to assure itself that Exh. X is not an
anomaly committed by the Commission, a possibility which TAHANAN
might be able to show.
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The lower court had already shoved aside the proposition advanced by the
Director of Lands that Exh. X issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368
was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco covering a
parcel of 422 sq. m. situated in the Municipality of Pasig. Respondent

Judge concluded that the title allegedly issued (Exh. 5) was a result of that
Decree was only a photostat and was weak evidence, as the supposed
original could not be found in the office of the Register of Deeds. But
TAHANAN could prove through the Official Gazette of December 13, 1913
(pp. 198, 200, Rollo) that in Land Registration Case No. 9368, the
applicants were Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and not
MANUELA Aquial. While Exh. X could be a forgery, the Official Gazette
cannot be spurious. Accidentally, if respondent Judge found that Exhibit 5
was weak as it was only a copy, under the same token he should neither
have given credence to Exh. X, which was also merely a xerox copy.
3. It has been noted that the certification made by the deceased Enrique
Altavas of Exh. X bears no date. That is an important factor to ascertain;
not only for the determination of the genuineness of his signature, but also
for the determination of the plausible reason why the certification was
made. As a rule, signatures can be established as genuine by comparison
with accepted true signatures executed around the same date.
4. It has also been further noted that there is no record that a Torrens
title had been issued in the name of MANUELA as no mertion of the
number thereof is in the record. It certainly would be strange if no title had
been issued since 1914. If a title had been issued, the number thereof
should have been mentioned in one document or other, executed after 1914.
For example in the tax declarations submitted by MANUELA before and
after the war, the number of her title (or the fact that it has been lost)
would have been mentioned.
5. Exh. X was supposed to have been issued to MANUELA on March 4,
1914 when she was still single.However, her son, Nicolas A. Pascual,
testified in 1977 or 1978 that he was then 67 years old. He must have been
born in 1910 which would belie thatMANUELA was still single in 1914.
6. In a re-opening, TAHANAN may ask for a relocation survey to be
actually made of the property by placing new monuments. It should be
advisable that such a relocation survey in the presence of the parties be
106
made so that possible occupants and adjoining owners will have direct and
personal knowledge of the reconstitution proceedings.
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7. The appeal by the government will not adequately protect the rights of
TAHANAN and other land owners who may be affected by the
reconstitution. For one thing, the Government did not introduce its own
handwriting expert, which TAHANAN might do, in order to assail the
authenticity of Exh. X. Ordinarily, whether a signature in a xerox copy is
genuine or forged is difficult to determine.
The Court of Appeals further sustained the right of Tahanan to be

heard in the case below on the basis of and in accordance with theResolution of the Supreme Court of September 25, 1979 inDirector of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-45168, the first case mentioned
at the beginning hereof as one of the three cases recently decided by
Us that are directly related to and squarely identified with the
petition at bar wherein We admitted the intervention of the
intervenors filed before Us even as of the time that the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals granting reconstitution of
the lost and/or destroyed certificate of title was already submitted for
decision in the Supreme Court. We are duty-bound to abide with the
rulings of the Supreme Court, said the appellate court, and it
concludes with the dispositive part, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court of November 23, 1978 and
January 4, 1979, as well as the Decision of October 5, 1978, are hereby set
aside and respondent Judge is hereby directed to reopen the CASE BELOW
so that TAHANAN can present its evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated

December 4, 1979 of the CA Decision penned by Justice Corazon
Juliano Agrava, arguing that the decision being set aside by the
appellate court had long become final and executory; that the lower
court had proper jurisdiction over the reconstitution case; that
petitioners remedy should not be a petition for certiorari but an
ordinary action for determination of the alleged overlapping of land
areas; and that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
Supreme Court resolution in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-45168, September 25, 1979.
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Through a Special Division of Five, respondent Court of Appeals
granted the Pascuals Motion for Reconsideration and reversed its
previous decision of November 16, 1979, through its Resolution
promulgated April 30, 1980. The petition for certiorari filed by
Tahanan was thereby dismissed and the restraining order issued on
January 9, 1979 was ordered dissolved.
With obvious vehemence, Justice Agrava dissented from the
findings of the majority, unequivocally observing that the alleged
difference between that case (Director of Lands vs. CA) and the
present case (is) pure casuistry and a failure to abide by decisions of
the Supreme Court.
In the instant appeal before Us, petitioner Tahanan assigns
numerous errors committed by the appellate court but the principal
and fundamental issues to be resolved is whether or not the trial
107
court properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction to hear

and decide Reconstitution Case No. 504-P in the light of the strict
and mandatory provisions of Republic Act No. 26. Upon resolving
this pivotal issue, the corollary issue as to respondent Judges grave
abuse of discretion in denying Tahanans Petition To Set Aside
Decision and To ReOpen the Proceedings of Reconstitution Case No.
504-P as well as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining
the decision of respondent Judge, will find the correct and
appropriate answers.
Republic Act No. 26 entitled An act providing a special procedure
for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or
destroyed approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or
authority to the Court of First Instance to hear and decide petitions
for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special
requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the
court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority
over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These
requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for
Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the
notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and
posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified
persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the
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mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed. These

sections state as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with
the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or
any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or
contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of
the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners,
mortgagees or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings
or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and
the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements;
(e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons
who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall
be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec, 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
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registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their
claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall at the hearing,
by the court.
As We have earlier quoted in full the petition for reconstitution in

Reconstitution Case No. 504-P and substantially the Notice of
Hearing issued by the court published in the Official Gazette
together with the Certification of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff, it
would not be a difficult task to check and verify whether the strict
and mandatory requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act
No. 26 have been faithfully complied with by therein petitioners
Pascuals, now the private respondents here.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and
the notice of hearing, it is at once apparent that Tahanan has not
been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner, occupant or
possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to which is sought to be
reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state or mention
that Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a portion of said Lot 2.
The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was never
notified of the petition for reconstitution and the hearings or
proceedings therein.
According to petitioner Tahanan, this omission was deliberate on
the part of the Pascuals who actively concealed or sought to conceal
the fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and possessor of

property adjacent to the alleged properties of the Pascuals as well as
the fact that Tahanan is in possession or occupancy of portions of the
land claimed by the Pascuals. Indeed, as pointed out by petitioner
Tahanan, to which We agree, the Pascuals made it appear in the
survey plan, Exhibit Y, submitted by them to the Court based on a
survey made as of July 7-12, 1974, that the area where Tahanan
Village would lie is described as public land.
That the Pascuals deliberately omitted, concealed or sought to
conceal the fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and
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Court of Appeals
possessor of property adjacent to the formers alleged property may

be deduced by their failure to comply with the order of Judge Leo
Medialdea issued in the original petition for reconstitution, Case No.
77, dated July 10, 1974 (the records) of which We ordered forwarded
to the Court) wherein the petitioners are hereby required to amend
their petition, within ten days from receipt hereof, by indicating
therein the names and addresses of all boundary owners of the
parcels of land in question as well as the names and addresses of all
persons occupying the same.
In complying with the above order, the Pascuals simply filed an
Amended Petition and although they allegedly undertook relocation
survey on the subject land by which the supposed adjoining owners
and claimants may be definitely ascertained as well as their actual
occupation and respected addresses, they only included Pedro L.
Flores as the occupant on the NE., NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-45-6-7 with address at 959 C. Lerma St., Sampaloc, Manila; and on
109
the SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by

Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, c/o Constancio B.
Maglana, President and Chairman of the Board, with address at No.
513, Lafayette St., Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
And as far as Lot 4 is concerned, the Amended Petition then
mentioned the boundary owner on the NW., SW., along lines 12-3
(portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) and on the SE., NE. and NW., along
lines 3-4-5-1, the same Maglana & Sons Management Corporation as
boundary owners.
The Amended Petition notwithstanding, the omission of Tahanan
as adjoining owner and even as occupant of portions of the supposed
Pascual property is palpable and conspicuous.
It is all too evident that the Pascuals in refiling their Petition for
Reconstitution in October, 1977 docketed as Case No. 504-P, had no
intention to notify nor give cause for notification and knowledge to all
adjacent or boundary owners, particularly Tahanan.
The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual
adjacent boundary owners on all sides and directions of their
property. They are charged with the obligation to inquire who their
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ly of portions of their own property but also of land adjacent thereto.
This duty or obligation cannot be ignored or simply brushed aside
where the location or the properties involved is a prime site for land
development, expansion, suitable for residential, commercial and
industrial purposes and where every square inch of real estate
becomes a valuable and profitable investment. It is of public
knowledge in the community of Paraaque that Tahanan Village is

a privately-owned and occupied residential subdivision, plainly
visible to the general public by reason of the perimeter fence or wall
separating it from adjacent estates, the roads and streets therein and
leading thereto, the numerous home constructions and buildings
going on, the visible electrical, lighting and water supply
installations, the presence of private security guards thereat and the
numerous signs and billboards advertising the estate as a housing
development owned and/or managed by petitioner Tahanan. It is
preposterous to claim that the area is public land.
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies
thereof be posted only in the bulletin board of the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law specifically
require that the notice of the petition shall be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city on which the land is situated, at
the provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30 days
prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by
Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was
posted on the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building,
Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the
main entrance of the provincial building in Pasig, Rizal; it was not
posted at the main entrance of the municipal building of Muntinlupa
where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in the
municipal building of Paraaque where Barrio San Dionisio was
then embraced.
Adverting again to the original records of the Petition for
Reconstitution No. 77, We find and note that Judge Leo Medialdea
correctly directed in his order of September 27, 1974 the service of
process, thus:
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Service of process in this proceedings shall be made as follows: (a) by

publication of a copy of this Order in two (2) successive issues of the Official
Gazette, (b) by posting of copies of this Order at the entrance of the
Provincial Capitol of Rizal and the Municipal Buildings of Muntinlupa and
Paraaque, Rizal, (c) by furnishing every person named in the amended
petition with copies of this Order by registered mail, (d) by furnishing
Pedro L. Flores and the Maglana & Sons Management Corporation with
copies of this Order personally, and (e) by furnishing the Director of Lands,
the Commission of the Land Registration Commission and the Register of
Deeds of Rizal with copies of this Order personally, the publication, posting
and notices shall be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of the
hearing, at the expense of the petitioners.
The Deputy Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to implement the
directives herein set forth.
Further proceedings in this original petition show that the above

directives were faithfully and strictly followed. Neverthe less, this
Reconstitution Case No.77 was withdrawn by the Pascuals,
apparently for the reason that there having been filed conflicting
reports by the Director of Lands and the Land Registration
Commission favorable to the Pascuals and another submitted by the
Register of Deeds which was adverse to them and the reports could
not be reconciled, the case would only clog the calendar of the court
pending continued research by the government offices concerned and
availability of certain documentary evidence of the Pascuals. The
Court granted the Motion to Withdraw in its Order of May 30, 1975.
It is necessary that We quote hereunder the Report of the Register

of Deeds for the Province of Rizal submitted in the Original
Reconstitution Case No. 77 as follows:
REPORT
COMES NOW, the undersigned Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully manifests:
1. That on June 4, 1974, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal has
been furnished a copy of the petition in the above entitled reconstitution
case;
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2. That on October 8, 1974, the Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy
of the Order of the Court dated September 27, 1974, by way of service of
process in the proceedings;
3. That the property subject of the petition for reconstitution, known as
Lot 2 and Lot 4 of plan 11-4374 are situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio,
Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now as Bo. Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal) containing an area of 375,622 sq. meters, and 56,295
sq. meters, respectively, was allegedly covered by Decree No. 15170 issued
on March 4, 1911;
4. That a verification of the records of this office, show that Decree No.
15170 of the Court of Land Registration in Case No. 9368 was issued in
favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo and Eusebio T.
Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian, under Original Certificate of
Title No. 724, Book A-7-B, and covers a property situated at Bambang,
Pasig, Rizal, with an area of 422 sq. meters.
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or

occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person
111
having an interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9

hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to
post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the
municipality on which the land is situated, at the provincial building
and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition
and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. This was Our ruling
in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438. It was
also stressed in Alabang Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel
E. Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982. And We
reiterate it herein, to wit:
In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with
the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the
case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere
Notice that all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show
cause if any they have why said petition should not be granted is not
sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it must be applied
rigorous310
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ly, with exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court
granting the motion to amend the original petition provided all the
requisites for publication and posting of notices be complied with, it
appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We have
pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to
comply with all the requirements for publication and posting of notices,
which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court.
The above rule is a reiteration of the doctrine laid down in Manila

Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June 22,
1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title
reconstituted from the plans and technical descriptions of the lots involved,
which sources may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in
the property should be sent a copy of the notice of the petition at the
expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a
possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of
his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not
sufficient but such notice must be actually sent or delivered to parties
affected by the petition for reconstitution.
Having resolved the fundamental issue that the trial court had not
properly acquired nor was it duly invested with jurisdiction to hear,
determine and decide the petition for reconstitution and accordingly
all proceedings conducted thereon were rendered null and void
including the judgment issued granting the reconstitution, the
resolution of the corollary issues need no extended discussion but
considering the obvious intent to circumvent the ruling of the
Supreme Court laid down in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, We find it imperative to make a
reiteration of the pertinent doctrines applicable to the case at bar.
In the above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of adjacent
owners even during the pendency of the appeal from the
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Court of Appeals
decision granting reconstitution, the appeal then in the Supreme
Court, in the paramount interest of justice and as an exception to
Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Tahanan having
sought to intervene in the court below and alleging material and
substantial interest in the property to which title is sought to be
reconstituted, in its Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its
transfer certificates of title of its properties adjoining and even
overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in
area, the trial court ought to have admitted said motion. There was
reversible error in refusing to do so. Once more, We must emphasize
the reasons in relaxing the strict application of the rule abovecited as
We did in Director of Lands vs. CA, et al., 93 SCRA 238, in this wise:
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein promulgated
is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to
make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts
are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict
application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice, or the alleged failure
of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of
injustice to the movants to their successors-in-interest and to all
purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud,
falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors claims; be proven to
be true. For it cannot be gainsaid that if the petition for reconstitution is
finally granted, the chaos and confusion arising from a situation where the
certificates of title of the movants covering large areas of land overlap or

incroach on properties the title to which is being sought to be reconstituted
by private respondent, who herself indicates in her Opposition that,
according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping embraces some 87
hectares only, is certain and inevitable. The aggregate area of the property
claimed by respondent covering Lot 1 and Lot 2 is 1,435,062 sq. meters
which is situated in a fast-growing, highly residential sector of Metro
Manila
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where growth and development are in rapid progress to meet the demands
of an urbanized, exploding population. Industries, factories, warehouses,
plants, and other commercial infrastructures are rising and spreading
within the area and the owners of these lands and the valuable
improvements thereon will not simply fold their hands but certainly will
seek judicial protection of their property rights or may even take the law
into their own hands, resulting to multiplicity of suits.
The holding of respondent Court of Appeals that Our resolution

inDirector of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, allowing intervention is
not applicable to the case at bar because there was no motion to
intervene filed before the Supreme Court by Tahanan is without
merit. Such holding fails to see that the intervention of Tahanan
while the reconstitution case was still in the trial court below was
more expedient for the trial court is in a better and more suitable
position to hear and decide the question of encroachment and
overlapping raised by Tahanan in its Motion To Set Aside Decision
and Re-Open Proceedings, and where the witnesses may be
113
examined and cross-examined by the parties and the court, whereas

the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the
end of the proceedings, there should and there ought to be no
quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention on the part of
subordinate and inferior courts to abide and conform to the rule
enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well-becoming sense of modesty
and a respectful awareness of its inferior position in the judicial
hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the appellate court to
the end that a well-ordered and disciplined administration of justice
may be preserved and maintained. We cannot allow, permit or
tolerate inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express
rulings of this Court.
There is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court
when it denied Tahanans Petition To Set Aside Decision and ReOpen Proceedings. While said petition is not captioned Motion for
Intervention the allegations of the petition clearly and succinctly
aver Tahanans legal interest in the matter in litigation, which
interest is substantial and material, involving
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as it does the boundaries, possession and ownership of about 9
hectares of land covered by certificates of title registered under the
Torrens System in Tahanans name and issued from the mother title
Original Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888, Land Registration Case
No. 776 dated September 18, 1930.
Aside from arbitrarily refusing to admit Tahanans intervention

sought in the trial court below, We find also grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge in not considering Tahanan as an
indispensable party to the proceedings, it having been shown
positively that it has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in its absence,
without injuring or affecting such interest. Again, We refer to Our
ruling in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, and more recently
in Alabang Development Corp. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G. R.
No. 54094, Aug. 30, 1982, that. The joinder must be ordered in order
to prevent multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter in dispute
may be determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim
and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and
necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues,
not only between the parties themselves but also as regards to other
persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment
cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.
Time and again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens titles
issued pursuant to the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and
Presidential Decree No. 1529 have been shaken by the very courts
whose unwavering duty should be to protect the rights and interests
of title holders but instead have favored claimants under the guise of
reconstitution filed after a long lapse of time after the Japanese
occupation, alleging the existence of original and duplicate
certificates of title issued pursuant to a court decree but have
subsequently been lost or destroyed including the records of the land
registration case on account of the war and lay claim and title to
valuable parcels of land previously titled and registered under the
Torrens
114
314
314
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
registration system and are even able to dispose these properties to

unsuspecting homelot buyers and speculating land developers. The
courts must be cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost
or destroyed certificates of title, both original and duplicate owners,
based on documents and decrees made to appear authentic from
mere xerox copies and certifications of officials supposedly signed
with the seals of their office affixed thereon, considering the ease and
facility with which documents are made to appear as official and
authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and verify carefully
all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every
fact, circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the
existence and loss of the title should be examined.
The claim of the Pascuals that their predecessor-in-interest,
Manuela Aquial, had an original certificate of title to Lots 2 and 4 of
Plan II-4374 is extremely difficult to believe and sustain. There are
too many omissions and blanks, too many failures and unanswered
questions that belie such a claim. Thus, it is at once noted that the
number of the certificate of title issued to and registered in the name
of respondents mother and predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial,
is unknown. Nowhere in the voluminous records do the Pascuals cite,
state, or mention the number of said certificate of title. Not even in
the tax declaration of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. S and
Tax Declaration No. 10187, Exh. S-1) and Lot No. 4 (Tax
Declaration No. 15424, Exh. T and Tax Declaration No. 10188,
Exh. T-1) is the number of the certificate of title indicated. And
there is absolutely no document, private or official, presented by the

Pascuals mentioning the number of the certificate of title.
There is also no proof as to when the certificate of title was issued.
Assuming that the certificate of title was issued pursuant to Decree
No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914, the date of issue of the certificate of
title must be subsequent thereto. Assuming further that her
duplicate copy was lost in 1944 during the Japanese occupation, why
did she wait until 1974 [when the first petition for reconstitution was
filed which was
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1982
Court of Appeals
after thirty (30) years] to seek reconstitution of her owners copy.
The survey plan allegedly conducted January 9-29, 1911 and
approved July 25, 1911 as shown in Exhibit O is titled Plan of
Property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al., Case No. ___, Court of Land
Registration. Unperfected Title No.___, Bureau of Lands. In the case
of Director of Lands vs. CA and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal,
et al., 102 SCRA 370 which involved the reconstitution of the
certificate of title to Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, Bernal, petitioner
therein, claimed ownership to Lots 1 and 3 by virtue of a sales patent
issued to her by the Government, which patent, however, We ruled as
fictitious. In the instant petition at bar, We find no claim of Aquial
nor her successors, the Pascuals, as to how they acquired title in fee
simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales patent,composicion con el
estado,orinformation possesoria.The only allegation of the basis of
their ownership is paragraph 3 of the petition for reconstitution
which alleges That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their
predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and still are in
115
the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful

occupation of the afore-described lands as owners in fee simple since
time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture.
Decree No. 15170 which supposedly decreed Lots 2 and 4 to
Manuela Aquial is claimed by the Pascuals to have been issued in
land Registration Case No. 9368. On its face, the attestation clause
of the decree reads:
Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of

Land Registration, the 10th day of January, A.D. nineteen hundred and
fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914, at 8:38 A.M.
Atte
st:
Seal of the
Court
A true copy.
(SGD.) ENRIQUE
ALTAVAS
Clerk of the
Court
(SGD.) ENRIQUE
ALTAVAS
Clerk of the
Court
316
316
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
In the official report submitted to the court by the Register of Deeds

of Pasig, Rizal in the original petition for reconstitution, No. 77, CFI
of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, marked Exhibit 2, Decree
No. 15170 was issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the
name of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and
Eusebio T. Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian, in whose names
the Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal covering a property situated at Barrio Bambang,
Pasig, Rizal with an area of 422 sq. meters was likewise issued.
The Tuason-Changco decree is dated January 10, 1914 and
entered on March 4, 1914 at 8:38 A.M. and the Certificate of Title
No. 724 was issued January 10, 1914. The attestation clause of the
certificate of title reads:
Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of

Land Registration, the 10th day of January, A.D. nineteen hundred and
fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914 at 8:38 A.M.
Attest: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Clerk of the Court.
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, this 7th day of March, nineteen
hundred and fourteen, at 9:15 oclock in the A.M.
(SGD.) (unintelligible)
Register of Deeds
Comparing the Aquial decree and the Tuason-Changco title, both

appears to have been entered at Manila on the same day, that is
March 4, 1914, and at the same hour, 8:38 A.M. That the Tuason
property and that of Aquial would bear the same decree number
(15170), the same land registration case number (9368), the same
land registration court (Pasig, Rizal), the same presiding judge (The
Honorable Dionisio Chanco) is indeed incredible, if not
incomprehensible.
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1982
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116
But contrary to the claim of the Pascuals that the records of Land
Registration Case No. 9368 have been lost, destroyed or missing,
there was presented copies of the Official Gazette of December 10
and 17, 1913, Volume II, Nos. 50 and 51, duly certified by the
Librarian of the Ministry of Justice wherein the Notice of Hearing in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 was published, the applicants for
the registration and confirmation of their title to a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Bambang, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal
being Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Tuason (sic). The Notice of
Hearing set the date on December 22, 1913 and Witness the
Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of the Court this 14th
day of November, in the year 1913.
Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued Certificate of Title
No. 724 pursuant to Decree No. 15170 issued in Land Registration
Case No. 9368 whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree number
and the same land registration case number, cannot present her
owners duplicate copy nor the original certificate which she claims
were lost or destroyed, including the records of Land Registration
Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the Notice of Hearing therein
was shown and exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette), We find
and so hold that it is the Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious,
if not nonexistent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate
No. 724.
At the back of Certificate of Title No. 724, We find annotated
therein a number of documents registered by the heirs of Tuason and
also the heirs of co-owner Changco. The deeds or transactions
executed on different dates and registered thereon appear normal
and there is no reason to doubt their authenticity. On the other hand,
no deed, document or transaction had been shown by the Pascuals
relating to or affecting their land from which We can infer or deduce
the existence of the original certificate of title if one was in truth and
in fact issued to Aquial.
The Pascuals claim that they have paid taxes on the land but they
can only present Exhibits U, U-1, V and V-1 to prove their
payment in lump sum of the taxes thereon for four (4) years only,
from 1970 to 1973. They have not presented
318
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
proof of tax payment from 1914 to 1969, more than five (5) decades.
All these omissions and failures cannot but show the spuriousness
and falsity of their claim that they were granted a decree by the
Land Registration Court, that a certificate of title was issued in their
name and that said certificate of title was existing and subsisting at
the time they filed the petition for reconstitution.
We reject the trial courts finding that the absence in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal of the Original Certificate of Title No.
724, although the owners duplicate is on file therein, is suspicious,
for it is satisfactorily explained in the letter of the Acting Register of
Deeds Guillermo San Pedro, Exhibit 4, that.
Original Certificate of Title No. 724 was cancelled on June 24, 1960 and
transferred to the heirs by virtue of the settlement of the estate of the
deceased registered owners. The original copy of OCT No. 724 is no longer
available but the cancelled owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 724 is still
existing inour files.
x x x.
Likewise, We do not agree with the holding of the trial court that in
the light of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming evidence
adduced by the petitioners in support of their petition for
117
reconstitution of the title in the name of Manuela Aquial, the Court

has no alternative to granting the petition, the Court having no
reason to doubt the credibility of the witnesses for the petitioner,
particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had occasion
and reason to know the facts they testified to, being parts of their
functions and duties in their respective offices.
It is to be noted that the supposedly impressive and overwhelming
evidence adduced by the petitioners centered on showing the alleged
authenticity and genuineness of the survey plan denominated Plan
II-4374. The list of petitioners exhibits is indeed long but the basic,
specific and relevant piece of evidence is Exhibit O with the
certification of Roman Mataverde, Chief, Survey Division, Bureau of
Lands dated October 27, 1972 that Exhibit O is a photographic
is the xerox copy of the letter dated 30 January 1978 of Staff

Supervisor Privadi JG. Dalire. Said Exhibit 7 further states:
However, assuming that Plan II-4374 exists and using its technical
description, the same overlaps Muntinlupa Estate and Plan 61581,
Lot 1, Decree No. N-515888, O.C.T.-6567 identical to Lot 4762, Cad299, Paraaque Cadastre.
Exhibit 8 of the Director of Lands is the xerox copy of the letter
referred to above, which for its materiality and relevance to the vital
question hereinbefore stated and stressed, is reproduced in full
below:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF LANDS
Manila
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1982
Court of Appeals
copy of the original plan as reproduced from the microfilm negative
which is on file in the Bureau of Lands, Manila.
This is the crucial question on which hinges the veracity of
respondents claim of title and ownership to 431,917 sq. meters of
prime land (lots 2 and 4) in Paraaque, Rizalis there such an
original survey plan known as Plan II-4374?
The oppositor Director of Lands strongly and stoutly maintains
that there is no such plan and in support thereof, Exhibit 7 is
submitted to the Court, the same being the official communication of
Amante R. Dumag, Officer In-Charge, Metro Manila Region, Bureau
of Lands, stating that Plan II-4374 could not be the basis for any
verification because the original plan thereof is not subsisting in the
files and records of this Bureau. Enclosed with said communication
SUBJECT: Plan II-4374

Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
Paraaque, Rizal
30 January 1978
Mr. Amante Dumag
Officer-in-Charge
Region IV, Metro Manila
Anent your Memorandum of 17 January 1978 requesting for an
320
320
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
authenticated plan of II-4374 Lot 1 and Lot 3 situated in Paraaque, Metro

Manila, please be informed of the following:
118
1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last
world war and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Alien and
Hamilton Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among
those salvaged. Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical
Reference Section which records were recently turned over to the Records
Division. A perusal of the folder of the case in the Records Division also
shows that on July 17, 1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the
records division certified that his division (Survey Records Section in
particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).
2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May
15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions
of Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record
was submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data
Accession No. 195551. This record turns out to be Plan II-4005 approved on
February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of Municipality of Liloan,
Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo
Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction Section upon request of the
interested party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374.
(This document was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for
reconstitution of title (pp. 1 and 2 of folio). As to how the data were
reconstituted by the then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of
the original copy of the plan is now known. This is not our standard
operating procedure since we always issue technical, descriptions based on
available approved survey records.
4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga,
then Chief, Reproduction Section, certified a copy of the microfilm
enlargement of a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the
survey number II-4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the
war got microfilmed is a mystery. Furthermore, as to how this frame is
pinpointed without the locator card indeed confound us. We are not now
privy to the testimonies made in Court regarding this microfilm.
5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For
this reason, we caused the preparation of an enlargement of said microfilm
for further examination and evaluation.
6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the
following significant discrepancies and deviations from similar
321
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 15. 321

1982
Court of Appeals
survey plans on record:
a) The date of approval appears to be July 25, 1911 andthe signature appearing as
the approving official (Director ofLands) of the alleged Plan II-4374 is not the same
official approving plans during the period. Samples of surveys and inven-toried
original survey plans on file in this Bureau clearly showsthat on July 25, 1911 or
thereabouts the Acting Director ofLands and therefore proper approving official for
survey planswas John R. Wilson. The following original plans (partial list)available
in our records and approved within the month of July1911 or thereabouts all bear
the signature of Acting Director ofLands John R. Wilson.
Survey
Accession Date of
No.
No.
Approval
1. I369826
July 25,
1817a
1911
2. II385736
July 25,
4142
1911
3. II385735
July 25,
4141
1911
4. II385833
July 25,
4110g
1911
5. II385832
July 25,
4110j
1911
6. II385834
July 25,
4110e
1911
119
Survey
Accession Date of
No.
No.
Approval
7. II385830
July 25,
4110d
1911
8. II385829
July 25,
4110c
1911
9. II385828
July 25,
4110b
1911
10. II186222
July 25,
4897
1911
11. IIJuly 11,
41696
1911
12. IIJuly 5,
4172
1911
13. I-1415 379513
July 25,
1911
14. II446936
Aug. 22,
1410
1911
b) Authentic plans like that of II-4858 (original copy on file) approved on December
19, 1911 show the BL Form No. 52 and the format then in use during the period.
Likewise, this plan (marked 0) shows the signature of the Director of Lands at that
time, Chas H. Sleeper. What is being represented as the signature of Chas H.
Sleeper as Director of Lands on the microfilm of II-4374 appears to be very far
from the genuine signature of Chas H. Sleeper appearing on original plans on file.
Chas H. Sleeper was the incumbent Director of Lands from November 1, 1905 up to
October 15, 1913. However, during his term of office, the then Assistant Director of
Lands in the person of John R. Wilson had occasion to assume duties as Acting
322
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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
Director of Lands as evidenced by the above-listed survey plans mostly

approved on July 25, 1911 by Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson.
Considering the fact that on various dates within the month of July 1911,
specifically those of July 25, 1911, the original survey plans available in the
file show John R. Wilson as the approving official in his capacity as Acting
Director of Lands, and the observation that the signature appearing on
microfilm II-4374 is very far from the genuine signature of the incumbent
Director of Lands Chas H. Sleeper, the appearance now of the microfilm of
II-4374 purportedly approved on July 25, 1911 showing Chas H. Sleeper as
the approving official is highly questionable. For this reason and the facts
stated elsewhere in this memorandum, we cannot certify authenticity of the
microfilm copy of II-4374.
c) The form used for the questionable plan II-4374 differs from the
standard survey plans approved during the time (year 1911) in the
following respects:
(1) Authentic plans during the time are prepared on B.L. Form No. 52 which is on
upper left hand corner; the questionable plan (II-4374) was prepared on B.L. Form
No. 52-A which appears on upper left hand corner and on upper center which is
unusual.
(2) Authentic plans indicate the name of the surveyor immediately below the
line that shows the date of survey, followed by the designation (surveyor) and
thereunder Bureau of Lands; the questionable plan, on the other hand, does not
conform with the said format.
(3) Authentic plans do not contain the paragraph The original field notes, x x
x as in the case of the questioned plan II-4374 but immediately Bureau of Lands
below the surveyors name is Approved: ___date______followed by the title and
signature of the approving official.
7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm

enlargement of the frame that purports to be that of survey plan II-4374
bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not
authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of land
properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau.
8. Nevertheless, our investigation is still continuing purposely to find
out how the frame of such microfilm got inserted into
120
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1982
Court of Appeals
microfilm Reel No. 560 of this Bureau.
9. Records of the Case show that this was handled by the late Atty.
Pedro Flores in collaboration with Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L.
Pronove, Jr. and Trial Attorney Antonio G. Castro. This pertains to the
petition of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal for the reconstitution of
T.C.T. (12/T-79) 42449 (Sales Patent) covering area of 143.5062 hectares.
The case is opposed in the sala of CFI, Seventh Judicial District, Branch
XIII of Rizal by the Director of Lands and Aurora R. Favila, et al. In cases
like this, we take action in close collaboration with the Legal Division.
10. Enclosed for your ready reference are:
1. a)Enlargement copy of alleged II-4374 whose original copy was not
inventoried as salvaged after the war;
2. b)Microfilm copies of Authentic Plans;
3. c)Xerox copies of relevant papers in the Folio:
1. 1)Certification of Mr. Gabriel Sansano, dated 17 July 1972.
2. 2)Petition for Reconstitution of Title (Filed with the Court)
3. 3)Opposition of the Director of Lands.
4. 4)Motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution of title filed by the
other oppositors.
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI JG. DALIRE

Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plans & Standards
From the evidence submitted by the Director of Lands, it is officially

and clearly shown that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged
after the last World War and subsequently microfilmed during the
Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy; that Plan II-4374 bearing
Accession No. 385637 is not authentic and does not and has never
represented any parcel of land property surveyed and approved by
the Director of Lands; that on July 17, 1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano,
the then Chief of the Survey Records Division, certified that his
division has no copy of Plan II-4374 and that on May 15, 1970, Mr.
Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots
1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the alleged source of data being
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324
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
Accession No. 195551 which, however, turned out to be Plan II-4005

approved on February 7, 1911 and the land pertaining thereto is the
property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of
Leyte.
Subsequent certifications issued by Anselmo Almazan, Chief,
Survey Reconstruction Section, Bureau of Lands dated November 24,
1971 marked Exhibits M and N indicating the technical
descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 with Accession No.
385637 cannot be relied upon because said plan was not among those
salvaged after the last World War. Our ruling in the Bernal case, 102
121
SCRA 370, 447 that the technical descriptions cannot have two
accession numbers as sources thereof stands.
Incidentally, We must point out that the above official report
(marked Exhibit 8) was submitted to the Supreme Court in
the Bernal case as Annex A to the Final Report of Amante R.
Dumag, Officer In-Charge, NCR, Bureau of Lands, pp. 425-428, in
compliance with Our Resolution of September 25, 1979, which was
accepted and approved by Us and admitted as evidence of this Court.
In the case at bar, it is part of the evidence of the oppositor Director
of Lands, admitted by the trial court and hence, reviewable on appeal
in the petition at bar, he being a respondent herein.
The Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous
transfers therefrom to innocent purchasers for value must be
respected and protected inorder to achieve the real purpose of the
Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land x x x and once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity
of waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su
casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. (Salao vs. Salao,70
SCRA 65, 84; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590,
593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).
In summation, We find no factual and legal basis for the judgment
granting the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No.
9368, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City.
Fundamentally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide
said petition for reconstitution and for this jurisdictional infirmity,
its decision
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1982
Court of Appeals
including all proceedings therefrom are null and void, including the
assailed Resolutions of April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay
City in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No.
9368 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of
April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the respondent Court of
Appeals are likewise declared null and void. Costs against private
respondents.
Petition granted.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion,Jr.,De Castroand Escolin,JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., I also join the concurrence of
Justice Aquino and the recommendation of Justice Abad Santos.
Abad Santos, J., I concur with the recommendation that the
case be referred to the NBI for investigation and possible
prosecution.
AQUINO, J.,concurring.
I concur in the result. This is a landgrabbing case. Landgrabbing
may be perpetrated by (1) actual and physical usurpation, (2)
expanded survey, (3) fake Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution of fake
Torrens titles, registration decrees or judgments in land registration
cases.
The Bernal case, to which thisTahanan case is related, involves
the reconstitution of a fictitious Torrens title over parcels of land
existing only on paper and which, when verified on the ground,
covers land already titled in the names of other persons.
122
The Bernal caseDemetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal of 102

Sixto Antonio Street, Barrio Rosario, Pasig, Rizal claimed that her
mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, bought in 1942 from the Government
a tract of land with an area of 186 hectares located at Barrio San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. Mrs. Sta.
326
326
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
Maria allegedly obtained a sales patent dated September 15, 1942

and Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 dated September 29,
1942.
The said land was allegedly surveyed in 1911 for Mrs. Sta. Maria
as shown in Plan II-4374.It consisted of four lots, Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3
and 4. Lots 1 and 3, with an area of 143 hectares, were supposedly
sold by Mrs. Sta. Maria to her daughter, Mrs. Bernal, for P10,000 in
November, 1943. The Register of Deeds of Greater Manila issued to
Mrs. Bernal Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 for Lots 1 and 3.
In 1970, or more than twenty-six years after the issuance of that
title, Mrs. Bernal filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for the reconstitution of the original thereof. She averred
that her owners duplicate of that title, which she first identified as
TCT No. 12 and later as TCT No. 42449, was not lost.
Judge Pedro A. Revilla denied the petition for reconstitution. Mrs.
Bernal appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a decision dated
October 1, 1976 allowed the reconstitution (Per Crisolito Pascual, J.,
with Bautista and Santiago, JJ., concurring).
The case was brought to this Court on petition for review and by
means of a special civil action for certiorari since the Solicitor
Generals motion for an extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration was filed one day late in the Court of Appeals and it
was denied.
During the pendency of the case in this Court, or on December 7
and 28, 1978, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed motions for
intervention on the ground that the 143 hectares claimed by Mrs.
Bernal included substantial portions of the lands already registered
in their names.
As an exceptional case and in the interest of expeditious justice,
the interventions were allowed in this Courts resolution of
September 25, 1979. Also in the interest of justice, although
unprecedented, this Court ordered the chief of the survey division of
the Bureau of Lands to relocate the boundaries of the lots claimed by
Mrs. Bernal and the intervenors
327

1982
Court of Appeals
and to report on the overlapping and the improvements in the said
areas (93 SCRA 238, 249 and 102 SCRA 421).
In his report of February 25, 1980, the officer-in-charge of the
national capital region of the Bureau of Lands categorically stated
that Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, claimed by Mrs. Bernal,donot
actually exist on the groundor, as found by the chief of the technical
services section of the same bureau, the said lotscould not be located
in the locality by all technical meansand that the original copy of
Plan II-4374 does not exist.
Consequently, this Court dismissed Mrs. Bernals petition for
reconstitution (Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal and
CA, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370).
123
This case of the heirs of Manuela Aquial.As already stated, Mrs.

Sta. Marias alleged 186-hectare land in Barrio San Dionisio
supposedly consisted of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of which Lots 1 and 3, with
a total area of 143 hectares, were claimed by her daughter, Mrs.
Bernal. That claim was found to be fictitious in the reconstitution
case already discussed above.
Now, the other two lots, Lots 2 and 4, of Mrs. Sta. Marias land
were supposedly acquired by Manuela Aquial of 307 15th Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City. She died on January 26, 1967.
On October 5, 1977, her legal heirs named Nicolas, Crisanto,
Anselmo, Mamerto, Cirilo and Catalina, all surnamed Pascual, and
Pascuala A. Mejia and Damiana A. Mejia filed in the Pasay City
branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the Bernal case was
filed in the Pasig branch) a petition for the reconstitution of Decree
No. 15170dated March 4, 1914 issued in Land Registration Case No.
9368 and the original and owners duplicate of the original certificate
of title issued pursuant to the said decree allegedly in the name of
Manuela Aquial, covering the said Lots 2 and 4, with a total area
of 43 hectares located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, formerly Barrio
San Dionisio, Parafiaque and described in Plan II-4374, the
same nonexistingplan involved in the 143-hectare land, Lots 1 and 3
claimed by Mrs. Bernal.
It should be noted that 43 hectares plus 143 hectares equal 186
hectares, the total area of the land allegedly surveyed for
328
328
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Court of Appeals
Mrs. Sta. Maria in 1911 in the fictitious Plan II-4374.It should be

further noted that in the description of Lots 1 and 3, as set forth in
the Bernal case, Manuela Aquial is cited as one of the boundary

owners.
In the description of Lots 2 and 4 set forth in the petition for
reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, Lots 1 and 3 and
the names of Mrs. Sta. Maria and Mrs. Bernal are not mentioned at
all.
The Director of Lands opposed the said petition for reconstitution
filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial. He alleged that a prior
reconstitution proceeding filed by the Pascuals was dismissed by the
Makati branch of the lower court; that Decree No. 15170, LRC Case
No. 9368, was issued to Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco for
a 422-square meter land in Barrio Bambang, Pasig,Rizal and that
the photostatic copy attached to the petition is a copy of a fake
decree.
After hearing, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela in his decision of
October 5, 1978 granted the petition. On November 15, 1978, the
Tahanan Development Corporation filed a petition to set aside the
decision and for the reopening of the proceeding on the ground that
Lots 2 and 4, claimed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, include
substantial portions of the subdivision lots of the Tahanan Village
covered by transfer certificates of title derived from OCT No. 6576,
Decree No. 515888, LRC Case No. 776.
Also on that same date, November 15, 1978, Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a motion to set aside the
decision on the ground that the land claimed by the Aquial heirs
overlaps the lots of Bagatsing and Alabang Development Corporation
covered by Torrens titles derived from OCT No. 684, Decree No. 4552
issued on August 27, 1910.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal but did not perfect
his appeal to the Court of Appeals. As the trial court failed to resolve
124
the petition to set aside filed by the Tahanan Development

Corporation, it filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which later ordered Judge Valenzuela to resolve Tahanans petition.
He denied it in his order of January 4, 1979.
329

1982
Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals in its decision of November 16, 1979 ordered
Judge Valenzuela to reopen the case and allow Tahanan to present
its evidence (Per Agrava, J.). The Pascuals filed a motion for
reconsideration. In a resolution dated April 30, 1980, the Court of
Appeals set aside its decision and dismissed Tahanans petition for
certiorari. The Tahanan Development Corporation appealed to this
Court.
On the other hand, Bagatsing and Alabang Development
Corporation filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition wherein they assailed Judge Valenzuelas decision.
This Court in its decision of August 30, 1982 in G.R. No. 54094,
Alabang Development Corporation, et al. vs. Judge Valenzuela, et al.,
using the findings and rulings in the Bernalcase, reversed Judge
Valenzuelas decision and dismissed the petition for reconsideration.
That decision in the Bagatsing and Alabang case rendered
thisTahanan case moot and academic. This case has to be decided in
the same manner as the Alabang and Bagatsing case because this
Court had already set aside Judge Valenzuelas decision and
dismissed the petition for reconstitution. All that is necessary is to
set aside the above-mentioned resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 1980.
As in the Bernal case, the decree and title sought to be

reconstituted and the land claimed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial
are imaginary or pure fabrications. See J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Mariano, L-33140, October 23, 1978, 85 SCRA 644, where the sisters
Manuela and Maria Aquial unsuccessfully assailed OCT No. 735
covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the
Tuason mayorazgo.
Decision reversed and set aside. Resolutions null and void.
Notes.A petition for quieting of title on the ground of fraud
although essentially an action for reconveyance should not be
dismissed on the ground of prescription where the petition contains
an averment that the malicious and illegal acts committed by the
defendants where known to the plaintiffs only during the year 1977.
(Heirs of Segundo Uberas vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental,86 SCRA 145.)
330
330
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Sta. Romana vs. Phil.
Commercial and Industrial Bank
Lands inside military reservations cannot be the object of a cadastral

proceeding or reopening under Republic Act No. 931. (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals,89 SCRA 648.)
o0o
Copyright 20
125
the existence of one automatically nullify the other, and if any of the
registrations should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be
the notice of lis pendens, and not the annotation of an adverse claim which
is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing and
proper disposition of the claim involved.
Same; Same; Same; Consulta, Defined; Statement that the property is
subject to consulta, unlike a statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as
warning and notice to third persons dealing with the property.Be-sides, it
cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the petitioner over the
land in question are amply protected by the annotation at the back of TCT
425582 issued in he name of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc., that the
property therein described is subject to the resolution of LRC Consulta No.
887. The statement that the property described is subject to the resolution
of a consulta, unlike a statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice
and warning to third persons dealing with the property that someone is
claiming an interest in the same or a better title than that of the registered
owner thereof. A consulta, as is generally understood, is but the reference
of a question to the Commissioner of Land Registration by a Register of
Deeds when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken when a deed or
instrument is presented to him for registration.
Nos. L-42956-57. January 12, 1988.

A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEV., INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL,
respondents.
*
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals. Gatmaitan, J.
_________________
*
Civil Law; Land Registration;Notice of lis pendens and adverse claims

are not contradictory or repugnant to each other; Annotation of an adverse
claim, more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing
and proper disposition of the claim involved.This Court, however, has
ruled differently, i.e., that the two remedies, notice of lis pendens and
adverse claim, are not contradictory or repugnant to one another; nor does
SECOND DIVISION.
27

27
1988
A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc.
126
PADILLA, J.:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 344936 in the name of Blue

Chips Projects, Inc. (id.);
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent

Court of Appeals issued on 26 November 1975 in cases CA-G.R. Nos.
SP-02509 & 02711, entitled: A. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc.,
petitioner-appellant, versusRegister of Deeds of Rizal, respondentappellee, which affirmed the resolutions of the Land Registration
Commission in LRC Consulta Nos. 887 and 894, denying petitioners
application for registration of an adverse claim. The Court
considered the petition as a special civil action.
The facts, as found by the respondent appellate court, are as
follows:
**
1. 1.Blue Chips Projects, Inc. a Corporation duly organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippines, is the registered
owner of a parcel of land containing an area of One Million
Two Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty
Nine (1,256,269) sq. meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Patiis, Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal and
covered by TCT Certificate of Title No. 344936 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal (See Original Record in LRC Consulta No.
887).
2. 2.Blue Chips Projects, Inc. purchased said property from
Purita Landicho the lawful registered owner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 167681 (id.);
3. 3.On December 11, 1972, petitioner-appellant A. Doronila
Resources Development, Inc. availed of the remedy of lis
pendens in Civil Case No. 12044 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the same having been annotated on
4. 4.On August 8, 1973, petitioner thru its President Alfonso

Doronila, filed an affidavit of adverse claim for registration on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 344936 with the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on the ground that the property covered by the
aforesaid title registered in the name of Blue Chips Projects
Inc. is a portion of a big parcel of land which was purchased
by petitioner corporation from Alfonso Doronila (Adverse
Claim of petitioner-appellantRecord of LRC Consulta No.
887);
5. 5.Respondent-appellee, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied
the registration of the affidavit of the aforementioned adverse
claim on the ground that a notice of lis pendens remains
registered on the certificate of title involved should be a bar
to the registration of an affidavit of
______________
**
Penned by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan with the concurrence of Justices Mama
Busran and Vicente G. Ericta.

28
28
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
1. adverse claim. Considering that the rights and interests of the
petitioner are already amply protected thereby without
imposing a further burden on the registered owner by the
127
registration of an affidavit of adverse claim which would be

serving the same purpose. After all, an affidavit of adverse
claim does not add anything to the validity of ones claim nor
does it create a non-existent right (Letter of denial dated
August 13, 1973. Record of LRC Consulta 887);
7. 11.The Land Registration Commission rendered on January 8,

1974, a resolution in L.R.C. Consulta No. 894 maintaining its
opinion in L.R.C. Consulta No. 887 and riding against
registrability of the affidavit of adverse claim (Resolution
LRC Consulta No. 894);
2. 6.Petitioner elevated the matter en consulta to the Land

Registration Commission (Records, LRC Consulta No. 887);
8. 12.Not satisfied with the above resolution, petitioner appealed

to this Honorable Court (Notice of Appeal, Record of LRC
Consulta No. 894);
3. 7.On November 6, 1973, the Land Registration Commission

issued its Resolution holding that the affidavit of adverse
claim be denied registration (LRC Consulta No. 887);
4. 8.On November 5, 1973, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
344936 registered in the name of Blue Chips Projects, Inc.
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 425582
was issued in favor of the purchaser Winmar Poultry Farms,
Inc. with an annotation at the back thereof that the property
therein described is subject to the Resolution of LRC
Consulta No. 887 (Record, LRC Consulta 894);
5. 9.Petitioner A. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc. again sought the
registration of an affidavit of Adverse Claim identical to that
which was the subject of LRC Consulta No. 887 on TCT No.
425582 registered in the name of Winmar Poultry Farms,
Inc. (Adverse Claim, LRC Consulta 894);
6. 10.Respondent-appellee Register of Deeds elevated the records
to the Land Registration Commission for resolution under
Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 1151 (Letter dated Nov. 27, 1973, Record of
LRC Consulta No. 894);
9. 13.On March 12, 1974, appellant filed before this Honorable

Court a petition for Consolidated (sic) of Case SP-02569 (LRC
Consulta 887) and Case SP-02711 (LRC Consulta 894) which
was granted by this Honorable Court on March 19, 1974 (p.
11, Appellants Brief). pp. 2-5, Brief for the RespondentAppellee.
1
On 26 November 1975, the respondent Court of Appeals, as earlier

stated, rendered a decision, affirming the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commission in LRC Consulta Nos. 887
______________
1
Rollo, pp. 20-22.
29

29
1988
and 894. The Court of Appeals said:
2
1. CONSIDERING: That as this Court understands position of appellant

Doronila Resources, it was and is true registered owner of subject land as
128
successor in interest of original registered owner, Meerkamp & Company

under OCT 301 issued on 14 January, 1907.
But that thru certain manipulations, another title was issued to same
land, namely, TCT 167681 in the name of Landicho, which in turn was
conveyed unto Blue Chips, and new title issued in the name of Blue Chips,
TCT 344936 in November, 1971, and finally, this last title was conveyed
unto Winmar Poultry Farms and new title TCT 425582 was issued unto
Winmar in November, 1973therefore, Doronila Resources contends that
as a matter of right on its part, and a ministerial duty of Register of Deeds,
its notice of ADVERSE CLAIM should be annotated in TCT 344936 and its
successor, TCT 425582,and the denial by Commissioner of Land
Registration to that registration was wrong,the denial having been based
on the ground that appellant Doronila Resources had already filed Civil
12044 in CFI Rizal and had there already secured annotation of LIS
PENDENS on TCT 344936; which Doronila Resources claims was no
ground at all for denial, because Lis Pendens and Adverse Claims are
different, and it had itself asked cancellation of its Lis Pendens as to TCT
344936 x x x. (pages 5-6, Decision)
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x if therefore, instead of at once filing adverse claim, he filed suit, as
in present case.in the mind of this Court, the annotation, the further
annotation, of adverse claim becomes redundant, x x x(page 7, Decision).
3
Hence, the present recourse.

The sole issue involved is whether or not the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens at the back of a certificate of title precludes the
subsequent registration on the same or successor certificate of title of
an adverse claim.
The Land Registration Commission, in its resolutions in
the Consultas, abovementioned, declared, and the respondent
appellate court affirmed, that since the petitioner had already
availed of the remedy of lis pendens, and that the rights and
interests of adverse claimant are already amply protected by the

registration of such notice of lis pendens, it does not seem fair to
______________
2
Id., p. 19.
Rollo, pp. 10-11.
30
30
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
have a title saddled by two encumbrances arising from one and the
same source, and serving one and the same purpose.
This Court, however, has ruled differently, i.e., that the two
remedies, notice of lis pendensand adverse claim, are not
contradictory or repugnant to one another; nor does the existence of
one automatically nullify the other, and if any of the registrations
should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the
notice of lis pendens,and not the annotation of an adverse claim
which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate
hearing and proper disposition of the claim involved. The Court said:
4
But We have to give certain consideration to the implication created by the

lower courts ruling that the institution of a court action for the purpose of
securing or preserving the right which is also the object of an adverse claim
invalidates the latter, irrespective of whether a notice of lis pendens has
been annotated or not, for such a doctrine gives the impression that the 2
remedies are contradictory or repugnant to one another, the existence of
one automatically nullifying the other. We are inclined to believe otherwise,
for while both registrations have their own characteristics and requisites, it
cannot be denied that they are both intended to protect the interest of a
claimant by posing as notices and caution to those dealing with the
property that same is subject to a claim. But while a notice of lis
129
pendens remains during the pendency of the action, although same may be
cancelled under certain circumstances as where the case is prolonged
unnecessarily or for failure of the plaintiff to introduce evidence bearing out
the allegations of the complaint (Victoriano vs. Rovira, 55 Phil.
1000; Municipal Council of Paraaque vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 196); and it has even been held that a court, in the
absence of a statute, has the inherent power to cancel a lis pendens notice
in a proper case (Victoriano vs. Rovira, supra), the same is not true in a
registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one instance, i.e.,
after the claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court, acting
either as a land registration court or one of general jurisdiction while
passing upon a case before it where the subject of the litigation is the same
interest or right which is being secured by the adverse claim. The
possibility therefore, that parties claiming an interest in a registered
property desire, for any other purpose, to have their cause ventilated in a
court of general jurisdiction, may result in giving them two ways of
______________
4
Id., p. 28; Appellants Brief, p. 21.
31

31
1988
making the registration of their claimed rights. In such instances, it would
not only be unreasonable but also oppressive to hold that the subsequent
institution of an ordinary civil action would work to divest the adverse
claim of its validity, for as We have pointed out, a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled even before the action is finally terminated for causes which
may not be attributable to the claimant. And it would similarly be beyond
reason to confine a claimant to the remedy afforded by Section 110 of Act
496 if there are other recourses in law which such claimant may avail of.
But, if any of the registrations should be considered unnecessary or

superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens and not the annotation of
the adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled
without adequate hearing and proper disposition of the claim.
5
Besides, it cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the
petitioner over the land in question are amply protected by the
annotation at the back of TCT 425582 issued in the name of Winmar
Poultry Farms, Inc., that the property therein described is subject to
the resolution of LRC Consulta No. 887. The statement that the
property described is subject to the resolution of aconsulta, unlike a
statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice and warning to
third persons dealing with the property that someone is claiming an
interest in the same or a better title than that of the registered
owner thereof. A consulta, as is generally understood, is but the
reference of a question to the Commissioner of Land Registration by
a Register of Deeds when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be
taken when a deed or instrument is presented to him for
registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 26 November 1975, in CA-G-R. Nos. SP02509 and 02711 as well as the resolutions in LRC Consulta Nos. 887
and 894, issued by the Land Registration Commissioner on 6
November 1973, and 8 January 1974, respectively, are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Rizal is
directed to register (annotate) the affidavit of adverse claim of A.
Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. at the back of TCT No. 344936 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Blue Chips Projects,
Inc. and of TCT No. 425582 of the same Registry issued in the name
of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. Without Costs.
_____________
130
Ty Sin Tei vs. Lee Dy Piao, 103 Phil. 858, 868-869.
32
3
2
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guevarra vs. Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman),Melencio-Herrera, Paras andSarmiento,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Decision annulled and set aside.
Notes.Title and possession of registered owners, cannot be
defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and
contradicted. (Sinoan vs. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407).
Reliance on certificate of title sufficient, even if the sale was void,
as the functionings of the Torrens System of registration is involved.
(Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489).
o0o
G.R. No. 133913. October 12, 1999.
JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS, petitioner, vs.THE CITY OF

LEGASPI, respondent.
131
Actions; Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; Fraud; For fraud to

become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual.
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been liti-gated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a
litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from
having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case such that there is
no fair submission of the controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Deliberately failing to notify a party entitled
to notice constitutes extrinsic fraud.Our examination of the facts shows
that, indeed, respondent failed (1) to state in its Petition for Reconstitution
that Lot 1 was occupied and possessed by petitioners predecessor-ininterest and (2) to give him notice of such proceedings. Deliberately failing
to notify a party entitled to notice constitutes extrinsic fraud.
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
524
5
24
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stilianopulos vs. City of
Legaspi
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land

Titles; Prescription; Quieting
of
Title;A party alleging extrinsic fraud should raise such issue in the action
for quieting of title filed by his adversary, as he would then become aware of
the title of the latter, and not reckon the prescriptive period from some other
later time.Petitioner argues that the fouryear prescriptive period for filing
the Petition for Annulment should begin, not from August 4, 1970, when
the action for quieting of title was filed, but from the discovery of the fraud
by the petitioners counsel shortly after March 24, 1988. Petitioner filed
the action for cancellation of title based on extrinsic fraud on May 26, 1988,
or sixty-one days after the discovery of the fraud. Said action allegedly
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period until May 26, 1994,
when petitioner received a copy of the CA Decision in the case for
cancellation of title. Hence, petitioner submits that less than three months
had lapsed after the filing of the Petition for Annulment at the CA.
Petitioners arguments are untenable. He could and should have raised the
issue of extrinsic fraud in the action for quieting of title. It was then that he
became aware of the reconstituted title in the name of respondent. A simple
check on the records of the reconstitution proceedings would have revealed
that it was conducted without notice to the petitioners father.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; An action for annul-ment shall
be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud; that is, within
four years from the discovery of the fraudulent statements made in the
application.Under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, an action for annulment
shall be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud; that is,
within four years from the discovery of the fraudulent statements made in
the application. Clearly, the period for raising this issue lapsed a long time
ago.
Same; Land Titles;Reconstitution of Titles; Under Section 13 of
Republic Act 26, the sending of notice to the occupant of the land covered by
the title sought to be reconstituted is mandatory and jurisdictional, and
where no notice was served, the order of reconstitution is null and void.
From all the allegation, it appears that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. First, under Section 13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to the
occupant of the land covered by the title sought to be reconstituted is
132
mandatory and jurisdictional. If no notice of the date of hearing of a

reconstitution case is served on the possessor or anyone else having interest
in the property involved, the order of reconstitution is null and void.
525
VOL. 316, OCTOBER

12, 1999
25

Legaspi
Same; Same; Same; If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in
fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void
and the court that rendered the Decision had no jurisdiction.
Reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a new
duplicatecertificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form
and condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or destruction of the owners
copy of the certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot 1 was not lost or
destroyed. It remained in the possession of the petitioners father and was
eventually passed on to him. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is
in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is
void and the court that rendered the Decision had no jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Laches;Words and Phrases; Laches, Explained.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable or unexplained length
of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, warranting the presumption that the right holder has
abandoned that right or declined to assert it. This inaction or neglect to
assert a right converts a valid claim into a stale demand.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Jurisdiction; Laches prevents a litigant from

raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction; A party, by participating in a
quieting-of-title case and arguing therein his defenses against the legality of
the title of the other party in order to establish his rights over the disputed
property, is deemed to have chosen this action over the annulment of the
reconstitution proceedings.Laches prevents a litigant from raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction. True, petitioner filed the annulment Complaint
right after the dismissal of the cancellation-of-title case, but it is equally
true that it was filed only after the quieting-of-title case had been decided
in favor of the respondent. By participating in the quieting-of-title case and
arguing therein his defenses against the legality of the title of the
respondent in order to establish his rights over the disputed property,
petitioner is deemed to have chosen this action over the annulment of the
reconstitution proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Laches bars a party from invoking
lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling
everything done, with his active participation, in the case below.
Annulment of the reconstitution proceedings was belatedly resorted to only
after the CA had reversed the trial court and
526
5
26
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Legaspi
133
upheld the reconstituted title of respondent. Laches bars a party from

invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
annulling everything done, with his active participation, in the case below.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;A litigant cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain
such relief, to repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. By seeking the
reexamination of the ownership of the disputed lot, petitioner accepted the
jurisdiction of the court which heard the action for quieting of title. A
litigant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
and, after failing to obtain such relief, to repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. Clearly, laches has attached and barred the petitioners right
to file an action for annulment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for annulment of judgment based
on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery or, if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches.To show the
cogency of the foregoing disquisition, the interrelation of these rules has
recently been synthesized and codified in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic
fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery or, if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches.
Same; Judgments; Res Judicata;Elements.We are convinced that
indeed res judicata has already set in. This conclusion is the most
persuasive argument raised by the appellate court. The principle applies
when the following elements are present (1) a judgment has become final;
(2) such judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the court that rendered
it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there
was identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action between the
previous and the subsequent action.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Causes of action are identical when there is

an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions, or
where the same evidence will sustain both actions.There is identity of
cause of action between a case for annulment of title and one for annulment
of judgment. Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of
527
VOL. 316, OCTOBER

12, 1999
27

Legaspi
the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions.
If the same facts or evidence can sustain either, the two actions are
considered the same so that the judgment in one is a bar to the other.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When a right or fact has been judi-cially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them.The difference in form and nature of the two actions is
immaterial and is not a reason to exempt petitioner from the effects of res
judicata. The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from
litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long
as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those
in privity with them. Verily, there should be an end to litigation by the
134
same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is fully and fairly
adjudicated.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision and a resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of the Case; Whatever has once been
irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle in an earlier final
judgment continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in
another suit, as long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the dispute before the court.It is also readily
apparent that the action for annulment of judgment was in effect a second
cycle of review regarding a subject matter which has already been finally
decided. Material facts or questions that had been in issue in a former
action and were then admitted or judicially determined are conclusively
settled by a judgment rendered therein. Such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the
same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in
the subsequent actionwhether the subsequent action involves the same or
a different form of proceeding, action, subject matter, claim or demand.
Plainly, a second cycle of review is prohibited. Whatever has once been
irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle in an earlier final
judgment continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in
another suit, as long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the dispute before the court.
The City Legal Officer for respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The annulment of a final judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud
prescribes within four years from the discovery of the fraud. On the
other hand, a petition for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction
may be barred by laches. In any event, once a controlling legal
principle is established by final judgment, the same parties may no
longer litigate the same matter again.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 21, 1998 and its
Resolution dated May 18, 1998 in CA-GR SP No. 34326, dismissing
Jose Manuel Stilianopulos action to annul the final Order dated
September 16, 1964 in Cad. Case No. RT-763, which directed the
Register of Deeds to reconstitute the Original Certificates of Title
(OCT) over certain properties in favor of the City of Legaspi.
1
528
528
Dominador R. Aytona andJuan O. Marfil, Jr. for petitioner.
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 33-43.
135
Ninth
Division,
composed
of
Justice
Salome
A.
Montoya,
chairman
andponente; Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Rodrigo V. Cosico, members, both

concurring.
3
Decision, which upheld the validity of TCT No. 13448 and its
superiority to OCT No. 665. Thus, petitioner was declared the lawful
owner of the disputed property, Lot 1, Psd-3261.
9
Rollo, pp. 31-32.
On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals in its Decision of

October 16, 1987, reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the
City of Legaspi. Petitioners recourse to this Court was dismissed in
a Minute Resolution promulgated
10
529
VOL. 316, OCTOBER 12,

1999
529
11
_______________
4
Docketed as Cadastral Case No. RT-763 before the Court of First Instance of Albay,
Branch II.
The Antecedent Facts

On September 26, 1962, the City of Legaspi filed a Petition for the
judicial reconstitution of its titles to twenty parcels of land, including
Lot 1 (Psd 3261), the certificates of which had allegedly been lost or
destroyed during World War II. On September 16, 1964, the trial
court ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the Original
Certificates of Title over these lots including OCT No. 665 in favor of
the applicant.
CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 37.
Ibid.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 4183before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
Branch VIII.
8
Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 72-73.
Ibid., p. 3; rollo, p. 73. See also Memorandum for Respondent, p. 2; rollo, p. 112.
On August 4, 1970, the City filed a Complaint for quieting of title

over Lot 1, Psd-3261 (covered by OCT No. 665) against Carlos V.
Stilianopulos alias Chas V. Stilianopulos, Ana Estela Stilianopulos,
and the American Oxygen and Acetylene Company. While this case
was pending,Carlos V. Stilianopulos died. As a consequence, TCT No.
T-1427 which was registered under his name was cancelled, and TCT
No. 13448 was issued in the name of his son, petitioner herein, on
July 12, 1974. On February 29, 1984, the trial court rendered its
10
Docketed as CA-GR CV No. 06900.
11
Twelfth Division composed of JJ. Pedro A. Ramirez, ponente; Luis A. Javellana,
chairman; and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, member, both concurring.
530
530
SUPREME COURT
136
petitioners predecessor-in-interest was the registered owner and

possessor of said Lot 1. He added that on January 26, 1953, the
petitioners predecessor-in-
REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
on August 17, 1988, on the ground that the issue raised was factual
in nature. Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution of October
26, 1988.
12
GR No. 82430.
13
Docketed as GRL Cad. Case No. M-10108 before the Regional Trial Court of
12
Undaunted, petitioner filed an action for the cancellation of OCT

No. 665, which the trial court subsequently dismissed on August 15,
1989 on the ground ofres judicata. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
trial court, reasoning that petitioners action was an action for
annulment of the order of the reconstitution of OCT No. 665 and
was therefore not cognizable by the trial court.
Legaspi City, Branch V.

14
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 5; rollo, p. 75.
15
Docketed as CA-GR CV No. 24429.
16
Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 75-76. See also Memorandum for
13
14
15
Respondent, p. 6; rollo, p. 116.
16
Refusing to accept defeat, on June 13, 1994, petitioner again filed

before the Court of Appeals a new action for annulment of the
September 16, 1964 Order based on three grounds: (1) that the
Respondent City of Legaspi procured OCT No. 665 fraudulently; (2)
that the original certificate of title which was judicially reconstituted
was non-existent; and (3) that the court which ordered the
reconstitution lack[ed] jurisdiction.
17
18
Before the CA, herein petitioner alleged (1) that the City of
Legaspi had omitted in its Petition for Reconstitution of Title the
name and address of his predecessor-in-interest, Chas V.
Stilianopulos, who at the time, was the occupant and possessor of the
disputed property; and (2) that as early as January 26, 1953 and
February 10, 1953, the respondent had actual knowledge that the
17
Docketed as CA-GR SP No. 34326, the precursor to the present case.
18
CA Decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 34.
531

1999
531

interest and the herein respondent had jointly petitioned the trial
court in Cad. Case No. MM-302 for the approval of the consolidation
subdivision plan and the technical description of said Lot 1, as well
137
as for the issuance by the Register of Deeds of the corresponding

Transfer Certificates of Title to the subject property in the name of
the petitioners predecessor-in-interest.
_______________
19
Ibid., p. 2; rollo, p. 35.
20
CA Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 35-36.
19
He further alleged that Lot 1, the disputed property, had never

been issued an original certificate of title before World War II, as it
was not an original/mother lot but a de-rived/resulting subdivision
which came into existence only on February 10, 1953. His father and
predecessor-in-interest was allegedly the registered owner of (1) Lot
No. 9703-A, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3227,
taken by transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3224, which
had been entered at the Register of Deeds of Legaspi, Albay, on
August 12, 1936, and administratively reconstituted from the
owners duplicate as TCT No. 93 (3227) 20625 on June 20, 1949; and
(2) Lot No. 1023, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1912
entered at the Register of Deeds of Legaspi, Albay, on October 10,
1931, which was administratively reconstituted from the owners
duplicate as TCT No. 98 (1912) 20626 on June 21, 1949.
These two lots were consolidated and subdivided into Lot 1 with
an area of 5,808 square meters for Chas V. Stilianopulos; and Lot 2
with an area of 1,003 square meters for the City of Legaspi to which
it had been donated by petitioner on September 13, 1952, as a city
street to be named Stilianopulos Boulevard; and Lot 3, containing an
area of 3,205 square meters forChas V. Stilianopulos, per
Consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-3261 surveyed on July 6, 1952.
In the Deed of Donation executed on September 13, 1952, the
respondent acknowledged that the petitioners predecessor-ininterest was the absolute owner of the derived or resulting Lot 2
donated to it.
532
532
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

As earlier mentioned, the Petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals through the assailed Decision and denied reconsideration
through the assailed Resolution.
Ruling of Respondent Court
The Court of Appeals ruled that the prescriptive period for extrinsic
fraud has lapsed [and] the petitioner is likewise guilty of laches in
the filing of this case for annulment.
Res judicata had also set in against petitioner, as there was an
identity of parties and causes of actionownership and possession of
the lot covered by OCT No. 665between the earlier case for quieting
of title and his Petition for Annulment. Further, petitioner did not
raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the earlier case; thus, he was
guilty of laches.
20
Hence, this Petition.
21
138
Assignment of Errors
First
In his Memorandum, petitioner failed to submit a clear and concise

statement of the issues as required in our Resolution dated
November 16, 1998.
However, from the Arguments found in the Memorandum, we
gather petitioners assignment of errors as follows: (1) the
prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has [not] lapsed and (2) the
reconstitution court had no jurisdiction and petitioner is [not] guilty
of laches. In addition, the Court will pass upon the CA holding that
this case is also barred by res judicata.
22
_______________
21
Prescriptive Period for Annulment Based on Extrinsic Fraud

Presence of Extrinsic Fraud
Petitioner contends that respondent committed extrinsic fraud when
it alleged in its Petition for Reconstitution of Title that it was the
owner of Lot 1, Pcs-3261, and that the Original Certificate of Title to
said lot issued in its name had either been lost or destroyed during
the last war.
Respondent was allegedly aware all along that (1) Lot 1 was never
covered by an original certificate of title because it was derived
merely from the consolidation and subdivision of Lot Nos. 9703-A
and 1023 on February 10, 1953; (2) as a derived lot, it was for the
first time issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1427 only on
March 5, 1953; (3) the Report of the Commissioner of Land
Registration stated that Decree No. 85234 pertained to Lot No. 9703,
not to the lost or destroyed OCT No. 665 as it was made to appear in
the reconstituted title; (4) petitioners father and respondent jointly
petitioned for the approval of the consolidation-subdivision plan of
Lot Nos. 9703 and 1023, resulting in the creation of Lots 1, 2 and 3,
in Cad. Case No. MM-302; and (5) petitioners father donated Lot 2
to respondent.
23
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on January 25, 1999 upon this
Courts receipt of the Memorandum for the Respondent. Petitioners Memorandum was
received earlier.
22
Issue:
Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 25-37; rollo, pp. 95-107.
533
24
25
26

1999
533

This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
27
Further, petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest were not

named in the Petition for Reconstitution as occupants or persons in
possession of the disputed land or notified of said
_______________
23
139
24
25
26
27
him notice of such proceedings. Deliberately failing to notify a party

entitled to notice constitutes extrinsic fraud.
32
Prescriptive Period
Although the CA and the respondent impliedly admitted the
presence of extrinsic fraud, both contend, however, that the
prescriptive period for filing an action based thereon had already run
out on the petitioner. The appellate court said:
534
33
534
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
If the ground for the annulment is extrinsic fraud, the action has to be
filed within four (4) years from the time the fraud is dis_______________

proceedings, in violation of Section 12(e) of Republic Act No.
26. Instead of disputing it, both the CA and the respondent allegedly
elected to remain silent on these contentions.
28
Ibid., pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 83-84.
29
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 673, 681, July 21, 1993.
30
Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 309, 318-319, March 21, 1997.
31
Ibid.; Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 714, 721-722, August 28, 1998;
28
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to

be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is
extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.
29
30
31
Our examination of the facts shows that, indeed, respondent failed

(1) to state in its Petition for Reconstitution that Lot 1 was occupied
and possessed by petitioners predecessorin-interest and (2) to give
and Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168, 179-180, November 29,
1996.
32
Salva v. Salvador, 18 Phil 193, 200, January 3, 1911.
33
CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 37-38.
535

1999
535
140

covered pursuant to the provisions of Article 1891 of the Civil Code. x x x.
We find in this case that the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has
lapsed x x x,
Cad. Case No. RT-763 was a petition for reconstitution of title dated
September 26, 1962 filed by the City of Lega[s]pi thru the then incumbent
Mayor Luis S. Los Baos with the Court of First Instance of Albay on
September 28, 1962. It resulted in the issuance of the Order dated
September 16, 1964 which ordered, among others, the Register of Deeds of
Lega[s]pi to reconstitute the titles of Lega[s]pi City over a number of lots,
including Lot 1 which is claimed by the petitioner as owned by his
predecessor-in-interest. Pursuant thereto, Original Certificate of Title No.
665 was issued in the name of respondent Lega[s]pi City. There is no
showing that the order was appealed by any party and has thus become
final.
Petitioner claims that the City of Lega[s]pi is guilty of fraud in not
notifying his predecessor-in-interest,Chas V. Stilianopulos, about the
petition for reconstitution of title and that they were never informed of the
proceedings or the decision therein rendered thus resulting in the issuance
of O.C.T. No. 665 to the City of Lega[s]pi, while they hold T.C.T. No. T-1427
covering the said lot.
Assuming that petitioner or his father Chas V. Stilianopulos was
intentionally not notified of the proceedings by the City of Lega[s]pi, the
records do show that precisely to quiet its O.C.T. No. 665 over the property,
the City of Lega[s]pi brought the matter to court.
In Civil Case No. 4183 for Quieting of Title filed by the City of Lega[s]pi
on August 4, 1970 against Stilianopulos over the same parcel of land, one of
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff City of Lega[s]pi was to have the
plaintiff declared as the lawful owner of Lot 1, Psd-3261 which is a portion
of Lot 9703-A and covered by O.C.T. No. 665 in the name of the plaintiff. x x
x.
As early as 1970, therefore, the petitioner was made aware of the
existence of O.C.T. No. 665 in favor of the City of Lega[s]pi which he now
claims was issued through fraud. Yet, the petitioner failed to file
proceedings to annul the Order of reconstitution of O.C.T. No. 665.
Petitioner argues that the four-year prescriptive period for filing the
Petition for Annulment should begin, not from
536
536
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

August 4, 1970, when the action for quieting of title was filed, but
from the discovery of the fraud by the petitioners counsel shortly
after March 24, 1988. Petitioner filed the action for cancellation of
title based on extrinsic fraud on May 26, 1988, or sixty-one days after
the discovery of the fraud. Said action allegedly interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period until May 26, 1994, when
petitioner received a copy of the CA Decision in the case for
cancellation of title. Hence, petitioner submits that less than three
141
months had lapsed after the filing of the Petition for Annulment at
the CA.
Petitioners arguments are untenable. He could and should have
raised the issue of extrinsic fraud in the action for quieting of title. It
was then that he became aware of the reconstituted title in the name
of respondent. A simple check on the records of the reconstitution
proceedings would have revealed that it was conducted without
notice to the petitioners father.
Thus, we find no sufficient explanation why March 24, 1988
should be reckoned as the date when the prescriptive period should
begin. Simply unacceptable is the contention that petitioners counsel
discovered the extrinsic fraud shortly after March 24, 1988 only.
Granting arguendo that the prescriptive period should begin when
petitioners counsel read the Land Registration Commission Report,
the discovery should have been made earlier, because the Report
had been made available to the said counsel when it was attached to
the respondents Appeal Brief on April 5, 1986, or at the latest, when
the CA Decision was promulgated on October 16, 1987. There was
absolutely no excuse why petitioner had to wait until the finality of
the Decision in the case for quieting of title, before raising the issue
of extrinsic fraud in order to annul the Decision in the reconstitution
proceedings. Clearly, the facts constituting the fraud should have
been known to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, when the Petition
to quiet the title was filed in 1970.
34
_______________
34
537

1999
537

Under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, an action for annulment shall
be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud; that is,
within four years from the discovery of the fraudulent statements
made in the application. Clearly, the period for raising this issue
lapsed a long time ago.
35
36
Second
Issue:
Annulment Based on Lack of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of the Reconstitution Court
Petitioner also avers that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order
the reconstitution of OCT No. 665, because respondent failed to state
in its Petition that his predecessor-in-interest was in possession of
Lot 1, or to give him notice of the said proceedings. The appellate
court debunked this contention by ruling that he was the one guilty
of laches, which thus cured the defect in the reconstitution courts
jurisdiction. Petitioner became aware of the reconstitution
proceedings when the action for quieting of title was instituted in
1970, and the CA held that the lapse of more than twenty years
before he filed the present action to annul the judgment in those
proceedings constituted an unreasonable delay.
142
From the above allegation, it appears that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. First, under Section 13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to
the occupant of the land covered by the title sought to be
reconstituted is mandatory and jurisdic-
petitioners father and was eventually passed on to him. If a

certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that
rendered the Decision had no jurisdiction.
_______________
Laches as a Defense
35
Cimafranca v. IAC, supra; Dumanon v. Butuan City Rural Bank, 119 SCRA 193,
199, December 15, 1982; Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, 277, January 20,
1989; Bael v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 617, 624, January 30, 1989; Asuncion v.
Court Appeals, 150 SCRA 353, 362, May 20, 1987.
36
Tomas Roco v. Gimeda, 104 Phil. 1011, 1014, December 27, 1958; andCimafranca
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 611, 619, January 31, 1987.
However, the CA ruled that the delay of more than twenty years
since petitioner learned of the reconstituted title was unreasonable,
giving rise to the presumption that he had abandoned the idea of
seeking annulment of the proceedings on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and that he had opted to take other actions instead.
Petitioner disputes this CA ruling, arguing that (1) on May 26,
1988, he filed Cad. Case No. M-10108 for the cancellation of OCT No.
665, thus negating the presumption that he had abandoned the
annulment of the reconstitution proceedings;
538
538
40
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
37
Secs. 12 & 13, RA No. 26; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370,
435, January 27, 1981; and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 551, 556, August
23, 1995.
tional. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is

served on the possessor or anyone else having interest in the
property involved, the order of reconstitution is null and void.
37
38
Second, reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a new

duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or destruction of the
owners copy of the certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot 1
was not lost or destroyed. It remained in the possession of the
39
38
Ibid., p. 439; Alabang Development Corp. v. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA 261, 271-272,
August 30, 1982.

39
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 218, 223, May 22, 1995.
40
Strait Times v. CA, supra, p. 724;Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 158,
162, November 14, 1994; and New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,253 SCRA
740, 747-748, February 20, 1996.
539
143

1999
539
Laches prevents a litigant from raising the issue of lack of

jurisdiction. True, petitioner filed the annulment Complaint right
after the dismissal of the cancellation-of-title case, but it is equally
true that it was filed only after the quieting-of-title case had been
decided in favor of the respondent. By participating in the quietingof-title case and arguing therein his defenses against the legality of
the title of the respondent in order to establish his rights over the
disputed property, petitioner is deemed to have chosen this action
over the annulment of the reconstitution proceedings.
43

(2) he could not file the action for annulment while the Petition for
Cancellation of Title was still pending, because of the rule against
forum-shopping; (3) there was no unreasonable delay in the filing of
his Petition for Annulment, which was filed just eighteen days after
his receipt of the CA Decision upholding the dismissal of his Petition
for Cancellation of Title; and (4) the application of the equitable
doctrine of laches in this case will perpetrate fraud and injustice
against him.
We remain unconvinced. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier,
warranting the presumption that the right holder has abandoned
that right or declined to assert it. This inaction or neglect to assert a
right converts a valid claim into a stale demand.
41
42
Annulment of the reconstitution proceedings was belatedly

resorted to only after the CA had reversed the trial court and
_______________
41
Agra v. Philippine National Bank,GR No. 133317, June 29, 1999, pp. 11-12,309
SCRA 509; Madija v. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540, 551, October 23, 1984; Espao, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 511, 514, February 17, 1997.
42
Cimafranca v. IAC, supra, p. 620.
43
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 414, September 14,
1993; Cimafranca v. IAC, supra, p. 621.See also Roberto Abad, Attack on Jurisdiction,
When Barred by Estoppel by Laches, 46 SCRA 149-157.
540
540
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

144
upheld the reconstituted title of respondent. Laches bars a party

from invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of annulling everything done, with his active participation,
in the case below.
44
It cannot be said either that the application of laches would work

an injustice against petitioner, because he was given a fair chance in
the quieting-of-title case to prove his ownership of the disputed lot.
Furthermore, by seeking the reexamination of the ownership of
the disputed lot, petitioner accepted the jurisdiction of the court
which heard the action for quieting of title. A litigant cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and, after
failing to obtain such relief, to repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. Clearly, laches has attached and barred the petitioners
right to file an action for annulment.
45
To show the cogency of the foregoing disquisition, the interrelation

of these rules has recently been synthesized and codified in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that an action for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within
four years from its discovery or, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before
it is barred by laches.
reconstitution of [OCT] No. 665 affecting its validity has not been
raised in the pleadings.
_______________
44
Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 187
SCRA 646, 651, July 20, 1990.

45
Garment and Textile Export Board v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 258, 297,
February 13, 1997.

46
Section 3, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
541

1999
541
Issue:
Petitioner has jumped to the wrong conclusion. What the CA said

was that he had not raised the defense of the nullity of the
reconstitution proceedings. It did not rule that res judicata would not
bar a subsequent action for annulment of judgment. Indisputably, he
misinterpreted the CA.
To show that there is no res judicata between the earlier case and
this Petition for annulment of judgment, petitioner uses the
appellate courts pronouncement in the action for quieting of title
that the matter of the regularity of the judicial proceedings for the
We are convinced that indeedres judicata has already set in. This
conclusion is the most persuasive argument raised by the appellate
court. The principle applies when the following elements are present
(1) a judgment has become final; (2) such judgment was rendered on
the merits; (3) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the
46
Third
Res Judicata and the Second Cycle of Review
145
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there was identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action between the previous and the
subsequent action. There is identity of cause of action between a
case for annulment of title and one for annulment of
judgment. Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions, or where
the same evidence will sustain both actions. If the same facts or
evidence can sustain either, the two actions are considered the same
so that the judgment in one is a bar to the other.
47
48
49
The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-oftitle and the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same
adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of
one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent
that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the
quieting-of-title case would also be used in this Petition.
542
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

The difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial
and is not a reason to exempt petitioner from the effects of res
judicata. The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from
litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Verily,
there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their
privies over a subject, once it is fully and fairly adjudicated.
50
51
_______________
47
Guevara v. Benito, 247 SCRA 570, 573, August 23, 1995; Mangoma v. Court of
Appeals, 241 SCRA 21, 25, February 1, 1995; and Carlet v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA
97, 106, July 7, 1997.
48
Linzag v. CA, 291 SCRA 304, 313, June 26, 1998; Carlet v. CA, supra. InMangoma
v. CA, there was identity of cause of action between the specific performance case for
execution of deeds of sale and the annulment of titles cases based on the same contract
to sell.
49
Linzag v. Court of Appeals, supra;Concepcion v. Agana, 268 SCRA 307, 318,
February 17, 1997; Carlet v. CA, supra, p. 107; Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
492, 502, July 5, 1996.
It is also readily apparent that the action for annulment of

judgment was in effect a second cycle of review regarding a subject
matter which has already been finally decided. Material facts or
questions that had been in issue in a former action and were then
admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a
judgment rendered therein. Such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the
issue may take in the subsequent actionwhether the subsequent
action involves the same or a different form of proceeding, action,
subject matter, claim or demand.
52
542
146
Plainly, a second cycle of review is prohibited. Whatever has once

been irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle in an
earlier final judgment continues to be the law of the case between the
same parties in another suit, as long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the dispute before
the court.
53
_______________
50
Linzag v. CA, supra, p. 315; Carlet v. CA, supra, p. 109.
51
Linzag v. CA, supra, p. 315.
52
Carlet v. CA, supra; and Veloso, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 196, 202,
August 28, 1996.

53
Veloso Jr. v. CA, supra; Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 457, 462, April 18,
1997; and Ybaez v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 540, 550-551, February 9, 1996.
reconstituted title were annulled, the ownership of the disputed lot

by the respondent has already been settled in the quieting-of-title
case. Therefore, the petitioner is legally bound to abide by the
Decision in the earlier case, as he has allowed the trial court to
determine the ownership of the disputed lot and the nullity of his
title. He has lost any legal right to pose the same question for
litigation again before a court of law.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. The Register of Deeds of Albay
is ORDERED to CANCEL TCT No. 13448. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Purisima andGon-zagaReyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied; Assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
543
Notes.The doctrine of law of the case applies only when a case

1999
543

Despite the presence of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction in the
reconstitution of OCT No. 665, the annulment of the reconstitution
order at this time is futile. At most, petitioner in this case can only
prove possession of the lot at the time of the reconstitution
proceedings. However, even if the reconstitution proceedings and the
is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.

(Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 [1995])
A resolution dismissing a petition for being moot and academic
after considering the pleadings and the annexes together with the
Comment filed by the successor of respondent mayor resolves the
issues raised in the pleadings, and upon attaining finality, becomes
the law of the case and constitutes a bar to any relitigation of the
same issues in any other proceeding under the principle of res
judicata. (Rosete vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 147 [1996])
544
147
544
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Madredijo vs. Loyao, Jr.
It is axiomatic that when a minute resolution denies or dismisses a

petition for lack of merit, the challenged decision or order, together
with its findings of fact and legal conclusions are deemed sustained.
(Zebra Security Agency and Allied Services vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 270 SCRA 476 [1997])
G.R. No. 101690. August 23, 1995.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES FERNANDO DAYAO and REMEDIOS
NICODEMUS, respondents.
*
o0o
Actions; Land Titles; R.A. No. 26;Reconstitution of Title; Reconstitution

of title under R.A. No. 26 is an action in rem which means that it is one
directed not only against particular persons but against the thing itself.
Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act Providing
A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates Of
Title Lost Or Destroyed) is an action in rem, which means it is one
directed not only against particular persons, but against the thing itself. Its
object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection
against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is
binding theoretically upon the whole world.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
jurisdictional
requirements
of
publication, posting and service of notice provide constructive notice to the
whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings.The jurisdictional
requirements of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26. They seek to provide constructive notice to the
whole world of the in rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to
148
apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action and to give
them ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole
world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Elements of the publication requirement
under R.A. No. 26.Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26
obligates the petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that:
(1) its Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting
it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. In the case at bench, private respondents were able to
show both elements through the certification of the Director of the National
Printing Office, a government official who enjoys the undisputed
presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office.
We note that, on the other
______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
552
5
52
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
hand, mere submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would

have evidenced only the first element.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Official Gazette; Evidence; Best Evidence
Rule; What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the0 content
of the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time
hearing date.Petitioners reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous.
What must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the content of the
Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication
in successive issues thereof at least thirty days before the hearing date.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; The Supreme Court has

consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of
the National Printing Office in reconstitution casesand there is no reason
for it to deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now the submission of
Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.This court
has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the
Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. We have, on
two separate occasions, adjudicated cases with factual backgrounds similar
to the one at bench. In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM,
Br. 170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking reconstitution
did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in evidence, but merely relied
on certifications comparable to the one at bench. In both cases, the granting
of reconstitution by the trial court was reversed. But the reversals were not
made on the basis of the failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They
were, instead, both grounded on the factas clearly evidenced by the
National Printing Office Directors certificationthat the publications were
made less than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no
reason for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the
Same; Same; Same; Same; While L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of
1983 mandates the Land Registration Commission Administrator and the
Register of Deeds concerned to submit to the court their reports and
recommendations regarding the petition for reconstitution, it attaches no
concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said officials.
It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the Land
Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of Deeds
concerned to submit their reports and recommendations regarding the
petition for reconstitution to the court. But, it attaches no
553

1995
53
149

concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by said
officials. It would, thus, be illogical in the case at bench to require such
showing by private respondents before their petition may be acted upon.

Appeals.
Roberto S. Dionisio for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated February 28, 1991, affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 16, dated October 9, 1989,
granting the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-304198.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 7, 1987, fire gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. On March 16, 1989, private respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Petition for Reconstitution of TCT
No. T-304198, on the ground that its original was among the
documents destroyed in the conflagration. The trial court set it for
initial hearing through an Order which reads, as follows:
1
Through its Sixteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.
(ponente and chairman), Nicolas P. Lapea, Jr., and Fermin A. Martin, Jr.
Also impugned is the August 29, 1991 Order of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth
Division, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration from the impugned Decision.
554
554
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Branch at the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building at Malolos

and on the Municipal Hall of Malolos, Bulacan where the parcel of land
covered by the subject title is situated for a period of thirty (30) days prior
to the date of hearing.
Finally, let copies of this order be also sent by registered mail to the
Office of the Solicitor General, the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration, the Bureau of Lands, the Provincial Fiscal,
the Register of Deeds, and the boundary owners, in order that they may
appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,

let the hearing of the petition be set on September 13, 1989 at 8:30 oclock
in the morning.
Let a copy of this order be published twice in two (2) successive issues
of the Official Gazette, at the expense of the (private respondents), and that
copies thereof be posted by the Deputy Sheriff of this
_____________
During the hearing, private respondents submitted in evidence,

among others, the following Certification of Publication issued by
the Director of the National Printing Office:
Order relative to LRC No. F-504-84 In Re: Petition for Judicial

Reconstitution of the Burned/Destroyed Original Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-304198, SPS. FERNANDO DAYAO and
REMEDIOS NICODEMUS, x x x was published in the Official Gazette, to
wit:
VOLUM
E
85
NUMBE PAGE DAT

R
S
E OF
ISSU
E
24
June
12,
1989
150
25
June
19,
1989
June 19, 1989 issue was released for publication on June 28, 1989.
They did not submit nor offer in evidence actual copies of the June
12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of the Official Gazette.
On October 9, 1989, the trial court issued an Order granting
private respondents petition for reconstitution. The Order was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 28, 1991. It held:
x x x
According to the Republic, the certification of publication issued by the
National Printing Office is not sufficient proof of publication, the best
evidence being the presentation of the copies of the Official Gazette where
the notice was included.
We are not convinced. The certification clearly states that the notice
was published in the June 12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of the Official
Gazette, the second notice being released for publication on June 28, 1989.
Be it stressed that the official acts of public officers enjoy the presumption
of regularity and this has not been overcome in this case.
555

555
1995
Besides, the Official Gazette is an official publication of the government
and consequently, We can take judicial notice of its contents in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, as recently amended.
Indeed, Our examination readily reveals that the first notice of hearing in
this case appeared on page 3908 of Volume 85, No. 24 issue while the
second notice appeared on page 4028 of Volume 85, No. 24 issue of the
Official Gazette. As the last issue was released for publication on June 28,
1989, as stated in the certification of the National Printing Office, or three
months prior to the hearing of September 13, 1989, the requirement of
Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 35, which provide that the notice be
published at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, was complied
with.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration from the above Decision was denied
in a Resolution, dated August 29, 1991.
Petitioner now puts forth a single reason for warranting review,
viz., that in affirming the Order of the Trial Court granting the
petition for reconstitution in LRC No. P-504-89, public respondent
Court of Appeals grievously disregarded: (a) the inadequate evidence
submitted by private respondents; and the (b) explicit provisions of
L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983.
We affirm the Decision.
Petitioner argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the petition for reconstitution of TCT No. T-304198 because
private respondents failed to prove actual publication of the trial
courts Order setting the petition for initial hearing. Petitioner posits
the view that a mere certification of publication is utterly
inadequate to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of
publication x x x; (t)he best evidence to prove (the fact of publication)
is the presentation of the actual copies of the Official Gazette x x x,
duly marked and offered as evidence in Court. We are not
persuaded.
3
____________
3
Ibid.
Id., at pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 16-17.
151
556
556
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act

Providing A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution
Of Torrens Certificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed) is an actionin
rem, which means it is one directed not only against particular
persons, but against the thing itself. Its object is to bar indifferently
all who might be minded to make any objection against the right
sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is binding
theoretically upon the whole world. The jurisdictional requirements
of publication, posting and service of notice are provided in Section
13 of R.A. No. 26, as follows:
6
Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the

petitioner to prove to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its
Order giving due course to the petition for reconstitution and setting
it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made
_____________
6
Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 900.
F.D. REGALADO, 1 Remedial Law Compendium, p. 16 (1988).
See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 773 (1993).
See Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC of Malabon, MM, Br. 170, 181 SCRA
788 (1990).
prior to the date of hearing. x x x The petitioner shall, at the hearing,
by the court.
They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in

rem reconstitution proceedings. Their purpose is to apprise all
interested parties of the existence of such action and to give them
ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole
world as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
8
557

557
1995
at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. In the case at bench,
private respondents were able to show both elements through the
certification of the Director of the National Printing Office, a
government official who enjoys the undisputed presumption of
regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. We note
that, on the other hand, mere submission of the subject Official
Gazette issues would have evidenced only the first element.
Petitioners reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous. What
must be proved under Section 13, R.A. No. 26 is not the content of
the Order published in the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time
hearing date.
This court has consistently accepted the probative value of
certifications of the Director of the National Printing Office in
reconstitution cases. We have, on two separate occasions, adjudicated
152
cases with factual backgrounds similar to the one at bench.

In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br.
170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking
reconstitution did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in
evidence, but merely relied on certifications comparable to the one at
bench. In both cases, the granting of reconstitution by the trial court
was reversed. But the reversals were not made on the basis of the
failure to present the Official Gazette issues. They were, instead, both
grounded on the factas clearly evidenced by the National Printing
Office Directors certificationthat the publications were made less
than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no reason
for us to deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the
Petitioner next argues that private respondents failed to comply
with Land Registration Commission (L.R.C.) Circular No. 35, Series
of 1983, particularly Section 13 thereof which reads as follows:
10
11
12
____________
10
Op. cit.
11
Op. cit.
12
558
558
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
13. The Court, after considering the report of the Land Registration
Commission and comments and findings of the Register of Deeds
concerned, as well as the documentary and parole evidence presented by
the petitioner, may take such action on the petition as it may deem proper.
Petitioner believes that the report of the Administrator of the

NALTDRA (now LRCA) and the comments and findings of the
Register of Deeds are conditions sine qua non before a petition for
reconstitution could be granted so as to forestall, if not eliminate,
anomalous or irregular reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates
of title. Thus, it argues, private respondents failure to show
compliance with these requirements is fatal to their petition for
reconstitution.
We disagree.
It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983 mandates the
Land Registration Commission Administrator and the Register of
Deeds concerned to submit their reports and recommendations
regarding the petition for reconstitution to the court. But, it attaches
no concomitant obligation on the petitioner to show compliance by
said officials. It would, thus, be illogical in the case at bench to
require such showing by private respondents before their petition
may be acted upon. More so, in light of the provisions of Section 15 of
R.A. No. 26, thus:
13
14
Sec. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as
supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to
warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and
that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest
therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost
or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property
are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of
court shall forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and
all the documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis
of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence
or basis to justify the reconstitu____________
153
13
Ibid., at p. 20; Rollo, p. 25.
14
See Sections 7 and 13, L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series of 1983, dated June 13, 1983.
559

559
1995
tion, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal shall not preclude
the right of the party or parties entitled thereto to file an application for
confirmation of his or their title under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. (Emphasis supplied)
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Court of Appeals Decision, dated February 28, 1991, as well as its
Resolution, dated August 29, 1991, are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza andFrancisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman),On leave.
Petition denied. Judgment affirmed in toto.
Notes.The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but
only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he has
purchased the property. (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA
705[1991])
The torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible,
should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 113 [1991])
o0o
154
G.R. No. 142284. June 8, 2005.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EL GOBIERNO
DE LAS ISLAS FILIPINAS, Contra, ENEMESIA ACASO, ET AL.,
Reclamantes, SEVERIANA GACHO, respondent.
*
Land Titles; Reconstitution; R.A. No. 26; Sources of the Bases of

Reconstitution of Original Certificates of Title.Section 2 of R.A. No. 26
quoted in the Court of Appeals decision enumerates the sources as bases of
reconstitution of the original certificate of title. To reiterate, they are as
follows: Sec. 2. Original Certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order: (a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owners,
mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified
copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the Register of Deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of

registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original
certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the Registry of
Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original has been registered; and (f) Any
other document which, in the judgment of the court is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. The Court of
Appeals relied on a one page, two-liner Decision dated March 31, 1929 as
well as the index of decree which contained the annotation for Decree No.
365835 for Lot No. 1499 in affirming the decision of the trial court granting
respondents petition for reconstitution. These documents would naturally
not fall under Sec. 2(a) to (e) of R.A. No. 26 but may be considered under
Sec. 2(f) of R.A. No. 26, as any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title. However, we find that they are not enough
bases for reconstitution of lost original certificate of title.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the absence of proof that the Geodetic
Engineer who certified that a copy of a decision attached to the petition for
reconstitution was a true copy of the same is a public officer in custody
thereof, such piece of evidence has no probative value.Significantly, only a
certain Geodetic Engineer certified that the copy of the decision attached to
the petition was a true copy of the same. It was not
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
534
5
34
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. El Gobierno de
las Islas Filipinas
155
established that the Geodetic Engineer is the public officer who is in

custody thereof. Section 7, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a) Thus, in the absence of
proof that the Geodetic Engineer is a public officer in custody thereof, such
piece of evidence has no probative value.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of any document, private or
official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and the date when
the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of such
petition for reconstitution.We also find insufficient the index of decree
showing that Decree No. 365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for
reconstitution. We noticed that the name of the applicant as well as the
date of the issuance of such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835
existed in the Record Book of Cadastral Lots in the Land Registration
Authority as stated in the Report submitted by it, however, the same report
did not state the number of the original certificate of title, which is not
sufficient evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution. The deed of
extrajudicial declaration of heirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and
Restituto Tumulak Perez and respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also
mention the number of the original certificate of title but only Tax
Declaration No. 00393. As we held in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals, the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the
number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title
was issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition.
Same; Same; Same; The courts must be cautious and careful in
granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title.In fine, we
are not convinced that respondent Gacho had adduced competent evidence
to warrant reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificate of title since
she had not proven the existence of the same. The courts must be cautious
and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of
titles. It is the duty of the trial court to scrutinize and verify carefully all
supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact,

circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence and
loss of the title should be examined.

Appeals.
535
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005

535
Republic vs. El Gobierno de las
Islas Filipinas
Leonardo Garcillano for respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
**
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of

the decision dated February 29, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 56966 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City granting
reconstitution of title for Lot No. 1499 in the name of Tirso Tumulak,
married to Engracia Pongasi.
On June 21, 1995, respondent Severiana Gacho filed a petition for
reconstitution of lost certificate of title before the RTC, Lapu-Lapu
City. Her petition alleged the following:
1
1. 1.That Petitioner Severiana Gacho, is single, Filipino, of legal age,

and a resident of Pleasant Homes, Labangon, Cebu City;
2. 2.That she is the owner, by purchase, of a portion of Lot No. 1499 of
the Opon Cadastre, situated in Barangay Babag, Municipality of
Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) described and bounded as follows
156
NW., by a provincial Road; by Lot 1492, owned by Filomena Palugot,

NE., by Lot 1492, owned by Melecio Tumulak;
SE., by Lot 1500, owned by Laureano Tumulak;
AREA5,409 square meters, more or less;
All adjacent owners are residents of Barangay Babag, Lapu-Lapu City,

with no house numbers.
3. That the said Lot No. 1499, above-described, was owned by Tirso
Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, both now deceased, which was
adjudged to them by virtue of a decision, dated March 31, 1929, rendered
_______________
**
1
Acting Chairman.
Rollo, pp. 24-32; Penned by Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos concurred in by Justices
Corona Ibay-Somera and Elvi John S. Asuncion.

Id., pp. 45-49; Per Presiding Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez.
3. 5.That pursuant to said Decree No. 565855, (sic) an Original

Certificate of Title has been issued to Lot No. 1499 in the name of
said Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi;
4. 6.That the owners duplicate copy of the said Original Certificate of
Title issued to Lot No. 1499, has been lost during the last World
War; and its copy on file in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City, was also either lost or destroyed during the said
last World War, as shown in a certificate issued by the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as Annex C;
5. 7.That no co-owners copy of said certificate of title lost has been
issued to a co-owner, mortgagee, or lessee;
2
3
As petitioner; Raffled to Branch 54, entitled EL GOBIERNO DE LAS ISLAS
FILIPINAS contra ENEMESIA ACASO, ET AL., Reclamantes; Lot No. 1499 EXP. CAT No.
17 Record No. 946 Opon Cadastre.
536
536
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
1. in the above-entitled registration case, copy of which decision is
hereto attached and marked as Annex A;
2. 4.That pursuant to the said decision (Annex A), Decree 365835 was
issued to said Lot 1499, in the name of said Tirso Tumulak,
married to Engracia Pongasi, but which decree was not salvaged
from the last World War, but its existence appears in Cadastral
Records, a copy of a page therein is hereto attached and marked as
Annex B;
6. 8.That no deed or any kind of involuntary document affecting said

Lot No. 1499 has ever been registered, or pending registration in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City;
7. 9.That the land Lot No. 1499 is not or has never been the subject of
any Court litigation;
8. 10.That your Petitioner, having purchased a portion of said Lot No.
1499 is initiating this Petition for reconstitution for the reason that
she wants her portion to be issued a certificate of title in her name,
but could not do so, if the lost original certificate of title which was
lost during the last World War, be reconstituted first; . . .
9. 11.That attached hereto is the approved plan of the land, consisting
of a tracing cloth plan, hereto attached marked as Annex D, blue
print plan, as Annex D-1, and its approved technical description
marked as Annex E, as additional basis for the reconstitution of
the said lost certificate of title of Lot No. 1499; and deed of
conveyance in favor of petitioner marked as Annex F.
157
4
adverse claimant on the portion she purchased and the lot had not
been the subject of any court litigation; that she has no knowledge
that a co-owners copy of the certificate of title had been
_______________
4
Records, pp. 1-2.
_______________
537
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537
Islas Filipinas
Id., p. 12.
Id., p. 25; Exh. H.
In an Order dated September 6, 1995, the trial court set the initial
hearing of the petition on February 12, 1996. Notices of hearing were
published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette and also
posted in conspicuous places in the Provincial Capitol Building of
Cebu City, the Lapu-Lapu City Hall and the barangay where the
property was situated, and the Lapu-Lapu Public Market. The
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority, the Director of the Bureau of Lands, and the
Office of the Solicitor General in Manila were also furnished copies
of the notice of hearing.
After the jurisdictional facts had been established, the Branch
Clerk of Court was commissioned to receive the evidence for the
respondent.
Respondent, in an ex-partehearing, testified that she had
purchased a portion of Lot No. 1499 from Aguinaldo and Restituto
Tumulak Perez , the legal heirs of the late Concepcion Tumulak, as
evidenced by a Deed of Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Sale
executed on February 12, 1979; that Concepcion Tumulak was the
only daughter of Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, both
deceased, the decreed owners of the lot by virtue of a decision dated
March 31, 1929; that Lot No. 1499 was issued Decree No. 365835, the
existence of which appeared in the cadastral record; that she
acquired an area of 901 square meters from the 5,000 sq. meters of
Lot No. 1499 and is in possession of the same; that there was no
5
10
11
12
Id., p. 25; Certificate of posting dated February 8, 1996 issued by Process Server
Tito D. Valencia, RTC, Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City.

Id., p.13; Registry Return Receipt, Exhibit C-3.
Id. p. 18; Registry Return Receipt, Exhibit F-1.
10
Id., p.16; Registry Return Receipt, Exhibit E-1.
11
Id., p. 19; Registry Return Receipt, Exhibit G-1.
12
Id., p. 27; Order dated February 12, 1996.
538
538
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
issued to any co-owner, mortgagee or lessee nor that any document

voluntarily issued to Lot No. 1499 had been presented for
registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City:
that the owners duplicate copy of the title was lost as evidenced by
an affidavit of Conchita Oyao.
13
_______________
13
Affidavit of Conchita Oyao dated February 22, 1996.
That I, CONCHITA OYAO, 72 years of age, Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of Pajak, LapuLapu City, after having been duly sworn to according to law, depose and say
1. 1That I know personally Aguinaldo Tumulak Perez, and Restituta (sic) Tumulak
Perez, and they (sic) the children of the late Concepcion Tumulak, and who is also the
daughter of the late Sps. Tirso Tumulak, and Engracia Pongasi, who died before the
last World War;
158
2. 2That the said Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, were the register (sic)
owners of that parcel of land, designated as Lot. No. 1499, of the Opon Cadastre,
situated in Barangay Babag, Lapu-Lapu City;
3. 3That I attest to the truth of the fact that said Lot No. 1499 was covered by Decree No.
365835, and an original certificate of title issued to the said Lot No. 1499, because I
saw personally the owners duplicate certificate of title to said Lot No. 1499, in the
name of said Tirso Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, as we were close neighbors
during their lifetime;
4. 4That I also attest to the truth of the fact that after the death of the said Sps. Tirso
2. (ii)Index of decrees, (Exhibit J).

3. (iii)Deed of Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Sale dated
February 12, 1979 (Exhibit K).
4. (iv)Affidavit of Conchita Oyao dated February 22, 1996
(Exhibit L).
5. (v)Certification from the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City,
dated June 9, 1995 (Exhibit M).
Tumulak, and Engracia Pongasi, the land was succeeded by their daughter Concepcion
Tumulak, and who also succeeded in the possession of the owners duplicate Certificate
of Title issued to the said Lot 1499, in the name of said Tirso Tumulak, married to
Engracia Pongasi;
5. 5That after the death of Concepcion Tumulak, the land was succeeded by her children
Aguinaldo Tumulak Perez and Restituto T. Perez, and who sold the land to one
Severiana Gacho;
6. (vi)Sketch plan of Lot No. 1499 (Exhibit N).

7. (vii)Certified Xerox copy of the technical description of Lot No.
1499 (Exhibit N-1).
On January 13, 1997, the Land Registration Authority submitted a
Report signed by Benjamin M. Bustos, its Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division, as follows:
14
6. 6That I also attest to the truth of the fact that the said owners duplicate of the
REPORT
original certificate of title issued to Lot No. 1499 was lost during the last World War, by
Aguinaldo Tumulak Perez, one of the children of Concepcion Tumulak, who was in the
possession of the said owners copy of the said original certificate of
539
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539
Islas Filipinas
Respondent Gacho offered as bases for reconstitution the following
documents:
1. (i)Xerox copy of the Decision dated March 31, 1929 in Exp.
Cad. No. 17, Record No. 946 (Exhibit I).
COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority and to the Honorable Court
respectfully reports that:
(1) The present petition seeks the reconstitution of Original Certificate
of Title No. (N.A.), allegedly lost or destroyed and sup_______________
title issued to Lot No. 1499, as we were again together during the evacuation and due to fear by us of
invading Japanese Forces invading Cebu, all their personal belongings including the owners duplicate
certificate of title, above-adverted, were lost and despite earnest efforts exerted by them to locate the
same after the liberation, all their efforts were in vain, the said owners duplicate of the Original
Certificate of Title issued to Lot No. 1499, could no longer be located.
159
1. 7That this affidavit is executed by me to attest to the truth of all the above
statements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hands below this 22nd day of February, 1996, at Cebu
City.
14
Id., p. 32. The Clerk of Court transmitted the petition together with the technical
description and plan of the subject lot for verification.
540
540
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
posedly covering Lot 1499, Opon Cadastre, situated at the Municipality of Opon,
Province of Cebu.
1. (2)From Book 38 of the Record Book of Cadastral Lots, on file at the
Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it appears that Decree No.
365835 was issued for Lot 1499 on October 28, 1929 in Cadastral Case
No. 17, GLRO Cad. Record No. 946, copy of said decree, however, is no
longer available in this Authority.
subject to a first lien in favor of the National Government to guarantee the

payment of the special taxes assessed pursuant to Section 18 of Act 2259,
as amended, and to a lien in favor of E. Bunagan Surveying Co. to
guarantee the payment of the costs of cadastral survey and monumenting
pursuant to Act 3327, as amended, unless the same has previously been
cancelled; and Provided, further, that no certificate of title covering the
same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned.
On March 11, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision as follows:
After a thorough examination of all the evidence, the Court is of the belief
that the allegations in the petition have been sufficiently established and
that therefore the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the Court hereby grants the
petition and renders judgment directing the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 1499 in the name of Tirso
Tumulak, married to Engracia Pongasi, which reconstituted title must
conform strictly with the technical description of the lot (Exhibit N-2).
SO ORDERED.
15
_______________
15
2. (3)The plan and technical description of Lot 1499, Opon Cadastre were
verified correct by this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the
same have been approved under (LRA) PR-16366 pursuant to the
provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the property in

question is respectfully submitted for consideration in the resolution of the
instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds
justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 to grant the
same, the plan and technical description having been approved, may be
used as basis for the inscription of the technical description on the
reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that in case the petition is
granted, the reconstituted title being an original certificate should be made
Rollo, pp. 45-49.
541
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541
Islas Filipinas
Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
its notice of appeal with the trial court and the records were
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its appellants brief, petitioner
alleged that the trial court erred:
In granting the petition for reconstitution on the basis of index of decree,
sketch plan, certification, among other documents, which documents are
non-acceptable and insufficient bases for reconstitution under RA 26.
16
160
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed

decision affirming the judgment of the trial court. It disposed
petitioner Republics appeal in this wise:
The appeal lacks merit.

Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26, the following are the acceptable
sources for reconstitution of an original certificate of title:
Sec. 2. Original Certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of
the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:
1. (a)The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
2. (b)The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate
of title;
3. (c)A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
4. (d)An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title
was issued;
5. (e)A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the
property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original has been registered; and
6. (f)Any other document which, in the judgment of the court is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
Appellant contends that the enumerated documents acceptable as
evidence of ownership are either issued by or registered in the Registry of
_______________
16
CA Rollo, p. 28.
542
542
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
Deeds, and thus should only be the ones to be considered as official sources
recognizing ownership of an applicant in a reconstitution case, but that
they are not among those presented herein. However appellant neglected to
mention that petitioner had presented the Decision of the Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de la Prov. de Cebu in EXP Cat. No. 17 entitled El
Gobierno De Las Islas Filipinas, peticionario contra Enemesia Acaso et al.,
reclamantes, Record No. 946 dated March 31, 1929, a certified copy of
which had been admitted in evidence as Exh. I, found on p. 4 of the
Record stating Lote No. 1499,a favor de Tirso Tumulak, casado con
Engracia Pongasi, as well as the Cadastral Record which contains the
annotation for Decree No. 365835 for Lot No. 1499 marked Exhibits J and
J-1 found on page 5 of the Record. The authenticity and due execution of
the foregoing documents marked Exhibits I and J have not been
questioned, hence deemed admitted.
There is sufficient evidence showing how ownership had been
transferred over Lot No. 1499 as afore-stated; Concepcion Tumulak was the
uncontested only heir of Tirso Tumulak. In a Deed of Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs with Sale (Exhibit K, Record, p. 10) Aguinaldo and
Restituto Perez, heirs to the intestate estate of Concepcion Tumulak, sold
the 901 square meters of Lot No. 1499 to the petitioner Severiana Gacho. It
is clear that petitioner was able to show valid title over the property in
question (Esso Standard Eastern Lab. vs. Lim, 123 SCRA 465).
There is ample basis therefore to sustain reconstitution ordered by the
court a quo considering that it was also shown by a certification of the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City that the Original Certificate of Title of
Lot No. 1499 had been lost or destroyed during the last Global War (Exhibit
M, Record, p. 6).
161
17
Hence, the instant petition for review wherein petitioner Republic

raises the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMNG THE

DECISION
OF
THE
COURT A
QUO WHICH
GRANTED
RECONSTITUTION ON THE BASES ALONE OF A XEROX COPY OF A
PAPER CAPTIONED DECISION (BUT WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR
TO BE ONE), AN ENTRY IN THE INDEX OF DECREES, SKETCH
PLAN,
_______________
claim that since a decree was already issued for Lot No. 1499, there
was already a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; that the
decision dated March 31, 1929, on which the Court of Appeals based
its assailed decision, was unsigned and contained no discussion or
reference as to matters of what transpired therein except the phrase
Lote No. 1499.A favor de Tirso Tumulak, casado conEngrasia
Pongasi which cannot be considered a valid judgment under Section
1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court from which a valid decree can
emanate; that the decision is inadmissible since only a geodetic
engineer certified as to its authenticity in violation of Section 7, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence; that the entry in the index of decree is
not the authenticated copy of the decree of registration referred to in
Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26 and the name of
18
19
17
Rollo, pp. 30-32.
543
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005

543
Islas Filipinas
_______________
18
Section 1. Rendition of judgment and final order.A judgment or final order
CERTIFICATIONS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND DEED OF

SALE, WHICH DOCUMENTS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE SOURCES FOR
RECONSTITUTION UNDER RA 26.
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared
II
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE
DECISION
OF
THE
COURT A
QUO GRANTING
RECONSTITUTION OF AN ALLEGEDLY LOST CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE DESPITE THE DEARTH OF EVIDENCE ON THE PREVIOUS
ISSUANCE OF SAID CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.
Respondent Gacho submitted her Comment and petitioner filed a

Reply. Parties filed their respective memoranda.
In its Memorandum, petitioner contends that no decree of
registration was ever presented by respondent that can support her
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
19
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.When the
office, its content may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
544
544
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
Tirso Tumulak from whom respondent traced her ownership did not
appear on the said index; and that these documents together with
the other documents which respondent presented in the trial court,
do not qualify as sources for reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles.
162
We agree.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 26 quoted in the Court of Appeals decision
enumerates the sources as bases of reconstitution of the original
certificate of title. To reiterate, they are as follows:
_______________
20
Sec. 2. Original Certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the

sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
1. (a)The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
2. (b)The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate

of title;
3. (c)A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
4. (d)An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title
was issued;
5. (e)A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the
property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original has been registered; and
6. (f)Any other document which, in the judgment of the court is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
The Court of Appeals relied on a one page, two-liner Decision dated

March 31, 1929 as well as the index of decree which contained the
annotation for Decree No. 365835 for Lot No. 1499 in affirming the
decision of the trial court granting respondents petition for
reconstitution. These documents would naturally not fall
20
An Act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of torrens certificate of
title lost or destroyed.

545
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005

545
Islas Filipinas
under Sec. 2(a) to (e) of R.A. No. 26 but may be considered under Sec.
2(f) of R.A. No. 26, as any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title. However, we find that they are not
enough bases for reconstitution of lost original certificate of title.
The entire text of the 1929 decision attached to the petition for
reconstitution is reproduced, in verbatim as follows:
ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA
ISLAS FILIPINAS
EN EL JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA DE LA
PROV. DE CEBU
20.0 Distrito
Sala Auxiliar
EL GOBIERNO DE
LAS ISLAS
FILIPINAS,
EXP. CAD.
No. 17
Record No.
946
Peticionario
- contra ENEMESIA ACASO,
et al.,
Reclamantes.
x-------------- - - - - -x
163
DECISION
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
Lote No. 1499.A favor de Tirso Tumulak, casado con Engrasia Pongasi.
xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
ASI SE ORDENA.
Cebu, Cebu, 31 de Marzo de 1929.
(Fdo.) GUILLERMO F. PABLO
546
546
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
Juez Auxiliar del 20.0 Distrito
A certified true copy:

Cebu City, April 19, 1995
BENITO F. BUNAGAN
Geodetic Engineer
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.

When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
Thus, in the absence of proof that the Geodetic Engineer is a public

officer in custody thereof, such piece of evidence has no probative
value.
We also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree
No. 365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for reconstitution.
We noticed that the name of the applicant as well as the date of the
issuance of such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835
existed in the Record Book of Cadastral Lots in the Land
Registration Authority as stated in the Report submitted by it,
however, the same report did not state the number of the original
certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in support of the
petition for reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration of
heirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak Perez
and respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also mention the
number of the original certificate of title but only Tax Declaration
No. 00393. As we held in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning
the number of the certificate of title and the date when
21
_______________
21
Significantly, only a certain Geodetic Engineer certified that the copy

of the decision attached to the petition was a true copy of the same. It
was not established that the Geodetic Engineer is the public officer
who is in custody thereof. Section 7, Rule 130, Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
No. L-55771, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 273, 314-315.
547
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547
Islas Filipinas
164
the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of
such petition.
Respondent Gacho argues that contrary to petitioners claim that
there is no certificate of title to be reconstituted, it had been shown
that the 1929 decision adjudicated Lot No. 1499 to Tirso Tumulak,
married to Engracia Pongasi which was the foundation of the
issuance of the decree and consequently the issuance of the original
certificate of title. We are not persuaded. As we have discussed above,
we cannot give any probative value to the 1929 decision which cannot
be considered as a valid source for reconstitution.
Respondent Gacho also submitted the plan, the technical
description of Lot No. 1499 as well as the certification from the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Dioscoro Y. Sanchez, Jr.,
stating that the Original Certificate of Title of Lot No. 1499 of Opon
Cadastre as per records on file has been lost or destroyed during the
last Global War. However, these are not the documents referred to
under Section 2(f) of R.A. No. 26 but are mere additional documents
that will accompany the petition to be forwarded to the Land
Registration Authority. In Heirs of Felicidad Dizon vs. Discaya, we
held:
22
We now tackle the theory that the other documents mentioned in Section
3(f) of RA 26 refer to those enumerated in paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No.
35 dated June 13, 1983, to wit:
5. In case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in Sections 2 (f) and 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26 in relation to
section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of the petition to be forwarded
to this Commission shall be accompanied by the following:
(a) A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth, with two
(2) print copies thereof, prepared by the government agency which issued
the certified technical description, or by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer
who shall certify thereon that he prepared the same on the basis of a duly
certified technical description. Where the plan as submitted is certified by

the government agency which issued the same, it is sufficient
_______________
22
G.R. No. 133502, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 197.
548
548
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Islas Filipinas
that the technical description be prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic

Engineer on the basis of said certified plan.
1. (b)The original, two (2) duplicate copies, and a xerox copy of the
original of the technical description of the parcel of land covered by
the certificate of title, duly certified by the authorized officer of the
Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Commission who issued
the technical description.
2. (c)A signed copy of the certification of the Register of Deeds
concerned that the original of the certificate of title on file in the
Registry was either lost or destroyed, indicating the name of the
registered owner, if known from the other records on file in said
office.
Petitioners maintain that since they submitted before the lower court
Exhibits N 5, S 6 and S-1 7, and T 8, consisting of the certification
from the register of Deeds, technical descriptions, and tracing cloth plan,
respectively, their petition for reconstitution should have been granted by
the lower court.
Untenable is petitioners contention. Paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No.
35 specifically states that [i]n case the reconstitution is to be made
exclusively from sources enumerated in sections 2(f) and 3(f) of Republic
165
Act No. 26, in relation to section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of the
petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be accompanied by the
following: . . . From the foregoing, it is clear that subparagraphs (a), (b),
and (c) of paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 are merely additional
documents that must accompany the petition to be forwarded to the Land
Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority). There is
nothing in LRC Circular No. 35 to support petitioners stance that the
documents therein enumerated are those referred to in Section 3(f) of RA
26.
It has been held by the Court that when Section 2(f) of Republic Act No.
26 speaks of any other document, the same must refer to similar
documents previously enumerated therein 9, that is, those mentioned in
Sections 2(a), (b), (c), and (d). Having failed to provide a sufficient and
proper basis for reconstitution, petitioners cannot assail the respondent
court for dismissing their petition for reconstitution. (Emphasis supplied).
23
_______________
23
Id., pp. 205-206.
same do not likewise help respondents case. While Oyao attested to

the fact of the loss of such title by Aguinaldo Tumulak Perez during
the Japanese invasion, respondent, however, failed to show why Oyao
was the one who attested to the fact of loss and not Aguinaldo who
was allegedly in possession of the owners duplicate copy at the time
it was lost. It is also noted that Aguinaldo or his brother Restituto
did not bother to reconstitute the title after it was lost during the
Japanese invasion.
In fine, we are not convinced that respondent Gacho had adduced
competent evidence to warrant reconstitution of allegedly lost
original certificate of title since she had not proven the existence of
the same. The courts must be cautious and careful in granting
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. It is the duty
of the trial court to scrutinize and verify carefully all supporting
documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact,
circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the
existence and loss of the title should be examined.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000, affirming
the RTC order granting respondents petition for reconstitution, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is entered denying
the petition for reconstitution.
25
26
549
VOL. 459, JUNE 8, 2005

549
Islas Filipinas
Furthermore, the affidavit of a certain Conchita Oyao, an alleged
neighbor of the Tumulaks, attesting to the fact that there existed an
original certificate of title, the number of which she did not mention,
issued to Lot 1499 as she personally saw the owners duplicate copy
during the lifetime of the registered owners, does not help the case of
respondent Gacho. In the first place, said affidavit is inadmissible in
evidence under the hearsay rule since Oyao was not presented in
court to testify on such alleged loss of the original certificate of title.
Secondly, even if we were to consider the contents of the affidavit, the
_______________
24
Peoples Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonides, G.R. No. 47815, March 11,
1992,207 SCRA 164, 166.

25
Supra, p. 314.
26
Ibid.
24
550
550
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
166
People vs. Bulan

SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., Tinga andChico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno (Chairman), J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set aside.
Notes.Section 3 of R.A. 26 governs petitions for reconstitution of
transfer certificates of title, while Section 2 of the same law applies
when original certificates of title are at stake. (Heirs of Felicidad
Dizon vs. Discaya, 303 SCRA 197[1999])
A court cannot be said to have exceeded its authority if, in
ordering the reconstitution of an original certificate of title, it stated
therein that the registered owner inherited it from her mother,
where such disposition was copied from the same courts earlier
decision acting as cadastral court. (Pisuea vs. Heirs of Petra
Unating, 313 SCRA 384[1999])
o0o
G.R. No. 111715. June 8, 2000.

MANUEL SILVESTRE BERNARDO and the HEIRS OF JOSE P.
BERNARDO namely, TELESFORA BERNARDO, ROBERTO
BERNARDO, WILFRIDO BERNARDO, LUIS BERNARDO and
MELCHOR BERNARDO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
*
167
THE ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., EMBASSY

TERRACES HOMES CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION and THE
HEIRS OF VICTORIA D. SANTOS, namely, MIGUEL, CARIDAD,
MANUEL TERESITA, ALICIA, ANTONIO MIGUEL and MA.
LOURDES, all surnamed SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 112876. June 8, 2000.
ANITA S. LIM, BENJAMIN A. TANGO and ANTONIO C.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ARANETA
INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., EMBASSY TERRACE
HOMES CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, and HEIRS OF
VICTORIA SANTOS namely, MIGUEL, CARIDAD, MANUEL,
TERESITA, ALICIA, ANTONIO MIGUEL and MA. LOURDES, all
surnamed SANTOS, respondents.
*
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Issue that the Court of Appeals has to address in
any petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
limited to error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.The issue that the Court of Appeals has to address in any petition
for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is limited to error
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In the
particular petition before it, the Court of Appeals had to resolve the issue of
whether or not it could give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition
that also prayed for annulment of judgment. We find that even as they prayed for
annulment of the Order granting reconstitution of title, private respondents
invoked jurisdictional issues arising from the failure of the Bernardos to comply
with requirements in a petition for reconstitution of
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
136
1
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

title. Hence, even if the object of the petition was for annulment of the
judgment of the Pasig RTC, still, the question of jurisdiction was involved.
Same; Same; The rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss is

interlocutory and hence, it cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari, is not absolute.As regards the private respondents prayer for
the reversal of the denial of their motion to dismiss, the general rule is that
the denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and hence, it cannot be
questioned in a special civil action of certiorari. Neither can a denial of a
motion to dismiss be subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment
or order is rendered. However, that rule is not absolute. An exception is
when the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
As we shall show later, the main thrust of the petition was to question the
trial courts jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
Same; Actions; Prejudicial Question; Court cannot subscribe to the
Court of Appeals pronouncement that the validity of TCT No. 12658 and
the proceedings for its reconstitution is a prejudicial question to the
validity of private respondents titles to the same land.We cannot
subscribe to the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the validity of TCT
No. 12658 and the proceedings for its reconstitution is a prejudicial
question to the validity of private respon-dents titles to the same land.
The phrase prejudicial question has a definite meaning in law. It comes
into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. As used by the Court of Appeals, the phrase pre-judicial
question may only be understood as meaning that the validity of the
reconstituted title is determinative of the success of the complaint for
annulment of the titles of private respondent.
168
Same; Judgment; Grounds for annulment of judgment even beyond the

period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 38.Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
provides that a final and executory judgment may be set aside through a
petition for relief from judgment within the period prescribed therefor.
However, even beyond the period pre137
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

137
scribed by Section 3 of Rule 38, a party aggrieved by a judgment may

petition for its annulment on two (2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has been
obtained by fraud. The nullity of a judgment based on lack of jurisdiction
may be shown not only by what patently appears on the face of such
decision but also by documentary and testimonial evidence found in the
records of the case and upon which such judgment is based.
Land Titles; Land Registration; Requirement of notice by publication is
a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith is fatal to the
petition for reconstitution of title; Actual notice to the occupants mandatory.
The requirements of these provisions of law must be complied with before
the court can act on the petition and grant to the petitioner the
reconstitution of title prayed for. The requirement of notice by publication is
thus a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith is fatal to
the petition for reconstitution of title. However, notwithstanding compliance
with that requirement, actual notice to the occupants of the property is still
mandatory. Thus: Notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of
title must be served on the actual possessors of the property. Notice thereof
by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effect settled that in
petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the
land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the
petition.
Same; Same; Court upon which the petition for reconstitution of title is
filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the petition and to review the
record and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional
requirements.The indispensability of notice to actual possessors of the
subject property was underscored in Manila Railroad Co. v. Hon. Moya. In
that case, the Court held that failure to serve notice on a possessor of the
property involved renders the order of reconstitution null and void as said
possessor is deprived of his day in court. As such, the court upon which the
petition for reconstitution of title is filed is duty-bound to examine
thoroughly the petition for reconstitution of title, and to review the record
and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional
requirements. It appears that the Pasig RTC failed to comply with this
judicial obligation.
138
138

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
Sergio F. Angeles for Manuel S. Bernardo, et al.
Pantaleon Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 111715.
J.P. Cortez & Associates for A. Lim, et al.
Antonio C. Gonzales for and in his own behalf and for other
petitioners.
Jose B. Layug for private respondent Heirs of V. Santos.
Formoso & Quimbo Law Offices for Araneta Institute of
Agriculture, Inc.
Roel M. Negre for Milestone Devt. Corp.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
169
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari aim to reverse

the August 19, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals that disposed
CA-G.R. SP No. 30815 as follows:
1
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 17, 1985 Rendered by the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 165, in LRC Case No. N-138,
reconstituting Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12658 is declared Null and
Void for lack of jurisdiction and in violation of the basic requirements of
due process. The reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12658, in
the name of Tomas Bernardo, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City is likewise declared Null and Void.
A writ is, hereby, issued permanently prohibiting respondent Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, from further conducting
proceedings in Civil Case No. 92-12645, except to dismiss the complaint,
and receive evidence on the counter-claim of the herein petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by Associate
Justices Arturo B. Buena and Luis L. Victor.

139
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

139
The instant controversy evolved from the following facts on

record: On July 16, 1985, Manuel Silvestre Bernardo, claiming to
be the legitimate son and only surviving heir of Tomas Bernardo,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a verified petition for
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12658 that the
Register of Deeds of Rizal Province issued in the name of Tomas
Bernardo. TCT No. 12658 allegedly covered an area of approximately
three hundred thirty-four thousand five hundred eleven (334,511)
square meters in Quezon City (previously part of Rizal Province)
designated as Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate. Docketed as L.R.C. Case

No. R-138, the petition alleged that the owners copy of TCT No.
12658 was in petitioner Manuel Bernardos custody, stored with
other old papers, but subsequent diligent search for it proved futile.
When he verified from the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal,
petitioner Manuel Bernardo was allegedly told that the original copy
of TCT No. 12658 had likewise been lost/destroyed and (could) no
longer be recovered. He had not pledged nor delivered to any person
or entity to secure any obligation or for any purpose whatsoever, the
owners copy of the title that was in his possession. Neither was there
any transaction or document relating thereto that had been
presented for or pending registration in the Register of Deeds office.
Furthermore, TCT No. 12658 had not been recalled, cancelled or
revoked and hence it was in full force and effect. Petitioner Manuel
Bernardo also alleged that since his deceased father died, he had
continuously exercised actual ownership and possession over the
property embraced in and covered by said title. He asserted that the
technical descriptions, boundaries and area of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 12658 are substantially the same as those
indicated in the official Technical Descriptions attached to the
petition and the officially approved survey plan that he would present
at the hearing. He indicated therein the properties adjoining the
property covered by TCT No. 12658 as follows:
_______________
2
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 236-240.
140
140

On the N., Lots 724 & 935 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by Far Eastern
University, Manila; on the E., Lot 933 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by
170
San Pedro Estate represented by Engracio San Pedro of 118 Kamias Road,
Quezon City; on the S., Lot 706 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by San
Pedro Estate, supra; and on the NW., Lot 705 (Piedad Estate)
owned/claimed by Himlayang Pilipino, Quezon Blvd., Quezon City;
On the strength of the certification allegedly issued by the Register of

Deeds of Pasig, Rizal stating that the original copy of TCT No. 12658
was on file and record under Reg. Book T-51 and that he could no
longer locate the owners copy of TCT No. 12658, petitioner Manuel
Bernardo contended that reconstitution of the same certificate of title
was proper and neces-sary. Otherwise, he could not exercise his
legitimate rights as owner of the property.
On August 8, 1985, the Pasig RTC issued an Order setting the
petition for hearing on October 3, 1985 and directing that its Order
be posted at the bulletin board of the Halls of Justice in Pasig. It also
directed that the same Order be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks in the Filipino Times as well as in the Official Gazette,
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26.
At the hearing on October 3, 1985, the Pasig RTC found that
petitioner Manuel Bernardos mother, Perfecta Bias, predeceased his
father, Tomas Bernardo, who thereafter married Constancia Cruz.
Tomas second marriage was without issue. Thus, when Tomas died
in 1944, petitioner Manuel Bernardo became Tomas sole heir to the
property covered by TCT No. 12658. Petitioner Manuel Bernardo
took possession of the property but when he wanted to exercise his
proprietary rights thereon, diligent search in his aparador failed to
yield the owners copy of the title.
3
_______________
141
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

141
On October 17, 1985, the Pasig RTC granted the petition for
reconstitution of title. In the Order it issued on that day, the court
said:
5
Petitioners evidence, both oral and documentary, has like-wise proved and
established, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the corresponding survey
plan and technical description of the property covered by TCT No. 12658,
duly approved by the Bureau of Lands are still intact; that the property is
fully cultivated, planted to fruit trees and a farm lot constructed thereon
(Exhs. N, N-1, O, O-1); that the requirements mentioned in the Order
(Exhs. A and A-1), with respect to posting and publication have been duly
complied with (Exhs. B, B-1, G, H, H-1, to H-4, I, I-1, F). No
encumbrance of whatever nature affect the realty covered by said title.
That Order having become final and executory, it was entered in the
daybook of the Registry of Deeds on November 21, 1985, together
with the certificate of finality.
On December 12, 1985, the Acting Commissioner of Land
Registration,
through
Ricardo
F.
Arandilla,
filed
a
manifestation before the Pasig RTC. It stated that the Order of
October 17, 1985 was issued by that court beforethe Land
Registration Commission could approve the plan and technical
description of Lot No. 802 of the Piedad Estate as required by
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26. The same manifestation stated
that the Commission was not furnished with the documents required
by LRC Circular No. 35 dated June 11, 1983.
6
_______________
Presided by Judge Milagros V. Caguioa.
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 241-244.
Ibid., pp. 267-269.
Ibid., p. 67.
171
Ibid., p. 245.
These are: (a) a signed copy of the petition for reconstitution; (b) a signed copy of
the certification of the Register of Deeds concerned that the original copy of the
certificate of title on file in the Registry was either lost or destroyed; (c) the original and
two duplicate copies of the technical description of the parcel of land covered by the lost
certificate of title duly certified by the authorized officer of the Bureau of Lands; and (d)
the plan in tracing cloth, with two print copies thereof, prepared by a duly licensed
Geodetic Engineer
142
142

It thus prayed that in the meantime that petitioner Manuel

Bernardo had not yet submitted the required documents,
implementation of the Order of October 17, 1985 should be held in
abeyance.
Accordingly, on January 15, 1986, the Pasig RTC issued an Order
requiring petitioner Manuel Bernardo to submit to the Land
Registration Commission the documents required by LRC Circular
No. 35. On January 23, 1986, the Acting Register of Deeds of Pasig
forwarded to the Land Registration Commissioner the same
documents required by LRC Circular No. 35 in relation to our letter
on consulta dated November 25, 1985.
On January 31, 1986, Acting Commissioner Oscar R. Victoriano of
the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA) issued a Resolution in LRC Consulta 1490 on account of
the doubts that the Pasig Register of Deeds entertained on whether
or not he should proceed with the registration of the Order of October
17, 1985. Said Register of Deeds had certified the records of the case
to the NLTDRA with these observations:
9
10
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12658 sought to be reconstituted is,
according to the records, Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate, situated in Pasong
Tamo, Quezon City with an area of 334,511 square meters.
Under the law, petitions for judicial reconstitution shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court (Sec. 2, Rep. Act
No. 26). The question may be asked. Is it the Regional Trial Court in Pasig
or the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City? The original copy of the title
appears to have been lost in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in Pasig, but the
property covered by the title is situated in Quezon City.
With due respect to the Court Order issued by the Honorable Regional
Trial Court, we elevated this matter en consulta to that who shall certify
thereon that he prepared the same on the basis of a duly certified technical
description.
_______________
9
10
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 246.

Ibid., p. 247.
143
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

143
Commission at our instance in view of our doubt as to whether we may

proceed to register the subject Court Order and issue the corresponding
transfer certificate of title although the land covered is located in Quezon
City and not in Rizal. Is it the Register of Deeds of Rizal who should
reconstitute?
11
Citing Bacalso
v.
Ramolete and Ella
v.
Salanga, Acting
Commissioner Victoriano ruled that since Quezon City and Pasig
belonged to the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region, either branch may take jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution of title. Thus, the Pasig RTC had jurisdiction to issue
the Order reconstituting the title in question. On the issue as to
whether it is the Register of Deeds of Pasig or the Register of Deed of
12
13
172
Quezon City who should register the Order of October 17, 1985, the
Acting Commissioner held that pursuant to Section 51 of P.D. No.
1527, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City should perform that task.
Accordingly, he ordered the transmittal of the necessary documents
to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
On June 4, 1986 the Pasig RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the Order of October 17, 1985. The following
day, the acting clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of Pasig accordingly
issued the writ of execution that was served on the Register of Deeds
of Pasig on January 26, 1987.
It appears that the Register of Deeds of Rizal and Ricardo F.
Arandilla, the Chief of the Clerks of Court of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC), refused to execute the Order of October 17, 1985.
Thus, petitioner Manuel Bernardo filed a petition to cite them in
indirect contempt of court. In his answer to that petition, Arandilla
admitted that said Order was
14
15
16
17
_______________
11
Ibid., pp. 67-68.
12
L-22488, October 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 519.
13
L-23826, September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 86.
14
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 67-72.
15
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 248.
16
Ibid., p. 249.
17
Ibid., pp. 250 & 251.
144
144

elevated to the LRC by way of consulta but that the documents

required by LRC Circular No. 35 were submitted to the LRC not in
virtue of that consulta but in compliance with said circular. Arandilia
alleged that he could not have submitted the required documents

while these were pending examination and verification by the
Commission especially because the findings of the Chief,
Department of Registration, show that said plan and technical
description submitted by petitioner overlaps other properties. On
account of that finding, the Chief of the Department of Registration
advised the Bureau of Lands thereof and requested that verification
be made on the overlapping parcels of land. However, since the
Bureau of Lands had not replied to the request, it would be improper
for Arandilia to forward the documents to the Register of Deeds.
Thereafter, with his report dated August 20, 1987, Administrator
Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the NLTDRA submitted to the Pasig RTC the
plan in tracing cloth and two (2) print copies of Lot 802, Piedad
Estate, and their corresponding technical descriptions on account of
the following findings:
18
19
1. (3)Upon plotting of the technical description of Lot 802, Piedad

Estate, on the municipal index sheets of this Office, the same was
found to overlap Lot 935-C, Psd-8994, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 148176 issued in the name of Freeman
Incorporated. This finding is contained in the 1st Indorsement
dated August 18, 1987 of the Chief, Department on Registration,
this Administration, x x x.
20
2. (4)The extent of overlapping between Lot 802, Piedad Estate, and

Lot 935-C, Psd-8994, is graphically shown in Sketch Plan No. SK86-053 where Lot 802 is drawn in black lines while Lot 935-C is
reflected in red lines, x x x.
Nonetheless, it appears that at 1:05 p.m. on January 4, 1988, TCT

No. 12658 in the name of Tomas Bernardo was
_______________
173
18
Ibid., p. 253.
19
Ibid., p. 259.
20
Ibid., p. 260.
145
lack of legal capacity to institute the action; (b) lack of cause of

action; and (c) plaintiffs cause of action, if any, had been waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished on the grounds of estoppel and
laches.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs (hereafter the Bernardos) amended their
complaint to implead as defendants the heirs
23
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

145
entered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Annotated at the

back of the title are the following inscriptions:
21
MEMO. This Certificate of title was issued pursuant to the Order (P.E.1453/T-12658) dtd. Oct. 17, 1985, issued by the Court (RTC) Br. CLXV
(165), Pasig, Metro Manila, LRC No. R-138 Manuel Silvestre Bernardo,
(Heir of deceased Tomas Bernardo), Petitioner, and by virtue of the
resolution promulgated in LRC Consulta No. 1490 dated January 31, 1986.
Quezon City, January 4, 1987 (sic)
SAMUEL C. CLEOFE
Register of Deeds
On July 3, 1992, armed with the reconstituted title, petitioner
Manuel Bernardo and the Heirs of Jose P. Bernardo filed before the
Quezon City RTC, Civil Case No. Q-92-12645, a complaint for
annulment of certificates of title. Named defendants therein are
persons and entities that petitioner Manuel Bernardo had found to
be in possession of certificates of title over property within that
covered by his reconstituted title. They are the following: Heirs of
Burgos Pangilinan, Embassy Terraces Homes Condominium,
Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. and/or Bonifacio Subdivision,
National Electrification Administration, A & E Industrial
Corporation, Paulino G. Pe and Milestone Development Corporation.
Except for Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (AIAI), these
defendants filed their respective answers to the complaint. AIAI filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on these grounds: (a) plaintiffs
22
_______________
21
Rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 30815, p. 179.
22
Ibid., back of p. 180.
23
Rollo of G.R. No. 111715, p. 4.
146
146

of Dr. Victoria D. Santos. The amended complaint alleged further

that Manuel Bernardo and his brother Jose, had been in possession
of the property in question since their father died intestate on
November 29, 1944 but it was Manuel who was in possession of the
certificate of ownership of the property. After Joses death on March
17, 1961, his heirs assisted Manuel in the possession of the said
parcel of land. In 1979, Manuel searched his locker for the certificate
of title that he needed for the relocationof the property but despite
exercise of due diligence, his efforts proved futile. He thus went to
the Register of Deeds in Pasig, only to find out that the original
certificate of title was also missing.
The amended complaint stated that in 1982, Manuel sought the
help of Attys. Julian F. Salcedo, Roberto Nolasco and Antonio
Gonzales in the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658, the relocation of the
actual boundaries of the land, and the settlement of the estate of
Tomas. Because said lawyers failed to render to him the desired
professional services, Manuel retained only Atty. Antonio Gonzales
24
174
and hired Atty. Benjamin Tango. These lawyers were able to secure
these documents: (a) certificate of sale; (b) certified plan of Lot 802,
Piedad Estate as prepared for Tomas Bernardo; and (c) technical
description of the property. They then filed the petition for
reconstitution of title and, having obtained a reconstituted title,
Manuel resumed his researches on the plan of the adjoining or
boundary owners in order to effect the relocation survey with the
help of a surveyor. The researches allegedly proved that
substantial portions if not all of the 33,4511 hectares have been
landgrabbed or overlapped.
Attys. Juan Salcedo and Roberto Nolascos filing of Civil Case No.
Q-90-5784, a complaint for specific performance against them,
allegedly hampered the Bernardos research efforts. Attys. Salcedo
and Nolasco wanted that eighteen (18) hectares of the land in
question be sold to them. The Bernardos thus contracted the services
of another counsel and continued their researches and verifications
x x x for the pur_______________
24
Ibid., pp. 58-69.
147
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

147
pose of determining the exact boundaries of their said land. Such

researches unveiled dubious and intricate manipula-tions and
juggling of lot numbers through subdivisions to hide the
landgrabbing. The complaint particularized these acts as follows:
1. (a)The supposed first subdivision plan of Lot 802 x x x shows the
designations of numbers 933, 934 and 935 to the subdivided lots
which are the lot numbers of the adjoining parcels of land of the
said parcel (Lot 802 Piedad Estate) of the plaintiffs; hence, the
location and identity of those lots are different from the location or
identity of said Lot 802 of Piedad Estate of the plaintiffs;
2. (b)The said subdivision plan x x x bears the signature of then
Director Jorge B. Vargas of the Director of Lands which is different
from the signature of Director Vargas affixed in the Certificate of
Sale x x x and from the signature of the same official affixed on
proximate dates in those assignment of Sale Certificates x x x;
hence, the signature in the said Subdivision Plan x x x is obviously
falsified;
3. (c)To give semblance of authenticity to said subdivision plan x x x
the name of deceased Tomas Bernardo was made to appear as the
owner of Lot 933 therein;
4. (d)The subsequent subdivision plans, x x x; show clearly the scheme
to suppress the original genuine Lot Number 802 of the land of the
plaintiffs to avoid identifications in violation of laws, rules and
regulations;
The amended complaint thus alleged that the defendants certificates

of title were null and void as these originated from a non-existent
and falsified subdivision plan x x x and from spurious subdivision
plans x x x and their predecessors-in-interest had not been
purchasers or assignees of certificate of sale from the Piedad Estate
(or) any portion of said Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate thru the Bureau
of Lands. Charging that the defendants knew the defects in their
titles, the Bernardos averred that defendants could not have been
holders of certificates of title in good faith.
The Bernardos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to observe the status quo and, after due no175
148
148

tice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued by

the court to enjoin the defendant from subdividing, developing and
selling any portion of Lot 802 or the parcel of land supposedly
designated as Lot Nos. 802-A; 933; 934 and 935 Piedad Estate. They
also prayed that the Subdivision Plan of Lot 902 Piedad Estate
prepared for Potenciano Guevarra; Antera Guevarra;Tomas
Bernardo and Cornelio Pangilinan be declared as null and void ab
initio, that defendants be declared as not buyers in good faith, and
their respective titles nullified. However, if the land covered by
defendants certificates of title could no longer be recovered, the
Bernardos prayed that the defendants should be ordered to pay for
the market value of the portions of said Lot 802 plus the interest at
the legal rate computed from the date of the sale until full payment
of the amount due the plaintiffs. They prayed further for damages of
P700,000.00, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and attorneys fees
of P500,000.00.
Thereafter, Anita S. Lim, Benjamin A. Tango and Antonio C.
Gonzales, filed a motion for intervention alleging that they were coowners of the land in question. In their complaint in
intervention, they alleged that as the only son and surviving legal
heir of Tomas Bernardo, Manuel Bernardo inherited the entire
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12658 through an affidavit of selfadjudication executed on March 21, 1989. Manuel later conveyed to
them the following undivided portions thereof: (a) 10,000 square
meters to Anita S. Lim in consideration of the amount of
P180,000.00; (b) 90,000 square meters to Atty. Antonio C. Gonzales
as contingent fee for legal services rendered; and (c) 90,511 square
25
26
27
28
meters to Atty. Benjamin A. Tango for his financial assistance and x

x x invaluable personal services in solving (Manuels) problems over
said tract of land. After these
29
_______________
25
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 152.
26
Ibid., p. 155.
27
Ibid., p. 163.
28
Ibid., p. 164.
29
Ibid., p. 165.
149
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

149
conveyances were made, Manuel and the intervenors entrusted the

owners copy of TCT No. 12658 to Tango and appointed him as their
representative in initiating and following up the administrative
reconstitution of the Register of Deeds Office copy of the title which
has been previously destroyed by fire. They thus intervened as
legitimate co-owners of the property entitled to resist the illegal
encroachments and usurpation(s) therein, thus joining the plaintiffs
prayer for a declaration of nullity of the subdivision plan and the
Torrens titles issued to defendants. They prayed further that
defendants should be made to vacate the property and to relinquish
the same in favor of Manuel and themselves, and that they should be
paid attorneys fees and actual damages.
In its motion to dismiss, defendant AIAI averred that the
Bernardos had no legal capacity to institute the action. It alleged
that since the photocopy of TCT No. 12658 attached to the complaint
was questionable as it did not have a back page and was not certified
as a true copy, the filing of the complaint was premature. Moreover,
since the action was for annulment of certificate of title, the proper
30
176
remedy would have been an action for reversion that only the
Solicitor General could file.
In alleging that the complainant did not have a cause of action,
defendant AIAI contended that the Pasig RTC gave due course to the
petition for reconstitution of title even without the usual Land
Registration Authority (formerly LRC) Report to pass upon the
authenticity of the claim and alleged title of the plaintiffs.
Defendant AIAI stated that its properties are all inside the area
claimed by plaintiffs and that OCT No. 614 from whence Tomas
Bernardo derived his alleged title, was the same original certificate
of title from where the title of AIAI emanated. Hence, unless the
plaintiffs could show a certified true copy of their title or a
confirmation of their title from the Land Registration Authority,
plaintiffs had no right to invoke under their alleged title.
_______________
30
Ibid., p. 166.
150
150

Defendant AIAI asserted that the plaintiffs cause of action, if any,

had been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished on the
ground of estoppel and laches. Because AIAIs title was registered
under the Torrens system of land registration, it could not be
defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession. Even if the
action would be considered as one to recover the property, the same
had prescribed as to titles registered 10 years prior to the filing of
this suit.
For its part, defendant Embassy Terrace Homes Condominium
Corporation (ETHCC) filed an answer to the amended
complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land covered

by TCT No. (360285) T-19080 that was within the area covered by
TCT No. 12658. It alleged that the same area covered by TCT No.
12658 was already under the private ownership of more than a
hundred persons who had titles either jointly or individually and
that, by reason thereof, the Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action for reconstitution of title. Moreover, that court had no
jurisdiction over such action because the actual occupants of the land
as well as the adjoining owners of land had not been notified of the
hearing thereon as required by Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 26. A
verification of the records in fact showed the following jurisdictional
defects: (a) the petition omitted to state the names and addresses of
actual occupants with their respective titles; (b) while a few adjoining
owners were mentioned with their addresses, there was no record
that they were notified of the hearing on the petition; and (c) Land
Registration Circular No. 35 dated June 12, 1983 was circumvented.
Furthermore, despite the numerous annexes to the petition for
reconstitution, a Deed of Conveyance executed by the Director of
Lands evidencing that a certificate of title had been issued as
provided in Sec. 122 of the Land Registration Act, was not attached.
Hence, defendant ETHCC prayed for the dismissal of the complaint,
a declaration of nullity of the Bernardos title, and an award of
damages in the amount of P700,000.00.
31
_______________
31
Ibid., p. 196.
151
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

151
177
Defendant ETHCC then filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on

the grounds for the motion to dismiss averred in its answer to the
complaint.
In their answer to the complaint, the heirs of Dr. Victoria Santos,
echoed defendant ETHCCs allegation that the land covered by TCT
No. 12658 was already occupied and titled in the names of hundreds
of persons like them. They asserted that TCT No. 44838 in their
name evidenced ownership of a parcel of land allegedly encompassed
by TCT No. 12658. They added that the certificate of sale relied upon
by the Bernardos in their petition for reconstitution of title was in
fact an agreement to sell conferring no right whatsoever to
plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, until and after the conditions
therein contained are complied with, established and proved. They
claimed that Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate had been subdivided under
Subdivision Plan Psd 2118 into four parcels: (a) Lot 802-A to Lot 802New (51,036 square metersCornelio Pangilinan); (b) Lot 802-B to
Lot 933 (50,001 square metersTomas Bernardo); (c) Lot 802-C to
Lot 934 (79,592 square metersPotenciana Guevarra); and (d) Lot
802-D to Lot 935 (153,882 square metersAntera Guevarra).
On November 13, 1992, the Quezon City RTC issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss filed by defendant AIAI. It considered
as grounds for such denial the following: (a) the plaintiffs had alleged
a cause of action against defendants who had transgressed the
formers title over the property in question, and (b) laches, much less
prescription, does not lie against a registered land.
On January 13, 1993, the same court also denied for lack of merit
the motions of defendant ETHCC and Milestone Development
Corporation for a preliminary hearing. It held that the reason for the
prayer for dismissal of the action,i.e., pre-
32
Ibid., p. 211.
33
Ibid., p. 229.
34
Presided by Judge Tirso DC Velasco.
35
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 234.
32
33
34
35
_______________
152
152

scription and laches, did not appear to be indubitable and therefore

these could be determined at the trial of the case.
Consequently, on April 27, 1993, all the defendants inCivil Case
No. Q-92-12645 filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals, naming as public
respondents both the Quezon City and the Pasig RTC, and as private
respondents, the Bernardos and the intervenors. Docketed as CAG.R. No. SP-30815, the petition alleged that it was only when the
defendants were summoned in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645 that they
learned of the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658 before the Pasig RTC.
As such, petitioner Manuel Bernardos failure to name in the petition
and to notify the actual occupants of the land and the owners of the
lots adjoining the area covered by the title to be reconstituted was a
jurisdictional defect that nullified the proceedings. Petitioner Manuel
Bernardo also failed to comply with the requirements of Section 142
of Republic Act No. 26 and LRC Circulars Nos. 35 and 364 and
therefore, as the records showed that the Register of Deeds of Pasig
sought consultation with his higher-ups, the proceedings before the
Pasig RTC was so highly irregular that even the Order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution commanded the Register of Deeds
ofRizal to register the property that was located in Quezon City.
The petition noted that the certificate of loss of the original copy of
TCT No. 12658 issued by the Pasig Register of Deeds to buttress the
36
37
178
petition for reconstitution did not even mention the material

particulars of the property that the title covered. The filing of the
petition for reconstitution with the Pasig RTC forty (40) years after
the war when the certificate of title would have been transferred to
the Register of Deeds in Quezon City, was a credible admission on
the part of Manuel Bernardo that the property was actually located
in Pasig. Moreover, there was no record in the Assessors Office in
Quezon City that a tax declaration was ever issued in the
_______________
36
Ibid., p. 235.
37
Ibid., p. 73.
153
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

153
name of Tomas Bernardo or his heirs. It was only after he filed Civil
Case No. Q-92-12645 that Manuel Bernardo applied for a tax
declaration but defendants AIAI and ETHCC, as regular taxpayers,
opposed such application.
The petition alleged further that per the technical description of
Lot 802 (Piedad Estate), the original survey was conducted from July
1 to December 14, 1907. The Director of Lands approved the
subdivision survey thereon under Psd 2118 on June 21, 1927 upon
the application of Potenciana Guevarra. The survey that was
conducted from December 5, 1925 to October 8, 1927 by private land
surveyor Emilio P. Gutierrez subdivided Lot No. 802 into four: Lots
802-A, 802-B, 802-C and 802-D which respectively became Lots 802New, 933, 934 and 935. Culled from the records of the Bureau of
Lands, these facts indubitably showed that the certificate of sale in
favor of Tomas Bernardo that was executed on July 25, 1927 was fake
and non-existent. That the certificate of sale could not have covered
the entire Lot 802 was borne by the fact that Lot 934 was the subject
of a final deed of conveyance, Deed No. 22246 dated February 13,
1931, in favor of Francisco Gaerlan, although that parcel of land was
claimed by Antera Guevarra in Subdivision Survey Map Psd 2118.
As regards the denial by the lower court of defendant AIAIs
motion to dismiss, the petition before the Court of Appeals claimed
that a consideration of the proceedings leading to the reconstitution
of TCT No. 12658 would lead the Court of Appeals to the inevitable
conclusion that indeed such title was null and void and hence, the
Bernardos had no cause of action to file Civil Case No. Q-92-12654.
However, to shorten proceedings, the lower court should not have
made an outright denial of their motion for preliminary hearing on
the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the
Bernardos action was barred by laches as against defendantspetitioners who have paid taxes, introduced visible, expensive and
permanent infrastructures and buildings and whose titles have been
perfected by the Bernardos long inaction.
On May 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals directed the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining Quezon City RTC
154
154

Branch 88 from further conducting any proceedings inCivil Case No.

Q-92-12645.
In their comment on the petition, intervenors Anita S. Lim,
Benjamin A. Tango and Antonio C. Gonzales averred that since LRC
Case No. R-138 had long become final and executory, the matter of
reconstitution of title was alreadyres judi-cata. Furthermore, the
question in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645 of which of the contending
parties had the better title over some portions of the property
38
179
covered by TCT No. 12658, was properly within the jurisdiction of the
Quezon City RTC, not the Court of Appeals.
Defending the propriety of their petition for certiorari and
prohibition, petitioners AIAI, et al. contended in their reply to said
intervenors comment that the Order for the reconstitution of TCT
No. 12658 having been issued without jurisdiction for lack of notice
to proper parties, res judicata did not attach. They asserted that the
Bernardos having annexed to their complaint in Civil Case No. 9212645 copies of defendants titles was a clear recognition of the
latters ownership of the property covered by their respective titles.
They added that the denial of their motion to dismiss by the Quezon
City RTC in a way validated the Bernardos reconstituted title and
hence, they were constrained to file the special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition.
The Bernardos asserted the validity of the reconstitution of TCT
No. 12658 in their comment on the petition. They assailed the
merger in the petition of what amounted to a complaint for
annulment of the Order of reconstitution of title and a petition to
prohibit further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. They
questioned the genuineness of the petitioners titles specifically that
of A & E Industrial Corporation which derived its title from
Freeman, Inc., allegedly the owner of Lot 935-B that was actually
located in Manila.
39
40
41
_______________
38
Rollo of CA-G-R. SP No. 30815, p. 201.
39
Ibid., pp. 214-215.
40
Ibid., pp. 219-231.
41
Ibid., pp. 239-263.
155
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

155
In the reply to that comment, petitioners AIAI, et al. defended the

propriety of the special civil action they had filed, contending that an
order of a court such as that granting reconstitution of title, if
rendered without jurisdiction, may be assailed at any time in any
proceeding. It added the information that Milestone Development
Corporation had filed a petition before the Pasig RTC to nullify the
Order of October 17, 1985 for lack of jurisdiction and for violation of
the basic requirements of due process but such petition had been
denied on May 26, 1993. Asserting the validity of its title, petitioner
AIAI assailed the Bernardos unkind accusation against Doa
Josefa Edralin Vda. de Marcos who had title and possession of a
portion of the property involved as early as 1952.
On August 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein
questioned Decision. After receiving a copy of that Decision, the
Bernardos filed with this Court G.R. No. 111715, a petition for
review on certiorari. Meanwhile, the intervenors filed a motion for
the reconsideration of that Decision. After the denial of that motion
on September 24, 1993, the same intervenors filed with this Court
their own petition for review on certiorari under G.R. No. 112876. On
March 7, 1994, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two cases.
In G.R. No. 111715, the Bernardos presented the following
arguments in support of their petition:
42
43
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED TO HAVE

RENDERED THE QUESTIONED DECISION ON THE ACTION TO
ANNUL UNDER SECTION 9, PARAGRAPH 2, BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
129 THE FINAL ORDER OF RECONSTITUTION RENDERED IN LRC
CASE NO. R-139, BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG, METRO
180
MANILA BRANCH 165 AND THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF

CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES
OF COURT TO DECLARE
_______________
42
Ibid., pp. 297-313.
43
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 389.
IN BOTH ACTIONS AS MERGED IN ONE PETITION THE

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION GATHERED AND COLLECTED FACTS FROM THE BARE
ALLEGATIONS AND THE ANNEXES THEREOF WHICH ARE STILL
CONTROVERTED AND NEITHER ESTABLISHED NOR ADMITTED BY
THE PETITIONERS; AND
IV
156
156

NULL AND VOID THE QUESTIONED ORDERS DENYING THE

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ISSUED
BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 88, QUEZON CITY ON
THE WRONG ASSUMPTION THAT THE ISSUE OF VALIDITY OF THE
RECONSTITUTED TCT NO. 12658 AS WELL AS THE VALIDITY OF
THE
RECONSTITUTION
THEREOF
POSES
A PREJUDICIALQUESTION TO THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 88 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON
CITY;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO LAWFULLY ERRED FOR NOT
BEING CONVERSANT WITH THE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT ON THE EFFICACY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE
EXECUTED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS UNDER THE FRIAR LANDS
ACT OR PUBLIC ACT NO. 1120; CONSEQUENTLY, THEY WERE
MISTAKEN TO HAVE ADOPTED AND QUOTED FROM THE PETITION
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THE WRONG CITATION OF THE
RULING INDELA CRUZ VS. DELA CRUZ, 130 SCRA 666;
III
THUS, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS BASING ON

THEIR UNSUPPORTED FINDINGS ERRED FURTHER IN DEPRIVING
COMPLETELY THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR DAY-IN-COURT; WHEN
THEY RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1-9212645 (sic) STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION; AND IN ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND WITH IGNOMINY HAS ORDERED THE
RECEPTION OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
157
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

157
In G.R. No. 112876, the intervenors below allege that the following
questions of law are involved in their petition for review on
certiorari:
1. 1.Does the petition for certiorari, etc., (Annex E hereof), filed in CAG.R. SP No. 30815 by herein private respondents, constitute a
violation of:
1. a.Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 date(d) September 3, 1991,
prohibiting forum-shopping?
2. b.Section 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court?
181
3. c.Section 4, Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court?
158
1. 2.In rendering the questioned decision and resolution (Annex

A and Annex B hereof), did herein respondent Honorable Court of
Appeals transgress:
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court in accordance with, among others, the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 296. The Court of Appeals may thus resolve
petitions for the annulment of final orders rendered by a court
without jurisdiction at any time and in any proceeding by a party
whom it is sought to be enforced. It gave due course to the petition
for certiorari notwithstanding the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration of the denial by the lower court of the motion to
dismiss filed by AIAI, because a considerable delay in the lower
courts resolution could leave the petitioners without any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Reasoning that immediate resolution of the petition would prevent
grave or irreparable injury to the petitioners if their cause be
meritorious, the Court of Appeals held:
1. a.Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 aforementioned?

2. b.Section 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court?
3. c.Section 4, Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court?
4. d.Section 8, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court?
5. e.Section 5, Executive Order No. 33 dated July 28, 1986 (published
in O.G. August 4, 1986), amending the second paragraph of Section
9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended?
6. f.Due process of law?
A preliminary issue that needs resolution in these consolidated cases

is whether or not, under the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals
may entertain and render a decision on a special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with a two-pronged purpose: (a)
annulment of an Order reconstituting a title, and (b) questioning the
denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint for nullification of titles
covering lots that overlap the area covered by the reconstituted title.
The Court of Appeals took jurisdiction over the petition,
specifically as regards the prayer for the annulment of the Order
reconstituting TCT No. 12658, pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129
that vests it with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
decisions and orders of regional trial courts,

We, therefore, uphold the propriety of the merging of the two causes of
action in the same petition for the reason that the issue of the validity of
TCT No. 12658 in the name of Tomas Bernardo as well as the validity of
the reconstitution thereof poses aprejudicial question to the issue before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As a matter of fact, We have decided
to resolve the whole controversy once and for all, considering that all the
facts surrounding the case are now before Us, and so as to prevent needless
delay in the disposition of this case. (Italics supplied.)
Petitioners in G.R. No. 111715 assert that the Court of Appeals

improperly merged or joined the action to annul the final Order of
reconstitution of title under its original and exclusive jurisdiction,
and the petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the denial
of the motion to dismiss which is under its original concurrent
158
182
jurisdiction. They aver that such merger of issues in a special civil

action is improper.
The issue that the Court of Appeals has to address in any petition
for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
limited to error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. In the particular petition before it, the Court of
Appeals had to resolve the
159
The merger of the two causes of action is thus justified. Since the
controversy revolves around a land title dispute, the pertinent laws
thereon must be considered in determining the procedural aspect of
the case. Under the law, once a decree of registration is issued under
the Torrens system and the one-year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration has lapsed without said decree being
controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and
cannot later on be questioned. The Bernardos complaint was aimed
at nullifying
46
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

159
issue of whether or not it could give due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition that also prayed for annulment of
judgment. We find that even as they prayed for annulment of the
Order granting reconstitution of title, private respondents invoked
jurisdictional issues arising from the failure of the Bernardos to
comply with requirements in a petition for reconstitution of title.
Hence, even if the object of the petition was for annulment of the
judgment of the Pasig RTC, still, the question of jurisdiction was
involved.
As regards the private respondents prayer for the reversal of the
denial of their motion to dismiss, the general rule is that the denial
of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and hence, it cannot be
questioned in a special civil action of certiorari. Neither can a denial
of a motion to dismiss be subject of an appeal unless and until a final
judgment or order is rendered. However, that rule is not absolute. An
exception is when the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss. As we shall show later, the main thrust of the
petition was to question the trial courts jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
44
45
_______________
44
Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils, v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80892,
September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 178, 183.

45
Casil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121534, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 264, 271-
274.
46
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. (COCLAI) v. Court of
Appeals, 254 SCRA 220, 230; 324 Phil. 466, 479 (1996) citingPamintuan v. San
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1922);
160
160

private respondents respective titles; the existence of such titles was

therefore a determinative factor as far as the matter of jurisdiction
was concerned. Hence, the Bernardos allegation that the properties
covered by said titles overlapped that covered by TCT No. 12658
created an indubitable nexus between the reconstituted title and the
titles of private respondents.
However, we cannot subscribe to the Court of Appeals
pronouncement that the validity of TCT No. 12658 and the
proceedings for its reconstitution is a prejudicial question to the
validity of private respondents titles to the same land. The phrase
183
prejudicial question has a definite meaning in law. It comes into

play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. As used by the Court
of Appeals, the phrase prejudicial question may only be understood
as meaning that the validity of the reconstituted title is
determinative of the success of the complaint for annulment of the
titles of private respondent.
Viewed from that light, there is a unity in the problem presented
and a common question of law and fact involved between the prayer
for annulment of the judgment reconstituting TCT No. 12658 and
that questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint for
the annulment of titles of parcels of land allegedly already covered by
TCT No. 12658. The joinder of the two causes of action is mandated
by the need to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote an efficient
administration of justice. In this regard, the Court once said:
47
48
_______________
Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791 (1927).
47
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33; 335 Phil. 490, 498-499 (1997).
48
Republic v. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509, 525-526; 323 Phil. 606, 626 (1996).
161
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

161
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party

litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be
joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will
not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b)
the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same
nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting
in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite
the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be
construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice
to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision
should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between
the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made
effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the
efficient administration of justice.
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action
is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in
giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of
universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of
action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as
he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem
presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always
to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
49
It is undisputed that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over an

action for the annulment of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court.
Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980) explicitly provides that the Court of Appeals (formerly the
Intermediate Appellate Court), has (e)xclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of
_______________
184
49
Ibid., pp. 625-626.
162
162

judgments of Regional Trial Courts. The rule on joinder of parties is

not violated by the institution of the action for annulment of
judgment as the Bernardos themselves were the petitioners in that
action. The causes of action in the action for annulment of judgment
and the special civil action questioning the denial of the motion to
dismiss arose out of the relation between the partiesboth are
holders of certificates of title that pertain to the same parcel of land.
Hence, contrary to the Bernardos contention, the Court of
Appeals correctly entertained the petition filed before it by the
private respondents. That the Court of Appeals is vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgment and with original butconcurrent jurisdiction over a special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition is immaterial. What is
material is that the issues jointly raised before the Court of Appeals
pertain to the jurisdiction of the Pasig and Quezon City RTCs
respectively, over the reconstitution proceedings and the denial of the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. As this Court has
always stressed, the Rules of Court must be liberally construed in
the administration of justice. The propriety of the Court of Appeals
action on each of the two (2) issues raised before it shall now be
discussed.
The Court of Appeals annulled the judgment in LRC Case No. N138, principally on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the necessary parties and for being in violation of the basic
requirements of due process. It held that said court could not have
exercised jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution of title
50
because it failed to observe the requirement in Section 13 of Republic

Act No. 26 that actual occupants of the property must be notified of
the proceedings. The Bernardos failed to notify private respondents
who are actual occupants of the land involved as, by the allegations
in paragraph 10 of the petition for reconstitution, they served notice
of the reconstitution proceedings only upon the owners of the lots
adjoining the area covered by TCT No. 12658, i.e.,
_______________
50
Casil v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 280.
163
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

163
Far Eastern University, San Pedro Estate and Himlayang Pilipino.

The Court of Appeals ruled further that the pieces of evidence relied
upon by the Pasig RTC in granting reconstitution, i.e., a certification
of loss of TCT No. 12658, technical description of Lot 802 by the
Bureau of Lands, and certificate of sale of Lot No. 802 by the Director
of Lands, do not meet the requirements of the law.
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory
judgment may be set aside through a petition for relief from
judgment within the period prescribed therefor. However, even
beyond the period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 38, a party
aggrieved by a judgment may petition for its annulment on two (2)
grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack
of due process of law; or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. The
nullity of a judgment based on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not
only by what patently appears on the face of such decision but also by
documentary and testimonial evidence found in the records of the
case and upon which such judgment is based. We find that the
51
52
53
185
record of this case sufficiently warrants a ruling on the jurisdiction of

the Pasig RTC over LRC Case N-138.
In order that a court may acquire jurisdiction over a petition for
reconstitution of title, the following provisions of Republic Act No. 26
must be observed:
SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the
_______________
51
A petition for relief from judgment may be filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken.
52
Lapulapu Development & Housing Corporation v. Judge Risos, 261 SCRA 517,
524; 330 Phil. 231, 240 (1996); Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76366, July 3,
1990, 187 SCRA 153, 161.
53
Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20, 45; 345 Phil. 250, 275 (1997).
164
164

property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the
following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had, been
lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate
had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or
destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do
not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of
the occupants or persons in possession of the property,of the owners of the
adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting

the property had been presented for registration, or if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents,
or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of
the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the
same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively
from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall
be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the
property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office (now Commission of Land Registration), or with a certified copy of
the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same
property.
SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their
claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing,
submit proof of the publication,
165
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

165
posting and service of the notice as directed by the court. (Italics supplied.)
186
The requirements of these provisions of law must be complied with

before the court can act on the petition and grant to the petitioner
the reconstitution of title prayed for. The requirement of notice by
publication is thus a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance
therewith is fatal to the petition for reconstitution of title. However,
notwithstanding compliance with that requirement, actual notice to
the occupants of the property is still mandatory. Thus:
54
55
Notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served

on the actual possessors of the property. Notice thereof by publication is
insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effect settled that in petitions for
reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the land involved
must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
56
The indispensability of notice to actual possessors of the subject

property was underscored in Manila Railroad Co. v. Hon. Moya. In
that case, the Court held that failure to serve notice on a possessor of
the property involved renders the order of reconstitution null and
void as said possessor is deprived of his day in court. As such, the
court upon which the
57
_______________
54
Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 328, 335-336; 337 Phil. 59, 66-67 (1997)
citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 190 Phil. 311(1981).

55
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127969, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA
110 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 551; 317 Phil. 653 (1995)
and Allama v. Republic, G.R. No. 88226, February 26, 1992,206 SCRA 600.
56
Dordas v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 336; p. 67 citing Alabang Development
Corporation v. Judge Valenzuela, G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 261, 277
and Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 34080, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
57
121 Phil. 1122, 1127 (1965) cited in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 484.
166
166

petition for reconstitution of title is filed is duty-bound to examine
thoroughly the petition for reconstitution of title, and to review the
record and the legal provisions laying down the germane
jurisdictional requirements. It appears that the Pasig RTC failed to
comply with this judicial obligation.
The petition for reconstitution of title does not contain the names
and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property as required by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26. Aside
from allegations pertinent to the Bernardos claims, all that the
petition contains is a description of its boundaries with the names
and addresses of the following owners of properties adjoining the
parcel of land embraced in and covered by the subject TCT No.
12658: (a) Far Eastern University, Manila; (b) Engracio San Pedro of
the San Pedro Estate, 118 Kamias Road, Quezon City; and (c)
Himlayang Pilipino, Quezon Blvd., Quezon City. No mention
whatsoever was made as to actual occupants of the property.
Moreover, the Bernardos do not dispute private respondents
assertion that they were not served with notice of the reconstitution
proceedings. The veracity of that claim is bolstered by their filing of
the action for annulment of private respondents title, alleging that
only after TCT No. 12658 had been reconstituted did they institute
researches that showed who the actual possessors of the property
were. Only after they had found out that the property was occupied
by and titled to private respondents did they institute Civil Case No.
Q-92-12645.
Nonetheless, the nullity of the reconstitution proceedings and the
resulting reconstituted title does not warrant the dismissal of Civil
Case No. Q-92-12645. Without denigrating the titles of private
respondents that have become indefeasible over time, proceedings
58
59
187
before the Quezon City RTC should continue on account of an

allegation on record that needs
_______________
58
62
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 277 SCRA 342, 350-351; 343
Phil. 115, 125 (1997).

59
is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The

certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an
evidence of title over a particular property.
Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 236-240.
167
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

167
verification lest the integrity of the Torrens system of land

registration be sullied.
Private respondents ETHCC and the heirs of Dr. Victoria Santos
both mention Subdivision Plan Psd 2118 that allegedly divided Lot
802 into four parts with one part thereof in the name of Tomas
Bernardo. The Bernardos and the intervenors assail the genuineness
of that subdivision plan from which private respondents trace their
rights over their titled property. That material fact, which is beyond
the ambit of this Courts jurisdiction to consider, requires threshing
out in the proceedings below in the interest of justice and equity. It
should be pointed out in this regard that the nullity of the
reconstitution proceedings in the Pasig RTC did not necessarily
divest the Bernardos of proprietary rights over the property. The
Torrens system of land registration does not create or vest title; it
has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership. Reconstitution of title is simply the reis-suance of a new
duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. As this Court said in Strait Times, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals:
60
61
x x x. (Reconstitution of title) does not pass upon the ownershipof the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title
The Court of Appeals obviously missed out on this point. In reversing

the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
Q-92-12645, the Court of Appeals held that the nullification of the
reconstituted title of the Bernardos left
_______________
60
Heirs of Teodoro De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117384, October 21,
1998, 298 SCRA 172, 180.

61
Stilianopulos v. City of Legazpi, G.R. No. 133913, October 12, 1999,316 SCRA 523,
citing Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 218, 223; 314 Phil. 57, 64 (1995).
62
G.R. No. 126673, August 28, 1998, 294 SCRA 714, 726.
168
168

them with no cause of action as it was foreclosed by the

indefeasibility of petitioners authentic titles. In light of the
aforesaid allegation in some of private respondents pleadings, this
ruling should be overturned. While the grounds for the motion to
dismiss thus appeared to have some bases considering that private
respondents are titled occupants of the property involved, subsequent
revelations such as their admission that a portion of Lot 802 as
subdivided pertained to Tomas Bernardo, mandate the continuation
of the proceedings. The interest of proper administration of justice
therefore demands that the writ of prohibition issued by the Court of
Appeals be set aside.
Civil Case No. Q-92-12645 should be considered as one of quieting
of title which can proceed notwithstanding the nullity of the
reconstitution proceedings before the Pasig RTC. Even if the
188
reconstitution proceedings had not been instituted, the Bernardos

are not precluded from establishing by other evidence, such as the
certificate of sale allegedly issued to Tomas Bernardo, the requisite
proof of validity of TCT No. 12658.
We thus do not see any need to discuss further the allegations and
contentions on procedural matters of the petitioners in G.R. No.
112876. Suffice it to state that private respondents were not guilty of
forum-shopping, which is prohibited by Circular No. 28-91, when
they filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. The estab63
64
_______________
63
In Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83383,
May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 630, 639-640), the Court said: The conveyance executed in
favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser becomes the
owner upon the issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor subject only to the
cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED as far as it declares the nullity of the proceedings in
L.R.C. No. 138 as well as the reconstituted TCT No. 12658. The same
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE as far as it prohibits the
continuation of proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to proceed with
dispatch in the resolution of Civil Case No. A-92-12645with the
purpose of quieting the various titles involved in the case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., Abroad, on official business.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed and set aside in part.
Note.An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA
276 [1997])
o0o
16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849).

64
Margolles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109490, February 14, 1994,230 SCRA 97,
110-111.
169
VOL. 333, JUNE 8, 2000

169
lished rule is that for forum-shopping to exist, both actions must

involve the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances, and must raise identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues. In filing the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition, private respondents simply raised the issue of
jurisdiction of the lower courts in the actions they took cognizance of.
65
189
G.R. No. 129977. February 1, 2001.

JOSELITO
VILLEGAS
and
DOMINGA
VILLEGAS,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, respondents.
*
Land Registration; Land Titles; Court is clothed with ample authority

to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of
the case.It must be noted at the outset that Fortunes claim over the
subject property is predicated upon the alleged prior issuance of its title in
1973, which was lost in a fire and reconstituted only in 1991. Hence, the
soundness of Fortunes claims is hinged upon the validity of its
reconstituted title. It is thus imperative for us to look into whether or not
Fortunes title was properly reconstituted. This question was not raised as
an issue by petitioners, and neither was the grant of Fortunes
reconstituted title assigned as an error in the petition. We have held
however, that the Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.
Same; Same; The lack of compliance with the requirements for the
judicial reconstitution of certificates of title deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the petition; The proceedings therein being in rem, the
court acquires jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for the
reconstitution of the owners title upon compliance with the required posting
of notices and publication in the Official Gazette.Juxtaposing the facts as
disposed by Branch 19 vis--vis Sec. 110 of P.D. 1529 and Sections 3, 9 and
10 of R.A. 26, it is evident that the requirements for judicial reconstitution
of certificates of title were not fully complied with. Although the order of
reconstitution reveals that there was publication of the notice of the
petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette as required by law, there
was, however, no mention of compliance with the requirement of posting of
the notice of the petition in the provincial or municipal building of the city
or municipality where the subject property is located. While proof of
publication of the notice of the petition was submitted by Fortune, there
was no proof of posting of the notice, presumably because no such posting
was accomplished. The lack of compliance with these requirements for the
judicial reconstitution of certificates of title deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the petition. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to
hear
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
70
7
0
SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Villegas vs. Court of Appeals
and decide a petition for reconstitution of title is conferred by R. A. 26.

The Act prescribes a special procedure that must be followed in order that
190
the court may act on the petition and grant the remedy sought. The specific
requirements and procedure are as laid down in Sections 9 and 10 of R.A.
26. The proceedings therein being in rem, the court acquires jurisdiction to
hear and decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owners title upon
compliance with the required posting of notices and publication in the
Official Gazette. These requirements and procedure are mandatory and
must strictly be complied with, otherwise, the proceedings are utterly void,
which is why the petitioner is required to submit proof of the publication
and posting of the notice. Non-compliance with the jurisdictional
requirement of posting of the notice renders the order of reconstitution null
and void. Consequently, the reconstituted title of Fortune is likewise void.
Fortune cannot now invoke the prior title rule, as it in effect has no valid
title to speak of.
Civil Law; Laches; While it is by express provision of law that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
required by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined
rule that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession
of property by virtue of laches; Elements of Laches.But even if Fortune
had validly acquired the subject property, it would still be barred from
asserting title because of laches. The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it.
While it is by express provision of law that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by
virtue of laches. The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that
led to the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay
in asserting the complainants rights, having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
71
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 1, 2001

71

Appeals.
Severo M. Lorenzo for petitioners.
Constante A. Foronda, Jr. for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision dated November 15, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals and its resolution promulgated on July 29,
1997, affirming the decision dated July 30, 1993 of the Regional
Trial Court, Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 19.
The facts of the case, as found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
Before September 6, 1973, Lot B-3-A, with an area of four (4)
hectares situated at Dapdap, now San Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela was
registered under TCT No. 68641 in the names of Ciriaco D. Andres
and Henson Caigas. This land was also declared for real estate
taxation under Tax Declaration No. C2-4442.
On September 6, 1973, Andres and Caigas, with the consent of
their respective spouses, Anita Barrientos and Consolacion Tobias,
sold the land to Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune) for
1
191
P60,000.00. Simultaneously, they executed a joint affidavit declaring

that they had no tenants on said lot. An affidavit to the effect was a
prerequisite for the registration of the sale under the LRC Circular
No. 232. On the same date, the sale was registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Isabela. TCT No. 68641 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-68737 was issued in Fortunes name.
On August 6, 1976, Andres and Caigas executed a Deed of
Reconveyance of the same lot in favor of Filomena Domingo, the
mother of Joselito Villegas, defendant in the case before the trial
court. Although no title was mentioned in this deed, Domingo suc________________
1
Rollo, pp. 15-20.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 103-113.
72
72

ceeded in registering this document in the Office of the Register of

Deeds on August 6, 1976, causing the latter to issue TCT No. T91864 in her name. It appears in this title that the same was a
transfer from TCT No. T-68641. On April 13, 1981, Domingo declared
the lot for real estate taxation under Tax Declaration No. 10-5633.
On December 4, 1976, the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Isabela was burned together with all titles in the office. On December
17, 1976, the original of TCT No. T-91864 was administratively
reconstituted by the Register of Deeds. On June 2, 1979, a Deed of
Absolute Sale of a portion of 20,000 square meters of Lot B-3-A was
executed by Filomena Domingo in favor of Villegas for a
consideration of P1,000.00. This document was registered on June 3,
1981 and as a result TCT No. T-131807 was issued by the Register of
Deeds to Villegas. On the same date, the technical description of Lot

B-3-A-2 was registered and TCT No. T-131808 was issued in the
name of Domingo. On January 22, 1991, this document was
registered and TCT No. 154962 was issued to the defendant, Joselito
Villegas.
On April 10, 1991, the trial court upon a petition filed by Fortune
ordered the reconstitution of the original of TCT No. T-68737.
In the pre-trial, the parties admitted that Lot B-3-A covered by
the plaintiffs TCT No. T-68737 is identical to Lot B-3-A described in
TCT No. T-91864 and Villegas titles were mere transfers from TCT
No. T-91864.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its assailed
decision in favor of Fortune Tobacco, declaring it to be entitled to the
property. Petitioners thus appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision, with a modification
on the award of damages and attorneys fees, disposing:
4
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the award of damages
and attorneys fees are deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
6
_______________
4
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 20.
73

73
Petitioners are now before us, asserting that the Court of Appeals
committed the following errors:
192
1. 1.THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED
IN
THE
APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR TITLE RULE, AS BOTH
PARTIES HAVE THEIR OWN REGISTERED TITLE. THE
BETTER, OR BEST EVIDENCE RULE, OR THE
EQUIPONDERANCE RULE OF EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO AVOID AN ABOMINABLE TRAVESTY OF
JUSTICE;
2. 2.THE DEED OF SALE, OR TITLE ACQUIRED BY THE
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
HAD
BEEN
LEFT
UNENFORCED, AND UNASERTED (SIC) FOR A SPAN OF
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS FROM ITS SO-CALLED
ISSUANCE, FOR IT HAS STILL TO WAIT FOR ITS
RECONSTITUTION IN 1991, AND SUBJECT TO THE
ANNOTATION, OR RESERVATION ON ITS DORSAL SIDE,
MAKES IT GUILTY OF LACHES AND WHATEVER RIGHT
IT MAY HAVE THEREUNDER HAD BEEN LOST THRU
LACHES, PRESCRIPTION OR INACTION;
3. 3.THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT DEFINITELY IS A BUYER
IN BAD FAITH; HE HAS NO BETTER RIGHT THAN ITS
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, AND IS SUBJECT TO ALL
THE DEFECTS AND INFIRMITIES THE TITLE HAS
BEFORE ITS TRANSMITTAL TO IT.
7
In the main, we are to resolve (a) Who among the parties is entitled
to the property, based on the validity of their respective titles? and
(b) Has laches set in against private respondent Fortune Tobacco
Corporation?
It is petitioners contention that Fortune was a buyer in bad faith.
They allege that Fortune should have investigated if the property
had any occupants. If it had done so, it would have found petitioners
and their predecessors-in-interest in possession thereof. Petitioners
also allege that Andres and Caigas were not the owners of the
property at the time it was sold to Fortune. Throughout their
pleadings before this Court, petitioners claim that Fortunes title is
fake and spurious, having proceeded from its so-called
reconstitution. Lastly, petitioners invoke the doctrine of laches
against Fortunes bid to recover the property.
Invoking the prior title rule, Fortune declares that it is the lawful
owner of the property, as the certificate of title in its name was
_______________
7
Id. at 10.
74
74

issued before issuance of another title to petitioners predecessor-ininterest, Filomena Domingo. Fortune claims that petitioners title is
spurious. It also alleges that petitioners admitted the validity of
Fortunes title, and that petitioners continuous possession of the
property cannot defeat said title. Fortune also asserts that it bought
the property in good faith.
It must be noted at the outset that Fortunes claim over the
subject property is predicated upon the alleged prior issuance of its
title in 1973, which was lost in a fire and reconstituted only in 1991.
Hence, the soundness of Fortunes claims is hinged upon the validity
of its reconstituted title. It is thus imperative for us to look into
whether or not Fortunes title was properly reconstituted. This
question was not raised as an issue by petitioners, and neither was
the grant of Fortunes reconstituted title assigned as an error in the
193
petition. We have held however, that the Court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in
the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just decision of the case.
In the case at bar, Fortunes title was judicially reconstituted by
virtue of an order dated April 10, 1991, issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19 of Cauayan, Isabela, also the court a quo. It
disposed:
8
This is a verified petition filed by the petitioner Fortune Tobacco

Corporation for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T68737 issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of Isabela.
The petition was set for hearing on January 31, 1991.The notice of
hearing was caused to be published for two (2) successive issues in the
Official Gazette.
On the scheduled date of hearing, Johnson Fernandez, Assistant
Manager of the petitioner and his counsel appeared. Nobody appeared to
oppose the petition.
To prove the jurisdictional facts, the petitioner presented as exhibits the
following:
________________
8
Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 96, 108 (1998); Korean
Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 717, 725 (1994); Vda. de Javellana v.
Court of Appeals,123 SCRA 799, 805 (1983).
75

75
Exh. A, the Amended Notice of Hearing;

Exh. B, the Affidavit of Publication of the notice of hearing in the Official
Gazette;
Exh. C, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-68737 issued in the
name of the petitioner by the Register of Deeds of Isabela.
There being no opposition, the petitioner was ordered to present its

evidence ex-parte.
From the evidence presented, it has been established that the petitioner
is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land situated at Dadap,
Cauayan, Isabela, described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-68737 issued in the name of the petitioner by the Register of Deeds of
Isabela; that sometime in December, 1976, the office of the Register of
Deeds was burned as a result of which the original of TCT No. T-68737 on
file with the Registry of Deeds was burned as shown by the certification
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Isabela (Exh. D); that as basis for the
reconstitution of the original copy of the title, the petitioner has in its
possession the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-68737.
Finding the petition to be well-founded;
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Isabela is hereby ordered to
reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. T-68737 in the name of the
petitioner on the basis of the owners duplicate copy thereof, upon payment
of the corresponding legal fees.
SO ORDERED. (Italics supplied.)
9
Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:

10
SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title.

Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in the offices of
Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands
covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with
the procedure described in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent
with this Decree. . . .
In turn, Sections 3, 10 and 9 of Republic Act No. 26 provide

11
_______________
9
10
Records, Folder of Exhibits for the Plaintiff, Exh. E.

Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for
Other Purposes.
194
11
An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate
of Title Lost or Destroyed.

76
76

SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the

sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
xxx
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered
owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section
five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on
sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act:
Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner
stated in section nine hereof. . .
SEC. 9. . . . Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to
be published, at the expense of petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city where the
land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after
hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice
and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the
number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the
names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of
title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having
an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may
have. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication
and posting of the notice. . .
Juxtaposing the facts as disposed by Branch 19 vis--vis Sec. 110 of

P.D. 1529 and Sections 3, 9 and 10 of R.A. 26, it is evident that the
requirements for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title were
not fully complied with. Although the order of reconstitution reveals

that there was publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette as required by law, there was,
however, no mention of compliance with the requirement of posting of
the notice of the petition in the provincial or municipal building of
the city or municipality where the subject property is located. While
proof of publication of the notice of the petition was submitted by
Fortune, there was no proof of posting of the notice, presumably
because no such posting was accomplished. The lack of compliance
with these requirements for the judicial reconstitution of certificates
of title deprived the court of jurisdiction over the
77

77
petition. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to hear and

decide a petition for reconstitution of title is conferred by R.A. 26.
The Act prescribes a special procedure that must be followed in order
that the court may act on the petition and grant the remedy sought.
The specific requirements and procedure are as laid down in Sections
9 and 10 of R.A. 26. The proceedings therein being in rem, the court
acquires jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for the
reconstitution of the owners title upon compliance with the required
posting of notices and publication in the Official Gazette. These
requirements and procedure are mandatory and must strictly be
complied with, otherwise, the proceedings are utterly void, which is
why the petitioner is required to submit proof of the publication and
posting of the notice. Non-compliance with the jurisdictional
requirement of posting of the notice renders the order of
reconstitution null and void. Consequently, the reconstituted title of
12
13
14
195
Fortune is likewise void. Fortune cannot now invoke the prior title
rule, as it in effect has no valid title to speak of.
But even if Fortune had validly acquired the subject property, it
would still be barred from asserting title because of laches. The
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it. While it is by express provision of law that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an
enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
15
16
17
________________
12
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 773, 778 (1993), citing Director of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 102 SCRA 370 (1981), citing the case of Caltex, et al. vs. CIR,
et al., 23 SCRA 492 (1968).
13
Municipality of Legaspi vs. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., 26 SCRA 218,
222 (1968).
14
Supra, note 13 at 778.
15
Lim Tay vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 634, 659 (1998).
16
Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529.
17
Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339, 356 (1997).
78
78

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant,
or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to
the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay
in asserting the complainants rights, having had knowledge or notice
of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity

to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred.
In the case at bar, there is no question on the presence of the first
element. The object of Fortunes complaint before the trial court was
to recover possession of the property in question, which is presently
in the hands of petitioners.
The second element of delay is also present in this case. Fortunes
suit for recovery of possession and damages was instituted only on
May 29, 1991,fifteen years after the registration of Filomena
Domingos title to the property in 1976. Domingos registration was
constructive notice to the whole world, including Fortune of the
existence of such adverse title. In applying the doctrine of laches, we
have ruled that where a party allows the following number of years
to lapse from the emergence of his cause of action to enforce his
claim, such action would be barred by the equitable defense of laches:
36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47
years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44
years; 4 years; and 67 years.
The third element of laches is also present in this case. There is
nothing in the record which shows that petitioners had any inkling of
Fortunes intent to possess the subject property. While Fortune
claims that it protested and demanded over several years that
petitioners vacate the land and surrender its possession, there is
nothing on record to support such contention; they remain selfserving, unsubstantiated claims. Petitioners controverted this
18
19
_________________
196
18
o0o
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 287, 306 (1998).

19
Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181, 197 (1996).
79

79
assertion, stating that they only received such notice during the
confrontation before the barangay captain of San Fermin, Cauayan,
Isabela on May 12, 1991, which was a condition precedent to the
filing of Fortunes complaint before the trial court. This is the only
prior notice to petitioners which is supported by the records.
As to the fourth element of laches, it goes without saying that
petitioners will be prejudiced if Fortunes complaint is accorded
relief, or not held barred, as then petitioners would be deprived of the
property on which their households stand. Needless to say, laches
has set in against Fortune, precluding its right to recover the
property in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on November 15, 1996 and its
Resolution dated July 29, 1997, are REVERSED. The complaint of
private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., No part, signatory to CA decision.
20
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed.

Note.A registered landowner may lose his right to recover the
possession of his registered property by reason of laches. (Eduarte vs.
Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 18 [1999])
No. L-31426.
February 29, 1988.*
LUZ CARO, HON. JUDGE UBALDO Y. ARANGEL, Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, and HON. JUDGE
PERFECTO QUICHO, Presiding Judge, Branch I of the Court of
First Instance of Albay, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
197
APPEALS
and
respondents.
BASILIA
LAHORRA
VDA.
DE
BENITO,
Land Registration; Court; Notice required under Section 112

of Act No. 496 jurisdictional and lack of it deprives the Court
of the authority to make a valid decree.On the issue as to
whether or not the CFI of Sorsogon has the power and authority to
issue the order of August 23, 1968 directing the issuance of a
separate title to Luz Caro, we agree with the ruling of the respondent
appellate court that said order was issued without jurisdiction. The
court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition and/or the
land sought to be subdivided for lack of notice to all the parties in
interest, as required under Section 112 of Act No. 496. Notice as
required by the above-cited statute is jurisdictional and the lack of it
deprives the court of the authority to make a valid decree.
Same; Same; A void order cannot create a valid and legally
enforceable right.The order of the CFI of Sorsogon being void is
no order at all. It confers no right nor does it impose any duty. "It
neither binds nor bars any one." All acts performed under a void
order or judgments and all claims flowing out of it are also void, for
like the spring that cannot rise above its source, a void order cannot
create a valid and legally enforceable right. A fortiori the order of
October 19,1968 of the CFI of Albay directing private respondent to
deliver the possession and enjoyment of Lot No. I-C to Luz Caro, is
also void.
Certiorari; Order or judgment rendered by a Court without
jurisdiction is without legal effects and may be impugned at
any time and in any proceedings.On the second issue as to
whether a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy to
question the validity of the aforestated orders, we likewise agree
with respondent appellate court. An order or judgment rendered by a
court without jurisdiction is without legal effect, hence, it may be
impugned at any time and in any proceedings by a party against
whom it is sought to be enforced.
APPEAL by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

YAP, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated December 16,1969, setting aside as null and void the
order dated August 23, 1968 of the then Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon and the order dated October 19,1968 of the then Court of
First Instance of Albay.
The record shows that Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and Benjamin
Benito were the registered co-owners pro-indiviso of a vast tract of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 610 of the Register of
Deeds of Sorsogon, located at Cumadcad, Castilla, Sorsogon. On
January 16, 1957, Mario Benito died intestate. His estate then
became the subject matter of Special Proceedings No. 506 of the
then Court of First Instance of Albay, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Mario A. Benito, Deceased, Basilia Lahorra,
Petitioner, Saturnino Benito, Oppositor." In that proceedings, the
decedent's wife, Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito and his father,
Saturnino Benito, were appointed on April 12, 1957 co-administrators
of the estate of the deceased.
On August 16, 1959, Benjamin Benito, one of the co-owners, sold his
one-third (1/3) undivided share to petitioner Luz Caro, On September
15, 1960, Luz Caro filed before the defunct Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, acting as a land registration court, a petition to subdivide
the land in controversy. The affidavits of the late Alfredo Benito, coowner of the land in question, Saturnino Benito, co-administrator and
principal heir of Mario Benito, and Josefina Duran, the mortgagee of
the share of Alfredo Benito, consenting to the subdivision, were
198
attached to the petition. On September 27, 1960, upon verbal motion

of Luz Caro and for reasons known only to her, the consideration of
the petition for subdivision was held in abeyance until further notice
from her. Eight years later, on July 5, 1968, petitioner Luz Caro filed
an ex-parte motion to set the case for hearing, and the trial court,
without notifying anybody, proceeded on August 23, 1968, with the
reception of petitioner's evidence ex-parte. On even date, the trial
court issued an order directing the issuance of a separate title to Luz
Caro, but holding in abeyance the issuance of certificates of title
covering the shares of Mario Benito and Alfredo Benito, for the
reason that both were then deceased and the court had not been
informed as to who their legal heirs were.
In consonance with the order of August 23, 1968, the Register of
Deeds of Sorsogon issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4978 to
petitioner Luz Caro, covering her one-third (1/3) segregated portion
identified as Lot No. I-C, Psu 75542, Amd-2, with an area of about
163-65-06 hectares.
On the strength of her separate title, petitioner filed a motion in the
then Court of First Instance of Albay trying Special Proceedings No.
508 and obtained an order dated October 19,1968 directing the
administratrix Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito (private respondent
herein) to deliver to Luz Caro the possession of Lot No, I-C, as well as
enjoining private respondent or her representatives from gathering
the produce thereof.
Private respondent sought a reconsideration of said order of October
19,1968, but the same was denied by the Court of First Instance of
Albay. Her second motion for reconsideration was also denied.
On August 16, 1969, private respondent filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking the annulment of the
order of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dated August 23,
1968 and the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated
October 19,1968. In its decision promulgated on December 16,1969,
the appellate court nullified both orders on the ground that said
courts acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion

in issuing said orders.
On January 3, 1970, petitioner interposed this petition for review on
certiorari. This Court denied the petition for lack of merit in its
minute resolution dated January 8, 1970.
On January 17. 1970, petitioner filed an amended petition
accompanied with a motion for admission, stating among others,
that material facts were inadvertently omitted in the original petition.
This Court admitted the amended petition, but denied the same for
lack of merit in its resolution dated January 21, 1970.
On February 4, 1970, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated January 21, 1970,
attaching thereto the said motion for reconsideration with a prayer
that the amended petition be given due course.
On February 9, 1970. the Court reconsidered its previous resolution
and gave due course to the petition. On June 17, 1970, the Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of
the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on August 16,1969.
The two issues in this petition are: (1) whether or not the Courts of
First Instance of Sorsogon and Albay had the jurisdiction to issue the
orders subject matter of this petition; and (2) whether certiorari is
the appropriate remedy to question the validity of the aforestated
orders of the lower court.
On the issue as to whether or not the CFI of Sorsogon has the power
and authority to issue the order of August 23, 1968 directing the
issuance of a separate title to Luz Caro, we agree with the ruling of
the respondent appellate court that said order was issued without
jurisdiction. The court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition and/or the land sought to be subdivided for lack of notice to
all the parties in interest, as required under Section 112 of Act No.
496. Notice as required by the above-cited statute is j urisdictional
199
and the lack of it deprives the court of the authority to make a valid
decree.1
otherwise, and shall in all cases do so when the interests of justice

require such section."
Petitioners claim that such notice was unnecessary since the parties
affected by the subdivision proceedings manifested their conformity
thereto. The registered co-owner, Alfredo Benito, together with
Josefina Duran, the mortgagee of the share of Benjamin Benito,
executed an affidavit of consent to the subdivision. Likewise,
Saturnino Benito, an heir who was also appointed co-administrator of
the estate of Mario Benito, the other registered co-owner, executed
an affidavit of conformity. According to petitioners, Saturnino Benito's
affidavit is binding not only upon the estate but also upon the
administratrix, Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito.
The order of the CFI of Sorsogon being void is no order at all. It

confers no right nor does it impose any duty. "It neither binds nor
bars any one."2 All acts performed under a void order or judgments
and all claims flowing out of it are also void, for like the spring that
cannot rise above its source, a void order cannot create a valid and
legally enforceable right. A fortiori the order of October 19,1968 of
the CFI of Albay directing private respondent to deliver the
possession and enjoyment of Lot No. I-C to Luz Caro, is also void,
We do not agree with the petitioners. The records do not show that
the required notice was given to all the parties in interest. One of the
indispensable parties, respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito who
was the co-administratrix of the estate of the deceased Mario Benito,
was not given any notice, nor did she give her conformity to the
partition.
For the court to validly acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition, the mode and manner of service of notice is governed by
Section 113 of Act No. 496, viz:
"All notices required by or given in pursuance of the provisions of this
Act by the clerk or any register of deeds, after original registration,
shall be sent by mail to the person to be notified at his residence and
post-office address as stated in the certificate of title, or in any
registered instrument under which he claims an interest in the office
of the clerk or register of deeds, relating to the parcel of land in
question.
All notices and citations directed by special order of the court under
the provisions of this Act, after original registration, may be served in
the manner above stated, and the certificate of the clerk shall be
conclusive proof of such service; Provided, however, That the court
may in any case order different or further service, by publication or
On the second issue as to whether a special civil action for certiorari

is the proper remedy to question the validity of the aforestated
orders, we likewise agree with respondent appellate court. An order
or judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is without legal
effect, hence it may be impugned at any time and in any
proceedings by a party against whom it is sought to be enforced.3
Petitioner's argument is correct if the order or judgment in question
was issued with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction
or if mere errors of judgment were committed, for in such cases the
court at the outset has jurisdiction, but not in the instant case where
the court from the very beginning has not acquired the power and
authority to hear and determine the petition.
As held in Crisostomo v. Endencia (66 Phil. 1,8) "the remedy by
certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an
appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having
been lost with or without the appellant's negligence? the court has
no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the subject
matter of the remedy."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
preliminary injunction issued by the Court on June 7, 1970 is hereby
lifted. Costs against petitioner,
This decision is immediately executory.
200
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed. Decision immediately executory.
Notes.An ordinance which amends and violates national laws in the
guise of implementing them by imposing additional requirements
would be ultra vires. (Villacorta vs. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480.)
A "moro-moro" trial could not result in a just and valid decision,
(Galman vs, Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43.)
o0o
Director of Lands vs. CA, 98 SCRA 235 DALAMACIO
201
the registration thereof under Act 3344 was invalid and no legal or binding
effect on third persons.
Same; Lien on improvement, how perfected.Since the attached house
in question was built on a land duly titled, and said house has not been
registered under either Act 436 or the Spanish Mortgage Law, the
defendant should have perfected his lien thereon, by filing a petition for
annotation of said improvement as well as the registration of his lien
thereon, on the title of the land, pursuant to Section 112 of Act No. 496.
Having failed to perfect his lien on the house in questions in the manner
indicated, he cannot enforce it against plaintiff, purchaser in good faith of
the house and the lot on which it stands.
No. L-17314. June 30, 1961.

PACIENCIA
B.
SALITA,
plaintiff-appellant, vs.EDUARDO
CALLEJA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Registration of Documents; Instruments registerable under Act
3344; Registration of attachment referring to house constructed on
registered land, invalid.In order to be registerable under Act No. 3344,
the instrument must refer only to unregistered land and its own
improvements only, and not any other kind of real estate or properties. The
deed cannot refer to improvements or buildings on lands registered under
the Torrens system, or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. To hold
otherwise, would result in the anomalous situation of two registrations, one
under Act 496 with respect to unimproved land, and another, under Act
3344 for improvements subsequently introduced on the same land. Since, in
the case at bar, the attachment refers to a house erected on registered land,
Land Registration; Failure to state improvement in the title does not

preclude acquisition thereof.The fact that the clean title acquired by
plaintiff did not mention the improvement, does not preclude the
acquisition thereof with the land described in the title. This is so, because
unless it otherwise appears on the title itself, the same includes not only
the land described therein,
788
88
Salita vs. Calleja
but also all improvements existing on said land. (Art. 2127, Civil Code;
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. vs. Camps, 36 Phil. 85; Bischoff
vs. Pomar, 12 Phil. 690; Cu Unjieng Hijos vs. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 58 Phil.
439; see also Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Art. 440, Civil Code).
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Lucero, J.
Ventura, Kahayon & Cuevas for plaintiff-appellant.
202
Catalino S. Maravilla for defendants-appellees.

BARRERA, J.:
Originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, but certified to us on March 24, 1960,
on the ground that it involves only questions of law.

789
This is a case for injunction filed by plaintiff-appellant Paciencia B.

Salita to prevent the sale by the Sheriff of Manila of a house in
satisfaction of a judgment for a sum of money obtained by defendantappellee Eduardo Calleja in another case against one Francisco
Domingo, admittedly the original owner of the said house. In this
other case, Calleja, as plaintiff therein, secured first a preliminary
writ of attachment which was levied on January 7, 1954 upon the
house in question. But as the house was constructed on a lot
purchased by Domingos wife, Mercedes Domingo, from Realty
Investments, Inc. (represented by C. M. Hoskins & Co., Inc.) on an
installment plan, and the price thereof had not yet been paid in full
and, therefore, the certificate of title covering the land was still in the
name of the vendor, the Notice of Attachment addressed to the
Register of Deeds of Manila specifically stated that the land on
which this house stands has not yet been fully paid for, and as per
investigation and information of the plaintiff (herein appellee
Calleja), the house has not been registered under either Act 496 or
the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is desired, therefore, that this Notice
be registered under Act 3344. Accordingly, the attachment was
entered upon the corresponding book, but not annotated on the
certificate of title covering the land, which did not mention any
improvement.
Five months later, or on June 3, 1954, Realty Investments, Inc.
conveyed the ownership of said lot to Mercedes
1
_______________
VOL. 2, JUNE 30, 1961

Salita vs. Calleja
789
cisco Domingo. However, since she still owed the company the sum of
P4,566.20, the transfer was by means of an instrument of sale with
mortgage on the lot and house and other improvements thereon, in
favor of the vendor company. On the same date, TCT No. 25957, in
the name of Realty Investments, Inc. was cancelled and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 36372 was issued in the name of Mercedes
Domingo, with the companys aforesaid mortgage duly annotated on
the new title. Outside of what was said in the deed of mortgage, this
new title (TCT No. 36372) likewise makes no mention whatsoever of
a house or other improvement thereon, nor of the attachment.
On February 3, 1955, Mercedes Domingo, with the marital
consent of her husband Francisco Domingo, who had knowledge of
the existing attachment on the house in question, sold both lot and
house to herein plaintiff Paciencia B. Salita, as evidenced by a deed
of sale with assumption (by Salita) of the aforementioned mortgage
in favor of Realty Investments, Inc. Said instrument was presented
for registration on February 5, 1955, by virtue of which TCT No.
36372 in the name of Mercedes Domingo was cancelled and a new
title (TCT No. 38401) was issued in the name of plaintiff Salita, but
with the annotation thereon of the mortgage in favor of Realty
Investments, Inc. Again, no mention or annotation was made on said
new title of the house in question, nor of the attachment thereon.
On June 23, 1955, said lot and house were mortgaged by plaintiff
Salita to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) as security
for a loan of P10,000.00. Apparently, part of the proceeds of this loan
203
was used to pay the P4,566.20 which Mercedes Domingo still owed
Realty Investments, Inc. as price of the sale of the lot and which
plaintiff Salita assumed to pay on February 3, 1955, for the
companys lien on her (Salitas) title was cancelled on July 2, 1955.
On December 16, 1955, plaintiff Salita obtained an additional loan of
Pl,000.00 from the RFC upon the same property.
Meanwhile, on February 14, 1955, Calleja obtained judgment in
that other case against Francisco Domingo, which
790
790

Salita vs. Calleja
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on April 27, 1956. On October

13, 1956, Calleja obtained a writ of execution and required the
Sheriff to satisfy the judgment by selling the attached house in
question. Salita, thereupon, filed a third-party claim with the Sheriff
claiming that the house in question was bought by her on February
3, 1955 including the lot on which it stands. To indemnify the Sheriff
against any damage which the execution sale of the house may cause,
Calleja filed a bond of P15,000.00. In order to prevent the execution
sale of said house and lot which was scheduled for December 27,
1956, at 10:00 A.M., plaintiff Salita filed the instant case (Civil Case
No. 31434) for Injunction and Damages against defendants Calleja
and Sheriff of Manila. On December 26, 1956, the court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining defendant Sheriff of Manila
from proceeding with the execution sale.
It is the contention of plaintiff Salita that when she purchased the
house and the lot on February 3, 1955, the vendor Mercedes Domingo
had a clean title (TCT No. 36372) except for the mortgage over the
said property (both land and house) in favor of Realty Investments,
Inc., which the purchaser expressly recognized and assumed, and
that upon payment of the mortgage indebtedness, she (Salita)

became the absolute owner of the entire property, free of all liens and
encumbrances.
On the other hand, defendant Calleja claims that since the
certificate of title covering the land did not mention any improvement
and since the house is real estate in nature and is not registered
under Act 496 or the Spanish Mortgage Law, the registration of his
attachment on January 7, 1954 under Act No. 3344 is effective and
binding upon all subsequent claimants of said house.
The trial court upheld defendant Callejas contention, dismissed
plaintiff Salitas complaint and sentenced the latter to pay defendant
P500.00 as attorneys fees on the latters counterclaim. Hence, this
appeal by Salita.
We find the appeal meritorious. Act No. 3344 (Sec. 194, Rev. Adm.
Code) pursuant to which defendant Callejas notice of attachment
was registered expressly requires that
791
VOL. 2, JUNE 30, 1961

Salita vs. Calleja
791
the register book shall contain, among other things, the character of
the contract and its conditions, the nature of each piece
of land (unregistered) and its own improvements only, and not any
other kind of real estate or properties, its situation, boundaries, area
in square meters, whether or not the boundaries of the property are
visible on the land by means of monuments or otherwise, and in the
affirmative case, in what they consist; the permanent improvements
existing in the property x x x. From this provision, it seems clear
that in order to be registerable under Act No. 3344, the instrument
must refer only tounregistered land and its own improvements
only, and not any other kind of real estate or properties. The
204
words ownand only used in the language of the law when

referring to improvements, clearly mean improvements on
unregistered lands alone. In fine, the deed cannot refer to
improvements or buildings on lands registered under the Torrens
system, or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. To hold otherwise,
would result in the anomalous situation of two registrations, one
under Act 496 with respect to unimproved land, and another, under
Act 3344 for improvements subsequently introduced on the same
land. Since, in the case at bar, the attachment refers to a house
erected on registered land, it is evident that the registration thereof
under Act 3344 was invalid and of no legal or binding effect on third
persons, or more particularly, on plaintiff Salita.
Furthermore, it is not disputed that in the notice of attachment of
real estate (Exh. 6-Calleja) dated January 7, 1954, it was therein
stated that the house in question was erected upon land bought
from C.M. Hoskins & Co., Inc. on the installment plan, and that
said house has not been registered under either Act 496 or the
Spanish Mortgage Law. Knowing that the land on which the house
was built was bought from C.M. Hoskins & Co., Inc., defendant
Calleja should have investigated whether the land was duly titled
and, finding that the same was titled, as in fact it was in the name of
Realty Investments, Inc. (TCT No. 25957), he should have taken
steps to perfect his lien on said house, by filing a petition for
annotation of said improvement as well as the registration of his
792
792

Salita vs. Calleja
lien thereon, on the title of the land, pursuant to Section 112 of Act
496 (Land Registration Act) which, insofar as pertinent, provides:
SEC. 112. x x x Any registered owner or other person in interest may at

any time apply by petition to the court, upon the groundthat registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or

inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or
been created which do not appear upon the certificate; or that any error,
omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or any duplicate certificate; x x x. (Italics supplied.)
Having failed to perfect his lien on the house in question in the

manner indicated, he cannot enforce it against plaintiff Salita,
purchaser in good faith of the house and the lot on which it stands.
The fact that the clean title acquired by Salita did not mention the
improvement, does not preclude the acquisition thereof with the land
described in the title. This is so, because unless it otherwise appears
on the title itself, the same includes not only the land described
therein, but also all improvements existing on said land. (Art. 2127,
Civil Code; Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. vs. Camps, 36
Phil. 85; Bischoff v. Pomar, et al., 12 Phil. 690; Cu Unjieng e Hijos v.
Mabalacat Sugar Co., 58 Phil. 439; see also Roxas v. Enriquez, 29
Phil. 31; Art. 440, Civil Code.)
Lastly, it appears that the sale made by Mercedes Domingo with
the consent of her husband Francisco Domingo to plaintiff Salita on
February 3, 1955, included both the house and lot in question.
Likewise, the mortgage in favor of Realty Investments, Inc., duly
annotated on Domingos certificate of title and which plaintiff Salita
had assumed and later paid, included both house and lot. In other
words, plaintiff-appellant Salita actually parted with her money to
acquire the house in question, while defendant-appellee Calleja
merely seeks security for an otherwise unsecured pre-existing claim.
So ordered.
Bengzon,
C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion,Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ.,concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
205
Decision affirmed.
_______________
793
VOL. 2, JULY 20, 1961

Lagrimas vs. Justice of the Peace of Camiling
793
Notes.A house is classified as immovable property by reason of

its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil
Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the
house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner
(Bicerra, et al. v. Teneza, et al., L-16218, Nov. 29, 1962; Leung v.
Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644).
If the land is registered under the Torrens System and the
certificate shows the holder to be the owner both of the land and the
improvements thereon, any purchaser for value who buys the land in
reliance on such title will take the property free from the builders
lien (Atkins, Kroll & Co. v. Domingo, 46 Phil. 362).
______________
No. L-19248.February 28, 1963.

ILUMINADO
HANOPOL,
plaintiff-appellant, vs.PERFECTO
PILAPIL, defendant-appellee.
Judgments; When conclusive upon successors-in-interest; Title should
be acquired subsequent to commencement of suit.Although appellee
claims to be the successor-in-interest of the vendors, he is not bound by the
judgment rendered against the latter, because it appears that he derived
his right to the land in question from its sale to him long before the filing of
the complaint against the vendors, and not subsequent to the commencement of the action as provided in paragraph (b), Section 44 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.
Registration of voluntary instruments; Double sale of land; Meaning of
term better righ in Act 3344.The better right that can not be
prejudiced by the registration of a second sale of a parcel of land, referred
to in Act No. 3344, is much more than the mere prior deed of sale in favor of
the first vendee. It involves facts and circumstances in addition to a deed
206
of sale which, combined, would make it clear that the first vendee has a
better right than the second purchaser.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First instance of Leyte.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.453
VOL. 7, FEBRUARY 28,

1963
Hanopol vs. Pilapil
453
Jesus P. Narvios for plaintiff-appellant.

Estacion & Paltriquerra for defendant-appellee.
BARRERA,J.:
This is a case of double sale of the same parcel of unregistered
land decided by the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Civil Case No.
21) in favor of defendant-appellee Perfecto Pilapil, originally
appealed by plaintiff-appellant Iluminado Hanopol to the Court of
Appeals, but later certified to this Court for proper adjudication, the
issues involved being exclusively of law.
Appellant Hanopol claims ownership of the land by virtue of a
series of purchases effected in 1938 by means of private instruments,
executed by the former owners Teodora, Lucia, Generosa, Sinforosa
and Isabelo, all surnamed Siapo. Additionally, he invokes in his favor
a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Leyte (in Civil
Case No. 412) on a complaint he filed on June 16, 1948, against the
same vendors, who, according to his own averments, took possession
of the said property in December, 1945 through fraud, threat and
intimidation, pretending falsely to be the owners thereof and ejecting
the tenants of Hanopol thereon, and since then had continued to
possess the land. Decision declaring him the exclusive owner of the
land in question and ordering therein defendants to deliver
possession thereof was rendered on September 21, 1958.
On the other hand, appellee Pilapil asserts title to the property on

the strength of a duly notarized deed of sale executed in his favor by
the same owners on December 3, 1945, which deed of sale was
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Leyte on August 20, 1948
under the provisions of Act No. 3344.
The case was submitted for decision without any testimonial
evidence, both parties relying exclusively on their documentary
evidence consisting, on the part of Hanopol, of the private
instruments alluded to and a copy of the decision in the
reivindicatory case, and on the part of Pilapil, the notarized deed of
sale in his favor bearing anno454
454
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hanopol vs. Pilapil
tation of its registration under Act No. 3344. As thus submitted, the
trial court rendered the decision adverted to at the beginning of this
opinion, mainly upon the authority of the second paragraph of
Article 15441 of the New Civil Code, which is a reproduction of Article
1473 of the old Civil Code, the law in force at the time the
transaction in this case took place.
Appellant Hanopol in his appeal from the decision of the trial
court presents two questions of law; firstly, whether or not the
judgment in the former case No. 412 against the vendors Siapos is
binding upon the defendant-appellee as their successor-in-interest;
and secondly, whether or not the registration of the second deed of
sale in favor of appellee Pilapil affects his right as the first vendee.
Under the first assignment of error, the appellant contends that
inasmuch as appellee claims to be the successor-in-interest of the
vendors, he is bound by the judgment rendered against the latter.
This contention is without merit, because it appears from the
207
documentary evidence that appellee Pilapil derived his right to the

land from the sale to him of the said property on December 3, 1945,
long before the filing of the complaint against the vendors in 1948.
He was not made a party in the case against the Siapos, and there
was not even a claim that he had knowledge of said litigation. He
cannot, therefore, be bound by such judgment in view of the provision
of paragraph (b), Section 44 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
speaks of the effect of judgment as follows:
x x x the judgment so ordered is, in respect to the matter directly

adjudged, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity." (Italics supplied)
_______________
1 Art. 1544.
x x x x
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded in the Registry of Property.
x x x x
455

1963
Hanopol vs. Pilapil
455
Since Pilapil was not a party to the action and is not a successor-ininterest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action,
having acquired his title in 1945 and the action filed in 1948, the
decision in said case cannot be binding on him.
Appellant argues under the second issue raised by him that the
registration of Pilapils notarized deed of sale in 1948 under Act No.
3344 shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right. He contends that since at the time the Siapos
sold the land in question in 1945 to Pilapil, the former were no longer
the owners as they had already sold the same to appellant since
1938, the first sale to him is a better right which cannot be
prejudiced by the registration of the second sale.
We do not think the quoted proviso in Act No. 3344 justifies
appellants contention. If his theory is correct, then the second
paragraph of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code (formerly Article
1473 of the old Code) would have no application at all except to lands
or real estate registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law or the
Land Registration Act. Such a theory would thus limit the scope of
that codal provision. But even if we adopt this latter view, that is,
that Article 1544 (formerly Article 1473) only applies to registered
land, still we cannot agree with the appellant that by the mere fact of
his having a previous title or deed of sale, he has acquired thereby
what is referred to in Act No. 3344 as the better right that would be
unaffected by the registration of a second deed of sale under the
same law. Under such theory, there would never be a case of double
sale of the same unregistered property.
An example of what could be a better right that is protected
against the inscription of a subsequent sale is given in the case
of Lichauco v. Berenguer (39 Phil. 643). The facts in that case are
succinctly stated in the syllabus thereof as follows:
x x x.In 1882 B sold to S a piece of land. After the sale B continued in
the possession of the land in the capacity of lessee of S through payment of
rent, and continued as such until his death when he was substituted by the
administrator of his property. In 1889 B sold again the same piece of land
to L who leased it to B himself under certain conditions. Both sales were
executed in a public instrument, the one executed
456
208
456
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hanopol vs. Pilapil
in favor of L being registered only in 1907. Thus, S and L acquired

possession of the land through the same vendor upon the latters ceasing to
be the owner and becoming the lessee of said S and L, respectively. HELD:
(1) That, with reference to the time prior to 1907, the preference should be
in favor of the purchaser who first took possession of the land, because this
possession, according to the law in force prior to the promulgation of the
Civil Code, constituted the consummation of the contract, and also because
afterwards the Civil Code expressly establishes that possession in such
cases transfers the ownership of the thing sold. (2) That, when a person
buys a piece of land and, instead of taking possession of it, leases it to the
vendor, possession by the latter after the sale is possession by the vendee,
and such possession, in case of a double sale, determines the preference in
favor of the one who first took possession of it, in the absence of inscription,
in accordance with the provision of article 1473 of the Civil Code,
notwithstanding the material and personal possession by the second
vendee. (Bautista vs. Sioson, 39 Phil. Rep., 615)
x x x. Because L had to receive his possession from B who was a mere
lessee of S and as such had no possession to give, inasmuch as his
possession was not for himself but in representation of S, it follows that L
never possessed the land.
x x x. The effect which the law gives to the inscription of a sale against
the efficacy of the sale which was not registered is not extended to other
titles which the other vendee was able to acquire independently as, in this
case, the title by prescription."
It thus appears that the better right referred to in Act No. 3344
is much more than the mere prior deed of sale in favor of the first
vendee. In the Lichauco case just mentioned, it was the prescriptive
right that had supervened. Or, as also suggested in that case, other
facts and circumstances exist which, in addition to his deed of sale,

the first vendee can be said to have better right than the second
purchaser.
In the case at bar, there appears to be no clear evidence of
Hanopols possession of the land in controversy. In fact, in his
complaint against the vendors, Hanopol alleged that the Siapos took
possession of the same land under claim of ownership in 1945 and
continued and were in such possession at the time of the filing of the
complaint against them in 1948. Consequently, since the Siapos were
in actual occupancy of the property under claim of ownership, when
they sold the said land to appellee Pilapil on
457

1963
Hanopol vs. Pilapil
457
December 3, 1945, such possession was transmitted to the latter, at

least constructively, with the execution of the notarial deed of sale, if
not actually and physically as claimed by Pilapil in his answer filed
in the present case. Thus, even on this score, Hanopol cannot have a
better right than appellee Pilapil who, according to the trial court,
was not shown to be a purchaser in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
REYES, J.B.L.,J.:
I concur, but reserve my vote as to the effect of registration under
Act 3344.
Decision affirmed.
209
Note.As to other cases where Article 1473 (now Art. 1544) of the
Civil Code was construed and applied, see Fabian v. Smith, Bell &
Co., 8 Phil. 496; Veguillas v. Jaucian, 25 Phil. 315; Legarda v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; Aitken v. La O, 36 Phil. 510; Rubiso v.
Rivera,37 Phil. 72; Leung Yee v. F. L. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil.
644; Bautista v. Sioson, 39 Phil. 615; Sanchez v. Ramos, 40 Phil.
614; Mendoza v. Kalaw, 42 Phil. 236; Aviles v. Arcega, 44 Phil.

924;Ramos v. Dueo, 50 Phil. 786; Po Sun Tun v. Price and
Provincial Government of Leyte, 54 Phil. 192.
_______________
210

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G.R. No. 107903. May 22, 1995.

MARILOU RIVERA, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

VOL. 244, MAY 22,

err in ruling that petitioner cannot invoke acquisitive prescription

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Leopoldo M. Consunto, Jr.for petitioner.

On February 21, 1977, spouses Taio sold the land to petitioner.

Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua and concurred by then Associate

VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is

Register of Deeds of Laguna is directed to cancel the adverse claim filed by

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING AND

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

Penned by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.

G.R. No. L-43190, August 31, 1984,131 SCRA 532.

VOL. 244, MAY 22, 1995

titled, it cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. To hold

Anciano v. Caballes, No. L-5040, September 29, 1953, 93 Phil. 876.

Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529.

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 35.

Gutierrez v. Bachrach Motor Co., 105 Phil. 29.

Notes.It is an elementary principle that the owner of land

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga

No. L-15183. October 30, 1962.

VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962

copy of the said original certificate of title was lost, and

records of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, the original of

manifesting that he was submitting his case, on the evidences

9, 1957, the trial court dismissed the petition against which

In view of the existence of the complete record in the Register of

in question, which appears in Book No. 1-5 of the said Register of

VOL. 6, OCTOBER 30, 1962 281

theannotation on Jurisdiction over Land Registration and Cadastral

G.R. No. 101690. August 23, 1995.

Actions; Land Titles; R.A. No. 26;Reconstitution of Title; Reconstitution

hand, mere submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would

VOL. 247, AUGUST 23,

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,

Branch at the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building at Malolos

During the hearing, private respondents submitted in evidence,

NUMBE PAGE DAT

VOL. 247, AUGUST 23,

Petition for Review, p. 9; Rollo, p. 14.

Id., at pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 16-17.

ample time to intervene in the proceeding. They bring in the whole

Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 (An Act

Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 900.

F.D. REGALADO, 1 Remedial Law Compendium, p. 16 (1988).

See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 773 (1993).

They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in

VOL. 247, AUGUST 23,

This court has consistently accepted the probative value of

Petition for Review, p. 19; Rollo, p. 24.

concerned, as well as the documentary and parole evidence presented by

Petitioner believes that the report of the Administrator of the

of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence

Ibid., at p. 20; Rollo, p. 25.

VOL. 247, AUGUST 23,

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The