Battle of Longewala

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Battle of Longewala

Part of The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Tank tracks at Longewala. Photographic reconnaissance

image taken at the time showing the desperate last minute
manoeuvres by Pakistani tanks in the Longewala sector.
Circles show destroyed Pakistani tanks
Date
Location
Result

47 December 1971
Longewala ~30 kilometres (19 mi)
fromRamgarh, Rajasthan, India
Decisive Indian victory[1]

Belligerents

India

Pakistan

Commanders and leaders

Brig.E.N.Ramadoss

Brig. Gen. Tariq Mir

Lt.Col Mohammed

Brig. Gen. Jahanzeb

Khursheed Hussain[2]

Abab

Major Kuldip Singh

Chandpuri

Brig. Gen. Syed

Mohammad Zaidi

Wg. Cdr. M.S. Bawa

Wg. Cdr. R A Cowasjee
Wg. Cdr. Suresh

Lt. Col. Zahir Alam

Khan

Wg. Cdr. Sherwin Tully

Major Atma Singh

Strength

120 soldiers[3]

2,000 soldiers[4]

6Hawker Hunters

1 Mobile infantry brigade[5]

1 HAL Krishak

45 tanks[5]

1 Jeep mounted M40 recoilless

rifle

Casualties and losses

2 soldiers killed[6]

200 soldiers killed[6]

1 anti-tank destroyed[6]

34 tanks lost[6][5]
500+ vehicles destroyed or
abandoned[6][5]

Location within India Rajasthan

[show]

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

[show]

Indo-Pakistani conflicts

The Battle of Longewala (47 December 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the
Western Sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces
and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desertof the
Rajasthan state in India.
The "A" company (reinforced) of the 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, under the Indian Army's 30th
Infantry, commanded by Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, was left with the choice of either attempting
to hold out until reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a mechanised infantry Pakistani force. Choosing
the former, Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri ensured that all his assets were correctly employed, and
made the most use of his strong defensive position, and weaknesses created by errors in enemy
tactics. He was also fortunate in that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure
and direct aircraft in support of the post's defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later.
[7]

The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of their strategic
intelligence to foresee availability of Indian strike aircraft in the Longewala area,
exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a tacticalfrontal
assault with no engineer reconnaissance. This led to the Pakistani brigade group being left
extremely vulnerable to air attack, vehicles becoming bogged in terrain not suitable for the
movement of armoured vehicles as they tried to deploy off a single track, these being more
susceptible to enemy fire by using external fuel storage in tactical combat, attempting to execute a
night attack over unfamiliar terrain, and infantry being surprised by obstacles to troop
movement causing confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial hours of darkness, when the
assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from Indian small arms and infantry support
weapon fire.
Contents
[hide]

1 Background

2 Prelude
o

2.1 The Western sector

2.2 Tactical plan

2.3 Indian defensive planning

3 Battle

4 Aftermath

5 In popular culture

6 See also

7 Citations and notes

8 References

9 Further reading

10 External links

Background[edit]
The main thrust of the Indian Army during the 1971 war was directed towards the eastern theatre,
with the western sector envisaged as a holding operation to prevent the Pakistan Army from
achieving any success that would allow the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, any bargaining tool
to trade against the captured territories in the east. By the last week of November 1971, the Indian
Army had launched offensive manoeuvres at Atgram against Pakistani border posts and
communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahinialso launched an offensive on
Jessore at this time. It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that
East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run. Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect
Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan's strategy "The defence of East Pakistan lies in
the West".
[8]

[9]

[10]

Prelude[edit]
The Western sector[edit]
Khan's policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due
to International pressure, and that since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be
concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the
negotiating table. To this end, Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF's
"overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive".
The initial plans for the
offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan's
troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and
consolidating their positions. To support Khan's troops, the PAF had launched pre-emptive strikes on
the evening of 3 December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities. In the western
theatre, the town of Rahim Yar Khan, close to the international border, formed a critical
communication centre for Khan's forces and, situated on the Sindh Punjab railway, remained a
vulnerable link on Khan's logistics. The fall of Rahim Yar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the rail
as well as road link between Sindh and Punjab, starving Khan's forces of fuel and ammunitions
delivered to Karachi.
[citation needed]

Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with the 12th Indian division
towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahim
Yar Khan, which would not only destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab, but also in
the Jammu & Kashmir Sector, allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to
sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.
[11]

Pakistan, which envisaged the Punjab as an operational centre, had a strong intelligence network in
the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground with a preemptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of Ramgarh Pakistani
intelligence did a very good job infiltrating the operations area posing as local people and passing on
information. However, these sources failed to pass on information on the Longewala post which,
originally a BSF post, was now held by a company of the Punjab Regiment. Longewala formed a
strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a pivotal theatre of war in engaging
India on the western front.
[11]

Tactical plan[edit]

Pakistan's tactical plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help
Pakistans 1st Armoured Divisions task in the Sri Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command also
felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was
close to the border. A Combined Arms Plan was decided upon. This involved two Infantry Brigades
and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed for this purpose. 18
Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an Armoured Regiment (38
Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longewala, a junction on the Indian road system
and 51st Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Cavalry (Pakistan Army Armoured Corps) to operate beyond
Longewala to capture Jaisalmer.
[12]

The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala, Ramgarh and Jaisalmer". The plan was far-fetched
from the start, if only because it called for a night attack to be conducted over terrain that was not
preceded by route or engineer reconnaissance, and the armoured troops were therefore unaware of
the ground surface that could not support rapid movement towards the objective. As the day
unfolded, Longewala would stand out as one of the biggest losses in a battle for Pakistan despite
overwhelming superiority before commencement of the battle, largely due to the vehicles becoming
bogged down in soft sand.

Indian defensive planning[edit]

On the Indian side, the Longewala post was held by the A company of the 23rd Battalion, Punjab
Regiment, led by Major K S Chandpuri, the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated
the area that was largely intractable to vehicles. The post was surrounded by a barbed wire fence of
three stands. The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala, 17 km north-east of the Longewala
post. Chandpuri commanded an infantry company reinforced by a section each of MMGs and L16
81mm Mortar, and one Jeep-mounted RCL. His two other recoilless rifle teams of the anti-tank
section were under training at the battalion headquarters. Major Chandpuri also had under his
command a four-man team of the camel Border Security Force division. The Longewala post had
no armoured vehicles, but artillery support was available from a battery of 170 Field Regiment (Veer
Rajput) tasked in direct support to the battalion, and 168 Field Regiment which had been deployed
to the area in secrecy just a day earlier. The direct support battery was attached to the 168 Field
Regiment and served as its "Sierra" Battery. Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on 3
December, Chandpuri dispatched a 20-man strong patrol under Lieutenant Dharam Veer to
Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, on the international border. This patrol was to play an important part in
detecting the Pakistani forces.
[7]

[13]

Battle[edit]

one of the three HAL Marut used by the IAF against Pakistani armour at Longewala

During the night of the 4th, Lt. Veer's platoon conducting a patrol detected noises across the border
that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching. These were soon confirmed by
reports from the Army's Air Observation Post aircraft flown by Maj. Atma Singh in the area of a
20 km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of
the Longewala post. Directing Lt Veer's patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri
[14]

[15]

got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and
artillery support. Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put, and containing the attack as much
as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would
not be available for at least six hours. Considering that Chandpuri's command had no transportation,
and was facing a mobile enemy, he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his
troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works, rather than conducting a withdrawal at
night that was a far riskier option.
The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12:30 am. As the offensive approached the lone outpost,
Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five of the ten
camels from the BSF detachment. As the column of 65 tanks neared the post, Indian defences,
lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced,
one infantryman being killed in the process. The Indian infantry held fire until the leading Pakistani
tanks had approached to 1530 metres before firing their PIATs. They accounted for the first two
tanks on the track with their Jeep-mounted 106 mm M40 recoilless rifle, with one of its crew being
killed during the combat. This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the
thinner top armour of the Pakistani tanks from its elevated position, firing at often stationary bogged
down vehicles. In all the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The initial
Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was
unseen in the night, and interpreted it to signify a minefield. Firing for the Indian RCL crews was
made easier by the flames of fires when the sparefuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks, intended to
supplement their internal capacity for the advance to Jaisalmer, exploded, at once providing ample
light for Indians located on higher ground, and creating a dense acrid smoke screen at ground level
for the Pakistani infantry, adding to the confusion. Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were
brought up, only to discover there was no minefield. However, at this time Pakistani infantry were
required to make another attack, from a different direction, but in the dawn light. The Pakistani
advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road, but
many vehicles, particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks, in trying to soften up the Indian
defenders before attacking, became bogged in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post.
Throughout the engagement Major Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire.
[16]

[17]

[17]

[18]

[17]

Although massively outnumbering the Indian defenders, and having surrounded them, the Pakistani
troops were unable to advance over open terrain on a full-moon night, under small arms and mortar
fire from the outpost. This encouraged the Indians not to give up their strong defensive position,
frustrating the Pakistani commanders. As dawn arrived, the Pakistan forces had still not taken the
post, and were now having to do so in full daylight.
[16]

In the morning the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct some HF-24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter
aircraft to assist the post; they were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and so were delayed
from conducting combat missions until dawn. With daylight, however, the IAF was able to operate
effectively, with the strike aircraft being guided to the targets by the airborne Forward Air
Controller (FAC) Major Atma Singh in a HAL Krishak. The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani
ground troops with the 16 Matra T-10 rockets and 30 mm cannon fire on each aircraft. Without
support from the Pakistan Air Force, which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured
vehicles were easy targets for the IAF's Hunters. The range of the 12.7 mm anti-aircraft heavy
machine guns mounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets.
Indian air attacks were made easier by the nature of the barren terrain. Many IAF officers later
described the attack as a 'Turkey Shoot' signifying the lopsidedness. By noon the next day, the
assault ended completely, having cost Pakistan 22 tanks claimed destroyed by aircraft fire, 12 by
ground anti-tank fire, and some captured after being abandoned, with a total of 100 vehicles claimed
to have been destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post. The Pakistani attack was first
halted, and then Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when Indian tanks from division's cavalry
regiment the 20 Lancers, Commanded by Col Bawa Guruvachan Singh, and the 17th Rajputana
Rifles launched their counter-offensive to end the six-hour combat; Longewala had proved to be
one of the defining moments in the war.
[19]

[20]

[17]

Aftermath[edit]

A burnt-out Pakistani T-59 tank hit during the battle.

The battle of Longewala saw heavy Pakistani losses and low Indian casualties. Since the Indians
were able to use the defenders' advantage, they managed to inflict heavy losses on the Pakistanis.
Indian casualties in the battle were two soldiers along with one of their jeep mounted recoil-less rifles
knocked out. Pakistani losses were 200 soldiers killed. The Pakistanis also suffered the loss of 34
tanks destroyed or abandoned, and lost 500 additional vehicles. Thejudicial commission set up at
the end of war recommended the commander of 18 division Major General Mustafa to be tried for
negligence during the war.
[6]

[5]

[21]

Notwithstanding the Indian victory, there were intelligence and strategic failures on both sides.
India's intelligence failed to provide warning of such a large armoured force in the western sector.
Moreover, the defending post was not heavily armed to neutralise the enemy. Finally, they did not
push home the advantage by destroying the fleeing Pakistani tanks, while the IAF had them on the
run. They did, however destroy or capture some 36 tanks, remaining one of the largest
disproportionate tank casualties for one side in a single battle after World War II.
[22]

Invading Pakistan troops meanwhile, had overestimated the Longewala post's defensive capability
due to the difficulty of approach over sand, conducting the attack at night and in full-moon light,
against stiff resistance encountered there from a well prepared defensive position located on a
dominant height. Attacking with virtually no air cover, they took too long to close for an assault on the
position, and failed to anticipate availability of Indian close air support. Given that
Pakistan's Sherman tanks and T-59/Type 59 Chinese tanks were slow on the sandy Thar desert,
some military analysts have opined that the attack may have been a poorly planned and executed
given the terrain. Some Pakistan tanks had suffered engine failures due to overheating in trying to
extricate themselves, and were abandoned. The open desert battleground provided little to no cover
for the tanks and infantry from air attacks. The plan to capture Longewala may have been good in
conception, but failed due to lack of air cover. As a result, two tank regiments failed to take
Longewala.
[23]

Brigadier Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was awarded Maha Vir Chakra, India's second highest gallantry award

For his part, the Indian company commander Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was
decorated with India's second highest gallantry award, the Maha Vir Chakra. Several other awards
were earned by members of the defending company, and the battalion's commander. On the other

hand, the Pakistani divisional commander was dismissed from service. However, the commander of
the Pakistani 51 Brigade who mounted the daring attack and crossed into Indian territory was later
awarded Pakistan's high award of the Sitara-e-Imtiaz.
The British media significantly exploited
the defence of Longewala. James Hatter compared
the Battle of Longewala as to Battle of Thermopylae in his article Taking on the enemy at
Longewala describing it as the deciding moment of the 1971 war. Similarly, Field Marshal R.M.
Carver, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, visited Longewala a few weeks after the war to
learn the details of the battle from Major Chandpuri.
[clarification needed]

[22]

[22]

In the early twenty-first century the battle was the subject of disagreement, some officers of the time
ascribing all the combat success to the air-force.
The Kuldip Singh Chandpuri sued for a nominal
one Rupee damages.
[24][25][26]

In popular culture[edit]
The Battle of Longewala was depicted in the 1997 Hindi film Border, which was directed by J.P.
Dutta and starred Sunny Deol as the Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri,Jackie Shroff as the Wing
Commander M.S. Bawa, Sunil Shetty as the Rajput Border Security Force Captain Bhairon Singh,
and then the teen idol Akshaye Khanna as Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan. The main criticism of the movie
was that it showed Indian forces being in a terrible position before any sort of help came from
the Indian Air Force. The movie also exaggerates the casualties of Indian soldiers for dramatic
purposes. This was not the case in the real incident as Indian forces had defended a position on a
height that commanded the area, and were able to defend it effectively due to tactical mistakes
made by the Pakistani commanders. This resulted in only two jawan casualties before combat
ceased. Indian troops were later able to capture damaged or abandoned Pakistani tanks.
[27]

[28]

[29]