Reserva Troncal

RESERVA TRONCAL
G.R. No. L-34395 - May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V),
BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE
LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES
DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve
troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil
Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was
survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la
Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties
which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the
following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares
of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life
Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and
57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206,
48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of
deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
WILLS & SUCCESSION (RESERVA TRONCAL) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 1
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her
other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and
Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada
a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned
the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children
inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the
order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate
Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should
be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F.
Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action
against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her
holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz
vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act
No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the
properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower
court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in
exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz
and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is
barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for
review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to
dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on
the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question
are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be
resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be
reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil
Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will
in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to
the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that
inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the
Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of
reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of
reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code
Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership
caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly
leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest.
Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and
inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve
troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and
doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:
1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por
titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere
adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y
pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or
from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by
operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for
the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from
an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of
law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a
third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging
to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho
Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her
properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be
inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable
property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus
(prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives
are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia
pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or
impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel
hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan
inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His
mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo
Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register
the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of
her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of
conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said
one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be
inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac,
who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs.
Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille,
CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line
from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the
prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When
Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable
property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal
aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent
their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation.
But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104
Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are
excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such
as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve
and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came (Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets
the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas,
63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a
fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at
the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the
reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become
absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil.
120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right
would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease
the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable
character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being
a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when
the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed
during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that
survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in
the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right
in the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168,
199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista
who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,
pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104
Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and
by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her
death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the
exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the
outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the
prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives
within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could
not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees
of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of
the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be
a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a
similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together
with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the
latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be
reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict
obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest
(prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon
begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her
will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her
deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants
of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in
the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had
inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and
could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties.
The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the
Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there
are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of
his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the
third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be
obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs.
Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the
relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her
daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all
the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not
pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only
one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should
be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties
in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda.
The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees
within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the
prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of
third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging
to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees
at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees
belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character.
The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva
troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of
Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the
fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and
Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs
against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29901 - August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in
Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three
children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died,
Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by
the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose
Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate
Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among
others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's
widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the
second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua,
his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)
2
dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After
his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a
week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in
her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la
Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and
sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners
herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3
(subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before
the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la
Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn
was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as
administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence
this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character
the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an
asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3)
that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of
the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second
marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No.
399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate
had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and
Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the
petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal whether the
property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or
not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was
not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other
fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the
lot in question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil
Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to a
reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court
quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be
or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by
an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient;
and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent
Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from
pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his
father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that
there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express
terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor
de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San
Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo,
estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros
Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo
No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas
gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last
will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931.
As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased
himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount
of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This
being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or
legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament of
Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was
never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents'
answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the
subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate
Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias
Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament
has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of
partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate
as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by
inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his death
his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was,
however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil
Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These
relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally
belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not
believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until
the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed
their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio
Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399;
and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new
Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4
undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 6878 - September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be
reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in
the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other
1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard
and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage
they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the
two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the
two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in
the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or
that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each
parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the
nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be
presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that
the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a contention
we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro
Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano
Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and
his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that
the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had
acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father
Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree
and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial
court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in
accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired
by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation
of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein.
Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in
1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be
reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents'
renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the
two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a
conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died
without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of
the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed
into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that
demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's
wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of
law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the
provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death
would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal
portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it
is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal
would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of
them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of
Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other
half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise,
proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was
acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of
the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation
does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the
following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said
that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said
that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced
the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant
alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to
her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in
No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of
law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so
in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the
prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right
of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are
entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I
remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right
of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for
requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the
property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute
the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be
reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its
character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of
the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the
Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December,
1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of property
reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of
the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country
since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to
reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved
by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to
answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to
lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory
obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is
the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be
registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly
organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas
that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in SpanishPhilippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not
the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended
Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in
article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall
be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the
property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or
other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do
not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such
right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the
effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a
second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the
decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811;
and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common
nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has
already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to
the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because
the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they
are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had
occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have
been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the
assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father
or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real
property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by
mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not
only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article
811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a
positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read
thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that
said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days
fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a
principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of
ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to
the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to
which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying,
according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the
father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the
law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding
the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property;
after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they
are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for
the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time,
since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled
to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of
such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that
the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for
the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this
prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with
reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property
required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the
registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved
in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set
forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The
person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise,
the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of
disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct
has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the
rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full
ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not
apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent.
This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the
supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895,
somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple; the
remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that
deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and
that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is, that
the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere
usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the
Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the
right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute
ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within
the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the
possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who
belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise.
The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that
the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant
heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not
seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been
expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked
difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary
and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or
mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property
resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way
perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the
limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple.
But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother
required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his
descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may
unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot
perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would
necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could
transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved
cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long
as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person
who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there
would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having
disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid
but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by
law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition,
because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to
circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the
legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the
children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the
ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations
during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved
and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain
to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their
nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use
and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of
the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt
arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892,
declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by
law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the
third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right
reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a
condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance
with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil
Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of
the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all,
the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion,
although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the
right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a
limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in
him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that
a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die
before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second
contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any
of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the
registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act
would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is
impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right,
because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right
cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may
even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person
required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such
person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a
condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a
title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis
causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got
the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law:
"To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a
mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be
absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the
appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation
that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the
Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that
the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of
the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she
transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the
institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor
in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can
use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real
owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is
annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when
the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved
to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it.
This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed that the
alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him
by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing
sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that
is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses.
Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register
his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of
his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the
acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed
period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person
in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law
would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein
relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and
conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of
the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to
costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
March 24, 1961 - G.R. No. L-12957

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendantsappellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed
by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2)
ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan
(now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants
the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any
knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of
appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang
had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had
never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous
possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim,
they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of
Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina
and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No.
3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and
the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no
valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the
estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea
Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions
being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a
reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor;
and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children
named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an
only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino
upon his death the date of which does not clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows:
Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina,
and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of
Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at
the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs
A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932
at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public
instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for
and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter
said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original
Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused, thus giving rise to the
filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs.
8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of
Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed
of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their
name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable
property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's
death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The
latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this
connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana
Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa
268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista
has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is
like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation,
said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the
death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being
survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died,
Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the
former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor
of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve
instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable
property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally,
the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee
survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still
alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute
owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and
her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are
not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in
question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso
for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Paredes,
JJ., concur.
November 15, 1919 - G.R. No. 14856
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs. MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel,
Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino,
guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of
Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio
Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he
begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena
of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time Severina
Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de
Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second
wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III,
was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died
single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and
Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of
Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the
children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the notary
public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos
Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all
his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos
son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold,
of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects mentioned in the
complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina
Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living
daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of all the property left at
the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the
complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio,
as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been
gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the
parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property
described therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph
9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their
corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants have
refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes
Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per
bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages
in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to
three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned reservable property and for
the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable
property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in
the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her
husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the
corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is based
on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her
deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz
de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by
the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following articles, but that established in article 811
of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of
said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited
by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property
which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant,
Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death
of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having been
inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is
absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law,
entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina
Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable
property - there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her
rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not passed into the
possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as
Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case,
there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by
the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is
secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon
was in duty bound to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to
reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced
heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4,
1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose
the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions
left by her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that
there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section
5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection. Wherefore they
prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the
complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said
motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which
was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs, but,
instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of action,
and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the demurrer,
every question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of the court - the said
judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by absolving the
defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of the
plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants,
thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed, in
view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be
the same which the defendants would allege in their answer - those dealing with a mere question of law
which the courts would have to decide - and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs
should insist - they could do no less - upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if
another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against
the plaintiffs - in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack
the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary - as in this case what has
been done does not prejudice the parties - the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according
to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in
controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the
ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is
now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the question of law presented in
this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of
the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in
article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited
said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had
the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned
deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were born,
namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father).
At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he
left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the aforementioned property
enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was
succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on
dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes
Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property left by her father, same constituting
the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos
son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said
property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino,
nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common
ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same
(by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers, by a
lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
Although said property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty
bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the
relatives, within the third degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use
or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain
designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the
nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by
operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) - said property reverts to
said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in
fact the right of reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third
degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the third
degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property
received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and
which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the
relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the
legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary
heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the
relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such property
came.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree,
of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as
reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation
on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of
the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and
relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and
Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II;
that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to represent their
aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the
legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs,
Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons
of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other
children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this
decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his
first marriage - Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are
represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second
marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III,
within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews
as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree
in their own right and the other twelve are such by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as
reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio
Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to accept the
theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the
ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes
Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes,
being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the
property left at the death of her mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio
III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger
that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and
that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased
Apolonio III never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such
property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does not
destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in
the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which
exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the
same Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases
expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any
kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether they
property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested
with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any doubt
whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without
issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it
became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object
that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the
order of person other than those comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from
Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and
condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she
did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with
the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased
son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits
and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the
legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his
descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her
only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will
concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will
reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is
unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law all of
the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III,
constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to
be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress,
the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the order of
legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as
well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming from the
inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the application of
article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes
Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just
reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third
degree, to participate in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living,
claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights
should not be upheld and why they should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the
litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the property
received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable property; and
that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives
within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been
already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress
Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina
of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the
character of reservable property, held before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of the
property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said
Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of
justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third degree in
accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property
which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on
January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in
the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs
cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon
any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the
reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the
legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive
right to receive all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third
degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the fruits
collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the
obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the
principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the
plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity
expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the
remaining seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we should
declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de
Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that
the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her
husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed
from said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and
that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special
findings as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-10701 - January 16, 1959
MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL.,
oppositors-appellants. JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.: In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No.
12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos.
1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and
posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two
parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation
of the order of general default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152,
known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their
improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow
and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall
be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of
the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within
the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in the
name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel
for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the
original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original
Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and
that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose
and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano, who contended that the application and
operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the
Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of
registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason that the
death of the reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio
troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the
ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but
requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to
the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor
of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from
a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said
property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to
exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly
recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was
acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes
Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls
squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of
the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia
Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his
former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other
private oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil
Code; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from contesting the
existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the title from the
reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has
survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the
reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The
reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the
reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (
prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life
interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the
prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not
even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the
property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of
record. It is equally well settled that the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or
his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree
from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the
reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without
determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or
where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further proceedings would be
unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been
expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer
degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are merely endeavoring to prolong their
enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against
appellants in both instances. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia JJ.,
concur
G.R. No. 176422 - March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,
DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS,
substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA.
DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot
1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No.
1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent
Julia Delos Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but
co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and
her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and
Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria,
Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely,
Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins children. Petitioners alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated
unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim
that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to
them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from
petitioners familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent,
the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears,
however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners claim and granted
their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its
Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land subject
of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including intervenor Maria
Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M)
which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia Policarpio,
TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the same to the enumerated
plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorneys fees and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6,
Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in
Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per Resolution9 dated January 17,
2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga
owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga
previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF
THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE
LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the properties came
from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this
regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule,
one of which is when the CAs findings are contrary to those of the trial court. 14 This being the case in the
petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA
on the two issues that arise one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties and two,
whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title,
whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus.
The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also
called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios
who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CAs resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the
ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the
subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs
to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved
by the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he
is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties
in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal
character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned
the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on
the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and collateral relatives under Article 964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as
the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather,
she is Gregorias collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants, and
those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.1wphi1 A direct line is
that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so
on. On the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her
collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor
and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julias collateral
relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then
to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents (second line/degree), and then descent to
Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias collateral relative within the third degree and not
her ascendant.
First cousins of the descendant/prepositus are fourth degree relatives and cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the property came and
upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias
fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives
and are not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a
personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus,
who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives,
within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character,
petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because
petitioners are not Gregorias relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CAs disposition that the
complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply
in the distribution of Gregorias estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of Gregorias
estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is
based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception of evidence
on Gregorias entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed
specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of the reservable property until the reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTCs disposition of the case. In
upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties
to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have done, assuming for
arguments sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered
on respondents titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a
prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title
perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively. 25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets
the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact
that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated
January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any
civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of the properties in
question.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
EUNICE R. TABINAS
2012 - 0085
Arellano University School of Law

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