JURISDICTION CASE DIGEST

TROPANG POTCHI

BELGICA VS OCHOA
FACTS: In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of AmericanEnglish origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (Congressional Pork
Barrel). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the
Executive. The Congressional Pork Barrel can be traced from Act
3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development
Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund
and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and
the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the
present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the petitioners include the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya
Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential
Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was
created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended
by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility managed and administered by
the Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, pork funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an
anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo
Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the
pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations
Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began
its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of
some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds
from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
JLN standing for Janet Lim Napoles had swindled billions of pesos
from the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August
2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-

year audit investigation covering the use of legislators PDAF from

2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration.

render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive

branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul
its legal existence.

As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that [a]t

least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a
dummy [NGO].

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy
HELD:
YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied
by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel System. Also, the questions in these consolidated
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there
is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lismota of the case.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when
there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose
can
be
served
in passing
upon
the
merits. The respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would
not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since
said reform
is
geared
towards
the
2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the
Presidents declaration that he had already abolished the PDAF

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and DidagenPiangDilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint
was
accompanied
by
a
"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in
a political crisis.
HELD:
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article
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VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond
judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are
not truly political in nature.

TROPANG POTCHI

closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the

other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in
cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict
and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,

On the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001
Election was valid.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for
the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On
Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935,
Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest
against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing
of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by
claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take
cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to
a writ of prohibition from the SC.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on
standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters
suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in
this petition is likely to arise again

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and
special elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners
contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the
said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term
of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and,
consequently, the declaration of the 13th elected senator.
Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of
the Special Election as required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself
provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to
fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this
statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did
not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of
the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the
Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were
not informed since there had been other accessible information
resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with
the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.
JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the
new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter
sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president.
He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election
held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being
intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what
petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special election on
14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine
Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a
quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority
of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the
ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise
of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent
evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is
to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973
Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a
political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.
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SALVADORA OCAMPO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. TOMAS

CABAGIS, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: From the decision held by the SC. The defendant is absolved
from the complaint without special finding as to costs, and record it to
the original court. However, two of the four justices who signed the
decision are no longer members of the court.
The appellees now seek the cancellation and annulment of the entry of
judgment and the recall of the remittitur and the record of the case to
this court. The motion is made upon the theory that no final judgment
has ever been entered, and that by reason of the changes in the
personnel of the court the more extensive opinion which was
contemplated can not now be filed.
Section 15 of Act. No. 136 provides that "in the determination of
causes all decision of the Supreme Court shall be given in writing,
signed by the judges concurring in the decision, and the grounds of the
decision shall be stated as briefly as may be consistent with
clearness."
The decision of December 26, 1908, was in writing, and was signed by
the four justices who concurred therein, but no grounds are stated for
the decision.

TROPANG POTCHI

Subject: Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

(constitutional limitations); Judicial branchs power to review factual
basis of suspension by Executive branch

Facs: In the evening of August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, two hand grenades were
thrown at the platform where the candidates and other persons were,
killing and injuring several persons.
Two days later, President Marcos announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, declaring that lawless elements have created a
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the
security of the State; and thereby the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended, for persons detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion. Presently, petitions for writs of habeas corpus
were filed by herein petitioners who have been arrested without a
warrant and then detained. They likewise assail Proclamation No. 889
as unconstitutional.
The respondent argues that petitioners had been detained on
reasonable belief that they had participated in the crime of
insurrection or rebellion and that their continued detention is justified
due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to Proclamation No. 889.

ISSUE: WON non compliance will affect the decision

HELD: No. A strict and literal compliance with this statute would often
render it impossible for the court to decide a case. The Act declares the
manner in which the Supreme Court shall perform the strictly judicial
act of giving final expression to its decision, but it does not say that the
failure to comply therewith shall render the decision ineffective. The
direction is as to a matter which is not of the essence of the thing to be
done, and there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended
that strict compliance therewith is not necessary to the validity of the
proceedings.

Lansang v. Garcia
G.R. No. L-33964 and G.R. No. L-33965 and G.R. No. L-33973 | 1971-1211

It is likewise alleged that the issuance of the proclamation partakes of

the nature of political question which cannot be the subject of judicial
inquiry and that in making said declaration.

beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the

power vested in the President or to determine the wisdom of his act.
The President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889.
Accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional. The President acted on
relevant facts gathered thru various intelligence agents of our
government.

Vinuya vs Romulo (2010)

G.R. No. 162230 | 2010-04-28
Facts: Members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims
of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War, claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), and Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort
women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan.

ISSUE: WON the proclamation is constitutional

Held: Yes. In testing the validity of acts of Congress and of the
Executive be, the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
This means that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned
proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President's decision is correct but that in suspending the writ, the
President did not act arbitrarily.
Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances, the function of the Court is merely to check, not to
supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone

HELD: No. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it
is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such
decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein
assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant
petition for certiorari.
Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the peoplein their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent

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upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

The Decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and

involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.

MANUEL MAMBA V. EDGAR LARA

G.R. No. 165109

TROPANG POTCHI

payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation and

discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well
as a proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town
center.
Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom
but to the legality of the acts complained of. Thus, we find the instant
controversy within the ambit of judicial review. Besides, even if the
issues were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened

pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review
the validity of the Presidents action. But, two days later or on
December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.

ISSUE: WON is it a Political Question

HELD: No. President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the
joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed several

resolutions authorizing Gov. Edgar Lara to negotiate, sign and execute
contracts or agreements for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fun
the priority projects of the governor and for the construction and
development of a New Cagayan Town Center subject to the approval
and ratification of by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently, the
planning, design, construction and site development of the project was
awarded to Asset Builders Corporation.
Petitioners Manuel Mamba, Raymund Guzman and Leonidaz Fausto, a
Representative of Cagayan and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, respectively, filed a petition for Annulment of Contracts
entered into by Gov. Lara in connection with the New Cagayan Town
Center project.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of course of action, stating
among others, that petitioners did not have the locus standi to file the
present case as they are not parties to the questioned contract.

FORTUN v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR no. 190293
FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the
ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt
57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this
carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar
lawless violence in Central Mindanao. In the instance, President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province
except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration

of

the

Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo

privilege

of

the

writ

of habeas

corpus in

Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable

controversy.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise
the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently,

Issue: Whether or not it is a political issue

Ruling: No. In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek
to restrain public respondents from implementing the bond flotation
and to declare null and void all contracts related to the bond flotation
and construction of the town center. In the petition before the RTC,
they alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by
public respondents. They put in issue the overpriced construction of
the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the
irrevocable assignment of the provincial government's annual regular
income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and secure the

same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot

although

the

Constitution

reserves

to

the

Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the

submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article

Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is

VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from

automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its

the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of

express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should

the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or

the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional

in writing of her action.

validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of

the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
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TROPANG POTCHI

existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of

the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution (Emphasis supplied)

Ting HovsTengGui
GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008
Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting
HoBelenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente TengGui. The
controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements
which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting
Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings.
Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June
26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the
said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the
name of respondent Vicente TengGui for the benefit of the deceased Felix
Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public
lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the
respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and
benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void
Held:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided
that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown
to have been in reality a donatin, or some other act or contract. The sale
in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation.
The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale.
But since the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not
been proven to be a simulation.
This is because the Court of law will prevail over court of equity. Under
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 1.
All agricultural timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any

The fundamental law is very clear in this aspect wherein it states that
the right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved for Filipino
citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos. Therefore since the father of petitioners and
respondent was a Chinese citizen; he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning real property in the Philippines. In fact, he was only occupying
the subject lot by virtue of the permission granted him by the then U.S.
Naval Reservation Office of Olongapo, Zambales. As correctly found by
the CA, the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner of the subject lot
in light of the constitutional proscription and the respondent did not at
any instance act as the dummy of his father.
Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent
involving public land is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other
certificate of title issued to private lands in the ordinary or cadastral
registration proceeding. The effect of the registration of a patent and the
issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an
incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had
been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is
absolutely conclusive and indisputable, and is not subject to collateral
attack.1[17]
Nonetheless, petitioners invoke equity considerations and claim that the
ruling of the RTC that an implied trust was created between respondent
and their father with respect to the subject lot should be upheld.
This contention must fail because the prohibition against an alien from
owning lands of the public domain is absolute and not even an implied
trust can be permitted to arise on equity considerations.

Muller V. Muller
G.R No. 149615, DAugust 29, 2006
Petitioners: ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER
Respondents: HELMUT MULLER

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller

were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple
resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel
of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction
of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking,

and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26,
1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which

terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the

assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that
respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the

FACTS:

Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It

also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the
respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there

is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring

the same.
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TROPANG POTCHI

Issue:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement on the
ground of equity.

Further, the distinction made between the transfer of ownership as

opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To
allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law.

Whether or not their acceptance of separation pay and signing of

quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case

HELD:
No because the respondent is aware of the constitutional prohibition
regarding the disqualification of aliens in acquiring lands of the public
domain and private lands. He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition.
Thus, his attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created
and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the
party who is guilty of the fraud. 2[13] To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a
court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a
rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 3[14] He who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity
on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought
the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp. vs. Tagyamon

G.R. No. 191475

Facts:

Respondents Ignacio B. Tagyamon, Pablito L. Luna, Fe B. Badayos, and

Cynthia L. Comandao were supervisors of petitioner Philippine Carpet
Manufacturing Corp. (PCMC).
Last March 15, 2004, they received a memorandum of dismissal from the
petitioner. They were informed that the petitioner was implementing a
retrenchment program in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code.
They were paid their separation pay and executed deeds of release,
waiver and quitclaim.

Claiming that they were aggrieved by petitioners decision to terminate

their employment, the respondents filed separate complaints against the
petitioner for illegal dismissal.

2
3

December 11, 2013

Held:
Yes. It can safely be concluded that economic necessity constrained the
respondents to accept the petitioners monetary offer and sign the deeds
of release, waiver and quitclaim. That respondents are supervisors and
not rank-and-file employees does not make them less susceptible to
financial offers, faced as they were with the prospect of unemployment.
The Court has allowed supervisory employees to seek payment of benefits
and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal even though, for a
consideration, they executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their
employers from liability (Ariola v. Philex Mining Corp., 503 Phil. 765, 780
(2005) at 789).
x xx There is no nexus between intelligence, or even the position which
the employee held in the company when it concerns the pressure which
the employer may exert upon the free will of the employee who is asked to
sign a release and quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager, as in
the present case, who is confronted with the same dilemma of whether
(to sign) a release and quitclaim and accept what the company offers
them, or (to refuse) to sign and walk out without receiving anything, may
succumb to the same pressure, being very well aware that it is going to
take quite a while before he can recover whatever he is entitled to,
because it is only after a protracted legal battle starting from the labor
arbiter level, all the way to this Court, can he receive anything at all. The
Court understands that such a risk of not receiving anything whatsoever,
coupled with the probability of not immediately getting any gainful
employment or means of livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough
pressure upon anyone who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim in
exchange of some amount of money which may be way below what he
may be entitled to based on company practice and policy or by law
(Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp., et. al. vs. Ignacio B. Tagyamon,
et. al., G.R. No. 191475, Dec. 11, 2013, quoting Becton Dickinson Phils.,
Inc. v. NLRC, 511 Phil. 566, 589-590 (2005)).
x xx Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law.
Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches
cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x xx
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have
no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals
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x xx, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure.
We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside
legality," this is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure.
Aequetasnunguamcontravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period,
recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply
the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law."32
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on
an injury to the complainants rights which should be brought within
four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 114633 of
the Civil Code. Respondents complaint filed almost 3 years after their
alleged illegal dismissal was still well within the prescriptive period.
Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches may be
applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for
the rights of laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of
the Constitution and under the Civil Code.35

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012)

ODES no power to try and decide cases E.O. No. 13 empowering it is
unconstitutional
FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as
the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel

TROPANG POTCHI

Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred
Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of
stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to
submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE
Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an
administrative office a quasi-judicial function through and E.O. and not
through legislative enactment by Congress.
HELD
NO.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. In the case of BuklodngKawaning EIIB v.
Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an
express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O.
292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the
policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President."
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of
the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the
President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and
policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power
to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of
EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the

Office of the President to Departments or gencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is
crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar
as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the
executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under
E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of
a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of
Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly
"under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA,
to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an
office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by
way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA
is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested
with quasi-judicial powers.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IADODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the
conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IADODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against
all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report
and recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a factfinding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power
to settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cario
v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission:
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi- judicial agency or office.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of
a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act
of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
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TROPANG POTCHI

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of

the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.

x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B.
ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B.
FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the

Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if
not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.

FACTS:

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively

targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing

Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

Respondents, through OSG,

petitioners and argued that:

Philippine

Truth

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

questioned

the

legal

standing

of

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question
E.
O.
No.
1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public
offices,
agencies
and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lismota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate

funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in

danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions

of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and
not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latters jurisdiction.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in
interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

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Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the

plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part
of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There
is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

TROPANG POTCHI

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive

Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent
to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle
for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation

to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS
G.R.
No.
100150,
January
5,
1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and
order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the
vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners
to
appear
before
the
CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was
filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their
privilege
to
engage
in
business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners'
motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25,
1991.The Petitioner filed aa petition for prohibition, praying for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to
prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 901580,
entitled
"Ferno,
et.al
vs.
Quimpo,
et.al".
ISSUE:Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the
authority
and
power
of
the
CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of
authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the
power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving
civil
and
political
rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an
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JURISDICTION CASE DIGEST

adjudicative power that it does not possess. The Constitutional

provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of
injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may
only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending
or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.The writ prayed for the petition is
granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with
CHR Case No. 90-1580.

Isidro Cariovs The Commission on

Human
CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions
to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their
grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the LiwasangBonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order
to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed
the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High
School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating

Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with
RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers
to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in
the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons
completely
unknown
to
them.

TROPANG POTCHI

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution
over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of
issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing
its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process
of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply
to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil
and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine
certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation
involving
civil
and
political
rights.
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much
less
take
over
the
functions
of
the
latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

G.R. No. 185663

June 20, 2012

REMEDIOS
ANTONINO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY
and TAN TIAN SU, Respondents.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution2 dated
December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
89145.
FACTS:

contract, Antonino was accorded with the right of first refusal in the
event Su would decide to sell the subject property. 3
On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as
Undertaking Agreement4 where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the
subject property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a
disagreement as to who between them would shoulder the payment of
the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended. 5
On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the
cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04802.6 Later that same day, Antonino filed an amended complaint to
enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell to her the
subject property.7
In an Order8 dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed Antoninos
complaint on the grounds of improper venue and non-payment of the
appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antoninos complaint is
one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are
personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the place
where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa
and Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
Specifically:
The instant case is an action for specific performance with damages, a
personal action, which may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides (Section 2, Rule 5
of the Rules of Court). Records show that plaintiff is a resident of 706
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City while defendant
is a resident of 550 Sto. Cristo St., Binondo, Manila. Hence, the instant
case should have been filed in the place of residence of either the
plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff. Contrary to the
claim of plaintiff, the alleged written agreements presented by the
plaintiff in her Amended Complaint do not contain any stipulation as to
the venue of actions. x x x9
The RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Antoninos
complaint in view of her failure to pay the correct amount of docket
fees. Citing Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,10 the RTC ruled that:

Since March 21, 1978, petitioner RemediosAntonino (Antonino) had

been leasing a residential property located at Makati City and owned
by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under the governing lease
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Anent the non-payment of filing fees on the Amended Complaint,

plaintiff alleges that no new assessment was made when the Amended
Complaint was filed since there [were] no additional damages prayed
for. The Manchester decision has been recently relaxed as to allow
additional payment of the necessary fees if the Honorable Court so
orders an assessment thereof.

Antonino alleged that her motion for reconsideration from the RTCs
December 8, 2004 was set for hearing on January 7, 2005 and Su
received a copy thereof on January 6, 2005. Antonino pleaded for a
liberal interpretation of the rules as Su was notified of her motion
before the hearing thereon and was not in any way prejudiced. She
also reiterated her arguments for the reinstatement of her complaint.

The Court is not persuaded.

In a Joint Resolution16 dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Sus
Omnibus Motion and Antoninos January 21, 2005 Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC refused to cancel the notice of lispendens,
holding that:

The Amended Complaint, which the Court notes to have been filed at
4:00 oclock in the afternoon or few hours after the initial complaint
was filed, further prays that judgment be rendered "ordering defendant
to sell his property located at 1623 Cypress, Dasmarias Village,
Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with
the terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7,
2004 and ordering defendant to desist from selling his property to any
other party other than plaintiff.", which makes the instant case also an
action for Specific Performance in addition to the claim for Damages.
However, the value of the described property was not stated in the
prayer and no docket fees were paid. Thus, following the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, that the Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, the instant case is hereby dismissed. 11
On December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus Motion, 12 praying for the
cancellation of the notice of lispendens, which Antonino caused to be
annotated on the title covering the subject property and the issuance
of a summary judgment on his counterclaims. Su, among others,
alleged the propriety of cancelling the notice of lispendens in view of
the dismissal of the complaint and Antoninos failure to appeal
therefrom.

It is quite clear that the dismissal of the Amended Complaint was

anchored on two grounds, e.g. (1) for improper venue and (2) for nonpayment of docket fee. It is elementary that when a complaint was
dismissed based on these grounds[,] the court did not resolve the case
on the merits. Moreover, "a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case unless the docket fees are paid" x xx. Thus,
the cause of action laid down in the complaint remains unresolved for
proper re-filing before the proper court. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court said: "The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by
the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time." x x x17
The RTC maintained its earlier ruling that Antoninos Motion for
Reconsideration from the December 8, 2004 Order is pro-forma and did
not suspend the running of the period to file an appeal. The RTC also
reiterated that Antoninos complaint is a personal action such that the
proper venue therefore is either the City of Manila or Muntinlupa City.

On
January
3,
2005,
Antonino
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration,13 claiming that her complaint is a real action and the
location of the subject property is determinative of its venue.
Alternatively, she submitted a certification issued by the Commission
on Elections, stating that she is a resident of Makati City. She then
prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of an order
directing the clerk of court to assess the proper docket fees. This was
denied by the RTC in an Order14 dated January 6, 2005, holding that
there was non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court.

On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of

judgment.18 Antonino prayed for the nullification of the RTCs Order
dated December 8, 2004 dismissing her complaint, Order dated
January 6, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint
Resolution dated February 24, 2005 denying her motion for
reconsideration of the January 6, 2005 Order. According to Antonino,
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for the enforcement of the
Undertaking Agreement is personal and when it deprived her of an
opportunity to pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTCs grave
abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise exhibited by its
strict application of the rules on motions and summary denial of her
motion for reconsideration.

Antonino thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 dated January 21,

2005, claiming that there was due observance of the rules on motions.

In its Decision19 dated May 26, 2008, the CA dismissed Antoninos

petition. While the CA recognized Antoninos faulty choice of remedy, it

proceeded to resolve the issues she raised relative to the dismissal of

her complaint. Thus:
It should be stressed that in this case, there is neither allegation in the
petition, nor sufficient proof adduced showing highly exceptional
circumstance to justify the failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies
of appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy through no
fault attributable to [her] before filing this petition for annulment of
judgment. In Manipor v. Ricafort, the Supreme Court held, thus:
If the petitioner failed to avail of such remedies without sufficient
justification, he cannot avail of an action for annulment because,
otherwise, he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural infirmity, and in the interest
of justice, we shall look into the issues raised and decide the case on
the merit.
A perusal of the allegations of the complaint unambiguously shows
that petitioner seeks to enforce the commitment of private respondent
to sell his property in accordance with the terms and conditions of their
purported agreement dated July 7, 2004. By implication, petitioner
does not question the ownership of private respondent over the
property nor does she claim, by any color of title, right to possess the
property or to its recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement of
a supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal action.
Guided by the above rule (Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court),
petitioner should have filed the case either in Muntinlupa City, where
she resides, or in Manila, where private respondent maintains his
residence. Other than filing the complaint in any of these places,
petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her case.
Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith raised
improper venue as an affirmative defense and his stand was sustained
by trial court, thus, resulting to the dismissal of the case.
Further, it is important to note that in a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a
judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion. Petitioner, by claiming
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, actually
concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case. She only assails the manner in which the trial
court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It
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follows that petitioner cannot use lack of jurisdiction as ground to

annul the judgment by claiming grave abuse of discretion. In this case
where the court refused to exercise jurisdiction due to improper venue,
neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion is available to
challenge the assailed order of dismissal of the trial court. 20 (Citations
omitted)

The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though

final, are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable
principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to
reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it
enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a
judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. 25

Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the

CA in its Resolution dated December 5, 2008. 21

Apart from the requirement that the existence of "extrinsic fraud" or

"lack of jurisdiction" should be amply demonstrated, one who desires
to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and other
appropriate remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for
causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided under Section 1,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the propriety of
Antoninos use of the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment
as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.
RULING:
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr.,22 this Court expounded that the
remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain
exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of
immutability of final judgments:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two
grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that
annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment
has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasijudicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
law.23 (Citations omitted)
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, 24 this Court emphasized that only void
judgments, by reason of "extrinsic fraud" or the courts lack of
jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled.

Antoninos recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and

the reasons are patent. There is therefore no reason to disturb the
questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory.
A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an appeal.
First, Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the various issuances
of the RTC, primary of which is the Order dated December 8, 2004, in
order to avoid the adverse consequences of their becoming final and
executory because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary remedies
available. Antonino did not proffer any explanation for her failure to
appeal the RTCs Order dated December 8, 2004 and, thereafter, the
Order dated January 6, 2005, denying her Motion for Reconsideration
dated January 3, 2005. Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules
immediately indicates that an appeal was already available from the
Order dated December 8, 2004, as this is a final order as contemplated
under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and there
was no legal compulsion for Antonino to move for reconsideration.
Nonetheless, since there is no bar for her to file a motion for
reconsideration so as to give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself
before elevating the matter for the appellate courts review, appeal is
the prescribed remedy from the denial of such motion and not another
motion for reconsideration. While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court includes "an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration" in the enumeration of unappealable matters, this
Court clarified in Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. 26 that such refers to a
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the denial of a
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a final order,
therefore, appealable. Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration
from a final judgment or order is prohibited, hence, can never interrupt
the period to perfect an appeal.

The RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of the threeday notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court contrary
to liberal stance taken by this Court in cases when the purpose of such
rule can be achieved by giving the opposing party sufficient time to
study and controvert the motion. 27 Justice and equity would thus
suggest that the fifteen-day period within which Antonino can appeal
should be counted from her receipt on January 7, 2005 28 of the Order
dated January 6, 2005 denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 3, 2005. Unfortunately, even liberality proved to be inadequate
to neutralize the adverse consequences of Antoninos negligence as
she allowed such period to lapse without filing an appeal, erroneously
believing that a second motion for reconsideration is the proper
remedy. While a second motion for reconsideration is not prohibited
insofar as interlocutory orders are concerned, 29 the Orders dated
December 8, 2004 and January 6, 2005 are final orders.
In fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from Antoninos
receipt of the Order dated February 24, 2005 denying her second
motion for reconsideration, she interposed no appeal and filed a
petition for annulment of judgment on April 1, 2005 instead. This, for
sure, constitutes a categorical admission that the assailed issuances of
the RTC had already become final and executory in view of her
omission to perfect an appeal within the mandated period. By no
means can her petition for annulment of judgment prosper as that
would, in effect, sanction her blatant negligence or sheer obliviousness
to proper procedure.
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the
reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final
orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must
have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for
relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to
the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would
benefit from his own inaction or negligence.30 (Citation omitted)
"Grave abuse of discretion" is not a ground to annul a final and
executory judgment.
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on
"extrinsic fraud" and "lack of jurisdiction" and cannot prosper on the
basis of "grave abuse of discretion". By anchoring her petition on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration,
Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of "lack of jurisdiction". As
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this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. "G"

Holdings, Inc.,31 "lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the annulment of
judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not
contemplate "grave abuse of discretion" considering that "jurisdiction"
is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge
Leviste:32
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.33 (Citation omitted)
In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing
Antoninos complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antoninos
cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the
wrong venue. Personal action is one that is founded on privity of
contracts between the parties; and in which the plaintiff usually seeks
the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or
recovery of damages. Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored
on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
ownership or possession of real property or interest in it.34 Antoninos
following allegations in her amended complaint show that one of her
causes of action is one for the enforcement or consummation of a
contract, hence, a personal action:
XII
On July 7, 2004, plaintiff and defendant executed a document entitled
"Undertaking Agreement" (copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
H) wherein defendant agreed to sell said property to plaintiff "who has
leased said property since March 21, 1978 up to the present" with the
plaintiff paying a downpayment of $50,000.00 US dollars the following
day, July 8, 2004.
XIV
Defendant also refused to accept the $50,000.00 US Dollars and was
about to tear up the document they previously signed the day before
when plaintiff prevented him from doing so.

TROPANG POTCHI

XV
Consequently, plaintiff discovered that defendant was already
negotiating to sell the said property to another Chinese national who
incidentally is also one of plaintiffs buyers.
Premises considered, in the interest of substantial justice, it is most
respectfully prayed that after due hearing that judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to sell his property located at 1623 Cypress,
Dasmarias Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff
in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their
agreement dated July 7, 2004.
Antoninos cause of action is premised on her claim that there has
already been a perfected contract of sale by virtue of their execution of
the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with his
obligations as seller. However, by claiming the existence of a perfected
contract of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired title to the
subject property. She does not allege otherwise and tacitly
acknowledges Sus title to the subject property by asking for the
consummation of the sale.
That there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged
sale does not confer to Antonino title to the subject
property.1wphi1 Ownership is transferred when there is actual or
constructive delivery and the thing is considered delivered when it is
placed in the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is
made through a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or
cannot be clearly inferred.36 In other words, Antoninos complaint is not
in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject property is
not at issue.
Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real property does not
make Antoninos complaint real in nature in the absence of a contrary
claim of title. After a contract of sale is perfected, the right of the
parties to reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation,
arises the vendee may require the vendor to compel the transfer the
title to the object of the sale37 and the vendor may require the
payment of the purchase price.38 The action to cause the
consummation of a sale does not involve an adverse claim of
ownership as the vendors title is recognized and the vendor is simply
being asked to perform an act, specifically, the transfer of such title by
any of the recognized modes of delivery.

Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong venue sufficed

for the dismissal thereof, it would be superfluous to discuss if
Antoninos non-payment of the correct docket fees likewise warranted
it.
At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her
complaint, such had already become final and executory and will not
be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less,
proved that there was extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the
assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as
an appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antoninos
fault. Litigation should end and terminate sometime and somewhere. It
is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be
deprived of the fruits of the verdict.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit and the Decision dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution dated
December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ABRENICA
06.18.12

VS

ABRENICAGR

180572

FACTS:
Petitioner and Respondent were law firm partners. R filed a caseagainst
P d to return partnership fundsrepresenting profits from the sale of a
parcel of land and sought to recover from petitionerretainer fees that
he received from two clientsof the firm and the balance of the cash
advance that he obtained.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging thatthe sheriff had
levied on properties belongingto his children and petitioner Joena.
Joena filedan Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she andher
stepchildren owned a number of thepersonal properties sought to be
levied and that it was under their ACP.
A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3January 2008 in favor of
the law firm for the Ps properties. Petitioner has been previously
married to another womanbut their marriage has already been
dissolved.
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ISSUE:

for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where

respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he
received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash
advance that he obtained in 1997.

WON Joena had the right to the claim?

HELD:
NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena
filed her Affidavit. As toone of the children, parental authority over
himbelongs to his parents. Absent any specialpower of attorney
authorizing Joena to representErlandos children, her claim cannotbe
sustained.

The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799,
which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from
the SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23,
2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, held that:

Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code

Excludesfrom the community property the propertyacquired before the
marriage of a spouse whohas legitimate descendants by a
formermarriage; and the fruits and the income, if any,of that property.
Thus, neither these two.
WHOLE CASE:

G.R. No. 180572

June 18, 2012

SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA

and JOENA B. ABRENICA Petitioners,
vs.
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and
TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN
and DANILO N. TUNGOL, Respondents.
The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420 1 decided by this
Court on 22 September 2006. For brevity, we quote the relevant facts
narrated in that case:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual
respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the
Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm").
In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was SEC Case
No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership
Funds With Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary
Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to return
partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land
in Lemery, Batangas. The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

as follows:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948

with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision
becomes final; and
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On
December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid
the required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions
in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject
to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.

1. Ordering the respondent Atty. ErlandoAbrenica to render full

accounting of the amounts he received as profits from the
sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount
of P 4,524,000.00;

On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's

Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07SC2 prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as the correct mode
of appeal from the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.

2. Ordering the respondent Atty. ErlandoAbrenica to remit to

the law firm the said amount of P4,524,000.00 plus interest of
12% per annum from the time he received the same and
converted the same to his own personal use or from
September 1997 until fully paid; and

Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition

to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents
motion for execution.

3. To pay the costs of suit.

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959
1. Ordering Atty. ErlandoAbrenica to render a full accounting
of the amounts he received under the retainer agreement
between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta
Land Corporation in the amount of P 320,000.00.
2. Ordering Atty. ErlandoAbrenica to remit to the law firm the
amount received by him under the Retainer Agreement with
Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the
amount of P 320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum from
June 1998 until fully paid;
3. Ordering Atty. ErlandoAbrenica to pay the law firm his
balance on his cash advance in the amount of P25,000.00

On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to
show cause why it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in
view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said
Order. Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the
motion.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed
Resolution dated June 29, 2005 x xx.
x xx

x xx

x xx

The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's

reconsideration in its August 23, 2005 Resolution.

motion

for

Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420
on the ground that the appeal filed by petitioner was the wrong
remedy. For that reason, we held as follows:3
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Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals,
even if these were timely filed. In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and
General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision
because the proper mode of appeal should have been a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. x xx.
x xx

x xx

x xx

Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. "Public interest

demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a
case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than
to delay the administration of justice." In the instant case, the trial
court's decision became final and executory on January 3, 2005.
Respondents had already acquired a vested right in the effects of the
finality of the decision, which should not be disturbed any longer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated June 29, 2005 and August 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076
denying admission of petitioners Petition for Review are AFFIRMED.
Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April
2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final and executory. 4
Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No.
169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The Petition for
Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in
Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42948 and Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No.
169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the following
grounds:
I. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners
and respondents did not present direct documentary evidence
to substantiate [their] respective claims.
II. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners
and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to
prove their respective position[s].
III. The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate
transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses

Roman and AmaliaAguzar was a personal transaction and not

a law partnership transaction.
IV. The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the
respondents are credible.
V. The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for
the lot involved was P 3 million and not P 8 million.
VI. The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer
agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership
transaction.
VII. The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said
petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to the various
personal loans secured by respondents.
VIII. The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its
jurisdiction but more importantly it acted without jurisdiction
or with lack of jurisdiction. 5
We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998
and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was
with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena
joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.
On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution 6 dismissing the Petition.
First, it reasoned that the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of petitioners.7 Considering that
the dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the
remedy under Rule 47 was no longer available.
Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved
on the merits of the case and the appreciation by the trial court of the
evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for
annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated
as a special commercial court did not mean that the latter had no
jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any
event, petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated

2 May 2007, but the CA had by then already issued the 26 April 2007
Resolution dismissing the Petition.
On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679
became final and executory.8
Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition
for Annulment of Judgment with the CA dated 25 May 2007 9 docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of
extrinsic fraud into what appeared to be substantially the same issues
raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The following were the grounds raised
in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:
A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the
Consolidated Decision x xx based on the following badges of fraud
and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:
I. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both
petitioners and respondents did not present direct
documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims,
as it relied purely on the gist of what its personnel did
as regards the transcript of stenographic notes the latter
[sic] in collusion with the respondents.
II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both
petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial
evidence to prove their respective positions by relying totally
on what was presented to it by its personnel who drafted the
Consolidated Decision in collusion with the respondents.
III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real
estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and
spouses Roman and AmaliaAguzar was a personal transaction
and not a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as
stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the
testimonies of the respondents are credible as against the
petitioner ErlandoAbrenica and his witnesses for the same
reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.
V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the
purchase price for the lot involved was P 3 million and not P 8
million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
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TROPANG POTCHI

VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners

retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law
partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos.
1 and II above.
VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on
said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to the
various personal loans secured by respondents also for the
same reasons as the above.
B. As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full
knowledge of its incapacity[,] rendered/promulgated the assailed
Consolidated Decision x xx without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction.10(Underscoring in the original.)
On
2
August
2007,
the
CA
issued
the
first
assailed
Resolution11 dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719, which
held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the
following:
x xx. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically
contained the prayer for the annulment of the subject consolidated
Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as
the present annulment of judgment case.
x xx

x xx

x xx

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed

only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 96[2004]).
Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only
grounds for an annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud
shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
x xx

x xx

x xx

x xx. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the persons of the parties, what petitioner
is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (as in this case),
the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise
of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the

exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the

proper subject of an appeal (Republic vs. "G" Holdings, supra, citing
Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently,
petitioners
filed
Reconsideration12 on 28 August 2007.

Humble

Motion

for

While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007,

petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion13 with Branch 226,
alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his
children and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial
court still had to determine the manner of distribution of the firms
assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that
the RTC still had to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal
was the correct remedy.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim 14 also
with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she 15 and her
stepchildren16 owned a number of the personal properties sought to be
levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor
vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community
of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family
home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping
having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos
(P 100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section
13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release
and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if
any.
Accordingly, the RTC scheduled17 a hearing on the motion. On 17
October 2007, however, petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his
motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents.18
Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent AbelardoTibayan,
witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of
Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of
the property covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable
settlement of the money judgment.19
Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the
second
assailed
Resolution20 denying
petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for
filing was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds

stated in the motion were merely recycled and rehashed propositions,

which had already been dispensed with.
Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007
and 30 October 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They
insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by
the RTC. That issue arose from the Order 21 given by the trial court to
petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take cognizance of the
Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the
dismissal of their appeal despite this Courts explanation in G.R. No.
169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly
dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order
issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and insisted that
the remedy they had undertaken was correct.
Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the
appreciation of the merits of the case. They raise in the present
Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment
of Judgment (including the Amended Petition) quoted above.
Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also
violated when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings
in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of
property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by
Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.
Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was
filed on time, since 27 August 2007 was a holiday. Therefore, they had
until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.
Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on
3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the sum of P 5 million for the
property covered by TCT No. 216818.
On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court,
petitioners filed a Complaint22 with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein
respondents and Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the
RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-1323MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina
City.23 Petitioners sought the nullification of the sheriffs sale on
execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch
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226, as well as the payment of damages. They alleged that the process
of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully, and in
violation of their right to due process.
On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents and/or their agents, and
the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No.
216818.24
The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted
respondents to file a Motion 25 before us to cite for contempt petitioner
spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was
on the ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they
filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina
City, while the present case was also still pending.
Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch
226 an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. 26 That Motion
was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution 27 issued on 10
November 2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition
for Certiorari28 under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (T.R.O.) 29 after
Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five
days from receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this
Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised in the Petition in CAG.R. SP No. 123164.
Our Ruling
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were
allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected their second
attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble
Motion for Reconsideration.
We DENY petitioners claims.
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice,
not to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this
Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer
available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of
annulment of judgment was no longer available to them, because they

TROPANG POTCHI

had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions,
that appeal was dismissed.
It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and
executory through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner
Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2)
filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the
resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.
In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,30 we said:
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible
denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be
avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory
right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must play by the rules. x xx. (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due
process was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her
Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner
Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues
contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two Motions
withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile,
no longer pursued her third-party claim or any other remedy available
to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was
no longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault
that she was not able to ventilate her claim.
Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was
first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983.
They had three children: PatrikErlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria
Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and PatrikRandel (born on
12 April 1990).
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got
married on 28 May 1998. 31 In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she
represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in
particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer
table were owned by the latter. We note that two of these
stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit.
As to PatrikRandel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents.
Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent
Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained.

Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles
purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by
TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community
regime.1wphi1 However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes
from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property.
Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second
marriage.
We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by
respondents.
Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty.
Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum shopping when the latter filed
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case
was still pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon, 32 we
explained forum shopping in this wise:
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus,
it has been held that there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum,
a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a
party files another before the Court of Appeals since in such
case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as
one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed,
another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open,"
or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction
in another court after failing to obtain the same from the
original court.
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings
undertaken by the sheriff in executing the judgment in Civil Case Nos.
Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case
questions the merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948
and Q01-42959. These cases have different causes of action. Thus, it
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cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping

when they filed the Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Manila v Spouses Manzo G.R. No. 163602

Facts:
On June 30, 1982, Ederlinda Gallardo leased two parcels
of land situated along Real St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, to Eulogia Manila for ten years at a monthly rental
of P2,000.00 for the first two years, and an increase of
10% percent every after two years. They also agreed
that the lessee shall have the option to buy the property
within two years from the date of execution of the
contract of lease at a fair market value of 150,000.00php.
The contract of lease expired on July 1, 1992 but
the lessee continued in possession of the property
despite a formal demand letter dated August 8, 1992, to
vacate the same and pay the rental arrearages. In a
letter reply dated August 12, 1992, herein defendant
claimed that no rental fee is due because she allegedly
became the owner of the property at the time she
communicated to the plaintiff her desire to exercise the
option to buy the said property.

TROPANG POTCHI

regional trial court of Makati city had no jurisdiction over the person of
respondents or the subject matter of the claim.

Held: Yes the regional trial court of Makati had no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent because of the lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or
over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction,
that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is
conferred by law

Navida v Dizon

Facts:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in
different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries,
including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages
for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes
(worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases
were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The
defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the
actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

They went to the Barangay to settle this but

it seems that they couldnt come to agreement, hence the present
action.

Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals committed a grave error in

annulling the judgement by the regional trial court of Makati city on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction when it has not been shown that the

In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally

granted the defendants motion to dismiss provided the defendants:

(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States

(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other
jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these
actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred.

(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the
commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;

(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of

these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same
extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment

rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms
the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a
plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he
was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper
motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case
had never been dismissed for.

Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):

336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the
RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell
Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp.
(OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit
Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred
to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International,
Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical
Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea
Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and
Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter
collectively referred to as defendant companies.)

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NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the

illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly
suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among
others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s
up to the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana
plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the
agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al.,
claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or
negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced,
sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCPcontaining products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to
be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies
knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers
health and well-being.

TROPANG POTCHI

through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary

appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the
Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal
for Forum Non Conveniens filed with the U.S. District Court,
defendants declared that (t)he authority of each designated
representative to accept service of process will become effective upon
final dismissal of these actions by the Court. The decision of the U.S.
District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since
both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently,
since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is
conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S.
courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of
the defendants is also conditional.

The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however
is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the
above but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the
interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report Pesticide Cause
Mass Sterility, Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May
1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to
file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the
causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine
laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence
awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no
available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation between
sterility and DBCP.
Eventually, the cases reached the SC!

Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General
Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial
court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the
complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on
their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of
defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of
pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale
or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and which is
uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course
of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine
territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine
Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court.

Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et
al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum
shopping and litis pendencia. This court frowns upon the fact that the
parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision
of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the
parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the
same cases in another forum, violates the rule on forum shopping so
abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S.
courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note
that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of
action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of
the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction
with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that
initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.

Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)

Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al.,
were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely
to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order and in order to keep open
to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.

Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary

appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have appointed
their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the
Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants
will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true
that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants

Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW,

OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before
Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City.
They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as
residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were
exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP.
According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in serious and
permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility
and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.

Present case:

The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious
acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within
Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for
our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.

DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant

companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law
defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong,
Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to
render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court
may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in
the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them.
CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged
exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging,
distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with
the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort,
which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant
companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by
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making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs

during the course of the proceedings.

TROPANG POTCHI

of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the

plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and
that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7
million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have
jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.

In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims
of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the
Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines,
either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific
areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third,
the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses,
such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of
the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in
these cases.

Held: Yes.

1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be
dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in
civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, was:

In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages

of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the

defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend
upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted.

Re: Jurisdiction over the person

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for
damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual
claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which
obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the
RTCs.

3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their
distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their
becoming part of the stream of commerce, and, hence, outside the
jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause

----

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or
the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of
jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such
as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies.
All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the
defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for
various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the
course of the proceedings below.

In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the

Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar
said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.
--Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction
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JURISDICTION CASE DIGEST

It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from

the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to
decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein.
Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo,
the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of
such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect
its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the
jurisdiction over the case.

TROPANG POTCHI

on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of

Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of Judge
Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case
No. 106, particularly, the: (1) Resolution [1] dated July 12, 2005 which, in
part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the
latters failure to implead indispensable parties and forum shopping;
and (2) Resolution[2] dated October 24, 2005, which denied the Partial
Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.

---Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow

petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any
merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations
that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule
on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist
at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not
appearances.

G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 are two Petitions for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where Landtrade
Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE), Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo
Cabildo assail the
Decision[3] dated
January
19,
2007
and
[4]
Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00456. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[5] dated July 17,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 (RTC-Branch 3) of IliganCity,
Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452, granting the Petition for
Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages filed by Demetria Vidal and
Azimuth International Development Corporation (AZIMUTH) against
Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.

NAPOCOR
and
TRANSCO. Both
Petitions
seek
to
annul
theResolution[12] dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, which (1)
granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE for the issuance of a writ
of execution and the designation of a special sheriff for the
enforcement of the Decision[13] dated December 12, 2005 of the RTCBranch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613, and (2) denied the applications of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the execution of the same RTC Decision. The Decision dated December
12, 2005 of RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 affirmed the Decision
dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF,
favoring LANDTRADE.
G.R.
No.
173401 involves
a
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic,
which raises pure questions of law and seeks the reversal of the
following issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 (RTC-Branch 4)
of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6686, an action for
cancellation of titles and reversion: (1) Order [14] dated December 13,
2005 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686; and (2)
Order[15] dated May 16, 2006, denying the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Republic.

THE PRECEDING CASES

* We REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial
Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the
ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the amended complaints.

Republic of the Philippines v Judge Mangotara

Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review

on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the
Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title,
expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same
parcels of land.

In G.R.
(Republic),
by

No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines

way
of
consolidated
Petitions
for
Review

G.R. No. 170505 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which LANDTRADE urges the Court to
reverse and set aside theDecision[6] dated November 23, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841. The appellate
court annulled several issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5
(RTC-Branch 5) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and its sheriff, in Civil
Case No. 6613, specifically, the: (1) Order [7] dated August 9, 2004
granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of LANDTRADE; (2)
Writ of Execution[8] dated August 10, 2004; (3) two Notices of
Garnishment[9] both
dated
August
11,
2004,
and
(4)
Notification[10] dated August 11, 2004. These issuances of the RTCBranch 5 allowed and/or enabled execution pending appeal of the
Decision[11] dated February 17, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, favoring
LANDTRADE in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, the ejectment case said
corporation instituted against the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) and the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO).
G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 are two Petitions
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed separately by

The consolidated seven cases have for their common genesis

the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United
States[16] (1914 Cacho case).

The 1914 Cacho Case

Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doa Demetria Cacho

(Doa Demetria) applied for the registration of two parcels of land:
(1) Lot 1 of Plan II-3732, the smaller parcel with an area of 3,635
square meters or 0.36 hectares (Lot 1); and (2) Lot 2 of Plan II3732, the larger parcel with an area of 378,707 square meters
or37.87 hectares (Lot 2). Both parcels are situated in what was
then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became Sitio
Nunucan, then Brgy. Suarez, inIligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doa
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TROPANG POTCHI

Demetrias applications for registration were docketed as GLRO Record

Nos. 6908 and 6909.
As we have seen, the deed on which
applicants title to the small parcel rests, is executed
only by the Moro woman Alanga, wife of Datto
Darondon, which is not permitted either by the Moro
laws or the Civil Code of the Philippine Islands. It
appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Darondon,
is alive yet, and before admitting this parcel to
registration it is ordered that a deed from
Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, be
presented, renouncing all his rights in the
small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in
favor of the applicant.[17] (Emphases supplied.)

The application in GLRO Record No. 6908 covered Lot 1,

the smaller parcel of land. Doa Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by
purchase from Gabriel Salzos (Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1
from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale
in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto
Darondon.

The application in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved Lot 2,

the bigger parcel of land. Doa Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2
from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2
from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue.

In GLRO Record No. 6909, the LRC observed and concluded

Only the Government opposed Doa Demetrias applications
for registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the
property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation,
generally known as Camp Overton.

On December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC)

rendered its Decision in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.

Based on the evidence, the LRC made the following findings

in GLRO Record No. 6908:

that:

A tract of land 37 hectares in area, which is

the extent of the land under discussion, is larger than
is cultivated ordinarily by the Christian Filipinos. In
the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of
parcels now on trial before this court, the average
size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and
the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his
family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as
the one in question. x x x

xxxx
6th. The court is convinced from the proofs
that the small parcel of land sold by the Moro
woman Alanga was the home of herself and her
husband, Darondon, and was their conjugal property;
and the court so finds.

xxxx

The court is also convinced from the proofs

that the small portion in the southern part of
the larger parcel, where, according to the proofs,
Datto Anandog had his house and where there still
exist some cocos and fruit trees, was the home of
the said Moro Datto Anandog; and the court so
finds. As to the rest of the large parcel the
court does not find the title of Datto Bunglay

established. According to his own declaration his

residence on this land commenced only a few days
before the sale. He admitted that the coco trees he
is supposed to have planted had not yet begun to
bear fruit at the time of the sale, and were very
small. Datto Duroc positively denies that Bunglay
lived on the land, and it clearly appears that he was
not on the land when it was first occupied by the
military. Nor does Datto Bunglay claim to have
planted the three mango trees by the roadside near
point 25 of the plan. The court believes that all the
rest of this parcel, not occupied nor cultivated by
Datto Anandog, was land claimed by Datto Duroc and
also by Datto Anandog and possibly by other dattos
as a part of their general jurisdiction, and that it is
the class of land that Act No. 718 prohibits the sale
of, by the dattos, without the express approval of the
Government.
It is also found that Datto Bunglay is the
nephew of Dato Anandog, and that the Moro woman
Alanga, grantor of the small parcel, is the sister of
Datto Anandog, and that he died without issue.
xxxx

It appears also that according to the

provisions of the Civil Code as also the provisions of
the Luwaran Code of the Moros, the Moro woman
Alanga has an interest in the portion of land left by
her deceased brother, Datto Anandog. By article
LXXXV, section 3, of the Luwaran Code, it will be
seen that the brothers and sisters of a deceased
Moro inherit his property to the exclusion of the more
distant relatives. Therefore Datto Bunglay had no
legal interest whatever in the land to sell to the
applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho. But the Moro
woman, Alanga, having appeared as a witness for the
applicant without having made any claim to the land,
the court finds from this fact that she has ratified the
sale made by her nephew.

The court therefore finds that the

applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the
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JURISDICTION CASE DIGEST

portion of land occupied and planted by the

deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part
of the large parcel object of expediente No.
6909 only; and her application as to all the rest
of the land solicited in said case is denied. And
it is ordered that a new survey of the land be
made and a corrected plan be presented,
excluding all the land not occupied and
cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey
be made and the corrected plan presented on
or before the 30th day of March, 1913, with
previous notice to the commanding general of
the Division of the Philippines.

On the 8th day of December, the court was

at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection
of the land for the purpose of fixing the limits of the
part cultivated by Datto Anandog, so often
mentioned herein, with previous notice to the
applicant and her husband and representative, Seor
Dionisio Vidal. Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did
not assist in the ocular inspection, which was fixed
for 3 oclock, p.m. of the day mentioned. But the
court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E.,
and S.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog. The N.E. limit
of said land is a brook, and the N.W. corner is the
point where the brook intersects the shore line of the
sea, the other corners mentioned being marked with
pine stakes. And it is ordered that the new
survey be made in accordance with the points
mentioned, by tracing four straight lines
connecting these four points. Between the
portion cultivated by Datto Anandog and the mouth
of the River Agus there is a high steep hill and the
court does not believe it possible to cultivate said
hill, it being covered with rocks and forest.
[18]
(Emphases supplied.)

The LRC additionally decreed at the end of its December 10,

1912 Decision:

TROPANG POTCHI

It is further ordered that one-half of the

costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and
the other half by the Government of the United
States, and that the applicant present the
corresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or
before the above-mentioned 30th day of March,
1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved until
the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.

6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were
issued. Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his
amended petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to this Court
in Cacho v. Mangotara, docketed as G.R. No. 85495, the Court resolved
to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to
accept Teofilos amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance
of decrees.

[19]

Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doa

Demetria appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated December 10,
1914, the Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10,
1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact of the court below were
fully sustained by the evidence adduced during trial.

Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called

upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in
the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals[20] (1997 Cacho case).

The 1997 Cacho Case

On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the

late Doa Demetrias son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition
for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs), docketed
under the original GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.

In opposing Teofilos petition, the Republic and NSC argued

that the same suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that Teofilo was
not the real party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that
Doa Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of
land; that no decrees were ever issued in Doa Demetrias name; and
that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.

After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision

granting Teofilos petition and ordering the reconstitution and reissuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The RTC held that the
issuance of Decree No. 10364 in GLRO No. 6908 on May 9, 1913 and
Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 on July 8, 1915 was
sufficiently established by the certifications and testimonies of
concerned officials. The original issuance of these decrees
presupposed a prior judgment that had become final.

Teofilos petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel

Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision

dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of
Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 because: (1) re-issuance of Decree No.
18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 could not be made in the absence of
the new survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case; (2) the
heir of a registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of
the property and title thereto by laches; and (3) Teofilo failed to
establish his identity and existence and that he was a real party-ininterest.

Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence

filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC initially dismissed Teofilos
petition for reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate
evidence to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be
restored. According to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for
the reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No.

Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997

Cacho case. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of
Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had
in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting
Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief
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of Registration of the then Land Registration Commission, now National

Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). The
Court further reasoned that:

[T]o sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards

requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth
in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the
doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of
the subject decrees presupposes a prior final
judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a
mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration
Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation
of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the
judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired
finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions
in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the
corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on
or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No.
10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO
Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey
per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912
and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914
(upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8,
1915).

Requiring the submission of a new plan as a

condition for the re-issuance of the decree would
render the finality attained by the Cacho vs.
U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental
rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that
the judgment and the resulting decree are res
judicata, and these are binding upon the whole
world, the proceedings being in the nature of
proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is
an impermissible assault upon the integrity and
stability of the Torrens System of registration
because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.[21]

As to the issue of laches, the Court referred to the settled

doctrine that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. A final

TROPANG POTCHI

decision in land registration cases can neither

inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches.

be

rendered

Anent the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he

being a real party-in-interest, the Court found that these were
sufficiently established by the records. The Court relied on Teofilos
Affidavit of Adjudication as Doa Demetrias sole heir, which he
executed before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago,United
States of America (U.S.A.); as well as the publication in the Times
Journal of the fact of adjudication of Doa Demetrias estate. Teofilo
also appeared personally before the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Chicago to execute a Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo (Atty. Cabildo) who represented him in
this case. The Court stressed that the execution of public documents is
entitled to the presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail
and controvert the same.

In the Resolution dated July 28, 1997, [22] the Court denied the
Motions for Reconsideration of the Republic and NSC.

As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration

were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two
parcels of land in Doa Demetrias name. OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) was
based on re-issued Decree No. N-219464 in GLRO Record No. 6908,
while OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N219465 in GLRO Record No. 6909.

pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) the
Expropriation Case, G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case,
G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894; (3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer
Case, G.R. No. 170505 (execution pending appeal before the RTC) and
G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (execution pending appeal before
the Court of Appeals); and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion
Case, G.R. No. 173401. These cases proceeded independently of each
other in the courts a quo until they reached this Court via the present
Petitions. In the Resolution[23] dated October 3, 2007, the Court
consolidated the seven Petitions considering that they either originated
from the same case or involved similar issues.

Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)

The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August

15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latters
mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided
over by Judge Mangotara.

ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No.

2729[24] dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the
iron and steel industry in thePhilippines. Its existence was extended
until October 10, 1988.

II
THE ANTECENT FACTS
OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR

The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination
of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels
of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the

On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No.
2239,[25] reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City,
measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to
the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied
certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC
failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation.

When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the

pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the
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JURISDICTION CASE DIGEST

case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1

granted the Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 9,
1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the
substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the
motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No.
106 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this
Court. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals [26] (ISA case), the
Court remanded the case to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow
the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment
was made in the ISA case on August 31, 1998. In an Order[27]dated
November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the
Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106.

Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho

case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil
Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and to
Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28,
2004[28] seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and
Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE
and AZIMUTH.

MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the
Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without
legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the
execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period
of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an
independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out
that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in
seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for
expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the
ground of estoppel by laches.

In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated

November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of
the Republic for ISA.

In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the

Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental

TROPANG POTCHI

Complaint. The RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did
not file any motion for execution of the judgment of this Court in
the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the
RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which
effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1)
failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC
insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the
Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the
same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.

Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution [29] on July

12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the
Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara
justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:

What the Republic seeks [herein] is the

expropriation of the subject parcels of land. Since
the exercise of the power of eminent domain
involves the taking of private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must,
of necessity, be directed against the owner of the
land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision
of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the
United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the
subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is
conclusive as to the question of ownership
thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant left in this
case, is not a proper party defendant in this
complaint for expropriation, the present case should
be dismissed.

This Court notes that the Republic [has filed

reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004,
involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case

No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of

Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The
Republic], however, did not state such fact in its
Verification
and
Certification
of
Non-Forum
Shopping attached to its Supplemental Complaint
dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of
forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the
Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership
over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed
to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation
case without making a mockery of justice. [30]

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No.
106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora in a
Resolution[31] dated October 24, 2005.

On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the
consolidated
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari and
Petition
for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively,
docketed as G.R. No. 170375.

The Quieting of Title Case

(G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894)

Demetria Vidal (Vidal) and AZIMUTH filed on November 18,

1998, a Petition[32] for Quieting of Title against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo,
and the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4452 and raffled to RTC-Branch 3.

In the Petition, Vidal claimed that she, and not Teofilo, was the
late Doa Demetrias sole surviving heir, entitled to the parcels of land
covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). She averred that
she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal (Francisco) and Fidela
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TROPANG POTCHI

Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal
and Doa Demetria.
On July 17, 2004, the RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision [33] in
Civil Case No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
AZIMUTH, for its part, filed the Petition as Vidals successor-ininterest with respect to a 23-hectare portion of the subject parcels of
land pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 2, 1998
and Deed of Conditional Conveyance dated August 13, 2004, which
Vidal executed in favor of AZIMUTH.

Teofilo opposed the Petition contending that it stated no cause

of action because there was no title being disturbed or in danger of
being lost due to the claim of a third party, and Vidal had neither legal
nor beneficial ownership of the parcels of land in question; that the
matter and issues raised in the Petition had already been tried, heard,
and decided by the RTC of Iligan City and affirmed with finality by this
Court in the 1997 Cacho case; and that the Petition was barred by the
Statute of Limitations and laches.

LANDTRADE, among other parties, was allowed by the RTCBranch 3 to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452. LANDTRADE alleged that
it is the owner of a portion of the subject parcels of land,
measuring 270,255 square meters or about 27.03 hectares, which it
purportedly acquired through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 1,
1996 from Teofilo, represented by Atty. Cabildo. LANDTRADE
essentially argued that Vidal's right as heir should be adjudicated upon
in a separate and independent proceeding and not in the instant
Quieting of Title Case.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested that

there was no possibility of any amicable settlement among them.

Vidal and AZIMUTH submitted testimonial and documentary

evidence during the trial before the RTC-Branch 3. Teofilo and Atty.
Cabildo failed to present any evidence as they did not appear at all
during the trial, while LANDTRADE was declared by the RTC-Branch 3 to
have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and
counterclaim.

a.) Respondent Register of Deeds

of Iligan City, and any other person
acting in his behalf, stop, cease
and desist:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the petitioners and against the
respondents and intervenors:
3) ORDERING respondents Teofilo Cacho and
Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to pay petitioners, jointly and
severally, the following:
1) DECLARING:

a.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal the

sole surviving heir of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho;
b.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal
alone has the hereditary right to
and
interest in
the Subject
Property;
c.) Petitioner Azimuth International
Development Corporation is the
successor-in-interest of petitioner
Demetria C. Vidal to a portion of
the Subject Property to the extent
provided in their 2 April 1998
Memorandum of Agreement and 13
August 1998 Deed of Conditional
Conveyance;
d.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho is not
a son or heir of the late Dona
Demetria Cacho; and
e.) Respondent
Teofilo
Cacho,
Godofredo Cabildo and any of their
transferees/assignees
have
no
valid right to or interest in the
Subject Property.

a) For
damages
b) For
damages

temperate
P 80,000.00
nominal

c) For
damages

P 60,000.00
moral
-

d) For
damages
-

P500,000.00
exemplary
P 500,000.00

e) For attorney's fees (ACCRA Law)P1,000,000.00

f) For
fees

Attorney's
-

P500,000.00
(Atty. Voltaire Rovira)

g) For
expenses
-

litigation
P300,000.00

For lack of factual and legal basis, the

counterclaim of Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo
Cabildo is hereby dismissed.

2) ORDERING:
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Likewise, the counterclaim of intervenor

IDD/Investa is dismissed for lack of basis as the
petitioners succeeded in proving their cause of
action.

On
the
cross-claim
of
intervenor
IDD/Investa, respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty.
Godofredo Cabildo are ORDERED to pay IDD/Investa,
jointly and severally, the principal sum of P5,433,036
with 15% interest per annum.

For lack of legal basis, the counterclaim of

Intervenor
Landtrade
Realty
Development
Corporation is dismissed.

Likewise,
Intervenor
Manguera's
counterclaim is dismissed for lack of legal basis. [34]

The joint appeal filed by LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo

with the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision [35] of January 19, 2007, affirmed in
toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3.

According to the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 3 did not

err in resolving the issue on Vidals status, filiation, and hereditary
rights as it is determinative of the issue on ownership of the subject
properties. It was indubitable that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction
over the person of Teofilo and juridical personality of LANDTRADE as
they both filed their Answers to the Petition for Quieting of Title
thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of said
trial court. Likewise, the Petition for Quieting of Title is in itself within
the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3. Hence, where there is jurisdiction
over the person and subject matter, the resolution of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise by the court of its
jurisdiction. Moreover, Teofilo and LANDTRADE were guilty of estoppel
by laches for failing to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 at

TROPANG POTCHI

the first opportunity and even actively participating in the trial of the
case and seeking affirmative reliefs.
Three Petitions before this Court are rooted in the Unlawful
Detainer Case instituted by LANDTRADE against NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO.
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the 1997 Cacho
case only determined the validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of
Adjudication that Teofilo executed before the Philippine Consulate
General in the U.S.A. The decision of this Court in the 1997 Cacho
case, which had become final and executory, did not vest upon Teofilo
ownership of the parcels of land as it merely ordered the re-issuance
of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.

The Court of Appeals agreed in the finding of the RTC-Branch

3 that the evidence on record preponderantly supports Vidals claim of
being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doa
Demetria. The appellate court further adjudged that Vidal did not
delay in asserting her rights over the subject parcels of land. The
prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is 30
years. Vidals rights as Doa Demetrias successor-in-interest accrued
upon the latters death in 1974, and only 24 years thereafter, in 1998,
Vidal already filed the present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus,
Vidals cause of action had not yet prescribed. And, where the action
was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law, the doctrine
of laches was also inapplicable.

LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo filed separate Motions for

Reconsideration of the January 19, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, which were denied in the July 4, 2007 Resolution [36] of the
same court.

On August 24, 2007, LANDTRADE filed with this Court a Petition

for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 178779. On September 6, 2007, Teofilo and Atty.
Cabildo filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178894.

The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case

On August 9, 1952, NAPOCOR took possession of two parcels

of land in Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Iligan City, denominated as
Lots 2029 and 2043, consisting of 3,588 square meters (or 0.36
hectares) and 3,177 square meters (or 0.32 hectares), respectively. On
Lot 2029, NAPOCOR constructed its power sub-station, known as the
Overton Sub-station, while on Lot 2043, it built a warehouse, known as
the Agus 7 Warehouse, both for the use of its Agus 7 Hydro-Electric
Power Plant. For more than 30 years, NAPOCOR occupied and
possessed said parcels of land pursuant to its charter, Republic Act No.
6395.[37] With the enactment in 2001 of Republic Act No. 9136,
otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA),
TRANSCO assumed the functions of NAPOCOR with regard to electrical
transmissions and took over possession of the Overton Sub-station.

Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where the Overton

Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse are located, LANDTRADE filed with
the MTCC on April 9, 2003 a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475AF.

In its Complaint, LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from

Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, two parcels of land at Sitio Nunucan,
Overton, Fuentes, Brgy. Maria Cristina, Iligan City, with a combined
area of 270,255 square meters or around 27.03 hectares, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale [38] dated October 1, 1996. Certain portions
of said parcels of land were being occupied by the Overton Sub-station
and Agus 7 Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, through the
tolerance of LANDTRADE. Upon failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to
pay rentals or to vacate the subject properties after demands to do so,
LANDTRADE filed the present Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, plus
damages in the amount of P450,000.00 as yearly rental from date of
the first extra-judicial demand until NAPOCOR and TRANSCO vacate the
subject properties.

(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)

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In their separate Answers, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO denied the

material allegations in the Complaint and countered, by way of special
and affirmative defenses, that the Complaint was barred by res
judicata; that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action; and that LANDTRADE lacked the legal capacity to sue.

On February 17, 2004, the MTCC rendered its Decision [39] in

favor of LANDTRADE. The MTCC disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment

is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Land Trade
Realty Corporation represented by Atty. Max C.
Tabimina and against defendant National Power
Corporation represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio
M. Murga and co-defendant TRANSCO represented by
its President Dr. Allan T. Ortiz and Engr. Lorrymir A.
Adaza, Manager, NAPOCOR-Mindanao, Regional
Center, Ma. Cristina, Iligan City, ordering:

1. Defendants National Power Corporation

and TRANSCO, their agents or representatives or any
person/s acting on its behalf or under its authority to
vacate the premises;

2. Defendants NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to

pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily:

a. Php500,000.00 a month representing fair

rental value or compensation since June 29,
1978 until defendant shall have vacated the
premises;
b. Php20,000.00 for and as attorneys fees
and
c. Cost of suit.

TROPANG POTCHI

Execution shall issue immediately upon

motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by this Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff, to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, defendants deposit with the
appellate court the amount of P500,000.00 per
month, as reasonable value of the use and
occupancy of the premises for the preceding month
or period on or before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period.[40]

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO seasonably filed a Joint Notice of

Appeal. Their appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6613, was initially
assigned to the RTC-Branch 5, presided over by Judge Maximino Magno
Libre (Judge Libre).

LANDTRADE filed on June 24, 2004 a Motion for Execution,

asserting that NAPOCOR and TRANSCO had neither filed
a supersedeas bond with the MTCC nor periodically deposited with the
RTC the monthly rental for the properties in question, so as to stay the
immediate execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment. However,
the said Motion failed to comply with the required notice of hearing
under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. LANDTRADE then filed a
Motion to Withdraw and/or Replace Notice of Hearing.

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed on July 13, 2004 a Joint Motion

to Suspend Proceedings citing Amagan v. Marayag,[41] in which the
Court ruled that if circumstances should require, the proceedings in an
ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found. Since LANDTRADE anchors its right to possession of the subject
parcels of land on the Deed of Sale executed in its favor by Teofilo on
October 1, 1996, the ejectment case should be held in abeyance
pending the resolution of other cases in which title over the same
properties are in issue, i.e., (1) Civil Case No. 6600, the action for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 filed by Teofilo
against LANDTRADE pending before the RTC-Branch 4; and (2) Civil

Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case filed by Vidal and AZIMUTH
against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo pending before the RTC-Branch 3.
LANDTRADE filed on July 19, 2004 another Motion for
Execution, which was heard together with the Joint Motion to Suspend
Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. After said hearing, the RTCBranch 5 directed the parties to file their memoranda on the two
pending Motions.

LANDTRADE, in its Memorandum, maintained that the

pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, should not
preclude the execution of the MTCC judgment in the Unlawful Detainer
Case because the issue involved in the latter was only the material
possession or possession de facto of the parcels of land in
question. LANDTRADE also reported that Civil Case No. 6600, the
action for annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996
instituted by Teofilo, was already dismissed given that the RTC-Branch
4 had approved the Compromise Agreement executed between
LANDTRADE and Teofilo.

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO likewise filed their respective

Memoranda. Subsequently, NAPOCOR filed a Supplement to its
Memorandum to bring to the attention of the RTC-Branch 5 the
Decision rendered on July 17, 2004 by the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case
No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, categorically declaring Teofilo, the
predecessor-in-interest of LANDTRADE, as having no right at all to the
subject parcels of land. Resultantly, the right of LANDTRADE to the two
properties, which merely emanated from Teofilo, was effectively
declared as non-existent too.

On August 4, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued an

Order[42] denying the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR
and TRANSCO. The RTC held that the pendency of other actions
involving the same parcels of land could not stay execution pending
appeal of the MTCC judgment because NAPOCOR and TRANSCO failed
to post the required bond and pay the monthly rentals.

Five days later, on August 9, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued

another Order[43] granting the Motion of LANDTRADE for execution of
the MTCC judgment pending appeal.
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TROPANG POTCHI

Manifestation and Motion praying for the resolution of its application

for preliminary injunction.
The next day, on August 10, 2004, the Acting Clerk of Court,
Atty. Joel M. Macaraya, Jr., issued a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal[44] which directed Sheriff IV Alberto O. Borres (Sheriff Borres) to
execute the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004.

A day later, on August 11, 2004, Sheriff Borres issued two

Notices of Garnishment[45] addressed to PNB and Land Bank of the
Philippines in Iligan City, garnishing all the goods, effects, stocks,
interests in stocks and shares, and any other personal properties
belonging to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO which were being held by and
under the possession and control of said banks. On even date, Sheriff
Borres also issued a Notification [46] to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for them
to vacate the subject parcels of land; and to pay LANDTRADE the sums
of (a) P156,000,000.00, representing the total fair rental value for the
said properties, computed atP500,000.00 per month, beginning June
29, 1978 until June 29, 2004, or for a period of 26 years, and
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Thereafter, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO each filed before the Court

of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction. The Petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos.
85174 and 85841, were eventually consolidated.

The Court of Appeals issued on August 18, 2004 a

TRO[47] enjoining the enforcement and implementation of the Order of
Execution and Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the RTC-Branch 5
and Notices of Garnishment and Notification of Sheriff Borres.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[48] dated November 23,

2005, determined that public respondents did commit grave abuse of
discretion in allowing and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC
judgment pending appeal, since NAPOCOR and TRANSCO were legally
excused from complying with the requirements for a stay of execution
specified in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the
posting of a supersedeas bond and periodic deposits of rental
payments. The decretal portion of said appellate court Decision states:

ACCORDINGLY, the two petitions at bench

are GRANTED; the Order dated 9 August 2004, the
Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated 10 August
2004, the two Notices of Garnishment dated 11
August 2004, and the Notification dated 11 August
2004, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.[49]

Displeased, LANDTRADE elevated the case to this Court on

January 10, 2006 via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505.

In the meantime, with the retirement of Judge Libre and the

inhibition[50] of Judge Oscar Badelles, the new presiding judge of RTCBranch 5, Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 1,
presided over by Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 promulgated on
December 12, 2005 a Decision [51] in Civil Case No. 6613 which
affirmed in toto the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC in Civil
Case No. 11475-AF favoring LANDTRADE.

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the RTC-Branch 1 twin

Motions, namely: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
December 12, 2005; and (2) Motion for Inhibition of Judge
Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 denied both Motions in a Resolution
dated January 30, 2006.

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the Court of Appeals

separate Petitions for Review with prayer for TRO and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854
and 00889, respectively. In a Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the
Court of Appeals granted the prayer for TRO of NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO.

With the impending lapse of the effectivity of the TRO on May

23, 2006, NAPOCOR filed on May 15, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a

On May 23, 2006, the same day the TRO lapsed, the Court of
Appeals granted the motions for extension of time to file a
consolidated comment of LANDTRADE. Two days later, LANDTRADE
filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the issuance of (1) a writ of execution
pending appeal, and (2) the designation of a special sheriff in
accordance with Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court.

In a Resolution[52] dated June 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals

granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE and denied the
applications for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. In effect, the appellate court authorized the
execution pending appeal of the judgment of the MTCC, affirmed by
the RTC-Branch 1, thus:

IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISQUISITIONS, this

Court resolves to grant the [LANDRADE]s omnibus
motion for execution pending appeal of the decision
rendered in its favor which is being assailed in these
consolidated petitions for review. Accordingly, the
[NAPOCOR and TRANSCOs] respective applications
for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction are both
denied for lack of factual and legal bases. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Iligan City,
which at present has the custody of the records of
the case a quo, is hereby ordered to cause the
immediate issuance of a writ of execution relative to
its decision dated 17 February 2004 in Civil Case No.
11475-AF.[53]

On July 20, 2006, NAPOCOR filed with this Court a Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
an urgent plea for a TRO, docketed as G.R. No. 173355-56. On August
2, 2006, TRANSCO filed with this Court its own Petition for Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 173563-64.
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TROPANG POTCHI

On July 21, 2006, NAPOCOR filed an Urgent Motion for the

Issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 173355-56. In a Resolution[54] dated July
26, 2006, the Court granted the Motion of NAPOCOR and issued a TRO,
[55]
effective immediately, which enjoined public and private
respondents from implementing the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 and the
Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475AF.

5.
On October 15, 1998, Original
Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 01201 (a.f.) were issued in the name of Demetria
Cacho, widow, now deceased consisting of a total
area of Three Hundred Seventy-Eight Thousand
Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707) square meters
and Three Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five
(3,635) square meters, respectively, situated in Iligan
City, x x x

xxxx
On July 31, 2006, Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, contending
therein that Vidal was the lawful owner of the parcels of land subject of
the Unlawful Detainer Case as confirmed in the Decision dated July 17,
2004 of the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452. In a Resolution dated
September 30, 2006, the Court required the parties to comment on the
Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, and deferred action on the said Motion
pending the submission of such comments.

6.
The afore-stated titles were issued in
implementation of a decision rendered in LRC (GLRO)
Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated December 10,
1912, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in
Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil.
616 (December 10, 1914),

The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case

(G.R. No. 173401)

On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a Complaint for the

Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and Reversion
against the late Doa Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal
and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. The
Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 6686, was raffled to the RTCBranch 4.

The Republic sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.)

and 0-1201 (a.f.) and the reversion of the parcels of land covered
thereby to the Government based on the following allegations in its
Complaint, under the heading Cause of Action:

7.
The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909, upon which the titles were
issued, did not grant the entire area applied for
therein. x x x

xxxx

9.
As events turned out, the titles
issued in connection with LRC (GLRO) Record Nos.
6908 and 6909 i.e. OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 01201 (a.f.) cover property MUCH LARGER in area
than that granted by the land registration court in its
corresponding decision, supra.

10.
While the LRC Decision, as affirmed
by the Honorable Supreme Court, granted only the
southern part of the 37.87 hectare land subject

of LRC
(GLRO)
Record
Case
No.
6909,
the ENTIRE 37.87 hectares is indicated as the
property covered by OCT 0-1200 (a.f.). Worse, OCT
No. 0-1200 (a.f.) made reference to Case No.
6908 as basis thereof, yet, the decision in said case
is clear:

(i)
The parcel object of Case
No. 6908
is
small
(Cacho
vs.
Government of the United States, 28 Phil.
616, p. 619)

(ii)
The parcel of land claimed by
the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the
bigger of two parcels and contains 37.87
hectares

11.
More significantly, the technical
description in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1200
(a.f.) specifies the date of survey as August 31 to
September 1, 1910, which is EARLIER than the date
the Supreme Court, in Cacho supra, resolved LRC
(GLRO)
Record
No.
6909
(involving
37.87
hectares). In resolving the application involving
the 37.87 hectares, the Honorable Supreme Court
declared that only the southern part of the 37.87
hectare property applied for is granted and that
a new survey specifying the southern part thereof
should be submitted. Accordingly, any survey
involving the granted southern part should bear a
date subsequent to the December 10, 1914 Supreme
Court decision. x x x

xxxx

12.
The Honorable Supreme Court
further declared that the Decision in LRC (GLRO)
Record No. 6909 was reserved:
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Final decision in these case

is reserved until the presentation of
the new plan. (28 Phil. 616, p.
631; Underscoring supplied)

In other words, as of December 10, 1914, when the

Honorable Supreme Court rendered its Decision on
appeal in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909, final
decision of the case was still reserved until the
presentation of a new plan. The metes and bounds
of OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) could not have been the
technical description of the property granted by the
court described as the southern part of the large
parcel object of expediente 6909 only (Cacho vs.
Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 617,
629). As earlier stated, the technical description
appearing in said title was the result of a survey
conducted in 1910 or before the Supreme Court
decision was rendered in 1914.

13.
In the same vein, Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-1201 (a.f.) specifies LRC (GLRO) Record
No. 6909 as the basis thereof (see front page of OCT
No. 0-1201 (a.f.)). Yet, the technical description
makes, as its reference, Lot 1, Plan II-3732, LR Case
No. 047, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6908 (see page 2
of said title). A title issued pursuant to a decision
may only cover the property subject of the case. A
title cannot properly be issued pursuant to a decision
in Case 6909, but whose technical description is
based on Case 6908.

14.
The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909 has become final and executory,
and it cannot be modified, much less result in an
increased area of the property decreed therein.

xxxx

TROPANG POTCHI

16.
In sum, Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), as issued, are
null and void since the technical descriptions vis--vis
the areas of the parcels of land covered therein went
beyond the areas granted by the land registration
court in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.[56]

Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss dated

December 23, 2004 on the grounds that (1) the Republic has no
cause of action; (2) assuming arguendothat the Republic has a
cause of action, its Complaint failed to state a cause of action; (3)
assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, the
same is barred by prior judgment; (4) assuming further that the
Republic has a cause of action, the same was extinguished by
prescription; and (4) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping.

Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an

Order[57] dated October 4, 2005, declaring LANDTRADE and Teofilo,
as represented by Atty. Cabildo, in default since they failed to
submit their respective answers to the Complaint despite the
proper service of summons upon them.

LANDTRADE
subsequently
filed
its
Answer
with
Compulsory Counterclaim dated September 28, 2005. It also
moved for the setting aside and reconsideration of the Order of
Default issued against it by the RTC-Branch 4 on October 20, 2005.

On December 13, 2005, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an

Order[58] dismissing the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No.
6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and AZIMUTH.

The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic had no

cause of action because there was no showing that the late Doa
Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of

any right of the Republic. Doa Demetria had sufficiently proven

her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the
LRC in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. On the other hand, the
Republic had no more right to the said parcels of land. The
Regalian doctrine does not apply in this case because the titles
were already issued to Doa Demetria and segregated from the
mass of the public domain.

The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic failed to

state a cause of action in its Complaint. The arguments of the
Republic i.e., the absence of a new survey plan and deed, the
titles covered properties with much larger area than that granted by
the LRC had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho
case. Also, the Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been
committed in having the titles registered and that the Director of
Lands requested the reversion of the subject parcels of land.

The RTC-Branch 4 was convinced that the Complaint was

barred by res judicata because the 1914 Cacho case already
decreed the registration of the parcels of land in the late Doa
Demetrias name and the 1997 Cacho case settled that there was
no merit in the argument that the conditions imposed in the first
case have not been complied with.

The RTC-Branch 4 was likewise persuaded that the cause

of action or remedy of the Republic was lost or extinguished by
prescription pursuant to Article 1106 of the Civil Code and Section
32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Decree, which prescribes a one-year period within
which to file an action for the review of a decree of registration.

Finally, the RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic guilty of

forum shopping because there is between this case, on one hand,
and the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases, on the other, identity of
parties, as well as rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, as the
contending parties are claiming rights of ownership over the same
parcels of land.

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TROPANG POTCHI

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

dismissal of its Complaint but the same was denied by the RTCBranch 4 in its Order[59] dated May 16, 2006.

Assailing the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16,
2006 of the RTC-Branch 4, the Republic filed on August 11, 2006 a
Petition for Review onCertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 173401.

III
ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS

Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)

The Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the

Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTCBranch 1 in Civil Case No. 106, made the following assignment of
errors:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING

THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 106 CONSIDERING THAT:

(a) THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES

IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE
DISMISSAL
OF
AN
ACTION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, RULE 3
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE;

(b) AN
EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDING IS AN ACTION QUASI
IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT THAT
THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS
MADE A PARTY TO THE ACTION IS
NOT ESSENTIALLY INDISPENSABLE;
(c) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT
ANY FORUM SHOPPING WITH THE
FILING
OF
THE
REVERSION
COMPLAINT DOCKETED AS CIVIL
CASE NO. 6686 WHICH IS PENDING
BEFORE
BRANCH
4
OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILI
GAN CITY.
At the outset, the Court notes that the Republic filed a pleading
with the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under
Rule 45) and Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. The
Republic explains that it filed the Consolidated Petitions pursuant
to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of
Appeals[61] (MWSS case).

The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its

mode of appeal is misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court
in said case out of context.

The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good

faith has the right to remove useful improvements, and not whether
consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court
can be filed. Therein petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but named the Court
of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only parties in
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court
which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said
appeal. It is in the special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as
party
defendant or
respondent. The Court, however,
also
acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant would also claim
that the court that rendered the appealed judgment acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which

case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or

respondent. While the Court may have stated that in such an instance,
the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the
Court did not hold that consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and
65 could or should be filed.

The Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer
on the distinction between these two modes of appeal. In Nunez v.
GSIS Family Bank,[62] the Court elucidated:

In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the

therein petitioner described her petition as an
appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, this Court, in frowning over what it
described as a chimera, reiterated that the
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative nor successive.

To be sure, the distinctions between Rules

45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most
apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best
reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be
corrected by appeal in a petition for review under
Rule 45.

But in the same case, the Court also held that:

This Court, x x x, in accordance with the

liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice may treat a petition for
certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more
so if the same was filed within the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review.[63]
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It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself

of the wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 and forCertiorari under Rule 65, when these are two
separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative
nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the Consolidated
Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the
allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the
Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed
with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The
Court, in a Resolution[64] dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic
a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29,
2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the
extension period.

Hierarchy of courts

TROPANG POTCHI

Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of

law, i.e., whether Civil Case No. 106 should have been dismissed for
failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus,
the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper.

The Court shall now consider the propriety of the dismissal by

the RTC-Branch 1 of the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic.

The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff

in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this Court
in the ISA case. The dispositive portion of the ISA case reads:

The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not
violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

According to Rule 41, Section 2(c) [65] of the Rules of Court, a

decision or order of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45, provided that such
petition raises only questions of law.[66]

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy

concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set
of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted.[67] A question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[68]

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October
1991 to the extent that it affirmed the trial courts
order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the
substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for
petitioner Iron Steel Authority for further proceedings
consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as
to costs.[69]

The ISA case had already become final and executory, and
entry of judgment was made in said case on August 31, 1998. The
RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated November 16, 2001, effected the
substitution of the Republic for ISA.

The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for

execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution
requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to
enforce the terms of the writ. [70] The November 16, 2001 Order of the
RTC-Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final
and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for
and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.

Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary

compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in the ISA case even
without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the
RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced the judicially determined right of the
Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of
Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not
be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly
conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek
which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties. [71]

The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any remedy
from the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch
1. Consequently, the said Order already became final, which even the
RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot reverse and set aside on the ground of
honest mistake.

The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No.

106 on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the
expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated. The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated that since
the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of
private land intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be
directed against the owner of the land sought to be expropriated.

The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-ininterest, impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation
because of its possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels
of land, and not by reason of its ownership of the said properties. In
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addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a

ground for the dismissal of an action.

Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court [72] described how
expropriation proceedings should be instituted:

Section 1. The complaint. The right of

eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a
complaint which shall state with certainty the right
and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or
personal property sought to be condemned, and join
as defendants all persons owning or claiming
to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the
interest of each defendant separately. If the title to
any property sought to be condemned appears
to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, or if
the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the
plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify
who are the real owners, averment to that effect may
be made in the complaint.[73] (Emphases supplied.)

For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited

to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just
compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court
held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals[74]:

The defendants in an expropriation

case are not limited to the owners of the
property condemned. They include all other
persons owning, occupying or claiming to own
the property. When [property] is taken by
eminent domain, the owner x x x is not
necessarily the only person who is entitled to
compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the
term owner when employed in statutes relating to
eminent domain to designate the persons who are to
be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the
rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to

TROPANG POTCHI

all those who have lawful interest in the property to

be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and
a vendee in possession under an executory
contract. Every person having an estate or interest
at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to
share in the award. If a person claiming an interest
in the land sought to be condemned is not made a
party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim
to the compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)

At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in

1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of
Instructions No. 1277[75] dated November 16, 1982 expressly
recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential
Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use
and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle
fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in
the same Letter of Instruction that:

(1)
NSC shall negotiate with the owners
of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for
the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy
rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty
(P30.00) Pesos per square meter or equivalent to the
assessed value thereof (as determined by the City
Assessor of Iligan), whichever is higher. NSC shall
give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid
plant, structures, equipment, machinery and other
facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership
thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to the fair
market value thereof as appraised by the Asian
Appraisal Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by
NSC and MCFC.

expropriation of the aforementioned occupancy

rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well as the
plant, structures, equipment, machinery and related
facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and thereafter
cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the
expropriation proceedings, NSC shall take possession
of the properties, subject to bonding and other
requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.)

Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be

expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case
No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint
for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.

Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the

original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against
MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said
property.

Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of

parties. According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of

parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis
supplied.)

(2)
In the event that NSC and MCFC fail
to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA)
shall exercise its authority under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the
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MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this
case where the party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be
expropriated, is an indispensable party.

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no

final determination can be had of an action.[76]

Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an

action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be
instituted even when title to the property sought to be condemned
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals. The same rule provides that a complaint for
expropriation shall name as defendants all persons owning or claiming
to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest in the property
sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears
to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting
expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a
complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the
property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is
not an indispensable party.

To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states

that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain,
hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277
recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to
institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation
for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not
an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation in
Civil Case No. 106.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the

property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings,
the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate
dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v.
Risos,[77] the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even
in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz:

TROPANG POTCHI

[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a

ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case,
the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of
the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss
the
complaint/petition for
the
petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply. (Emphasis
supplied.)

for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion[78] dated September 27, 2004

was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13, 2004. The
records, however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for
Expropriation[79] dated September 28, 2004 was filed with the
RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was
filed after the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since
the Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing of the latter.
[80]
Even then, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping[81] attached to the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation
did not disclose the filing of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and
Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the Court finds that
the Republic did not commit forum shopping for filing both Complaints.

In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang,[82] the Court laid down

the circumstances when forum shopping exists:
In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic
to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the
Republic upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in
the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and
LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped
with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 sought leave of
court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four
parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of
the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the
original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC.

Forum shopping

The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic

committed forum shopping by (1) simultaneously instituting the
actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil Case
No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent
positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land
in the expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same
properties in the reversion case.

There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion

proceedings (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land subject
of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint

Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant

files multiple suits involving the same parties, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Thus, itexists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of partie
s, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases is such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other case. Forum-shopping is an act of
malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x x.

Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no

identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106
and Civil Case No. 6686.

Civil Case No. 106 was instituted against MCFC to acquire, for a
public purpose, its possessory/occupancy rights over 322,532 square
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JURISDICTION CASE DIGEST

meters or 32.25 hectares of land which, at the time of the filing of the
original Complaint in 1983, was not yet covered by any certificate of
title. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6686 sought the cancellation of
OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), which was entered into
registration on December 4, 1998 in Doa Demetrias name, on the
argument that the parcels of land covered by said certificates
exceeded the areas granted by the LRC to Doa Demetria in GLRO
Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, as affirmed by this Court in the 1914
Cacho case.

Expropriation vis--vis reversion

The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted

both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of
land. The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct
remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other.

The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the

institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted
back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as
against the occupants thereof.

TROPANG POTCHI

of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant

or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the
property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if
entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental

Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and
AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the Republic
merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are
private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The
Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation
and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public
domain.

In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original

Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case
No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the Resolutions dated July
12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case
106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.

Dolot v Paje, et al.

Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing
of a complaint for expropriation even when the title to any property
sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy
or certainty specify who are the real owners. Rule 67, Section 9 of the
Rules of Court further provides:

SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting

claims. If the ownership of the property taken
is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to
any part thereof, the court may order any sum or
sums awarded as compensation for the property to
be paid to the court for the benefit of the person
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment

Facts: Maricris Dolot filed a petition that sometime in 2009 they

protested that an ore mining company in the municipality of Matnog
violated a number of laws including not having a permit and Republic
Act no. 7076. The petitioners find it their right to protect the
environment. The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC
of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court . In
the Order dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: whether or not the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil

Case No. 2011-8338.

Held: Yes it has and RTC cannot solely rely on SC.A.O. No. 7 and Admin
Circular No. 23-2008 whether it has jurisdiction over the case. None is
more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and
authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by
law.It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject
matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in
the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly,
Section 21 thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions.
Ang v Spouse Ang
Facts: On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang
(respondents)obtained a loan of US$300,000.00 from Theodore and
Nancy Ang (petitioners). On evendate, the respondents executed a
promissory note in favor of the petitionerswherein they promised to
pay the latter the said amount, with interest at 10% per annum, upon
demand. However, despiterepeated demands, the respondents failed
to pay the petitioners.Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent
the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay their outstanding
debt which, at that time, already amounted to US$719,671.23 inclusive
of the 10%) annual interest that had accumulated overthe years.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, therespondents
still failed to settle their loan obligation.On August 6, 2006, the
petitioners, who were then residing in LosAngeles, California, United
States of America (USA), executed theirrespective Special Powers of
Attorney in favor of Atty. Aceron for the purpose of filing an action in
court againstthe respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in
behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with the RTCof Quezon City against the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it
ruled that the complaint must be dismissed on the ground that venue
was not properly laid.
Held: The CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulledand
set aside the orders of the RTC of Quezon City and
consequentlydismissed the petitioners complaint against the
respondents on the groundof improper venue.It is a legal truism that
the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the
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convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equallysettled,

however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is notleft
to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
The petitioners complaint for collection of sum of money against
therespondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the
enforcement of acontract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of
choosing where to filehis complaint. He can file it in the place where he
himself or any of them resides, or where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or maybe found. The plaintiff or the defendant must
be residents of the place wherethe action has been instituted at the
time the action is commenced. However, if the plaintiff does not reside
in the Philippines, thecomplaint in such case may only be filed in the
court of the place where thedefendant resides.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159746

July 18, 2012

SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N.

MENDIOLA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, and TABANGAO REALTY, INC., Respondents.
DECISION

(such as fuels, lubricants and allied items) by Pacific Management &

Development (Pacific), a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner
Ramon G. Mendiola (Ramon). To secure Pacifics performance of its
obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed on August 1,
1985 a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell3 covering their real estate
and its improvements, located in the then Municipality of Paraaque,
Rizal, and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-59807 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (in the name of "Ramon Mendiola,
married to Araceli Mendoza").4
Pacific ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to
commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in April 1987. Having
received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled to be held
at the main entrance of the Paraaque Municipal Hall on May 14,
1987,5 petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the
scheduled date and time but did not witness any auction being
conducted and did not meet the sheriff supposed to conduct the
auction despite their being at the lobby from 9:00 am until 11:30 am of
May 14, 1987.6 They later learned that the auction had been held as
scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to
Tabangao Realty, Inc. (Tabangao), as the corresponding certificate of
sale bears out.7 They further learned that Tabangaos winning bidder
bid of P670,000.00 had topped Shells bid of P660,000.00. 8
After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific,
a deficiency of P170,228.00 (representing the foreclosure expenses
equivalent of 25% of the amount claimed plus interest) remained. The
deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, on September 2, 1987, Shell
sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency, docketed as Civil
Case No. 87-41852 entitled Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.
Ramon G. Mendiola, doing business under the name and style Pacific
Management & Development (Manila case).9

BERSAMIN, J.:
Through their petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition,
petitioners assail the resolutions promulgated on November 22,
20021 and July 31, 2002,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
respectively denied petitioners' motion to dismiss the appeal and
motion for reconsideration. They allege that the CA thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On July 31, 1985, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) entered
into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum products

In his answer with counterclaim filed on October 28, 1987, Ramon

asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been
devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the
filing of the action were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently
and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
On March 22, 1988, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an
action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure docketed as Civil Case No.
88-398 entitled Ramon G. Mendiola and Araceli N. Mendiola v. Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, Tabangao Realty, Inc., and Maximo C.
Contreras, as Clerk of Court and Ex Oficio Sheriff of Rizal,10 which was
assigned to Branch 134 (Makati case).

As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately

moved for dismissal,11 stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that the
Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case;
(b) that the complaint stated no cause of action, the Makati case
having been filed more than a year after the registration of the
certificate of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the
same subject matter was pending; (d) that the venue was improperly
laid; and (e) that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners
failure to raise its cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the
Manila case.
After the Makati RTC denied both motions on September 23,
1988,12 Shell filed its answer ad cautelam,13whereby it denied
petitioners allegation that no auction had been held; insisted that
there had been proper accounting of the deliveries made to Pacific and
its clients; and averred that petitioners failure to file their compulsory
counterclaim in the Manila case already barred the action.
Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its
judgment in favor of Shell on May 31, 1990, viz:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, defendants (sic) is ordered
to pay plaintiffs as follows:
1. On the First Cause of Action
a) P167,585.50 representing the deficiency as of the date of the
foreclosure sale;
b) P2,643.26 representing the interest due on the unpaid principal as
of 30 June 1987; and
c) The sum corresponding to the interest due on the unpaid principal
from 30 June 1987 to date.
2. On the Second Cause of Action attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation to (sic) the amount of P15,000.00; and finally,
3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon appealed (C.A.-G.R. No.
CV-28056), but his appeal was decided adversely to him on July 22,
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1994,15 with the CA affirming the Manila RTCs decision and finding that
he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the Makati case.
Undaunted, he next appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 122795), which
denied his petition for review on February 26, 1996, 16 and upheld the
foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court became final
and executory, as borne out by the entry of judgment issued on June
10, 1996.17
Nonetheless, on February 3, 1998, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati
case,18 finding that there had been no auction actually conducted on
the scheduled date; that had such auction taken place, petitioners
could have actively participated and enabled to raise their objections
against the amount of their supposed obligation; and that they had
been consequently deprived of notice and hearing as to their liability.
The Makati RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs having duly established
their case that the SHERIFFs Certificate of Sale of May 14, 1987, is
void for lack of actual auction sale and lack of valid consideration as
the amount utilized by the SHERIFF was based on an invalid amount as
a basis of an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage where the amount
of the mortgage is based on a future obligation unilaterally adjudicated
by SHELL alone in violation of MENDIOLAs right of due process, and
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring as NULL and VOID the Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage of plaintiffs house and lot under TCT No. T-59807 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
2. Declaring as NULL and VOID the Certificate of Sale issued by Maximo
C. Contreras on May 14, 1987 in favor of TABANGAO REALTY, INC.;
3. Ordering defendant PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION to
make a full accounting of the extent of the future obligation of plaintiff
MENDIOLA in the Mortgage Contract before any foreclosure
proceedings are initiated;
4. Ordering defendants PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
and TABANGAO REALTY INC. to pay the amount of P20,000.00 as and
by way of attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

TROPANG POTCHI

Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision, 19 maintaining that the

issues raised on the validity of the foreclosure sale and on the amount
of the outstanding obligation of Pacific had been settled in the Manila
case; and that the Makati RTC became bereft of jurisdiction to render
judgment on the same issues pursuant to the principle of res judicata.

RESOLUTION IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULINGS OF A COEQUAL COURT AND SUPERIOR COURTS.

Tabangao adopted Shells motion for reconsideration.

Instead of filing their appellees brief, petitioners submitted a motion to

dismiss appeal,24 mainly positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court prohibited an appeal of the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.

On October 5, 1999, however, the Makati RTC denied Shells motion for
reconsideration,20 to wit:

On November 22, 2002, the CA denied petitioners motion to dismiss

appeal through the first assailed resolution, stating:25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is NO RES JUDICATA to speak

of in this case. Consequently, the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by
defendant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, which was later
adopted by defendant Tabangao Realty, Inc., is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiffs "Motion for Execution" is likewise DENIED for reasons as
stated above.

For consideration is the Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated August 6, 2002

filed by counsel for plaintiffs-appellees praying for the dismissal of the
appeal on the grounds that the Notice of Appeal filed by defendantsappellants was specifically interposed solely against the Resolution of
the trial court dated October 20, 1999 which merely denied defendantappellants Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision,
dated February 3, 1998.

SO ORDERED.21
Aggrieved by the decision of the Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a
joint notice of appeal.22 The appeal was docketed in the CA as C.A.-G.R.
No. 65764.
In their appellants brief filed in C.A.-G.R. No. 65764, 23 Shell and
Tabangao assigned the following errors, namely:
I
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT
DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA
AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN
DISREGARDING THAT THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WERE SATISFIED.
III
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ASSAILED

Upon perusal of the records of the case, it seems apparent that herein
defendants-appellants intended to appeal not only the Resolution
dated October 2, 1999 but also the Decision dated February 3, 1998.
Assuming arguendo that defendants-appellants indeed committed a
technical error, it is best that the parties be given every chance to fight
their case fairly and in the open without resort to technicality to afford
petitioners their day in court (Zenith Insurance vs. Purisima, 114 SCRA
62).
The Motion to Dismiss Appeal must not be granted if only to stress that
the rules of procedure may not be misused as instruments for the
denial of substantial justice. We must not forget the plain injunction of
Section 2 of (now Sec. 6 of Rule 1, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure) Rule 1 that the "rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining not only
speedy, but more imperatively just and inexpensive determination of
justice in every action and proceeding" (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66
SCRA 425).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss Appeal is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2002, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
through the second assailed resolution.26
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Hence, petitioners brought these special civil actions for certiorari,

mandamus and prohibition, insisting that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying their motion to dismiss appeal and their motion for
reconsideration.
Issue
Petitioners contend that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the appeal of Shell and Tabangao in contravention of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which proscribes an appeal of
the denial of a motion for reconsideration.

It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure expressly limited an appeal to a judgment or final
order, and proscribed the taking of an appeal from an order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, among others, viz:
Section 1.Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

Shell and Tabangao counter that their appeal was not proscribed
because the action could be said to be completely disposed of only
upon the rendition on October 5, 1999 of the assailed resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration; that, as such, the decision of
February 3, 1998 and the denial of their motion for reconsideration
formed one integrated disposition of the merits of the action; and that
the CA justifiably applied the rules of procedure liberally.

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

Two issues have to be determined. The first is whether or not an appeal

may be taken from the denial of a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of February 3, 1998. The determination of this issue
necessarily decides whether the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus were warranted. The second is whether the Makati case
could prosper independently of the Manila case. The Court has to pass
upon and resolve the second issue without waiting for the CA to decide
the appeal on its merits in view of the urging by Shell and Tabangao
that the Makati case was barred due to litispendentia or res judicata.
Ruling

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,

confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or
any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and thirdparty complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom; and

The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lacks merit.

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

1.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. (n)

Appeal by Shell and Tabangao of the denial of their motion for

reconsideration was not proscribed
Petitioners contention that the appeal by Shell and Tabangao should
be rejected on the ground that an appeal of the denial of their motion
for reconsideration was prohibited cannot be sustained.

The inclusion of the order denying a motion for new trial or a motion
for reconsideration in the list of issuances of a trial court not subject to
appeal was by reason of such order not being the final order
terminating the proceedings in the trial court. This nature of the order
is reflected in Section 9 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which declares that such order denying a motion for new trial or

reconsideration is not appealable, "the remedy being an appeal from

the judgment or final order."
In Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses
Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez,27 the Court further expounded:
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for
reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical
and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a
new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the
case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final
order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either
because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence
is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or
final order is contrary to law.
By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only
partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to
modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final
order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the
course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.
In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,28 however, the Court has
interpreted the proscription against appealing the order denying a
motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion for reconsideration
filed against an interlocutory order, not to a motion for reconsideration
filed against a judgment or final order, to wit:
This Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order,
and not to a final order or judgment. That that was the intention of the
above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455
(1971), cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in
which this Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss an
action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an
interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and
undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders
as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a
single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for
the final judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an
error of the court on appeal.

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The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of

a complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as
it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the
matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do
other than to execute the order.

SEC. 3.Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken wi thin

fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the notice of judgment or final order.

Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for

reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an
appeal of the order of dismissal itself.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new

trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12,

1999 Order denying his Omnibus MotionMotion for Reconsideration
should thus be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which
declared him non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from

the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment
or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for
the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it
may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for

reconsideration is applied to any order, then there would have been no
need to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of the Rules
"final orders or judgments" as subject of appeal. In other words, from
the entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that
what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.29
In Apuyan v. Haldeman,30 too, the Court categorized an order denying
the motion for reconsideration as the final resolution of the issues a
trial court earlier passed upon and decided, and accordingly held that
the notice of appeal filed against the order of denial was deemed to
refer to the decision subject of the motion for reconsideration. 31
32

Subsequently, in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, where the decisive issue

was whether or not the appeal was taken within the reglementary
period, with petitioners contending that they had timely filed their
notice of appeal based on their submission that the period of appeal
should be reckoned from July 22, 1998, the day they had received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration (of
the order dismissing their complaint), instead of on March 3, 1998, the
day they had received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint, the Court, citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. and
Apuyan v. Haldeman, ruled that the receipt by petitioners of the denial
of their motion for reconsideration filed against the dismissal of their
complaint, which was a final order, started the reckoning point for the
filing of their appeal, to wit:
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998

denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the
"final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their
complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion
for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which
triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998
order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court
declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of
the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed
his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been
filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order
that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and
declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an

order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it

was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan
v. Haldeman et al. where we again considered the order denying
petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that
the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration
was the final order contemplated in the Rules. 33
As the aftermath of these rulings, the Court issued its resolution in A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC to approve certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and
65 of the Rules of Court effective on December 27, 2007. Among the
amendments was the delisting of an order denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration found in
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of what are not
appealable. The amended rule now reads:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or
any other ground vitiating consent;
(e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and thirdparty complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom; and
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(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.
Based on the foregoing developments, Shell and Tabangaos appeal,
albeit seemingly directed only at the October 5, 1999 denial of their
motion for reconsideration, was proper. Thus, we sustain the CAs
denial for being in accord with the rules and pertinent precedents. We
further point out that for petitioners to insist that the appeal was
limited only to the assailed resolution of October 5, 1999 was
objectively erroneous, because Shell and Tabangao expressly indicated
in their appellants brief that their appeal was directed at both the
February 3, 1998 decision and the October 5, 1999 resolution.34
The petition cannot prosper if the CA acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary
remedies intended to correct errors of jurisdiction and to check grave
abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.35 The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.36 Yet, here, petitioners utterly
failed to establish that the CA abused its discretion, least of all gravely.
2. Makati case is barred and should be dismissed on ground of res
judicata and waiver
The dismissal of the petition should ordinarily permit the CA to resume
its proceedings in order to enable it to resolve the appeal of Shell and
Tabangao. But the Court deems itself bound to first determine whether
the Makati case could still proceed by virtue of their insistence that the
cause of action for annulment of the foreclosure sale in the Makati
case, which was intimately intertwined with the cause of action for
collection of the deficiency amount in the Manila case, could not
proceed independently of the Manila case.
Shell and Tabangaos insistence has merit. The Makati case should
have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of
litispendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final,
should have been dismissed on the ground of being barred by res
judicata.

TROPANG POTCHI

In the Manila case, Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim

asserting that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been
devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the
filing of the action had been made in bad faith, with malice,
fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights. His
pleading thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in
the Makati case - that of annulment of the foreclosure sale - was
identical to the compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila
case.

of effort and time by the parties and the court?38 Of the four, the one
compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the
claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such
relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and
effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve
the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of
the same basic controversy between the parties. 39 If these tests result
in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.

Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory

counterclaim as follows:

The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was
concerned. The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case
because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of petitioners
credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell.
Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated
on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would
not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell
not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramons cause
of action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure was a true
compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC
could not have missed the logical relation between the two actions.

Section 7.Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is

one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out
of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction
of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that
in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim
may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. (n)
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the
claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original
action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.
A compulsory counterclaim that a defending party has at the time he
files his answer shall be contained therein.37Pursuant to Section 2, Rule
9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a compulsory counterclaim not
set up shall be barred.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by
the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication

We hold, therefore, that the Makati case was already barred by res
judicata. Hence, its immediate dismissal is warranted.
Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or
order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d) there
must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action.40
The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits
Shells complaint to recover the deficiency, and its decision rendered
on May 31, 1990 on the merits already became final and executory.
Hence, the first, second and third elements were present.
Anent the fourth element, the Makati RTC concluded that the Manila
case and the Makati case had no identity as to their causes of action,
explaining that the former was a personal action involving the
collection of a sum of money, but the latter was a real action affecting
the validity of the foreclosure sale, stating in its order of October 5,
1999 denying Shells motion for reconsideration as follows:

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Finally, as to whether there is identity of causes of action between the

two (2) cases, this Court finds in negative.
xxxx
True, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an
action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish
the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions
in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. It has been held that a party
cannot by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and
the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same
parties and their privies. (Sangalang vs. Caparas, 151 SCRA 53;
Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 437. This ruling however does
not fall squarely on the present controversy.
Civil Case No. 42852 is for collection of sum of money, a personal
action where what is at issue is whether spouses Mendiola have
indebtedness to Pilipinas Shell. There is no concrete findings on
questions regarding the validity of sale affecting the mortgaged
property, otherwise, there would be a determination of transferring of
title over the property which is already a real action. In the latter
action, Manila courts has no jurisdiction considering that the property
is located in Paranaque, then sitting under Makati RTC. At any rate, this
Court is not unmindful of series of cases which state that from an
otherwise rigid rule outlining jurisdiction of courts being limited in
character, deviations have been sanctioned where the (1) parties
agreed or have acquiesced in submitting the issues for determination
by the court; (2) the parties were accorded full opportunity in
presenting their respective arguments of the issues litigated and of the
evidence in support thereof; and (3) the court has already considered
the evidence on record and is convinced that the same is sufficient and
adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues controverted. xxx.
While there is a semblance of substantial compliance with the
aforesaid criteria, primarily because the issue of validity of foreclosure
proceedings was submitted for determination of RTC Manila when this
was stated as an affirmative defense by spouses Mendiola in their
Answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 42852, however it appears
from the Decision rendered in said case that the issue on validity of
foreclosure sale was not fully ventilated before the RTC Manila because
spouses Mendiolas right to present evidence in its behalf was declared
waived. Naturally, where this issue was not fully litigated upon, no
resolution or declaration could be made therein.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 88-398 is an action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of foreclosure sale, a real action where the

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location of property controls the venue where it should properly be

filed. This Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to adjudicate this case.
Plaintiff spouses Mendiola merely claimed that no actual foreclosure
sale was conducted, and if there was, the same was premature for lack
of notice and hearing. Take note that plaintiffs do not deny their
indebtedness to Pilipinas Shell although the amount being claimed is
disputed. They are simply asserting their rights as owners of the
mortgaged property, contending that they were not afforded due
process in the course of foreclosure proceedings. And based mainly on
the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, as well as the
postulations, expositions and arguments raised by all parties in this
case, it is the Courts considered view that spouses Mendiola have
established the material allegations in their complaint and have
convincingly shown to the satisfaction of the Court that they are
entitled to the reliefs prayed for. With these findings and adjudications,
the Court does not find inconsistency with those held in Civil Case No.
42852. As to whether spouses Mendiola is still indebted to Pilipinas
Shell is not in issue here, and not even a single discussion touched that
matter as this would tantamount to encroaching upon the subject
matter litigated in Civil Case No. 42852.41
The foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between
the causes of action was patently unsound. The identity of causes of
action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action
or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action
are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will sustain
the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action.42 Petitioners Makati case
and Shells Manila case undeniably required the production of the same
evidence. In fact, Shells counsel faced a dilemma upon being required
by the Makati RTC to present the original copies of certain documents
because the documents had been made part of the records of the
Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal of the
Manila RTCs judgment.43 Also, both cases arose from the same
transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage), such that the
success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would
have necessarily negated Shells right to recover the deficiency.
Apparently, the Makati RTC had the erroneous impression that the
Manila RTC did not have jurisdiction over the complaint of petitioners
because the property involved was situated within the jurisdiction of
the Makati RTC. Thereby, the Makati RTC confused venue of a real
action with jurisdiction. Its confusion was puzzling, considering that it
was well aware of the distinction between venue and jurisdiction, and

certainly knew that venue in civil actions was not jurisdictional and
might even be waived by the parties.44 To be clear, venue related only
to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it
relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the
courts.45 In contrast, jurisdiction refers to the power to hear and
determine a cause,46 and is conferred by law and not by the parties. 47
By virtue of the concurrence of the elements of res judicata, the
immediate dismissal of the Makati case would have been authorized
under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(2a)
The rule expressly mandated the Makati RTC to dismiss the case
motuproprio once the pleadings or the evidence on record indicated
the pendency of the Manila case, or, later on, disclosed that the
judgment in the Manila case had meanwhile become final and
executory.
Yet, we are appalled by the Makati RTC's flagrant disregard of the
mandate.1wphi1 Its reason for the disregard was not well-founded.
We stress that its disregard cannot be easily ignored because it
needlessly contributed to the clogging of the dockets of the Judiciary.
Thus, we deem it to be imperative to again remind all judges to
consciously heed any clear mandate under the Rules of Court designed
to expedite the disposition of cases as well as to declog the court
dockets.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus for lack of merit; CONSIDER Civil Case No. 88-398
dismissed with prejudice on the. ground of res judicata; and ORDER
petitioners to pay the costs of suit to respondents.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to disseminate this
decision to all trial courts for their guidance. SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
THE CIVIL SERVICE G.R. No. 168766
COMMISSION, Petitioner,
- versus HENRY A. SOJOR, Respondent.
x--- -----------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the
disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a
state university violate academic freedom?
The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
annulled two (2) CSCResolutions[2] against respondent Henry A. Sojor.
The Facts
The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the
CSC and the CA, are as follows:
On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College
(CVPC) in DumagueteCity. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292,
or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, was enacted.
This law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as
the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed
respondent as president, with a four-year term beginning September
1998 up to September 2002.[3] Upon the expiration of his first term of
office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution for a
second four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.[4]
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State
University (NORSU).[5] A Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT
as its governing body.

Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent

were filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC Regional Office
(CSC-RO) No. VII in CebuCity, to wit:
1.

ADMC DC No. 02-20(A) Complaint for dishonesty, grave

misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service filed on June 26, 2002 by Jose Rene A. Cepe and
Narciso P. Ragay. It was alleged that respondent approved the
release of salary differentials despite the absence of the
required Plantilla and Salary Adjustment Form and valid
appointments.[6]

2.
2. ADM DC No. 02-20 Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and
falsification of official documents filed on July 10, 2002 by Jocelyn
Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent
maliciously allowed the antedating and falsification of the
reclassification differential payroll, to the prejudice of instructors and
professors who have pending request for adjustment of their academic
ranks.[7]
3. ADM DC No. 02-21 Complaint for nepotism filed on August 15,
2002 by Rose Marie Palomar, a former part-time instructor of CVPC. It
was alleged that respondent appointed his half-sister, EstrellasSojorManaguilas, as casual clerk, in violation of the provisions against
nepotism under the Administrative Code.[8]
Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the
first two complaints on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, bar by prior
judgment and forum shopping.
He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential
appointee. Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of
the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the Office of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no
authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him;
that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation,
discipline, and removal of presidential appointees. He also pointed out
that the subject matter of the complaints had already been resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman.[9]
Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondents arguments, the CSCRO denied his motion to dismiss in its Resolution dated September 4,
2002.[10] His motion for reconsideration[11] was likewise denied.
Thus, respondent was formally charged with three administrative
cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official

Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial

to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism.[12]
Respondent appealed the actions of the regional office to the
Commission proper (CSC), raising the same arguments in his motion to
dismiss.[13] He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee
on Higher Education Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was
also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed by the
BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the
jurisdiction granted to CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
807[14] enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this was
superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292,[15] a later law which
granted to the BOT the power to remove university officials.
CSC Disposition
In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,[16] the CSC dismissed
respondents appeal and authorized its regional office to proceed with
the investigation. He was also preventively suspended for 90 days. The
fallo of the said resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of Central Visayas
Polytechnic College, is hereby DISMISSED. The Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. VII, CebuCity, is authorized to proceed
with the formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit the
investigation reports to the Commission within one hundred five (105)
days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days.[17]
In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against
respondent, the CSC opined that his claim that he was a presidential
appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC. We quote:
His appointment dated September 23, 2002 was signed by then
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman Ester A. Garcia.
Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved
and adopted by the Central Visayas Polytechnic College Board of
Trustees on August 13, 2002 in accordance with Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 8292 (Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which
explicitly provides that, He (the president of a state college) shall be
appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of
a duly constituted search committee. Since the President of a state
college is appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees of the college
concerned, it is crystal clear that he is not a presidential appointee.
Therefore, it is without doubt that Sojor, being the President of a state

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college (Central Visayas Polytechnic College), is within the disciplinary

jurisdiction of the Commission.
The allegation of appellant Sojor that the Commission is bereft of
disciplinary jurisdiction over him since the same is exclusively lodged
in the CVPC Board of Trustees, being the appointing authority, cannot
be considered. The Commission and the CVPC Board of Trustees have
concurrent jurisdiction over cases against officials and employees of
the said agency. Since the three (3) complaints against Sojor were filed
with the Commission and not with the CVPC, then the former already
acquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion of
the latter agency.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined
under its rules, who are under the jurisdiction of the Commission
proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the formal charges issued by its
regional office and ordered it to proceed with the investigation:
Pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, Sojor, being a third level official, is within the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Commission Proper. Thus, strictly speaking, the
Commission has the sole jurisdiction to issue the formal charge against
Sojor. x xx However, since the CSC RO No. VII already issued the formal
charges against him and found merit in the said formal charges, the
same is adopted. The CSC RO No. VII is authorized to proceed with the
formal investigation of the case against Sojor in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the aforestated Uniform Rules.[19] (Emphasis
supplied) No merit was found by the CSC in respondents motion for
reconsideration and, accordingly, denied it with finality on July 6, 2004.
[20]
Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions;
that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and that
the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC
was exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC.
CA Disposition
On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction
directing the CSC to cease and desist from enforcing its Resolution
dated March 30, 2004 and Resolution dated July 6, 2004.[21] Thus, the

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formal investigation of the administrative charges against Sojor before

the CSC-RO was suspended.
On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their
sides, the CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the
questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from
proceeding with the administrative investigation. The dispositive part
of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding that the
respondent Civil Service Commission acted without jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolution Nos. 040321 and 040766 dated March
20, 2004 and July 6, 2004, respectively, the same are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on September 29, 2004 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.[22]
The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No.
9299[23] in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest
the BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members,
administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as
president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.[24] The power of the BOT to remove
and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative
officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is
also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299.
The said provision reads:
Power and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall
have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general
powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the
board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines:
x xxx
to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative
officials and employees x xx; and to remove them for cause in
accordance with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis
added)
The CA added that Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,[25] which grants
disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all branches, subdivisions,

instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including

government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, is
a general law. According to the appellate court, E.O. No. 292 does not
prevail over R.A. No. 9299,[26] a special law.
Issues
Petitioner CSC comes to Us, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA
on the ground that THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
RESOLUTION NO. 040321 DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND RESOLUTION
NO. 04766 DATED JULY 6, 2004.[27]
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I. Jurisdiction of the CSC
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil
service.[28] As defined, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including
every government-owned or controlled corporation.[29] It is further
classified into career and non-career service positions. Career service
positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or
highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of
tenure. These include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior
qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
(2)
(3) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly
technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic
staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and
technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(4) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President;
(5) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive
Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the
Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

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(6) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces

which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(7) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether performing governmental or proprietary functions,
who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(8) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or
unskilled.[30]
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the
first two levels is determined through competitive examinations, while
entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive
Service Board.[31] The positions covered by each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial
service positions which involve non-professional or subprofessional
work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than
four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific
positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a
non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of
college work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.
[32]
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by:
(1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and (2) tenure
which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made.[33] The law states:
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

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(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.[34]

It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the
Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the
government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of
general jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.[35] We find that the
specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from
the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the
Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office
(Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as:
Section 4.Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil
Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil
Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in
the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline
and efficiency of such officers and employees.
Section 5.Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil
Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following
cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on
petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing penalties
exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper
personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential
appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are
not acted upon by the agencies and such other complaints requiring
direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by
Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in
connection with the foregoing enumerations.

B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought
before it;
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive
clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions,
involving third level officials; and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation
with the foregoing enumerations.
Section 6.Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. The Civil
Service Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the
following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts or
omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office,
including Civil Service examination anomalies or irregularities and the
persons complained of are employees of agencies, local or national,
within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service Commission Regional Office
personnel who are appointees of said office; and
3. Petitions to place respondent under Preventive Suspension.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;
2. Protests against the appointments of first and second level
employees brought before it directly or on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office
appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a
non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and
members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law,
respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of
the CSC.
II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not
exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state
university.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act
of 1997, under which law respondent was appointed during the time
material to the present case, provides that the schools governing
board shall have the general powers of administration granted to a
corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the
power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and
employees for cause:
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Section 4.Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing

board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to
its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers
granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of
Batas PambansaBlg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of
the Philippines:
x xxx
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative
officials and employees subject to the provisions of the revised
compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget
and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its
discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not
withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis supplied)
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the
succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299.
Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now
provides that the administration of the university and exercise of
corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive:
Sec. 4.Administration. The University shall have the general powers
of a corporation set forth in Batas PambansaBlg. 68, as amended,
otherwise known as The Corporation Code of the Philippines. The
administration of the University and the exercise of its corporate
powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and the
president of the University insofar as authorized by the Board.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that
administrative power over the school exclusively belongs to its BOR.
But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to
remove its erring employees and officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondents argument
that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials
must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove
faculty members, employees, and officials of the university is granted
to the BOR in addition to its general powers of administration. This
provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor,
R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not
change even with the enactment of the new law. For clarity, the text of
the said section is reproduced below:

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Sec. 7.Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents. The Board shall
have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general
powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to
the Board of Directors of a corporation under existing laws:
x xxx
i.

To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and

administrative officials and employees, subject to the
provisions of the Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System and other pertinent budget and
compensation laws governing hours of service and such
other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under
such regulations as it may promulgate, any provision of
existing law to the contrary notwithstanding; and to
remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law.[36] (Emphasis
supplied)

ii.
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the
university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining
and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No.
9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that
such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it
be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction
over the matter.[37]
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does
not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or noncareer, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of
the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.
In University of the Philippines v. Regino,[38] this Court struck down
the claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR to discipline its
employees. The Court held then:

The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission
appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving
members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the
Commission shall have the power to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal. And Section 37(a) provides that, The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled
corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were
considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall
within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section
2(1), which states:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly
a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now
continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an
original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore
governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline
of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria,[40] this Court lent
credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC when it affirmed that
a case against a university official may be filed either with the
universitys BOR or directly with the CSC. We quote:
Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the
respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP Board of Regents, was
contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific
provision of the Civil Service Law which was violated by the
respondents in forming the investigating committee. The Civil Service
Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the
Secretary and the university, through its governing board, to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Of course under EO
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292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed either

with the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service
Commission, although the CSC may delegate the investigation of a
complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department,
agency, official or group of officials to conduct such investigation.[41]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints
directly filed before the regional office, concerning violations of civil
service rules against respondent.
III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged
violations of civil service laws and rules.
Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide
latitude of action under the principle of academic freedom. Academic
freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.[42] Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that
institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the
best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from outside
coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires.
[43] They have the independence to determine who to accept to study
in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a
student.[44]
That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present
case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be
within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints
filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing
charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. These are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules,
punishable with suspension or even dismissal.[45]
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not
give an institution the unbridled authority to perform acts without any
statutory basis.[46] For that reason, a school official, who is a member
of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil
service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the
principle of academic freedom.
Lastly, We do not agree with respondents contention that his
appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the
pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by
the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid
down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[47] and Aguinaldo v. Santos[48] are
inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the

TROPANG POTCHI

mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is

an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of
the people.[49] Under the principle of voxpopuliestsupremalex, the reelection of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a
non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of
when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university
president.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168766

May 22, 2008

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
HENRY A. SOJOR, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the
disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a
state university violate academic freedom?
The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
annulled two (2) CSC Resolutions2 against respondent Henry A. Sojor.
The Facts

The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the

CSC and the CA, are as follows:
On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College
(CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292,
or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This
law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the
governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed
respondent as president, with a four-year term beginning September
1998 up to September 2002.3 Upon the expiration of his first term of
office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution for a
second four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.4
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State
University (NORSU).5 A Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as
its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent
were filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC Regional Office
(CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:
1. ADMC DC No. 02-20(A) Complaint for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
filed on June 26, 2002 by Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay. It
was alleged that respondent approved the release of salary
differentials despite the absence of the required Plantilla and Salary
Adjustment Form and valid appointments.6
2. ADM DC No. 02-20 Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and
falsification of official documents filed on July 10, 2002 by Jocelyn
Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent
maliciously allowed the antedating and falsification of the
reclassification differential payroll, to the prejudice of instructors and
professors who have pending request for adjustment of their academic
ranks.7
3. ADM DC No. 02-21 Complaint for nepotism filed on August 15,
2002 by Rose Marie Palomar, a former part-time instructor of CVPC. It
was alleged that respondent appointed his half-sister, EstrellasSojorManaguilas, as casual clerk, in violation of the provisions against
nepotism under the Administrative Code.8
Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the
first two complaints on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, bar by prior
judgment and forum shopping.
He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential
appointee. Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of
the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction
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of the Office of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no

authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him;
that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation,
discipline, and removal of presidential appointees. He also pointed out
that the subject matter of the complaints had already been resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman.9
Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondents arguments, the CSCRO denied his motion to dismiss in its Resolution dated September 4,
2002.10 His motion for reconsideration 11 was likewise denied. Thus,
respondent was formally charged with three administrative cases,
namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official
Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism.12
Respondent appealed the actions of the regional office to the
Commission proper (CSC), raising the same arguments in his motion to
dismiss.13 He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee
on Higher Education Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was
also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed by the
BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the
jurisdiction granted to
CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 14 enacted in October
1975, respondent contended that this was superseded by the
provisions of R.A. No. 8292,15 a later law which granted to the BOT the
power to remove university officials.
CSC Disposition
In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,16 the CSC dismissed
respondents appeal and authorized its regional office to proceed with
the investigation. He was also preventively suspended for 90 days.
The fallo of the said resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of Central Visayas
Polytechnic College, is hereby DISMISSED. The Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, is authorized to proceed
with the formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit the
investigation reports to the Commission within one hundred five (105)
days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days.17

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Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved

and adopted by the Central Visayas Polytechnic College Board of
Trustees on August 13, 2002 in accordance with Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 8292 (Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which
explicitly provides that, "He (the president of a state college) shall be
appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of
a duly constituted search committee." Since the President of a
state college is appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees of
the college concerned, it is crystal clear that he is not a
presidential appointee. Therefore, it is without doubt that
Sojor, being the President of a state college (Central Visayas
Polytechnic College), is within the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the Commission.
The allegation of appellant Sojor that the Commission is bereft of
disciplinary jurisdiction over him since the same is exclusively lodged
in the CVPC Board of Trustees, being the appointing authority, cannot
be considered. The Commission and the CVPC Board of Trustees
have concurrent jurisdiction over cases against officials and
employees of the said agency. Since the three (3) complaints
against Sojor were filed with the Commission and not with the CVPC,
then the former already acquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the
appellant to the exclusion of the latter agency. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined
under its rules, who are under the jurisdiction of the Commission
proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the formal charges issued by its
regional office and ordered it to proceed with the investigation:
Pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, Sojor, being a third level official, is within the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Commission Proper. Thus, strictly speaking, the
Commission has the sole jurisdiction to issue the formal charge against
Sojor. x xx However, since the CSC RO No. VII already issued the formal
charges against him and found merit in the said formal charges, the
same is adopted. The CSC RO No. VII is authorized to proceed
with the formal investigation of the case against Sojor in
accordance with the procedure outlined in the aforestated
Uniform Rules.19 (Emphasis supplied)
No merit was found by the CSC in respondents motion for
reconsideration and, accordingly, denied it with finality on July 6,
2004.20

CA Disposition
On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction
directing the CSC to cease and desist from enforcing its Resolution
dated March 30, 2004 and Resolution dated July 6, 2004.21 Thus, the
formal investigation of the administrative charges against Sojor before
the CSC-RO was suspended.
On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their
sides, the CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the
questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from
proceeding with the administrative investigation. The dispositive part
of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding that the
respondent Civil Service Commission acted without jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolution Nos. 040321 and 040766 dated March
20, 2004 and July 6, 2004, respectively, the same are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on September 29, 2004 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.22
The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No.
929923 in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the
BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members,
administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as
president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.24 The power of the BOT to remove
and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative
officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is
also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299.
The said provision reads:
Power and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall
have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general
powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the
board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines:
x xxx

In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against

respondent, the CSC opined that his claim that he was a presidential
appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC. We quote:
His appointment dated September 23, 2002 was signed by then
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman Ester A. Garcia.

Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition

for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC;
and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of
CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC.

to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative

officials and employees x xx; and to remove them for cause in
accordance with the requirements of due process of law.
(Emphasis added)

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The CA added that Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,25 which grants
disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, is
a general law. According to the appellate court, E.O. No. 292 does not
prevail over R.A. No. 9299,26 a special law.
Issues
Petitioner CSC comes to Us, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA
on the ground that THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
RESOLUTION NO. 040321 DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND RESOLUTION
NO. 04766 DATED JULY 6, 2004.27
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I. Jurisdiction of the CSC
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil
service.28 As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation. 29 It is further classified
into career and non-career service positions. Career service positions
are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly
technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. These
include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification
in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in
nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges
and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit
systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President;

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(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,
who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service
Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which
shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not
fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 30
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the
first two levels is determined through competitive examinations, while
entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive
Service Board.31 The positions covered by each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial
service positions which involve non-professional or subprofessional
work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than
four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific
positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a
non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of
college work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive
Service.32
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by:
(1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and (2) tenure
which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made.33 The law states:
The Non-Career Service shall include:

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the

government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.34
It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the
Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the
government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of
general jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.35 We find that the specific
jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the
general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the Regional
Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission
Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil
Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers
and employees in the civil service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such
officers and employees.
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The
Civil Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the
following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on
petition for review;

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;

2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,

municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing penalties
exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper
personnel;
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4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential

appointees;

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B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;

5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees

which are not acted upon by the agencies and such other
complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest
of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by
Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in
connection with the foregoing enumerations.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices
brought before it;
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive
clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions,
involving third level officials; and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation
with the foregoing enumerations.
Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. The Civil
Service Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the
following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts or
omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Office, including Civil Service examination anomalies
or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees
of agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service Commission Regional Office
personnel who are appointees of said office; and
3. Petitions to place respondent under Preventive Suspension.

2. Protests against the appointments of first and second level

employees brought before it directly or on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office
appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a
non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and
members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law,
respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of
the CSC.
II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees
is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a
president of a state university.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act
of 1997, under which law respondent was appointed during the time
material to the present case, provides that the schools governing
board shall have the general powers of administration granted to a
corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the
power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and
employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing
board shall have the following specific powers and duties in
addition to its general powers of administration and the
exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of
a corporation under Section 36 of Batas PambansaBlg. 68, otherwise
known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:
x xxx
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative
officials and employees subject to the provisions of the revised
compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget
and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its
discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not
withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis supplied)
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the
succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299.
Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now
provides that the administration of the university and exercise of
corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive:

Sec. 4. Administration. The University shall have the general powers

of a corporation set forth in Batas PambansaBlg. 68, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Corporation Code of the Philippines." The
administration of the University and the exercise of its
corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of
Regents and the president of the University insofar as
authorized by the Board.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that
administrative power over the school exclusively belongs to its BOR.
But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to
remove its erring employees and officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondents argument
that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials
must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove
faculty members, employees, and officials of the university is granted
to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of administration." This
provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor,
R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not
change even with the enactment of the new law. For clarity, the text of
the said section is reproduced below:
Sec. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents. The
Board shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of
administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to
the Board of Directors of a corporation under existing laws:
x xxx
i. To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative
officials and employees, subject to the provisions of the Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System and other pertinent
budget and compensation laws governing hours of service and such
other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at
its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance
with the requirements of due process of law.36 (Emphasis
supplied)
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the
university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining
and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No.
9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that
such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it
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TROPANG POTCHI

be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same

jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction
over the matter.37
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does
not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or noncareer, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of
the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.
In University of the Philippines v. Regino,38 this Court struck down the
claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR to discipline its
employees. The Court held then:
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission
appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving
members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the
Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a) provides that, "The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled
corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were
considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall
within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section
2(1), which states:
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly
a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now
continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an
original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is
therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases
involving the discipline of its employees come under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.39 (Emphasis supplied)
40

In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria, this Court lent

credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC when it affirmed that

a case against a university official may be filed either with the

universitys BOR or directly with the CSC. We quote:

service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the
principle of academic freedom.

Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the

respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP Board of Regents, was
contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific
provision of the Civil Service Law which was violated by the
respondents in forming the investigating committee. The Civil Service
Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the
Secretary and the university, through its governing board, to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Of course under EO
292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed
either with the universitys Board of Regents or directly with
the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may delegate
the investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may
deputize any department, agency, official or group of officials
to conduct such investigation.41 (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, We do not agree with respondents contention that his

appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the
pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by
the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid
down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.47 and Aguinaldo v. Santos48 are
inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the
mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is
an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of
the people.49Under the principle of voxpopuliestsupremalex, the reelection of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a
non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of
when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university
president.

Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints

directly filed before the regional office, concerning violations of civil
service rules against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are

alleged violations of civil service laws and rules.
Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide
latitude of action under the principle of academic freedom. Academic
freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.42 Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that
institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the
best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from outside
coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so
requires.43 They have the independence to determine who to accept to
study in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to
enroll a student.44
That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present
case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be
within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints
filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing
charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. These are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules,
punishable with suspension or even dismissal.45
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not
give an institution the unbridled authority to perform acts without any
statutory basis.46 For that reason, a school official, who is a member of
the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23537

March 31, 1965

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION, DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA and

CECILIO T. SENO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE MODESTO R. RAMOLETE of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu,
KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., and ROQUE
ABELLAR, respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
Respondent Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. (Katipunan for short), is
engaged in the Lumber business, and maintains a regular and
permanent staff of office employees, drivers and laborers, who perform
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the routinary phases of its operations, and who are affiliated with the
Cebu Industrial Labor Organization, a duly accredited labor union.
Regarding the other phases of its business, specially those which are
occasional, it engages, as all other firms dealing in the same kind of
business, independent labor contractors, the compensation of which
was dependent upon the work done, so much per thousand board feet
of lumber hauled, piled, transferred and/or classified. For the handling
and hauling, loading and unloading of lumber cargoes from the pier to
the lumberyard of Katipunan, Dionisio Antioquia was engaged; the City
Trucking Service, Inc., took care of handling the hauling, loading and
unloading of plywood cargoes from pier to bodega or from bodega to
pier and other places; Luis Amores was in charge of the classification,
piling and transfer of stocks from one place to another inside the
lumberyard; and CiriloCabasa, other manual work not included in the
routinary exigencies of work within the lumberyard. Since the case at
bar arose out of the contract of CiriloCabasa with Katipunan, We will
refrain from discussing the participation of the other independent
contractors.
CiriloCabasa had an existing contract with Katipunan to supply all the
laborers occasionally needed by it on the jobs not assigned to other
independent contractors and not embraced in the regular routinary
conduct of business. On August 18, 1964, Cabasa asked for the
termination of his contract. RoqueAbellar who also had similar
contracts, with other lumber companies in Cebu City, entered into a
written contract with respondent Katipunan, to furnish all the labor
needed by the latter, in connection with its business phases, before
performed by Cabasa.
On September 3, 1964, Katipunan and RoqueAbelar, filed with the CFI
of Cebu, presided over by the Honorable Modesto Ramolete, a
complaint for Injunction and Damages, with a Preliminary Injunction
(Civil Case No. R-8564), against Democrito T. Mendoza, Cecilio T. Seno
and the Associated Labor Union. In the complaint, besides stating the
jurisdictional facts and the harassing and coercive tactics, threats,
cajoleries and other overt acts which Katipunan claimed to be an illegal
interference by the respondents therein, in the contractual
obligations of Katipunan and Abellar, it was also alleged that there was
absolutely no employer-employee relationship between the Katipunan
and the laborers of the independent contractor Abellar, the latter being
strictly responsible in matters of control and supervision.
On September 8, 1964, respondent Judge Ramolete handed down an
Order, the pertinent portions of which recite:

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The allegations of facts of the plaintiffs and the further fact that the
said plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable damage unless the acts
complained of by the defendants will be restrained by a writ of
preliminary injunction. The Court believes that the writ may be issued
upon the plaintiffs' filing a bond of P50,000.00 to guarantee the
damages that may be suffered by the defendants in case the issuance
of the writ is not justified under the authority of Section 3 of Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, considering the request for the issuance in the meantime
of the writ of preliminary injunction justified and authorized under the
provisions of the said Rules of Court, the Court hereby grants the
request and let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued upon
plaintiffs' filing of a bond of P50,000.00 to answer for any damage that
may be caused on the defendants by the issuance of the writ,
restraining the said defendants, their agents, laborers, officials and
representatives from (a) blocking and disturbing the passage of trucks
used by co-plaintiff RoqueAbellar in the course of the performance of
the duties assumed by him under his contract with plaintiff Katipunan
Lumber Co., Inc., especially in the entry and exit of the same to and
from the premises of latter plaintiff's lumberyard; (b) disturbing and
molesting the laborers of co-plaintiff RoqueAbellar in the piers, wharf
and other places of loading and unloading of the lumber, plywood and
other construction materials, including the premises of plaintiff
Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.; (c) persuading, cajoling and/or coercing
shipping companies into refusing to accept the shipment of incoming
and outgoing cargoes of plaintiff Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc., and (d)
persuading and/or threatening plaintiff Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.'s
customers and dealers into refusing to purchase or deal with.
Defendants presented a Motion for Reconsideration and for Lifting of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, claiming that
(1) the Court did not have jurisdiction to issue the restraining order in
cases of the same nature as the one at bar;
(2) that peaceful picketing cannot be lawfully enjoined by any court in
this jurisdiction;
(3) that the requisites enumerated in Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875
should have been followed and not those provided in Section 3, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court in issuing the restraining Order in cases of the
same nature;

(4) that there is already pending an Unfair Labor practice case

involving the labor dispute presented with the CIR, by the ALU against
the Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc., where all the incidents relative to the
parties should be ventilated.
Plaintiffs therein, now private-parties respondents, on September 12,
1964, opposed the motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Court
had jurisdiction for the allegations in the complaint are the basis in
determining jurisdiction; that what respondent Court had enjoined was
not a peaceful picketing, but interference in the performance of the
contractual obligations of the plaintiffs; that Section 9 (d) of Republic
Act 875 does not apply; and that there was no unfair labor practice
case actually filed against Katipunan, although there was a charge,
which had not yet been investigated by the CIR.
Without waiting for resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration and
to lift the injunction, petitioners came to this Court on a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, raising the
same issues alleged in their motion for reconsideration in the lower
court. In effect, their petition centers on their assumption that the
matter between the Katipunan Lumber and Abellar on one hand, and
petitioners on the other, is a labor dispute of which the CFI cannot
validly take cognizance, and that in entertaining the same and in
issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
We gave Due Course to the petition and directed the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction as prayed for upon the posting of a P1,000.00
bond, and ordered respondents to answer. Before the Writ could be
issued, however, private-parties respondents presented a
Manifestation, inviting the attention of this Court to the fact that the
petition under consideration was filed prematurely, since there was, at
the time, pending resolution by the respondent Court, the Motion for
Reconsideration and Lifting of the Writ. This Court suspended the
issuance of the Injunctive Writ, and ordered petitioners to answer the
manifestation.
In a Very Urgent Reply to Respondents' Manifestation, petitioners
alleged that since the case involves a labor dispute, the respondent
court cannot validly take cognizance thereof, and while they did not
wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration, their case
falls within the exception, for there existed special reasons for not
exhausting all the remedies in the lower court, such as the
enforcement of the ex-parte writ, which resulted in the paralyzation of
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their right to self-organization, to picket and to otherwise promote the

collective welfare of petitioners and the members of the ALU.
Thereafter, several incidents had taken place, which need not be
considered, since they are not necessary in the determination of the
issues presently involved.
Under date of September 25, 1964, private-parties respondents filed
an Urgent Motion for Dismissal, claiming that the petition was
manifestly premature, and that the determination of whether the lower
court had jurisdiction over the case was dependent upon facts which
must be shown before respondent Court. Attached to said urgent
motion was the Order of the respondent Court, dated September 17,
1964, the pertinent portions of which read:
... Under these circumstances based on the opposing mere allegations
of the parties in which no evidence so far has been formally
presented, the Court finds itself unable to determine whether the
present case involves labor dispute or unfair labor practice, or it is
merely a simple civil case involving the restraining of some unlawful
and illegal acts committed and continued to be committed by the
defendants.
For these reasons the Court instead of resolving to lift or to maintain
the writ already issued defers the resolution of the defendants' motion
until evidence is presented by the parties to prove their respective
allegations and contentions, and, in order to expedite matters, the
hearing and reception of evidence of the parties on the main case shall
be set by the Clerk of Court as soon as the issues are joined; and the
defendants are required to answer the complaint within the legal
period counted from the time they are served copies of this order
embodying in their answer all the grounds they alleged in their motion
so that the issues may be put squarely before the Court for its
decision.1wph1.t
WHEREFORE, the consideration and resolution of the defendants'
motion for reconsideration and lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction are hereby deferred until evidence is presented by the
parties to establish their respective allegations and contentions and
the defendants are required to answer within the reglementary period
the plaintiffs' complaint; and, as soon as the issues are joined the Clerk
of Court shall immediately calendar the hearing of the main case for
the reception of the evidence of the parties with due notice to them.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Both parties, in the interim, filed various pleadings. On October 26,
1964, respondents presented a Manifestation inviting the attention of

TROPANG POTCHI

this Court to the fact that aside from the petitioners, filing their Answer
to the Complaint,they have also availed and/or actually commenced to
take advantage of the remedies available to them before the
respondent Court. So much so, that on October 23, 1964, respondent
Judge entered a Pre-Trial Order, which contained matters agreed upon
to be proved by the parties and those which they did not dispute. On
November 17, 1964, private-parties respondents, filed their Answer to
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and invoked the following
defenses, to wit:

10. That petitioner are amply protected of any damage that may be
caused them with the P50,000.00 injunction bond posted by
respondents.

1. The instant petition is premature;

No plausible argument could be offered to dispute the proposition that

what confers jurisdiction are the allegations of the complaint. In the
case at bar, the plaintiffs sought the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
damages on overt acts, which they considered illegal, and which had
caused them losses. They also asserted that there existed no
employer-employee relationship whatsoever between them. Generally,
therefore, upon such allegations, the CFI had jurisdiction over the case
and it was authorized under the Rules of Court to issue an injunctive
writ, even ex parte, upon a valid showing of the necessity thereof. It is
true that petitioners herein, in their motion for reconsideration and to
lift the writ of injunction, they alleged that there is a labor dispute. This
mere allegation did not serve to automatically deprive the Court of its
jurisdiction duly conferred by the allegations of the complaint. In the
wake of the assertions in the motion for reconsideration that there was,
in the opinion of the petitioners, a labor dispute, the respondent Court
was duty bound to find out if such a circumstance really existed. In
order to intelligently form an opinion regarding the matter, respondent
Court ordered the presentation of evidence by both parties.
Unfortunately, however, petitioners, without waiting for the resolution
of the court a quo on their motion for reconsideration and to lift the
injunction, they filed with this Court the instant petition. In the case
of Villa-Rey Transit, vs. Hon. E. Bello, G.R. No. L-18957. April 23, 1963,
We said:

2. Petitioners have speedy and adequate remedy before the lower

court which they failed to exhaust before presenting the instant
petition;
3. The instant proceedings have been rendered moot and academic,
because petitioners have actually taken advantage of the remedies
available to them in the court below;
4. That whether the case involves a labor dispute could only be
determined after a hearing, which the respondent court has already
ordered;
5. That the principal cause of action as alleged in the complaint is for
the recovery of P50,000.00 as damages, a matter of which the
respondent Court has jurisdiction, and all orders issued in connection
therewith being within its power and authority;
6. That the nature of an action as appearing in the complaint, cannot
be changed nor varied by the impleading by the defendants of
defenses tending to change the cause of action;
7. The alleged failure of respondent judge to observe the procedural
requirements of section 9(a) of Act 875, merely amounted to an error
of judgment, not reviewable by certiorari;
8. That the acts enjoined by respondent judge are not the acts
insulated from injunction under section 9(a) of Act 875;
9. That there is no pending Unfair Labor Practice Case against the
Katipunan Lumber; and

A panoramic appraisal of the facts of the case will show that the issue
primarily involved is whether the respondent Court had jurisdiction
over the case, as the allegation of the complaint indicates, and/or there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Court in
issuing the injunctive writ, so that certiorari or prohibition would lie.

True, that petitioner had filed a motion to lift order of default, and a
motion for new trial and to set aside the default judgment, but before
they could be resolved, petitioner had already brought the matter to
this Court, on a petition for Certiorari and Injunction, without giving the
respondent Court an opportunity to pass upon the said motions, which
act renders the filing of the present petition premature.
Obviously, therefore, the petition at bar is premature.
There is manifestly, a need for evidence towards proving the
allegations pertaining to petitioners' claim of a labor dispute. This act is
properly within the power and prerogative of respondent Court. Even
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TROPANG POTCHI

petitioners are aware of this fact, for they have already presented their
Answer to the complainant and have entered into a pre-trial. When
there are other remedies, proper and adequate in the
premises, certiorari or prohibition will not lie. Should the lower court
ultimately hold that it has jurisdiction, appeal in due time would
perhaps be the proper remedy.
Petitioner further ascribe excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion to respondent Court, because it issued the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction ex parte and in violation of the provisions of Act
No. 875. The Rules properly gives the Court the authority to issue
injunctive writs ex parte. Since the cause of action was for damages,
arising from what plaintiffs, now respondents, pointed as interference
in the performance of contractual obligations, there was no occasion,
at that time, for respondent Judge to consider the applicability of Act
No. 875. It was only when the matter of an apparent labor dispute was
injected by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, that said act
could be considered Judge wanted to hear evidence to assure himself
whether there is or excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion. Predicated upon the allegations of the complaint, the
respondent Judge though it had jurisdiction, which conclusion, if
erroneous, was merely a judicial error or a mistake of law. When the
court has jurisdiction over or a subject matter, the orders or decisions
upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions
within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be,
they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Gala v. Cui and Rodriguez, 23
Phil. 522; Galang v. Endencia, 73 Phil. 399; Villa-Rey Transit v. Bello,
G.R. No. L-21399, Jan. 31, 1964).
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs
against petitioner.

illiteracy before voting and who were aided only by one inspector of
election are null and void.
That the respondent Judge failed to make findings of the facts
presented wherein the petitioner contends that these facts were
sufficient to annul an election.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner filed at the proper venue with a
proper petition.

Dela Cruz vsMoir

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to be directed to the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga requiring him to remit to this court
all the records and papers relating to a certain election contest
pending therein instituted by Juan de la Cruz against Melecio M.
Trinidad, that the proceeding had in said contest may be revised by
this court and certain of the steps taken therein be declared null and
void on the ground that they were taken by the court without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
The petition shows that on the 20th of June, 1916, Juan de la Cruz filed
a protest in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Melecio M.
Trinidad and others challenging the validity of the election of said
Trinidad to the office of municipal president of Macabebe, Pampanga.
The contest was duly brought on for hearing. After hearing and the
presentation of evidence the court dismissed the proceedings on the
merits. The particular acts of the court of which complaint is made are
set out in the petition in this case as follows:
That in trying and dismissing the said election protest filed by the
petitioner, the said respondent the Hon. Percy M. Moir, as judge, of first
instance of Pampanga, has exceeded his jurisdiction in that although
the said respondent judge admits that there were 193 electors of
Macabebe who voted as illiterates and most of whom took no oath
regarding their illiteracy before voting and who were aided only by one
inspector of election and not by two as required by the election law,
yet the said respondent judge has entirely and voluntarily failed,
omitted and refused to separate the votes of the said illiterates and to
declare the same as null and void, and act which is not only in excess
of his jurisdiction but is manifestly against the law, for the votes of
illiterates who have not taken the necessary oath regarding their

RULING: We are of the opinion that the petition does not state facts
sufficient to warrant the relief prayed for. We have held in a long line of
decisions that certiorari will not lie under the law of the Philippine
Islands except in cases where the court has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction and the acts thus performed are void. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued
unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will not be issued to cure
errors in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or
of fact. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the
person, decisions upon all question pertaining to the cause are
decisions within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous
they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause - the right
to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determined, it does
not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or
upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should
therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The
authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered
therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the
person and subject-matter, as we have said before, the decision of all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction.
A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court
touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully supports the
proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person, its decision of any
question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be
reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal
None of the acts set out in the petition affect the jurisdiction of the
court. They are acts performed in the exercise of jurisdiction; and even
though the decision of the court upon each one of the questions
presented by the allegations of the petition was wrong in fact and in
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law, his jurisdiction would remain unaffected. As we have said so many

times, it is always necessary to bear in mind the difference between
jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. When a court exercises its
jurisdiction an error committed while engaged in that exercise does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction which it is exercising when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive if
of jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This, of course, is not possible. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. The decision of the trial court in the case
before us holding that certain ballots cast by illiterates which had been
prepared for them by the inspectors of election were legal and valid
although the illiterates did not, previous to the preparation of their
ballots by the inspectors, take the oath required by law showing that
they could not cast their ballots without assistance, is a decision
entirely within the jurisdiction of the court, even if we concede for the
sake or argument that the court was wrong in that decision. The same
could be said if he had held the precise contrary and had excluded all
of the ballots cast by illiterates; and, of course, it necessarily follows
that his failure to separate those which the petitioner claims were
illegal from those he claims were legal does not alter the situation. The
court has power and authority to conduct the case as he believes law
and justice require and whatever he does is within his jurisdiction so
long as he does not violate the principle of due process of law or
transcend the limits of the case before him.
We reach the same result in discussing the other alleged errors. The
denial of the motion to separate the illegal from the legal ballots, the
rejection of the offer to prove that the majority of the illiterate voters
could read and write, the refusal to annul 62 ballots in favor of Melecio
M. Trinidad in spite of the fact that they were marked with certain
letters, the finding that a certain ballot box had been tampered with
after the ballots have been counted and the box sealed by the
inspectors, the refusal to annul the election in the municipality of
Macabebe on account of certain irregularities and violations of law
which took place in the conduct thereof, and the counting of more than
40 marked ballots in favor of Trinidad and the refusal to count legal
ballots in favor of Juan de la Cruz, do not touch the jurisdiction of the
court in any way. They are all decisions made in the exercise of its
jurisdiction and however erroneous they may be, if they or any of them
are erroneous at all, it had power and authority to make them and they
cannot be attacked on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On the oral argument it was said by counsel for the petitioner that
some of the findings of the trial court were without evidence to support
them. There is no allegation to this effect in the petition and no
question of that sort is presented by the pleadings. We might say,
however, that, even if the question were presented and it were

TROPANG POTCHI

admitted that certain findings were without evidence to support them,

that would not mean necessarily that the judgment on the whole case
was rendered without jurisdiction and was void. If the judgment was
utterly without basis in the record as a whole to such an extent that it
was a purely arbitrary act of the court, then a different question might
be presented. That is not the case here and we have no reason to
consider or decide such a question

INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, represented by its proprietress,

MARCELINA I. PAGSIBIGAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167590

SUPREME COURT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), the OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), the LABOR ARBITERS OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), the HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and the
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Petitioners,

Manil

vs.

The petition is dismissed on the merits, with costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 152642

November 13, 2012

HON. PATRICIA A. STO.TOMAS, ROSALINDA BALDOZ and LUCITA

LAZO, Petitioners,

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (P ASEI),

Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 182978-79
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

vs.

REY SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU, MARIO MONTENEGRO, DODGIE

BELONIO, LOLIT SALINEL and BUDDY BONNEVIE, Respondents.

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of

daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC., and
JAIME ORTIZ (President of White Falcon Services, Inc.), Respondents.

G.R. No. 152710

HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Secretary of
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), HON. ROSALINDA D.
BALDOZ, in her capacity as Administrator, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), and the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNING BOARD, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. PANEDA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
220, Quezon City, ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER,
INC. (ARCOPHIL), for itself and in behalf of its members: WORLDCARE
PHILIPPINES SERVIZO INTERNATIONALE, INC., STEADFAST
INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT CORP., VERDANT MANPOWER
MOBILIZATION CORP., BRENT OVERSEAS PERSONNEL, INC., ARL
MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., DAHLZEN INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC.,
INTERWORLD PLACEMENT CENTER, INC., LAKAS TAO CONTRACT
SERVICES LTD. CO., SSC MULTI-SERVICES, DMJ INTERNATIONAL, and MIP

G.R. Nos. 184298-99

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
deceased daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), Petitioners,
vs.
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER AND
PROMOTION, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts and the Case
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TROPANG POTCHI

On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among
other purposes, sets the Governments policies on overseas
employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and
overseas Filipinos in distress.

On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.

intervened in the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March
20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the
deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The Confederated
Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA)
intervened for the same purpose.4

G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710

On May 23, 2002 the Court5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the
Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.

(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)

Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1 commanded the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its
passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the
regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario
Montenegro, DodgieBelonio, LolitSalinel, and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et
al.) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96.2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO
10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the
DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further
issuing rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and
placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them
to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29
and 30 of Republic Act 8042.

On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.s petition
and ordered the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the
recruitment and placement of OFWs.3 The RTC also annulled DOLE DO
10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders, circulars and issuances that are
inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.
Prompted by the RTCs above actions, the government officials
concerned filed the present petition in G.R. 152642 seeking to annul
the RTCs decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the
petition.

In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment

Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for TRO and
preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General,6 before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from implementing the
2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and desist from issuing
other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate the
recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of the policy of
deregulation provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting
the petition and enjoining the government agencies involved from
exercising regulatory functions over the recruitment and placement of
OFWs. This prompted the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and
the TESDA Director-General to file the present action in G.R. 152710.
As in G.R. 152642, the Court issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining
the Quezon City RTC, Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed7 the Court that
on April 10, 2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into
law R.A. 94228 which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A.
8042 and adopted the policy of close government regulation of the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422 pertinently provides:
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" is
hereby amended to read as follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration The
Administration shall regulate private sector participation in the
recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a
licensing and registration system. It shall also formulate and
implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when
necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the overseas
employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration their welfare
and the domestic manpower requirements.

In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform

migrant workers not only of their rights as workers but also of their
rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert
their rights and provide the available mechanism to redress violation of
their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the
requirements for trained and competent Filipino workers of foreign
governments and their instrumentalities, and such other employers as
public interests may require, the administration shall deploy only to
countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor
agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such countries shall
guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino migrant workers; and:
Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or comply with
the international laws and standards for migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R.
152642 that they agree9 with the Republics view that the repeal of
Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their
action moot and academic. The Court has no reason to disagree.
Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should be
dismissed for being moot and academic.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and
9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a
portion of Section 10 but the Court will take up this point later together
with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the
acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for
prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6.Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall
mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for
profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of
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authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.

442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or non-holder, who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the
following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a nonlicensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
SEC. 7.Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions
arising from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of the province or city
where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on
the ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment" is vague as it fails
to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters11 and for
that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in
violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with
government licenses or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary to the RTCs finding, actually makes a
distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms,
persons who engage in "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the
appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated
in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if
they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.

TROPANG POTCHI

The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground

that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make any
distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the
application of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an example,
said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under Section
6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor Department under
Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for six years and one day
and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but which could unreasonably go
even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least three
persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such
grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that were not
as condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform
penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress
was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally
reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full
protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within
the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice.
Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010
with the enactment of R.A. 1002212 which increased even more the
duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for
the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the
unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the countrys borders and
beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an
effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within
its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out
without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat
such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura,13 the State under its police
power "may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or
tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them
against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud." Police power is "that inherent and plenary power
of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society."14
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground
that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in their place
of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases
which is the place where the crime or any of its essential elements
were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws
and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of
the offended parties violates their right to due process. Section 9
provides:

SEC. 9.Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as

defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed
shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided,
however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those
criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an
alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs
from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions
provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing
laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal
actions is, consistent with that laws declared policy15 of providing a
criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of
the victims of illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,16 and G.R. 184298-9917
(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases.
Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas)
filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages against
petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and
White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their
daughter JasminCuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the
Cuaresmas had already received insurance benefits arising from their
daughters death from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to the findings of the Saudi
Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
found Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable for Jasmins
death and ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas the amount of
US$113,000.00 as actual damages. The NLRC relied on the Cabanatuan
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City Health Offices autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal

violence and rape.

TROPANG POTCHI

The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:

SEC. 10. Money Claims. x xx

Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).18 On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen and White
Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for
actual damages, with Becmen having a right of reimbursement from
White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision to
this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmins death not work-related or
work-connected since her rape and death did not occur while she was
on duty at the hospital or doing acts incidental to her employment. The
Court deleted the award of actual damages but ruled that Becmens
corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their company
for its failure to investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and
White Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the
Cuaresmas in obtaining justice for their daughter. Consequently, the
Court held the foreign employer Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon,
Becmen, and the latters corporate directors and officers jointly and
severally liable to the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral
damages; 2) P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorneys fees
of 10% of the total monetary award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen,
namely, EufrocinaGumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and
Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to
Intervene. They questioned the constitutionality of the last sentence of
the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the
corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily liable
with their company for money claims filed by OFWs against their
employers and the recruitment firms. On September 9, 2009 the Court
allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay, et al.s motion for
reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd
paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate
directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies
jointly and solidarilyliable for money claims and damages that may be
adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as
unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10
of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the
corporate officers and directors of the erring company had knowledge
of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically
liable would violate their right to due process of law.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement

agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and
several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its
approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to
the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being,
the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that
the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To
make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must
be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that
company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal
activities.19 In the case of Becmen and White Falcon,20 while there is
evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the
cause of Jasmins death, there is no mention of any evidence in the
case against them that intervenorsGumabay, et al., Becmens
corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their
companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to
regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if
not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs
seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire
into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative
Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case
that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the
petitions for having become moot and academic.1wphi1
In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court ofManila dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7,
and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the
Court HOLDS the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10
of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court, however,
RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R.

182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held

intervenorsEufrocinaGumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and
Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent Becmen
Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia and Mila
Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such intervenors had
a part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Civil Service Commission vs CA

Facts
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar
(Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for
Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP)2 in 2005.
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then
PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra
and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of
official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.3 Cueva charged Guevarra with
falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond
of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the
Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending
criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the school, Guevarra
was required to be bonded in order to be able to engage in financial
transactions on behalf of PUP.4 In his Application for Bond of
Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines
(General Form No. 58-A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so,
state briefly the nature thereof NO.5
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra
and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.6 Cezar, knowing fully
well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before the
Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the
application.7
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The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or

administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or
administrative case.8 Thus, because their cases had not yet been
decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded
to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good
faith.9
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued
Resolution No. 06052110 formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty
and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable
under the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case11 praying that the
case be suspended immediately and that the CSC declare a complete
absence of a prima facie case against them. Cueva, on the other hand,
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive
Suspension12 and an Omnibus Motion13 seeking the issuance of an
order of preventive suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the
inclusion of the following offenses in the formal charge against them:
Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously
Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.

In Resolution No. 061141, dated June 30, 2006,14 the CSC denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents for being a nonresponsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a
prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission.15 It also denied
Cuevas motion to include additional charges against the respondents.
The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for
ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as the officer-incharge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible
witnesses against him.
Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the
CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. On
December 29, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition
and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC
for having been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the CA,
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the second paragraph of which
states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary

TROPANG POTCHI

action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction," bestows

upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and
Cezar. In addition, the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the
complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have
exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances
to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original

concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under
the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
RULING:
The petitions are meritorious.
Both CSC and Cueva contend that because the CSC is the central
personnel agency of the government, it has been expressly granted by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 the authority to assume original
jurisdiction over complaints directly filed with it. The CSC explains that
under the said law, it has appellate jurisdiction over all administrative
disciplinary proceedings and original jurisdiction over complaints
against government officials and employees filed before it by private
citizens.16 Accordingly, the CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction,
together with the PUP Board of Regents, over the administrative case
against Guevarra and Cezar and it can take cognizance of a case filed
directly with it, despite the fact that the Board of Regents is the
disciplining authority of university employees.

Respondents Guevarra and Cezar, on the other hand, fully adopted the
position of the CA in its questioned decision and propounded the
additional argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 has effectively
removed from the CSC the authority to hear and decide on cases filed
directly with it.
CSC has jurisdiction over cases
filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the
power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it

directly or on appeal.17 Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987

Constitution defines the scope of the civil service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,18 PUP became a
chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or
controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are
part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No.
292.19
The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are
government employees and part of the Civil Service. The controversy,
however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book
V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it
may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials
to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty
to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case
the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
While in its assailed decision, the CA conceded that paragraph one of
the same provision abovequoted allows the filing of a complaint
directly with the CSC, it makes a distinction between a complaint filed
by a private citizen and that of an employee under the jurisdiction of
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the disciplining authority involved. The CA resolved that because

Cueva was then the Dean of the College of Law and the Chief Legal
Counsel of PUP when he filed the complaint with the CSC, he was under
the authority of the PUP Board of Regents. Thus, it is the Board of
Regents which had exclusive jurisdiction over the administrative case
he initiated against Guevarra and Cezar.
The Court finds itself unable to sustain the reading of the CA.

TROPANG POTCHI

to disenfranchising government employees by removing from them an

alternative course of action against erring public officials.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by
a private citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service,
especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book
V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to
"hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal" without any qualification.

It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is

immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case
by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may
deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation.
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board of Regents over

The issue is not novel.

The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case
filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in
the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory
construction which requires that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The
Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping
with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a
well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable
interpretation so as not to defeat the very purpose for which they were
passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be
unjust or lead to absurd results."20 In Secretary of Justice v. Koruga,21
the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on the
overzealous application of the plain meaning rule:
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is
that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a
literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate
unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the
statute taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to
give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequences.22
A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private
citizens can file a complaint directly with the CSC. For administrative
cases instituted by government employees against their fellow public
servants, the CSC would only have appellate jurisdiction over those.
Such a plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would
effectively divest CSC of its original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided
by law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be tantamount

In the case of Camacho v. Gloria,23 the Court stated that "under E.O.
No. 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed
with either the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil
Service Commission."24 It is important to note that the Court did not
interpret the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude
complaints filed directly with it by a member of the civil service.
Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service
Commission,25 the Court interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC
by a public official of a complaint against a fellow government
employee. In the said case, Quezon City Vice-Mayor CharitoPlanas
directly filed with the CSC a complaint for usurpation, grave
misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against the City
Legal Officer of Quezon City. The CSC issued a resolution ruling that the
respondent official should not be allowed to continue holding the
position of legal officer. In a petition to the Supreme Court, the official
in question asserted that the City Mayor was the only one who could
remove him from office directly and not the CSC. The Court upheld the
decision of the CSC, citing the same provision of the Administrative
Code:
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing
under the law to prevent her from filing a complaint directly with the
CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC determined that petitioner
was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was
acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and
decide complaints filed before it.26 [Underscoring supplied]
It has been argued that Hilario is not squarely in point.27 While it is
true that the circumstances present in the two cases are not identical,
a careful reading of Hilario reveals that petitioner therein questioned
the authority of the CSC to hear the disciplinary case filed against him,
alleging that the CSCs jurisdiction was only appellate in nature. Hence,
the reference to the abovequoted passage in Hilario is very appropriate
in this case as respondents herein pose a similar query before us.

administrative cases
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service28 (the
Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide
administrative cases directly brought before it:
Section 4.Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil
Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil
Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in
the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline
and efficiency of such officers and employees. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have
the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to mean
that the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority,
in this case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided
on the charges against the respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed to
take into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which
undeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and
belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases
on appeal:
Section 7.Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities
shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over
their respective officers and employees.29 [Emphasis supplied]
It was also argued that although Section 4 of the Uniform Rules is silent
as to who can file a complaint directly with the CSC, it cannot be
construed to authorize one who is not a private citizen to file a
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complaint directly with the CSC. This is because a rule issued by a

government agency pursuant to its law-making power cannot modify,
reduce or enlarge the scope of the law which it seeks to implement.30

TROPANG POTCHI

6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by

Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and

Following the earlier disquisition, it can be said that the Uniform Rules
does not contradict the Administrative Code. Rather, the former simply
provides a reasonable interpretation of the latter. Such action is
perfectly within the authority of the CSC, pursuant to Section 12(2),
Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, which gives it the
power to "prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other
pertinent laws."

Another view has been propounded that the original jurisdiction of the
CSC has been further limited by Section 5 of the Uniform Rules, such
that the CSC can only take cognizance of complaints filed directly with
it which: (1) are brought against personnel of the CSC central office, (2)
are against third level officials who are not presidential appointees, (3)
are against officials and employees, but are not acted upon by the
agencies themselves, or (4) otherwise require direct or immediate
action in the interest of justice:
Section 5.Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil
Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following
cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of the Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on
petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing penalties
exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper
personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential
appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are
not acted upon by the agencies and such other complaints requiring
direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;

8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in

connection with the foregoing enumerations.
It is the Courts position that the Uniform Rules did not supplant the
law which provided the CSC with original jurisdiction. While the Uniform
Rules may have so provided, the Court invites attention to the cases of
Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso31 and Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor,32 to be further discussed in the course of this decision, both of
which buttressed the pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares
its authority to discipline erring school officials and employees with the
CSC. It can be presumed that, at the time of their promulgation, the
members of this Court, in Alfonso and Sojor, were fully aware of all the
existing laws and applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the CSC, including the Uniform Rules. In fact, Sojor
specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support of its ruling allowing the
CSC to take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it
against the president of a state university. As the Court, in the two
cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform Rules as a limitation to
the original concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC, it can be stated that
Section 5 is merely implementary. It is merely directory and not
restrictive of the CSCs powers. The CSC itself is of this view as it has
vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through this petition.
The case of Alfonso33 is on all fours with the case at bench. The case
involved a complaint filed before the CSC against a PUP employee by
two employees of the same university. The CA was then faced with the
identical issue of whether it was the CSC or the PUP Board of Regents
which had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against the
said PUP employee. The CA similarly ruled that the CSC could take
cognizance of an administrative case if the decisions of secretaries or
heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities were appealed to it or if a private citizen directly filed
with the CSC a complaint against a government official or employee.
Because the complainants in the said case were PUP employees and
not private citizens, the CA held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to
hear the administrative case. It further posited that even assuming the
CSC had the authority to do so, immediate resort to the CSC violated
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the complaint
should have been first lodged with the PUP Board of Regents to allow
them the opportunity to decide on the matter. This Court, however,
reversed the said decision and declared the following:

Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases

decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities.
However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the
Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it
may opt to deputize a department or an
agency to conduct the investigation.
We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation
of disciplinary committees and governing bodies in different branches,
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear
and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers
and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of
such bodies nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670
allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies as having
divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline
government employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC
was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and
accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the
Constitution itself.
But it is not only for this reason that Alfonsos argument must fail.
Equally significant is the fact that he had already submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit and his
motion for reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not
from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-Central Office to the
CSC-NCR. It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly
had a change of heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction.
This cannot be allowed because it would violate the doctrine of res
judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to administrative cases as
well. At the very least, respondents active participation in the
proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars
him from impugning the Commissions authority under the principle of
estoppel by laches.
In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP
employees. These complaints were not lodged before the disciplinary
tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with averments
detailing respondents alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and
regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission found
that a prima facie case existed against Alfonso, prompting the
Commission to file a formal charge against the latter. Verily, since the
complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to
assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of
jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising
concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to deputize
any department or agency or official or group of officials such as the
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BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation, or to delegate the

investigation to the proper regional office. But the same is merely
permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.34 [Emphases
and underscoring supplied]
It has been opined that Alfonso does not apply to the case at bar
because respondent therein submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit before it, thereby preventing
him from later questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. Such
circumstance is said to be totally absent in this case.35
The records speak otherwise. As in Alfonso, respondents herein
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the CSC when they filed
their Joint Counter-Affidavit.36 It was only when their Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case37
was denied by the CSC that they thought to put in issue the jurisdiction
of the CSC before the CA, clearly a desperate attempt to evade
prosecution by the CSC. As in Alfonso, respondents are also estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the
CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it
against an official or employee of a chartered state college or
university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private
citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is
shared with the Board of Regents of the school.

TROPANG POTCHI

petitioner therein guilty of the charges against him and dismissing him
from the service. The trial court upheld the resolution of the director of
LAS-CHED but on appeal, this was reversed by the CA, affirming the
decision of the CHED chairman removing petitioner from service. One
of the issues raised therein before this Court was whether the CA erred
in disregarding the fact that the complaint was not made under oath as
required by the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292.

The respondents are mistaken.

In the said case, the Court concurred with the findings of the CA that it
was the formal charge issued by the LAS-CHED which constituted the
complaint, and because the same was initiated by the appropriate
disciplining authority, it need not be subscribed and sworn to and
CHED acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court further affirmed
the authority of the heads of agencies to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against their officers and
employees. It bears stressing, at this point, that there is nothing in the
case that remotely implies that this Court meant to place upon the
Board of Regent exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases filed
against their employees.
In fact, following the ruling in Gaoiran, it can be argued that it was CSC
Resolution No. 060521 which formally charged respondents that
constituted the complaint, and since the complaint was initiated by the
CSC itself as the disciplining authority, the CSC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict

Gaoiran not applicable

with E.O. No. 292.
In its decision, the CA relied heavily on Gaoiran v. Alcala38 to support
its judgment that it is the Board of Regents, and not the CSC, which
has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint filed against the
respondents.
A thorough study of the said case, however, reveals that it is irrelevant
to the issues discussed in the case at bench. Gaoiran speaks of a
complaint filed against a high school teacher of a state-supervised
school by another employee of the same school. The complaint was
referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher
Education (LAS-CHED). After a fact-finding investigation established the
existence of a prima facie case against the teacher, the Officer-inCharge of the Office of the Director of LAS-CHED issued a formal
charge for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, together with the Order of Preventive
Suspension. The newly-appointed Director of LAS-CHED, however,
dismissed the administrative complaint on the ground that the lettercomplaint was not made under oath. Unaware of this previous
resolution, the Chairman of the CHED issued another resolution finding

and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other

duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its
discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not with
standing; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law. [Emphasis supplied]

In addition, the respondents argue that R.A. No. 8292, which granted to
the board of regents or board of trustees disciplinary authority over
school employees and officials of chartered state colleges and
universities, should prevail over the provisions of E.O. No. 292.39 They
anchor their assertion that the Board of Regents has exclusive
jurisdiction over administrative cases on Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292,40
to wit:
Section 4.Powers and duties of Governing Boards. The governing
board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to
its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers
granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of
Batas PambansaBlg. 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of
the Philippines;
(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative
officials and employees subject to the provisions of the revised
compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget

Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and

harmonizing laws is the best method of interpretation in order to form
a uniform, complete, coherent, and intelligible system of jurisprudence,
in accordance with the legal maxim interpretare et
concordarelegeslegibusestoptimusinterpretandi modus.41 Simply
because a later statute relates to a similar subject matter as that of an
earlier statute does not result in an implied repeal of the latter.42
A perusal of the abovequoted provision clearly reveals that the same
does not indicate any intention to remove employees and officials of
state universities and colleges from the ambit of the CSC. What it
merely states is that the governing board of a school has the authority
to discipline and remove faculty members and administrative officials
and employees for cause. It neither supersedes nor conflicts with E.O.
No. 292 which allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases
filed directly with it or on appeal.
In addition to the previously cited case of Alfonso, the case of The Civil
Service Commission v. Sojor43 is likewise instructive. In the said case,
this Court ruled that the CSC validly took cognizance of the
administrative complaints directly filed with it concerning violations of
civil service rules committed by a university president. This Court
acknowledged that the board of regents of a state university has the
sole power of administration over a university, in accordance with its
charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining and removal
of its employees and officials, however, such authority is not exclusive
to it because all members of the civil service fall under the jurisdiction
of the CSC:
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over
the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of
disciplining and removing its employees and officials. Although the
BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to
discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such
power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body
the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved
that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
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All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does
not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the
jurisdiction of the CSC.44 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

It has been pointed out that the case of Sojor is not applicable to the
case at bar because the distinction between a complaint filed by a
private citizen and one filed by a government employee was not taken
into consideration in the said case.45 The dissent fails to consider that
Sojor is cited in the ponencia to support the ruling that R.A. No. 8292 is
not in conflict with E.O. No. 292 and to counter respondents flawed
argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 granted the Board of
Regents exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases against school
employees and officials of chartered state colleges and universities.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the complainants before the CSC in
Sojor were faculty members of a state university and were, thus,
government employees. Nevertheless, despite this, the Court allowed
the CSC to assert jurisdiction over the administrative case, proclaiming
that the power of the Board of Regents to discipline its officials and
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with the CSC.46
The case of University of the Philippines v. Regino47 was also cited to
bolster the claim that original jurisdiction over disciplinary cases
against government officials is vested upon the department secretaries
and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities, whereas the CSC only enjoys appellate jurisdiction over
such cases.48 The interpretation therein of the Administrative Code
supposedly renders effectual the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 and does
not "deprive the governing body of the power to discipline its own
officials and employees and render inutile the legal provisions on
disciplinary measures which may be taken by it."49
The Court respectfully disagrees. Regino is obviously inapplicable to
this case because there, the school employee had already been found
guilty and dismissed by the Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines. Therefore, the issue put forth before this Court was
whether the CSC had appellate jurisdiction over cases against
university employees, considering the university charter which gives it
academic freedom allegedly encompassing institutional autonomy. In
contrast, no administrative case was filed before the Board of Regents
of PUP because the case was filed directly with the CSC and so, the
question here is whether the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction
over disciplinary cases. Rationally, the quoted portions in Regino find
no application to the case at bench because those statements were

TROPANG POTCHI

made to uphold the CSCs appellate jurisdiction which was being

contested by petitioner therein. At the risk of being repetitive, it is
hereby stressed that the authority of the CSC to hear cases on appeal
has already been established in this case. What is in question here is
its original jurisdiction over administrative cases.

into the matter, thereby considerably easing the burden placed upon
the CSC.

A different interpretation of the Administrative Code was suggested in

order to harmonize the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. 292. By
allowing only a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC,
the CSC maintains its power to review on appeal decisions of the Board
of Regents while at the same time the governing board is not deprived
of its power to discipline its officials and employees.50

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006 and June
30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission are
REINSTATED.

To begin with, there is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O.
No. 292, as previously explained in Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to
see how a complaint filed by a private citizen is any different from one
filed by a government employee. If the grant to the CSC of concurrent
original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by private citizens
against public officials would not deprive the governing bodies of the
power to discipline their own officials and employees and would not be
violative of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case filed by
a government employee would do so. Such a distinction between cases
filed by private citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical
and unreasonable. To accede to such a mistaken interpretation of the
Administrative Code would be a great disservice to our developing
jurisprudence.1wphi1
It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292
giving the board of regents or board of trustees of a state school the
authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still retains jurisdiction
over the school and its employees and has concurrent original
jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university,
over administrative cases against state university officials and
employees.
Finally, with regard to the concern that the CSC may be overwhelmed
by the increase in number of cases filed before it which would result
from our ruling,51 it behooves us to allay such worries by highlighting
two important facts. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has
original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in
question, in this case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if
the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint, then it
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.52 Thus, not all
administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly, Section
47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to deputize
some other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation

Having thus concluded, the Court sees no need to discuss the other
issues raised in the petitions.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149588

September 29, 2009

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition captioned as "Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari,
with Preliminary Injunction," petitioners assail, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the trial courts decision convicting them of "other form of
swindling" penalized by Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

The antecedent facts and proceedings that led to the filing of the
instant petition are pertinently narrated as follows:
On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of "other forms of
swindling" in the Information,1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 11787,
which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1978, in the municipality
of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
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well knowing that their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6
of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey of
Paraaque, LRC Record No. N-26926, Case No. 4869, situated at Barrio
San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, was mortgaged
to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely
representing the same to be free from all liens and encumbrances
whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned
property for the sum of P12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to
the damage and prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the
aforementioned amount of P12,895.00.
Contrary to law.2
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision3 on June 30,
1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
two months and to pay the fine of P18,085.00 each.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999 Decision4 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In its
December 22, 1999 Resolution,5 the appellate court further denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners
filed before this Court, on February 11, 2000, their petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 141208.6 The Court, however, on March 13,
2000, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material
dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on June 28, 2000,7 the judgment of conviction became
final and executory.

TROPANG POTCHI

The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the

September 24, 2001 Resolution,11 but reinstated the same, on motion
for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.12

time of the filing of the information, the applicable law was Batas
PambansaBilang 129,16 approved on August 14, 1981, which
pertinently provides:

After a thorough evaluation of petitioners arguments vis--vis the

applicable law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition.

Section 20.Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those
now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter.

In People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of

annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, thus
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy
of annulment of judgment to the following:
Section 1.Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.a1f
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being
questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded
Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal
cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18.Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.
The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to
procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original
and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as
they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.

With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001
Warrant of Arrest,8 the police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner
Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police,
nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he
was nowhere to be found.9

There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of

Rule 47 to criminal cases. As we explained in Macalalag v.
Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing for this remedy,
recourse to it cannot be allowed

On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of
the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.10

Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a

decision in a criminal case. Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow
such recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules.

There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion,
petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings
for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.

In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court which
rendered the assailed decision had jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action determines the jurisdiction of the court.15 In this case, at the

Section 32.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
Article 316(2) of the RPC, the provision which penalizes the crime
charged in the information, provides that
Article 316. Other forms of swindling.The penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value
of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall
be imposed upon:
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall
dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded.
The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, which has a duration of 1 month and 1
day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than three times such value. Here, as alleged in
the information, the value of the damage caused, or the imposable
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fine, is P12,895.00. Clearly, from a reading of the information, the

jurisdiction over the criminal case was with the RTC and not the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The MeTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of
the information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with
a fine of not more than P4,000.00.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Republic of the Philippines

Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the

following reasons:
1. The summary proceeding was null and void because no hearing was
conducted; and
2. The evidence presented at the summary hearing does not prove that
respondent is guilty of the charges against him.
Respondent insists that the summary hearing officer did not conduct
any hearing at all but only relied on the affidavits and pleadings
submitted to him, without propounding further questions to
complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses such as PO2
Villarama. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there
was no full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer does not
invalidate said proceedings. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,1 the Court
reiterated the time-honored principle that:

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154243

December 22, 2007

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL
AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF
SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, petitioners,
vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision promulgated on March 6, 2007. In said Decision, the Court
granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civilian complaint
against respondent and that the latter was accorded due process
during the summary hearing.

render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari.

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type

proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to
be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
The standard of due process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place
of their direct testimony.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The first issue presented by respondent must, therefore, be struck
down.
To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court recalibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary
hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove
respondent's guilt of the charges against him.
However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by
respondent before the Regional Trial Court is one for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as held in People v. Court of
Appeals,3 where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to

Yet, respondent-movant's arguments and the fact that the

administrative case against respondent was filed way back in 1997,
convinced the Court to suspend the rules of procedure.

The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does not toll
the running of the period to appeal.4

However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. In Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of
Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in
order to promote substantial justice where matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has
rendered years of service to the country.
In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately
resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for
reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision as an appeal before the
National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to
which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against
respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990. Section 41 states that citizens' complaints
should be brought before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB),
while Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to
immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a police officer.
It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals,7 promulgated in 2005 or
after respondent had already filed the petition for certiorari with the
trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of which body has
jurisdiction over cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A.
No. 6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional
directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases filed
against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service,
but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors,
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said authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the

case.

With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent

should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate his
arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an
appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a
settled jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.8 In Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court stressed thus:

After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but
are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation
of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed
liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial
justice.10

Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be

deemed available to respondent in the higher interest of substantial
justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is partly
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated March 6, 2007 is MODIFIED
such that respondent is hereby allowed to file his appeal with the
National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from finality of herein
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife of retired Major Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia,with application for injunctive relief in order issued by
the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayandenying the motion to quash or
dismiss Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for the forfeiturecommenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.The forfeiture suit
was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that
theGarcias allegedly acquired and amassed. Then Republic then filed
with the Sandiganbaythrough the OMB a petition for forfeiture of those
alleged unlawfully acquired properties of theGarcias. The case was

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docketed as Civil Case 0193(Forfeiture I) and subsequently another

caseof forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil
Case 0196(Forfeiture II).Thus the two cases were consolidated for
convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent
to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garciaswithviolation of
RA 7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The
plunder charge covered substantially the same properties identified in
both Forfeiture I and II.Petitioner now contends, after denying there
motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, thatthe the plunder case and
the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the 2 nd division of
SB pursuant to RA 8249.On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied
the motion for the reason that the forfeiturecase is not the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
thecriminal case of plunder. Arguments Petitioner: (a) the filing of the
plunder case ousted the SB 4thDivision of jurisdiction over theforfeiture
case; (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible
double jeopardy entanglements.
Issue: Whether or not the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her three sons
considering that, first ,vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I)and
0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or
improperly serve and, second, that the plunder case Crim. Case No.
28107 has already been filed and pendingwith the 2nddivision of the
SB.
HELD: The court ruled that the forfeiture cases and plunder cases have
different causes of action. Theformer is civil in nature and the latter is
criminal. On the matter of double jeopardy the courtheldthat:Double
jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment
for thesame offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two
separate criminal prosecutions.Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to
repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who issued under
RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the
filing of a caseunder that law is not barred by the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107for plunder.The court
also said that RA 7080(plunder) did not repeal RA 1379(forfeiture)
stating that: Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would
indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a
penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize theact of any
public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his
family amasses,accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. Onthe other hand, RA
1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of
a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property
manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income.
RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of theState to recover the properties

which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.However on the matter

on Jurisdiction over the person of Clarita Garcia and his sons the
courtsaid that the 4th division of SB did not acquire jurisdiction because
there was no validsubstituted services of summons made, the SB did
not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children
for the reason that there was also no voluntary appearance since
theyquestioned the jurisdiction of the 4th division of SB through their
motion to dismiss and quashalfor lack of jurisdiction into their person .
And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiturecases, insofar as
petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be
set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are
concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them,it is, thus,
imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the
petitioner andher three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over
their persons. WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus
are PARTIALLY GRANTED. TheSandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garciaand her three
children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner
and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their
persons. No costs.
ALEJANDRO VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT FINDING
AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
FACTS:
The Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the
Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report that Mico Car
Wash (MICO), an establishment owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has
been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its
car-wash business in Binondo, Manila. Acting on this report, the MWSI,
in coordination with the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), conducted an antiwater pilferage operation against MICO. During the anti-water pilferage
operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICOs car-wash boys indeed
had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNPCIDG arrested the car-wash boys and confiscated the containers used
in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredos father and the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila
(Alejandro), interfered with the PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering
several men to unload the confiscated containers. This intervention
caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the
apprehended car-wash boys to escape. The Office of the Ombudsman
Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial
investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman
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an administrative complaint against Alejandro for his blatant refusal to

recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted
intervention. In its decision, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
found Alejandro guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal
from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled that Alejandro cannot
overextend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other
people to disrespect proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also
added that Alejandro had tolerated the illegal acts of MICOs car-wash
boys. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration which the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman denied. Alejandro appealed to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA
dismissed the petition for premature filing and ruled that Alejandro
failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies because he did not
appeal the Deputy Ombudsmans decision to the Ombudsman.
Alejandro moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, which the CA
denied.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
elective officials and has the power to order their dismissal from the
service.

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jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the

complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case,
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising
concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay
Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14.
Under RA 7160, the sangguniangpanlungsod or sangguniangbayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official[.] Since the
complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the sangguniangbayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is
concurrent.

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the

Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the Local Government
Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the
seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases
decided by [the Supreme] Court. In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, [the Court]
pointed out that there is nothing in the Local Government Code to
indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other. The two laws may be
reconciled by understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public
officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.
Consequently, as [the Court] held in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Rodriguez, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies. In administrative cases involving the concurrent

Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint.

The respondents averred that among others that it belies the

petitioners claim that it sought the consent of the majority of
the respondents surrounding the tower site as there where
nly a handful of residents signed the document prepared by
petitioner and the contents of which were misrepresented by
a Sangguniang Bayan Member in the person of Nick Sebastian
who is an interested party being the owner of the land where
the tower is constructed.

The petitioner filed as well a Motion for Summary Judgment

which was, later on, granted by RTC.

The resident filed a memorandum stating that the test was

conducted on November 14 and 15, 2000 and the result
shows that the petitioners power generator failed the noise
emission test, day and night time.

RTC ruled in favor of Smart dismissing the complaint as the

allegations therein are purely speculative and hence no basis
in fact to warrant further proceedings of this case.

Appeal to CA which declared the cellular base station of

petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety
of the residents of Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1)
the locational clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity
due to the lack of approval by majority of the actual residents
of the barangay and a barangay resolution endorsing the
construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound
emission of the generator at the cellular base station
exceeded the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) standards.

Smart Communications IncvsAldecoaet. Al

GR NO. 166330
SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
Facts:
0

RULING:
YES.

barangay, as well as that of the municipality, the

Environmental
Compliance
Certificate
of
the
[Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)],construction permit, and other requirements
of the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC)

Petitioner is a domestic corporation

telecommunications business.

engaged

in

the

It entered into a contract of leasewith FlorentinoSebastian

whereinAllarilla Construction, immediately constructed and
installed a cellular base station.

Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower,

rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and transmitters; as
well as a power house open on three sides containing a 25KVA
diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base
station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments,
including the properties of respondents

Respondents filed a Complaint against petitioner for

abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
alleging that:
0

Susceptible to collapse

Emits noxious and deleterious fumes

Radiates ultra high frequency (UHF) radio wave

emissions

Violates the law by constructing the tower without

the necessary public hearing, permit of the

Issue:
0

WON CA erred when it encroached upon an executive function

of determining the validity of a locational clearance when it
declared, contrary to the administrative findings of the
Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board ("HLURB"), that the
locational clearance of Petitioner was void.
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Held
0

Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it
was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of
and rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioners
locational clearance for its cellular base station.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the

intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not
be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact
In this case, there is no showing that respondents availed
themselves of the afore-mentioned administrative remedies
prior to instituting the case before the RTC. While there are
accepted exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction,30 respondents never asserted nor argued any of
them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply
the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.

Bank of Commerce, petitioner v. Planters Development Bank

and
BangkoSentralngPilipinas,respondents/BangkoSentralngPilipin
as, petitioner v. Planters Development Bank, respondent
Facts: For the 1st set of CB bills, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) was the registered owner of 7 Central Bank (CB) bills with a
total face value of Php 70 million, which were eventually sold to Bank
of Commerce (BOC), which, in turn, sold these CB bills to Planters
Development Bank (PDB) as evidenced by a Detached Assignment. A

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week later, PDB sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth Php 70 million as
evidenced by a Trading Order and Confirmation of Sale. For the 2nd set
of CB bills, RCBC sold 2 CB bills with a total face value of Php 20 million
to the PDB and delivered to PDB the corresponding Detached
Assignment. PDB delivered to Bancap the 2CB bills which in turn sold
the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines,
which also sold it to the BOC. Upon learning of the transfers involving
the CB Bills, the PDB informed the officer-in-charge of the BSPs
Government Securities Department of the PDBs claim over these CB
bills, based on the
Detached Assignments in its possession. The requests of PDB were
denied by the officer-in-charge which prompted the petitioner to file an
action so as to compel the BSP to determine the party legally entitled
to the proceeds of the subject CB bills.
Issue: Whether or not the BangkoSentralngPilipinas has jurisdiction in
determining the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the CB bills.
Held: Under the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653), the BSP is given the
responsibility of providing policy directions in the areas of money,
banking and credit; it is given the primary objective of maintaining
price stability, conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the
economy and of promoting and maintaining monetary stability and
convertibility of the peso. Moreover, the Constitution expressly grants
the BSP the power of supervision over the operation of banks. While RA
7653 empowers the BSP to conduct administrative hearings and render
judgment for or against an entity under its supervisory and regulatory
powers, the grant of quasi-judicial authority to the BSP cannot possibly
extend to situation which do not call for the exercise by the BSP of its
supervisory or regulatory functions over entities within its jurisdiction.
The fact alone that the parties involved are banking institutions does
not necessarily call for the exercise by the BSP of its quasi-judicial
powers under the law.
ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION, INC. (AHMCSO), PetitionervsMEGAWORLD
PROPERTIES & HOLDING, INC., WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL, in his
capacity as Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND LANDUSE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLRUB), DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), Respondents
Facts:Megaworld (Private respondent) was the registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Brgy. Addition Hills, MandaluyongCity, covered
by a TCT Title issued by the Register of Deeds on which it
conceptualized the construction of a residential
condominium complex called as the Wack-Wack Heights
Condominium.

Megaworld secured the necessary clearances, licenses and permits

for the project, including:
1.Certificate of Locational Viability and Development permit issued by
HLRUB
2.Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by DENR
3. Building Permit issued by the office of the Building Official of
Mandaluyong City
4. Barangay Clearance issued by the Chairman of Barangay Addition
Hills, Mandaluyong City.
Pending construction, plaintiff filed a complaint before the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 158 for:
1. Annulment of the Building Permit, CLV, ECC and Development
Permit;
2. Prohibit the issuance to Megaworld of Certificate of Registration and
License to Sell Condominium units and;
3. Permanently enjoin Local and National Building Officials from issuing
licenses and permits.
Megaworld filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action and that jurisdiction over the case was withHLRUB and not with
the regular courts, however the RTC denied the motion, which lead to
Megaworld filing its Answer to thecomplaint, and the trial on the merits
ensued, rendering decision in favour to the petitioner.
Aggrieved with the RTCs decision, respondent appealed the rendered
decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed and setaside such
lower courtsDecision finding petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention
fromcourts. As expected, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which however the CA denied. Hence, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether or Not the CA erred in its finding about the petitioners
failure to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial intervention?
Held: The court finds the petition without merit. At the outset, the
parties discusses issues, although ostensibly legal, actually require the
court to make findings of facts. It is long settled by law and
jurisprudence that the court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, the only
relevant issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the remedy
sought by the petitioner in the trial court is in violation of the legal
principle of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Citing the case
of Republic vs. Lacap, the court expounded on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and related doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in this wise:1.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency
the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.2.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not
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determine a controversy involving a question which is within the

jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.3.
Nonetheless, the doctrines enunciated which are based on sound
public policy and practical considerations are not inflexible rules. There
are many accepted exceptions, such as:
A.Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine;
B.Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
C.Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
D.Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
E.Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice;
F.Where judicial intervention is urgent;
G.When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
H.Where the controverted acts violate due process;
I.When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot;
J.When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
K.When strong public interest is involved;
L.In quo warranto proceedings.
In view of the foregoing, the court finds that none of the
aforementioned exceptions exist in the case at bar. Hence, the court
concludes that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
setting aside the trial court decision and dismissing saidcomplaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court ofAppeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.

TROPANG POTCHI

period of one year from the date hereof, "after which no further

application for the approval of the increased authorized capital

with the then Board of Communications (BOC)

the original authorized capital of P100K was already

capacity

April 12, 1977: Without no prior authorization from the BOC

(now National Telecommunications Commission) (NTC), Natelco

SEC: ordering the holding of special stockholder' meeting to

elect the new members of the BOD based on its findings of who

Natelco issued 24K shares of CS to CSI

as downpayment

are entitled to vote

May 5, 1979: issued another 12K shares of CS to CSI

May 19, 1979: annual stockholders' meeting to elect their 7
directors to their BOD for the year 1979-1980

Pedro Lopez Dee (Dee) was unseated as Chairman of

together with his wife, Amelia Lopez Dee

Among the directors: Mr. Justino de Jesus, Sr., Mr. Pedro Lopez
Dee and Mrs Amelia C. Lopez Dee never attended the Maggay

May 20, 1982: Antonio Villasenor filed w/ the CFI claiming that

Natelco under a Deed of Assignment executed in his favor

May 21, 1982: restraining order dwas issued by the lower

court commanding desistance from the scheduled election until

Atty. Luciano Maggay (Maggay) won a seat in the Board

Atty. Maggay became president upon reorganization

SEC en banc: dismissed for lack of merit

he was an assignee of an option to repurchase 36K shares of CS of

CSI was able to gain control when their legal counsel,

June 23, 1981: Dee filed a petition for certiorari/appeal with

the SEC en banc

the Board and President but was elected as one of the directors,

resulted in the unseating of the Maggay group from

the BOD in a "hold-over" capacity

equipment

Upon elevation to the SC: dismissed the petition for being

premature; restraining order was restrained

entered into a contract with Communication Services, Inc. (CSI) for

the "manufacture, supply, delivery and installation" of telephone

As prayed for a restraining order was issued by the SEC

placing officers of the 1978-1979 Natelco Board in hold-over

capital stock of Natelco was divided into 213K CS and 87K PS,
both at a par value of P10/shares

ground: no valid list of stockholders through which

to P580K of which P145K was fully paid

Dee having been unseated filed a petition in the SEC

the right to vote could be determined

increased capital of P2.9M the subscribers subscribed

1954: Naga Telephone Company (Natelco), Inc. was organized

As required by the Public Service Act, Natelco filed an

paid

P3,000,000.00

in favor of CSI

questioning the validity of the elections

as per contract they issued 113,800 shares of stock

SEC

1974: Natelco decided to increase its authorized capital to

Natelco filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation with the

with P100K authorized capital

attended

issues will be made without previous authority from this Board."

SAAVEDRA VS SEC

Board thereby only Maggay representatives and Atty. Maggay

That the issuance of the shares of stocks will be for a

FACTS:

January 8, 1975: approved with conditions:

further orders

May 22, 1982: controlling majority of the

stockholders proceeded with the elections under the supervision
of the SEC representatives
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TROPANG POTCHI

May 25, 1982: SEC recognized the election and the duly

entities; P.D. 902-A does not confer jurisdiction to SEC over all

elected directors
Lopez Dee group headed by Messrs. Justino De Jesus

matters affecting corporations

and Julio Lopez Dee kept insisting no elections were held and
refused to vacate their positions

controversy in the election of the directors and officers of Natelco

corporate controversies and that is precisely the only issue in this

over directors and officers to turn over their respective posts and

May 29, 1982: hold-over officers peacefully vacated

June 2, 1982: Villasenor filed a charge for contempt

September 7, 1982: lower court rendered CSI Nilda Ramos,

2. NO

and

- CSI was in control of voting shares and the Board

consider it because additional issuance of shares of stocks does

restraining order against the CFI

not need approval of the stockholders - no violation of preemptive

right

ISSUES:

3. YES.
W/N SEC has the power and jurisdiction to declare null and

Clear from records that it was held

void shares of stock issued by NATELCO to CSI for violation of

within the jurisdiction of the lower court as it does not involve

Sec. 20 (h) of the Public Service Act - NO

an intra-corporate matter but merely a claim of a private party of

W/N Natelco stockholders have a right of preemption to the

the right to repurchase common shares of stock of Natelco and

113,800 shares
3.

that the restraining order was not meant to stop the election duly

W/N the May 22, 1982 election was valid

called for by the SEC and a matter purely within the exclusive

HELD: Dismissed for lack of merit

1.

The power to issue shares of stocks in a corporation is lodged

in the board of directors and nostockholders meeting is required to

April 14, 1983: IAC: Annuling contempt charge

2.

actual issuance of the shares after May 19, 1979

for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or

1.

an order to issue shares on or before May 19, 1979;

September 17, 1982: CSI group filed a petition

There is distinction between:

Luciano Maggay, Desiderio Saavedra, Augusto Federis and Ernesto

Miguel, guilty of contempt of court

NO

jurisdiction of the SEC

The jurisdiction of the SEC is limited to matters intrinsically

connected with the regulation of corporations, partnerships and
associations and those dealing with internal affairs of such

Facts: The President issued Presidential Decree No. 276 establishing a

coconut stabilization fund. Under this decree, the Philippine Coconut
Authority, in addition to its powers granted under Presidential Decree
No. 232, was authorized to formulate and immediately implement a
stabilization scheme for coconut-based consumer goods,

case.

directing the Sheriff of Naga City and other enforcement agencies

to enforce its order

The SEC is empowered by P.D. 902-A to decide intra-

May 28, 1982: SEC issued another order directing the hold-

The jurisdiction of the SEC is limited to deciding the

BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILIPPINES VS THE HONORABLE

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO

temporary restraining order amounted to an injunctive relief

against the SEC

since the trial judge in the lower court did not have
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned restraining order,

Rules and Regulations governing the collection and disposition of the

Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) promulgated by the
Coconut Consumer Stabilization Committee provides that the collection
of levy in every first sale of copra resecada or its equivalent in terms of
whole nuts shall take effect on August 10, 1973. The petitioners are all
end-users and as such, are levy-collectors and remitters.
The respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated
a special audit of coconut end-user companies, which include herein
petitioners, with respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
levy collections and the subsidies they had received. As a result of the
initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to the
petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman,
the Administrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager
of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them
(Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of petition) to collect the short levies and
overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of
short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.
The remaining issues all revolve on the questionAfter the Philippine
Coconut Authoritythe authority vested by law to implement the
stabilization scheme for the coconut industry under P.D. 276, which
includes the collection of the levy to support the Stabilization Fund
had acted, can the Commission on Audit say that the rules and
decisions of the PCA are erroneous and nullify them, to the prejudice of
petitioners who obediently complied with said rules and decisions?"
Issue: Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman was correct in
disregarding the two resolutions of the PCA Governing Board for being
ultra vires is the main issue in this petition. This issue became
academic when the then President of the Philippines informed the
Solicitor General that the Governing Board of the PCA would continue
to function until the formal organization of the new Governing Board.
Following this ruling, the respondent COA Chairman reconsidered his
earlier stand and allowed the petitioners to get their subsidy claims
which he had earlier refused. In effect, the respondent COA Chairman

disobedience thereto did not constitute contempt

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eventually acknowledged the validity of the two questioned PCA

resolutions.
The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them.
They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit"
power which is confined to government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Held: his argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the
Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or
through the Government which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity."
(Emphasis supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long
established rule that private entities who handle government funds or
subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said
funds by government auditors.
doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statute
administered."
In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown through the laying
down of concrete factual foundations that the respondents' questioned
acts were done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts: The Supreme Court has dismissed the petition of former Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) comptroller Major General Garlos F.
Garcia that sought to annul the September 9, 2011 Confirmation of
Sentence by the Office of the President (OP). The sentence handed
down by the Special General Court Martial No. 2 had ordered his
dishonorable discharge from service, forfeiture of all his pay and
allowances, and confinement for two years in a penitentiary. On

TROPANG POTCHI

September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of

the court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and
continues to be detained at the maximum security compound of the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. Garcia, tried by the Special
General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of
violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose
all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in
relation to RA 6713.
Issue: Whether or not the office of the President commit grave abuse of
discretion
Held: The court held that the OP did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence.The Court upheld the
authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to confirm the
sentence. It held that the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over
the case since it was indisputable that Garcia was an officer in the
active service of AFP when he committed the violations until his
arraignment. Garcias mandatory retirement on November 18, 2004
did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. And since the
General Court Martial has jurisdiction, the Court held that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, also acquired jurisdiction as
mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War.
The Court stressed that Article 48 of the Articles of War vests on the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to approve or disapprove
the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial, while
Article 49 of the same grants the President the power to mitigate or
remit a sentence.
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a
sentence of erring military personnel is a clear recognition of the
superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, although the
law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is
silent as to the deduction of the period of preventive confinement to
the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an
accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC, held the Court.
OPTIMA REALTY CORP. VS. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.
FACTS: Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out
commercial spaces and buildings to its tenants. Sometime in
2002,Optima and Hertz entered into a Contract of Lease with over a
131-square-meter office unit and a parking lot in the Optima Building
for a period of three years commencingand ending. The parties

amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to two

years and five months.
Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and
ended. As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in
monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnels productivity.
It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months of May,
June, July and August 2005.
Optima granted the request of Hertz.However, the latter still failed to
pay its rentals. In addition, Hertz likewise failed to pay its utility bills
Hertz filed a Complaint against Optima, what optima did was he wrote
a letter through his counsel that Herzt should vacate the building, but
Hertz refused to do so. Accordingly Optima was constrained to file
charges before MeTC. MeTC ruled in favor of the Optima thus Hertz
appealed in RTC but also in favor of Optima. Not satisfied with the
decision of the appellate courts Hertz filed an appeal before Supreme
Court, contending that MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case at bar
due to improper service of summon.
ISSUE:Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent Hertz;
HELD: Yes.
The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
acquired either by service of summons or by the defendants voluntary
appearance in court and submission to its authority.In this case, the
MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by
reason of the latters voluntary appearance in court.
In this case, the records show that the following statement appeared in
respondents Motion for Leave to File Answer:
In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant opted to
file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court, upon
inquiring from the office of the clerk of court of this Honorable Court
and due to its notice of hearing on March 29, 2005 application for
TRO/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was received on March 26, 2006.
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised
the defense of improper service of summons. The defenses that it
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pleaded were limited to litispendentia, pari delicto, performance of its

obligations and lack of cause of action.38 Finally, it even asserted its
own counterclaim against Optima.
Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial International
Bank, these actions lead to no other conclusion than that Hertz
voluntarily appeared before the court a quo. We therefore rule that, by
virtue of the voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz before the
MeTC, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

TROPANG POTCHI

On the scheduled pre-trial conference, neither Domingo nor her

counsel appeared. As a result of EAICs failure to appear in the pre-trial
conference, respondents were allowed to present their evidence ex
parte.

Domingo lacked the necessary authority to bind EAIC to Civil Case No.
96-177 before the RTC despite the filing of an Answer with
Counterclaim. EAIC cannot be bound or deemed to have voluntarily
appeared before the RTC by the act of an unauthorized stranger.

EAIC, represented by Gala, filed its Petition for Relief from JudgmentRTC
Decision before the same court. The petition for relief from judgment
was premised on the alleged fraud committed by Domingo in
concealing the existence of both the Contract to Sellfrom EAIC.

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either

upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit
to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons,
any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is null and void. 27 The purpose of summons is not only to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to give
notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against it
and to afford it an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against
it. The requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly followed,
otherwise, the trial court will not acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant.

The RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment for being clearly
filed out of time under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
ELICE AGRO-INDUSTIRAL CORP. VS. YOUNG
FACTS:The Respondents and Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation (EAIC),
represented by its alleged corporate secretary and attorney-in-fact,
Guia G. Domingo (Domingo), entered into a Contract to Sell, under
certain terms and conditions, wherein EAIC agreed to sell to the
respondents a 30,000 square-meter portion of a parcel of land located
in Lutucan, Quezon and registered under EAICs name in consideration
P1,050,000.00 Pesos.
Pursuant to the Contract to Sell, respondents paid EAIC, through
Domingo, the aggregate amount of P545,000.00 Pesos as partial
payment for the acquisition of the subject property. Despite such
payment, EAIC failed to deliver to respondents the owners duplicate
certificate of title of the subject property and the corresponding deed
of sale as required under the Contract to Sell.
Prompted by the failure of EAIC to comply with its obligation,
respondents had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated in TCT No.
T-157038.
Thus, Respondents filed a Complaintbefore the RTC.
The initial attempt to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint
and its annexes on EAIC, through Domingo, on Rizal Street, Sariaya,
Quezon, was unsuccessful as EAIC could not be located in the said
address.
Another attempt was made to serve the alias summons on EAIC at 996
Maligaya Street, Singalong, Manila, the residence of Domingo. The
second attempt to serve the alias summons to Domingo was, this time,
successful.

Thus filed before the CA, but unfortunately CA dismisses the petition
because it had already been rejected with finality, EAIC could not be
permitted to invoke the same ground in a petition for annulment of
judgment.
ISSUE:Whether or not the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of EAIC.
HELD: NO.Service of summons upon a private domestic corporation, to
be effective and valid, should be made on the party involved in the
said case. Conversely, service of summons on anyone other than the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not valid.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure
that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him.
In the present case,the pertinent document showing EAICs
composition at the time the summons was served upon it, through
Domingo, will readily reveal that she was not its president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or director. Due to this fact, the Court is of the
view that her honest belief that she was the authorized corporate
secretary was clearly mistaken because she was evidently not the
corporate secretary she claimed to be. In view of Domingos lack of
authority to properly represent EAIC, the Court is constrained to rule
that there was no valid service of summons binding on it.
In addition, at the time she filed the Answer with Counterclaim,
Domingo was clearly not an officer of EAIC, much less duly authorized
by any board resolution or secretarys certificate from EAIC to file the
said Answer with Counterclaim in behalf of EAIC. Undoubtedly,

AFADAL VS. CARLOS

FACTS:Respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages against petitioners, ZenaidaGuijabar (Guijabar),
John Doe, Peter Doe, Juana Doe, and all persons claiming rights under
them before the Municipal Trial Court, Bian, Laguna (MTC).
Respondent alleged that petitioners, Guijabar, and all other persons
claiming rights under them were occupying, by mere tolerance, a
parcel of land in respondents name covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-530139 in the Registry of Deeds Calamba, Laguna.
Respondent claimed that petitioner AbubakarAfdal (petitioner
Abubakar) sold the property to him but that he allowed petitioners to
stay in the property. Respondent demanded that petitioners, Guijabar,
and all persons claiming rights under them turn over the property to
him because he needed the property for his personal use. Respondent
further alleged that petitioners refused to heed his demand and he was
constrained
to
file
a
complaint
before
the LuponngTagapamayapa (Lupon).
According
to
respondent,
petitioners ignored the notices and the Lupon issued a "certificate to
file action." Then, respondent filed the complaint before the MTC.
According to the records, there were three attempts to serve the
summons and complaint on petitioners 14 January, 3 and 18 February
2004. However, petitioners failed to file an answer.
Respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position
paper submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on
record.
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In its Decision, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed a

petition for relief from judgment with the MTC. Respondent filed a
motion to dismiss or strike out the petition for relief. Subsequently,
petitioners manifested their intention to withdraw the petition for relief
after realizing that it was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. the MTC granted petitioners request to
withdraw the petition for relief. But instead they file the relief before
the RTC.
RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing the petition for relief. The RTC
said it had no jurisdiction over the petition because the petition should
have been filed before the MTC in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 38
of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for relief should be
filed "in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case for the
reason that it is not within their jurisdiction
HELD: Yes.In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for
relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful
detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief with the
RTC because the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief
from judgments of the MTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing
the petition for relief from judgment of the MTC.

TROPANG POTCHI

After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio

Zapanta (Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted
service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not
acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names.
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer,
prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein
respondents] in Default which the trial court granted.

Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was

Eight months thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of

Default. Claiming that on January 27, 2006 they officially
received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes.

the court.

RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. SPOUSES

VILLA
FACTS: Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development
Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
subdivision plans, mandamus and damages against several defendants
including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents). The
complaint, which was docketed at the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, was lodged at Branch 71 thereof.

a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction

over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of

Supreme Court ruling:

The trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein
respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals

did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to

Decision of April 29, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

declare them in default, which the trial courtagain granted.

And

then

again,

respondents

filed

an

Omnibus

Motion

for

reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to

The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for
certiorari with the RTC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of petitioners
in view of the absence of summons to petitioners. Here, we shall treat
petitioners petition for relief from judgment as a petition for certiorari
before the RTC.

equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a

motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.

vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:EpifanioMatienzo and FlorenciaMatienzo were the original
owners of a 4,161 sq. meter-lot registered situated at Cabinitan, Virac,
Catanduanes.

summons.

The business partners, Domingo, Orlando and Ireneo, all surnamed

Molina, were looking for a lot in Virac where they could put up a
furniture shop and a 'chicharon' factory. Respondents Matienzos offered
to sell their lot.

ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case at bar

The Molinas wanted to buy only one-half of the property. An affidavit

was executed by the parties pertaining the sale of the said property

acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of

HELD: Yes.It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the

court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by
virtue of the latters voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14
of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be

Orlando Molina issued a promissory note for P20,800, payable in

installments as the price of the 2,080-sq.-meter portion of Matienzo's
land. Both the affidavit and the promissory note were signed by
Orlando Molina.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented to Matienzo
for signing, Domingo Molina appeared as vendee, instead of Orlando.
The spouses wondered why that was so, but they were assured that
there would be no problem because Domingo Molina was one of the
partners to the proposed business venture. Convinced of the group's
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sincerity, the respondent spouses signed the Deed of Absolute Sale.

Thus, the sale was proceeded. The defendants were able to pay
Matienzo only P3,350 out of the P20,000 price of the sale of one-half of
their property. Despite repeated demands for payment, the
Molinasdefaulted, they were also defaulted in paying the PNB loan.
Tatienzosthen filed an action for Reconveyance of Title, Recovery of
Ownership and Possession, Annulment of the Document and Damages.
The RTC dismissed the case thus it was appealed before the CA.
However, CA reversed the decision of the RTC. As a result the PND filed
a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court asserting that CA has
no jurisdiction to render the judgment against it.
ISSUE:Whether or not CA has jurisdiction in rendering judgment over
the case
HELD: No.Since the PNB was not a party in the suit (only its manager
was sued and then dropped from the complaint) both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over said Bank.
The Court of Appeals' decision ordering the Bank to reconvey to
Matienzo one-half of the land which it had purchased at the foreclosure
sale, was therefore null and void for lack of jurisdiction
Mere service of the appellants' brief on PNB did not operate to bring
the Bank into the case. Jurisdiction over a person is acquired by service
of summons and copy of the complaint on him (Rule 14, Rules of
Court). PNB could not be expected to answer the appellants' brief not
only because it was not a party in the appeal (nor in the trial court) but
also because the dismissal of the complaint against the PNB manager
in Virac was not one of the errors argued in the appellants' brief.
The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp.
Facts: The Province of Aklan (Aklan) and Jody King Construction and
Development Corp. (JKCDC) entered into a contract for the design
and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in
Malay, Aklan. In the course of construction, Aklan issued
variation/change orders for additional works, whichagreed upon by the
parties.
Aklan entered into a negotiated contract with JKCDC for the
construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan
Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. JKCDC made a demand for the total amount
of P22,419,112.96 covering the items which Aklan allegedly failed to
settle. JKCDC then filed a civil case with the RTC of Marikina City
(RTC) against Aklan for the collection of said amount. The RTC issued

TROPANG POTCHI

a writ of preliminary attachment against Aklan. The RTC later ruled in

favor of JKCDC (RTC Decision). Since Aklans motion for
reconsideration of the RTC Decision was filed out of time, a writ of
execution was later issued. The sheriff served notices of garnishment
on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and
Development Bank of the Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan
for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited
under Aklans account. Said banks, however, refused to give due
course to the court order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes,
circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government
monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.
Aklans Notice of Appeal was denied by the RTC (RTC Order). Aklan
moved for reconsideration of the RTC Order, which was also denied by
the RTC.
Aklan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) to
assail the writ of execution. The CA dismissed said petition, on the
ground, among others, that the issue on the execution of the RTC
decision had been rendered moot by Aklans filing of a petition before
the Commission on Audit (COA).
Aklan also filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to assail the denial
of its Notice of Appeal. The CA dismissed said petition and ruled,
among others, that Akla was estopped from invoking the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction of the COA as it only raised it after Aklans Notice
of Appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.
Issue: WON the COA have primary jurisdiction over JKCDCs money
claims against Aklan?
Held: YES. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section
26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA, which has primary
jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities. Section 1 of Rule VIII and Section 1 of rule II of COAs
2009 Revised Rules of Procedure also provide, among others, that the
COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claim against the
Government, and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims due from or
owing to any government agency, respectively.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied
by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper
jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would
not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
JKCDC sought to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by
Aklan, a local government unit. As JKCDCs collection suit was against a
local government unit, such money claim should have been first

brought to the COA. The RTC should have suspended the proceedings
and referred the filing of the claim before the COA.
Are there exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when
strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
None of the foregoing circumstances are applicable to this case.
Is Aklan estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction before the CA,
after the denial of its notice of appeal?
No. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the
doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and
void.
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all, it
cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All
acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect
and the void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution
based on it is likewise void.
KJCDCs belated compliance with the formal requirements of
presenting its money claim before the COA did not cure the serious
errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision. The
RTC's orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction
must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly
executed.

Boston vs. CA
Facts: On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. 6 Herein
respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998,
she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer7 in which she
alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel
Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.8 The death certificate9 of Manuel
states "13 July 1995" as the date of death. As a result, petitioner filed a
motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the
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heirs of Manuel.10 In compliance with the verbal order of the court

during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the case, respondent submitted
the required names and addresses of the heirs.11 Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel
be substituted by his children as party-defendants. It appears that this
motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October
2000.13
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial court issued
its pre-trial order containing, among others, the dates of hearing of the
case.14
The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff,
presented its evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was
cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004,
counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence.15 However, on 7 October 2004,
respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the
following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an
indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case must be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court
erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs;
and (4) that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.16
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied the motion
to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Court which states that: "Within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
a motion to dismiss may be made x x x."17Respondents motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise denied on the
ground that "defendants attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now
barred by estoppel by laches" since respondent failed to raise the issue
despite several chances to do so.18
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused
its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery,
during the trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a ground
for dismissal of the case
Issue:whether or not respondent is estopped fromquestioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

TROPANG POTCHI

Held: At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding

discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on
jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by the fact that jurisdiction has
been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals
and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to
finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this
case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of jurisdiction.

jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the issue of

ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga,34
accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of which
she was charged, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal
courts or city courts and the then courts of first instance, and that the
judgment of the court of first instance, to which she had appealed the
municipal court's conviction, should be deemed null and void for want
of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.

1. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondents motion to
dismiss questioning the trial courts jurisdiction was filed more than six
years after her amended answer was filed. According to petitioner,
respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the
proceedings, to assail the trial courts jurisdiction but never did so for
six straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et
al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.30 petitioner claimed that respondents failure
to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from
later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the
proceedings conducted by the trial court.
Petitioners argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the
concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over
the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction
over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as
a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved
was the authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for
the collection of a sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00 which
amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the municipal courts.

In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was
likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject
matter of the case. Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals,32 the issue for consideration was the authority of the regional
trial court to hear and decide an action for reformation of contract and
damages involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that
jurisdiction is vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi City,
petitioners argued that the respondent municipal trial court had no

In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the
jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter
of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot
be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before
the trial court was that courts jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction
over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

Padlan v. Dinglasan,G.R. No. 180321March 20, 2012

FACTS:Respondent was the registered owner of a parcel of land.
Whileon board a jeepney, respondents mother, Lilia, had a conversatio
n with oneMaura regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that
Maura was areal estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of the
TCT fromrespondent and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the
property intoseveral lots. Through a falsified deed of sale, Maura was
able to sell the lotsto different buyers. Maura sold one of the lots to
one Lorna who sold thesame to petitioner for P4,000.00. Respondents
filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC.
Summons was, thereafter,served to petitioner through her mother,
Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered aDecision finding petitioner to be a
buyer in good faith and, consequently,dismissed the complaint. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision of theRTC and ordered the
cancellation of the TCT.
ISSUE:Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter
HELD:NO.In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over
theaction, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a
hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred bylaw and determined by the allegations in the
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complaint which comprise aconcise statement of the ultimate facts

constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.The Court has already held
that a complaint must allege the assessedvalue of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon todetermine which
court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, theonly basis
of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in thecomplaint
that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amountof P4,000.00.
Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents forthe
disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction
over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are nulland void.
People vsEstrbella
Facts: After due trial, the court, rendered a decision 1 the dispositive
portion reading as follows, the Court finds accused Romeo Estrebella
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the complaining witness, Joy Alcala y Advincula, in the sum of
P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.
He argued that The trial court gravely erred in trying the case on
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

TROPANG POTCHI

Issue: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in trying the case on
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

of a public trial. (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57

Phil. 298, 304, cited in Valdepenas v. People, supra)

Held: Appellant's argument holds no water.

In the case at bar, while the complaint may have been technically in
the sense that complainant was incompetent, this defect has been
cured when complainant's brother Fernando Alcala took the witness
stand for the prosecution. The brother's testimony shows the consent
and willingness of the family of complainant, who can not give her
consent obviously, to have the private offense committed against the
latter publicly tried. Substantially, this is what is required by the rules.
Evidently, by undergoing trial, the family of complainant chose to
denounce the injustice committed against the latter in public and thus
agreed to bear the personal effects of said exposure. Undoubtedly,
therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case.

It is of course well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of

an actionin this case the crime of rapeis and may be conferred only
by law, and that jurisdiction over a given crime not vested by law upon
a particular court, may not be conferred thereon by the parties
involved in the offense. (Manila Railroad v. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523;
Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514, cited in Valdepenas vs. People, 16 SCRA
871). But the aforementioned provision of Art. 344 does not determine
the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It
could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same with respect to the
instant crime is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the
Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes
and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The
complaint required in said Art. 344 is merely a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed out of
consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal

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