Greek government-debt crisis

10-year Greece government bonds [1]

The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the

Greek depression)[2][3][4] started in late 2009. It was
the rst of ve sovereign debt crises in the eurozone Relative change in unit labour costs, 20002012
later referred to collectively as the European debt crisis. In Greece, triggers included the turmoil of the Great
Recession, structural weaknesses in the Greek economy,
and a sudden crisis in condence among lenders. In late
2009, fears developed about Greeces ability to meet its
debt obligations, due to revelations that previous data on
government debt levels and decits had been misreported
by the Greek government.[5][6][7] This led to a crisis of
condence, indicated by a widening of bond yield spreads
and the cost of risk insurance on credit default swaps
compared to the other Eurozone countries Germany
in particular.[8][9] In 2012, Greeces government had the
largest sovereign debt default in history. On June 30,
2015, Greece became the rst developed country to fail to Real unit labour costs: total economy (Ratio of compensation per
make an IMF loan repayment.[10] At that time, Greeces employee to nominal GDP per person employed.)
government had debts of 323bn.[11]

other potential driver of the inow of investment into

Greece was its membership in the EU, which helped
lower the yields on its government bonds over the 1998
2007 periods. In other words, Greece was perceived as
a higher credit risk alone than it was as a member of the
EU, which implies investors felt the EU would bring discipline to its nances and support Greece in the event of
problems.[14]

Overview

The 2001 introduction of the euro as a common currency

reduced trade costs among the Eurozone countries, increasing overall trade volume. However, labour costs increased more in peripheral countries such as Greece relative to core countries such as Germany, making Greek As the Great Recession that began in the U.S. in 2007
exports less competitive. As a result, Greece saw its cur- 2009 spread to Europe, the ow of funds lent from the Eurent account (trade) decit rise signicantly.[12]
ropean core countries (e.g., Germany, France, and Italy)
A trade decit means that a country is consuming more to the peripheral countries such as Greece began to dry
than it produces, which requires borrowing from other up. Reports in 2009 of Greek scal mismanagement
countries.[12] Both the Greek trade decit and budget and deception increased borrowing costs; the combinadecit rose from below 5% of GDP in 1999 to peak tion meant Greece could no longer borrow to nance its
around 15% of GDP in the 20082009 periods.[13] An- trade and budget decits.[12]
1

A country facing a sudden stop in private investment

and a high debt load typically allows its currency to
depreciate (i.e., ination) to encourage investment and to
pay back the debt in cheaper currency, but this is not an
option while Greece remains on the Euro.[12] Instead, to
become more competitive, Greek wages fell nearly 20%
from mid-2010 to 2014, a form of deation. This resulted
in a signicant reduction in income and GDP, resulting
in a severe recession and a signicant rise in the debt-toGDP ratio. Unemployment has risen to nearly 25%, from
below 10% in 2003. However, signicant government
spending cuts also helped the Greek government return
to a primary budget surplus by 2014, meaning it collected
more revenue than it paid out, excluding interest.[15]

Causes

2.1

Government summary report

In January 2010, the Greek Ministry of Finance published the Stability and Growth Program 2010.[16] The
report listed these ve main causes for eruption of the
current government-debt crisis:
GDP growth rates: After 2008, GDP growth rates
were lower than the Greek national statistical agency
had anticipated. In the report, the Greek Ministry of
Finance reported the need to improve competitiveness by reducing salaries and bureaucracy,[16] and
the need to redirect much of its current governmental spending from non-growth sectors such as military into growth-stimulating sectors.

CAUSES

results of such reforms could be achieved. On this

basis the governments report emphasized that in addition to implementing the needed structural economic reforms, there was an urgent need in the coming four-year period to implement packages of both
permanent and temporary austerity measures (with
a size relative to GDP of 4.0% in 2010, 3.1% in
2011, 2.8% in 2012 and 0.8% in 2013). Implementation of this entire package of structural reforms
and austerity measures, in combination with an expected return of positive economic growth in 2011,
would then result in the baseline decit being forecast to decrease from 30.6 billion in 2009 to only
5.7 billion in 2013, while the debt-level relative
to GDP would stabilize at 120% in 20102011 and
begin declining again in 2012 and 2013.
Budget compliance: Budget compliance was acknowledged to be in strong need of improvement,
and for 2009 it was even found to be a lot worse
than normal, due to economic control being more
lax in a year with political elections. In order to improve the level of budget compliance for upcoming
years, the Greek government wanted to implement
a new reform to strengthen the monitoring system in
2010, making it possible to keep better track on the
future developments of revenues and expenses, both
at the governmental and local level.
Statistical credibility: Problems with unreliable
data had existed ever since Greece applied for membership of the Euro in 1999.[17] In the ve years from
2005 to 2009, Eurostat each year noted a reservation
about the scal statistics for Greece, and too often
previously reported gures got revised to a somewhat worse gure, after a couple of years.[18][19][20]
The awed statistics made it impossible to predict
accurate numbers for GDP growth, budget decit
and the public debt. By the end of the year, all
turned out to be worse than originally anticipated.
Problems with statistical credibility were also evident in several other countries, but in the case of
Greece, the magnitude of the 2009 revisions and its
connection to the crisis added pressure to the need
for immediate improvement.

Government decit: Huge scal imbalances developed during the ve years from 2004 to 2009:
the output increased in nominal terms by 40%,
while central government primary expenditures increased by 87% against an increase of only 31% in
tax revenues. In the report the Greek Ministry of
Finance stated their aim to restore the scal balance
of the public budget. They intended to implement
permanent real expenditure cuts (meaning expenditures would only be allowed to grow 3.8% from
2009 to 2013, which was below the expected ination at 6.9%). Overall revenues were expected to
grow 31.5% from 2009 to 2013, secured not only In 2010, the Greek Ministry of Finance reported the need
by new, higher taxes but also by a major reform of to restore trust among nancial investors, and to correct
previous statistical methodological issues, by making the
the ineective tax collection system.
National Statistics Service an independent legal entity and
Government debt-level: Mainly deteriorated in phasing in, during the rst quarter of 2010, all the neces2009 due to the higher than expected government sary checks and balances that will improve the accuracy
decit and high debt-service costs. An urgent s- and reporting of scal statistics.[16]
cal consolidation plan was needed to ensure that the
decit would decline to a level compatible with a declining debt-to-GDP ratio. The Greek government 2.2 Government spending
assessed that it was not enough to implement structural economic reforms, as the debt would still in- The Greek economy was one of the fastest growing in the
crease to an unsustainable level before the positive Eurozone from 2000 to 2007: during this period it grew at

2.3

Current account balance

Combined charts of Greeces GDP and debt since 1970; also of

decit since 2000. Absolute terms time series are in current euros.
Public decit (brown) worsened to 10% in 2008, 15% in 2009
and 11% in 2010. As a result, the public debt-to-GDP ratio (red)
rose from 109% in 2008 to 146% in 2010.

3
helped to nance Greek government borrowing. After
the euros introduction in January 2001, the devaluation
tool disappeared. Throughout the next 8 years, Greece
was able to continue its high level of borrowing because
of the lower interest rates that government bonds in euros could command, in combination with a long series of
strong GDP growth rates. Problems started to occur when
the global nancial crisis peaked, with negative repercussions hitting all national economies in September 2008.
The global nancial crisis had a particularly large negative impact on GDP growth rates in Greece. Two of the
countrys largest earners, tourism and shipping were badly
aected by the downturn, with revenues falling 15% in
2009.[32]

2.3 Current account balance

an annual rate of 4.2%, as foreign capital ooded into the

country newly backed by the euro.[21] This capital inow
coincided with a higher budget decit.[13]
Greece had budget surpluses from 196073, but since
then it has had budget decits.[22][23][24] In 197480 the
government had budget decits below 3% of GDP, and in
19812013 decits were above 3% of GDP.[23][24][25][26]
According to an editorial published by the Greek conservative newspaper Kathimerini, after the removal of the
right-wing military junta in 1974, Greek governments
wanted to bring disenfranchised left-leaning portions of
the population into the economic mainstream[27] and so
ran large decits to nance enormous military expenditure, public sector jobs, pensions and other social benets.
Greece is, as a percentage of GDP, the second-biggest defense spender[28] in NATO, the highest being the United
States, according to NATO statistics.
The US is the major supplier of Greek arms, with the
Americans supplying 42 per cent of its arms, Germany
supplying 22.7 per cent, and France 12.5 per cent of
Current account imbalances (19972014)
Greeces arms purchases.[29]
The long period of budget decits caused a situation
where, from 1993, the debt-to-GDP ratio was always
above 94%.[30] In the turmoil of the global nancial crisis, the situation became unsustainable (causing the capital markets to freeze in April 2010), as the downturn had
caused the debt level to grow rapidly above the maximum
sustainable level for Greece (dened by IMF economists
to be 120%). According to The Economic Adjustment
Programme for Greece published by the EU Commission in October 2011, the debt level was even expected
to worsen into a highly unsustainable level of 198% in
2012, if the proposed debt restructure agreement was not
implemented.[31]

Economist Paul Krugman wrote in February 2012:

What were basically looking at...is a balance of payments problem, in which capital ooded south after the
creation of the euro, leading to overvaluation in southern
Europe.[33] He continued in June 2015: In truth, this
has never been a scal crisis at its root; it has always been
a balance of payments crisis that manifests itself in part
in budget problems, which have then been pushed onto
the center of the stage by ideology.[34]

The translation of trade decits to budget decits works

through sectoral balances. Greece ran current account (trade) decits averaging 9.1% GDP from 2000
2011.[13] By denition, a trade decit requires capital inPrior to the introduction of the euro, currency devaluation ow (mainly borrowing) to fund; this is referred to as a

CAUSES

capital surplus or foreign nancial surplus. This can drive

higher levels of government budget decits, if the private
sector maintains relatively even amounts of savings and
investment, as the three nancial sectors (foreign, government, and private) by denition must balance to zero.

Greece has had particularly precarious debt dynamics

and Greece is the only member state that cheated with
its statistics for years and years.[48] It was revealed that
Goldman Sachs and other banks had helped the Greek
government to hide its debts. Other sources said that
concluded in Greece, Italy, and
Greeces large budget decit was funded by running a similar agreements were
[49][50]
possibly
elsewhere.
large foreign nancial surplus. As the inow of money
stopped during the crisis, reducing the foreign nancial The deal with Greece was extremely protable for
surplus, Greece was forced to reduce its budget decit Goldman. Christoforos Sardelis, former head of Greeces
substantially. Countries facing such a sudden reversal Public Debt Management Agency, said that the country
in capital ows typically devalue their currencies to re- did not understand what it was buying. He also said he
sume the inow of capital; however, Greece was unable learned that other EU countries such as Italy had made
to do this, and so has instead suered signicant income similar deals.[51] This led to speculation as to which other
(GDP) reduction, another form of devaluation.[12][13]
countries had made similar deals.[52][53][54]

2.4

Tax evasion

Further information: Tax evasion and corruption in

Greece
Another persistent problem Greece has suered in recent
decades is the governments tax income. Each year it has
been below the expected level. In 2010, the estimated
tax evasion costs for the Greek government amounted to
well over $20 billion.[35] The latest gures from 2013, also
show that the State only collected less than half of the revenues due in 2012, with the remaining tax owings being
accepted to be paid by a delayed payment schedule.[36]
As of 2012, tax evasion was widespread, and according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, Greece, with a score of 36/100, ranked as
the most corrupt country in the EU.[37][38] One of the
conditions of the bailout was implementation of an anticorruption strategy.[39] The Greek government agreed to
combat corruption, and the corruption perception level
improved to a score of 43/100 in 2014, which was still
the lowest in the EU, but now on par with Italy, Bulgaria
and Romania.[37][40]

According to Der Spiegel credits given to European governments were disguised as swaps and consequently
were not registered as debt because Eurostat at the time
ignored statistics involving nancial derivatives. A German derivatives dealer commented to Der Spiegel that
The Maastricht rules can be circumvented quite legally
through swaps, and In previous years, Italy used a similar trick to mask its true debt with the help of a dierent
US bank.[54] These conditions had enabled Greek as well
as many other European governments to spend beyond
their means, while meeting the decit targets of the European Union.[49][55] In May 2010, the Greek government
decit was again revised and estimated to be 13.6%[56]
which was the second highest in the world relative to GDP
with Iceland in rst place at 15.7% and Great Britain
third with 12.6%.[57] Public debt was forecast, according
to some estimates, to hit 120% of GDP during 2010.[58]
The actual government debt to GDP ratio was closer to
150%.[59]

To keep within the monetary union guidelines, the government of Greece had also for many years misreported
the countrys ocial economic statistics.[60][61] At the beginning of 2010, it was discovered that Greece had paid
Goldman Sachs and other banks hundreds of millions of
dollars in fees since 2001, for arranging transactions that
[62]
Most notable is a
It is estimated that the amount of tax evasion by Greeks hid the actual level of borrowing.
cross
currency
swap,
where
billions
worth
of Greek debts
stored in Swiss banks is around 80 billion Euro and a tax
and
loans
were
converted
into
yen
and
dollars
at a ctitreaty to address this issue is in negotiation between the
[41][42]
tious
exchange
rate
by
Goldman
Sachs,
thus
hiding
the
Greek and Swiss government.
true extent of Greek loans.[63]
Data for 2012 places the Greek black economy at
24.3% of GDP,[43] compared with 28.6% for Estonia, The purpose of these deals made by several successive
26.5% for Latvia, 21.6% for Italy, 17.1% for Belgium Greek governments, was to enable them to continue
and 13.5% for Germany (which partly correlates with the spending, while hiding the actual decit from the EU,
high percentage of Greeks who are self-employed[44] i.e., which, at the time, was a common practice amongst many
[62]
31.9% in Greece vs. 15% EU average,[45] several stud- European governments. The revised statistics revealed
that
Greece
at
all
years
from 2000 to 2010 had exceeded
ies have shown a clear correlation between tax evasion
[46][47]
the
Eurozone
stability
criteria,
with the yearly decits ex).
and self-employment
ceeding the recommended maximum limit at 3.0% of
GDP, and with the debt level signicantly above the rec2.5 Misreported debt statistics
ommended limit of 60% of GDP.
In early 2010, economy commissioner Olli Rehn denied that other countries would need a bailout. He said,

2.6

Debt levels revealed (2010)

Greeces debt percentage since 1977, compared to the average of

the Eurozone

in January 2010 had the oered amount of 8 bn 5year bonds over-subscribed by four times.[72] At the next
auction in March, the Financial Times again reported:
Athens sold 5bn in 10-year bonds and received orders
for three times that amount.[73] The continued successful auction and sale of bonds was, however, only possible
at the cost of increased yields, which in return caused a
further worsening of the Greek public decit. As a result, the rating agencies downgraded the Greek economy
to junk status in late April 2010. This led to a freeze
of the private capital market, requiring the Greek nancial needs to be covered by international bailout loans to
avoid a sovereign default.[74] In April 2010, it was estimated that up to 70% of Greek government bonds were
held by foreign investors, primarily banks.[68] The subsequent bailout loans paid to Greece were mainly used to
pay for the maturing bonds, but also to nance the continued yearly budget decits.

3 Chronology
Main article: Greek debt crisis timeline

The European statistics agency, Eurostat, had at regular

intervals ever since 2004, sent 10 delegations to Athens
with a view to improving the reliability of statistical gures related to the Greek national account, but apparently 3.1 20102014
to no avail. In January 2010, it issued a damning report
which contained accusations of falsied data and political In April 2010, adding to news of the adverse decit
and debt data for 2008 and 2009, the national account
interference.[64]
data revealed that the Greek economy had also been hit
In February 2010, the new government of George Pa- by three distinct recessions (Q3-Q4 2007, Q2-2008 unpandreou (elected in October 2009) admitted a awed til Q1-2009, and a third starting in Q3-2009),[75] which
statistical procedure previously had existed, before the equaled an outlook for a further rise in the debt-to-GDP
new government had been elected, and revised the 2009 ratio from 109% in 2008 to 146% in 2010. Credit rating
decit from a previously estimated 6%8% to an alarm- agencies responded by downgrading the Greek governing 12.7% of GDP.[65] In April 2010, the reported 2009
ment debt to junk bond status (below investment grade),
decit was further increased to 13.6%,[66] and the nal re- as they found indicators of a growing risk of a sovereign
vised calculation, using Eurostats standardized method,
default, and the government bond yields responded by risset it at 15.7% of GDP; the highest decit for any EU ing into unsustainable territory making the private capcountry in 2009.
ital lending market inaccessible as a funding source for
The gure for Greek government debt at the end of Greece.
2009 was also increased from its rst November esti- On 2 May 2010, the European Commission, European
mate at 269.3 billion (113% of GDP)[67][68] to a revised Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund
299.7 billion (130% of GDP). The need for a major (IMF), later nicknamed the Troika, responded by launchand sudden upward revision of both the decit and debt ing a 110 billion bailout loan to rescue Greece from
level for 2009, only being realized at a very late point, sovereign default and cover its nancial needs througharose due to Greek authorities previously having pub- out May 2010 until June 2013, conditional on implemenlished awed estimates and statistics in 2009. To sort out tation of austerity measures, structural reforms, and priall Greek statistical issues once and for all, Eurostat then vatization of government assets.[76] A year later, a worsdecided to perform their own in depth Financial Audit of ened recession along with a delayed implementation by
the scal years 200609. After having conducted the - the Greek government of the agreed conditions in the
nancial audit, Eurostat noted in November 2010 that all bailout programme revealed the need for Greece to remethodological issues now had been xed, and that the ceive a second bailout worth 130 billion (including a
new revised gures for 20062009 nally were consid- bank recapitalization package worth 48bn), while all
ered to be reliable.[69][70][71]
private creditors holding Greek government bonds were
Despite the crisis, the Greek governments bond auction required at the same time to sign a deal accepting ex-

CHRONOLOGY

tended maturities, lower interest rates, and a 53.5% face to reach a renegotiated bailout agreement were made by
value loss.[77]
the Greek government in the rst half[90] and second half
[91]
The second bailout programme was nally ratied by all of June 2015. Default would inevitably entail enforceparties in February 2012, and by eect extended the rst ment of recessionary capital controls to avoid a collapse
programme, meaning a total of 240 billion was to be of the banking sector and potentially could lead to exit
transferred at regular tranches throughout the period of from the eurozone, due to growing liquidity constraints
of public pension and salaries
May 2010 to December 2014. Due to a worsened reces- making continued payment
[92][93]
impossible
in
euro.
sion and continued delay of implementation of the conditions in the bailout programme, in December 2012 the
Troika agreed to provide Greece with a last round of signicant debt relief measures, while the IMF extended its
support with an extra 8.2bn of loans to be transferred
during the period of January 2015 to March 2016.
The fourth review of the bailout programme revealed
development of some unexpected upcoming nancing
gaps.[78][79] Due to an improved outlook for the Greek
economy, with achievement of a government structural
surplus both in 2013 and 2014 along with a decline of
the unemployment rate and return of positive economic
growth in 2014,[80][81] it was possible for the Greek government to regain access to the private lending market
for the rst time since eruption of its debt crisis to the
extent that its entire nancing gap for 2014 was patched
through a sale of bonds to private creditors.[82]
The improved economic outlook was replaced by a
new fourth recession starting in Q4-2014,[83] related to
the premature snap parliamentary election called by the
Greek parliament in December 2014 and the following
formation of a Syriza-led government refusing to respect
the terms of its current bailout agreement.[84] The rising political uncertainty of what would follow, caused the
Troika to suspend all scheduled remaining aid to Greece
under its current programme until such time when the
Greek government either accepted the previously negotiated conditional payment terms or alternately could reach
a mutually accepted agreement of some new updated
terms with its public creditors.[85] This rift caused a renewed and increasingly growing liquidity crisis (both for
the Greek government and Greek nancial system), resulting in plummeting stock prices at the Athens Stock
Exchange, while interest rates for the Greek government
at the private lending market spiked, making it once again
inaccessible as an alternative funding source.

3.2

2015

After the Greek election of January 2015, the Eurogroup granted a further four-month technical extension
of its bailout programme to Greece; accepting the payment terms attached to its last tranche to be renegotiated with the new Greek government before the end of
April 2015,[86] so that the review and last nancial transfer could be completed before the end of June.[87] The
new renegotiation deal was still pending at the end of
May.[88][89]
Faced by the threat of sovereign default, nal attempts

According to a statement by the Eurogroup, the Greek

government unilaterally broke o negotiations late on
June 26,[94][95][96] diverting from their prior agreement
to continue negotiating until a mutually acceptable compromise could be presented to the Eurogroup in the afternoon of 27 June.[97] A few hours later, Alexis Tsipras
announced on Greek national television that instead, a
referendum would be held on July 5, 2015 to approve or
reject the achieved preliminary negotiation result (the latest counter proposal submitted and oered by the Troika
on 25 June) for a new set of updated terms ensuring completion of the second bailout agreement.[98]
The Greek government campaigned for rejection of the
new terms, while four opposition parties (PASOK, To
Potami, KIDISO and New Democracy) objected to the
proposed referendum because it would be unconstitutional, and petitioned for the Greek parliament or Greek
president to reject the referendum proposal.[99] Meanwhile, the Eurogroup notied that the existing second
bailout agreement would technically expire on 30 June
(as regulated by its 20 February statement), if not updated prior this date by a new agreement setting up some
mutually agreed updated terms, rendering it too late for
Greece to arrange a referendum on updated terms ve
days after its expiry.[95][97]
The Eurogroup claried on June 27, that the only imaginable scenario in which the Eurogroup perhaps could oer
Greece further exibility through a new technical extension of its bailout program to pave the way for holding
the proposed Greek bailout referendum on July 5, would
be if the Greek government prior of 30 June settled a
nal renegotiated deal on a set of mutually agreed updated terms for program completion subject to the nal
approval by its proposed bailout referendum on July 5.
The reason for this rm stance was that the Eurogroup
wanted the Greek government to take some ownership
for the subsequent programs completion at the new, updated terms, assuming that the referendum was held and
resulted in approval.[100]
As for the Greek authorities continued call in negotiations to be granted additional debt relief, the Eurogroup
had signaled willingness to uphold their November 2012
debt relief promise after reaching agreement for updated terms for completion of the second program.[91]
This promise is a guarantee which holds that if Greece
completes its second program and if Greeces debt-toGDP ratio subsequently gets forecast to be over 124% in
2020 or 110% in 2022 for any reason, then the Eurozone

4.1

First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (May 2010 June 2011)

will implement a debt-relief large enough to ensure that junk status.

these two targets will still be met.[101]
The new austerity package was met with great anger by
On June 28, 2015, the referendum was approved by the the Greek public, leading to massive protests, riots and
Greek parliament, and ECB decided to maintain avail- social unrest throughout Greece. On 5 May 2010, a naability of its Emergency Liquidity Assistance to Greek tional strike was held in opposition to the planned spendbanks at its current level, as it was still considered po- ing cuts and tax increases.[107] Nevertheless, the new exlitically possible for Greece to ensure extension of its tra fourth package with austerity measures was approved
pre-required current bailout program (at least until 30 on 29 June 2011, with 155 out of 300 members of parJune). As many Greeks continued rapidly withdrawing liament voting in favour.
cash from ATMs due to fear that capital controls would
soon be invoked, the Greek central bank convened a
meeting on Sunday evening, June 28, in order to decide
how to handle the liquidity crisis during the upcoming
week.
On July 5, 2015, a large majority of Greek citizens voted
to reject the bailout terms (a 61% to 39% decision with
62.5% voter turnout). This caused indexes worldwide to
tumble, as many are now uncertain about Greeces future, fearing a potential exit from the European Union.
Following the vote, Greeces nance minister Yanis Varoufakis stepped down on July 6 and was replaced by Euclid
Tsakalotos.[102] Negotiations between Greece and other
Eurozone members continued in the following days to try 100,000 people protest against the austerity measures in front of
to procure funds from the European Central Bank in or- parliament building in Athens (29 May 2011).
der to decide whether Greece should or should not remain
a member of the Eurozone area.[103][104] On July 13, after
17 hours of negotiations, Eurozone leaders reached a provisional agreement on a third bailout programme to save
Greece from bankruptcy. But a nal deal needs further
negotiations, and requires ratication in several national
parliaments.[105]

Solutions implemented

Main article: Greek government-debt crisis countermeasures

4.1

First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (May 2010 June

2011)

Main article: First Economic Adjustment Programme

for Greece
On 1 May 2010, the Greek government announced a series of austerity measures[106] to persuade Germany, the
last remaining holdout, to sign on to a larger EU/IMF loan
package.[107] The next day the eurozone countries and the
International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year 110
billion loan (see below) retaining relatively high interest Former Prime Minister George Papandreou and former Eurates of 5.5%,[108] conditional on the implementation of ropean Commission President Jos Manuel Barroso after their
austerity measures. Credit rating agencies immediately meeting in Brussels on 20 June 2011.
downgraded Greek governmental bonds to an even lower

4.2

5 CREDITORS

Second Economic Adjustment Pro- HFSF shares, because the market share price was actually
gramme for Greece (July 2011 cheaper than the strike price.[120] This means that HFSF
can not be certain to sell all their bank shares through the
present)

warrants program. In case some of the shares have not

HFSF is
Main article: Second Economic Adjustment Programme been sold by the end of December 2017, then
[117]
allowed
to
sell
them
to
alternative
investors.
for Greece
In May 2014, a second round of bank recapitalization
EuEU emergency measures continued at a summit on 21 for all six commercial banks in Greece (Alpha,
[39]
robank,
NBG,
Piraeus,
Attica
and
Panellinia),
worth
July 2011 in Brussels, where euro area leaders agreed to
extend Greek (as well as Irish and Portuguese) loan re- 8.3bn, was concluded entirely nanzed by private
payment periods from 7 years to a minimum of 15 years shareholders, without HFSF needing to tap into any
reserve capital fund for fuand to cut interest rates to 3.5%. They also approved the of their current 11.5bn [121]
ture
bank
recapitalizations.
The fourth systemic bank
construction of a new 109 billion support package, of
(Eurobank),
which
failed
to
attract
private investor parwhich the exact content was to be debated and agreed
ticipation
in
the
rst
recapitalization
program, and thus
[109]
on at a later summit.
On 27 October 2011, eurobecame
almost
entirely
nanced
and
owned by HFSF,
zone leaders and the IMF also came to an agreement with
also
succeeded
in
the
second
round
to
introduce private
banks to accept a 50% write-o of (some part of) Greek
[122]
investors;
although
this
was
only
achieved
by HFSF
[110][111][112]
debt.
accepting in the process to dilute their amount of shares
The austerity measures helped Greece bring down its pri- from 95.2% to 34.7%.[123]
mary decit from 25bn (11% of GDP) in 2009 to 5bn
(2.4% of GDP) in 2011,[113] but as a side-eect they According to the third quarter 2014 nancial report of
also contributed to a worsening of the Greek recession. HFSF, the fund is estimated to recover a total of 27.3bn
Overall the Greek GDP had its worst year in 2011 with out of the initially injected 48.2bn to the fund. This
a 7.1% decline.[114] The unemployment rate also grew estimated recovery of 27.3bn includes A 0.6bn posfrom 7.5% in September 2008 to a, at the time, record itive cash balance stemming from its previous selling of
warrants (selling of recapitalization shares) and liquidahigh of 19.9% in November 2011.[115][116]
tion of assets, 2.8bn estimated to be recovered from liquidation of assets held by its bad asset bank, 10.9bn
4.3 Impact of the conducted bank recapi- of EFSF bonds still held as capital reserve, and 13bn
from its future sale of recapitalization shares in the four
talization
systemic banks. The last of these gures is aected by
The Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) managed the highest amount of uncertainty, as it directly reects
to complete a 48.2bn bank recapitalization in June the current market price of the remaining shares held in
2013, of which the rst 24.4bn were injected into the the four systemic banks (66.4% in Alpha, 35.4% in Eufour biggest Greek banks. Initially, this 48.2bn bank re- robank, 57.2% in NBG, 66.9% in Piraeus), which for
capitalization was accounted for as an equally sized debt- HFSF had a combined market value of 22.6bn by the
2013 but only was worth 13bn on 10 December
increase, which when assessed as an isolated factor end of[124]
2014.
had elevated the debt-to-GDP ratio by 24.8 points by the
end of 2012. However, in return for this, the Greek government at the same time received a number of shares
in those banks being recapitalized, which it can now sell
again during the upcoming years (a sale that per March
2012 was expected to generate 16bn of extra privatization income for the Greek government, to be realized
during 20132020).

Once HFSF has liquidated all its assets, the total amount
of recovered capital will be returned to the Greek government to help to reduce its debt. In early December 2014, the Bank of Greece allowed HFSF to repay
the rst 9.3bn out of its 11.3bn reserve to the Greek
government.[125] A few months later, the remaining part
of HFSF reserves were likewise approved for repayment
For three out of the four big Greek banks (NBG, Alpha to ECB, resulting in a total of 11.4bn debt notes being
[126]
and Piraeus), where there was an additional private in- repaid during the course of the rst quarter of 2015.
vestor capital contribution at minimum 10% of the conducted recapitalization, HFSF has oered them warrants
to buy back all HFSF bank shares in semi-annual exercise
periods up to December 2017, at some predened strike 5 Creditors
prices.[117] During the rst warrant period, the shareholders in Alpha bank bought back the rst 2.4% of the is- Initially, European banks had the largest holdings of
sued HFSF shares;[118] while the shareholders in Piraeus Greek debt. However, this has shifted as the troika (i.e.,
Bank only bought back the rst 0.07% of the issued HFSF European Central Bank or ECB, International Monetary
shares,[119] and nally the shareholders in National Bank Fund or IMF, and a European government-sponsored
(NBG) only bought back the rst 0.01% of the issued fund) have purchased Greek bonds. As of early 2015,

9
the largest individual contributors to the fund were Germany, France and Italy with roughly 130B total of the
323B debt.[127] The IMF is owed 32B and the ECB
20B. Foreign banks had little Greek debt.[128]

5.1

European banks

Excluding Greek banks, European banks had 45.8bn

exposure to Greece in June 2011, with 9.4bn held
by French and 7.9bn by German banks.[129] However, by early 2015 their holdings were minimal, roughly
2.4B.[128]

tle, independent British economist and consultant, wrote

of this: there has been so much propaganda over the
years about the merits of the euro and the perils of being outside it that both expert and popular opinion can
barely see straight. It is true that default and a euro exit
could endanger Greeces continued membership of the
EU. More importantly, though, there is a strong element
of national pride. For Greece to leave the euro would
seem like a national humiliation. Mind you, quite how
agreeing to decades of misery under German subjugation
allows Greeks to hold their heads high defeats me.[133]
Nonetheless, other 2012 polls showed that almost half
(48%) of Greeks were in favour of default, in contrast
with a minority (38%) who are not.[134]

Greek public opinion

7 Economic and social eects of the
crisis
See also: 20102012 Greek protests

2008 riots in Athens

According to a poll in February 2012 by Public Issue and

SKAI Channel, PASOKwhich won the national elections of 2009 with 43.92% of the votehad seen its approval rating reduced to a mere 8%, placing it fth afProtests in Athens on 25 May 2011
ter centre-right New Democracy (31%), left-wing Democratic Left (18%), far-left Communist Party of Greece
(KKE) (12.5%) and radical left SYRIZA (12%). The
same poll suggested that Papandreou was the least popular political leader with a 9% approval rating, while 71% 7.1 Economic eects
of Greeks did not trust Papademos as prime minister.[130]
Greek GDP suered its worst decline in 2011 when it
In a poll published on 18 May 2011, 62% of the people clocked growth of 6.9%;[135] a year where the seasonal
questioned felt the IMF memorandum that Greece signed adjusted industrial output ended 28.4% lower than in
in 2010 was a bad decision that hurt the country, while 2005,[136][137] during that year, 111,000 Greek compa80% had no faith in the Minister of Finance, Giorgos nies went bankrupt (27% higher than in 2010).[138][139]
Papakonstantinou, to handle the crisis.[131] (Evangelos As a result, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
Venizelos replaced Papakonstantinou on 17 June). 75% also grew from 7.5% in September 2008 to a then record
of those polled had a negative image of the IMF, and high of 23.1% in May 2012, while the youth unem65% felt it was hurting Greeces economy.[131] 64% felt ployment rate during the same time rose from 22.0% to
that sovereign default was likely. When asked about their 54.9%.[115][116][140] On 17 October 2011, Minister of Fifears for the near future, Greeks highlighted unemploy- nance Evangelos Venizelos announced that the government (97%), poverty (93%) and the closure of businesses ment would establish a new fund, aimed at helping those
(92%).[131]
who were hit the hardest from the governments austerPolls have shown that the vast majority of Greeks are ity measures.[141] The money for this agency would come
not in favour of leaving the Eurozone.[132] Roger Boo- from a crackdown on tax evasion.[141]

10

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS

Key statistics are summarized below, with a detailed table 7.2 Social eects
at the bottom of the article. According to the CIA World
Factbook and Eurostat:
The social eects of the austerity measures on the Greek
population have been severe.[146]
Greek GDP fell from 242 billion in 2008 to 179
billion in 2014, a 26% decline overall. Greece was
in recession for over ve years, emerging in 2014 by
some measures.
GDP per capita fell from a peak of 22,500 in 2007
to 17,000 in 2014, a 24% decline.
The public debt to GDP ratio in 2014 was 177%
GDP or 317 billion. This ratio was the third highest in the world after Japan and Zimbabwe. The
public debt peaked at 356 billion in 2011; it was
reduced by a bailout program to 305 billion in
2012 and has risen slightly since then.
The annual budget decit (expenses over revenues)
was 3.4% GDP in 2014, much improved versus the
15% GDP of 2009. Greece has achieved a primary
budget surplus, meaning it had more revenue than
expenses excluding interest payments in 2013 and
2014.
Revenues for 2014 were 86 billion (about 48%
GDP), while expenditures were 89.5 billion (about
50% GDP).

Employment and unemployment in Greece from 2004 to 2014

In February 2012, it was reported that 20,000 Greeks

had been made homeless during the preceding year, and
that 20 per cent of shops in the historic city centre of
Athens were empty.[147] The same month, Poul Thomsen, a Danish IMF ocial overseeing the Greek austerity programme, warned that ordinary Greeks were at the
limit of their toleration of austerity, and he called for
more international recognition of the fact that Greece
has already done a lot [in terms of reforms], at a great
cost to the population";[148] and moreover cautioned that
although further spending cuts were certainly still needed,
they should not be implemented rapidly, as it was crucial
rst to give some more time for the implemented economic reforms to start to work.[149]

Interest rates on Greek long-term debt rose from

around 6% in 2014 to 10% in 2015. Based on a debt
of 317 billion, the 6% rate represents annual interest payments of roughly 20 billion, nearly 23%
of government revenues. For scale, U.S. interest is
roughly 8% of revenues. Interest rates on German
bonds were under 1% in 2015.

By 2015, unemployment in Greece had reached 26% and

it was reported by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development that nearly twenty-percent
of Greeks lacked sucient funds to meet daily food expenses. As the economy has contracted and the welfare
state has declined, traditionally strong Greek families
have come under increasing strain, often unable to bear
the burden of increasing numbers of unemployed and of The unemployment rate has risen considerably, ten homeless relatives. Many unemployed Greeks cycle
from below 10% (20052009) to around 25% between friends and family members until they run out
(20142015).
of options and end up in homeless shelters. In contrast
to the traditional perception of homeless shelter residents
An estimated 44% of Greeks lived below the in Greece, these new homeless have extensive work hispoverty line in 2014.[142][143]
tories and are largely free of mental health and substance
abuse concerns.[150]
Greece defaulted on a $1.7 billion IMF payment on June The Greek national government has not been able to com29, 2015. Greece had requested a two-year bailout from mit the necessary resources to combat the homelessness
its lenders for roughly $30 billion, its third in six years, problem, due in part to austerity measures. A program
but did not receive it.[144]
was launched to provide a stipend to assist homeless to
The IMF reported on July 2, 2015, that the debt dynamics of Greece were unsustainable due to its already
high debt level and "...signicant changes in policies since
[2014]not least, lower primary surpluses and a weak reform eort that will weigh on growth and privatization
[which] are leading to substantial new nancing needs.
The report also stated that debt reduction (haircuts, in
which creditors sustain losses through debt principal reduction) would be required if the package of reforms under consideration were weakened further.[145]

return to their homes, but many enrollees never received

their grants. Various attempts have been made by local governments and non-governmental agencies to alleviate the problem. The non-prot street newspaper Shedia (Greek: ),[151] Raft is sold by street vendors
in Athens who are allowed to keep half the 3.50 cover
price for each issue sold. The number of homeless seeking to sell the paper has risen so high that the publication now requires a formal application where once there
was none. The municipality of Athens has started its own

8.2

Digital currency cards

shelters, the rst of which was called the Hotel Ionis.[150]

In 2015, the Venetis bakery chain in Athens was giving
away ten thousand loaves of bread a day, one-third of
its total production. In some of the poorest neighborhoods, according to the chains general manager, there
were disturbances among the large numbers of hungry
people queuing up to receive bread, and went on to say
In the third round of austerity measures, which is beginning now, it is certain that in Greece there will be no
consumers there will be only beggars.[152]

11

8.2 Digital currency cards

The bank multiplier eect means the amount of bank deposits far exceeds the amount of paper euros. Greece and
its people face a shortage of paper euros when withdrawing funds from their bank accounts. Reducing the requirement of paper euros in the withdrawal process, into
a digital form, allows withdrawals and spending.[161]

8.3 Negotiate another bailout

Solutions to the crisis

8.1

Exit the Eurozone or Grexit

Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman suggests

that the Greek economy can recover from the severe recession by exiting the Eurozone (often called Grexit
in the media) and launching a new national currency,
the drachma. The devaluation of the currency may help
Greece boost its exports and pay down its debts with
cheaper currency.[153] In fact, Iceland made a dramatic recovery after it led for bankruptcy in 2008, taking advantage of the devaluation of Icelandic krona (ISK).[154][155]
In 2013, it enjoyed an economic growth rate of about 3.3
percent.[156] Canada was also able to improve its budget
position in the 1990s by devaluing its currency.[157]
However, the consequences of Grexit could be global
and severe, including:
Membership in the Eurozone would no longer be
perceived as irrevocable. Other countries might be
tempted to exit or demand additional debt relief.
These countries might also see the interest rates rise
on their bonds, making debt service more dicult.
Further depreciation of the euro relative to the dollar, which would cheapen Eurozone exports while
making imports more expensive for Eurozone members. This could reduce the exports of non-euro
countries.
Geopolitical shifts, such as closer relations between
Greece and Russia, as the crisis sours relations with
Europe.
Signicant nancial losses for Eurozone countries
and the IMF, which are owed the majority of
Greeces roughly $300 billion national debt.
Adverse impact on the IMF and the credibility of
its austerity strategy, which has contributed to the
Greek depression.
Inability of Greece to access global capital markets
and the collapse of its banking system for an indeterminate period of time.[14][158][159][160]

Greece could also agree to additional bailout funds and

debt relief (i.e., bondholder haircuts or principal reductions) in exchange for further public pension cuts, privatizing certain government owned businesses, selling
government-owned assets, raising tax rates, and more aggressively collecting taxes. However, the present austerity
strategy has contributed to a Greek Depression, making it
even harder to pay back its debts, so it is unclear how further austerity measures would help if not accompanied by
very signicant reduction in the debt balance owed.[14] In
2011 the Greek government agreed to creditors proposals
that Greece could raise up to 50 billion through the sale
or development of state-owned assets,[162] but the Greek
government was not successful, receipts were much lower
than expected, and the policy was strongly opposed by
SYRIZA. In 2014, only 530m was raised. Some key
assets were sold to insiders.[163]

8.4 European debt conference

Economist Thomas Piketty said in July 2015: We need a
conference on all of Europes debts, just like after World
War II. A restructuring of all debt, not just in Greece but
in several European countries, is inevitable. He pointed
out that Germany received signicant debt relief after
World War II. A new institution would be required to
manage budget decits within limits across all Eurozone
countries. He warned that: If we start kicking states
out, then the crisis of condence in which the Eurozone
nds itself today will only worsen. Financial markets will
immediately turn on the next country. This would be
the beginning of a long, drawn-out period of agony, in
whose grasp we risk sacricing Europes social model, its
democracy, indeed its civilization on the altar of a conservative, irrational austerity policy.[164]

9 Economic statistics table

10 See also
Currency crisis
List of countries by external debt

12

11 NOTES AND REFERENCES

List of countries by net international investment position per capita

[11] BBC News, 30 June 2015: Greece debt crisis: Eurozone

rejects bailout appeal

The role of the Institute of International Finance in

the Greek debt crisis
List of acronyms: European sovereign-debt crisis

[12] Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco Research, Economic Research, Europe, Balance of Payments, European
Periphery. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 14
January 2013. Retrieved 3 July 2015.

Puerto Rican debt crisis

[13] FRED Graph. stlouisfed.org. Retrieved 3 July 2015.

Vulture fund

[14] Ezra Klein. Greeces debt crisis explained in charts and

maps. Vox.

Analogous events:

[15] Anil Kashyap-A Primer on the Greek Crisis-June 29,

2015

1997 Asian nancial crisis

[16] Update of the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme (PDF). Greek Ministry of Finance. European
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1998 Russian nancial crisis

19982002 Argentine great depression
Latin American debt crisis

[17] Revision of the Greek Government Decit and Debt Figures (PDF). Eurostat. 22 November 2004. Retrieved 5
March 2012.

List of sovereign debt crises

South American economic crisis of 2002

[18] Report on Greek government decit and debt statistics.

European Commission. 8 January 2010. Retrieved 8 January 2010.

Film about the debt

[19] Annual National Accounts: Revised data for the period

20052010 (PDF). Hellenic Statistical Authority. 5 October 2011. Retrieved 19 October 2011.

Debtocracy

11

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Weimar

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13

[28] Dempsey, Judy (7 January 2013). Military in Greece Is

Spared Cuts. The New York Times.
[29] McMeeken, Roxane (6 November 2011). Less healthcare, but Greece is still buying guns. The Independent
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[34] NYT-Paul Krugman-Does
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Need

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[42] Swiss await Greek input on hidden billions. Swissinfo.ch. 25 February 2015.
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[49] Greece Paid Goldman $300 Million To Help It Hide Its
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[50] Louise Story; Landon Thomas Jr; Nelson D. Schwartz
(February 13, 2010). Global Business: Wall St. Helped
to Mask Debt Fueling Europes Crisis. The New York
Times. In dozens of deals across the Continent, banks
provided cash upfront in return for government payments
in the future, with those liabilities then left o the books.
Greece, for example, traded away the rights to airport fees
and lottery proceeds in years to come.
[51] Nicholas Dunbar & Elisa Martinuzzi (March 5, 2012).
Goldman Secret Greece Loan Shows Two Sinners as
Client Unravels. Bloomberg. Greece actually executed the swap transactions to reduce its debt-to-grossdomestic-product ratio because all member states were required by the Maastricht Treaty to show an improvement
in their public nances, Laan said in an e- mail. The
swaps were one of several techniques that many European
governments used to meet the terms of the treaty.
[52] Edmund Conway Economics (February 15, 2010). Did
Goldman Sachs help Britain hide its debts too?". The Telegraph (London). One of the more intriguing lines from
that latter piece says: Instruments developed by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and a wide range of other
banks enabled politicians to mask additional borrowing
in Greece, Italy and possibly elsewhere. So, the obvious
question goes, what about the UK? Did Britain hide its
debts? Was Goldman Sachs involved? Should we panic?
[53] Elena Moya (16 February 2010). Banks that inated
Greek debt should be investigated, EU urges. The
Guardian. These instruments were not invented by
Greece, nor did investment banks discover them just for
Greece, said Christophoros Sardelis, who was chief of
Greeces debt management agency when the contracts
were conducted with Goldman Sachs. Such contracts
were also used by other European countries until Eurostat,
the EUs statistic agency, stopped accepting them later in
the decade. Eurostat has also asked Athens to clarify the
contracts.
[54] Beat Balzli (February 8, 2010). Greek Debt Crisis: How
Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt.
Der Spiegel. Retrieved 29 October 2013. This credit
disguised as a swap didn't show up in the Greek debt
statistics. Eurostats reporting rules don't comprehensively
record transactions involving nancial derivatives. The
Maastricht rules can be circumvented quite legally through
swaps, says a German derivatives dealer. In previous
years, Italy used a similar trick to mask its true debt with
the help of a dierent US bank.
[55] Story, Louise; Thomas Jr, Landon; Schwartz, Nelson D.
(14 February 2010). Wall St. Helped To Mask Debt
Fueling Europes Crisis. The New York Times. Retrieved
6 May 2010.

14

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15

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13

13

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13.1

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Greek government-debt crisis Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_government-debt_crisis?oldid=686462032 Contributors:

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