June 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law

calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were
placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no
basis too. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.

Presidential powers; calling-out power. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency
powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato. The Supreme Court held that such deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not
Here are selected June 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of
Constitutional Law
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. The issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. But, apart from the fact that
Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a
there was no such take over to begin with, the SC held the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and as a result, the President had to act to prevent
government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations, which are not government owned or
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement
controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the
or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed
as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and
forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened
economic viability but to a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and the peace and security in the affected places. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R.
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of
Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. On the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial
Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private
corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify court judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the
totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an
its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in
some economic activity or business function for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right
public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy Scouts of the of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to
render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in
Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.
the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder
Local governments; principle of local autonomy. The claim of petitioners in this case that the subject proclamation cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M.
and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.
the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
governmental powers over the region. The Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not Local Government Code
take over control of the powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law enforcement agents took respondent Local government; power to classify lands. Petitioners in this case contend that the subject property is outside the
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan
petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land. Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the
found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the
record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly
ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG
casting doubt on the validity of the reclassification over the subject property. The Supreme Court agreed with
Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. petitioners that the property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Ordinance No. 1313 was
Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
enacted in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on
Posted on July 8, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged Commission on Audit,
due process, freedom of the press, local government, Ombudsman

Presidential Electoral Tribunal; constitutionality. This case involved a motion for reconsideration, reiterating the Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was in existence at that time. The Task Force was
not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on
contention that the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
denied the motion and explained that judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution is plenary. August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit
their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the Settlements for review and ratification. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
169913. June 8, 2011.
means necessary to carry it into effect. As to the claim of petitioner that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power
and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Administrative Law
held that, contrary to petitioners claim, the resolution of electoral contests are judicial in nature. Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011.
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is putting the subject
property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated.
Presidential powers; declaration of a state of emergency. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully
The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program
exercised her powers when she declared a state of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due process
and the City of Cotabato. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs of law. If the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take action and declare the
from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may issuance as null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the instant case were improperly
inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. The same holds true with respect to the EPs and
judgment on the matter. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination which they were grounded are void. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Here,
169913. June 8, 2011.
petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency as well as the Presidents exercise of the

Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in this case raise the issue of whether
economic viability.
administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year
As
a
result,
while exonerating the Senator, the Supreme Court was compelled to declare most of the first thirteen
suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that it is immediately
executory pending appeal. This is the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the provisions of the PNRC charter as void to the extent that they created the PNRC as a private corporation.
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides It was this latter portion of the decision which Gordon and the PNRC as intervenor, asked the High Court to
among others: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
reconsider.
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension
In speaking for the majority, Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro, as ponente of the decision on the motions for
and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
reconsideration filed by Gordon and PNRC, first conceded that the constitutionality of the PNRC was never
removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course Under this provision, a respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman brought up as an issue by the petitioners. Accordingly, on the basis of existing jurisprudence which asserts that the
issue of unconstitutionality should not be touched upon unless it is the very lis mota or unless such question is
and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right to file an appeal
with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a respondent is given raised by the parties, the Supreme Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have
the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the
exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court
Ombudsman. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11.
could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
June 1, 2011.
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of
(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing this post.)
the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60)
years of existence in this country.
(This post will be updated when the remaining June 201o cases are published.)

Dissension in the Court: January 2011

Posted on February 8, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases,
Philippines - Law
The following is a decision promulgated by the High Court in January 2011 where at least one Justice felt
compelled to express his or her dissent from the decision penned by the ponente.
1. Sui Generis (Leonardo-de Castro vs. Carpio)
The case of Dante V. Liban, et al vs. Richard J. Gordon originated from a petition filed by petitioners to declare
Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). According to the petitioners, Gordon had violated Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Justice Leonardo-de Castro specifically pointed out that the constitutionality of the PNRC charter had never been
challenged and had in fact been amended several times by Congress. These actions by the legislature, relating as
they do to the PNRCs very corporate existence notwithstanding the constitutional proscription on the creation of
private corporations by law, constitutes a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
As the ponente states:
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.
Citing a 2004 ruling in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, the majority decision noted that the purpose of the
constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent the granting of
special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups. This, according to
the High Court, is not the case with the PNRC Charter as it does not grant special privileges to a particular
individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good. A strict and mechanical
interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution will, wrote Justice Leonardo-de Castro, hinder the
State in adopting measures that will serve the public good or national interest.

Accordingly, as a sui generis entity, the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof (and therefore Senator
Gordon is not in breach of the Constitution for having accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC). That it is not such
a government entity does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of
In its original decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Senator Gordon did not commit such a violation because the the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
PNRC, having been established in March 22, 1947 through Republic Act No. 95, was not a government-owned or
The sole dissenter, Antonio T. Carpio first took exception to the adherence by the majority to the view that the
controlled corporation, but a private corporation or organization albeit performing public functions.
Supreme Court should refrain from ruling on matters of constitutionality where the parties did not raise the same as
That ruling, however, engendered a resultant query as to whether or not then, the PNRC was unconstitutionally
an issue. On this point, Justice Caprio posited that the constitutional issue was inevitable because of the Courts
established by the legislature given that under Section 7, Article XIV of the then effective 1935 Constitution, it was decision that the PNRC was a private corporation established through a special law. The Court could not declare
provided that:
the PNRC a private corporation created by the special law without running afoul of Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. To declare the PNRC a private corporation necessarily meant declaring RA 95
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
unconstitutional. To declare the PNRC, a creation of RA 95, a private corporation without declaring RA 95
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned and controlled by the
unconstitutional would mean that Congress can create a private corporation through a special law. This the Court
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
could not do.
Similar prohibitions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution and Article XII, Section 16 of the
Besides, according to the dissent, the Supreme Court allowed the PNRC to intervene to argue on the validity of its
1987 Constitution. The latter reads:
charter. Accordingly, the PNRC had actually become a party to the case, raising the specific issue of the
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,
constitutionality of the PNRC charter. Although the original parties did not raise as an issue the constitutionality of
or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created
Republic Act 95, they were still afforded the opportunity to be heard on this constitutional issue when they filed
or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
their respective motions for reconsideration.

Justice Carpio then took the contrary view that the PNRC charter suffered constitutional infirmities, despite the
arguments raised by the PNRC as to its nature as an entity. On this issue, the dissent said:
All private charitable organizations are doing public service or activities that also constitute
governmental functions. Hence, the PNRC cannot claim that it is sui generis just because it is a
private organization performing certain public or governmental functions. That the PNRC is
rendering public service does not exempt it from the constitutional prohibition against the creation of
a private corporation through a special law since the PNRC is, admittedly, still a private
organization. The express prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charter
under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disregarded just because a private
corporation claims to be sui generis. The constitutional prohibition admits of no exception.
Nevertheless, according to the dissenter, because of the treaty obligations of the Philippines under the Geneva
Conventions, only those provisions of the PNRC charter which create PNRC as a private corporation or grant it
corporate powers should be declared void. The other provisions respecting the governments treaty obligations
remain valid.
(Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, respondent, Philippine National Red Cross, intervenor; G.R. No.
175352, January 18, 2011. See dissenting opinion here.)
(authors note: This author suspects that an entity such as the Philippine National Red Cross was not the sort of
private corporation that the framers of the Constitution had in mind when it decreed that the Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Be that as it
may, this author wonders why Congress did not consider establishing the Philippine National Red Cross as some
form of association or institution as opposed to a corporation given that the Constitution only restricts
Congress from establishing private corporations. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association or an
institution, like a corporation, could have a juridical personality. Surely, Congress had that power.)

Forfeiture of Senate seat for holding another

government office
Posted on August 19, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged corporation, public
officers
In Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, the petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to
be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo vs. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores vs. Drilon, which held that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
The Supreme Court addressed the preliminary issue of whether the petitioners have standing to file the petition.
The Supreme Court answered in the negative:
. . . petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an

action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an
act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo
warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However,
under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the
action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim
and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed
at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that PNPRC is a private organization performing public functions:
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of
PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not,
can be members of the PNRC. . .
. . . the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC, which ruled that the
PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its
own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general
corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a
government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a
government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. . .
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of
a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the
case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government
officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this
criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the PNRC Charter is violative of the constitutional proscription against the
creation of private corporations by special law, as provided in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution:
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation
would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation
is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created
under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the
Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through
special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can
create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled. . .
. . . although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a governmentowned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and
control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact
creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of
private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable
corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,
2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.

August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law

August 15, 2012.

Public officers
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. We have ruled that dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose

Posted on September 5, 2012 by Philbert E. Varona Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
- Law, Philippines - Regulation
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly,
Here are select August 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:
criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from
penal and civil liability.
Constitutional law
Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same
Bill of rights; due process. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a subject matter is of no moment. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that the administrative case may
trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
criminal charge. Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by the Sandiganbayan and of several criminal
process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their complaints by the Ombudsman did not result in the absolution of petitioner from the administrative charges. Dr.
charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course,
Fernando A. Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Antisaid party is not denied due process. Since petitioner was given the opportunity to defend himself from the
Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.
charges against him, as in fact he submitted a Counter-Affidavit with the PAGC, though he failed to comply with
the order for the submission of position paper, he cannot complain of denial of due process. Dr. Fernando A.
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. Under the threefold liability rule, any act or omission of any public
Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft
official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.
other. Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.
Bill of rights; unreasonable searches; exclusionary rule. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of
said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search
and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Margarita Ambre Y
Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012.

Ombudsman; power to dismiss erring public officials. As a last ditch effort to save himself, petitioner now puts in
issue the power of the Ombudsman to order his dismissal from service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in
dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article XI of the Constitution as well as
Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770, which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a
public official or employee.

It is already well-settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not
merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals [503
Bill of rights; warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto. Section 5[ of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure]
Phil. 396 (2003)], the fact [t]hat the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with [the] order of the
provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action [under Section 15(3) of
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No.
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
173268, August 23, 2012
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

July 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law

In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu Posted on August 10, 2012 by Philbert E. Varona Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected
Law Tagged Bill of Rights, eminent domain, impea, President
shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no prior
Here are select July 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:
valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in
flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in
the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro
and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only
authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Constitutional Law

Bill of rights; right of confrontation. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the safest and most satisfactory
method of investigating facts as it enables the judge to test the witness credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her person examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as Bill of rights; right of confrontation; conditional examination of witnesses. But for purposes of taking the
proof of the commission of an offense. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for

trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,
et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the Eminent domain; determination of just compensation. We also declared in National Power Corporation v.
case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive Purefoods Corporation [G.R. No. 160725, September 12, 2008] that Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395, as
the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness deportment and properly assess his credibility, amended (which provides a fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of
which is especially intolerable when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case against the
easements of right of way) is not binding upon this Court. This is in keeping with the established rule that the
accused
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. National Power Corporation
vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a
twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of President. [I]t has already been established that there is one
and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris [G.R. repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article
No. L- 48883, August 6, 1980] that the constitutional requirement insures that the witness will give his testimony VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to crossJustice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 541 (1939)]: With reference
examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to
to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible
observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility. Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and
without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The
Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation
of the principle that The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. This means that the
Bill of rights; right to privacy. Clearly [citing Morfe v. Mutuc (130 Phil. 415 [1968]) and Ople v. Torres (354 Phil. President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. Corollarily, it is
948 [1998]), the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23,
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks [G.R. No. 167173, December 27, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article
2007], this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute
VII thereof. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local executives over police. Regarding the countrys police
both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: The State shall establish and maintain one police
succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national
C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
law. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police,
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission
regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise
to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control
unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the
police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the
security on the other. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
power of executive control. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
3, 2012.
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided by Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local executives. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1,
subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision expressly refers to
cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular
note is Leander v. Sweden [26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433], in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is
certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping
free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security
incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may
mooring under this provision to justify their actions. Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is
yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of
writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the a national law enforcement agency, to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its
alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt.
departments belong. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and
Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
defend the Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national
territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate
Constitutional construction; verba legis non est recedendum. One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial
construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M.
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates Executive power; power of reorganization. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him
legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency
The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it

In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora [G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001], the Court affirmed that
the Presidents authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an
express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus: But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the

President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President,
subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose,
he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. Pichay, Jr. v. Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale. And in Domingo v. Zamora [G.R. No. 142283, February 6,
2003], the Court gave the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority in this wise: The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is
the command post of the President. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal AffairsInvestigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.

was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest
danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt. Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary
in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches
while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political
departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens
and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US
Constitution.
Our own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution Corona v. Senate of
the Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.

Impeachment; power of judicial review. In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. [G.R. No. 160261, November 10,
Executive power; power of reorganization; nature. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is 2003], we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) [of the Administrative Code] gives the President a virtual [G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011], the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral
freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process
as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions clause and of the one year bar provision
and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court noted: However, the Presidents
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the
power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished
required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to
day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. Corona v. Senate of the Philippines sitting as
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice
an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.
versa.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter a preceding
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what
(2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly
Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
under the Office of the President. On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have
now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to Judicial and Bar Council; composition. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functionsword Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but
Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
Eminent domain; what constitutes taking. The NPC, relying on [Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395], argues memorandum, from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members
that the CA erred when it ordered the payment of just compensation for the properties in question, given that most pertained to a single individual only. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
of the properties were subject only to an aerial easement of right of way, with the NPC requiring the use of the area
above the subject lands for its transmission lines. We have already established in a number of cases the flaw behind Judicial and Bar Council; composition. More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of
the NPCs argument. At the heart of this argument is the mistaken assumption that what are involved are mere liens constitutional construction, the Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Courts conclusion
on the property in the form of aerial easements. While it may be true that the transmission lines merely pass over that Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident that the
definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the
the affected properties, the easement imposes the additional limitation that the landowners are prohibited from
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
constructing any improvements or planting any trees that exceed three (3) meters within the aerial right of way
holds true in Congress non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an
area. This prohibition clearly interferes with the landowners right to possess and enjoy their properties
existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, and impeachment.
Apart from interfering with the attributes of ownership, we have articulated in our observation in National Power In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the roles which a
Corp. v. Sps. Gutierrez [271 Phil. 1 (1991)]that these transmission lines, because of the high-tension current that particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or
passes through them, pose a danger to the lives and limbs of those in the surrounding areas, and, thus, serve to limit separately. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
the activities that can be done on these lands. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al., G.R. dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and
Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.
functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
Impeachment; nature of. Impeachment, described as the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy, consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government.

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually
the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire
and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is
co-equal branches of government. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
prohibited by the Constitution. Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Commission on Audit and Reynaldo A.
Villar, Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; liability of public officer executing contract without authority. Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares
Public officers; authority of city vice-mayor to enter into contracts. Under [Section 456 of the Local Government that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a
Code], there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. The public officials personal
government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into
liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioners
contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003
act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit without the requisite authority therefor was in
specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power violation of the Local Government Code. While petitioner may have relied on the opinion of the City Legal
or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a
Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his personal
continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit
liability under P.D. 1445. Arnold D. Vicencio v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.
similar, contracts. Arnold D. Vicencio v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. While the suspension of a public officer under [Section 13 or Republic Act No.
Public officers; compensation and allowances. The issuance of Resolution No. 464 by the NHA was without legal 3019] is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine the validity of the information filed
basis. At the time of its issuance in 1982, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 had already expressly repealed all decrees,
against him, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public
executive orders, and issuances that authorized the grant of allowances to groups of officials or employees despite official even before his conviction. The accused public officials right to challenge the validity of the information
the inconsistency of those allowances with the position classification or rates indicated in the National
before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding
Compensation and Position Classification Plan.
leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners contention that P.D. 1597 only repealed Section 4 of P.D. 985, but not Section 2 thereof, is without
basis. While Section 2 of P.D. 1597 only mentions Section 4 of P.D. 985, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 specifically refers Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.
to all inconsistent laws or issuances.
Public officers; suspension order. The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the
validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with
Thereafter, or in 1989, R.A. 6758 further reinforced this policy by expressly decreeing that all allowances not
specifically mentioned therein, or as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way
salary rates prescribed.
of a motion to quash.
Under Section 12 of R.A. 6758, all kinds of allowances are integrated in the standardized salary rates. Below are
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
the exceptions: 1. Representation and transportation allowance (RATA); 2. Clothing and laundry allowance; 3.
validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, [Luciano v. Mariano (148-B Phil. 178
Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels; 4. Subsistence allowance of
hospital personnel; 5. Hazard pay; 6. Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and 7. Such other [1971])]likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a presuspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM.
suspension order. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.
Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents as of 1 July 1989, which were not
No estoppel against Government. In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit [425 Phil. 326 [2002]), this
integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized.
Court stated that public officers erroneous application and enforcement of the law do not estop the government
In this case, the incentive allowances granted under Resolution No.464 are clearly not among those enumerated
from making a subsequent correction of those errors. Where there is an express provision of law prohibiting the
under R.A. 6758. Neither has there been any allegation that the allowances were specifically determined by the
grant of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties on account of an error
DBM to be an exception to the standardized salary rates. Hence, such allowances can no longer be granted after the committed by public officials in granting the benefit. Practice, without more no matter how long continued
effectivity of R.A. 6758. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and National
185806, July 24, 2012.
Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.
Public officers; validity of per diems paid to ex-officio members of PEZA. PEZAs insistence that there is legal
Local government
basis in its grant of per diems to the ex officio members of its Board does not hold water. The constitutional
Local autonomy; devolution; reservation in favor of national government. While [Section 17 of the Local
prohibition explained in [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22,
1991] still stands and this Court finds no reason to revisit the doctrine laid down therein as said interpretation, to Government Code] charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved
upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
this Courts mind, is in consonance with what our Constitution provides In Civil Liberties Union, this Court
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationallyclarified the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public official
holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus: (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)
position. This Court ruled: It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex- wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the
officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. The ex-officio position local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no programs and services.
right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by

the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of Government-owned and -controlled corporations; Constitutional requirements. Furthermore, there is another reason
basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU
why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is,
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. Pimentel, et al. v. The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on two
Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012.
conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of
economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common good but failed the second
Other laws
one economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or
Agrarian reform; procedure for acquisition. The procedure for acquisition of private lands under Section 16 (e) of commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering that there were no other
competing reclamation companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created
the CARL is that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a
cash or in LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and request the proper Register of
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands belonging to the
Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi- public interest. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of
Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.
Paraaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Agrarian reform; control and possession of agricultural land. We, however, agree that petitioner must now turn over Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. This Court is convinced that PRA is not a GOCC
possession of the 109-hectare land. The matter has already been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. either under Section 2(3) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al. [G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012], when we ruled that the
XII of the 1987 Constitution. The facts, the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position
Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over agricultural
that PRA was not organized either as a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by Congress to
lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII operate commercially and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on the right of
corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory
farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from
agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Diamond
payment of real property tax. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority
Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.
(PRA) vs. City of Paraaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. From [Sections 2(10) and 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)], it is clear that a GOCC must be
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation while an instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers.
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality
remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.

Government contracts; public bidding requirement. Public bidding, as a method of government procurement, is
governed by the principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity, and accountability. By its very nature and
characteristic, a competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible
advantages thru open competition and in order to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the
execution of public contracts. Except only in cases in which alternative methods of procurement are allowed, all
government procurement shall be done by competitive bidding. In the case of Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not necessarily
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it Air Terminals Co, Inc. [G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003], the Court held: Competition must be
legitimate, fair and honest. In the field of government contract law, competition requires, not only bidding upon a
remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, the same undertaking, but also
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or non-stock that it be legitimate, fair and honest; and not designed to injure of defraud the government. It has been held that
corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the three principles in bidding are the offer to the public, opportunity for competition, and a basis for the exact
the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines, and comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not
character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John
organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate
entities. They are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative Code, which is Government contracts; public bidding requirement; approved budget of contract must be disclosed. Under the law,
the PSC-BAC is mandated to disclose not only the description of the items to be procured, and the eligibility
the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of government entities. Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Paraaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012. requirements, among others, but also the approved budget of the project. Competitive bidding is an essential
element of a public bidding. Thus, it should be conducted fairly and openly with full and free opportunity for
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is competition among bidders. It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive
neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a bidding required by law is void and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it Consequently, the
capital stock divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to
provision in the Instruction to Bidders stating that no award of the contract shall be made to a bidder whose bid
distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D. No.
price is lower than the allowable government estimate (AGE) or AAE is not valid. The rule on the matter is clear.
1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525, E.O. No. 6546 The PSC-BAC is obliged to observe and enforce the same in the procurement of goods and services for the project.
and EO No. 7987 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its stockholders.
The law on public bidding is not an empty formality. A strict adherence to the principles, rules and regulations on
public bidding must be sustained if only to preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on the
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A non-stock
procedure. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
corporation must have members. Moreover, it was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 88
of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to manage all government reclamation projects. Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Paraaque, G.R. No.
191109, July 18, 2012.

February 2012 Supreme Court Decisions on Political

Law

the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures,
or uses of government funds and properties. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R.
No. 157838, February 7, 2012.

Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 07-012; relevance of brand of an equipment as basis for what is
Posted on March 14, 2012 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases,
reasonable. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of
Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, citizenship, COMELEC, Commission on Audit, declaratory relief,
the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall
double jeopardy, due process, eminent domain, equal protection, immunity from suit, plebiscite, President, treaty have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
Here are selected February 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. As such, CDAs decisions regarding
Constitutional Law
procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs
Autonomous Region; plebiscite requirement. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that the creation auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform to the
a plebiscite called for the purpose. The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or
criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v.
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012 (guidelines on evidence to support audit findings of overthrough a plebiscite. While it agrees with the petitioners underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides
pricing). 3.1 When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is found beyond the allowable ten percent (10%)
with the people, it disagrees that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all
amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the above the prices indicated in reference price lists referred to in pa[r].2.1 as market price indicators, the auditor shall
Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming secure additional evidence to firm-up the initial audit finding to a reliable degree of certainty. 3.2 To firm-up the
findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial findings of over-pricing based on market price indicators mentioned
effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results hampering the ARMMs progress by impeding
Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the in pa[r]. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheets and/or price quotations indicating: a) the
identities/names of the suppliers or sellers; b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the
ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite. Also, Sec. 3 of R.A. No.
requirements of the procuring agency; c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in the
10153 cannot be seen as changing the basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this
provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of finding of over-pricing; and d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the
the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to perform the questioned transaction. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February
7, 2012.
functions pertaining to the said offices. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et
al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012; no retroactive effect. In Arriola v. COA, this Court ruled that the
al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs.
disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was based on undocumented
Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
claims. The documents that were used as basis of the COA Decision were not shown to petitioners therein despite
Citizenship; proceeding for declaration of Philippine citizenship. There is no specific statutory or procedural rule their repeated demands to see them; they were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from
which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. accredited suppliers. Absent due process and evidence to support COAs disallowance, COAs ruling on petitioners
The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of liability has no basis. We categorically ruled in Nava v. Palattao that neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum
Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of No. 97-012 can be given any retroactive effect. Thus, although Arriolawas already promulgated at the time, it is not
correct to say that the COA in this case violated the afore-quoted guidelines which have not yet been issued at the
entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
time the audit was conducted in 1993. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No.
respondent. The Republic of the Philippines v. Nora Fe Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012.
157838, February 7, 2012.
COMELEC; authority to hold special elections. The Constitution merely empowers the COMELEC to enforce and
Commission on Audit; pre-audit. On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the
pre-audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. With the normalization of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone
political system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299,
elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law.
which again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and
Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of Sections 5 and 6, which address instances when
elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs). Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA
and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, includes the duty to conduct pre-audit. The Supreme Court found that there is nothing in section 2 of Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and
or Section 6 of BP 881. More important, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections
and COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit
the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
is not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B.
line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
Commission on Audit; authority to determine if price is excessive; power to conduct post-audit. The COA, under application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v.
the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989,
post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority,
February 7, 2012.
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques
and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for Constitutionality; locus standi. Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a moratorium on the
increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900,

of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all
regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law
allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The under Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d)
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Locus standi or legal standing has been the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated
defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury without the defendants express consent. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal
the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. This processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It
requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from
stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right
expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be
of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The
characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and,
state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in
therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. Neither can the lack of the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where
good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and
there has been a grave abuse of discretion. Artemio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines
validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa vs.
Zamora, as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry. Thus, the Court Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al. G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R.
ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
No. 178080, February 1, 2012.
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President
Due process; deprivation of the States right to due process. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden of
DAR Administrative Order No. 01; 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of
diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest. The States right to be
Agricultural Lands under RA No. 6657; procedure; commencement. Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the
Reform Officer (MARO) After determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and upon
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty. The prosecutors role in the administration of justice is to lay
accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NO (CARP Form No. 5-1).
before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to
Corolarilly, Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, which outlines the steps in the acquisition of lands,
whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and without regard to any personal
rd
details that in the 3 step, the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office (DARMO) should conduct a
conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is disposed to do. The prosecutor owes the State, the court and
preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether or not the property maybe covered under the CARP, the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous
which findings will be contained in CARP Form No. 3.a, or the Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report. Gonzalo
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the courts
Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Ruben Alcaide (deceased), substituted by Gloria Alcaide representative of the Farmermind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape
Beneficiaries, G.R. No. 167952, February 1, 2012.
unpunished. In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control
the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to
Declaratory relief. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question
present or who to call as witness. In this case, the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the
judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory
available evidence or that other evidence could be secured. People of the Philippines, v. Hon. Sandiganbayan
relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to
(Fourth Division), et al., G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012.
assail the validity of EO 7. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No.
193978, February 28, 2012.
Elections; synchronization of ARMM elections with local elections. The Court was unanimous in holding that the
Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not
Double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from
two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the
Sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not
could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective
apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to
manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM
rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus of the
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. It is to be considered that the ARMM,
review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by
Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.
the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years
but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a
Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the
or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution
an identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. Article X of the Constitution, entitled
civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of
Local Government, clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the
jurisprudence. It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, viz: The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state ARMM, as local governments. The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of
the State under the heading Local Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a

autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments. That the Constitution mentions only the national
government and the local governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and
the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which,
while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local
governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections. Datu Michael Abas Kida, et. al v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.

President; judicial courtesy. Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies
only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a
higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical
considerations. In other words, the principle of judicial courtesy applies where there is a strong probability that
the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court or court of origin. Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President,
who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of
separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is founded upon. Secondly, the fact that our
previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any
Eminent domain; just compensation. When the State exercises its inherent power of eminent domain, the
less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of
Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation to compensate the landowner for the expropriated property.
the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, a decision garnering only 8
When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian reform program, the votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The
constitutional provision which governs is Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. Notably, this provision also petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting, the probability exists that their
imposes upon the State the obligation of paying the landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the motion for reconsideration may be granted. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et
governments agrarian reform purposes. That the compensation mentioned here pertains to the fair and full price of al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et
the taken property is evident from the exchange between the members of the Constitutional Commission during the al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs.
discussion on the governments agrarian reform program. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012.
President; power to appoint officer in charge. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive
Equal protection clause. The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of in nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power. The main
the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the
the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a
sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are
classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing
same class. Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. It was not seen how the quality of
for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of
wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. Commissioner of
presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments. he first group of presidential
Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579,
appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
February 1, 2012.
consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Executive agreement; requisites. An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower range of subject matters. The second group of officials the President can appoint are all other officers of the Government whose
Despite these differences, to be considered an executive agreement, the following three requisites provided under appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be between states; (b) it must be written; second sentence acts as the catch-all provision for the Presidents appointment power, in recognition of the fact
that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is
and (c) it must governed by international law. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar
further demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to appoint officials whose appointments are not
Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not
Executive Power; power to classify or reclassify lands. The power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by
executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances, may, subject to certain conditions,
appointment. There is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
very well effect reclassification of land use within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to
issued by the executive department, through its appropriate agencies, carry the same force and effect as any statute. appoint OICs. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto
As it were, PD 27 and Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2),
Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs.
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis
Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P.
Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos.
State immunity; doctrine of state immunity. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
Irrepealable law. The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power of the
but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is
legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs
attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would
with the plenary powers of Congress. Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. Piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract
bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1 October
with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a
clearly violated the very principle which the Supreme Court sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business. Even assuming arguendo that
one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest it with immunity. It is readily
et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental
vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term
Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, implementing agency has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit.
2012.
Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not

consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Courts ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled
corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the
Corporation Code. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No.
185572, February 7, 2012.

vigilance on the part of the latter. Here, even with the respondents supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the
contract and the authority of the public official involved in the construction agreements, there is no such confusion
as to the matter of the contracts validity and the equivalent compensation. As found by the court a quo, petitioner
had assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work that they would do, as even DPWH
Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to fast-track the project. Hence, respondents cannot by
any stretch of logic, be deprived of compensation for their services when despite their ostensible omissions
State immunity; waiver by submission to arbitration. In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of they only heeded the assurance of DPWH and proceeded to work on the urgent project. DPWH v. Ronaldo Quiwa,
1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to et. al, G.R. No. 183444, February 8, 2012.
arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no
similar law in the Philippines, there is reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case. Under the Agrarian Reform
provisions of The Conditions of Contract which is an integral part of the Contract Agreement,, if any dispute arises
between Northrail and CNMEG, both parties are bound to submit the matter to the HKIAC for arbitration. In case Agrarian Reform Law; agricultural lands. The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be
the HKIAC makes an arbitral award in favor of Northrail, its enforcement in the Philippines would be subject to they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657.
the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special Rules). Rule 13 thereof provides for the Recognition Section 3(c) of RA 6657 defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award. Under Rules 13.2 and 13.3 of the Special Rules, the party to
arbitration wishing to have an arbitral award recognized and enforced in the Philippines must petition the proper Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran,
regional trial court (a) where the assets to be attached or levied upon is located; (b) where the acts to be enjoined Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos.
are being performed; (c) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties; (d) if any of the 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region. From Agrarian Reform Law; applicability of PD 27, RA 6657, and Proclamation 1637. From the standpoint of agrarian
all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG has agreed that it will not be afforded immunity from suit. Thus, the
reform, PD 27, being in context the earliest issuance, governed at the start the disposition of the rice-and-corn land
courts have the competence and jurisdiction to ascertain the validity of the Contract Agreement. China National
portions of the Doronilla property. And true enough, the DAR began processing land transfers through the OLT
machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
program under PD 27 and thereafter issued the corresponding CLTs. However, when Proclamation 1637 went into
effect, DAR discontinued with the OLT processing. The tenants of Doronilla during that time desisted from
Supreme Court; respect to factual findings of administrative agencies. It is the general policy of the Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the questioning the halt in the issuance of the CLTs. It is fairly evident that DAR noted the effect of the issuance of
basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to Proclamation 1637 on the subject land and decided not to pursue its original operation, recognizing the change of
classification of the property from agricultural to residential. When it took effect on June 15, 1988, RA 6657
enforce. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such became the prevailing agrarian reform law. This is not to say, however, that its coming into effect necessarily
impeded the operation of PD 27, which, to repeat, covers only rice and corn land. Far from it, for RA 6657, which
findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
identifies rice and corn land under PD 27 as among the properties the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and
landless, no less provides that PD 27 shall be of suppletory application. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of
COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P.
Taxpayers suit; standing. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;
established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Constitution. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the
Agrarian Reform Law; certificates of title; merely an evidence of recognition by the government; inchoate right.
National Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012.
While the PD 27 tenant-farmers are considered the owners by virtue of that decree, they cannot yet exercise all the
Administrative Law
attributes inherent in ownership, such as selling the lot, because, with respect to the government represented by
DAR and LBP, they have in the meantime only inchoate rights in the lotthe being amortizing owners. This is
Administrative Rule; due process; publication, when required. The Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27because they must still pay all the amortizations over the lot to Land Bank before an EP is issued to them. Then and
2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or only then do they acquire, in the phraseology ofVinzons-Magana, the vested right of absolute ownership in the
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of
landholding. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs.
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors,
Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al.
wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was
vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
3%, for feed grade, 7%.CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Considering that the regulation would affect the substantive
Agrarian Reform Law; private rights; just compensation. As payment the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the
rights of respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied Sections 3 and 9 of Book VII, Chapter 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283, as amended by Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of
2 of the Revised Administrative Code. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis--vis the real registered owner. The farmer-beneficiaries have private rights over
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law said lots as they were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS Townsite reservation or at least are
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for subrogated to the rights of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries who were issued CLTs or EPs after
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases June 21, 1974 when Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not acquire rights over the lots they were
the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657, because the lots have already been reclassified as residential and are beyond the
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. Because
compulsory coverage for agrarian reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974
petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed
have to be annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis, since the lots in question are no longer subject to
regulation must be struck down. Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v.
agrarian reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-agricultural purposes. Land
Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.
Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado
Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J.
Void government contract; payment for services. Parties who do not come to court with clean hands cannot be
Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
allowed to profit from their own wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of the party seeking equity must be free
from fault, and he must have done nothing to lull his adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing
Agricultural tenancy relationship; de jure tenant; grounds for ejection provided by law. Respondent, as

landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of
Agrarian reform finds context in social justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But social justice itself
petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee. This rule proceeds from the principle that a tenancy relationship, once
is not merely granted to the marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social justice is
established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural
intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an
landholding on grounds provided by law, in this case Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844. SEC. 36. Possession of
injustice. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate
Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an
of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs.
agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: (1)
The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will Public Land
convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful nonPublic Land Act; alienable and disposable land. Public Land Act requires that the applicant for registration must
agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections 25 and except when the possession and occupation of the land must have been either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance the Public Land Act. Certifications of the DENR are not sufficient to prove the foregoing. DENR Administrative
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas
three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it below 50 hectares. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession; (2) The agricultural lessee failed to classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code
the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event orforce majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used theCENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The agricultural lessee failed to
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section 29; (5) The land or other substantial
be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. The
the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it
CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public
falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR
per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Republic of the Philippines v. Lucia Gomez, G.R.
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or (7) The lessee employed a sub- No. 189021, February 22, 2012.
lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section 27. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin,
Public Land Act; confirmation of of imperfect titles. It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and
G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land must be open,
Agricultural tenancy relationship; requisites; may be established through written or oral contract. The essential
continuous, exclusive and notorious in character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, the Supreme Court
elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural explained that the intent behind the use of possession in conjunction with occupation is to emphasize the need
lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the tenant or agricultural lessee. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. Juan
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
Jurisdiction of DAR; DARAB. The DARAB has been created and designed to exercise the DARs adjudicating
functions. And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB derives its jurisdiction from law, specifically RA 6657, property. On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus,
which invested it with adjudicatory powers over agrarian reform disputes and matters related to the implementation requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof,
of CARL. The Supreme Court need not belabor that DARABs jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Doronilla possession for purposes of prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. It
property, cannot be conferred by the main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-beneficiaries claiming to have is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is
vested rights under PD 27. As earlier discussed, the process of land reform covering the 1,266 hectares of the
patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
Araneta estate was not completed prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1637. So the intervenors, with the
exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries who were granted CLTs, failed to acquire private rights of ownership under intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
PD 27 before the effective conversion of the Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the Doronilla
property, being outside of CARP coverage, is also beyond DARABs jurisdiction. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. Republic of the
Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012.
Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos.
161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Public Officers

Social justice; laches. There can be little quibble about Duran, et al. being guilty of laches. They failed and
neglected to keep track of their case with their lawyer for 14 long years. As discussed above, Atty. Lara died even
prior to the promulgation of the DARAB Decision. Even then, they failed to notify the DARAB and the other
parties of the case regarding the demise of Atty. Lara and even a change of counsel. It certainly strains credulity to
think that literally no one, among those constituting the petitioning-intervenors, had the characteristic good sense
of following up the case with their legal counsel. Only now, 14 years after, did some think of fighting for the right
they slept on. Thus, as to them, the CA Decision is deemed final and executory based on the principle of laches.

Public officer; preventive suspension. The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for 90 days in
accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. Clearly, by well-established jurisprudence, the provision of Section
13, Republic Act 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety
(90) days, any public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of public funds or
property. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al. G.R. No. 171513, February 6,
2012.

Public officers; liability for overpricing; personal and solidary liability; reimbursement. The Court upholds the
their unexplained failure to do so barred them from claiming that they were acting in good faith in the performance
COAs ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the overpricing in the computers purchased by of their duty. The presumptions of good faith or regular performance of official duty are disputable and may be
CDA. The directive for the payment of the amount of disallowance finally determined by the COA did not change contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit,
the nature of the obligation as solidary because the demand thus made upon petitioner did not foreclose his right as G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012.
solidary debtor to proceed against his co-debtors/obligors, in this case the members of the PBAC charged under
Notice of Disallowance No. 93-0016-101, for their share in the total amount of disallowance. Petitioner is therefore (Teng thanks Jiselle Compuesto for her assistance in the preparation of this post.)
liable to restitute the P881,819.00 to the Government without prejudice, however, to his right to recover it from
persons who were solidarily liable with him. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R.
No. 157838, February 7, 2012.

January 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law

Public officials; holdover. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials
can occupy their offices. The Supreme Court has already established that elective ARMM officials are also local
officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes Posted on February 20, 2012 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity.
Here are selected January 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years,
as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has, Constitutional Law
in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy disposition of cases. The right to a speedy trial is
present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In this case, the appropriate
to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional
right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. An
Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
examination of the petitioners arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the absence of any allegation
Constitution. Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious, capricious
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings. Petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy
no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the alleged breach
Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes,
of the right in question was not raised below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled
etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The
exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Philippine Coconut
Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al.,
Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January
Signing bonus; legality. There is no dispute that the grant of a signing bonus had been previously disallowed by the 24, 2012.
express mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo). On July 22, 2002, this Court
Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be resolved without going into the constitutionality of
declared in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commissions authority to fix the compensation of its employees under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners predicate their claim over the sequestered shares and
its charter, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161 as amended, is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which
necessarily their cause on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the respondent on constitutional grounds. This
provides for the consolidation of allowances and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates. While case is for the recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of certain enactments, which in turn is rooted in the
there are exceptions provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 in observance of the policy on nonshares being public in character, purchased as they were by funds raised by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and
diminution of pay, the signing bonus is not one of the benefits contemplated. This Court also ruled that the signing police powers of the state. As may be recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-declaring provision, authorized the
bonus is not a truly reasonable compensation since conduct of peaceful collective negotiations should not come distribution of UCPB shares of stock free to coconut farmers. On the other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755
with a price tag. hat MIAAs Board of Directors did not make a mistake and their real intention was to reward the authorized the PCA to utilize portions of the CCSF to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire
successful conclusion of collective negotiations by some pecuniary means is belied by simultaneous approval of UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCSF levies with UCPB interest free. The CCSF, CIDF and like levies that
the grant and the CNA between SMPP and MIAA betrays their real intention. Moreover, prior to the issuance of
Philippine Coconut Authority is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be
AOM No. JPA 03-35 declaring the subject benefit illegal, there was no effort on the part of its Board of Directors transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.
to rectify the alleged mistake in nomenclature. It was only after then Corporate Auditor Manalo and Director
Nacion called MIAAs attention as to the illegality of a signing bonus that MIAA alleged that the subject benefit is In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, could have
been the only plausible means by which close to a purported million and a half coconut farmers could have
a CNA Incentive. Easily, such is a mere afterthought.Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on
acquired the said shares of stock. It has, therefore, become necessary to determine the validity of the authorizing
Audit, G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012.
law, which made the stock transfer and acquisitions possible.
Signing bonus; return of illegal bonus. Good faith is anchored on an honest belief that one is legally entitled to the
benefit. In this case, the MIAA employees who had no participation in the approval and release of the disallowed It is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the constitutional
benefit accepted the same on the assumption that Resolution No. 2003-067 was issued in the valid exercise of the proscription against the use of special funds save for the purpose it was established. Otherwise, petitioners claim
power vested in the Board of Directors under the MIAA charter. As they were not privy as to reason and motivation of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly over SMC shares held by UCPBs subsidiaries
will have no leg to stand on, P.D. No. 755 being the only law authorizing the distribution of the SMC and UCPB
of the Board of Directors, they can properly rely on the presumption that the former acted regularly in the
performance of their official duties in accepting the subject benefit. Furthermore, their acceptance of the disallowed shares of stock to coconut farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually stating and holding that the
grant, in the absence of any competent proof of bad faith on their part, will not suffice to render liable for a refund. coco levy fund shall not be considered as a special not even general fund, but shall be owned by the farmers in
their private capacities.
The same is not true as far as the Board of Directors. Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not
absolute as their exercise thereof is subject to existing laws, rules and regulations and they cannot deny
A. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they
knowledge of SSS v. COA and the various issuances of the Executive Department prohibiting the grant of the
cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
signing bonus. In fact, they are duty-bound to understand and know the law that they are tasked to implement and

Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes PCA to distribute
benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue
to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial
benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not
the requirement of public purpose. In this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be
under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. To already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be
hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is entitled to
private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the
the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
implementing agency.
The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect if not exactly direct conversion of special funds
into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for
free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free
distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The
fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does
not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds or more bluntly, owners thereof in their
private capacity. The said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said
special funds of the government.
B. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert to the
general fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private individuals
in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional.

Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB
shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of the national policy declared
under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a
vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth
and development. The said law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them
exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy
or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to
dispose of them by sale or any other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for
any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers
that would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to
distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full disposition of such
shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the
laws national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation, enjoins the
disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance, if
there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds D. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the
of the government,
1987 Constitution.
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF to advance the governments avowed policy of
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut levy funds from the coffer of the public funds. It
protecting the coconut industry. The CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer purchases privatized revenues derived from the coco levy. The same provision is carried over in Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
of coconut products. The protection of the entire coconut industry and the consuming public provides the rationale No. 1468. These provisions violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the Constitution, which states in pertinent part
for the creation of the coconut levy fund. P.D. No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein not especially that the Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
for the coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by,
redound to the benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.
961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: [the coconut levy] fund and the disbursements
thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them in their private
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As an independent
capacities; or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section
not therefore form part of the general fund of the national government later on; or the UCPB shares acquired using 3 of the 1987 Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in
the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free, violated the special public purpose for
any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
which the CCSF was established.
Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has
jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority
Not only were the challenged presidential issuances unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the shares of and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the
stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore, negating the public purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to UCPB shares purchased using the said funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private
stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the
funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government,
coconut levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of private individuals in their
and consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D.
private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for which the fund was created. To compound the situation, the Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional
offending provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which
independence.
normally can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into
private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the pertinent
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut levy funds is an example of an investment of
provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the
public funds. The conversion of these special public funds into private funds by allowing private individuals to
Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy own them in their private capacities is something else. It effectively deprives the COA of its constitutionallyfund a special fund of the government to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
invested power to audit and settle such accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using special public
funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has taken, or will completely take away the said funds from the
C. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
boundaries with which the COA has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit jurisdiction over the receipt
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by struck down for being unconstitutional. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the
the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
Decisions; statement of fact and law. Complainant alleges that respondent members of the CAs Sixth Division
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically stating the facts and the law on which

the denial of the petition for review was based. He insists that the decision promulgated by the CAs Sixth Division Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, provides that the hearing officer may
had no legal foundation and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition for review. Section 14
issue an order directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified
provides that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
position papers on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer may consider the case
facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that, based on the evidence, there is a need to
court shall be refused due course or denied without starting the legal basis therefor. The Court held that the
conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further
complaint was unfounded. The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a judicial decision proceedings will be conducted. But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound
be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision nowhere
discretion of the hearing officer. As the petitioners have failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing officers
demands that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary. Re:
determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. The Court likewise find
Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, no merit in petitioners contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case was
Jr., et al., A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012.
already undergoing trial before the hearing officer, should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the
Due process; right to be heard. Petitioner COCOFEDs right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are not subject to its operation, or
of partial summary judgments before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case
able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its Class Action Omnibus Motion dated February 23, would cause injustice to them. Here, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend
2001 where they appended around 400 documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners
themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their
manifested that said documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers ownership of the UCPB shares,
defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully
which were distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion complain that they were denied due process of law. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in
for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the act, declaration or omission of a reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Viewed in this light, the Court rejected
requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties
petitioners allegations about being deprived the right to adduce evidence. Philippine Coconut Producers
submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors;
interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S.
Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al.,
Eminent domain; just compensation. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the
Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative
owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and
constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the
place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal,
property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. The provisions of R.A. No. 6770 taken
action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In this case, the Court affirmed the appellate courts
disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the
ruling that the commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of
properties were expropriated by petitioner. The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public
under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made an ocular inspection of officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that
the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region
the number of improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the
VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C.
land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The members of the new committee even made a
second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal
Public funds/assets. The coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by
valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors
means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens
such as distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members also considered
and restrictions attached by law to such property. In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by UCPB using
Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which coconut levy funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF
provides the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. The committee members based Oil Mills. These companies were acquired using or whose capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds.
their recommendations on reliable data and considered various factors that affected the value of the land and the However, as in the case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF Oil Mills to coconut
improvements.
farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portions distributed to the supposed coconut farmers
followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78. And as the administrator of the CIIF holding
The Court also upheld the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment companies, UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or
for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the
organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding
expropriated properties. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the companies used borrowed funds from UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion.
expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds funds that
actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. Republic of the Philippines, have been established to be public in character it goes without saying that these acquired corporations and assets
rep. by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) vs.Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185124,
ought to be regarded and treated as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned
January 25, 2012.
by the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws. Philippine Coconut Producers
Ombudsman; due process. Petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating lawyer proceeded Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors;
Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on record. Section 5(b)(1), Rule 3 of the Rules of

Election Law

that an employee is reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that such
reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries. The principal distinctions between a detail and
Supreme Court; review of decision of a COMELEC division. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
reassignment lie in the place where the employee is to be moved and in its effectiveness pending appeal with the
Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits
CSC. A detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement within
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory
the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Thus, the Court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of Having ruled that respondent was constructively dismissed, the next question is whether she is entitled to
the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC reinstatement and back wages. The Court held that she is entitled to reinstatement but not to full back wages and
First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of benefits. An illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum
his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. Republic of the
upon the merits.
Philippines, represented by the Civil Service Commission vs. Minerva M.P. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January
31, 2012.
One exception to the above rule is that the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to
review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made
Public officers; reorganization; termination of employment. The issue here is whether the NEA Board had the
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
power to terminate all of NEAs employees in connection with a reorganization of the agency. Under Rule 33,
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be
matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the
considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by
members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out. Petitioners argue
can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter
that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the power to terminate
concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. Douglas R. Cagas vs. the Commission on Elections & employees but only to reduce NEAs manpower complement. The Court disagreed and affirmed the termination of
Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012.
the employees. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of ones position through removal or
Public Officers
abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more
Public employee; grave misconduct. Grave misconduct consists in a government officials deliberate violation of a efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination of
rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Boards powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof
of bad faith. United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. vs. National Electrification Administration
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. In particular, corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the officials unlawful and wrongful use of his station or reputation to procure some benefit (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012.
for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Rigging by a public official of bidding Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No officer or employee in the Civil Service can be
in the organization where he belongs is a form of corruption. As a public officer, private respondent had the duty to removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions, as it is likewise
protect the process of public bidding in his organization. A ruling that would absolve private respondent of any
settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are temporary
liability for rigging the bids in the government office where he works on the pretext that he was not a member of and coterminous in nature. Here, petitioners appointment was temporary as he did not have the required career
the bids and awards committee would encourage public officers who are not members of bids committees to make executive service eligibility. An appointee without such eligibility cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity.
an industry of rigging bids, using their offices and official reputations. National Power Corporation vs. Civil
A temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moments notice. As to those with eligibilities,
Service Commission & Rodrigo A. Tanfelix, G.R. No. 152093. January 24, 2012.
their right to security of tenure pertain to their rank but not to the position to which they were appointed. Petitioner
never alleged that, at any time during which he held the position in question, he had acquired the requisite
Public officers; reassignment; detail versus reassignment. The issue here is whether or not respondents
reassignment constitutes constructive dismissal entitling her to reinstatement and back wages. The Court ruled in eligibility. Petitioners temporary appointment was also coterminous, or one that is co-existent with the tenure of
the affirmative. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees the appointing authority or at the latters pleasure. As such, his replacement was not a removal but rather an
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. The acceptance of a
temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without cause. One
away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the
pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause. Samuel B. Ong
who are in the Civil Service. Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines
constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency heads unreasonable, vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.
humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to
have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the
employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job. Reassignments
involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of tenure, which is assured by the
Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of
tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and
reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
Posted on December 21, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Commercial Law, Philippines - Cases,
The Court distinguished between a detail and reassignment. A detail, as defined and governed by Executive Order
Philippines - Law
292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), is the movement of an employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of
Here are selected November 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to Constitutional Law
detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. On the other hand, a
Agrarian reform; control over agricultural lands. Upon review of the facts and circumstances, the Court concluded
reassignment, as defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), means that the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) will never have control over the agricultural lands as long as they

November 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions

on Political Law

remain as stockholders of HLI. Since control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers,
Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448. November 16, 2011.
the Court reconsidered its earlier ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
Expropriation; valuation of expropriated property. One of the issues in this case was whether or not the RTC and
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. A revisit of HLIs Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties. The
Option Agreement upon which the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI is PhP590,554,220, while Supreme Court held that even in expropriation cases, questions of facts are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the
the value of the 4,915.7466 hectares is PhP196,630,000. Consequently, the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the Rules of Court as a petition for review may only raise questions of law. Moreover, factual findings of the trial
court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court. Thus, the Court
HLI capital stock is 33.296% (196,630,000 divided by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent
affirmed the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Report is founded on evidence. The petitioners tax
33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares unanimously vote to remain as HLI
stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be placed in the hands of the farmer-beneficiaries. Control, of declarations, the BIR zonal valuation and the deeds of sale it presented are not the only proof of the fair value of
course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying properties. Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. By itself, this index
the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares cannot be the sole basis of just compensation in expropriation cases. Various factors come into play in the
(590,554,220 divided by 2 plus one HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448. November
substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control of HLI. Hence, control
can never be attained by the FWBs. There is even no assurance that 100% of the 118,391,976.85 shares issued to 16, 2011.
the FWBs will all be voted in favor of staying in HLI, taking into account the previous referendum among the
farmers where said shares were not voted unanimously in favor of retaining the SDP. In light of the foregoing
consideration, the option to remain in HLI granted to the individual FWBs will have to be recalled and revoked.
Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating
under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of
HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22,
2011.

Operative fact doctrine. The operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared
unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. The Court
rejected the view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which
are quasi-legislative in nature. While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch
have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does
not have such specific definition under existing laws. The term executive act is broad enough to encompass
decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by
Command responsibility. One of the issues raised in this case was whether or not the President, as commander-in- the agency in question or nullified by the Court. Even assuming that the operative fact doctrine applies only to
chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to
The Supreme Court held that the President may be held responsible or accountable. To hold someone liable under decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of
justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive
the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and
superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c) the superior consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that
The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness. Significantly, a
decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and
that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. On the issue of
knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the
actual knowledge, the same may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance
of said decision, which must be respected. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform
more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. Knowledge of the
Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.
commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when: (a) the acts are widespread within the
government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area Presidential immunity from suit; non-sitting president. The Court of Appeals found respondents in G.R. No.
of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved. As to the issue of failure 191805 with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguezs right
to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President has to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. It,
the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military. The Supreme Court held, however, that aside however, dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity
from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish former President Arroyos from suit. Regarding this issue, the Supreme Court held that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure. Thus, the rationale for the CAs dropping of the case against
have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or former President Arroyo no longer exists in the present case. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
prevent it. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160. November 15,
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
2011.
trespasser. The intent of the framers of the Constitution is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Applying the foregoing rationale to this case, it is clear that
Expropriation; denial of due process. In this case, the petitioner argues that it was deprived of its right to due
former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
process when it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence. The petitioner claims that the committee
tasked by the court to receive evidence on just compensation did not conduct any hearing to enable the parties to would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
present their respective evidence. Instead, the committee based the Report on documents submitted by the parties, abduction of Rodriguez. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H.
verifications from offices, ocular inspections and local market conditions, and unsubstantiated statements as to the Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160.
highest and best use of the properties, and the devaluation of the peso. The Supreme Court held that there was no November 15, 2011.
such deprivation of due process. The pleadings it submitted and the testimonial evidence presented during the
several hearings conducted all prove that the petitioner was given its day in court. The Court noted that the RTC
acceded to the petitioners request, over the respondents objection, for the reconvening of the Committee for
reception of evidence and further proceedings. It also heard and allowed both sides to present evidence during the
clarificatory hearings and rendered a decision based on the evidence presented. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps.

Taking and just compensation in agrarian reform. The Court maintains its earlier ruling in this case that the date of
taking is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) per PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) were
considered to have owned and possessed the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. These lands became subject of
the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. Such

approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. The minority contends that attain synchronization of elections. The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
it is the date of the notice of coverage, that is, January 2, 2006, which is determinative of the just compensation
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number
HLI is entitled to for its expropriated lands. To support its contention, it cited numerous cases where the time of the of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.
taking was reckoned on the date of the issuance of the notice of coverage. However, a perusal of the cases cited by This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. These
the minority would reveal that none of them involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
squarely apply to this case. Moreover, it should be noted that it is precisely because the stock distribution option is serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
a distinctive mechanism under RA 6657 that it cannot be treated similarly with that of compulsory land acquisition the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections. Although called regional elections, the
as these are two different modalities under the agrarian reform program. In this regard, it should be noted that when ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
HLI submitted the SDP to DAR for approval, it cannot be gainsaid that the stock distribution scheme is clearly
wording and structure of the Constitution.
HLIs preferred modality in order to comply with CARP. And when the SDP was approved, stocks were given to
Does the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution? No. That section provides that
the FWBs in lieu of land distribution. As aptly observed by the minority itself, [i]nstead of expropriating lands,
what the government took and distributed to the FWBs were shares of stock of petitioner HLI in proportion to the before a bill passed by either the House or the Senate can become law, it must pass through three readings on
separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. In
value of the agricultural lands that should have been expropriated and turned over to the FWBs. It cannot,
therefore, be denied that upon the approval of the SDP submitted by HLI, the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita this case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
became subject of CARP coverage. Evidently, the approval of the SDP took the place of a notice of coverage
issued under compulsory acquisition. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et elections. Following Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and
the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA 9054 violate Section 1 and
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws? Yes. Even assuming
Barangay elections; three-consecutive term limit rule. Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of
that RA 9333 and RA 10153 did in fact amend RA 9054 (the Court ruled in this case that those two laws did not
Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro, in the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections. Prior thereto, Mendoza had amend RA 9054), the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054
been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three consecutive terms, on 9 May 1994, 12 May
has to be struck down for giving that law the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
1997 and 15 July 2002. On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to
Constitution demands. RA 9054 is the Second Organic Act of the ARMM, which provided that the first ARMM
Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for
elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. RA 9333 is one of several laws prior to RA
Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served in the same position for three
10153 that reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides
consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections. When the case was brought to the Supreme that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. As long as majority of the members of the
Court, one of the issues Mendoza raised was the constitutionality of the retroactive application to the 1994
House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and
Barangay Elections of the three-consecutive term limit rule. The Supreme Court held that the issue has already
hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. In contrast,
been settled in the case of COMELEC v. Cruz. The Court reiterated that no retroactive application was made
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 requires a vote of no less than 2/3 of the Members of the House of
because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to amend that law. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary
current law. Constancio F. Mendoza vs. Senen C. Familara & Commission Elections, G.R. No. 191017. November powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. While a supermajority is not a total ban
15, 2011.
against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for assisting in the preparation of this post.)
Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only to the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section
18, Article X of the Constitution? Yes. RA 9054 enlarged the plebiscite requirement in the Constitution with respect
to the ARMM. This enlargement violates Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Section 18 states that a
plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and
geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of,
the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation ofautonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
Posted on November 14, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases
government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under
Constitutional Law
any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Constitutionality of RA 10153. Republic Act 10153 reset the ARMM elections from August 8, 2011, to the second Therefore, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act
that would require compliance with the plebiscite requirement.
Monday of May 2013 and every three years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local
elections. The law also granted the President the power to appoint officers in charge for the Office of the ARMM Does RA 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM? No. Petitioners argued that while synchronization
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who will may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution
hold said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two
In addressing the constitutionality of this law, the Court discussed the following issues:
recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose
Election Law

October 2011 Supreme Court Decisions on Political

Law

Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections? Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly
state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to

one over the other. The Court found this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional
construction that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and one mandate should not be given importance
over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear. Synchronization is an interest that is as
constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that the Court should reconcile and give effect

to, in the way that Congress did in RA 10153, which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional
elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be
respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features,
except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances. Further, while
autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with
independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State
and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot
be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional
concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Given the constitutional objective of synchronization, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the
Constitution when it addressed through RA 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections
necessarily brought with it? No. The Court here identified the following options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problems: (1) allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until
those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms
of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint officers in charge, pursuant to Section 3 of RA 10153, until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office. The Court held that in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs,
Congress chose the correct option and passed RA 10153 as a valid law.

officials in the ARMM forless, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years, as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the same way that the term of elective ARMM
officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier
than the three years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years
if a call for special elections shall prevail.
Does the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs violate the Constitution? No. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be
strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which pertinently states that the
President shall appoint all other officers of the government whose whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA 10153, it falls under this group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA 10153
is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose nonobservance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. But the Court said this
alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA 10153 were to be
mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Holdover option is unconstitutional. This option violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Since elective ARMM
and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
Congress cannot extend their term through a law allowing officials to serve in a holdover capacity. If it will be
claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to Given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities
create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to
appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way
that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make? Admittedly, the grant of the
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican.
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the
COMELEC has no authority to order special elections. Another option proposed by the petitioner is for this
point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas
representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. But this conclusion would not
Pambansa Bilang 881. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. Congress has acted be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA 10153 where the period is fixed and, more
on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13,
important, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA 9054 will not
2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so
systemically be touched nor affected at all. RA 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in
doing, Congress itself has madea policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call
accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of
special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After elections requires.
Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. The Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
legislative decision and effectively legislating. Further, the constitutional power of COMELEC, in contrast with the community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
power of Congress to call for and to set the date of elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. These measures,
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special
too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the
elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.
regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by
The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials. Even assuming that it is legally permissible Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the
for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis exists to rule that the newly elected interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have
assumed office. The Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns
shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes in the 1992 congressional elections, and extended arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the
the terms of the President and the Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications. Datu Michael Abas
Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep.
same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More
Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not the Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local
Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo vs. The

Commission on Elections, et al./Jacinto V. Paras vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 196271/G.R. No.
of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for
196305/G.R. No. 197221/G.R. No. 197280/G.R. No. 197282/G.R. No. 197392/G.R. No. 197454. October 18, 2011. suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose. The search will be permissible in its scope when
Ombudsman; power to grant immunity. In this case, petitioner argues that by excluding the respondents in the
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
information, the Ombudsman is engaged in selective prosecution which is a clear case of grave abuse of
the nature of the misconduct.
discretion. He claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they must be
included first in the information filed with the court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their
Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following issues: (1) Did petitioner have
discharge so that they can be used as state witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the
Rules of Court. The Supreme Court held petitioners claim to be erroneous. The Ombudsman has the power to
respondent Civil Service Commission Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer,
grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court. RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this
reasonable in its inception and scope? Here, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include: (1) the
prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to such terms and conditions employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee
as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the need to take into account when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item.
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The rule under
The Court answered the first issue in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
RA No. 6770 clarifies that in cases already filed with the courts, the prosecution merely makes a proposal and
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files.
initiates the process of granting immunity to an accused-witness in order to use him as a witness against his coaccused. If there is any distinction at all between the public prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office
the specificity of and the higher priority given by law to the Ombudsmans purpose and objective. This accounts was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or
for the Ombudsmans unique power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court, adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that
a power that the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy. Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion in being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his office. Even assuming that
petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, the same is negated by the
this case. Erdito Quarto vs. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al., G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011.
presence of policy regulating the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts its
Police power; zoning. Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City. With regard to the power office computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated
of local government units to issue zoning ordinances, jurisprudence has recognized that the government may enact or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that computer resources were
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
used only for legitimate business purposes.
general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Based on the foregoing, the power
On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of petitioners computer files was
to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the Court
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. In this case, it is clear that the primary
objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of held that the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and in scope. Briccio Ricky
A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.
arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the
improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and
Administrative Law
convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More
especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business Administrative agencies; due process. Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice
and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to
zone along EDSA. Consequently, the enactment of the ordinance in this case is within the power of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust. defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the
opportunity to be heard. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. In this case, while the petitioner did
Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro Manila
Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933. October 11, not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of
the August 11, 2006 order) conducted by the GSIS, GSIS President and General Manager Winston Garcias
2011.
decision of February 21, 2007 duly considered and discussed the defenses raised in the pleadings filed by
Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure. This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
petitioners counsel. Furthermore, what negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for
government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The
reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing
employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of
the petitioners case. Again, Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for
misconduct. Petitioner questions the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his reconsideration when he rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his
personal files without his knowledge and consent. He said this search violated his constitutional right to privacy. pleadings. Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
The right to privacy is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under
Administrative agencies; findings of facts. In this case, petitioner was found to have committed the acts
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who
Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right involves a two-fold requirement: lacked the necessary contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-99. However, the Supreme Court disagreed
first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be with the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA that the petitioners acts constituted grave misconduct. While
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). Once the right is established, the next inquiry is great respect is accorded to the factual findings of administrative agencies, the Supreme Court did not characterize
whether the search alleged to have violated such right was reasonable. This proceeds from the principle that the
the offense committed as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of corruption,
constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule that must be present to characterize the
unreasonable searches and seizures.
misconduct as grave. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not see the type of open
In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance the invasion of the employees defiance and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed. In fact, the CSCs findings on the petitioners actions
prior to the approval of the loans negate the presence of any intent on the petitioners part to deliberately defy the
legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient
policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan
operation of the workplace. A public employers intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related applications beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient practice in the
approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the existing GSIS policy; and third, the
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Ordinarily, a search petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate supervisor before acting on the loan applications. These

circumstances run counter to the characteristic flagrant disregard of the rules that grave misconduct requires. Thus, of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of
the his liability under the given facts was found to constitute as simple misconduct only. Monico K. Imperial, Jr. the court. The ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a
vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
violation of the ordinance. Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development
Authority/Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R.
Administrative proceedings; due process. Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the No. 177933. October 11, 2011.
following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case
and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the Election Law
decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be
Election protest; failure to file preliminary conference brief. In exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes. Here, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners motion for reconsideration was not
of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
verified, the COMELEC should have considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioners meritorious
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. In the
present case, the fifth requirement was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for the preliminary conference. The essence of due process
is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of ones claim or
against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave
defense. It is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law. Procedural due process
misconduct. The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for
Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to demands prior notice and hearing. The fact that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or information of the date
due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due set for the preliminary conference by means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse
process. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were to dismiss his protest, because it cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to
adequately prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only able to file his
not disclosed to Reyes. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself. Hence, by denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, without taking into consideration the violation of his right to procedural due process, the
Reyes, G.R. No. 170512. October 5, 2011.
COMELEC also guilty of grave abuse of discretion. Salvador D. Violago, Sr. vs. Commission on Elections and
Government contract; lack of appropriation. Petitioner DPWH argues that the contracts with respondents were void Joan V. Alarilla, G.R. No. 194143. October 4, 2011.
for not complying with Sections 85 and 86 of Presidential Decree 1445, or the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No. 292. These sections require an appropriation for the contracts and Public Officers
a certification by the chief accountant of the agency or by the head of its accounting unit as to the availability of
Public officers; dishonesty. Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of
funds. In this case, there was an appropriation amounting to Php400 million, which was increased to Php700
intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. In other
million. The funding was for the rehabilitation of the areas devastated and affected by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, words, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal, one can ascertain a
which included the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River for which some of the channeling, desilting and diking works
persons intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his
were rendered by respondents construction companies. It was, however, undisputed that there was no certification conduct and outward acts. In this case, the facts and circumstances surrounding petitioners acquisition of the
from the chief accountant of DPWH regarding the availability of funds for the disputed expenditure. In spite of the Certificate of Eligibility cast serious doubts on his good faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC official and
lack of certification, however, the Supreme Court held that jurisprudence has consistently recognized the rule that accepted the Certificate of Eligibility from the latters representative. These circumstances reveal petitioners
payment for services done on account of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. The
knowledge that the CSC official could have pulled strings in order to obtain his Certificate of Eligibility and have it
contract in this case was not illegal per se. Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Ronald E. Quiwa, doing delivered to his residence. Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be held administratively liable for
under the name R.E.Q. Construction, et al., G.R. No. 183444. October 12, 2011.
falsifying petitioners Certificate of Eligibility is beside the point. The fact that someone else falsified the
Government construction contracts; price escalation. The issue here is whether Presidential Decree 1594 requires certificate will not excuse him for knowingly using the same for his career advancement. Thus, the Supreme Court
the contractor to prove that the price increase of construction materials was due to the direct acts of the government held that that the CA did not err in affirming the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties imposed by the
before a price escalation is granted in a construction contract. Petitioner argues that Section 8 of PD 1594 requires CSC. Cesar S. Dumduma vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606. October 4, 2011.
the following conditions before an adjustment of the contract price may be made: (i) there was an increase or a
(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for assisting in the preparation of this post.)
decrease in the cost of labor, equipment, materials and supplies for construction; and (ii) the increase or decrease is
due to the direct acts of the government. Petitioner stresses that respondent failed to show the existence of these
conditions. The Court disagreed. The contractor does not need to prove that the increase in construction cost was
due to the direct acts of the government. PD 454, which was enacted prior to PD 1594, provides (in relation to
adjustment of contract price for public works projects) that increase of prices of gasoline and other fuel oils and of
cement shall be considered direct acts of the Government. Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase
direct acts of the government without supplying a contrary or different definition, the definition and coverage
provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 were deemed adopted by the later decree. Thus, proof of increase in fuel or
Posted on October 21, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases,
cement price during the contract period is enough to justify a claim for price escalation based on such increase.
Philippines - Law
Philippine Economic zone Authority vs. Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation, etc., G.R. No.

September 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions

on Political Law

188866. October 19, 2011.

Here are selected September 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.

MMDA; power to demolish. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is
empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to
the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904, as amended. However, the Supreme Court held that the
power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and
Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to
implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the penalty
prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case

Constitutional Law
COA; Powers and function. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Audit is vested with authority to
determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds. Pursuant to its mandate as the
guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue
and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the

scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate
property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including business enterprises and entities for the
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
same until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth illLGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Luciano Veloso,
gotten. On the other hand, a freeze order prohibits the person having possession or control of property alleged to
Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677. constitute ill-gotten wealth from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such
September 6, 2011.
property, or from assisting or taking part in its transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation. In other words,
it commands the possessor to hold the property and conserve it subject to the orders and disposition of the authority
Local government units; grant of award to employees. In the exercise of its power to determine the positions and decreeing such freezing. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et
salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly al., G.R. No. 152500. September 14, 2011.
from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and
activities of the city government, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, which authorized the Administrative Law
conferment of the EPSA (Exemplary Public Service Award) to the former three-term councilors and, as part of the
Public officers; administrative vs. criminal liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are
award, the qualified city officials were to be given retirement and gratuity pay remuneration. The Supreme
under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may
Court, however, noted that the above power is not without limitations, such as the rule against double
compensation. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total compensation received by be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is separate and
distinct from penal and civil liability. First, there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required and,
each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance, representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed. Second, there is the principle that a single act may
offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as
13th month pay and cash gift. Undoubtedly, the awardees reward is excessive and tantamount to double and
additional compensation. The remuneration is equivalent to everything that the awardees received during the entire well as administrative liability. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 by
period that he served as such official. Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive half the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against Cataquiz, as the general manager of Laguna Lake
of them at the end of their last term. Luciano Veloso, Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Development Authority. Office of the President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz,
G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.
Lacson vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677. September 6, 2011.
Public officers; effect of removal or resignation from office on administrative liability. Removal or resignation
Constitutionality; Tariff and Customs Code. In this case, the issue was the validity of Customs Administrative
from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite his removal from his position, Cataquiz can
Order No. 7-92 and Section 3506 of the Tariff and Customs Code (on the assignment of customs employees to
overtime work). Section 3506 provides: Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime work still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his service as General Manager of the Laguna Lake
at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid by the importers, shippers Development Authority and he can be made to suffer the corresponding penalties. Office of the President and
or other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.
of private enterprise. The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA in excluding airline companies, aircraft owners, (Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for assisting in the preparation of this post.)
and operators from the coverage of Section 3506 of the TCCP. The term other persons served refers to all other
persons served by the BOC employees. Airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are among other persons
served by the BOC employees. The processing of embarking and disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as
well as their baggage and cargoes, forms part of the BOC functions. BOC employees who serve beyond the regular
office hours are entitled to overtime pay for the services they render. The SC also noted that the BOC created a
committee to re-evaluate the proposed increase in the rate of overtime pay and for two years, several meetings
were conducted with the agencies concerned to discuss the proposal. BAR and the Airline Operators Council
participated in these meetings and discussions. Hence, BAR cannot claim that it was denied due process in the
Posted on August 19, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases,
imposition of the increase of the overtime rate. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R. No.
Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, due process, public officers
193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.
Undue Delegation; Tariff and Customs Code. The SC did not agree with the Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of Here are selected July 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.

July 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law

the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Contrary to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law is complete in itself that it
leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do
overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be made by
the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the
Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to
employees of private enterprise. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R. No. 193247/G.R. No.
194276. September 14, 2011.

Constitutional Law

Court proceedings; denial of due process. The SC here ruled that the Energy Regulatory Commission did not
deprive petitioners of their right to be heard. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is granted, there is no denial of due process. In this case, prior to the issuance of the assailed
ERC Decision approving Meralcos application for rate increase, petitioners were given several opportunities to
attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and evidence. Petitioners voluntarily failed to appear in most
of those hearings. Although the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its Decision (as the same was issued prior to the
lapse of the period for petitioners to file their comment on the application), its subsequent act of ordering
petitioners to file their comments on another partys motion for reconsideration cured this defect. Even though
petitioners never filed their own motion for reconsideration, the fact that they were still given notice of the other
motion and the opportunity to file their comments renders immaterial ERCs failure to admit their comment on the
Sequestration and Freeze Orders; nature and purpose. Without making a definitive conclusion as to the validity of rate application. National Association of Electricity Consumers of reforms, Inc. [Nasecore], et al. vs. Energy
the Sequestration and Freeze Orders being the main issue in Civil Case No. 0142 which is yet to be decided by the Regulator Commission (ERC), et al., G.R. No. 190795. July 6, 2011.
Sandiganbayan, the SC concluded that the pieces of evidence enumerated by Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc.
(TDFSI) do not show that it has a right to be protected and that the implementation of the Sequestration and Freeze Value added tax on toll fees; non-impairment clause. Petitioners argue that since VAT was never factored into the
Orders violates its rights. The power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be ill-gotten means to place formula for computing toll fees under the Toll Operation Agreements, its imposition would violate the nonimpairment of contract clause of the constitution. The SC held that Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke
or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such

the non-impairment clause on behalf of private investors in the tollway projects. She will neither be prejudiced nor
affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments that may result from the VAT imposition. She has no
interest in the profits to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover investments belongs solely
to the private tollway investors. Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol vs. The Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 193007. July 19, 2011.

part of FARM and its members to raise the question of constitutionality at the first opportunity. It took them 27
years before they raised the same before the SC and after they have already received some benefits from its
implementation. Second, the issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of this case, the lis mota being the alleged
non-compliance by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. with the conditions of the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) to support a
plea for its revocation. And before the Supreme Court, the lis mota is whether or not the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance
Administrative Law
and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. The
Public official; effect of resignation on filing of administrative complaint. The Ombudsman can no longer institute SC held that any of these key issues may be resolved without going into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It 6657. Finally, there appears to be no breach of the fundamental law. The wording of the Section 4 of Article XIII of
the Constitution is unequivocalthe farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to own directly or collectively
is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the
administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the lands they till. Accordingly, the basic law allows two modes of land distributiondirect and indirect
the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public officials resignation does not ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted.
Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of
render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. However, the facts of those
agricultural land by individual farmers. Therefore, Section 4 expressly authorizes collective ownership by farmers.
cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials
subject of the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre- No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of
empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. Hacienda Luisita, Inc., et
nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while al. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.
the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing this post.)
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed
the administrative case against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official even
if he has been separated from the service for a long time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his
superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of
the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P.
Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case was charged with violation of Section 7(d) of
Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public office. The CA found that RA 6713
was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not liable. The SC found the contrary. There was no repeal. The
ban on Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in RA
6938 should be taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically applicable to CDA
officials and employees. True, RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become members of cooperatives
and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating
in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering
that the benefits and privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of
loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members.
Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No.
169198, July 6, 2011.

June 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law

Posted on July 8, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged Commission on Audit,
due process, freedom of the press, local government, Ombudsman
Here are selected June 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law

Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. The issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the
government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations, which are not government owned or
controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations
or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law
as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and
Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum. It is the commission economic viability but to a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently
provision has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of
prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private
undue influence on respondents part required to be proven as held by the CA. Whether respondent used her
corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify
position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability.
its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in
And considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose some economic activity or business function for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a
operations are directly regulated by respondents office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of suspension public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy Scouts of the
by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.
Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the
Local governments; principle of local autonomy. The claim of petitioners in this case that the subject proclamation
Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them,
Agrarian Reform
the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
governmental powers over the region. The Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not
Agrarian reform; distribution of shares to farmers. In this case, Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc.
take over control of the powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law enforcement agents took respondent
(FARM) argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional as it permits stock transfer in lieu of outright
agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead of them Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor,
petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession
owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be
found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the
annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court denied FARMs contention of unconstitutionality. First, there was a failure on the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG

Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Local Government Code
Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Local government; power to classify lands. Petitioners in this case contend that the subject property is outside the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal; constitutionality. This case involved a motion for reconsideration, reiterating the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan
contention that the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land. Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the
denied the motion and explained that judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution is plenary. record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
casting doubt on the validity of the reclassification over the subject property. The Supreme Court agreed with
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the petitioners that the property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Ordinance No. 1313 was
means necessary to carry it into effect. As to the claim of petitioner that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power
enacted in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on
and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was in existence at that time. The Task Force was
held that, contrary to petitioners claim, the resolution of electoral contests are judicial in nature. Atty. Romulo B. not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011.
August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit
their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human
Presidential powers; declaration of a state of emergency. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully
Settlements for review and ratification. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
exercised her powers when she declared a state of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat 169913. June 8, 2011.
and the City of Cotabato. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs
from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may Administrative Law
inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is putting the subject
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated.
The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program
was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Here,
cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due process
petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency as well as the Presidents exercise of the
of law. If the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take action and declare the
calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were
placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no issuance as null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the instant case were improperly
issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. The same holds true with respect to the EPs and
basis too. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on
Presidential powers; calling-out power. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency
which they were grounded are void. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan 169913. June 8, 2011.
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato. The Supreme Court held that such deployment is not by itself an exercise of
Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in this case raise the issue of whether
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not
administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year
proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that it is immediately
executory pending appeal. This is the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. But, apart from the fact that Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides
among others: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
there was no such take over to begin with, the SC held the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and as a result, the President had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the
course Under this provision, a respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman
peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed
forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right to file an appeal
with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a respondent is given
the peace and security in the affected places. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R.
the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the
No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Ombudsman. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11.
Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. On the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial June 1, 2011.
court judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the
(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing this post.)
totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right(This post will be updated when the remaining June 201o cases are published.)
of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to
render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in
the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder
cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M.
No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.