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Introduction
2.1.1
Project overview
This chapter presents the results of the ex post analysis for the first pilot project,
the construction of the A2 motorway between Konin and Strykow in Poland.
Location
The central position of Poland in Central-Eastern Europe means that the main
transport corridors passing through it are of international significance. More
specifically the A2 Motorway forms part of the European Route E30 between
Berlin and Belarus. As illustrated in Figure 1, the A2 also forms a cross section
with the proposed A1 (a north south axis between Gdansk and Vienna) at
Strykow (north of Lodz). The A1 also forms part of the European TEN-T and
therefore forms a route of international significance linking Poland with Austria;
Hungary and Greece.
The A2 Konin to Strykow improvements considered in this evaluation is located
between Poznan and Warsaw and is shown in Figure 1.
Source: Openstreetmap.org
Description
Whilst the A2 enhancements are clearly of strategic significance to international
traffic, it also serves as a more regional/local link between Konin (at the western
extremity) and Lodz (at the eastern extremity). Prior to the improvements on
this stretch of the A2, the main connecting route between these main settlements
was the single lane R72. Congestion however remains an issue in peak periods on
the R14 (linking Strykow with Lowicz) which remains a single carriageway road.
It has experienced a considerable increase in traffic flows since the pilot project
opened. After the opening, the A2 has since been extended to include a bypass
around the village of Strykow. This was completed in 2008 and removed
significant proportions of through traffic from the R14 (see figure 2 for location)
through the village.
Good transport connectivity is regarded as key to supporting economic activity
and inward investment in the Lodz and Wielkopolska Viovodeships (Regions).
At the regional and local level, both the A1 and A2 have been recognised recently
as a key strength in assisting the delivery of regional and national economic
growth.
Given their strong strategic location combined with other economic stimulus
methods such as property tax breaks and incentives for SME (small and medium
size enterprises), Lodz and Konin (amongst others) are major focal points for
future economic growth both regionally and nationally. Already these
settlements have attracted significant inward investment from multi-national
organisations in the food, distribution, electrical manufacturing and car
manufacturing sectors recent examples include Nestle; Unicom; Wrigley;
Volkswagen and Skoda.
The project evaluated comprised of the construction of a dual 2 lane motorway
between Konin and Strykow. The project was developed in two phases, from
Konin to Emilia (85.8 km, Phase 1) and between Emilia and Strykow (18.1 km,
Phase 2). Key timescales for the project are summarised as follows:
The A2 is, in part, toll motorway, with the exception of this new section. There
are proposals in place to introduce tolls on the section between Konin and
Stykow, and in April 2010 the construction of toll plazas at either end of the
project extremity was underway. The location of the project in its regional
context is shown in Figure 2
Source: Openstreetmap.org
Figure 3 provides a comparison between the A2 motorway, which is a dual twolane motorway, and the former route and current main alternative (the R2),
which is a wide single lane and subject to varying speed limits and route quality.
The R72 (the former route between Konin and Lodz) is similar to the R2 and
passes through a number of towns and villages.
As set out in the Polish National Transport Policy 2006-2025, continued growth
in Polands economic prosperity (as shown in Figure 4) in the period 2000-2007
brought with it a number of problematic trends in national transport patterns,
including:
a smaller mode share for rail freight and passenger transport (the freight
distribution market being more focused on road transportation);
Figure 4. GDP per Capita for Lodzkie and Wielkopolskie Vovoidships compared to
Poland.
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
POLAND
10,000
DZKIE
5,000
WIELKOPOLSKIE
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2004 to
2005
2005 to
2006
2006 to
2007
2007 to
2008
Poland
6.5%
3.0%
8.5%
9.0%
10.2%
dzkie
5.1%
1.3%
8.0%
8.9%
10.1%
Wielkopolskie
5.8%
-2.8%
7.9%
8.9%
11.0%
in the EU. This document has since been updated in the form of the Strategy
of Transport Infrastructure Development in 2004-2006 and following years.
The main objectives stated in the latter are focused on removing barriers to
economic development posed by the insufficient transport infrastructure and on
improving the integration of Poland's transport network with the network of the
European Union and reducing environmental and social costs caused by lack of
infrastructure. Specific priorities for the investment included:
2.1.2
Sources
We have used a number of different data sources for this review. They can be
grouped into two categories:
Obtained from
GDDKiA
GDDKiA
GDDKiA
GDDKiA
GDDKiA
EC Commission Decisions
Subsection: Konin to Emilia
Subsection: Emilia to Strykow
DG REGIO
Financing Memorandum
Subsection: Emilia to Strykow
DG REGIO
2.2
Pre-project Opening
Post-project Opening
Traffic
flows
Highway
journey
times
Accident
data
Project
Costs
10
2.2.1
High case
523
900
18.2%
22.8%
Benefit-cost ratio
3.0
4.4
11
Table 5. Summary of the differences between the high and low case scenarios.
Traffic Flows Assumption
Traffic Speed
Assumption
High Case
Low Case
Scenario
12
-263
-3.5%
47
11.6%
Costs
This section undertakes a comparison between the predicted and outturn project
costs in order to identify areas of under/overspend. The predicted and observed
project costs are contained in the Final Reports for the two subsections and are
summarised in Table 7.
13
Table 7. Summary of ex ante and ex post project costs (2003 prices discounted to
2003)
Ex Ante
(m)
Ex Post
(m)
401.4
406.3
0.1
0.2
Construction
324.7
327.7
Technical Support
13.6
15.7
Publicity
0.1
0.1
Cost Category
Level 1 (including VAT)
All-in
Level 2 (excludes VAT)
Land Purchase
Source: Own calculation based on Application Reports and Project Completion Report
Table 7 shows that the actual costs are slightly higher than originally forecast. In
discussions with key stakeholders it became clear that the Application for EU
funding was based on an estimate of costs. The Project Completion Report
specified the following reasons for increases in cost over and above the Tender
price for construction:
20% decrease in the value of the Euro compared to that assumed when
preparing the Feasibility Study and cost estimations.
Ex post evaluation of cohesion policy programmes 2000-06. Work package 10: Efficiency Unit costs of major projects.
Published on: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado2_en.htm
14
Forms and Project Completion Report should be used for definitive information
and a more detailed breakdown of costs is unlikely to be available.
Table 8 shows the project costs split into costs per km. With the data available
this is the closest match to Level 2 and 3 costs. Our analysis shows that on a cost
per km basis land purchase costs were around 67% higher than forecast. The
Level 1 unit cost was as predicted at 3.9m per km.
Table 8. Summary of ex ante and ex post project costs per km (2003 prices
discounted to 2003
Ex Ante
()
Ex Post
()
3.9m
3.9m
900
1,500
Construction (m/km)
3.1m
3.2m
0.1m
0.2m
Publicity (/km)
600
400
Cost Category
Level 1 (including VAT)
All-in (m/km)
Level 2 (excludes VAT)
Source: Own calculation based on Application Reports and Project Completion Report
2.2.3
Direct benefits
Time savings
The Application Form for Funding predicted journey times on two routes in the
study area. Post opening journey time surveys have therefore been undertaken by
the project team and a comparison of these figures is presented in Table 9.
15
Predicted
(Unknown
date)
Observed
Route
Without project
With
project
Savings
Konin
to
Lowicz
2h 8min
(via R2)
1h 44min
(via A2, R14)
24min
Konin
to Lodz
2h 14min
(via R72)
1h 24min
(via A2)
50min
Konin
to
Lowicz
2h 8min*
(via R2)
1h 36min
(via A2, R14)
32min
Konin
to Lodz
2h 14min*
(via R72)
1 hour
(via A2)
1 hour 15min
(2010)
(*) Pre implementation journey time data was not available for this project. The predicted without project
journey times have therefore been used for the purposes of this evaluation, which seem robust from our
observations on the site visit.
The table shows that the journey time savings resulting from the A2 project are
one hour 15mins which is greater than the predicted saving of 50 minutes. The
post opening journey times on R2 are also better than predicted.
Traffic Impacts and Congestion Reduction
Predicted traffic volumes were presented in the Feasibility Report for 2006. A
selected few of these counts have been factored to 2010 flows (at a growth rate
of 4% per annum) and are presented in Table 10. Also contained in the table are
observed pre and post implementation traffic flows. The pre project traffic flows
from 2005 have been factored by the same growth rate as those used for the
predicted flows, whilst the post opening traffic volumes are from 2010 so require
no factoring.
16
A2
Location
Observed (2010)
Without
Project
With
Project
Before
After
Modla (west of
project)
19,200
19,800
17,000
21,200
Dabie to Kolo
N/A
16,900
N/A
18,800
Emilia to
Wartkowice
N/A
19,200
N/A
16,300
Kolo
24,900
14,300
24,300
10,500
Kutno
16,200
7,900
15,900
7,400
Aleksandrow
Lodski
9,300
4,500
10,900
6,300
Turek
6,700
5,000
9,800
5,400
Jamno
14,800
23,900
12,500
16,700
R2
R72
R14
The traffic flow data shows that actual traffic flows on the A2 are marginally
higher than predicted on the western section (Dabie to Kolo) and lower than
predicted on the eastern section (Emilia to Wartkowice). Traffic flows have
reduced considerably on the R2 and are now lower than forecast. Flows on the
R72 between Konin and Lodz have also decreased but are still higher than
forecast. R14 between Strykow and Lowicz has experienced an increase in traffic
volumes as expected, but traffic volumes are considerably lower than predicted
on this route.
The traffic flows presented in this section suggest that the vast majority of the
traffic using the A2 has re-assigned from the R2 in the north and the R72 in the
south. The figures suggest that there has been very little additional traffic as a
result of the project.
Safety
Observed accident data on the main routes in the vicinity of the project has been
made available by GDDKiA, and covers the period 2004 to 2008. The opening
year, 2006, has been excluded from the evaluation as it has not been possible to
determine whether the accidents recorded in this year occurred before or after
17
opening. The period 2004-2005 has therefore been selected to represent the pre
project situation, with 2007-2008 representing the post opening situation. This
data has been compared to the predicted number of accidents over the same time
period.
Table 11 shows that the number of predicted accidents is higher than observed.
This is primarily because the predicted accidents cover many of the minor roads
in the modelled area. As traffic volumes on these minor roads are not forecast to
significantly change as a result of the project, and hence we would not envisage
large change in accident numbers on these minor roads. The observed data
cover the main strategic routes where traffic flows are forecast to have changed
(A2, R2, R72, R14). Therefore even though the percentage difference between
predicted and observed is similar, the absolute difference in the number of
accidents is likely to be a more accurate representation of the impact of the
project.
Table 11. Summary of Predicted vs. Observed Accident Numbers
Predicted
Observed
1,058
434
937
395
Difference
121
39
% Difference
13%
10%
2.2.4
Externalities
The Application for Funding states that 0.5% of the benefits of the entire project
arise from savings due to lower air pollution levels. However, the technical basis
for these figures could not be established from the available documentation. As
these figures form a small proportion of the overall benefits they have not been
evaluated in this study.
2.2.5
Wider impacts
The Cohesion Fund is a structural instrument that helps Member States to
reduce economic and social disparities and to stabilise their economies.
Therefore it is important that this evaluation considers not only the impacts on
journey times, safety and utilisation, but also some of the more qualitative
impacts relating to the social, economic and physical environment. The ex ante
documentation for the three elements of the A2 project contained relatively little
information regarding the specific wider economic, social and environmental
18
the project will create conditions for the improvement of transport and
development of the road network, which constitutes a growth factor;
relieve traffic from towns and villages located on the old A2 alignment;
and,
Further to the above, the ex ante evaluation provided an estimate of the number
of jobs (direct and indirect) that the project was anticipated to generate in the
construction and operational phases. The detail of the forecast impact on jobs is
discussed further in the sections that follow. The remainder of this section sets
out our general approach to assessing the wider impacts of this project. It then
summarises the impacts identified by stakeholders that can be attributed, at least
in part, to the A2 Konin to Strykow improvement.
Approach to Ex Post Evaluation
The recent global economic downturn, growth in Polands national economy and
other policy/infrastructural interventions implemented at local, regional and
national levels will all have influenced the emerging patterns of development,
economic growth, social and environmental change along the A2 corridor.
To obtain a qualitative understanding of the broad economic, social and
environmental costs and benefits materialising from the A2 project, we talked to
with representatives of the following organisations:
19
20
Source: LODZ SEZ Flexicurity Our Key to Success (Lodz Special Economic Zone, 2008)
21
lorry movements that was regarded as an indicator of how the A2 has helped
facilitate business activity. This is verified by the traffic data collected for the
existing and former A2 corridors (Table 12) which confirms a 75% increase in
HGV traffic in the A2 corridor.
Table 12. Summary of changes in A2 corridor HGV flows
Route
R2
New A2
Total
5.500
2,100
N/A
7,500
5,500
9,600
22
23
to exploit the logistical and visibility benefits offered by the A2. In the vicinity of
Strykow, over 0.5million Ha of land has been developed mostly by foreign
companies from other parts of Western Europe and North America.
There were some suggestions that internal trading has increased between towns
and of strengthening supply chains, particularly those located along the A2
corridor, businesses previously based in Poznan have now moved to nearer to
Warsaw to exploit the levels of accessibility that were not there before.
Few stakeholders reported adverse economic impacts from the A2, a
representative from the SEZ suggested there had been a probable reduction in
service/fuel trade on bypassed route, although this has been offset with gains on
the R14 where traffic has increased following project opening.
Administrative Burdens
When challenged on the administrative burdens created following opening, little
feedback was provided. A number of stakeholders did comment on the increased
maintenance costs associated with pavement damage caused by diversions of
heavy traffic during construction on to lower capacity local routes and increased
traffic on the R14 following opening of the A2. One stakeholder quoted a 50%
increase in maintenance costs following the opening of the A2 due to new trips
generated by the increased development around the A2.
The R14 suffers from heavy congestion but this is due for renewal following the
works for the completion of the A2 to Warsaw by 2012, which will offer further
accessibility benefits. Congestion is particularly prevalent on the periphery of
Lowicz and is offsetting some of the journey time gains offered by the A2
improvement. Furthermore, Strykows position at the end of the upgraded A2
had created some local congestion issues in town. These have since been resolved
following the completion of the A2 Strykow Bypass. Strykows representatives
stated that their budgets for investment in the Gemina had increased by 40 times
since 2000, and this is perceived as a reflection of the increased attractiveness of
the area due to the A2 and proposals for the A1 corridor.
Property Values
Land values have increased substantially in recent years according to SEZ (100%
increase in recent years). This appears to reflect the commercial attractiveness of
the sites to investors whom have a preference for highly accessible sites with
good visibility from the core network, but is also reflected in the high sales prices
achieved by farmers selling their land along the proposed route.
24
Social Impacts
Skills, Labour and Employment
Whilst it is not clear how these figures were prepared, Table 13 summarises the
number of jobs anticipated to be created as a result of the A2 project at the ex
ante stage. With an absence of baseline assumptions and the range of other
influencing factors affecting job growth in the vicinity of the project and Poland
more generally, it is not appropriate to provide a quantitative estimate of the
number of jobs created by the project as part of this ex post evaluation.
Table 13. Summary of Forecast Job Creation at time of Ex ante Appraisal
Construction Phase
Operational Phase
Direct Jobs
Indirect
Jobs
Expected
Duration
Direct Jobs
(Increase
per annum)
Indirect
Jobs
(Increase
per annum)
Konin to
Dabie
1,450
2,200
15
140
325
Dabie to
Emilia
1,250
1,900
15
160
375
Emilia to
Strykow
300
625
21
32
80
TOTALS
3,000
4,725
332
780
Project
Phase
Consultees in Lodz, Strykow, Konin, Kutno and Lowicz did provide verbal
feedback suggesting that the A2 improvement has facilitated job creation through
the large increase in investment in the area over recent years. A number of
consultees felt that historically the region had struggled to retain graduates and
skilled workers trained at Lodzs University. However there was some feeling that
this trend was declining and that urban areas with good linkages were becoming
more attractive places to seek employment in a variety of sectors including
warehousing, logistics and distribution, white goods manufacturing and electronic
items. Responses from stakeholders in Konin suggest there has been a decline in
local unemployment, however it is unclear whether this is attributable solely to
the A2 improvement or wider economic influences.
Community Impacts and Quality of Life
The main observable impact of the A2 has been its effects on traffic volumes and
composition.
25
26
water pollution control structures between the road drains and the outfall, points to surface or ground water; this comprise oil interceptors,
sand traps, and two forms of combined balancing ponds/storage
reservoirs to treat road run-off to achieve national water quality
standards; and
Two Post Opening Studies have been undertaken following the opening of the
A2. The first published in January 2008 focused on the section from Dabie to
Strykow, whilst the second published in June 2010 focussed on impacts between
Strykow I and Strykow II junctions. Both were conducted on behalf of
GDDKIA. Whilst stakeholders were asked to provide evidence on the emerging
environmental impacts of the project, very few examples were given.
Stakeholders all commented on the adverse effect of the increased traffic on the
R14 on noise and air quality, but no other examples of impact was provided.
The conclusions from the two studies are summarised as follows:
at locations adjacent to A2 with high noise levels (>60db during the day
and >50db during night time hours) it was recommended for land use
to be reserved for non residence purposes;
there was no evidence that the motorway has had a negative impact on
air quality or human health. The highest recorded level of nitrogen
dioxide in the air was 79u/m3 per hour (39.5% of permissible
thresholds);
27
there was no evidence that the A2 on this section has had a negative
impact on soil condition in the proximity of the motorway;
the agricultural order of the area through which the motorway passes
had been disrupted, bringing a new order to surrounding areas; and,
28
Discussions with stakeholders in Konin and Strykow showed that the A2 has
been central to local spatial planning processes as local authorities were keen to
exploit the accessibility advantages it offers. In order to mitigate against the
adverse impacts of new development around the A2, Strykow has introduced a
policy that only development with a neutral or beneficial impact on the local
environment will be granted planning permission.
Modal Shift
In accordance with growing economic prosperity in Poland, car ownership has
increased in recent years (as shown in Table 1). This is reflected in increasing
traffic volumes discussed elsewhere in this document. Long term modal share
data shows that the proportional changes in car ownership levels in the vicinity
of the project are in line with national trends. Feedback from stakeholders
suggests that the A2 has resulted in reduced utilisation of the rail freight system
due to the increased attractiveness and flexibility of the road network.
Suggestions were also made that peoples travel horizons may have increased
along the A2 corridor as journey times have reduced, however this can not be
verified in quantitative terms.
Utilisation rates
As requested by the TORs, we have considered the evolution of the utilisation
rate of the project since opening. We have calculated this by considering, for the
year 2010, the ratio between the actual total number of passenger car units
29
(PCUs) and the total potential number of PCUs that could be accommodated on
the A2, based on our route capacity calculations.
Table 14 shows the total number of PCUs in 2010 for two sections of A2. The
table also shows the total maximum capacity available, based on a calculation of
Congestion Reference Flow given by the UK formula:
Capacity = 2300 - (A x proportion of HGVs)
= 2300 (24 x 50%)
= 1,100 x 4 lanes * hour to day factor (assumed 10 for this project)
= 44,000 vehicles per day
Table 14. Utilisation rates on the A2 Konin to Strykow (2010)
Observed Flow
(PCUs)
Theoretical
Capacity
Utilisation Rate
Dabie to Kolo
29,700
44,000
67%
Emilia to Wartkowice
24,450
44,000
56%
A2 Section
Source: Own calculation based on GDDKiA data, PCU factor =2 for HGVs and UK Capacity Formulae
Based on our calculation, we have found that utilisation rates on the two sections
of A2 are between 56% and 67%, largely because of the very high HGV
proportion of 50% suggesting spare capacity does exist. However, we note that,
due the assumptions underpinning this calculation, this result should be treated
as purely indicative and only represents a snapshot of the current situation.
Table 15 presents the utilisation rate at the end of the appraisal period (2022) if
the forecast traffic growth is realised (2010 to 2022 = 39% increase). This shows
that the project would be approaching capacity in 2022 if the forecast traffic
growth is realised.
Table 15. Estimated Utilisation rates on the A2 Konin to Strykow (2022)
Observed Flow
(PCUs)
Theoretical
Capacity
Utilisation Rate
Dabie to Kolo
41,300
44,000
94%
Emilia to Wartkowice
34,000
44,000
77%
A2 Section
Source: Own calculation based on GDDKiA data, PCU factor =2 for HGVs and UK Capacity Formulae
It should be noted that the forecast growth assumes no tolls on this section. If
for example, traffic growth was half of that forecast as a result of the tolls, the
30
utilisation would be 81% and 66% for the Dabie to Kolo and Emilia to
Wartkowice sections respectively.
Unintended Effects
The nature of the positive impacts observed following project opening are largely
as desired and on the whole adverse unintended effects have largely been
avoided. Anecdotal evidence from stakeholders suggests that increased traffic on
the R14 between the improved section of the A2 and Warsaw has had adverse
impacts on noise, air quality and road safety. Furthermore maintenance
challenges on the R14 and other links to the A2 have emerged as a result of
greater presence of HGVs in the vicinity of the scheme. Furthermore public
awareness of proposals for development of Polands motorway network has lead
to land values rising more than expected hence the higher than expected land
costs associated with this scheme.
Accompanying Actions
We would envisage that the dramatic increase in capacity provided by the new
motorway is likely to have been sufficient to promote the success of the scheme
in its own right. The improved A2 itself has been used as a key selling point for
those involved in promoting economic development along the route e.g. Stykow,
Lowicz, Lodz and Konin.
2.2.6
31
significantly greater than the figures presented in the Funding Application which
states that a journey time saving between Konin and Lowicz of 24 minutes is
expected.
Hence, the primary reason for the high level of journey time and vehicle
operating costs benefits is the assumed non investment speeds that have been
modelled on the R2.
For example, in the UK, speed-flow relationships have been derived for different
road types, and these assume a minimum speed cut-off which is based on the
assumption that below a certain speed (45km/h in the case of a single
carriageway road), vehicles would either:
In our view, these speeds are unrealistically low, and this has been reflected in the
selection of the high and low case scenarios used for the outturn assessment.
Therefore, we have re-calculated the ex ante economic benefits of the project. To
do so, we have updated with and without project traffic volumes, assume
logical speeds on a number of key routes, and update VOT, VOC and traffic
accident rate values from recent sources. Below we provide a summary of our
assumptions.
Pre project (factored) and post project traffic volumes for 2010 were used in
conjunction with the same growth profile as used in the ex ante appraisal.
This assumed a traffic volume growth rate of approximately 2-4% per
annum.
The investment accident costs derived in this evaluation have been reduced
by 68% to account for the observed reduction in accidents (39) compared to
predicted (121).
The study area was revised to only include the key routes where benefits
would be expected. These are as follows: R2 (between Konin and Strykow),
R72 (between Konin and Lodz), R14 (between Lodz and Strykow) and the
A2 motorway. The A1 (running north-south through the area) and the R14
south of Lodz have therefore been removed from this evaluation.
The non investment vehicle speeds on the R2 have been increased from
10km/h to a minimum of 35km/h (i.e. a speed cut-off has been applied).
32
10km/h is a very low speed cutoff for a rural road and indeed many urban
areas. Therefore 35km/h has been selected to more accurately reflect what
would occur in reality, and this still represents a conservative estimate.
This approach is seen as the most appropriate for deriving a best estimate of the
outturn benefits of the project as it utilises updated sources of information whilst
retaining the common sense approach towards vehicle speeds discussed
previously. The low and high case developed to test the sensitivity of the project
to changes in traffic flow and speeds is summarised in Table 5 earlier in this
report.
Margin of Error
The high case scenario demand over the 30 year evaluation period generates an
NPV 72% above the low case scenario. This is primarily due to the level of
uncertainty associated with the levels of economic and associated traffic growth
forecast in Poland over the 30 year period, and also due to the different
assuptions of minimum speed cut offs used for the low and high case scenarios.
http://heatco.ier.uni-stuttgart.de/
3http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/B07E158E-3A7A-43A2-87C4
84E1533AA415/47156/BlueBookPublicTransportfinalMRRMI12_092.pdf
2.3
33
relieve traffic from the existing national road (No 2) and local towns
and villages between Konin and Lowicz;
34
Konin - Strykow
NPV ( million,
2003 prices)
Economic IRR ~
(%)
Benefit-Cost
Ratio
1,867
20.2%
3.1
2.3.2
the forecasts do not include the potential for induced traffic resulting
from the project.
We could not obtain an explanation for the split between light and heavy
vehicles. However, an analysis of observed post-opening data suggests that this
assumption has significantly underestimated the proportion of heavy vehicles
both on the A2 and on the surrounding local highway network.
The study area for the ex ante appraisal is sufficient in size, as it covers the
obvious parallel routes (R2 in the north), R72 (in the south) and other local roads
in the area. The ex ante analysis also considers the potential for traffic reassignment from these nearby routes, presenting the predicted percentage
changes (albeit with a large range).
35
Economic analysis
As noted previously, the ex ante CBA only includes an analysis of the non
investment and investment options. It does not consider any other route
alignments at this stage. The project was appraised over a 20 year period (20032023). The analysis assumes that capital costs would be incurred in 2003, 2004
and 2005 prior to opening in 2006. It was therefore assumed that benefits would
be accrued from 2006 onwards.
The project costs have been presented in the Feasibility Report (in Zlotys), and
are summarised in the EU Application forms (in Euros). When the currencies are
converted at the stated exchange rate (4.2PLN = 1 Euro), the costs in both
documents match. Predicted costs are also presented in the Project Completion
Final Reports for the 2 subsections alongside the actual costs accrued during
construction. The Final Report provides a breakdown of costs by key elements
(land purchase, construction, VAT etc). It is noted that the predicted costs
information falls short of the degree of granularity required to calculate Level 3
unit costs as specified in Work Package 10, and are actually little more than Level
1 costs with some additional breakdown.
With regards to benefits, the CBA makes the following assumptions:
Time Savings. The main time benefit for this project is for those users
who switch to the motorway, with predicted time savings of 24 minutes
between Konin and Lowicz and 50 minutes between Konin and Lodz. The
congestion relief for users remaining on the other local roads would have
been considered in the traffic model and resulting economic analysis.
However, the available documentation provides no commentary in this
regard. The values of time have been derived from Polish sources. These are
3.60/hour for cars, 6/hour for trucks, and 29/hour for buses. It should
be noted that the values of time do not distinguish between leisure time and
work time. We would expect to see a higher value for drivers work time.
The rationale for not differentiating between journey purposes (i.e. business
or leisure) is not presented.
Accidents. To calculate the accident savings, the CBA has assumed the
following values: 60,000 per accident, 120,000 per fatality and 25,000 per
injury. These were used in conjunction with standard accident rates by road
classification along with the predicted traffic volumes. The CBA presented
the monetary benefit arising from reduction in accidents but did not provide
an indication of which parts of the network are likely to see the most
benefits. It is noted that the cost of a fatality is very low compared to UK
values and indeed those contained in the 2002 EU Guide to CBA. The
assumptions underlying the ex ante accident costs are not reported in the
documentation.
36
In order to calculate the annual benefits of the project over 20 years, the CBA
multiplied the above values by the number of vehicles, taking into account traffic
volume growth and modelled speed changes. The rule of a half, presented in
Annexe 1, would not have been required in this instance as no new trips were
assumed to result from the project.
In terms of wider socio-economic impacts, the Funding Application quantifies
the number of direct and indirect jobs that would be created in both the
construction and operational phases of the road investment. However,
supporting commentary to back up the figures was not provided.
An Environmental Impact Assessment was undertaken. The Funding
Applications contains a summary of the main results. Based on a review of the
Non-Technical Summary, it would appear that all aspects of the environmental
impacts were considered in detail. The air pollution impacts were monetised
based on changes in traffic volumes but these results are presented only in the
Funding Applications. A number of measures to mitigate the negative
environmental impacts were also presented (including noise barriers, wildlife
tunnels).
The CBA appendices contain the results of the calculations of costs and benefits
for each year of the appraisal period and present the net present value (NPV), the
internal rate of return (IRR), and the benefit-cost ratio (BCR). The CBA used
the 8% discount rate suggested by the EU guidelines Guide to Cost Benefit
Analysis of Major Projects in the Context of EC Regional Policy (June 1997) at
the time of application.
Table 17 provides a summary of the results of the ex ante cost benefit analysis.
These figures are presented in the Application for Funding for the Emilia to
Strykow subsection (although they relate to the entire project) and are the ones
we use to compare ex ante and ex post CBA later in this chapter.
37
Unit Value
Car: 0.16/km
Truck: 0.6/km
1,289
Car: 3.6/hour
Passenger time costs
Truck 6/hour
5,784
Bus 29/hour
Drivers worktime costs
Car: 3.6/hour
4,037
60,000/accident
Accidents
120,000/fatality
507
25,000/injury
Air Pollution
TOTAL
59
11,676
Source: GDDKiA
This table shows overall benefits of 11.7bn for the A2 Motorway between
Konin and Strykow, with 84% of the benefits being derived from journey time
savings, 11% from savings in vehicle operating costs, 4.5% from accident
benefits, with only 0.5% from air pollution benefits.
Financial analysis
The CBA was completed on the basis that the project would not be a toll
motorway, therefore it was assumed that a detailed financial analysis was not
required. However, the absence of tolls does not eliminate the need to carry out a
financial analysis. This is therefore an omission in the ex ante appraisal. We note
that the infrastructure necessary for collecting tolls is being installed even though,
based on the information available the future tolling of the route was not
considered in the CBA documents. The impact of tolls would clearly have a
detrimental impact of the economic results of the project, whilst improving the
financial results due to the income from revenues.
Time savings
An analysis of the technical documentation reveals a lack of detailed predicted
journey times. The Funding Application presents a forecast journey time saving
between Konin and Lodz of 50 minutes and between Konin and Lowicz of 24
38
minutes. However, from this information, we could not ascertain exactly where
the journey time measurements were taken (for example, it could be the Lodz
junction on the A2 or Lodz city centre). For the purposes of the ex post
evaluation considered later in this chapter, we have made an assumption
regarding the start and end points for the predicted journey times.
Given the predicted journey time savings of an hour or more in future years, the
assumption of no induced traffic is conservative, as these time savings would
make induced traffic relevant to the appraisal.
Sensitivity Analysis and Risk Assessment
In addition to the non investment and investment options considered in the ex
ante appraisal, a small number of sensitivity tests were undertaken which aimed
to provide evidence relating to the robustness of the economic benefits of the
project. The tests which were presented are as follows:
It is understood that a standalone Risk Analysis document was not prepared for
this project, and the results of the above tests were presented in the Feasibility
Study and the EU Application for Funding documents. This showed that despite
variations in costs and traffic volumes, the project still performed well in terms of
its Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The IRR showed less variation resulting from
changes in cost than traffic flows. However, the results provide sufficient
confirmation that the benefits of the project are maintained despite the
substantial cost and traffic under/over estimates tested.
There is no indication from the documentation that any other forms of risk
and/or sensitivity analysis was undertaken for this project.
2.3.3
Summary
The CBA presented for the project option which was finally implemented is
complete and follows the appraisal guidance that was appropriate at the time.
However, we have identified a number of issues which are summarised next:
The decision making process for the choice of route alignment was carried
out prior to the CBA, therefore the reasons underpinning the selected
alignment are not considered in detail in the CBA assessment;
The predicted benefits seem to be high for a project of this kind (in excess
of 11billion). Although a project of this nature would be expected to
generate considerable benefits, the reasons for the exceptionally large
magnitude of benefits have been investigated in detail;
2.4
39
The CBA documents made available to the evaluation team do not provide
sufficient clarification regarding how the key assumptions were derived and
are often not consistent. This is supported by discussions with stakeholders
who stated that consultants often underestimate the importance of the
assumptions used in the CBA.
Based on the information received, its clear that a formal risk assessment
was not undertaken for this project. Although the results of a small number
of sensitivity tests were presented.
There is no single self contained CBA document, with the data and results
spread between the Feasibility Study, EU Application Forms, and Economic
Assessment Reports. A standalone document which explicitly details the
process, assumptions and results is recommended which would create an
element of consistency and clarity when comparing different projects.
Based on discussions with stakeholders in Poland, there is a general view
that the quality of CBAs being published is improving; and
The key risks associated with this project (as with many others) were
identified as the forecasting of traffic demands, journey time assumptions
and project costs. We have carefully reviewed these assumptions as part of
our ex post evaluation.
40
Table 18. Comparison of ex ante and ex post economic CBA (2003 prices)
Ex ante
Ex post
Low case
High case
1,867
523
900
20.2%
18%
23%
Benefit-cost ratio
3.1
3.0
4.4
Source: GDDKiA for ex ante analysis and own calculation for ex post analysis
Overall, GDDKiA estimated that the project would deliver value for money,
with an NPV of 1,867m and a benefit-cost ratio of 3.1. However, we have
reviewed in detail all of the key parameters and made some significant revisions
in our ex post evaluation, and even with these changes the ex post analysis has
confirmed that the project has delivered value for money.
We have identified a few sources of differences between the ex ante analysis and
the ex post evaluation. We address them below.
Capital cost
Capital costs reported in the ex post evaluation are 406m, up from
approximately 400m reported in the ex ante analysis.
Traffic volumes
With regards to traffic volumes, the actual traffic volumes on the A2 are similar
to those predicted, with a greater transfer from Road 2 than predicted, but less
transfer from Road 72 than predicted.
In short, the traffic volume predictions in 2010 were realistic, and the traffic
volume growth was also sensible at 3-4% p.a. which is less than observed trends
in the corridor
Benefit calculation
With regards to benefit calculation, there are two main causes for the difference
between the ex ante and ex post analyses.
Different parameters. For the ex post CBA we have used updated values
for all the parameters used to calculate the benefits of the project, ranging
from the value of time, the reduction of vehicle operating costs and updated
accident costs. These are generally higher values than those used in the
41
original CBA (even when compared at the same price base) and hence the
application of this change has increased the benefits.
Induced Traffic. The CBA states that induced traffic has not been
considered, i.e. only re-assigned traffic uses the new A2 Motorway. With
time savings of an hour, this level of time saving is likely to lead to additional
traffic in the corridor. This is likely to be the release of suppressed trips in
the Without Investment scenario, as well as generating completely new
trips. Once the A2 is complete to Warsaw, induced traffic may be
significant. The exclusion of this source of traffic may have under-estimated
benefits.
Foregone government revenues from the fuel tax. Changing vehicle
kilometres and vehicle speeds implies a change in overall fuel consumption,
which, in turn, implies a change in government revenues from the fuel tax.
The GDDKiA CBA did not include this impact in the ex ante CBA.
Discount rate
Finally, we note that, in the ex ante analysis, the calculation of the NPV of the
project used an 8% discount rate, as suggested by the guidance available at the
time. Currently, The EU recommends the use of a 5.5% discount rate which we
have used for the ex post evaluation. For comparison purposes, we have
calculated the NPV of the ex post evaluation using a discount rate of 8%. Table
19 summarises the results. It can be seen that the ex ante results shown
previously in Table 18 closely match the low and high case results discounted at
8% here. This indicates that on a like with basis, the project has delivered value
for money broadly in line with that predicted.
42
Scenario
Undiscounted
Benefits
(m)
Discounted
Benefits
(m)
NPV
IRR
BCR
High Case
2,197
880
622
22%
3.2
Low Case
1,392
601.1
346
18%
2.2
Finally, we note that the current Polish discount rate as specified by the National
Bank of Poland is 3.75%.
Residual value
In the ex post analysis we have calculated the expected residual value of the
project at the end of the appraisal period. In order to do this we have applied a
linear depreciation over 40 years to the capital expenditure incurred.
2.5
With the exception of CUPT, all of the bodies consulted were involved in the
application process for the A2 Konin to Stykow project. The depth of ex ante
evaluation for the A2 project was largely dictated by the processes and
requirements set out by the EU guidelines in Guide to Cost Benefit Analysis of
Major Projects in the Context of EC Regional Policy (June 1997) at the time of
application.
It was generally felt that CBA guidance is useful and gives sufficient flexibility for
Member States to adopt aspects of their own CBA processes to meet the
challenges posed by different types of transport project. This does however
create some problems in that consultants regularly misunderstand the importance
of documenting their CBA assumptions clearly as part of the overall application
process.
43
Overall, the rigour of CBA auditing for Polish funding applications has improved
over recent years. Internally within Poland, all applications for cohesion funding
under the 2007-2013 have been subjected to a greater degree of auditing than was
the case for the A2 Konin to Strykow under the previous ISPA and 2000-2006
cohesion funding processes. An illustration of improvements to CBA auditing
procedures is the establishment of CUPT in 2007. The mission of this body is to
support beneficiaries such as GDDKiA in the preparation for and
implementation of EU funded projects including those funded through the EU
Cohesion Fund.
As a major investor in the A2 Konin to Strykow project and of other major
transport projects implemented in new Member States, the EIB undertook its
own CBA analysis using its own models based on more conservative values of
time, accidents and vehicle operating costs. Our discussions with the EIB were
useful to understand the Polish CBA issues and the key areas of risk, namely
traffic demand and cost forecasting.
Discussions held with the relevant stakeholders have revealed that CBA was not
used as a tool to prioritise between alignments for this pilot project as the
alignment had been set many years before EU accession. Our discussions
revealed that Poland has a national priority to build up its motorway network,
only after this has been achieved will CBA be more comprehensively used to
prioritise projects or options. Furthermore there was a general consensus that it
was political influence determining which projects progress and not the outcome
from CBA which at most confirms the extent to which a chosen project offers
value for money. This was also a view that Member States regard CBA as a
hurdle to jump in order to secure funding and the go versus no go scenario
rarely exists.
Stakeholders from the Member States expressed that it was rare to find poor
economically performing projects in the current list of priorities as they represent
such significant improvements to the national road network.
As result of EU guidance, the establishment of CUPT and greater experience of
CBA analysis for EU projects, it is generally felt that the reliability of the
application of CBA in Poland is improving.
45
Detailed results
Figure 8. A2 Motorway Poland. Economic analysis (m, 2003 prices) Low case
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Time Benefits
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
56.5
85.2
95.3
95.5
94.2
91.4
86.8
0.0
-39.0
-1.0
0.6
8.0
11.5
9.7
Environmental Benefits
0.0
5.3
0.0
0.0
-0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Accident Reduction
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-3.2
-1.7
-1.8
-1.4
-1.8
-2.1
-2.4
TOTAL BENEFITS
0.0
0.0
0.0
14.2
82.5
94.2
102.3
104.0
99.1
89.7
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land Purchase
0.0
0.1
0.0
Construction
25.9
222.8
93.2
Technical Support
1.2
10.7
4.5
Publicity
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.2
233.6
97.7
TOTAL COSTS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
NET BENEFITS
-27.2
-233.6
-97.7
14.2
82.5
94.2
102.3
104.0
99.1
89.7
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Time Benefits
105.5
111.1
115.7
119.7
125.1
129.9
140.4
152.2
164.3
177.3
10.1
10.6
8.6
9.0
21.9
22.6
26.1
31.2
32.6
34.6
Environmental Benefits
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
Accident Reduction
-2.3
-2.4
-2.5
-2.9
-3.0
-3.3
-1.4
-2.6
-2.7
-2.8
TOTAL BENEFITS
113.4
119.5
121.9
126.0
144.2
149.4
165.4
181.2
194.6
209.5
TOTAL COSTS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-190.0
NET BENEFITS
113.4
119.5
121.9
126.0
144.2
149.4
165.4
181.2
194.6
399.5
Discount Rate
5.5%
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land Purchase
Construction
Technical Support
Publicity
Total Investment costs
ENPV
ERR
B/C Ratio
-190.0
523
18.2%
2.96
46
TOTAL REVENUES
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Land Purchase
0.0
0.1
0.0
Construction
25.9
222.8
93.2
Technical Support
1.2
10.7
4.5
Publicity
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Maintenance
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
CASH FLOW
-27.2
-233.6
-97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-190.0
Maintenance
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-190.0
CASH FLOW
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
190.0
Discount rate
5.0%
TOTAL REVENUES
Land Purchase
Construction
Technical Support
Publicity
FNPV (C)
-263
FRR (C)
-3.5%
47
Figure 10. A2 Motorway Poland. Financial return on capital (m, 2003 prices)
Low case
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
National contribution
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Revenues
Residual values
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
Maintenance
Total Operating Costs
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.4
30.3
-66.2
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
190.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
190.0
Revenues
Residual values
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS
190.0
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution
Maintenance
Discount rate
5.0%
FNPV (K)
47
FRR (K)
11.6%
48
Figure 11. A2 Motorway Poland. Financial sustainability (m, 2003 prices) Low
case
2003
2004
2005
2006
28.6
263.9
31.6
1.3
National contribution
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
27.2
233.6
EU Grant
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
-1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
TOTAL REVENUES
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Land Purchase
0.0
0.1
0.0
Construction
25.9
222.8
93.2
Technical Support
1.2
10.7
4.5
Publicity
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Maintenance
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL REVENUES
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
EU Grant
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
Land Purchase
Construction
Technical Support
Publicity
TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS
Maintenance
49
Figure 12. A2 Motorway Poland. Economic analysis (m, 2003 prices) High case
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Time Benefits
0.0
0.0
0.0
69.4
82.5
95.7
99.4
102.0
103.1
102.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
-9.7
-1.7
1.8
5.9
11.5
11.9
9.7
Environmental Benefits
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Accident Reduction
0.0
0.0
0.0
-1.9
-2.0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.8
-2.0
-2.1
TOTAL BENEFITS
0.0
0.0
0.0
57.8
78.9
95.6
103.9
111.8
113.2
110.6
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land Purchase
0.0
0.1
0.0
Construction
25.9
222.8
93.2
Technical Support
1.2
10.7
4.5
Publicity
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.2
233.6
97.7
TOTAL COSTS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
NET BENEFITS
-27.2
-233.6
-97.7
57.8
78.9
95.6
103.9
111.8
113.2
110.6
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Time Benefits
85.0
85.8
85.4
84.2
83.9
81.8
84.9
88.6
90.8
93.4
3.3
1.3
-3.6
-5.8
-8.2
-10.8
0.7
2.1
0.0
-1.8
Environmental Benefits
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Accident Reduction
-2.6
-2.8
-3.1
-3.6
-3.9
-4.2
-2.7
-3.6
-3.7
-4.0
TOTAL BENEFITS
85.7
84.3
78.7
74.9
71.8
66.9
82.9
87.1
87.1
87.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL COSTS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-190.0
NET BENEFITS
85.7
84.3
78.7
74.9
71.8
66.9
82.9
87.1
87.1
277.5
Discount Rate
5.5%
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land Purchase
Construction
Technical Support
Publicity
ENPV
ERR
B/C Ratio
-190.0
900
22.8%
4.36
50
Figure 13. A2 Motorway Poland. Financial return on investment (m, 2003 prices)
High case
TOTAL REVENUES
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Land Purchase
0.0
0.1
0.0
Construction
25.9
222.8
93.2
Technical Support
1.2
10.7
4.5
Publicity
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Maintenance
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
CASH FLOW
-27.2
-233.6
-97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-190.0
Maintenance
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-190.0
CASH FLOW
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
190.0
Discount rate
5.0%
TOTAL REVENUES
Land Purchase
Construction
Technical Support
Publicity
FNPV (C)
-263
FRR (C)
-3.5%
51
Figure 14. A2 Motorway Poland. Financial return on capital (m, 2003 prices)
High case
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
National contribution
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Revenues
Residual values
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
Maintenance
Total Operating Costs
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.4
30.3
-66.2
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
190.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
190.0
Revenues
Residual values
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS
190.0
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution
Maintenance
Discount rate
FNPV (K)
FRR (K)
5.0%
47
11.6%
52
Figure 15. A2 Motorway Poland. Financial sustainability (m, 2003 prices) High
case
2003
2004
2005
2006
28.6
263.9
31.6
1.3
National contribution
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
-1.3
-1.4
-30.3
66.2
27.2
233.6
EU Grant
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
-1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
TOTAL REVENUES
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Land Purchase
0.0
0.1
0.0
Construction
25.9
222.8
93.2
Technical Support
1.2
10.7
4.5
Publicity
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Maintenance
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
27.2
233.6
97.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL REVENUES
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL OUTFLOWS
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
EU Grant
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
Land Purchase
Construction
Technical Support
Publicity
TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS
Maintenance