PEOPLE

V
VERA
LAUREL;
November
16,
1937
FACTS
- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case People
v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al. filed in CFI Manila. In the
said case, HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as
private
prosecutor.
- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a
judgment
of
conviction
sentencing
MCU
to
imprisonment.
- 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a
slight
modification
of
the
duration
of
imprisonment.
- 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by
MCU
denied
by
Phil
SC.
- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil
SC.
MCU
seeks
to
elevate
the
case
to
US
SC.
- November 1936: US SC denies petition for certiorari.
- 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCUs petition for
leave to file a 2nd alternative MFR or new trial; &
remands the case to CFI Manila for execution of the
judgment.
- 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probation
under
the
provisions
of
Act
No.
4221
of
the
Phil
Legislature.
CFI
Manila,
Judge
Pedro
Tuason
presiding,
refers
the
application
to
the
Insular
Probation
Office
(IPO)
18
June
1937:
IPO
recommends
denial
of
MCUs
application
for
probation
- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila,
7th branch with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC &
the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate oppositions
to
the
granting
of
probation.
HSBC
attacks
constitutionality
of
Act
No.
4221
on
the
following
grounds:
equal
protection
of
the
laws
(its
applicability
is
not
uniform
throughout
the
Islands);
undue
delegation
of
legislative
power
(section
11
of
the said Act endows provl boards w/ power to make said
law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces).
- 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Vera of CFI Mnla
promulgates
resolution
with
a
finding
that
MCU
is
innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but
denying
the
latter's
petition
for
probation.
- 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the
resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file
MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions
for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave
to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33
(34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1
of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to
withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground
that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by
counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without
mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.)
HSBC
files
opposition
to
motion
for
intervention.
- 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files
motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute
judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail
in
obedience
to
said
judgment.
- 19 August 1937 is the date set for hearing on the
various
motions
for
CFIs
consideration.
On
this
same
date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an
end
to
what
they
alleged
was
an
interminable
proceeding
in
CFI
Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While
a
probation
case
may
look
into
the
circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, this does not
authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this
court,
either
directly
or
indirectly, especially
wherefrom
its
own
admission
reliance
was
merely
had
on
the
printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If
each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court,
there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos
would
result.
<emphasis
on
the
hierarchy
in
the
Philippine
judicial
system>
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been

properly
raised
in
these
proceedings
2.
if
YES,
WON
said
Act
is
constitutional
a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning
power
of
the
Executive
b.
WON
section
11
of
Act
No.
4221
constitute
an
undue
delegation
of
legislative
power
c.
WON
the
Probation
Act
violates
Bill
of
Rights
provisions
on
equal
protection
of
the
laws
3.
WON
the
entire
Act
should
be
avoided
HELD
1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and
is necessary to a determination of the case. <lis mota>
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature is frequently raised
in
ordinary actions BUT
resort
may
be
made
to
extraordinary
legal
remedies,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of
law
even
if
available,
are
not
plain,
speedy
and
adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action
of quo warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an
application
for
injunction
to
restrain
action
under
the
challenged
statute,
&
even
on
an
application
for
preliminary
injunction
where
the
determination
of
the
constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the
case, or through petitions for prohibition and certiorari.
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
section
516:
Philippine
SC
is
granted
concurrent
jurisdiction
in
prohibition
with
courts
of
first
instance
over
inferior
tribunals
or
persons,
and
original
jurisdiction
over
courts
of
first
instance,
when
such
courts are exercising functions without or in excess of
their
jurisdiction.
- General rule: the question of the validity of the
criminal statute must be raised by a defendant in the
trial court and be carried regularly in review to the
Supreme Court. BUT in cases where a new act seriously
affected
numerous
persons
and
extensive
property
rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions,
the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the
issue of the act's validity promptly before it and decide
in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
- The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it
is
not
legally
vested.
General
rule:
the
merit
of
prohibition
will
not
lie
where
the
inferior
court
has
jurisdiction
independent
of
the
statute
the
constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the
inferior
court
or
tribunal
derives
its
jurisdiction
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that
statute. A CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court
of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings
is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature.
It
is
unquestionable
that
the
constitutional
issue has been squarely presented not only before this
court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by
the
private
prosecution.
- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. The authority to define and
fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes
the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for
the
purpose
of
executing
the
statute,
elements
of
consideration
which
would
be
otherwise
beyond
the
scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve
from
the
punishment,
fixed
by
law
and
ascertained
according to the methods by it provided belongs to the
executive
department.
- Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not
consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a
statute by one who has no interest in defeating it
because his rights are not affected by its operation. The
power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where

he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and

official
oath
decline
the
responsibility.
- General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of
the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality
will be considered on its being brought to the attention
of the court by persons interested in the effect to be
given
the
statute.
General
rule:
the
question
of
constitutionality
must
be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised
by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not
considered on appeal. BUT courts, in the exercise of
sounds
discretion,
may
determine
the
time
when
a
question
affecting
the
constitutionality
of
a
statute
should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may
be
raised
for the
first
time
at
any
stage
of
the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Same
is true in civil cases if it appears that a determination of
the question is necessary to a decision of the case. Also,
a
constitutional
question
will
be
considered
by
an
appellate
court
at
any
time,
where
it
involves
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
below
- General rule: the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The People of
the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having Act
No.
4221
set
aside.
Of
greater
import
than
the
damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the
state
can
challenge
the
validity
of
its own laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to
its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people
must
bow. The
state
is
always
interested
where
the
integrity
of
its
Constitution
or
statutes
is
involved.
A
judge
should
not
judicially
declare
a
statute
unconstitutional
until
the
question
of
constitutionality
is
tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in
order to determine the right of a party litigant. An officer
on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its
provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that
he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if
the
statute
be
unconstitutional.
Executive
officers
(e.g.,
the state auditor and state treasurer) should not decline
to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.
The
mere
fact
that
the
Probation
Act
has
been
repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila
but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him
as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People
of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only
when
presented
before
it
in
bona
fide
cases
for
determination, and the fact that the question has not
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are
justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as
valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 is necessary to resolve the instant case? While the
court will meet the question with firmness, where its
decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and
just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to
waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other
points.
General
rule:
the
determination
of
a
constitutional
question is necessary whenever it is essential to the
decision of the case, as where the right of a party is

founded solely on a statute the validity of which is

attacked. There is no doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his
privilege
to
probation
solely
from Act
No.
4221
now
being
assailed.
- Moreover, the Probation Act is a new addition to our
statute books and its validity has never before been
passed upon by the courts; many persons accused and
convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; some of them are already on probation; more
people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in
the future; and the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has
been at large for a period of about four years since his
first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the
constitutional
question.
Considering,
therefore,
the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to
prevent
multiplicity
of
suits,
strong
reasons
of
public
policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221
be
now
resolved.
- Also, in Phil SCs ruling in an analogous situation in Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court said: "Inasmuch as the
property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants
are
affected
by
these
proceedings,
and
inasmuch
as Act
No.
2972
is
a
new
law
not
yet
interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public
welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we
have determined to overrule the defense of want of
jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue.
We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a
relaxation of the general rule." Phil SCs ruling on this
point was sustained by the US SC. A more binding
authority in support of the view we have taken can not
be
found.
2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty
of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by
clear
implication
from
the
provisions
of
section
2,
subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the
Constitution,
may
declare
an
act
of
the
national
legislature
invalid
because
in
conflict
with
the
fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting
aside
a
statute
in
conflict
therewith.
Fundamental
criteria:
all
reasonable
doubts
should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is
presumed
to
be
within
constitutional
limitations.
The
members
of
the
Legislature
and
the
Chief
Executive
have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it
must be presumed that they have been true to this oath
and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law
they
did
not
intend
to
violate
the
Constitution.
The
courts
cannot
but
cautiously
exercise
its
power
to
overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three
grand
departments
of
the
governments.
The
judiciary
ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed
through
an
elective
Legislature
and
an
elective
Chief
Executive.
- The President of the Philippines had already expressed
his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation
Act.
In
a
message
dated
September
1,
1937,
he
recommended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting
in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the NA repealing the
probation
Act,
subject
to
certain
conditions
therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President
on
September
13,
1937,
much
against
his
wish.
In
vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his
constitutional
prerogative.
He
may
express
the
reasons
which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but
his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination
of
actual
controversies
submitted
for
our
determination.
Whatever
opinion
is
expressed
by
him
under
these
circumstances,
however,
cannot
sway
our
judgment
on
way or another and prevent us from taking what in our
opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. We are independent of the Executive no less than
of
the
Legislative
department
of
our
government

independent
in
the
performance
of
our
functions,

undeterred
by
any
consideration,
free
from
politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the
accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as
we
understand
it.
- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on
three
principal
grounds:
(1)
That
said
Act
encroaches
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and
(3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act
No.
4221
vests
in
the
Governor-General
of
the
Philippines
"the
exclusive
power
to
grant
pardons
and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is
now
vested
in
the
President
of
the
Philippines
(A7,
s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes specific mention of
"commutation" and of the power of the executive to
impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions,
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper; and
to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But
the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
- Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the
Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not,
therefore,
be
vested
in
anyone
else.
Where
the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without
express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and
the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor
delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper
exercise
thereof.
- Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: US SC
ruled
in
1916
that
an
order
indefinitely
suspending
sentenced was void. Under the common law the power
of the court was limited to temporary suspension and
the
right
to
suspend
sentence
absolutely
and
permanently was vested in the executive branch of the
government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of
Congress
to
establish
probation
by
statute
was
conceded.
US
v
Murray:
when
a
person
sentenced
to
imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his
sentence, that court has no power under the Probation
Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though
the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet
expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of
the probation Act was not considered but was assumed.
US SC denied the right of the district courts to suspend
sentence. The court pointed out the necessity for action
by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation
powers
in
the
future.
- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth
Circuit held that the constitutionality of Probation Act of
March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
same was held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning
power
of
the
President.
1916:
US
SC,
in
plain
and
unequivocal
language,
pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to
enact
probation
laws.
A
federal
probation
law
was
actually enacted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Act
has
been
assumed
by
the
US
SC
in
1928
and
consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a
number of earlier cases. The Philippine Legislature, like
the
US
Congress,
may
legally
enact
a
probation
law
under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and
all penal offenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has
defined
all
crimes
and
fixed
the
penalties
for
their
violation.
Invariably,
the
legislature
has
demonstrated
the desire to vest in the courts -- particularly the trial
courts -- large discretion in imposing the penalties which
the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that
justice can best be served by vesting this power in the
courts, they being in a position to best determine the
penalties
which
an
individual
convict,
peculiarly
circumstanced,
should
suffer.
<Revised
Penal
Code,
Indeterminate
Sentence
Law,
Parole
Act,
Juvenile
Delinquency
Law, (Adult)
Probation
Law, etc
show
the
intention
of
the
legislature
to
humanize
the
penal
laws.>

- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to

vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of
a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so
would
encroach
upon
the
pardoning
power
of
the
executive.
Other
cases,
however, hold
contra.
Phil
SC
elects to follow the long catena of authorities holding
that
the
courts
may
be
legally
authorized
by
the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of
a
system
of
probation
however
characterized.
- Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they
the same. They are actually district and different from
each other, both in origin and in nature. Probation, the
power to suspend sentence, was always a part of the
judicial power. It simply postpones the judgment of the
court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and
liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and
become
operative
when
judgment
is
rendered.
The
power
to
grant
reprieves
and
pardons,
on
the
other
hand, was always a part of the executive power. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he
had
never
committed
the
offense.
It
removes
the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him
a
new
credit
and
capacity.
Probation
should
also
be
distinguished
from
reprieve
and
from
commutation
of
the
sentence.
Snodgrass
vs.
State:
the
power
to
suspend
the
sentence
does
not
conflict
with
the
power
of
the
Governor
to
grant
reprieves.
A
reprieve
postpones
the
execution
of
the
sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for
an indefinite time. A commutation is but to change the
punishment
assessed
to
a
less
punishment.
- State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is
an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted
with
the
execution
of
the
laws
which
exempts
the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a
remission
of
guilt,
a
forgiveness
of
the
offense.
"Commutation"
is
a
remission
of
a
part
of
the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
originally
imposed.
"Reprieve"
or
"respite"
is
the
withholding of the sentence for an interval of time, a
postponement
of
execution,
a
temporary
suspension
of
execution.
- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning
power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect
to
those
serving
their
probationary
sentences,
remains
as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never
been
enacted.
The
President
may
yet
pardon
the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the
court
to
order
his
rearrest
and
imprisonment.
b. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among
3
coordinate
and
substantially
independent
organs:
legislative,
executive
and
judicial.
Each
department
derives its authority from the Constitution, the highest
expression
of
popular
will.
Each
has
exclusive
cognizance
of
the
matters
within
its
jurisdiction,
supreme
within
its
own
sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is
vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec.
12)
and
in
a
unicameral
National
Assembly
by
the
Constitution
(A6,s1).
The
Philippine
Legislature
or
the
National
Assembly
may
not
escape
its
duties
and
responsibilities
by
delegating
that
power
to
any
other
body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary of
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of
legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to
local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as
Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4)
to
those
whom
the
Constitution
itself
delegates
such

legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before

us
does
not
fall
under
any
of
these
exceptions.
Test
of
Undue
Delegation:
to
inquire
whether
the
statute
was
complete
in
all
its
terms
and
provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate
of
the
legislature.
BUT to a
certain
extent
matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise
of
the
discretionary
powers
delegated
to
it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all.
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not
susceptible
of
any
other
interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter
no
valid
objection
can
be
made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies,
as
by
proclamation
of
the
executive
or
the adoption by the people of a particular community.
The
legislature
may
delegate
a
power
not
legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.
There
is
nothing
essentially
legislative
in
ascertaining
the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process
common
to
all
branches
of
the
government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative
will
must,
of
course,
come
from
Congress,
but
the
ascertainment
of
the
contingency
upon
which
the
Act
shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
designate.
The
legislature,
then
may
provide
that
a
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the
power
to
determine
when
the
specified
contingencies
has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial
boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power
of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their
respective
provinces.
While
the
legislature
may
suspend
a law, or
the
execution or operation of a law, a law may not be
suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law
to
be
enjoyed
by
others.
The
suspension
must
be
general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for
particular
localities.
Here
the
sovereign
and
absolute
power resides in the people; and the legislature can only
exercise what is delegated to them according to the
constitution.
It
is
manifestly
contrary
to
the
first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen
should
enjoy
privileges
and
advantages
which
are
denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant
one
should
be
subject
to
losses,
damages,
suits,
or
actions from which all others under like circumstances
are
exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular
locality different from those applicable to other localities.
But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local
in
character
which
should
receive
different
treatment
in
different
localities
placed
under
different
circumstances. While we do not deny the right of local
self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or
for the people of small communities to pass upon, we
believe that in matters of general of general legislation

like that which treats of criminals in general, and as

regards the general subject of probation, discretion may
not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute
as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not
tested by what has been done but by what may be done
under
its
provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the
legislature not only in the expression of what may be
termed
legislative
policy
but
in
the
elaboration
and
execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
become
oppressive
and
yet
imbecile."
The
mass
of
powers of government is vested in the representatives of
the people and that these representatives are no further
restrained
under
our
system
than
by
the
express
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by
particular
provisions
which
by
clear
intendment,
have
that
effect.
(Angara
case)
We
conclude
that
section
11
of
Act
No.
4221
constitutes
an
improper
and
unlawful
delegation
of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this
reason,
unconstitutional
and
void.
c.
This
basic
individual
right
sheltered
by
the
Constitution
is
a
restraint
on
all
the
tree
grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities
and
subdivision
thereof,
and
on
many
constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain. BUT what may be regarded as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws in a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case
can
be
formulated.
Class
legislation
discriminating
against
some
and
favoring
others
in
prohibited.
But
classification
on
a
reasonable
basis,
and
nor
made
arbitrarily
or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to
be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of
the
class.
- In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality
may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative
power,
although
perhaps
this
is
not
necessarily
the
result
in
every
case.
While
inequality
may result in the application of the law and in the
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is
not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may
be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation
Act
creates
a
situation
in
which
discrimination
and
inequality
are
permitted
or
allowed.
- There is no difference between a law which denies
equal protection and a law which permits of such denial.
A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance,
yet,
if
it
permits
of
unjust
and
illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions.
Statutes
may
be
adjudged
unconstitutional
because
of
their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of
denying
the
equal
protection
of
the
law
it
is
unconstitutional.
3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is
against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will
resort
to
elimination
only
where
an
unconstitutional
provision
is
interjected
into
a
statute
otherwise
valid,
and is so independent and separable that its removal will
leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially
unaffected
by
the
process.
- Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic
Law,
while
another
part
is
valid,
the
valid
portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be
enforced.
The
void
provisions
must
be
eliminated
without causing results affecting the main purpose of the
Act,
in
a
manner
contrary
to
the
intention
of
the
Legislature.
What
remains
must
express
the
legislative
will, independently of the void part, since the court has
no
power
to
legislate.
- In the case at bar, section 11 (which makes the
Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries

of probation officers) is so inseparably linked with the

other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the
section what would be left is the bare idealism of the
system,
devoid
of
any
practical
benefit
to
a
large
number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial
result
of
that
system.
- Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We
may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as
has
been
said
regarding
progressive
interpretation
and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are
not
permitted
to
read
into
the
law
matters
and
provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make
the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation
officers
in
the
provinces
but
to
make
the
provinces
defray them should they desire to have the Probation
Act
apply
thereto.
- Probation as a development of a modern penology is a
commendable
system.
Probation
laws
have
been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what
modern
criminologist
call
the
"individualization
of
the
punishment",
the
adjustment
of
the
penalty
to
the
character of the criminal and the circumstances of his
particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of
reform.
Decision
WHEREFORE, Act
No.
4221
is
hereby
declared
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly,
granted.
Without
any
pronouncement
regarding
costs.
So
ordered.
DE
AGBAYANI
V
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
FERNANDO;
April
29,
1971
FACTS
Francisca
De
Agbayani
obtained
a
P450.00loan
from
PNB dated July 19, 1939 maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured
by
real
estate
mortgage
As
of
November
27,
1959
the
loan
balance
was
P1,294.00

- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure

proceedings
in
the
office
of
Pangasinan
Provincial
Sherriff
for the
recovery
of
the
unpaid
loan
balance
- August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit against PNB and
Sheriff alleging that 15 years having elapsed from the
date
of
maturity
the
mortgage
have
prescribed.
- PNB prayed for the dismissal since the defense of
prescription
would
not
be
available
in
the
period
of
March 10, 1945 , when EO 32 providing for a moratorium
on debts was issued, to July 26, 1948 when RA 342
which extended the period of moratorium was declared
invalid, were to be deducted from the time during which
PNB took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan
Lower
court
ruled
in
favor
of
De
Agbayani
ISSUES
1.
WON
a
statute
subsequently
adjudged
as
invalid
should be deemed to have force and effect before the
declaration
of
its
nullity.
2. (if yes) WON prescription ran during the eight year
period
that
EO
32
and
RA
342
was
in
force.
HELD
1. YES Prior to the declaration of nullity a challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and
effect.
The
actual
existence
of
a
statute,
prior
to
the
determination
of
unconstitutionality
is
an
operative
fact
and
may
have
consequences
which
cannot
be
justly
ignored.
2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium
was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferer the SC has made clear its
view in a series of cases that during the eight year
period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription
did not run. (cases decided: Day v. CFI, Republic vs.
Hernaez.
Orthodox
view
on
an
unconstitutional
act:
An
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order
or
a
municipal
ordinance
likewise
suffering
from
that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or
duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
- SC said, in Agbayani vs. PNB that orthodox view is
unrealistic and that until after the judiciary declares its
invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect.