Lozada v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No.

184379-80
J.)

April 24, 2012 Sereno,

FACTS: Lozada was issued a subpoena by Senate with regards to the NBN-ZTE
scandal. He did not appear during the hearing and instead flew to London on
official business. Upon his return, he was escorted by several men and was told by
Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking to ES and Mam, whom Lozada assumed to be
ES Recto and the President. Lozada was brought to LSGH where he was purportedly
harassed and threatened by the police.His brother filed for a writ of amparo. The
court held that the Writ of Amparo was properly denied by the CA because the
petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence and that they failed
to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a
transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National
Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of
telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of
Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during
the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said
transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of
the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for
which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January
2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced
that Lozada was in an official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an order
(1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the
sergeant-at-arms to implement such order and make a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he
informed his family that he would be arriving in Manila,Feb 5 at 4 pm.
In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms
and took his bag. He allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it
would be wiser to go with the men when he heard them say in their handheld radio
[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado.
Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo
and informed him of his situation. He observed that there were several cars tailing
their car. Sec. Atienza called him and assured him that he was with government
people and that Sec. Atienza would confer with ES and Mam. Lozada surmised them
to be ES Ermita and the President. He was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta, who
was making public statements asking for her husbands return. Along the way, the
men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection. Lozada
asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks.
They stopped at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col.

Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an affidavit. He
was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and the LS
brothers, guarded the perimeter of LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista
to finalize and sign an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas
Corpus and his brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and
prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to
the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that
would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.
Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police protection. On 7
February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after
his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then
harassed, stalked and threatened.
Respondents contended that Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened
from the time of his arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and
was never deprived of his liberty and that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the
custody of the Senate.
CA rendered the following decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case as moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile
Witnesses and Adverse Parties irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to
testify would be a fishing expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as
president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. Petitioners unable to prove through substantial
evidence that respondents violated Lozadas right to life, liberty and security.
ISSUE:
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to
entitle him to the protection of the writ of amparo
HELD: No. The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that
provides rapid judicial relief to protect the peoples right to life, liberty and security.
Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and
curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is

curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by

inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is
aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty
and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases
where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.
Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and
remedial character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the writ of amparo is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the
remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of Amparo
petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
Writ of Amparo Denied
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already
ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence
of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to
meet the threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and
allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and
credibility of the parties diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6
February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of
the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the
point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the
departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of
respondents and the following other proofs:

He was able to go to the mens bathroom and call his brother

He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms,
detour appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where
[Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could
be properly stamped
No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help
He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him
He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport
because at that time, it was his decision not to testify before the Senate

it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so

much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that
manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered
the grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo moot.
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada]
was in the custody of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to
[Lozadas] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind
would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to
threaten somebodys life, liberty and security
Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH
premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed
men around him at places where he went to. Again, these alleged threats
were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the
respondents
Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St.
Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims
that these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozadas] self-serving claim,
he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the
respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and
security
No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents
or done upon their instigation.
He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was
actually in the official watch list of the Bureau
[Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or
any of the respondents ordered the filing of these frivolous cases against
him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined based on their
own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition
filed against the respondents
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary
diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of
the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)

Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an Amparo petition should a
criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent
to a petition for Amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action
where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under
the Rule.

In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the above sections as follows: (1) the
consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the
investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in
the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats
to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the
investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual
resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to
all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily,
Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to
amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully
effective.
Provided that if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a
criminal case, then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations
made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of Amparo
as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. On
the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the
denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom
Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.
Since the writ of amparo was denied there is no basis for interim reliefs.
In Yano v. Sanchez, the SC declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as
well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public
officials were not accountable for the disappearance subject of that case.
Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant herein petitioners prayer for a TPO
and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that there no
longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozadas right to life, liberty and
security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim
reliefs can be anchored.
Re: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum proper - for a subpoena
to issue, it must first appear that the person or documents sought to be presented
are prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
CA correctly denied petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be
presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case.The court
has repeatedly reminded the parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the
instant Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation of the ZTE-NBN contract.
Additionally,President Arroyo was not proven to be involved in the alleged violation
of life, liberty and security of Lozada

President Arroyos term as president has ended, therefore she no longer enjoys
immunity, but an examination of Petitioners evidence reveals their failure to
sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or
threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for
the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain Ma[a]m, whom Lozada
speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the
President was hurting from all the media frenzy, there is nothing in the records
that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the events
that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that
Lozada and his family purportedly received.

Jamar M. Kulayan et al vs Gov. Abdusakur Tan (G.R. No. 187298

2012 Sereno, J.)

July 3,

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres
Notter, a Swiss national, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national, and Marie Jean Lacaba,
a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed
to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers
was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports
linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened
under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor
of Sulu, organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male
civilians coming from different municipalities.The organization of the CEF was
embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties:
the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police,
represented by P/SUPT. Latag.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09),
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant
to the Human Security.
On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to
respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station, he was
booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who
were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the
three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi,
companions were arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that

they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 109.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not authorized
by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and
limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop
Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts
Doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the
Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought
unless special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the
petition.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public interest
and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps
taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners
themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an
existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The
matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved
now for the education and guidance of all concerned.

Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with

transcendental public importance.
II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief
of the Republic
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII
of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no
one else.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are
exercised by one president
One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to
which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency
Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as
embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers
inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely
granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.
The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic,
and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would
make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, and should
not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted said proclamation and guidelines are
hereby declared NULL and VOID.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185128, 30

January 2012,
(Peralta, J.)
FACTS:
Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search
warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search
of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid which prompted the police
officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to
Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in
Del Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from

the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation
of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the
arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty
beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary,
the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government
authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as
evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a
private individual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillos right against unreasonable
searches and seizure
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place
to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion
of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were
seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the
Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del
Castillos constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place
not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as
evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a
private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is
devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the

search warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been
established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore
acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code
defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person
in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to
the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function
of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local
Government Code reads: For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong
tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated
by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection
and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced
environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods
were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search.
Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence.
Manolito Gil Zafra vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 176317 July 23,
2014 BERSAMIN, J.:)
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!:
through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for
the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the
property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the
Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.
The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment
promulgated on August 16, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the
consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651,

inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union
guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents.3
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:
Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his
duties was to receive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official
receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer
while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.
Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of
Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection,
name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of
the MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the
Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the
duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the
real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the
issued ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax paid.
On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario,
Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the central
office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the
appellant.
Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as
Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments
from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew
Aberin and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the
corresponding RORs. To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who
testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam
Fernando, La Union, it was a female BIR employee who received the payment and
issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to
1994, testified that when he made the payments to the same BIR office, it was not
appellant who received the payments nor issued the corresponding receipts but
another unidentified BIR employee."
Decision of the RTC
The RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.

Decision of CA
CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court and found the accused guilty of
malversation of public funds
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public funds at the same time
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such
findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate
reviewing tribunal, are now binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, the
Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner had been the forger of the
falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public
documents had been necessary to commit the malversations of the collected taxes.
Anent the petitioners defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the
taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly
ruminated:
x x x If this Court were to believe that the criminal act imputed to the accused were
done by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by
the accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this
presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss.21
(Italics supplied)
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTCs ruling to buttress his contention
that he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is
grossly misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he
had been merely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse
on the legal consequence if his defense was favorably considered, and was notthe
basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to
divert attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied,
indeed, that the RTC did not give any weight to his position.
Initially, the CAs disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the
same tenor as that of the RTCs,22 and later on even went to the extent of opining
that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence.23
But such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for
the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the
States evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of
public funds through falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on
findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our

attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly
appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in
his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted
his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be
barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the
convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by
appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving
him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately
conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the terms
of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Yet, SC cited the need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was
duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense,
to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public
officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00.25 Prision
mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In
contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled,
to wit:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate
or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person
to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals subject to the
modification of the penalties imposed as stated in this decision and the
consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is
hereby amended and the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crimes charged.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. GLORIA JARALVE G.R. No.

175177 : October 24, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On October 22, 1996, Gloria Jaralve, ll Edgardo Jaralve, Serafin Uy, Jr., Shella Uy,
Nimfa Lagnada, Pantaleon Saya-Ang, Starglad International and Development
Corporation, Annie Tan, Teotimo Cabarrubias, Jessica Daclan, and Ma. Emma Ramas
filed an Applicationll with Branch 20 of the RTC of Cebu City, for the registration in
their names of Lot Sgs-07-000307 (subject property).
In their original and amended applications, respondents declared that they were the
co-owners in fee simple of the subject property, a parcel of land with an area of
731,380 square meters, belonging to Cadastral Lot situated in Barangay Quiot, City
of Cebu, and all the improvements thereon. They alleged that they occupied the
subject property and to the best of their knowledge, there was no mortgage or
encumbrance affecting it, and no one was in possession thereof. Respondents
further averred that the subject property was not covered by any certificate of title
or any pending case before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents also identified the
names and complete postal addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots.
The respondents claimed that they
property by way of purchase from
continuous, open, adverse, public,
possession thereof for more than thirty

had acquired ownership over the subject

predecessors-in-interest who had been in
uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious
(30) years, or from June 12, 1945.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the following:

1. Sepia Plan;
2. Blue Print Copy of Survey Plan;
3. Technical Description of SGS-07-000307;
4. Geodetic Engineers Certificate (of the survey of the subject property);
5. Certificate of Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
dated March 20, 1996, signed by CENR and Provincial Environmental and Natural
Resources (PENR) Officers (CENRO Certificate) that the subject property is within the
alienable and disposable portion of Lot 18590;
6. Deeds of Sale;
7. Tax Clearances; and
8. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7 Certification
that subject property is not covered by any subsisting land application.
This was opposed by the respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of the applicants for having a registerable title to the parcel
of land herein applied for original registration of title, and thereby confirmed the
same. The RTC also granted Starglad International and Development Corporations
application despite the constitutional prohibition on acquisition of public lands of
private corporations or associations, explaining that such prohibition does not apply
when the corporations predecessors-in-interest had satisfied the requirements in

acquiring ownership over public lands before such land was transferred to the
corporation. l
The RTC stated that the private oppositors were not able to present any convincing
evidence and/or approved survey plan that clearly identified the portions of the
subject property they were claiming.
Finding for the respondents, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its Decision
dated June 28, 2006.
The Court of Appeals stated that the private oppositors failed to prove that the
parcels of land they were claiming were identical to the respective portions of the
subject property the respondents sought to register.
As for the petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTCs findings
that the petitioner failed to controvert the fact that the subject property was within
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. It added that it was a
great blunder that petitioners own witness, for his failure to conduct an actual
relocation or verification survey, could not even categorically identify the relative
position of the subject property to the timberland area.

ISSUE: whether the grant of respondents application for registration of title to the
subject property was proper under the law and jurisprudence.
HELD: Going to the merits of the case, this Court agrees with the petitioner that the
respondents failed to prove in accordance with law that the subject property is
within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

The Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141, until this day, is the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain, except for timber and mineral lands. In the case at bar, the subject
property has an area of 731,380 square meters or 73.138 hectares. Clearly, under
DAO No. 38, series of 1990, the subject property is beyond the authority of the
CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
It is undisputed that while PENR Officer Montejos signature appears on the CENRO
Certificate, it was under the CENRO that the survey of the subject property was
conducted. The certificate was likewise issued under the CENRO, and not the
PENRO. The respondents admit and even emphasize that it was the CENRO that was
involved in the conduct of the survey and issuance of the certification with respect
to the land classification status of the subject property.
In Republic v. Medida,

This Court x x x holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among
the matters that can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of
parties. The law and jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such
fact. Our Constitution, no less, embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which the source of any is asserted right to
ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we are duty-bound, to ensure
that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper observance by
parties of the rules and requirements on land registration.
Unfortunately, respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land they sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.
The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside. The respondents application for registration and issuance of title to the
subject property is accordingly dismissed.
Francis Saez vs Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (680 SCRA 681 September
25,2012 Reyes J .)
Facts:
Petitioner Francis Saez filed for a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of
place and production of documents. The petitioner expressed his fear of being
abducted and killed and so he sought to be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the
court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from
the order of battle and other records connecting him to the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP).
RTCs Decision:
The court issued the writ of amparo and referred the case to the CA for hearing and
decision
CAs Decision:
CA denied petition and dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent.
OSGs Comment:
Petitioner advances no cogent grounds to justify reversal of CAs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President (GMA) as former commander-in-chief of the military
can be held responsible for extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.

HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the
petitioners rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to
show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with
knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable
diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules.
The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only
in concurrence with the presidents incumbency. Conversely, this presidential
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts
committed during his or her tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of
proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the
latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and
security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the Presidents name as
a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latters actual
involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of
the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought
to the Presidents attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely
dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as
commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified
to prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the
defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the
verification attached to the petition was deemed cured. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

People of the Philippines vs Gomer S. Climaco (G.R. No. 199403 June 13,
2012 CARPIO, J.:)
FACTS:

This is a consolidated criminal case filed against appellant Gomer S. Climaco

(Climaco) for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for illegal possession (Criminal Case
No. 4911-SPL) and illegal sale (Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL) of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna dated 20 January 2009 (RTC
Decision), found Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride (a dangerous drug) and guilty for
the illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA), in its Decision dated 29 March 2011 (CA Decision), affirmed the RTC Decision.
Climaco appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Climaco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug
HELD:
No. SC resolved to acquit Climaco for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Constitution guarantees the accused presumption of
innocence until proven guilty. Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights (Article III) provides
that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.
Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court likewise states that, in a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, which produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainly is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti.
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise
obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the
same is advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application
of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a
substance was later analyzed as heroin was handled by two police officers prior to
examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts
of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession was excluded from the
prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could
have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that
unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of
the exhibit at least between the time it came into the posession of the police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony
of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.
SC decided to set aside the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna.
Gomer S. Climaco is acquitted based on reasonable doubt and ordered for his
immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for any other lawful cause.

People of the Philippines vs Zafra M. Maraorao (G.R. No. 174369 June 20,
2012 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)
FACTS:
On November 30, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without
being authorized by law to possess or use regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing 1,280.081 grams of white
crystalline
substance
known
as
shabu
containing
methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
thereof.
PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they received reliable
information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an
undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo
in the early morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00
a.m., he and PO2 Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit
went to the Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw
two men talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and
PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend him.
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement.
He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the
maroon bag. The man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y
Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag and saw a transparent
plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, which they suspected to be
shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet ZM-1 in the
presence of the police officers.
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan,
the 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m.,
he was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a
letter from his mother. He went there early because he had to report for work at the
Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag
asked him about a house number which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk
to the man, who placed his bag down and asked him again. When they turned
around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that

they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man
ran away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because
he was not aware of what was inside the bag.
Appellant further narrated that the police arrested him and asked who the owner of
the bag was. He replied that it did not belong to him but to the man who ran away.
They made him board a bus-type vehicle and brought him to the police station in
Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was referred to a desk sergeant. The desk sergeant
asked him whether the bag was recovered from him, and he replied that he had no
knowledge about that bag. He was not assisted by counsel during the investigation.
He was also incarcerated in a small cell for about ten days before he was brought to
Manila City Jail. At the Office of the City Prosecutor, he met his lawyer for the first
time.
RTCs Decision:
Zafra Maraorao was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of illegal
drugs.
CAs Decision:
The appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. RTC decision AFFIRMED.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecutions evidence was able to satisfy the presumption of guilt
on the accused Maraorao for the illegal possession of shabu
HELD:
No. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. In
this case, the prosecutions evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may
not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until
proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with
moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of
innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.

The SC ruled to reverse and set aside CAs and appellant Zafra Maraorao y
Macabalang is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

People of the Philippines vs Antonio Baraoil (G.R. No. 194608

9, 2012 REYES, J.:)

July

FACTS:
Antonio Baraoil was charged for the crime of rape allegedly committed on August 8,
2004, inside the comfort room adjacent to the Apo Rice Mill at Brgy. San Maximo of
Natividad, Province of Pangasinan, raped his neighbors 5-year old daughter (AAA).
For the defense, the accused-appellant denied the charges and proffered an alibi by
stating that he was with his friend Renato at the fish pond at the time when the
alleged rape took place. He claimed that they were fishing from 7:30 to 10:00 in the
morning. They also drank gin at around 3:00 p.m. and went home at 4:00 p.m. He,
moreover, claimed that AAA was nice to him before the alleged rape. However,
AAA's family got mad at him after he disconnected their jumper connection from the
power source. They even threatened that they will hack him to death. Thus, the
accusation of AAA's family was a means of revenge.
RTCs Decision:
Accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape.
CAs Decision :
The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellant after finding that the
testimony of AAA was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.
ISSUE:
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the accused-appellants guilt has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt vis-a-vis his main defense that the rape
charges were merely concocted to get back at him as leverage against his act of
disconnecting the jumper owned by AAA's family.
HELD:
Yes. This Court sustains accused-appellants conviction.
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the
contrary is proven. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural
rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty
of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of

proof has been met is largely left to the trial courts to determine. However, an
appeal throws the whole case open for review such that the Court may, and
generally does, look into the entire records if only to ensure that no fact of weight or
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. 9
Courts use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in
which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime,
conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainants testimony provided it
is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.
After a meticulous review of the records of the instant case, the Court holds that the
totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution proved the guilt of the accusedappellant beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses' testimony. Findings of trial court relative to
the credibility of the rape victim are normally respected and not disturbed on
appeal, more so, if affirmed by the appellate court. This rule may be brushed aside
in exceptional circumstances, such as when the courts evaluation was reached
arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the
case. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial
court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts - and when
his findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.
The accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an
inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To
merit approbation, the accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed. Since alibi is a weak defense for being
easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive
identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED .
People of the Philippines vs Meriam K. Guru

(G.R. No. 189808 October 24, 2012 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:)

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Meriam Guru y Kazan was charged for selling to a poseur-buyer
0.012 gram of shabu on September 24, 2004. She denied the charges filed against
her. Bhoy Tagadaya, who was fetching his brother-in-law in the vicinity where
accused-appellant was arrested, testified that at around 3:00 p.m. on September
24, 2004, he saw six men in civilian clothes alight from a Ford Fiera. Two men went
inside the house in front of that of his brother-in-law. Fifteen minutes later, the two
men came out of the house with the accused-appellant, who was crying and
shouting, and left. Someone had asked his brother-in-law about the incident.
Tagadayas brother-in-law told that person that it was Tagadaya who saw the
incident.
RTCs Decision:
Meriam Guru y Kazan was found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, she is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
CAs Decision:
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
illegal possession of drugs
HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the physical inventory of the subject specimens was made
only at the police station and by an unnamed investigator. This, in itself, evokes to a
reasonable mind several questions on the safekeeping of the specimens from the
time accused-appellant was arrested, up to the time she and the buy-bust team
arrived at the police station. The identity of the person who marked the specimens
and his or her competence to distinguish between the item sold by accusedappellant and the item recovered from her are likewise relevant points of inquiry.
Finally, the conflicting evidence as regards the persons who had custody of the
specimens after the marking casts serious doubts as to whether the identity and
integrity of said items had truly been preserved. We find that these are all
substantial gaps in the chain of custody which inevitably creates a rational
uncertainty in the appreciation of the existence of the corpus delicti. The SC ruled to
acquit accused-appellant in both Criminal Case No. 04-230545 and Criminal Case
No. 04-230546 on account of reasonable doubt.