DISEC

Draft Resolution 1A
Topic: State Disarmament
Sponsors: Austria, China, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Palestine, Poland, Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States
Signatories: Canada, Denmark, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Switzerland
The General Assembly,
Noting the necessity of eventual global disarmament,
Expressing concern with the rapid proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological,
weapons,
Noting the need for a clean coherent disarmament policy for the United Nations,
Recognizing the need for a clean coherent disarmament policy for the United Nations,
Guided by the principles of a the United Nations charter and the principle of state sovereignty
expressed therein,
Noting the need for United Nations support of post-conflict nations
Acknowledging the existence of non-compliant states to the International Disarmament regime and the
threat they present to international security,
Strongly affirming UN resolution 1540 and its framework for strengthening the role of the UNSC in
creating measures to criminalize the proliferation of non-conventional CBRN weapons and ballistic
missiles, enforce strict export controls, secure materials related to development of these weapons, and
to prevent non-state actors for gaining access to non-conventional weapons,
Emphasizing the rule of the IAEA to protect against nuclear terrorism through measures aimed at
enhancing the safety and security of radioactive sources and strengthening the convention of Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material,
Guided by the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon s through the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, which guarantees compliance with the nonproliferation obligation, prevents the abuse of
the peaceful use of nuclear energy for military purposes, and promotes nuclear disarmament in line
with the 2000 NPT Conference,
Acknowledging that military force shall be used only when all other options are exhausted and when a
lack of military force would cause a far greater loss of life,
1. Determines that a sate will be considered to be of concern to the UN for the purpose of this
resolution if:
1. It is thought by the Security Council to be in violation of an International disarmament
treaty such as but not limited to the NPT, CCW, CWC, BWC, ABM, MBT or CTBT to
which it is a party, or a security council resolution on disarmament
2. It is thought by the Security Council to to possess nuclear, biological, chemical, or

radiological weapons and to be an imminent threat to international peace and security

3. The Security Council suspects that it is trafficking weapons to states or non-state actors in
violation of international agreements of SC resolutions;
2. Suggests that the member states encourage countries, not states of concern, but who are not
currently party to the CWC, BWC, NPT, CCW to ratify those treaties through mechanisms
provided for their governmental action
3. Recommends the inclusion of the May NPT Talks of non-signatory nations and attempt to
involve them as important parties
4. Encourages regional and multilateral talks in an effort to disarm all new possessors of WMD of
their WMDS
5. Decides that a state of concern will be co considered to have complied with UN guidelines if it:
1. Commits itself to disarmament and to obedience to all relevant disarmament treaties and
Security Council resolutions,
2. Allows the United Nations of its Representative agencies by any means necessary to verify
this commitment, including unfettered access to any sites thought to have weapons such as,
but not limited to, depots, research facilities, or border sites
3. Fulfills some other criterion instead of those described above, as required by the Security
Council;
6. Recognizes the ability of an international panel of experts to come before the Security Council
in an advisory role to determine the status of states as states of concern;
7. Further recognizes the ability of the GA or any member state to put items on the agenda of the
Security Council;
8. Calls upon member states party to the BWC to create and Organization for the Prevention of
Biological Weapons corresponding the OPCW
9. Recommends that compliance be determined by inspectors appropriate to the treaties or
resolutions being violated, such as inspectors from the IAEA, OPCW regional disarmament
centers, or inspects from a specific mission created by the Security Council in reports every six
months, or more frequently if the Security Council deems necessary;
10. Recommends that if a state is found to be non-compliant, the Security Council will use
information provided by states, inspectors, and other experts as to determine whether the state
shall be classified as:
1. immediate threat countries that are non-compliant and pose a tangible, immediate threat to
international peace and security
2. imminent threat countries that are non-compliant and may soon pose a threat to
international peace and security
3. potential threat countries that are non-compliant, yet do not pose an immediate threat to
international peace and security
11. Encourages in the case of an immediate threat the International Community take the following
course of actions:
1. strongly condemn the actions of the nation,
2. engage in multi-lateral talks with emphasis on regional organizations,
3. impose economic sanctions in addition to talk,
4. impose diplomatic sanctions, such as expulsion of diplomats and refusal of diplomatic visas,
5. consider military options after exhaustion of the above
12. Recommends after 4 months the Security council reviews the efficacy of its actions and
determines the next plan of action
13. Encourages in the case of an imminent threat:
1. The UN shall sponsor emergency multilateral talks between the state(s) of concern and any
interested states with which the state(s) of concern are willing to initiate such means as:
1. security guarantees
2. economic and technological incentives provided by the states present

3. political incentives for future talks

4. humanitarian aid
5. other confidence building measures
6. any other useful means
2. if the above talks fail, the Security Council should institute sanctions on the member states'
arms traders and import and export controls on sensitive technology with the state(s) of
concern and it should discuss the arms embargo every 6 months until the SC declares the
arms embargo and import/export controls ineffective
3. If the Security Council decides the arms sanction regime described above is ineffective,
institute a regime of economic sanctions on the state of concern, targeting all goods, though
ensuring humanitarian goods and basic necessities continue to reach the state through NGOs
4. The security Council should condemn the state for taking actions in violation of
International Law and Security
5. The employment of force if all else fails, and said state becomes and immediate threat
14. Recommends in the case of long-term threats the following course of action:
1. A series of regional talks that are re-evaluated every 6 months by the Security Council to
determine efficacy,
2. A series of multilateral talks including all interested states to be initiated when the Security
Council deems necessary,
3. Political condemnation of all states taking non-compliant actions
4. Examination of political pressure and sanctions
5. The employment of force if all else fails, and said state becomes an immediate threat
15. Suggests that the UN, in cases in which military action is authorized by the Security Council as
described above, should perform the following actions:
1. Deploy a multinational force (MNF) comprised of contingencies of willing and able nations
assembled to disarm the state(s) of concern, under the auspices of the Security Council
2. Primary method of the MNF is to eliminate key sites and objectives in question by way of
Close Air Support (CAS) or other targeted precision strike methods
3. special attention should be given to ensure that collateral damage and civilian casualties are
minimize and any collateral damage incurred will be resolved through the use of
multinational civil affairs units
4. To legitimize the MNF as a non-invading, non-conquering force after the disarmament of
the sits and objectives in question, the MNF shall be withdrawn from the field when the
Security Council deems it appropriate after the operation, a small stabilizing MNF may
remain at the discretion of the Security Council
5. Following the completion of military action, the UN shall sponsor reconstruction efforts in
the state(s) of concern, and shall simultaneously lift any political and economic sanctions
remaining on the country UN agencies including UNICEF, UNDP, and NGOs such as the
Red Cross and OxFam shall be encouraged to rebuild any damaged infrastructure, and
provide any needed humanitarian aid,
6. In the case that political stability of the state(s) of concern has weakened as a result of
military intervention, the UN - at the discretion of the Security council, shall provide any
aid necessary to restore a functioning and stable government to the state, in line with the
principles embodied in the UN Charter
16. Support the utilization of regional organizations (i.e. ASEAN, AU, LAS, OAS, EU, etc.) to
work in conjunction with the UN, IAEA and other relevant organs, to address the following
issues, with specific emphasis on their regional implications:
1. definitions regarding disarmaments such as:
1. rogue state
2. non-compliance
3. specific weapon terminology

2. economic incentives regarding state disarmament,

3. security incentives regarding state disarmament,
4. nuclear arsenals,
5. nuclear-weapons-free zones,
6. biological weapons,
7. conventional weapons,
8. adherence to the relevant UN disarmament conventions and resolutions,
9. the maintenance of open regional dialog forms,
10. relations with the other regional organizations' disarmament initiatives,
11. any other matters deemed pertinent by the respective regional organization,
12. creation of regional disarmament centers composed of experts on disarmament that would
share information, provide consultation, and monitor progress on disarmament in the
regions;
17. Urges United Nations agencies such as UNESCO to promote the values of disarmament in
volatile regions of the world through education programs
18. Reasserts th existing policy that member states that do not comply with the UN Security
Council sanctions face consequences that may include sanctions.