Crimes Against Property

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST
PROPERTY
Manahan vs People
Phil., 89, 90.).
ALFONSO MANAHAN, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The penalty provided in Article 294, No. 5, of the Revised Penal

Code is prisin correccional to prision mayor in its medium
period. The minimum, therefore, of the indeterminate penalty to be
imposed should be within arresto mayor.
People vs Repuela
FACTS:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1987, at Sityo (sic)
Lumingoy, Dulong Amihan, Barangay Cagbalete I, Municipality of
Mauban, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to rob, armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of the spouses Sotero Banagan and
Norma Perez Banagan by destroying and passing thru the
backdoor, and once inside, take, steal and carry away from spouses
Sotero Banagan and Norma Perez-Banagan, cash money and some
high valued belongings; and that by reason of and on the occasion
of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there attack, assault and beat the head with the handle of said knife
said Sotero Banagan, inflicting upon him fatal wounds on his head
which directly caused his death; and likewise with intent to kill
beat the head of Norma Perez-Banagan, inflicting wounds thereto,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the accused, that is by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said Norma Perez Banagan which
prevented her death. That the accused is an recidivist.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is robbery with homicide
HELD:
No.
It has been held that in robbery with homicide, the robbery itself
must be proven, otherwise, the accused may be convicted only for
the killing, homicide or murder as the case may be. 13 In this case
the fact of robbery has been established by presumption while the
homicide was shown by the corpus delicti.
The court has held, 17 however, that there exists no offense as
robbery with frustrated homicide because "homicide," as the term
is used by Article 294, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, is
meant in its generic sense, that is, any act that results in death. Any
other act producing a result short of death is embraced by
"homicide," 18 assuming that death occurs at the same time. If no
death supervenes, the accused should be held liable for robbery
and frustrated or attempted homicide or murder (provided there
was intent to kill), 19 and not the complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
G.R. No. 47899 | 1942-09-30

DECISION
TINA MORAN, J:
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, in the night of
January 28, 1937, armed with a revolver and with five
companions, by means of threat and intimidation against Catalino
Padayao, one of the servants of Meliton Carlos, took from the
latter's camarin about fifteen sacks of palay through an opening
made on the floor of said camarin. In the following night,
petitioner and his companions, by the same means employed
against Catalino Padayao and Felicidad Cabungcal, the latter also a
servant of Meliton Carlos, again took six sacks of palay through
the same opening.
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals declared the petitioner
guilty of robbery under Article 294, No. 5, of the Revised Penal
Code, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 months and 1
day of prision correccional to 6 years, 10 months and 1 day of
prision mayor with the accessory penalties provided by law, and
proportionate part of the costs. Indemnity is reserved to a separate
civil action due to the uncertainty of evidence in that regard.
Disregarding questions of fact, petitioner maintains that, as the
property stolen consists of cereals, the lighter penalty provided in
Article 303 of the Revised Penal Code should have been applied. It
is to be noted, however, that this provision refers to robbery
committed through the use of force upon things, and the robbery
charged here is one with violence against or intimidation of
persons. It is true that the opening of a hole on the floor of the
camarin implies force upon things; but, as we have once held,
when the robbery committed with force upon things is also
accompanied with violence against or intimidation of persons, "the
latter element supplies the controlling qualification" since, with
that circumstance, "there is greater disturbance to the order of
society and the security of the individual". (U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40
With the only modification that the minimum of the indeterminate

penalty imposed upon the petitioner be 6 months of arresto mayor,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in all other
respects, with costs against petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, JJ., concur.
Amado Izon vs Poeple
FACTS:
That on or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, actiot The above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another and by means of violence and intimidation applied upon
the person of Reynaldo Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy
Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y Batero who were armed with
bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio and
used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who
helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon said Reynaldo
Togorio the following physical injuries , who tried to steal the
Tricycle . The Accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced in to the
Penalty provided in R.A. 6539 the anti Carnapping act. Which
defines motor vehicles as : "Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled
by any power other than muscular power using the public
highways, but excepting road rollers, trolleys cars, street sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian
trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which
run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction
engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes.
Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended
to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified
as separate motor vehicle with no power rating."
The Accused,Contending that the court a quo erred in imposing the
penalty prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of
that prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with
violence, because the information did not allege that the motorized
tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as to make it a
motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and
therefore failed to inform them that they were being charged under
the cited statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them,
petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for review.
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They maintain that tricycle is not included in the Motor Vehicle

category
ISSUE:
whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the
definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
HELD:
From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners
admit as authoritative, highways are always public, free for the use
of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license
to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle"
within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle
uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes
within the protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is
not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is
used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to
which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still
unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just been bought
from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the
penal sanction of the anti-carnapping statute, but only as simple
robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code.
This obviously, could not have been the intention of the anticarnapping law.
Ernesto Pil-Ey vs People
FACTS:
On April 16, 1994, private complainant Rita Khayad
of Bontoc, Mt. Province discovered that her 3-yearold white and black-spotted cow,[5] which was
grazing at Sitio Taed with her 4 other bovines, was
missing.[6] She and her children searched for it but
to no avail. She was later informed by her grandson,
Ronnie Faluyan, that in the afternoon of April 15,
1994, while the latter was with his friends at the 156
Store at the back of the market, he saw a cow
similar to that of his grandmother's[7] loaded in a
blue Ford Fiera driven along the national highway by
accused Manochon.[8] With Manochon in the Fiera
was his helper, petitioner Pil-ey.[9] Manochon was a
butcher and meat vendor.[10]
After having ascertained from people in the market
that the cow was already slaughtered,[11] Rita
reported the matter to the police.[12] Tagged as the
primary suspects were petitioner Pil-ey, his coaccused, Manochon and Anamot. The 3 accused were
invited by the authorities to the Bontoc Municipal

Police Station for questioning.[13] On April 17, 1994,
Rita, Annie and Ronnie went to the station to file
their respective affidavits.[14] During the
confrontation between the parties, petitioner Pil-ey
admitted that they were the ones who took the cow.
Since they were relatives, Pil-ey asked for a
settlement of the case.[15] Rita, however, rebuffed
the request.[16] On separate occasions, Anamot and
Manochon went to the house of Rita,[17] to offer a
compromise, but again, Rita refused.
For his part, Anamot denied having conspired with
his co-accused in taking the subject cow.[33] He
testified that in 1993, he and Rita co-owned a white
female cow, which was hacked and sold for
butchering to Manochon.[34] On April 12, 1994, he
went to see Manochon at his house in order to collect
his share of the payment.[35] He further claimed
that, aside from the cow he co-owned with Rita, he
had three other cows grazing near the road going to
Guina-ang but he had nothing at Sitio Taed;[36]
hence, he denied seeing and talking to Manochon
and Pil-ey on April 15, 1994 and instructing them to
get a cow at Sitio Taed. He stated that after the
meeting on April 12, 1994, he saw his co-accused
again when they were already behind bars.[37] He
further alleged that he went to Rita's place not to ask
for a settlement but only to ask from the latter why
he was included in her complain. The RTC held that
the accused were guilty so as the CA's Decision.
Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of P.D. No.
533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
HELD:
As defined in the law :
Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any means,
method or scheme, without the consent of the owner
or raiser, of any cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass or
other domesticated member of the bovine family,
whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things; and
it includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its
meat or hide without the consent of the owner or

raiser.
Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the

concurrence of the following elements: (1) large
cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the
taking is done without the consent of the owner or
raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means, method
or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without
intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished
with or without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.[50] Considering that
the gravamen of the crime is the taking or killing of
large cattle or taking its meat or hide without the
consent of the owner or raiser,[51] conviction for the
same need only be supported by the fact of taking
without the cattle owner's consent.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Rita Khayad's white and blackspotted cow was taken from Sitio Taed where it was
grazing; that its taking was without Rita's consent;
and that the said cattle was later seen in the
possession of the petitioner and his co-accused.
Thus, the foregoing elements of the crime of cattlerustling are present.
Its takers have not offered a satisfactory explanation
for their possession of the missing bovine. It is the
rule that when stolen property is found in the
possession of one, not the owner, and without a
satisfactory explanation of his possession, he is
presumed to be the thief. This is in consonance with
the disputable presumption that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act.[53]
Indeed, petitioner's defense of mistake of fact, i.e.,
he and his employer Manochon were of the
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erroneous belief that the cow was owned or raised by

Anamot, is unacceptable. This defense crumbles in
the light of Anamot's testimony that his purpose in
going to Manochon's house on April 12, 1994 was to
exact payment of a white female cow sold for
butchering in 1993, and not to sell the white and
black-spotted cow subject of this case. He further
stated that he did not have cows grazing at Sitio
Taed.
Petitioner's admission in the course of the trial that
he and his co-accused took the cow is buttressed by
the testimony of prosecution witness Ronnie Faluyan
that he saw Manochon and Pil-ey with the subject
cow in a blue Ford Fiera. This judicial admission,
which binds the declarant and which does not need
any further presentation of evidence,[54] reinforces
petitioner's
conviction.
Thus, petitioner's argument that his alleged offer of
settlement during the informal confrontation at the
police station is inadmissible in evidence because it
was made without the presence of counsel, is no
longer material. After all, the crime of cattle-rustling
and the fact that petitioners and his co-accused are
the perpetrators thereof had been established by
ample evidence other than the alleged inadmissible
extrajudicial confession. The same holds true even if
we do not apply the presumption of guilt under
Section
7[55]
of
P.D.
No.
533.
All told, we hold that the evidence on record
sufficiently prove the unanimous findings of the RTC
and the CA that the petitioner and his co-accused are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
provisions of P.D. No. 533. There is no cogent reason
to
reverse
the
said
rulings.
Be that as it may, we, however, find that the penalty
imposed by the trial court is erroneous. While it
correctly imposed reclusion temporal in its minimum
period as the maximum penalty, it erred in imposing

prision mayor in its maximum period as the
minimum penalty. As in Canta v. People,[56] the RTC
in this case considered P.D. No. 533 as a special law
and applied the latter portion of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.[57] However, as we
have declared in Canta, the computation of the
penalty should be in accordance with our discussion
in People v. Macatanda,[58] which we quote herein
for emphasis, thus:
We do not agree with the Solicitor General
that P.D. No. 533 is a special law, entirely
distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty
imposed which is in terms of the classification
and duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties
as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the
intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised
Penal Code, with respect to the offense of
theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise
to be subject to applicable provisions thereof
such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code
on civil liability of the offender, a provision
which is not found in the decree, but which
could not have been intended to be discarded
or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the
same Code should, likewise, be applicable x x
x.[59]
Hence, in the instant case, considering that neither
aggravating[60]
nor
mitigating
circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, the penalty to
be imposed should be within the range of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion
temporalin its minimum period, as maximum. We,
thus, modify the minimum penalty imposed by the
trial court to be four (4) years, two (2) months and

one
(1)
day
of
prision
correccional.
Furthermore, we note that the separate appeals
interposed by Manochon and Anamot were denied by
this Court on November 11 and December 16, 2002,
respectively. As their convictions were affirmed
earlier, they were already made to suffer the
erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court.
Nevertheless, they shall benefit from the favorable
modification of the minimum penalty made herein.
Section 11, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that "an appeal taken by
one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter."[61]
People vs. Barruga
G.R. No. L-42744, March 27, 1935
Robbery with Homicide
FACTS: The accused Benjamin Barruga, armed with a bolo,

entered through the window of a house inhabited by Bon Uan Yap,
a copra and abaca dealer with a shop in the basement of said house.
Barruga allegedlytook with him money contained in a wooden box

amounting to P400 which are believed to be earnings from Bon
Uan Yaps shop. Bon Uan Yap, his son Antonio and
nephewFidenciowere all assaulted in their sleep by the accused
with his bolo and caused them to sustain several mortal wounds in
different parts of the body, and as a result of which, the victims
died instantaneously.
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During investigation at the crime scene, however, it was found that

the drawer of the shelf where Bon Uan Yap keeps his money which
was usually closed and locked was apparently bloodstained. It was
opened but it turned out that that it did not contain any money, but
only with vouchers and cigarettes. The iron safe in the shop was
bloodstained but was still locked.
As to the nature of the crime committed, the lower court found that
the commission of the robbery was not satisfactorily proved,
because Bon Uan Yap, before retiring, might have taken the money
from the drawer and put it in the iron safe which he had in the
store; that it was not proved that this safe was opened and that the
money in question was not found therein. Nevertheless considering
a conviction of the complex crime of robbery with homicide more
favorable to the accused than a conviction for three crimes of
murder, the trial judge found the defendant guilty as charged, and
taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of
alevosia, nocturnity, and morada sentenced him to suffer the death
penalty, to indemnify the heirs of the three deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The accused then appealed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of robbery with

homicide
HELD: No. The finding of the trial judge that the robbery was not
satisfactorily proved is in accordance with the evidence, because
the prosecution failed to show that the money in question was in

the drawer when Bon Uan Yap and the two boys were killed, that
is, that Bon Uan Yap had not transferred it to the iron safe before
retiring for the night. If there was no money left in the drawer that
could be taken, the crime of robbery could not be committed, and
the purpose for which Bon UanYap and the two children were slain
was defeated.
The court cannot assent to the conviction of the defendant for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide, when the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the charge of robbery, because such a
conviction might appear to be more favorable to him than
conviction for three crimes of murder.
Where, in a trial for the complex offense of robbery with double

homicide, the proof fails to support the charge of robbery, the
penalties appropriate to each of the homicides should be imposed,
to be successively served in conformity with article 87 of the Penal
Code, in relation with No. 2 of article 88 of the same Code. It has
likewise been decided by the court that if a person is charged with
the complex crime of robbery with homicide, and the evidence is
not sufficient to prove the robbery, and accused should be
convicted of each homicide alleged and proved, although the
number of persons that may have been killed is immaterial in the
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The court therefore, found the appellant not guilty of the complex
crime of robbery with homicide, as found by the lower court, but
of three crimes of murder, since the facts alleged and proved
constitute three separate crimes, that is, the killing of three persons
by different acts, and it was alleged and proved beyond any
reasonable doubt that the appellant slew the three persons
treacherously while they lay asleep; and since it was proved that
the deceased were murdered in their own dwelling, and the
appellant gained access thereto by climbing through a window, and
these two aggravating circumstances are not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the appellant must be, and he hereby is,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death for each of the three
crimes, although the sentence cannot be executed more than once,
and to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased persons in the
sum of P1,000.
RATIO: In a trial for the complex offense of robbery with double

homicide, the proof fails to support the charge of robbery, the
penalties appropriate to each of the homicides should be
imposed.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
JUAN MANUEL, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
January 12, 1923 G.R. No. 19343
FACTS: On the night of April 14, 1919, an aged couple, consisting
residents of the barrio of San Antonio, in the municipality of San
Manuel, Pangasinan, were foully murdered and robbed in their
home by a band of eight miscreants, consisting of the five
appellants and three others, namely, Victoriano Gamboa, Saturnino
Aguilar, and Teodoro Estioco, the last three having been used as
witnesses for the prosecution.
The first truthful clue leading to the apprehension of the actual
malefactors came from one Victoriano Gamboa while in Bilibid
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Prison under sentence of death for participation in a similar crime

of robbery and murder.
Upon arriving at the house, which was low, the aged inmates were
found asleep. Juan Manuel (2.) was the first to enter, followed by
others of the party. The old man (Valentin Pasamonte) was found
on the floor in front of the steps leading up into the house; and him
Juan Manuel (2.) struck at once on the head with a bolo,
producing immediate death. Maria de la Cruz, the aged wife, was
sleeping in a little room separated somewhat from the sala where
Valentin was slain, and she was soon awakened by the noise that
had been made at the door. Becoming frightened, she began to
scream, and just at the moment when she was attempting to get up,
Ildefonso Giron seized her in the breast with one hand and cut her
throat with a stroke of the bolo, almost severing the head from the
body.
After the two inmates of the house had been thus dispatched, the
party proceeded to search the interior of the house; and Pedro
Martos and Graciano (Marcelino) Saori carried out a trunk in
which valuables were kept. Placing the trunk upon the ground,
Ildefonso Giron forced the lock, and in the trunk was found a small
box from which was taken the sum of P240 in paper money. The
money thus obtained was distributed among the men of the party,
but apparently in very unequal proportions, as Victoriano Gamboa
received only P6; Saturnino Aguilar, P25; and Teodoro Estioco,
P10.
ISSUE: whether or not criminal acts should be viewed as
constitutive of two offenses and not as a single complex offense
HELD: Yes. Upon this proposition our first observation is that
although the authors of the Code have used only the word
"homicide" in subsection 1 of article 503 and not "homicide or
murder," it is evident that the word "homicide" is there used in a
generic sense; and the complex crime therein contemplated
comprehends not only robbery with homicide, in its restricted
sense, but also robbery with murder. In other words, an offense is
not taken out of the purview of that article merely because the
homicide rises to the atrocity of murder.

It is the intention of the actor which supplies the connection
between the homicide and the robbery necessary to constitute the
complex offense; and if that intention comprehends the robbery, it
is immaterial that the homicide may immediately precede instead
of follow the robbery in point of time.
The proper qualification of the offense which is the subject of
prosecution in this case is that of the complex crime of robbery
with homicide, with aggravating circumstances.
G.R. No. L-27909 December 5, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ARCADIO PUESCA alias "Big Boy", WALTER,
APA, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias "White",
MAGNO MONTANO alias "Edol", JOSE GUSTILO
alias "Peping" and RICARDO
DAIRO alias 'Carding" defendants-appellants.
FACTS: The robbery and killing in the house of
Candido Macias were reported that same night,
November 27, 1960, by Francisco Macias to Antonio
Viran, Chief of Police of Hagonoy, Davao.
Accompanied by police officers, Chief Viran went to
the house of Candido Macias in Barrio Sinayawan and
found Candido Macias dead. The furniture in the
house were in topsyturvy condition. The officer
interviewed persons in the house and the latter
assured him that they could recognize the culprits.
The get-away jeep was recovered near a bridge on
the road to Davao City. The following morning, Chief
Viran returned to the house of Candido Macias,
accompanied by Mayor Llanos of Digos, Zosimo
Melendez, Chief of Police of Digos, Sgt. Bano and Lt.
Javier of the Digos Police Force. Chief Viran found
P17.00 in one-peso bills, while Chief Melendez found
empty shells in the sleeping room of Candido Macias,
and a bullet slug on the floor of the sala. They also
saw downstairs a jeep with flat tires and a
"Petromax" lamp destroyed by bullets.
ISSUE: WON the case is Robbery with Homicide
HELD: Yes. The killing of Candido Macias was committed "by

reason or on occasion of the robbery". 9 The original design of the
perpetrators of the offense comprehended robbery in the dwelling
of the victim. There is robbery with homicide if the homicide
resulted by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, in
Mangulabnan, 10 this Court stated that in order to determine the
existence of the crime of robbery with homicide, the rule is that it
is enough that a homicide resulted by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, and it is immaterial that the death supervened by mere
accident. It is sufficient that the homicide was produced by reason
or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime, that has to be taken into consideration.
There is homicide by reason of the robbery when there is a direct
relation, an intimate connection, between the robbery and the
killing, whether the killing be prior or subsequent to the robbery or
whether both crimes be committed.
In the case at bar, the crime committed is robbery with homicide.
Considering that the crime was committed by six armed men, the
circumstance of "band" should be considered merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance. It is also obvious that the perpetrators of
the offense waited for the night before committing the robbery to
better accomplish their purpose. The trial court, therefore, correctly
found the existence of "band" and "nocturnity". These two
aggravating circumstances, when occurring jointly in the
commission of a crime, are generally treated only as one
aggravating circumstance. Nevertheless, they may be considered
separately when their elements are distinctly perceived and can
subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity.
PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA

G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.
FELIX, J. (EN BANC)
FACTS:
At 11p.m. November 5, 1953, the reports of gunfire awakened the
spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor
children and Ciprianas mother, Monica del Mundo, in their
house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
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Someone broke into the kitchen wall at the back of the house and
then broke into the living room. Intruder with a hunting knife
was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan.
Agustin then opened the balcony door to allow entry of 2
unidentified persons.
Agustin snatched from Cipriana Tadeo: necklace (P50) and P50
(bills) and P20 (silver coins).
Two others took from Monica del Mundo: P200 in cash and in gold
necklace (P200). They demanded a diamond ring from her but
she did not give so he struck her twice on the face with the butt
of his gun. Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her
right arm when one of the men tried to strike one of the kids.
Then, one fired his gun at the ceiling. Finally, all left.
Cipriano found her husband dead lying on the floor upstairs.
conspiracy.
It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by
one of the 2 unidentified persons who climbed up a table and fired
at the ceiling, was an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of
the amount and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson was
hiding therein, and that the English version of Article 294, No. 1,
of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special, single and
indivisible crime of robbery with homicide only punished any
persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, but this English version of
the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text. In
order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason of on
the occasion of the robbery.
The commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength
and with the aid of armed men.
Autopsy: 4 gunshot wounds (front of the head-cause of death, left

arm, left forearm, right clavicle)
CFI: guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400;
Cipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; P6,000 to the heirs of Vicente
Pacson, and to pay the costs. Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was
acquitted while the information as against the other Defendants
who continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of evidence,
with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.
Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for lack of
merit. The lower court did neither err in rejecting Exhibit 1 for the
defense. This is an affidavit purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan
Fernando of the Philippine Constabulary. The latter part is hearsay
and, anyway, it is of no moment in the case at bar, because 2 of the
3 persons who entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were
unidentified.
Issue: WON the crime of robbery with homicide is the proper
crime
HELD: Yes. There is no denial that the crime of robbery with
homicide was committed by Appellants own admission (Exhibit A
and B) and the testimony of Cipriana Tadeo. No doubt in
appellants participation and the joint entry and exit showed
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People vsJaranilla, 55 SCRA 563

Facts:
The case is an appeal of the defendants Elias Jaranilla,
Ricardo Suyo, and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Ilo-ilo which convicted the accused
of robbery and with homicide, and sentenced each of them
to Reclusion Perpetua and ordered the accused to pay
solidarily the sum of six thousand pesos to the heirs of
RamonitoJabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to
ValentinBaylon as the value of five fighting cocks.
It should also be noted that the accsued, Elias Jaranilla, has
escaped from the provincial jail and no record shows that he
has been appreheanded.
Issue:
WON defendants Suyo and Brillantes are liable as co
principal in the crime of Homicide.
Held:
The killing of the peace officer is characterized as homicide
because the act was made during the spur of the moment
and the treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or
deliberately adopted by the offender. In addition, only
persons who perpetrated the killing is responsible for such
action. Furthermore, mere presence in the crime scene does
not necessarily make a person co-principal thereof.
Hence, only the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated
the killing is responsible and liable for robbery and homicide.
The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of theft.
Therefore, the decision of the lower court is reversed and
sentenced the accused, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes,
as co-principals in the crime of theft.
No promulgation as to the accused, Elias Jaranilla, that
being stated that the accused has escaped from the
provincial jail.
ANTI-PIRACY (PD 532)
PEOPLE vs. AGOMO-O (G.R. No. 131829)
Facts: On the evening of September 22, 1993, a passenger

jeepney driven was stopped by three men, among them was
the accused in this case, Ronnie Agomo-o, who, armed with
a gun, announced a hold-up and ordered the driver to turn
off the engine.
As a consequence of gunshots fired during the hold-up, the
driver of the jeep died while few of its passengers were
wounded.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of
highway robbery?
when the accused were there. There was, thus, randomness

in the selection of the victims, or the act of committing
robbery indiscriminately, which differentiates this case from
that of a simple robbery with homicide.
People vs. Puno

Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the
accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver

of Mrs. Sarmiento'shusband (who was then away
in Davao purportedly on account of local election
there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento'sbakeshop in
Araneta Ave, QC
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred
had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so

Isabelo will temporarilytake his place
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home
to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's

Mercedes BenzwithIsabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta
Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused

Enrique Amurao, boardedthe car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as
Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from

her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she
handed to the accused

But the accused said that they wanted P100,000
more
The car
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs.

Sarmiento to issue a check forP100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000
checks and one P40,000 check

Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro
Held: Highway robbery is now governed by P.D. No. 532,

otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974. This law provides:
Sec. 2. (e). Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of
any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes,
or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon
things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on
any Philippine highway.
In the case of People v. Puno, it was held that P.D. No. 532
amended Art. 306 of the Revised Penal Code and that it is
no longer required that there be at least four armed persons
forming a band of robbers. The number of offenders is no
longer an essential element of the crime of highway
robbery. Hence, the fact that there were only three identified
perpetrators is of no moment. P.D. No. 532 only requires
proof that persons were organized for the purpose of
committing highway robbery indiscriminately. "The robbery
must be directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective
victims." In this case, the accused, intending to commit
robbery, waited at the Barangay Mapili crossing for any
vehicle that would happen to travel along that road. The
driver RoditoLasap and his passengers were not
predetermined targets. Rather, they became the accused's
victims because they happened to be traveling at the time
sped
off north
towards
the
North
Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the

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car againtowards Pampanga

According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of
the car then, crossed to the other side of the

superhighway and wasable to flag down a fish
vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground
andwas injured when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative
of the complainant except that according to

Isabelo, he stopped thecar at North Diversion and
freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the
car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove
away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a

ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed
an incident in the commission of another offenseprimarily

intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention
Issue:
1.Whether or not the accused can be convicted of
kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as
"highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974)
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the

American occupation of our country, roving bands
wereorganized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with
suchmoving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts
of robbery
perpetrated
by
outlaws
indiscriminately
againstany person or persons on Philippine highways and
not acts of robbery committed against only apredetermined
or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car
which was casually operating on a highway doesnot make
PD No 532 applicable to the case
This is not justified by the accused's intentionAccusedappellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4
years and 2 months or prisioncorreccional, asminimum, to
10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moraldamages.)
Holding:
1.No.
2.No.
PEOPLE vs. ROMULO VERSOZA y GARCIA and JERRY

AVENDAO y MENDOZA
her toe while running across the highway
Ratio:
1.There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed
thewrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats
orintimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprivethe
offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely
FACTS:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1994, in
Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused; armed with a
gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
(sic) one another, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
passengers wristwatches with an unestimated amount while
abroad a passenger jeepney with Plate No. NYZ-655, along

NBB South, Navotas, Metro Manila and in the course
thereof said accused with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, shoot passenger ALBERTO APLAON, hitting the
latter on the back of his head, thereby inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wound cause (sic) his immediate death.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
This case was spawned by an incident that occurred
at around 9:00 in the morning of 21 April 1994. According to
eyewitness Arthur Dojenas, he left his house at Sawata,
Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City that morning to report for
work as headwaiter at the Savory Restaurant in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. He boarded a passenger jeepney
with plate no. NYZ-655, en route to Divisoria. At around
9:00 a.m., while the passenger jeepney was cruising along
the C-3 Road, North Bay Boulevard, Navotas, Metro Manila,
one of the passengers, who was later identified as Romulo
Versoza,
suddenly
cried
out:
Hold-up
ito. Walangpapalag.[3]
Versoza grabble the necklace of one of the
passengers who was later identified as Alberto
Aplaon. Aplaon immediately reacted and shouted, Anong
Hold-up? as he simultaneoulsy grabbed the firearm of
Versoza. When Aplaon successfully wrested the firearm
from Versoza, someone seated at the rear of the jeepney,
who was later identified as Jerry Avedao, pulled out a gun
and shot Aplaon, hitting his head just above the
nape. Aplaon fell to the floor of the jeepney. Before
alighting from the jeepney along North Bay Boulevard, one
of the three perpetrators snatched the wristwatch of a
passenger seated in front of the jeepney. Versoza,
Avendao and their unnamed associate ran towards the
squatters area in front of the Sulpicio Lines Compound
along North Bay Boulevard.
The
police
authorities
were
subsequently
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summoned. Dojenas alighted from the jeepney and waited

for the policeman to arrive. Meanwhile, the driver of the
jeepney rushed Aplaon to the Tondo General Hospital for
treatment. He was pronounced dead on arrival.
Minutes later, several policeman arrived at the crime
scene and conducted an investigation on the holdup
incident. Dojenas volunteered to accompany the policemen
to the squatters area to look for and identify the
perpetrators, but their search proved futile. Dojenas and the
policemen proceeded to the Tondo General Hospital where
they were informed that Aplaon had died. Dojenas went with
the policemen to the Navotas Police Station where he gave
his statement about the incident before SPO1 Daniel Ferrer,
the investigator on the duty at the Navotas Police Station.
[4]
SPO1 Ferrer requested the PNP Crime Laboratory
Services-National Capital Region Unit, to conduct an
autopsy on the body of Aplaon.[5]
Dr. FloranteBaltazar, Chief Inspector and MedicoLegal Officer, conducted the autopsy at around 1:00 in the
afternoon of the same day. His examination revealed that
victim Aplaon died of a single gunshot wound to the back of
his head.[6] He issued a medico-legal report[7] with the
following findings: (1) gunshot wound, right parietal as the
point of entry, 156.5 cm, from heel, 5 cms. From midsagittal
line, measuring 0.8 x 0,7 cm., with contusion collar,
measuring 0.9 x 0.8 cms., directed downwards, forwards
(sic), right to left, fracturing the right parietal, left orbital plate,
greater wing of the left sphenoid with a deformed slug
recovered embedded thereat, lacerating the left and right
cerebral hemisphere of the brain, (2) abrasion, right frontal
region, measuring 3 x 2 cms., 5 cms. from anterior midline,
and (3) hematoma, left infra-orbital region measuring 4.5 x 2
cms., 4 cms. from anterior midline.
Dr. Baltazar also recovered a .38 caliber slug from
Aplaons head. He opined that the relative distance between
the assailant and the victim was more than 24 inches and
that based on the downward trajectory of the bullet on the

forehead from right to left, the assailant was in a higher
position than, and was at the back of, the victim.[8]
At around 12:05 a.m. of 1 May 1994, SPO1 Ferrer was
along R-10 Road, SitioSto. Nio, North Bay Boulevard
conducting a follow-up investigation when Lito Francisco,
another victim in a separate robbery hold-up incident,
approached him. Francisco told him that he could identify
one of his assailants and accompanied SPO1 Ferrer to
nearby Barangay PutingBato where the alleged perpetrator
was attending the wake of his grandmother. Upon their
arrival, Francisco positively identified Versoza, a resident of
R-10 Road, No. 1350 SitioSto. Nio, BBB South, Navotas,
Manila, as the perpetrator of the holdup in which he was one
of the victims. Immediately, SPO1 Ferrer frisked
Versoza. He found and confiscated from Versoza a ruler
measuring 8-1/2 inches long with an improvised knife at its
end. SPO1 Ferrer apprehended Versoza and brought him to
the Navotas Police Station for further investigation.[9]
Thereafter, SPO1 Ferrer went to Dojenas house and
asked Dojenas to go to the Navotas Police Station to find out
if any of those detained there were the perpetrators of the 21
April 1994 robbery with homicide incident. A police line-up of
the detained persons, including Versoza, was formed and
Dojenasunhesitantly and positively identified Versoza as the
one who grabbed the necklace of Aplaon.[10]
Three days later, a follow-up police team apprehended
and detained Avendao. Once again, SPO1 Ferrer
contracted Dojenas and asked him to go to the police station
to identify any of the culprits among the detainees. Dojenas
positively identified Avendao as the person who shot
Aplaon.[11]
ISSUE: WON the appellants committed crime of
highway robbery.
HELD:
No. The identification of appellants as the persons who
robbed the passenger jeepney and gunned down Aplaon
after robbing him of his necklace is, therefore, beyond
peradventure of doubt. However, the trial court erred in
convicting them of the crime of highway robbery with
homicide under P.D. 532, the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974. What appellants committed is the
crime of robbery with homicide, which is distinct from the
offense covered by P.D. 532 which punishes, among others,
indiscriminate highway robbery.
Highway robbery/brigadage is defined in Section 2 (e)
of said decree as (t)he seizure of any person fro ransom,
extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway. As manifest in the preamble of said decree, its
objective is to deter and punish lawless elements who
commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility
of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress
of the people. Consonant with this expressed policy,
in People v. Puno,[29] the Court said:
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery,
the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at
least four armed participants. The martial law legislator, in
creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware
of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the
same, there being no indication to the contrary. This
conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous
construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and
the circumstance under which the decree to be construed
9|P a g e

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originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is

the best and strongest in the law.
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as
highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person
or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined
or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses
thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal
that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation
upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility
of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress
of the people;
countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle to

the economic, social, educational, and community progress
of the people, such that said isolated act would constitute
the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration
bordering on the ridiculous.
In other words, a conviction for highway robbery
requires proof that several accused were organized for the
purpose
of
committing
highway
robbery
indiscriminately. There is no such proof in this case. Neither
is there proof that appellants previously attempted to
commmit similar robberies to show the indiscriminate
perpetration thereof.[30]
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be

discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end view
of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the designation of the crime in the

information as highway robbery with homicide (Violation of
P.D. 532) does not preclude conviction of the appellants of
the crime of robbery with homicide. In the interpretation of an
information, what controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged. [31] The crime of robbery
with homicide is clearly alleged in the information
notwithstanding its erroneous caption. It is an offense
necessarily included in that with which they were charged.
Accordingly, appellants should be liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. Said crime is
committed when, on the occasion of the robbery, homicide
resulted.[32]Consequently, all those who took part in the
robbery are liable as principals therein although they did not
actually take part in the homicide.[33]
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery

against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, and which single act of depredation would
be capable of stunting the economic and social progress of
the people as to be considered among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,

robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. No mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended
the commission of the crime. Thus, in accordance with
Article 63 (2) providing that in the absence of neither
mitigating or aggravating circumstances in crimes in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied, and therefore
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute x xx

highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries;
the imposable penalty in this case is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision convicting appellants
Romulo Versoza and Jerry Avendao y Mendoza (Cherry
Abendao y Pagatpat) of the crime of highway robbery with
homicide is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants are found guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
U.S v. De Vera
FACTS:on the 20th of February, 1920, three Igorots
named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta,
of this city, trying to dispose of a bar of gold when an
Ilocano invited them to go to his house, stating that
there was a woman there who would buy the
precious metal. they accompanied the Ilocano to the
house indicated by him where they met a woman,
the accused herein, who apparently, was desirous of
buying the gold and requested them to hand it to her
so that she might take it to a silversmith and have it
examined, stating that she would return within a
short time to report the result. The IgorotPepe, who
was the owner of the bar of gold, thereupon handed
it to her, together with P200 in bank notes which her
requested to her to have changed into silver coins
were more desirable in the Mountain Province. The
woman then left the house at about 12 o'clock on
that day, asking the Igorots to wait there. But the
woman did not return. They waited in vain for hours
for her and at nightfall they agreed that one of them
should remain on watch while the other two went to
the Meisic police station to report the matter. The
police acted promptly and effectively. The policeman
Jose Gonzales, assigned to take charge of the case,
soon identified the woman who had taken away the
bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had
given him, and at a few minutes after 11 o'clock he
already was in a house on Calle Barcelona,
examining the accused as to the whereabout of the
bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots. As the
woman gave evasive answers, it became necessary
to ask for assistance from the office of the police,
and shortly thereafter, two other policemen, Mr.
Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the woman
10 | P a g e

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to the house at No. 541 CalleRegidor, followed by

Gonzales and the three Igorots. There the bar of gold
divided into three pieces was found wrapped in a
handkerchief and placed inside the water tank of a
water-closet. The accused requested one Mamerta de
la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in turn
handed to the policeman.
According to Exhibit B, which is a certificate issued
by the Bureau of Science, the bar of gold delivered to
the accused weighed 559.7 grammes and was worth
P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per gramme; whereas,
the three bars found by the police weighed only 416
grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short.
Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the accused, she
returned only P150.
Counsel for the accused contends, that as the
evidence does not establish the essential elements of
theft, the crime charged in the information, but those
of the crime of estafa, the judgment appealed from
should be reversed. Counsel for the prosecution
holds that the evidence adduced during the trial of
the case show that the accused is guilty of the crime
of estafa, and as she cannot be convicted for this
crime for the reason that the information upon which
she was arraigned was for the crime of theft, the
essential elements of which are different from those
of estafa, he recommends the remanding of the case
to the court of origin for proper proceeding in
accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON the crime of theft has been committed.
HELD: It is well to remember the essential elements
of the crime of theft, as expounded in the textbooks,
which are as follows: First, the taking of personal
property, second, that the property belongs to
another; third, that the taking away be done with
intent of gain; fourth, that the taking away be done
without consent of the owner; and fifth, that the
taking away be accomplished without violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things.
The commentators on the Spanish Penal Code, from
which ours was adopted, lay great stress on the first
element which is the taking away, that is, getting
possession, laying hold of the thing, so that, as Viada
says if, the things is not taken away, but received
and then appropriated or converted without the
consent of the owner, it may be any other crime, that
of estafa for instance, but in no way that of theft,
which consists in the taking away of the thing, that
is, in removing it from the place where it is kept by

the legal owner, without the latter's consent, of the
legitimate owner.
The American decisions an textbooks on "larceny," a
crime which has the same characteristics as those
oaf theft under our Penal Code, contain abundant
illustrations of the question raised in the present
case.
The intention of the owner to part with his property is
the gist and essence of the offense of theft (larceny),
and the vital point on which the crime hinges and is
to be determined.
A felonious taking necessary in the crime of larceny,
and generally speaking, a taking which is done with
the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the
property is not felonious. But is the owner parts with
the possession thereof for a particular purpose, and
the person who receives the possession avowedly for
that purpose has the fraudulent intention to make
use of it as the means of converting it to his own use,
and does so convert it, this is larceny, for in such
case, the fraud supplies the place of the trespass in
the taking, or, as otherwise stated, the subsequent
felonious conversion of the property by the alleged
thief will relate back and make the taking and
conversion larceny. And it has been said that the act
goes farther than the consent, and may be fairly said
to be against it. If money is given to a person to be
applied to a particular purpose, it is larceny for the
receiver to appropriate it to his own use which was
not the purpose contemplated by the owner.
Obtaining money under the false pretense that it is
to be bet on a horse race, and with the intent at the
time to convert it to the bailee's own use, the race
being a mere sham to aid this purpose, is larceny.
The rule has been applied also to cases in which a
person takes a piece of money from another to
change, and keeps it with the unlawful intent to
convert it and refuses to deliver the money given to
him or the change therefore, on demand; and the
fact that the taking was open and from the owner is
of no consequence, if the intent to steal existed. This
is so for the reason that the delivery of money to
another for the sole purpose of getting it changed is
a parting with the custody only and not the amount
does not relieve him from liability for the larceny of
the entire amount given him.
Where the parties are engaged in a cash sale the
whole transaction is incomplete until the payment is

completed; and the possession of the goods remains
in the seller and that of the money in the buyer, until
they are simultaneously exchanged. If, in such case,
the buyer gets control of the goods and makes off
with them without paying for them, he is guilty of
larceny. And conversely if the seller gets the money
and refuses to give up the goods, it is larceny. Thus,
where one surrenders up his watch with the
understanding that he is immediately to receive 50
dollars for it, the keeping of the watch without
payment of money is larceny. (chamberlain vs. State,
25 Tex, App., 398; 8 S. W., 474.) and where a
tradesman handed good to a customer to examine
and the latter ran away with them, he was held guilty
of larceny. (Rex vs. Chissers, T. Raym., 275.)
Similarly, where one unloaded onions which he
owned on the premises of a prospective buyer, who
thereupon refused to pay for the onions or to allow
the seller to remove them, it was held larceny, as the
owner never intended to part with the possession of
the onions until he received his money therefor.
(Reg. vs. Slowly, 12 Cox C. C., 269; 27 L. T. Rep., N.
S., 803). One, waiting in crowd to purchase a railway
ticket, requested another nearer the ticket office to
buy a ticket for her, handing him the money to pay
for it. He made off with money and was held guilty of
larceny. (Reg. vs Thompson, 9 Cox C. C., 244; 8 Jur.,
N. S., 1184, L. and C., 225; 32 L. J. M. C., 53; 7 L. T.
Rep., N. S., 432; 11 Wkly. Rep., 40: 25 Cyclopedia of
Law and Procedure, pp. 25 and 26.)
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and
so hold, that the crime proven in the cause to have
been committed by the appellant by appropriating
the gold bar delivered to her for examination, and by
converting to her own use, without the consent of the
owner, the bank notes which had been handed her to
be exchanged for silver coins, is that of theft, defined
and punished in article 518, paragraph 2, of the
Penal Code. And the appealed judgment being in
accordance with law, it must be, as is hereby,
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
US v ADIAO
88 Phil 754
Consummated Theft
Facts:
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the
lesser crime of frustrated theft.
11 | P a g e

PROPERTY
The defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector,

abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80 centavos
from the baggage of a Japanese named T Murakami;
and secreted the belt in his desk in the
Custom House, where it was found by other customs
employee.
Issue:W/N Tomas Adiao is guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft?
Held: SC is of the opinion that the crime can not
properly be classified as frustrated since
the offender had performed all of the acts of
execution necessary for the accomplishment of the
felony, thus, Adiao was found guilty of consummated
theft.
Valenzuela v. People
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft
FACTS:
May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon
were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a
security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking
area of the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing
an ID with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU) who
hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of Tide brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was
waiting. He then returned inside the supermarket and emerged 5
minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, he left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded
the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon
was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside
the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded
to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area and asked
Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a warning shot to
alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered
worth P12,090.
Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to
the SM security office before they were transferred to the Baler
Station II of the Philippine National Police but only Valenzuela and
Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.
They pleaded not guilty.
Calderons Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the
Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied
by his neighbor, LeoncioRosulada. As the queue for the ATM was

long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the
supermarket. While they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired
by Lago, so they went out to check what was transpiring and when
they did, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard
Valenzuelas Alibi: He is employed as a bundler of GMS
Marketing and assigned at the supermarket. He and his cousin, a
Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking beside
the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to
Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot causing
evryon to start running. Then they were apprehended by Lago.
RTC: guilty of consummated theft
CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should
only be frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he
was never placed in a position to freely dispose of
the articles stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.
HELD: YES.petition is DENIED
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated,
frustrated and attempted felonies.
o A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment are present.
o It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
o It is attempted when the offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime
if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the
offense, the crime is merely attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been
breached
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated
crimes
the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or
consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts
of execution have been performed by the offender
The determination of whether the felony was produced after
all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the
particular statutory definition of the felony.
actus non facitreum, nisi mens sit rea - ordinarily, evil intent
must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can
be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting

In crimes mala in se, mensrea has been defined before as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent and
essential for criminal liability.
Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to
supply what the mensrea of the crime is and overt acts that
constitute the crime
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative
act of execution by the actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive
circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things - descriptive
circumstances
Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom
House - consummated theft
o Dio: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and
found 3 boxes of army rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the empty sea van had actually
contained other merchandise as well - consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had
seized - frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able
to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced
the felony as a consequence
cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
The ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen,
even if it were only momentary.
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the
petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he
acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a
spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a
taxicab.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted (no unlawful taking)
or consummated (there is unlawful taking).
.
Puayikun vs people
FACTS: Raised as the only issue in this original petition for
certiorari and prohibition1 is the materiality, in an information for
Theft, of the identity of the owner of the stolen property; in other
words, whether or not an accurate identification of the owner of the
stolen property is essential to the validity of an information for
theft. On February 13, 1964, Pua Yi Kun was charged with the
crime of theft before the City Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. E12 | P a g e

PROPERTY
18590; I.S. 64-5062), in an information reading as follows:

The undersigned (Assistant Fiscal) accuses Pua Yi Kun of the
crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the period from January 10, 1964 to January 13,
1964, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with one whose true name
and identity are still unknown and helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away the following:
Nine (9) stock certificates of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.
and the Consolidated Mining, Inc., to wit:
Lepanto Shares: Certificates Nos. 44431 30,000 shares; 50372
19,000 shares; 48758 1,351 shares; Consolidated Shares:
45453-B 90,000 shares;
44728-B 100,000 shares; 44562-B 100,000 shares; 43691-B
100,000 share; 43688-B 50,000 shares; 43529-B 90,000
shares,
all valued at P10,335.00, belonging to the aforesaid mining
companies to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the
aforesaid sum of P10,335.00, Philippine currency.1vvphi1.nt
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on July 15, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not
guilty.
On January 26, 1965, Assistant Fiscal Agapito C. Magpantay
moved for the dismissal of the case against the accused Pua Yi
Kun, on the ground that reinvestigation and re-examination of the
evidence on hand disclosed that the same would be insufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view
of this motion, the City Judge on January 29, 1965, ordered the
dismissal of the case with costs de officio.
On April 20, 1966, another information for theft of the same stock
certificates was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Crim. Case No. 82120; I.S. 64-5062 &
64-5063), this time charging Pua Yi Kun and Frank Chou, thus:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 1964, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,

steal and carry away three (3) stock certificates of the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., consisting of 50,351 shares, valued at
P0.72 a share, or a total value of P36,252.72, and six (6) stock
certificates of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. consisting of 530,000
shares valued at P0.085 a share or a total value of P45,050.00,
belonging to the Chiong& Co., Inc., to the damage and prejudice
of said owner in the aforesaid sum of P81,302.72, Philippine
currency.
The petitioner move to quash the second information on the ground
of double jeopardy, the lower court sustain the information on the
ground that the petitioner was not convicted under the first
information and does not expose him on double jeopardy
ISSUE:Whether or not there is double jeopardy ,whether or not an
accurate identification of the owner of the stolen property is
essential to the validity of an information for theft
RULING:Because in the case at bar the offense charged is theft, it
became essential that the previous indictment that was dismissed
without consent of the accused, should have expressed all the
requisites of that particular offense. As theft is defined in
paragraph 1 of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code to be a
felony committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent.
the decisions of this Court have ruled that five elements are
essential to constitute the crime: (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) that the property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking was done with intent of gain; (4) that it was done without
the consent of the owner, and (5) that it was accomplished without
violence or intimidation of persons nor force upon things (U.S. vs.
De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000; People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; People
vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598; People vs. Rodrigo, L-18507, March 31,
1966, 16 S. C. Rep. Anno. 475).
Now, with particular regard to the taking without the consent of the
owner, it is conceded that the first information (City Court Case
No. E-18590 of Manila) averred that the stolen certificates
belonged to the mining companies (Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Co. and the Consolidated Mines, Inc.). The allegation that the
accused took, stole and carried away the certificate of stock

without the consent of their owner could only mean that it was
done without the consent of the two companies aforementioned.
But as the motion to quash the second necessarily assumes the
truth of the averment therein that the true owner was Chiong& Co.,
then we must conclude that the first information in the City Court
was insufficient to support a conviction, because the same did not
allege that the taking of the certificates was done without the
consent of the true owner or possessor (Chiong& Co.). True, that
the first charge did state that the taking was done without the
consent of the mining companies Lepanto and Consolidated; but as
they were not the owners, the allegation was not only irrelevant,
but it did not import that the act was also done against or without
the consent of the real owner. Such deficiency is fatal to the
sufficiency of the first charge, because the non-consent of the
owner to the taking is essential to the existence of the crime of
theft under the first paragraph of Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.
We are aware that some decisions state that the crime of theft does
not require that the culprit should know the owner of the thing
stolen. Other authorities declare that it is not necessary for the
existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a specific
manner who is the owner of the thing stolen, and that the crime is
consummated provided the thing belongs to another and the same
is taken with intent of gain (Decision, Supreme Court of Spain,
Nov. 22, 1898 and October 4, 1905).
By and large, these pronouncements are merely generalizations
designed to cover all varieties of theft, from the one where the
thing stolen is taken directly from the owner's control to that
committed by "any person who having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner"
which is also theft under Article 308, paragraph 2(1), Revised
Penal Code. The rulings, therefore, are not fully applicable to the
present case, which does not involve property lost (extraviada) nor
do they warrant the inference that the non-consent of the owner or
possessor can be excused.
In the ordinary course of events, the owner of the thing (whoever
he should be) would not consent to the taking of his property
without any consideration or quid pro quo therefor; nevertheless,
13 | P a g e

PROPERTY
the possibility of such consent remains and the law demands that it
be negated in the information. That the owner's lack of consent can
not be dispensed with in charging an ordinary theft under the first
paragraph of Article 308 of the Penal Code, is shown by the
express requirement therein that the taking should be without the
consent of the owner.3 In view of the clear text of the law, an
information or charge that does not aver this lack of consent is
manifestly bad and insufficient, and may be quashed for failure to
allege an essential element of the delict.
Since the first charge against petitioner in the City Court was thus
deficient in not alleging each and every element of the offense, and
as no evidence was produced to cure the defect, the Court of First
Instance did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that
thereunder jeopardy did not attach.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the writ
applied for is denied, with costs against petitioner Pua Yi Kun.
US VS ROSALES
FACTS: This case comes up in consultation of the judgment of the
18th of February, 1898, rendered in case No. 13153 of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, for robbery. In that case Balbino
Rosales and Leocadio de Guzman were each convicted as
principals in the crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of one
year and one day of correctional imprisonment, with accessories,
were condemned to the payment of a fine of 6,250 pesetas each,
and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment not to
exceed six months. All four were condemned to pay to the
complaining witness damages in the sum of 55 Mexican pesos, the
value of the animals stolen, together with 10 cuartos, the amount of
damage done to the corral, this obligation being imposed jointly
and severally, in accordance with law, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. These defendants were also
condemned to pay each one-ninth part of the costs. The
Government in the second instance asks that the judgment be
reversed and that the four accused convicted by the judge below be
acquitted.
ISSUE:whether or not the committed felony is theft or robbery
RULING:The taking of a bull belonging to BrigidoBonafe from
the corral where he was inclosed on the night of Saturday, the 7th
of November, 1891, and the destruction of part of the said corral,
can not be properly classified as robbery, but constitutes the crime

of theft, since, as in order to take the animal away, it was not
necessary to destroy the corral or to cut the stakes driven into the
ground. The only thing that was done was to pull up some of these
stakes for the purpose of making the opening the thieves required,
and so the man in charge found the corral the next day. The fence
opened does not appear to have been firmly constructed and did
not offer the slightest security against the most insignificant effort
to force an entrance, as appears from the fact that the thieves, with
their hands alone, and without any other instrument, were able to
make the opening and to take away the bull. In consideration,
moreover, of the fact that the corral was not covered or in any way
connected with an inhabited house, it is unquestionable that the
offense committed was that of theft, defined and punished by
section 3 of article 518 of the Penal Code.
The guilt of the defendants Balbino Rosales and Leocadio de
Guzman as principals, and that of RupertoAlse and Julian
Dimaculangan (who subsequently died) as accessories, is
established by the evidence in the case. Therefore, the undersigned
being of the opinion that the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the judgment of the court below are correct, with the
exception of its conclusion with respect to the classification of the
offense, as stated above, the said findings of fact and conclusions
of law are accepted by the undersigned as the basis of this
decision, notwithstanding the opinion of the counsel for the
Government, with the exception of the part of the said judgment
which refers to the deceased defendant.
In determining the appropriate penalty the concurrence of the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity will be considered. There
are no mitigating circumstances in the case, and therefore the
judgment of the court below should be reversed. Balbino Rosales
and Leocadio de Guzman, guilty as principals of the crime of theft
prosecuted, should be convicted and sentenced each to six months
and one day of correctional imprisonment, with the accessories of
article 58 of the Code. RupertoAlse should be fined 1,250 pesetas,
and, in case of insolvency, should suffer subsidiary imprisonment,
not to exceed one month. All three defendants should be
condemned to the restitution of the stolen animal, or to indemnify
the complaining witness therefor jointly and severally, in the order
established in article 125 of the Code, the value of the animal

being fixed at 55 pesos, and in case of insolvency should suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. Finally, they should be
condemned to pay each one-ninth of the costs of both instances.
The case is, with respect to Julian Dimaculangan, reversed, with
one-ninth part of the costs de oficio. No decision can be made with
respect to the two absent accused, as to whom the course of the
case was suspended, nor with respect to the three defendants
acquitted below, under section 50 of General Orders, No. 58. The
order declaratory of insolvency, made in the incident of embargo,
is approved. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS RODRIGO
FACTS:That on or about March 8, 1960, and months previous at
Tubod, Pio A. Corpuz, Masbate, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused deliberately did there
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally kept in
his possession one male horse which is specifically described
under Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle No. 4685981,
legally belonging to FELIX MUERTEIGUE, said accused
knowing as he does that the aforementioned horse was stolen from
the ranch of said Felix Muertigue at Casabangan, Pio V. Corpuz,
Masbate, and deliberately failed as he did fail to deliver the same
to the authorities or to its owner. The value of the aforecited horse
is no less than ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P150.00), all to
the damage and prejudice of said owner of the aforementioned
amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred on dismissing the
case against Rodrigo
RULING: YES. The only question raised is whether or not the
lower court erred in ruling that the foregoing complaint is defective
because the element of "intent to gain" is not alleged.
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed (Section
5, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court). The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily
14 | P a g e

PROPERTY
in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounced his proper judgment (Section 8, Id).
The complaint in question designates the offense charged as "theft
of large cattle." This is the crime defined in Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 308 thereof.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver
the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property
of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and, without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Art. 310. Qualified theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article, ... if the property stolen is ...
large cattle.
Under the first paragraph of Article 308 the essential elements of
theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property
belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of
gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence
or intimidation against person or force upon things (U.S. vs. De
Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). But under paragraph 2, subparagraph (1), the
elements are (1) the finding of lost property; and (2) the failure of
the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner. In this kind of theft intent of gain is inferred from the
deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper person,
the finder knowing that the property does not belong to him.
Appellee contends that since the complaint refers to a stolen horse
it does not fall under said particular paragraph, "stolen property"
not being the same as "lost property." The argument is without

merit. The word "lost" is generic in nature, and embraces loss by
stealing or by any act of a person other than the owner, as well as
by the act of the owner himself or through some casual occurrence.
If anything, the finder who fails deliberately to return the thing lost
may be considered more blameworthy if the loss was by stealing
than through some other means.
PEOPLE VS AVILA
FACTS:It appears in evidence that on August 16, 1921, in the
municipality of Meycauayan, in the Province of Bulacan, Lucio
Pilares and his family, composed of his wife, two children and a
niece of his wife, took a carretela to go from the house of his
father-in-law to his own home in said municipality. Upon said
occasion the wife of Lucio Pilares carried, among other things, a
large pocketbook, or purse, containing paper money, gold coin, and
jewels of a total value of P4,500. Upon arriving at the house of
Lucio Pilares, the family alighted from the vehicle, but the wife of
Lucio Pilares inadvertently failed to carry with her the purse
containing the valuables, and she left the same in
the carretela.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The driver of the carretela was one Tiburcio de los Santos, of the
age of 50 years; and after his passengers had alighted, Tiburcio
turned to go back, when his attention was attracted by two girls,
namely, Dolores Orito and Rosario Buing, who were standing on
the street in front of their house and who indicated that they
wanted to embark in thecarretela. Tiburcio accordingly stopped to
pick them up, but before they had gotten abroad Tiburcio though
well to clean out or arrange the interior of the carretela. In doing
this he saw the purse which had been left in the carretela by the
wife of Lucio Pilares, and he accordingly picked it up. As the two
girls mentioned climbed abroad the carretela, the accused in this
case, Clemente Avila, who was at the time a policeman of the
municipality, also got in; and as the three passenger were adjusting
themselves in their seats, Tiburcio handed the purse to Clemente
Avila, and asked him, as a policeman, to deliver it to Lucio Pilares.
The accused received the purse and, wrapping it in his raincoat,
placed the bundle under his
arm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The said purse, it is now to be stated, has never come to the hands
of Pilares through the person to whom it was thus confided, nor
though any other channel; but within a very few hours after the
incident above narrated the loss of the purse came to the attention
of the owner and efforts to locate its whereabouts were begun. To
this end complaint was made to the police authorities; and
the cochero, Tiburcio de los Santos, was arrested. At first he denied
any knowledge of the purse, doubtless through fear of becoming
implicated himself, but later he admitted that he had picked it up in
the carretela after the Pilares got out and that he had turned it over
to Clemente Avila, with the request that it should be delivered to its
owner. A search warrant was then procured; and armed with this,
two officials, one of whom was a lieutenant of the barrio,
proceeded to a search of the house of Clemente Avila, on August
23, 1921, or about a week after the incident above narrated
occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The result of this search was the finding of a solitaire stone
(diamond) and a locket containing the pictures of Lucio Pilares and
his wife. These objects were subsequently identified by Lucio
Pilares as belonging to himself and wife and constituting part of
the contents of the lost purse.chanroblesvirt
ISSUE: Whether or not the first finder of the lost thing is essential
on the crime of theft
RULING:In the light of the foregoing discussion the conclusion
seems inevitable that the accused in this case committed the
offense of theft when he appropriated the purse belonging to Lucio
Pilares under the conditions already stated; and the circumstances
that he received the purse by the delivery from Tiburcio de los
Santos, who was the actual finder, is
immaterial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Moreover, it is not necessary for us to formulate any conclusion as
to the exact point of time when the felonious designs to appropriate
the purse was formed. Upon this point the situation resembles that
involved in larceny by a servant. The properly converted was at
most only in the physical custody of the accused, and he at no time
was vested with legal possession. The violation of possession,
essential in larceny, was therefore simultaneous with the actual
15 | P a g e

PROPERTY
appropriation or conversion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library
The only decision which has been called to our attention
supporting a conclusion in anywise contrary to that announced
above is one noted by Viada in Question XXIV of his comment on
the second paragraph of article 530 of the Spanish Penal Code,
corresponding to the second paragraph of article 517 of the Code
in force in these Islands. It there appeared that a certain person had
found a portfolio containing papers exclusively of interest to the
owner. Not knowing how to read, the finder delivered the portfolio
to the two accused in order that they might ascertain to whom it
belonged. These individuals, however, kept the article in their
possession and on that account were afterwards prosecuted for
theft. The trial court held them guilty of that offense, but the
decision was quashed upon appeal to the Supreme Court. The
decision was based upon the grounds; namely, first, that the two
accused were not the actual finders; secondly, that it did not appear
which of the two had in fact received it from the finder; and,
thirdly, that in view of the trivial value of the portfolio there was
no appropriation by the accused with intent to
gain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The decision contains the bare resolution of the court only, and it is
evident that the point now under discussion; namely, whether one
who receives lost or mislaid property from the hands of a finder
can be guilty of theft in misappropriating the same, was there
involved with other consideration decisive of the case. Under these
circumstances the decision is entitled to little or no weight upon
the point we have been considering; and as the resolution on the
point referred to is, in our opinion, contrary to the principles of
sound jurisprudence, we are unable to accept i
PEOPLE VS REYES
FACTS: The present appeal was interposed by the City Attorney
of Quezon City from the order of the Court of First Instance dated
December 8, 1953, dismissing the case against Amada Reyes de
Hernandez, Ricardo and Teofilo Reyes and Solano Hernandez.
It appears from the record that on April 24, 1953, an information
for qualified theft was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City (Case No. Q-972), couched in the following terms:
The undersigned City Attorney of Quezon City accuses Anselmo
Reyes y Barican as principal, and accused Amada Reyes de
Hernandez, Solano Hernandez, Ricardo Reyes, Teofilo Reyes and
others who are still unidentified as accessories after the fact of the
crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th of April, 1953, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the accused Anselmo Reyes Y Barican, who at the
time was then the trusted driver of Mr. and Mrs. Lucas Paredes and
has been especially assigned to take charge and drive a Cadillac car
for the Governor of Abra wherein the jewelries belonging to Mr.
and Mrs. Paredes were being kept and while said car was under the
care and custody of Anselmo Reyes y Barican, said accused,
without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent of gain and with
grave abuse of confidence, open the baggage compartment of said
Cadillac car and take, steal, and carry away the following jewelries
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Lucas Paredes:
(List of Jewelries)
That the accused Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Solano Hernandez,
Ricardo Reyes and Teofilo Reyes, having knowledge of the
commission of the above described crime of qualified theft, and
without having participated therein either as principals or as
accomplices took part in said offense subsequent to its commission
by then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously concealing
the aforementioned pieces of jewelry after receiving same from the
principal accused Anselmo Reyes y Barican, in order to conceal
the crime, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners thereof
in the aforementioned sum of P227, 190, Philippine currency.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3).
The principal accused, Anselmo Reyes, pleaded guilty to simple
theft, and was sentenced accordingly. Those charged as accessories
after the fact (now appellees herein) pleaded not guilty, and later
filed a motion to quash (Rec., p. 58) on the ground that being
brothers and sisters, of the accused, they were exempt of criminal
responsibility for the acts charged against them in the information,
invoking Art. 20 of the Revised Penal Code and submitting
evidence of the relationship. Thereupon, the prosecution moved
(Rec. p. 77) to be allowed to clarify the information by adding
thereto an allegation that the accused Ricardo, Teofilo, and Amada
Reyes, and the latter's husband Solano Hernandez, profited from
the effects of the crime committed by the principal accused. In
view of this move, counsel for the accused moved to withdraw
their motion to quash, and objected to the proposed amendment of
the information, on the ground that it was a material change not
allowable after plea without consent of the accused (Rec., pp. 79,
86). On June 15, 1953, the Court issued an order denying the
motion to amend the information, because it would substantially
affect the fundamental rights of the accused, who were exempt
from criminal responsibility under the original information, in
view of their relationship with the principal accused (Rec., p. 102)
but without acting on the motion for the withdraw of the motion to
quash. Then the prosecution moved to dismiss the case against the
alleged accessories, with reservation of the right to file another
information; and the court ordered the dismissal on August 26,
1953 (Rec. p. 155), without ruling on the reservation made by the
prosecution because any such ruling would be, in its opinion,

premature.
A new information was then filed (Crim. Case No. Q-1064) in the
same Court, virtually reproducing the previous one in case Q-972,
except for the allegation on that
Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Solano Hernandez, Ricardo Reyes
and Teofilo Reyes received the following pieces of jewelry and
with intent of gain willfully unlawfully and feloniously kept them
for the purpose of profiting themselves and assisting Anselmo
Reyes to profit by the effects of the crime above mentioned to the
damage and prejudice of the abovementioned owner in the sum of
P162,180 Philippine Currency. . . ..
The accused moved to quash the second information on the ground
that it place them twice in jeopardy for the same offense; and the
motion was granted by the Court below. Thereupon, the
prosecution appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is double jeopardy
RULING: NO, The Solicitor General argues that there could be no
second jeopardy for the accused because (1) they could not be
convicted under the first information, in view of their relationship
with the accused; and (2) that the second information requires
evidence (of intent of gain) that could not be admitted under the
first information, since it charged merely intent to conceal the
crime.
We are of the opinion that the plea of double jeopardy was
erroneously sustained. In the first place, the accused-appellees
herein filed a motion to quash on the ground that they incurred no
criminal liability under the facts alleged in the information in the
preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial Court, instead of allowing
the withdrawal of the motion to quash, virtually sustained the same
when it denied the fiscal's motion to amend, thereby forcing the
latter to dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that the former
case was terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Secondly, the defendants themselves showed that the information
in case No. Q-972 was insufficient to charge them with any
criminal offense, in view of their relationship with the principal
accused; and it is well established doctrine that for jeopardy to
attach, there must be an information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction (Rule 113, sec. 9). Lastly, the
herein accused having successfully contended that the information
in case No Q-972 was insufficient to sustain a conviction, they can
not turn around now and claim that such information was after all,
sufficient and did place them in danger or jeopardy of being
convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no conviction
could be had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to contend
now that the information in the second case (Q-1064) places them
in jeopardy for the second time. Their case comes within the spirit
of the rule laid down in People vs. Acierto, (92 Phil., 534):
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military
authorities, the defendant was estopped from demurring to the
Philippine court's jurisdiction and pleading double jeopardy on the
strength of his trial by the court martial. A partly will not be
16 | P a g e

PROPERTY
allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent

positions which, if allowed, would result in brazen deception. It is
trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of the
right dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court that it
lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort,
to tell the court to which he has been turned over that the first has
committed error in yielding to his plea.
17 | P a g e

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CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

Phil., 89, 90.).

ALFONSO MANAHAN, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF

The penalty provided in Article 294, No. 5, of the Revised Penal

G.R. No. 47899 | 1942-09-30

With the only modification that the minimum of the indeterminate

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

They maintain that tricycle is not included in the Motor Vehicle

invited by the authorities to the Bontoc Municipal

meat or hide without the consent of the owner or

Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

erroneous belief that the cow was owned or raised by

period as the maximum penalty, it erred in imposing

trial court to be four (4) years, two (2) months and

FACTS: The accused Benjamin Barruga, armed with a bolo,

Barruga allegedlytook with him money contained in a wooden box

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

During investigation at the crime scene, however, it was found that

The accused then appealed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of robbery with

the prosecution failed to show that the money in question was in

Where, in a trial for the complex offense of robbery with double

RATIO: In a trial for the complex offense of robbery with double

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

Prison under sentence of death for participation in a similar crime

homicide rises to the atrocity of murder.

HELD: Yes. The killing of Candido Macias was committed "by

PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

Autopsy: 4 gunshot wounds (front of the head-cause of death, left

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

People vsJaranilla, 55 SCRA 563

Facts: On the evening of September 22, 1993, a passenger

when the accused were there. There was, thus, randomness

People vs. Puno

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the

accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver

had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so

to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's

Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused

Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from

handed to the accused

superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs.

checks and one P40,000 check

Held: Highway robbery is now governed by P.D. No. 532,

Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

car againtowards Pampanga

the car then, crossed to the other side of the

of the complainant except that according to

away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a

an incident in the commission of another offenseprimarily

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the

PEOPLE vs. ROMULO VERSOZA y GARCIA and JERRY

her toe while running across the highway

abroad a passenger jeepney with Plate No. NYZ-655, along

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

summoned. Dojenas alighted from the jeepney and waited

that based on the downward trajectory of the bullet on the

CRIMINAL LAW II: CRIMES AGAINST

originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is

countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle to