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Alenka Zupančič
so far as they think at all, into those very metaphysical assertions which they
profess so greatly to despise’.4 It is tempting to compare this passage with
Badiou’s discussion of the great contemporary sophists who, although they are
the rare thinkers of our time, remain caught in the same paradox:
Kant’s own response to the proclaimed impasse or dead end of philosophy is,
first, to establish the conditions of the possibility of philosophy, and then to
assign to philosophy its proper field, preventing it from sliding either into
Schwärmerei or into sophistic play. If philosophy steps out the field that defines
it and constitutes its scene or space it can head only for disaster. On this level,
i.e. concerning the very philosophical gesture involved in the Kantian project
on the one hand and in Badiou’s project on the other, the similarities seem to be
more than just superficial.
However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to compare Badiou and Kant.
Neither is it to establish whether the Kantian gesture was purely restrictive or
else if it had the power of effectively re-inaugurating philosophy under new
conditions, or in the face of the reconfiguration of its conditions. (Given the
subsequent development of German idealism I would be rather inclined to opt
for the second suggestion.) My question concerns the philosophical impact, in
the context of the contemporary configuration of philosophy, of the key ele-
ments that constitute Badiou’s own definition of philosophy. Philosophy is only
possible: (1) under the four conditions which philosophy itself declares us such;
(2) by maintaining a distance towards these conditions, which is to say by
resisting a suture of philosophy to any of its conditions or by renouncing the
claim that philosophy is itself a production of truth. This is what I’ve called the
‘fifth condition’.
being’ (MP 37/56). One could say that what happened in the nineteenth cen-
tury is that a slow but massive shift took place from one dominant social bond
to another. Yet what is at stake in this shift of the social bond is not simply the
alternative between or the replacement of One with multiple.
In order to appreciate this properly it is important to determine what exactly
the expression ‘authority of the One’ refers to. There is, first of all, an important
difference between what Badiou calls the ‘authority of the One’ and what he
calls the ‘count for one’. The latter is simply the condition of any thinkable
situation or thing: whereas the purely multiple is inconsistent and is a pure
‘excess beyond itself’, all consistent thought supposes a structure, a counting-
for-one, such that every presented or presentable multiple is consistent. Every
presentable multiple is presented, in other words, precisely as a set or consistent
being-together of a certain collection of elements. In this respect, the counting-
for-one (and with it the notion of ‘one’) is perfectly compatible with the notion
of pure multiplicity. However, excess beyond itself, which is the very being of
Being as purely multiple, also takes place on the level of what is already
counted-for-one, i.e. on the level of presentation, within a set, or within what
Badiou calls a ‘situation’ (which is just another word for ‘set’): it takes place as
the excess of the parts of a given multiple or set over its elements: if we have a
multiple of, say, five elements, the possible combination of these elements – i.e.
the number of the ‘parts’ – exceeds by far the number of elements (more
precisely, this number amounts to two to the power of five). This excess, that
Badiou also calls l’excès errant, a ‘wandering excess’, is one of the crucial notions
of his ontology, for he holds ‘the wandering [errance] of the excess to be the real
of being’ (MP 61/81). What he calls the ‘state’ of a situation (playing on the
double meaning of this word) involves the operation whereby this excess itself is
counted-for-one, and thus fixed (or made consistent). The count-for-one itself,
which takes place on the level of presentation, is thus counted-for-one. This is
what Badiou also calls representation, or meta-structure.
Now, what is involved in the expression the ‘authority of the One’ is
something quite different than the count-for-one which makes any multiplicity
presentable or intelligible, as well as something other than a ‘state’. Badiou
usually employs the statement ‘the One is not’ as synonymous with ‘God is not’,
or else as directly synonymous with the ‘death of God’. Yet at the same time he
also identifies this statement with what is involved in his own fundamental
ontological stance: a multiple is always a multiple of multiples (of multiples, of
multiples . . .), and the eventual ‘stopping point’ can in no way be a ‘one’ but
only a void. However, I would maintain that the ‘One is not’ (in the sense of
‘God is not’) cannot be situated on the same level as the positing of a void as
‘the stuff that being is made of’. The reason for this is that – as Badiou himself
points out5 – ‘God is dead’ is not an ontological statement but a statement that
belongs to an evental horizon or, more precisely, to its closure. In other words, I
would suggest that we take the formulation ‘authority of the One’ to refer to a
structurally as well as historically determinable social bond, and not as pri-
marily referring to a conceptual choice between One and multiple.
The ‘authority of the One’ is a social bond which roughly corresponds to
196 THINK AGAIN
what Lacan conceptualized as the discourse of the Master. The Master’s dis-
course is not exactly a ‘state’ in Badiou’s sense. In it, the wandering excess is
fixed, not by being counted as one, but by being subjected and attached, as
Other, to the agency of the One. The authority of the One is not based upon a
totalization of a multiple, it is not a ‘forcing’ of the multiple by the One. It is
based upon relating the One and Other in the element of their pure disjunction.
The Master’s discourse functioned so well and so long because it succeeded in
transforming the ‘weakest’ point of a given multiple (the point of its very
inconsistency) into the strongest lever, as well as the source, of its own power.
What was entirely mobilized or absorbed in the One was not the colourful
multiplicity of Being, but the point of its potential generic power: its loose end,
the point on account of which no multiplicity can be intrinsically ‘counted as
One’. The important thing to remember in relation to the Master’s discourse (or
the authority of the One) is that the agent of this social bond is not the excessive
multiplicity counted-for-one, it is not a unified totality of the excessive mul-
tiplicity, but an (empty) signifier of its impossible totalization. In other words,
the way multiplicity is attached (and fixed) to the One is that the One gives
body to, or incarnates, the constitutive void of the multiple. This is how the
master signifier, as agent of this social bond, fixates the excess, assigns it its place
and keeps it there.
What happens with the destitution of the authority of the One is that the
bond between the One and multiple, the bond that was there in their very
disjunction, dissolves. The result is that the excess, as the very real of Being,
emerges as a free-floating element and appears in a form of a ‘passionate
detachment’. For what happens is not that excess loses its signifier or repre-
sentation (since it never really had one), what it loses is its attachment to the
One. One could say that a spectre of excess starts haunting the society, in its
different spheres; and its ‘spectral’ form is in no way insignificant. The Master’s
discourse (or, if one prefers, the authority of the One) is a social bond in which
this excessive element is, if one may say so, in the ‘ideal’ place, in the service of
the hegemonic power of the One, which reigns by assuming the very exces-
siveness of excess. What happens with the destitution of this bond is, so to
speak, that the ghost of excess escapes from the bottle. This process could be
said to have started with the French Revolution, to have reached its full extent
in the nineteenth century, and to have continued through a part of the twen-
tieth century. The nineteenth century in particular was deeply haunted by this
excessive element in all possible forms, from the conceptual to the phantas-
magoric. Perhaps no single phrase can capture, so to speak, the spirit of the
thought of this period (regardless of different schools and orientations) better
than this: there is something rotten in the State of Things. Some thinkers of the time
attributed this rot to the still-remaining pockets of the authority of the One,
believing that redemption would come only with their definitive elimination.
Others, on the contrary, saw the origin of discontent in the very destitution of
the authority of the One. But we can say, without oversimplifying things, that
virtually all serious thinkers sought to think at a maximal proximity to, if not
in a direct confrontation with, this excess. A ‘tarrying with the excess’ thus
THE FIFTH CONDITION 197
This singular notion of the Two is very much related to the question of
representation, i.e. of the possibility for the ‘counting the count itself’ to be
situated on the same level as the count (and not on a meta-level), yet dislocated
in relation to it. For this is precisely what it implies to think a ‘Two that would
be counted for two in an immanent way’.
Badiou was not only the first philosopher explicitly to conceptualize this
singular notion of the Two in philosophy, he also reminded psychoanalysis
of the production of this truth that it sometimes tends to forget. By
conceptualizing it within philosophy, i.e. within the space of a ‘general com-
possibility’ of truths, he gave contemporary philosophy one of its most precious
concepts which, although it comes from a singular generic procedure, has its
universal value and is in no way limited to that procedure. I would also add that
with this concept, Badiou addresses the question of representation from a new
and different angle, an angle which avoids the difficulties sketched out above
and which, at the same time, directly concerns the conditions of philosophy.
If philosophy is to take place within the space of the infinite process of truth
without itself being a process of truth, if it is to be situated on the same level as
generic procedures yet at a certain distance from them (i.e. dislocated in relation
to them), then it has to rely precisely on such an ‘immanent count-for-two’ as is
at work in a Badiouian conception of the Two.
This would imply, of course, that one of the four conditions of philosophy
(love, with its immanent count-for-two) is also its ‘fifth condition’, the con-
dition that defines the very relationship of philosophy with its conditions and
keeps it from merging with them, as well as from appearing as their inde-
pendent sum. As a thought that operates within the field of four generic
procedures of truth, without simply merging with this field and becoming
indistinguishable from it, philosophy presupposes a scène du Deux, a ‘stage/scene
of the Two’. In other words, in the configuration of conditions of philosophy,
one of its conditions – the immanent count-for-two, which Badiou recognizes
in the figure of love – has itself to be counted-for-two.