G.R. No.

104482
January 22, 1996
BELINDA TAREDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters,
and TEOFILA CORPUZ TANEDO, representing her minor daughter VERNA
TANEDO, petitioners
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAREDO AND TERESITA
BARERA TAREDO, respondents
FACTS:
1. October 20, 1962: Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale
in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita
Barera (private respondents) whereby he conveyed for P1,500 one hectare of
his future inheritance from his parents.
2. February 28, 1980: Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro made another
affidavit to reaffirm the 1962 sale.
3. January 13, 1981: Lazaro acknowledged therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as
consideration for the sale.
4. February 1981: Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his
children (petitioners) through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980
5. On June 7, 1982, Ricardo recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the
Registry of Deeds
Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale
executed by Lazaro in favor of Ricardo. They contend that Lolo Matias desired that
whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his
(Lazaros) children.
Ricardo (private respondents) however presented in evidence a Deed of Revocation
of a Deed of Sale wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of his children for the
reason that it was simulated or fictitious - without any consideration whatsoever.
LAZAROS VERSION: He executed a sworn statement in favor of his children. BUT he
also testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who
induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five
pesos (P5.00) to buy a drink. LABO
Trial court ruled in favor of Lazaros children. Ca affirmed TCs decision.
ISSUES:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid? NO
2. Was Ricardos registration of the deed of valid? YES
HELD: SC rules in favor of Ricardo.

Pursuant to Art 1347, the contract made in 1962 (sale of future inheritance) is not
valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
between the parties. (No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.)
However, Article 1544 governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
multiple sales. The property in question is land, an immovable, and ownership shall
belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property.
Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of Ricardo was later than the one in favor of
Lazaros children, ownership would vest with Ricardo because of the undisputed fact
of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them
at all.
Lazaros children contend that they were in possession of the property and that
Ricardo never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170405 February 2, 2010

RAYMUNDO S. DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
BENITA T. ONG. Respondent.

Facts:
On March 10, 1993, Raymundo S. De Leon (petitioner) sold 3 parcels of land to
Benita T. Ong(respondent). The said properties were mortgaged to a financial
institution; Real Savings & Loan Association Inc. (RSLAI). The parties then executed
a notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage. As indicated in the
deed of mortgage, the parties stipulated that the petitioner (de Leon) shall execute
a deed of assumption of mortgage in favor of Ong (respondent)after full payment of
the P415,000. They also agreed that the respondent (Ong) shall assume the

mortgage. The respondent then subsequently gave petitioner P415,000 as partial

payment. On the other hand, de Leon handed the keys to Ong and de Leon wrote a
letter to inform RSLAI that the mortgage will be assumed by Ong. Thereafter, the
respondent took repairs and made improvements in the properties. Subsequently,
respondent learned that the same properties were sold to a certain Viloria after
March 10, 1993 and changed the locks, rendering the keys given to her useless.
Respondent proceeded to RSLAI but she was informed that the mortgage has been
fully paid and that the titles have been given to the said person. Respondent then
filed a complaint for specific performance and declaration of nullity of the second
sale and damages. The petitioner contended that respondent does not have a cause
of action against him because the sale was subject to a condition which requires the
approval of RSLAI of the mortgage. Petitioner reiterated that they only entered into
a contract to sell. The RTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA upheld the sale to
respondent and nullified the sale to Viloria. Petitioner moved for reconsideration to
the SC.

Issue:
Whether the parties entered into a contract of sale or a contract to sell?

Held:
In a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the buyer upon
the perfection of the contract. The non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
condition. Contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive condition. The buyer
does not acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the purchase price.In
the present case, the deed executed by the parties did not show that the owner
intends to reserve ownership of the properties. The terms and conditions affected
only the manner of payment and not the immediate transfer of ownership. It was
clear that the owner intended a sale because he unqualifiedly delivered and
transferred ownership of the properties to the respondent

AGRICULTURAL & HOME EXTENSION DEVELOPMENT GROUP (AHDG) vs CA

In 1972, Diaz and Mia sold a parcel of land to Gundran. The owners duplicate copy was given to Gundran
but the sale was unregistered because of existing notices of lis pendens on the title.
Gundran and AHDG entered into a joint venture agreement for the improvement & subdivision of the land.
This agreement was also not annotated.
In 1976, Diaz & Mia again sold the same property to Cabautan. By virtue of a court order, a new owners
copy of the title was issued (they supposedly lost their copy).

The notice of lis pendens was canceled and the deed of sale was recorded. A new TCT was issued in favor
of Cabautan.
In 1977, Gundran issued an action for reconveyance.

Who has a better right to the property? Was Cabautan a purchaser in good faith?

Since the 2nd sale was registered, the 2nd buyer has a better right to the property. Cabautan was not a
purchaser in bad faith merely because of the notice of lis pendens.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property without notice that another person has an interest
in the property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of the purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.
The TCT shows no annotation of any sale, lien, encumbrance or adverse claim on the property. When the
property is registered under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as 3rrd persons are concerned. A person dealing with registered land is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the register or certificate of title.
Even the annotation of lis pendens on the title to the property by 3 rd parties does not place the buyer
thereof in bad faith since these did not have the effect of establishing a lien or encumbrance on the
property affected.
Their only purpose was to give notice to 3rrd persons and to the whole world that any interest they might
acquire in the property pending litigation would be subject to the result of the suit.

NAVERA V. CA (April 26, 1990)

FACTS:
Leocadio Navera owns a parcel of land in Albay which was inherited by his 5 children. His 3 children already have their share of the
inheritance from the other properties of Leocadio. The subject land was now owned by his 2 daughters. An OCT was issued in the
name of Elena Navera et.al (et.al refers to his sister Eduarda Navera)
When Elena died, his share of the land was inherited by her heirs Arsenio and Felix Narez. The other portion was owned by
Eduarda.
Eduarda sold her portion to her nephew Arsenio and then one year after to Mariano Navera. Both sales were made in a public
instrument but both sales were also not registered in the Registry of Property.
ISSUE:
WON the second sale of the property is valid.
HELD:
Since the records show that both sales were not recorded in the Registry of Property, the law clearly vests the ownership upon the
person who in good faith was first in possession of the disputed lot.
The possession viewed in the law includes not only the material but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the
execution of a public instrument. This means that after the sale of a realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it
to another, does not transmit anything to the second vendee, and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale, takes material
possession of the thing, he does it as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the thing
lawfully acquired by the first vendee.
In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to respondent Arsenio Nares by means of a public instrument is clearly tantamount to a
delivery of the land resulting in the material and symbolic possession thereof by the latter.

NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO AND ANNABELLE LUMO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128573. January 13, 2003]
Under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing
with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate
of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine
the legal status of the property.
FACTS:
1. On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered to sell to private
respondent-spouses Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo, a house and lot measuring
located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City.
2. Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents made inquiries at the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City where the property is
located and the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendors title. They
found out that the property was mortgaged for P8,000 to a certain Mrs.
Galupo and that the owners copy of the Certificate of Title to said
property was in her possession.
3. Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to redeem the property from
Galupo at their expense, giving the amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that
purpose.
4. On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of Galupo was annotated
on TCT No. T-41499 which covered the subject property.
5. In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the release of Galupos adverse
claim, private respondents and Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of
absolute sale. The subject property was allegedly sold for P125,000 but the
deed of sale reflected the amount of only P30,000 which was the amount private
respondents were ready to pay at the time of the execution of said deed, the
balance payable by installment.
6. On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered and inscribed on TCT
No. T-41499 and, on even date, TCT No. T-50134 was issued in favor of private
respondents
7. After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested the issuance of a new
tax declaration certificate in their names. However, they were surprised to
learn from the City Assessors Office that the property was also
declared for tax purposes in the name of petitioner Naawan Community
Rural Bank Inc. Records in the City Assessors Office revealed that, for the lot
covered by TCT No. T-50134, Alfredo Lumos T/D # 83324 bore the note: This
lot is also declared in the name of Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D
# 71210.
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas obtained a P15,000
loan from petitioner Bank using the subject property as security. At
the time said contract of mortgage was entered into, the subject property

was then an unregistered parcel of residential land, tax-declared in the name

of a certain Sergio A. Balibay while the residential one-storey house was taxdeclared in the name of Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing Comayas to borrow
money and use the subject lot as security. But the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage and the Special Power of Attorney were recorded in the
registration book of the Province of Misamis Oriental, not in the
registration book of Cagayan de Oro City.
It appears that, when the registration was made, there was only one Register
of Deeds for the entire province of Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de
Oro City. It was only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds for
Cagayan de Oro City was established separately from the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed and
the subject property sold at a public auction to the mortgagee Naawan
Community Rural Bank as the highest bidder in the amount of P16,031.35.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for redemption of the
foreclosed subject property lapsed and the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan
de Oro City issued and delivered to petitioner bank the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance. This time, the deed was registered under Act 3344 and
recorded in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro
City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax declaration for the
subject house and lot.
8. Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for ejectment against Comayas
before the MTCC which decided in its favor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision dated April 13, 1988.
9. On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an order for the issuance of
a writ of execution of its judgment. The MTCC, being the court of origin,
promptly issued said writ.
10.However, when the writ was served, the property was no longer occupied
by Comayas but herein private respondents, the spouses Lumowho had,
as earlier mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988
11.Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their home, private respondents
filed an action for quieting of title. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered
a decision declaring private respondents as purchasers for value and in good
faith, and consequently declaring them as the absolute owners and possessors
of the subject house and lot.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT REGISTRATION OF SHERIFFS DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE
IN THE PROPER REGISTRY OF DEEDS IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN THE TORRENS
TITLE? NO.

2. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COULD BE CONSIDERED AS

BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH? YES.
HELD:
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance in the day book under Act 3344 should prevail over the later
registration of private respondents deed of absolute sale under Act 496, as
amended by the Property Registration Decree, PD 1529.
1. This contention has no leg to stand on.
2. It has been held that, where a person claims to have superior proprietary rights
over another on the ground that he derived his title from a sheriffs sale
registered in the Registry of Property, Article 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil
Code will apply only if said execution sale of real estate is registered
under Act 496.
3. Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when it was
acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a final deed of conveyance. On
the other hand, when private respondents purchased the same
property, it was already covered by the Torrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs. Fulewhere the Court ruled that the
registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds
creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with
the same property.
4. However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at the time of the
execution and delivery of the sheriffs deed of final conveyance on
September 5, 1986, the disputed property was already covered by the
Land Registration Act and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820 pursuant
to Decree No. N189413 was likewise already entered in the registration book of
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan De Oro City as of April 17, 1984.
5. Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was already under the operation
of the Torrens System. Under the said system, registration is the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon
the land.
6. Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relieving the land
of all claims except those noted thereon.
7. Accordingly, private respondents, in dealing with the subject registered
land, were not required by law to go beyond the register to determine
the legal condition of the property. They were only charged with notice
of such burdens on the property as were noted on the register or the
certificate of title. To have required them to do more would have been
to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the
Torrens Title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.

8. Mere registration of title in case of double sale is not enough; good faith must
concur with the registration.
Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration of the sheriffs deed of final
conveyance on December 2, 1986 amounted to constructive notice to private
respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought the subject property on May
17, 1988, they were deemed to have purchased the said property with the
knowledge that it was already registered in the name of petitioner bank.
1. The priority in time principle being invoked by petitioner bank is
misplaced because its registration referred to land not within the
Torrens System but under Act 3344.
2. On the other hand, when private respondents bought the subject property, the
same was already registered under the Torrens System. It is a well-known rule in
this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have the legal right to
rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need
to inquire further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry.
3. Private respondents exercise the required diligence in ascertaining the legal
condition of the title to the subject property so as to be considered as innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith
Before private respondents bought the subject property from Guillermo
Comayas, inquiries were made with the Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of
Lands regarding the status of the vendors title. No liens or encumbrances
were found to have been annotated on the certificate of title. Neither were
private respondents aware of any adverse claim or lien on the property other
than the adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to whom Guillermo
Comayas had mortgaged the subject property. But, as already mentioned,
the claim of Galupo was eventually settled and the adverse claim previously
annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the necessary inquiries,
private respondents did not have to go beyond the certificate of
title. Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of
Title would be rendered futile and nugatory.
Considering therefore that private respondents exercised the diligence required by
law in ascertaining the legal status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over
the subject property and found no flaws therein, they should be considered as
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate court upholding private
respondents Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo as the true and rightful owners of the
disputed property is affirmed.

CARRUMBA vs. CA

1.

2.
3.
4.

Spouses Amado Canuto (older brother of Benita) and Nemesia Ibasco by virtue of a Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land with Covenants of Warranty sold a parcel of land, partly residential, partly coconut land
to spouses Amado Carumba and Benita Canuto. The referred deed of sale was never registered and the
notary public was not then authorized.
A complaint was filed by Santiago Balbuena against Amado Canuto and Ibasco. CFI rendered decision in
favor of the Balbuena and sheriff issued a definite deed of sale to him which was registered.
CFI finding after execution of the document Carumba had taken possession of the land, planting fruits and
vegetables, declared him to be the owner under a consummated sale and held void the execution of levy
made by the sheriff and nullified sale in favor of Balbuena.
CA: Double sale. But Balbuenas title was superior to that of his adversary since he was the first to register
and he was in good faith.

HELD:
Court disagrees.
1.
2.

3.
4.

1544 not applicable. Purchaser of unregistered land at sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of
the judgment debtor and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the
property was levied upon.
While at the time of the levy does not clearly appear, it could have been made prior to April 1957 when
the decision against the former owners of the land was rendered in favor of Balbuena. But the deed of sale
in favor of Canuto had been executed 2 years before, and while only embodied in a private document, the
same, coupled with the fact that Carumba had taken possession of the unregistered land sold, sufficed to
vest ownership on Carumba.
When the levy was made by the sheriff, the judgment debtor no longer had dominical interest nor any real
right over the land that could pass to the purchaser at the execution sale.
Land belongs to Carumba.

CA decision reversed. CFI decision

Radiowealth Finance Company v Palileo

The Castros (Enrique and Herminia) sold to Palileo a parcel of unregistered coconut land situated in Surigao del
Norte. The sale was evidenced by a deed, but was not registered in the Registry of Property. Since the execution
of the deed, Palileo, through his mother (as administratrix or overseer), exercised acts of ownership over the land.
He also paid the necessary taxes from 1971 onwards. In 1976, Enrique Castro lost a case to Radiowealth and to
satisfy the judgment, the same piece of land was levied upon and sold at a public auction. A certificate of sale was
executed by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of Radiowealth (the only bidder). A deed of final sale was also issued
after the lapse of the period of redemption. Palileo filed an action for quieting of title. The trial court ruled for him.
The CA affirmed.

Who has a better right to the land? Radiowealth or Palileo?

Palileo. It must be stressed that what is being dealt with here is a parcel of unregistered land. Under Act No.
3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better
right, meaning that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the

vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else, even if the first
sale was unrecorded. In the previous case of Carumba v CA, it was held that the purchaser of an unregistered land
at an execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in
the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. Applying this, Radiowealth merely acquired Castros
interest in the land which, since he had already sold the same to Palileo previously, was no interest at all.
Therefore, Palileo has the better right to the land.

SALE BY NON-OWNER

PAULMITAN vs. CA (1992)

Agatona Paulmitan had two children: Pascual (he died and left 7 kids who are respondents in
this case) and Donato (1 child, Juliana Fanesa).
Agatona died and left two parcels of land (Lot 757 and Lot 1091). Her estate was unsettled.
But then Donato extrajudicially adjudicated onto himself Lot 757, and a TCT was issued in his
name. Then donato executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter Juliana
Fanesa.
o Lot 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes. Juliana
Fanesa redeemed the property.
The respondents (kids of Pascual) filed a case to partition the properties plus damages.
RTC: The respondents, as descendants of Agatona, are entitled to of Lot 1091 pro indiviso.
The deed of sale to Juliana Fanesa is valid as to the one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091,
while the remaining half belongs to the respondents. CA: Affirmed.

Issue: Does Juliana own the entirety of Lot 1091?

Held: NO. Only pro-indiviso share.
-

When Agatona died, she left two kids, Pascual and Donato. Art 777 says: The rights to the
succession are transmitted form the moment of the death of the decedent, so the right of
ownership of Pascual and Donato was vested in them when Agatona died.
But when Donato sold Lot 1091 to his daughter, he could only sell that portion which
may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership, because he co-owned
the lot with his brother Pascual who died and left 7 kids, so the kids/respondents
are the co-owners along with Donato. Donatos sale to his daughter did not vest
ownership in the entire land with his daughter, but transferred only the sellers pro
indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the
land until it is partitioned.
Juliana Fanesa claims that the owns the land by virtue of her redeeming it from the
government. But the redemption did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the
entire land subject of the co-ownership.
o But she can be reimbursed for half the redemption price she paid on behalf of her coowners.

MINDANAO vs. YAP (1965)

-

Rosenda de Nuqui (widow of deceased Sotero Dionisio) and her son Sotero sold three parcels
of land in favor of Yap. Included the sale were also buildings on the land as well as lab

equipment, books, furniture and other fixtures used by two schools established on the
properties (the Mindanao Academy and the Misamis Academy). The price was P100,700.
But Rosenda actually co-owned the land with many of her other children. And the lab
equipment, buildings, books, etc were owned by the Mindanao Academy and the Misamis
Academy.
Yap took possession of the properties and even changed the names of the schools to
Harvardian Colleges.
The children who did not take part in the deed of sale filed two cases: one was for annulment
of the sale and the other for rescission.

Issue: What is the status of the sale?

Held: NULL AND VOID.
-

The contract purported to sell properties of which the sellers were not the only owners. Plus
the prestation involved in the sale was indivisible and therefore incapable of partial annulment,
inasmuch as the buyer Yap, by his own admission, would not have entered into the transaction
except to acquire all of the properties purchased by him. So there is no necessity to rule on
the question of rescission since the contract itself is null and void.
The buyer and seller were both in bad faith. The return of the properties by the buyer is a
necessary consequence of the decree of annulment. No part of the purchase price having been
paid, as far as the record shows, there is no need for restitution (just return of the properties).

Note: See Villanuevas explanation in the book (his opinion is that the sale is NOT null and void
because a seller may validly enter into a valid and binding contract of sale on properties which he
entirely does not own; there is a diff between the perfect stage and the consummation stage).

LEONORA ESTOQUE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.ELENA M. PAJIMULA, assisted by her

husband CIRIACO PAJIMULA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24419

July 15, 1968

FACTS:
Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, was originally owned by the late
spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by her children, namely,
Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October
28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802
consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque. On October
29, 1951, a deed of extrajudicial settlement was entered into wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia
P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot
No. 802 to Crispina Perez. On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita
Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and
Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802
with an area of 958 square meters.
Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of
Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square

meters as evidenced by a deed of sale,which was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina
Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor.
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other 2/3
portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that the plaintiff
bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and segregated, hence
there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid
portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of.
Estoques stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the
southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description in the
deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell any
definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her undivided share,
since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until partition
takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this
premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area,
should be construed as having conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at
the time by the vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said
vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common
property of appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore, appellant argues, when Crispina sold the
rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former was selling an undivided 2/3
that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to Article 1620 of the New
Civil Code.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common.
The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of the
defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal
redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.

ISSUE:
WON right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque?
HELD:
NO. Appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802
on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And
when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds

of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since
their respective portions were distinct and separate.
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold
as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840
square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could
not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two
brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to
appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the
deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could have validly sold her one-third
undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. .
(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed,
the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day (October 29,
1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners
(Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey
(Llacer vs. Muoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly
prescribes that .
When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and
later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law
to the buyer or grantee."
CA decision affirmed

Almendra vs. IAC

G.R. No. 75111 November 21, 1991

Facts:
During the two marriages of Aleja, she and her respective husbands acquired parcels of land. The
lands from the first marriage were duly partitioned. After the death of her second husband, Aleja sold
to her son Roman, and daughter Angeles, parcels of land. After Alejas death, her other children filed
a complaint against Roman & Angeles for the annulment of the deeds of sale in their favor executed
by Aleja; and to partition the properties. Among the questioned sales was the one executed in favor
of Angeles which is a half portion of the conjugal property of Aleja and her 2nd husband, the hilly
portion was specifically marked in a sketch.
Issue: WON Aleja may validly sell a one half portion of a conjugal property, the hilly portion of which
had been specifically marked in a sketch.
Held: Yes, she may validly sell one-half portion of a lot, the hilly portion of which had been
specifically identified/marked in a sketch, but there must be proof that the conjugal property had

been partitioned after the death of the 2nd husband. Otherwise, the sale may be considered valid only
as Alejas one half interesttherein.
Aleja could not have sold particular hilly portion specified in the deed of sale in absence of proof that
the conjugal partnership property had been partitioned after the death of Santiago. Before such
partition, Aleja could not claim title to any definite portion of the property for all she had was an ideal
or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property.

REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO

G.R. No. 171571
March 24, 2008
FACTS: 2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following
in four equal shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono

share in the two lots;

b) Tito Dignos share in the two lots;

c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents

share in the two lots;

and

d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents

share in the two lots

It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.

It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold
the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public
instrument entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of respondents
whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two
lots.

In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA),
erected a security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of families, who had built their
dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security.

MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to
occupy the lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City.
Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated
or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession.
Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had
given them any written notice of its acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos.

The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from
the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired
valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and
assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years,
acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all events, petitioner contended
that respondents action was barred by estoppel and laches.

The trial court found for respondents. the CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents

2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents

HELD: the petition is denied

1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to thesale.This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the

sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners
is NOT null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellersheirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.

2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners insistence
that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then
extraordinary, does not lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the following material portions
thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two lots were registered: x x
xx
1.

That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have

been lost and/or destroyed and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute
said title/s at its own expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs,
successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so
that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance
with law x x x x

NOTES:
As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing market
value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, (1) the respondents received just
compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the
property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several
hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on its side.

Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take judicial notice of the
increase in value of the lots.

As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the
sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:

That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake andagree to
warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies
herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and
should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the
Courts of Justice.

Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioners
right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.
Figuracion vs. Figuracion-Gerilla
G.R. No. 151334
Topic: Partition of inherited property (intestate) originally belonging to CPG but was not immediately
liquidated and delivered to heirs upon death of one of the spouses.
Date: February 13, 2013
Petitioners: CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACIONANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A.
FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M.
FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. FIGURACION
Respondents: EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,

FACTS:
Petition
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision dated December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch
49.
The RTC decision:
1. Dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerillas (Emilia) complaint for partition,
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and
2. Annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Carolina (Carlina)
Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina).
Antecedent Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958.
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were
acquired by Leandro during his lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 and (2) Lot No.
705.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio),
Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom
Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina,
with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina).
On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No.
707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.

On December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication

adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased
parents, Eulalio and Faustina. Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in
favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the cancellation of OCT
No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in
1981. Upon her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half
of Lot No. 707
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to
demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No.
707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into:
o W/N Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of Leandro
o W/N respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot No. 707
RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997:
o RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their
ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs
o RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half () share to Felipa and
Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void.
o RTC refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lots eastern half portion in favor of
respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, 2001, ruled
that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707.
o The CA agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed
premature considering that there is a pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No.
705 and Lot No. 2299
o The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under judicial
administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and
Hilaria.
o The proper action in such case is for a division or partition of the entire lot.
o A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 707 to be owned by:
appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent], pro indiviso share
appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share,
appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share
Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court
In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the
CAs ruling that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1)
the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the
expenses chargeable to the estate of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole error committed
by the CA.
Position of Petitioner
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership
because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation
that contained no acceptance
Position of Respondent

Respondent Emilia contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an onerous
donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the
formalities for a simple donation.

ISSUE:

W/N the decision rendered by the CA is contrary to law and existing jurisprudential dicta laid
down by the honorable SC.

HELD/RATIO:
No, CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is entitled to have Lot No.
707 partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the belowdiscussed apportionment of the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.

Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a petition filed
under Rule 45
o The Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of
Quitclaim are questions of fact. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the province
of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts
The respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
o The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership.
o The respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed
of Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of
the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
The respondents right to demand for partition is not barred by acquisitive prescription or
laches.
o The Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the period when the
co-ownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed.
o Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
o More so, laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from
recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
Partition of Lot No. 707
o Under the Old Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas
marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property.
o When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the
surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Marcelas rights to the other
half, in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse
Eulalio.
o When he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his share in the
conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were brought into his
second marriage with Faustina.

When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her
share in the conjugal partnership. The remaining were transmitted equally to the
widow Faustina and Eulalios children, Carolina and Agripina.
o Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 were in turn inherited by Carolina.
o Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8
pertains to Carolina.
o Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8
portion of the subject lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern
portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof,
the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripinas nearest collateral relative, who,
records show, is her sister Carolina.
Final Ruling:
o The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in dated December 11,
2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
3/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and
Felipa Figuracion-Manuel
portion of Lot. No. 707 shall pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate of Carolina (Carlina) Vda.
De Figuracion.
o The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch
49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the
actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie
therein, in the foregoing manner.
Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_151334_2013.html
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