Immigrants To A Developing Society. The Chinese in Northern Mexico, 1875-1932

IMMIGRANTS TO A DEVELOPING SOCIETY: The Chinese in Northern Mexico, 18751932
Author(s): Evelyn Hu-DeHart

Source: The Journal of Arizona History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Autumn 1980), pp. 275-312
Published by: Arizona Historical Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42678263
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IMMIGRANTS
TO
DEVELOPING
The
Chinese
SOCIETY
in Northern
Mexico,
1875-1932
by
Hu-DeHart
Evelyn
hile the Middle Kingdom has never
Wr been truly expansionist or imperialist in a
national way, has never accumulated large overseas colonies or built extensive overseas empires,
the Chinese people have wandered far beyond
the confines of their country. Especially active
during the nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants reached many corners of the world; most
went as coolies or contract laborers, but some
went as colonists. They ended up in Southeast
Asia, in Africa, and in the Americas - North,
South and the Caribbean.1 They were attracted
primarily to frontier or developing areas, where
emerging economic needs and activities offered
them new and greater opportunities to make a
better life.
The Chinese overseas worked hard, lived
frugally, and usually prospered, though often
only in a modest way. They also acquired a reputation for being resistant to acculturation, preferring to cling to their own kind and their own
ways. They often incurred the deep resentment
of local populations who perceived them as unduly wealthy and clannish. When strong sentiments were translated into violent action, the
Chinese suffered severe persecution.
JOL
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Bornin Chungking,
China,and raisedin Hong Kongand
Dr.Hu-DeHart
holdsdegrees
Stanford
andthe
from
California,
of Texasat Austin.She is an assistant
of
University
professor
at Washington
in St.Louis,and has recently
history
University
a booktobe published
ofArizona
completed
bytheUniversity
Presson relations
and YaquiIndians
Spaniards
amongJesuits,
thecolonial
period.
during
[ 275]
THE JOURNAL OF ARIZONA HISTORY

The Chinese in Mexico, while reflecting the typical pattern
of their experience elsewhere in the world, were also distinctive
in several ways.2 During the firstquarter of the twentieth century,they had become an important social and economic group
in northern Mexico. In the late twenties and early thirties,however, their prospects for continuous prosperity ended when
thousands of them were expelled from the northwestern state
of Sonora, which had the largest and most influential Chinese
colony. Since then their presence in Mexico has been insignificant, their early historyall but forgotten.
When they first arrived, the poor but enterprising Asian
immigrants found themselves better able than local Mexicans to
take advantage of certain new economic opportunities opening
up in a developing region. While North Americans, Europeans
and some Mexicans with large capital invested in mines, transportation and commercial agriculture leading to urbanization, population increase and growth of the wage labor
sector - the Chinese moved into a lower level of the economy,
that of local trade and commerce. By the end of the Porfiriato,
they had become the dominant component of the new petit
bourgeoisclass. The Chinese did not so much displace Mexicans
or other foreigners as they met new demands for goods and
services in a greatly expanded society. The turning point was
the Mexican Revolution of 1910, which gave rise to a new nation and new nationalism. To the humble, dispossessed masses,
it promised social justice; to all Mexicans, it promised national
control of the country's resources and economy. Chinese domination of local businesses in much of the north, notably Sonora,
became a national embarrassment. Most of all, the Asians
blocked the immediate advancement of middle and lower class
northerners who possessed newly enhanced social and economic aspirations. Ultimately expulsion was viewed as the only
solution to this intolerable situation.
Although Chinese did not immigrate to Mexico in significant numbers until the nineteenth century, they began entering
the country two centuries earlier, when it was still a colony of
Spain. This handful of tradesmen came to the New World on
the ships of the Manila luxury trade between Acapulco, Mexico
City and the Philippines, probably as personal servants of
[276]
toa DevelopingSociety
Immigrants
Spanish shipmasters or merchants. While they could hardly be
considered an important social group at this time, it is interesting to note that the reactions they stirred among Mexicans
presaged their later troubles in this land: Spanish barbers complained of competition ("excesses" and "inconveniences," in
their words) from their Oriental rivals and succeeded in having
them segregated on the outskirts of town; Chinese shopkeepers
were accused of not employing enough Spanish apprentices.
Little more is known of these early Chinese arrivals.3
With the ascension to national political power of General
Porfiro Diaz in 1876, Mexico embarked on a course of rapid
economic growth predicated upon foreign money, expertise,
technology and markets, and firmlybased in political unity and
stability. The cost, however, was dictatorship and foreign immigration into Mexico. To Mexicans the most desirable colonists were European Catholics; but in the absence of available
land or well-paying jobs, they could not be enticed to come in
large numbers. Mexico agreed, therefore, to accept some less
attractive settlers, including Asians, who had a reputation of
being docile, hard-working people. In the beginning, the Diaz
government also had hopes of improving trade with countries
such as China and Japan. In 1893, after several false starts,
Mexico and China signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce
which included a "most favored nation" clause. Since the
United States had virtually terminated Chinese immigration by
the Exclusion Act of 1882, Mexico became an attractive alternative. Actually, by the time the treatywas signed in 1893, Chinese
colonies were already established in several northern states:
Baja California (then a Territory), Sinaloa, Chihuahua,
Tamaulipas, Coahuila and Sonora. In 1890, Governor Ramn
Corral of Sonora reported in a name-by-name census that of all
foreign residents in his state 229 were Chinese, second only to
the 337 North Americans and well ahead of the Germans,
English and Spanish in the state. The total population for the
state at that time was about 56,00o.4 From that early date on,
the Chinese in Sonora would rank as the firstor second most
populous foreign group.
Not surprisingly most of the Americans on the Corral census were listed by occupation as minero, mine speculator or
[ 277]

owner, followed by rancher, railroad employee, manufacturer,
merchant, and skilled tradesmen - such as carpenters,
machinists, assayers, doctors. One cook was included. Among
the Chinese there was only one minero.Over half of them (161)
were zapateros (shoemakers), tailors or ironers, who were
employed in the few Chinese-owned shoe and clothing factories in the state. Two of these plants - Siu Fo Chon and
Tung, Chung, Lung, both of Guaymas were established as
5
early as 1873. Other occupations listed for Chinese were day
worker, truck farm laborer, cook, baker, and even cirujano or
surgeon (probably a traditional Chinese healer). Only twenty,
or less than ten percent, were comerciantes, merchants or
businessmen. No Chinese was specifically noted as a mine or
railroad laborer, two lines of work typically associated with
Asian immigrants in the American West and Southwest in the
nineteenth century. In the case of northern Mexico, where
most of the mines and railroads were located, Indians and native Mexicans appeared to have met the labor requirements
sufficiently.
During the rest of the Porfiriato, a small but prominent
group of Chinese entrepreneurs continued to advance their
interest in the manufacturing of cheap shoes and clothing for
local consumption by the emerging working class. By 1903,
Chinese owned at least ten of thirty-seven shoe factories in
Sonora, producing over $100,000 (U.S.) in goods each year.6
The Chinese profile, however, was still low in comparison to
other foreign groups and to native Mexican businessmen.
When John R. Southworth of Nogales, Arizona, conducted his
commercial survey of Sonora in 1897, listing all the important
enterprises by district,he included only one Chinese establishment, the shoe manufacturer Siu Fo Chon of Guaymas.7 German, Spanish, French, American and Mexican houses all figured much more prominently as leading retail and wholesale
merchants. North Americans, as usual, operated most of the
mines. What Southworth considered unworthy of mention was
a lower level of local economic activity: door-to-door peddling;
small grocery and variety sales; sewing, laundry and cooking
services. Poor Chinese immigrants became adept at all of these.
Rather than displacing established houses, the Chinese
[278]
Immigrants
apparently moved quietly and quickly to fill the commercial
demands created by the opening of mines, the construction of
railroads, the growth of towns and the expansion of internal
markets. In the 1903 census more than 3000 Chinese residents
in Sonora were noted, and although they were spead over a
large number of towns, their greatest numbers were concentrated in dynamic urban centers, such as Magdalena, Hermosillo, Guaymas and the mining town of Cananea.8
Cananea is a good example of exactly the kind of town that
attracted droves of Chinese at the turn of the century for the
simple reason that it provided many opportunities to make a
decent living. Out of a total population of around 4000, the
Chinese numbered 800. It was a typical company town, owned
and operated by the Greene Consolidated Copper Company.
In good times it had all the features of a boom town. Most of
the residents were Mexican mine workers, who were also at the
bottom of the social scale. At the top of the hierarchy was a
small group of American managers and skilled workers. The
large Chinese population does not seem to have been actively
employed in the mines. If they worked for wages it was likely to
have been in American homes as cooks, houseboys and clothes
washers. Many opened small stores that required a very low
initial investment and provided necessary goods and services to
an urban, salaried population.9
By 1907 Chinese merchants had become more visible in
local commerce throughout Sonora. A poll of the state's "most
important businesses," conducted between 1905 and 1907,
noted Chinese merchants operating in twenty-one out of
two of 968 listings.
eighty-seven towns, accounting for fifty"Business" was defined loosely to include doctors, lawyers,
landowners (hacendados) and other individuals of economic
means, thus explaining the long roster of names. All the
10Small businesses, howChinese were described as comerciante.
ever, were left out and the directory included no Chinese
names under the Cananea heading. Oversight based on a certain degree of prejudice might partially explain their exclusion
since elsewhere in the same directory it was noted that the
prominent Chinese department store Juan Lung Tain of Magdalena had two branch stores in Cananea.
[ 279]
Thewell-stocked
interior
Chinesegrocers
ofa ChinesestoreinHermosillo.
carrieda greatvariety
urban
merchandise
that
to
consumers.
of
appealed
[ 280]
Immigrants
A few of the large establishments took out advertisement
space in the 1905-07 commercial directory. Ranging from
full-page to quarter-page, these were replete with handsome
illustrations, flowery prose, and some information. The fullpage spread on the firmof Quan, Gun, Lung y Ca. is especially
revealing about the nature of a big Chinese business, as well as
reflective of at least official Mexican attitudes towards these
merchants at the beginning of the twentieth century. Established in 1894, this company was one of the principal commercial houses of the town of Alamos in southern Sonora. It sold a
wide variety of goods, ranging from groceries and canned
goods to clothing and notions; dealing in imported as well as
domestic products, it had its own "well mounted factory" to
manufacture shoes. In addition, the company served as the
agent for Pacific Beer, Pochutla and Pluma Hidalgo coffee
(products of Oaxaca in southern Mexico), "La Violeta" cigars
(from Veracruz state in southern Mexico), and "El Dorado"
rum. Quan, Gun, Lung y Ca. traded directly with New York,
Chicago, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Hamburg, Germany.
Within Mexico, its sphere of operation extended beyond
Sonora to the adjacent states of Chihuahua to the east and
Sinaloa to the south, where a new branch had recently opened.
The owner and general manager of Quan, Gun, Lung was
Guillermo Leytn, whose name had been hispanicized. The
advertisement described him as:
... an excellentChinese who enjoys general popularityin the locality.
... In particularhe is well loved by the workingpeople, because he
willinglyand readily helps them out, especiallywhen a poor harvest
or some othercause raises the pricesof basic necessities;at whichtime
Leytn- makingonlya littleprofitor perhaps none at all sells them
these articles of primaryneed at prices they could afford, thereby
avertingthe specterof hunger.. . .
This sympathetic depiction of a generous, sensitive Chinese
merchant contrasted sharply with charges, soon to become
widespread, that Chinese proprietors were rapacious, mean
and exploitive of Mexican employees and consumers alike.
From the advertisement it is apparent that Mr. Leytn had
[281]

a Chinese assistant manager, Francisco Chon, but a Mexican
chief clerk, Modesto J. Lozano, "a conscientious and intelligent
employee." That Leytn employed Mexicans contrasted with
later accusations that Chinese businesses hired practically no
native nationals. Finally, the fact that Leytn hispanicized his
name was certainly an indication of some inclination to adopt
Mexican ways, and to acculturate, even if the primary motive
was to promote his business.
Another Chinese firm that took out a full-page advertisement in the directory was Juan Lung Tain of Magdalena in
northern Sonora, a town with over 300 Chinese residents. As
with other large Chinese general merchandise stores, this too
had its own adjoining shoe factory. Founded in 1896, the firm
opened branches in Hermosillo and Cananea; the Hermosillo
store had its own shoe and clothing factoryand in Cananea the
oudets were located in the American section called Ronquillo.
The lengthy description concluded with the positive observation that the company conducted business with "the best good
faith."
Little is known about the small Chinese businesses that
seemed to proliferate throughout Sonora and the north during
the Porfiriato, but whenever urbanization and population
growth appeared, Chinese could be found participating actively in the local economy. Ironically, more information became available when the Mexicans turned against the Chinese
at the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Before
then, only the most progressive political group - the radical,
pro-labor Mexican Liberal Party- had targeted Chinese immigration as detrimental to Mexican welfare. The party members reserved their most virulent xenophobic attacks, however,
for the imperialist North Americans, against whom they or11
ganized the famous Cananea labor strike of 1906. Before the
Revolution, racist stereotypes of the Chinese also appeared
muted, although such characterizations were not unknown.
They were occasionally caricatured as criminal, indolent and
cruel by nature; as prone to spread horrible diseases such as
trachoma and beri-beri; and as addicted to pernicious vices
such as opium and gambling.12
At the end of the Porfiriatoin 1911, it was estimated that
[282]
Immigrants
some 35,000 Chinese had entered Mexico. Only about half setded in Mexico; the rest found their way illegally to the United
States, returned to China, or transshipped elsewhere in the
Americas. Contemporary surveys, however, disagreed on the
extent of Chinese immigration. One source counted 13,203
Chinese in Mexico at this time, with a third residing in Sonora.
United States consuls in Mexico estimated somewhat higher
figures that ranged between twentyand fortythousand. In any
case, it is apparent that they had become the most numerically
prominent foreign colony in Mexico.13
In 1910, Francisco Madero, a northern landowner and industrialist, led a broad coalition of nationalistic middle-class
entrepreneurs, petit bourgeois elements, peons, workers and
peasants, to unseat the increasingly repressive dictator Diaz.
Besides many legitimate grievances, most Mexicans, especially
those in the north and hence close to U.S. investments and
influence, felt that Diaz had sold the country to foreign interests. There was a strong racist undercurrent to the Revolution
from the beginning. After Diaz fled the country in mid-1911,
the loose coalition fell apart, throwing Mexico into a decade of
almost constant civil war.
In this protracted period of chaos and violence, the
Chinese tried to stay neutral, but under the uncertain, volatile
conditions of a revolution, neutrality was not a tenable position.
In the end they had no friends and no protectors among the
Mexicans, and the breakdown of law and order that Diaz had
masterfully maintained for over three decades allowed latent
anti-Asian sentiments to surface. Moreover, in the north, Mexicans began to focus a widespread, general hatred of foreigners
more narrowly on the Chinese, who were numerous and visible
in their capacity as small local merchants, yet totally vulnerable
because of China's own internal chaos and weak international
position.14 With no consular representation of its own, the
Asian colony in the north had to rely on U.S. consular personnel for protection, a dependence that added an ironic twist to
general American-Chinese relations. In 1882, discrimination
and resentment against Chinese immigrants, predominantly in
California, resulted in the enactment of the Exclusion Act banning further Chinese entry. In Mexico, however, both Ameri[283]

can and Chinese were aliens in an increasingly hostile environment. Many were bound together by employer-employee,
patron-client, or landlord-lessee relations, prompting a sense of
responsibility on the part of Americans for the defenseless
Chinese.
The experiences of Fong Lewis exemplify the closeness of
this relationship. From 1905 to 1908, he cooked for the Booker
family in Casa Grande, Chihuahua; later he went to work for
the American-owned Madera Company. When the company
mills closed down and the Americans fled to El Paso shortly
after the Revolution broke out, Fong was thrown out of a job.
In 1914, his former employer pressed the U.S. Immigration
Service to grant Fong temporary refuge at El Paso. The supervisor of the El Paso station remarked that the Americans were
motivated not only by humanitarian concerns, but also because
they were loath to lose sight of a good, faithful and cheap
servant.15 Similar requests by Americans on behalf of their
present or former Chinese employees for temporary asylum in
the United States were common during the Revolution. How
Fong's case was ultimately settled is not known, but in situations
of real emergency, suspension of the Exclusion Act was usually
granted.16
Even when Chinese were not directly employed by Americans or American companies, they tended to follow U.S. capital in the sense that heavy U.S. investments in mines and railroads stimulated the kind of growth that provided economic
opportunities for them. By 1912, for example, the Chinese colony in Cananea had grown to between 1500 and 2000
- half or more (800 to
people
900, according to U.S. consular
were
"merchants," a broad category that
agent George Wiswall)
included everyone in business for himself. Other Chinese continued to work for American families, or were also engaged in
truck farming on the outskirts of town.17 Many of the stores,
such as the two branch outlets of Juan Lung Tain, were located
in Ronquillo, probably on rented American property.
Another possible relationship between Americans and
Chinese is suggested by an example from the Saltillo area in
Coahuila: Fong Sing's restaurant was located within the territory of the Mazapil Copper Company in Concepcin del Oro.
[284]
Immigrants
In fact, Fong Sing owned only half of the restaurant and the
American company controlled the rest of the inventory, so the
upstart Chinese businessman and the wealthy American company, whose workers the restaurant probably served, formed a
partnership.18 Similar arrangements may have existed in
Cananea.
With such a large concentration of foreigners around the
Mexicans - wealthy, privileged, powerful Americans; inscrutable, thrivingOrientals - it is no wonder that anti-foreign feelings ran deep in Cananea. Before the Revolution, the Mexican
workers directed their hostilityprimarily toward the American
owners and managers - as was clearly the case during the 1906
strike- but during the Revolution, they also turned on the
large Chinese colony with a vengeance. Besides arousing
resentment by their own activities, the Chinese might well have
with the much-hated
suffered a "guilt by association"
Americans.
Most of the demonstrations in Cananea that resulted in
personal or property injuries started out as general anti-foreign
rallies, which somehow degenerated into anti-Chinese mob actions. One such incident took place on February 24, 1914. Following an "open letter" in which two Mexican labor leaders
accused the managers of the copper company of thievery, a
band of Mexican women - wives of the mine workers gathered at the Ronquillo district "making speeches attacking
all foreigners." The group grew into an angry mob of almost
500 men and women who marched to a Chinese laundry,
ransacked it inside and out, and beat up three Chinese
workers trapped on the premises. The police arrived late
and did nothing, probably because there were only eight of
them. Finally, thirty mounted soldiers managed to disperse
the Mexicans.
The gravity of this incident immediately prompted U.S.
Consul Frederick Simpich of Nogales to make an on-spot inspection of Cananea, which fell within his jurisdiction.19 Following State Department instructions to protect Chinese under
attack, he made provisions to evacuate them in the event of a
crisis to the copper company's "meat packing building ... an
extensive steel and concrete structure." Upon receiving a long
[285]

list of grievances and abuses from the Chinese community including seizure of property and excess taxes imposed by revolutionary factions Simpich urged them to stay open rather
than to close down their businesses. He also noted that should
the American company cease to operate - the managers
threatened to do so if Mexican unions became more
- the situation of the Chinese would become "most
demanding
perilous." In his report to the State Department, Simpich offered this final observation:
. . . the feelingagainst all foreignersand against Chinese in particular
is very strong; the continued depreciation of money,and the subsequent rise in the cost of food ... and the mistaken idea of the
ignorantminersthatAmerican capitalistsand Chinese merchantsare
in some way veryresponsiblefor thiscondition,is drivingthe people
to increasingunrest.
Justifiablyor not, because the Chinese grew much of the
vegetable crop and owned many of the local foodstores, when
food became scarce or too cosdy, they inevitably got the blame.
Frequently, hungry Mexicans reacted by looting Chinese stores
of everything they could consume, in one case leaving behind
only some exotic drugs. In some small communities where the
Asians virtually monopolized local food supplies, desperate
mobs sacked the entire town.20 When well-stocked shops were
looted, losses could be substantial. In July, 1915, while revolutionary soldiers and poor Mexicans raided forty large
Chinese businesses in Cananea, the proprietors reported losses
totaling more than $530,000 (U.S.).21 Local authorities usually
stood by as the pillaging took place, afraid to intervene.
Perhaps this was their way to defuse tension. One prefect reportedly advised his people to "help themselves" at Chinese
stores if merchants withheld produce in expectation of higher
prices.22
Besides these mob attacks on their persons and properties,
the Chinese suffered another kind of abuse during the Revolution that can be best described as extortion. In search of constant cash to pay for armies and guns, revolutionary generals of
every faction imposed forced loans or contributions on wealthy
[286]
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Mexicans and foreigners. In the north, Pancho Villa and his
lieutenants appeared especially adept at this practice. Since
powerful governments backed up the fierce protests of Americans, Englishmen and other Europeans, only the Chinese could
be squeezed with virtual impunity. As early as August, x9 1 1, a
Mexican newspaper reported that 216 Chinese had complained
of forced loans.23 Another fairly common pressure revolutionary generals applied on Chinese storekeepers was to force
them to sell food and goods at less than cost, that is, at a loss, to
appease hungry soldiers and the poor.24 Faced with the loss of
property and profits,Chinese merchants responded by limiting
orders for new supplies, thereby aggravating already severe
shortages. Frustrated mobs often mistook an actual lack of
merchandise for the deliberate withholding of goods.
The frequency and intensity of these assaults generally
reflected the ups and downs of the Revolution in the north,
especially in the camp of Pancho Villa and his allies. When on
the winning streak, their armies supported massive numbers of
otherwise unemployed Mexicans, alleviating some of the misery caused by the ravages of war. With the decline of Villa from
mid- 1914 on, anti-Chinese hostilitymounted. In the face of all
the violence, however, the Chinese persevered and continued
to stay in business, even with the loss of lives. In most cases,
one or at most a few unfortunates caught in the wrong place
at the wrong time perished at the hands of trigger-happy
revolutionary soldiers.25
There was, however, a painful incident in which over three
hundred Chinese were killed during the course of one bloody
afternoon. To Chinese all over Mexico and through time, the
tragic massacre of Torren on May 15, 1911, served as a frightful reminder of their extreme vulnerability as unwelcome
aliens in a war-torn country uncertain of its own future and
identity.26Torren in the northeastern state of Coahuila was an
important commercial and industrial town of over 30,000 residents in 1910. The 700 Chinese residents constituted the most
prominent foreign colony, in both number and property. Besides the usual small businesses, they operated hotels, department stores, even a bank, housed in its own building.27 Chinese
investment also extended to urban real estate and the city
tramway line.
[288]
Immigrants
When Maderista soldiers took the cityfrom thefederales on
the fifteenth, they quickly attracted an unruly mob of four
thousand lower class men and women, descended upon the
central business district, and pillaged the commercial establishments. In the wake of total havoc and destruction were 303
dead foreigners, almost all Chinese. The looting caused estimated property damages of $850,000 (U.S.), and the Chinese
community sustained, by far, the greatest losses, destroying at
the outset of the Revolution what had been Mexico's most
prosperous Asian colony. It was never to recover.
What could possibly have unleashed this sudden, uncontrollable fury on an outwardly peaceful, law-abiding,
hard-working alien immigrant group? Emilio Madero, who
commanded the invading army, could never substantiate a
charge that the Chinese had invited the massacre by firing first
at the rebels. Nor did the unarmed Chinese put up any kind of
resistance when the Mexicans sacked their premises. The massive killings were wanton and without direct provocation. The
answer to the Mexicans' rage lay not in what the Chinese did to
them, but simply in what the Chinese had made of themselves
in Torren. Many Mexicans probably found it intolerable that a
relatively recent, upstart, nonwhite immigrant group became
so successful in so short a time, and with so much facility.Unlike North Americans and other Europeans who tended to invest in capital intensive enterprises beyond the reach of most
Mexicans, the Chinese engaged primarily in modest economic
activities that Mexicans could readily identify with. The resentment was made evident in a speech that Jess Flores, a
Maderista, delivered on May 5, ten days before the massacre, at
the plaza of Gmez Palacio near Torren.28 The Chinese
monopolized the garden industry, he charged; they were not
good citizens because they sent money earned in Mexico out of
the country, "instead of spending it here as other foreigners
do." Worst of all, in running laundries and restaurants, they
took traditional work away from Mexican women. Flores called
for their expulsion from Mexico.
Poor, lower-class Mexican women were particularly susceptible to the kind of inflammatory messages Flores preached.
They struggled to take care of their families during the difficult
times of the Revolution, when so many of the menfolk were
[289]

away fighting. Chinese businesses probably did preempt them
from taking in laundry and sewing, or cooking for others. In
Cananea, a Women's Union was at the forefront of the antiChinese persecution.29
After Torren, anti-Chinese hostility occurred mainly in
the states of Chihuahua and especially Sonora. Although no
other single incident even remotely approached the tragic
proportions of Torren, the assaults were frequent, widespread and arbitrary,creating for the Asians what amounted to
an atmosphere of terror.30By 1916, it was conservatively estimated that a hundred Chinese had lost their lives in Sonora
alone. The northwestern state had the largest Chinese population, estimated as high as ten to fifteen thousand, including
those born in Mexico, those who were naturalized Mexican
citizens, and those with Mexican wives and children.31 Not surprisingly,it was in Sonora that the persecution was most intense
and innovative.
In 1916, a new way of waging the racist campaign emerged
in that state - one which proved in the end more devastating
than sporadic murders. For the firsttime a "studied and deliberate" political movement organized local communities to use
legal means in harassing Chinese. Essentially, this consisted of
"intolerable discriminatory" local ordinances, some ostensibly
intended for everyone but in fact designed with the peculiar
conditions of the Chinese in mind. The purpose was to make
life so difficult, business so unprofitable, that the Chinese
would not want to stay any longer in Mexico. Again, much to
the Mexicans' frustration, the Chinese level of tolerance was
quite a bit higher than they had anticipated. This campaign
moved forward in spurts until it petered out temporarily in
1920, and it failed to achieve the ultimate goal of expelling the
Chinese, but it did establish the pattern for all subsequent
movements, including the final successful one in 1931.
Early in April, 1916, in reporting the nature of this new
campaign to the State Department, Consul Simpich included a
list of the kind of local ordinances designed to harass the
Chinese communities only. He received the accounting from
Francisco L. Yuen of Nogales (Sonora),
a prominent
businessman and president of the Chinese Fraternal Union, a
[ 290]
Immigrants
mutual aid society. Simpich prefaced his report with the ominous warning that these "illegal" laws were in obvious violation
of international treaties, property rights and personal liberty,
and "if allowed to stand unchallenged by outside governments
. . . are likely to establish troublesome precedents and encourage the present despotic military government of Sonora to
adopt an even more prejudicial attitude towards all foreign
interests."32 Simpich made quite clear his conviction that such
discriminatory actions hurt all foreigners, hence the United
States should intervene to discourage their implementation.
The ordinances that Yuen enumerated were varied. Some
were discriminatory taxes levied specifically on Chinese merchants, such as those in Agua Prieta that raised municipal taxes
on Chinese stores from $5 to $30 per month. Some tried to
exclude Chinese from engaging in certain economic activities
that they had come to monopolize: the Magdalena ordinances,
for example, forced Chinese to abandon all truck farming after
May 1, 1916, and, in addition, prohibited them from leasing
land for agricultural purposes; in Cananea and Nogales,
Chinese were ordered to quit dealing altogether in meats,
fruits,vegetables, and to cease laundry work. Other laws were
aimed at Mexicans doing business with or renting property
to Chinese: in Magdalena, Mexicans were authorized to break
contracts with Chinese at will and with impunity; in Cananea
and Magdalena, the Chinese were to cease occupying premises
legally rented, and Mexican landlords were warned not to lease
property to Chinese on penalty of confiscation of that property.
El Tigre passed an outright expulsion decree; Agua Prieta limited the number of times a Chinese businessman could travel
from one town to another, and forbade them to visit each
other's houses without prior authorization from the local
police. Finally, some laws were aimed at humiliating the
Chinese, such as the one in Agua Prieta that required them to
take public baths before municipal officers.
Yuen's list certainly did not exhaust the variety of ordinances that local municipalities came up with to intimidate the
Chinese business community. Because the merchants, their
partners and employees (especially if all were single men),
tended to live, eat and cook on the store premises, and because
[291]

Chinese stores usually doubled as warehouses for the excess
stock, some towns passed sanitation regulations ostensibly to
improve general health conditions, but, in fact, the ordinances
were directed at undermining certain Chinese business practices that saved them money. Another innovation was the Ley de
Trabajo or Work Law, commonly known as the "80 percent
law," enacted statewide in 1919. It stipulated that the work force
of all foreign enterprises must be at least eighty percent
Mexican. Mostly the Chinese were affected, for it was well
known that they hired few Mexicans. Reminiscent of the regulation proposed in the seventeenth century, segregation laws
attempted to restrict Chinese residents to their own barrio or
ghetto outside town.33
Spearheading the campaign from 1916 to 1919 was Jos
Mara Arana, Magdalena businessman and schoolteacher, who
insisted that their methods were strictlylegal. He and his associates organized the small Mexican businessmen, with support from local consumers and the working class, to act as a
political pressure or lobby group. It was largely through their
effortsthat town councils passed such discriminatory measures.
These propaganda organizations took various names, each
quite revealing about its membership and ideology. Arana's
own pioneer group in Magdalena was named the Junta Comercial y de Hombresde Negocio, or "Commercial and Businessmen's
Junta." In Caborca, a similar organization was called the "Junta
of National protectionism"; and in Culiacn, Sinaloa, the group
was called the Junta CentralNacionalista "En Defensa de la Raza."
In Cananea, the anti-Chinese league also had an interesting
name, the "Fraternal Union of Salaried Workers of Cananea,"
which clearly reflected the dominant Mexican social class in the
company town. By 1917, Arana claimed he had inspired the
foundation of seventeen juntas, with a combined membership
of 5000 in Sonora and several neighboring states such as
Sinaloa, Nayarit, Chihuahua, the Territory of Baja and as far
south as Oaxaca.34
In addition to these juntas or leagues, Arana and his fellow
believers - appropriately self-named co-religionarios- used
another effective instrument of propaganda, the weekly tabloid. The most famous was probably Arana's own Pro-Patria.
Printed on each issue was the following rousing statement:
[292]
Immigrants
JosMara Arana,Magdalena
businessman
wholedthe19161919 campaigntosuppress
Chinese
competitors
through
discriminatory
legislation.
An earlyphotoofRamnCorral,
thegovernor
ofSonorawhoordered
a censusofforeignresidents
living
in hisstatein 1890.
[293]

Improvementof the race is the supreme ideal of all civilizednations,
so that if the Chinese are corruptingour race, we ought to restrict
them. The Chinese produce on the towns the same effectthat the
locusthas on the crops: theydestroythem.The Mexican thatdefends
the Chinese with detrimentto the national good, is a traitorto the
country.35
In loud and clear terms, these words unequivocally equated the
anti-Chinese campaign with patriotism, or, more accurately,
with a new nationalism.
The local politicians and revolutionary generals in command of Sonora, center of the Arana movement, reacted differently, even as they all agreed in principle to the validity
of the Chinese issue. Native Sonoran Generals Plutarco Elias
Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, leaders of the victorious Constitutionalist faction, were generally sympathetic. But in the
face of pressure from the United States, transmitted through
its consular agents, they were forced to rescind or at least not
to pursue vigorously the discriminatory legistlation. Cesario
Soriano, interim governor during 1917, was quite outspoken in
his condemnation of Arana's inflammatory rhetoric and scandalous tactics. He publicly denounced the shrill and vulgar
Pro-Patria language, and its cheap appeal to base chauvinism,
which amounted to emotional exploitation of untutored
lower-class Mexicans. He regarded Pro-Patria "diatribes, insults and parochialisms" as a potential international embarrassment, as well as violations of constitutional guarantees to all
persons, including the alien Chinese.36 In short, outside pressure and internal voices of moderation prevailed, thereby softening the impact of the legalistic campaign.
Still, one undeniable result of the Aranistas' crude emotional appeal was to generate and intensifyanti-Chinese racism.
The movement reinforced old and existing stereotypes, created
new ones, and fanned antagonism. Besides the internationally
known "yellow peril" image, propagandists depicted Chinese
immigration as "an avalanche that has inundated us," or as "an
obnoxious octopus." A typical derogatory term for Chinese was
chinacate- chink or chinaman; milder but more sarcastic names
were celestials and sons of Confucius. For those who protected
[294]
Immigrants
or defended the rights of the harassed Chinese was reserved
the name chineroor chink-lover.37 Racism more than anything
else underlay the prejudice against Chinese- Mexican marriages. Aranistas charged that such unions debilitated the Mexican race, specifically by producing "feeble, pale and slit-eyed"
offspring. In some cases, they actively intervened to ruin a
relationship. Miguel Moo and his Mexican fiance, Francisca
Acua of Nacozari, were so intimidated, for example, that their
planned wedding in late 1917 never materialized. The critics
claimed that the bride "was not in her right mind," because
Moo had numbed her senses with morphine and other narcotics.38 Bizarre charges, perhaps, but actually quite in conformity
with the prevailing stereotype of the evil, drug-wielding
Chinaman.
This firstanti-Chinese political campaign did not succeed
for a number of reasons. First, there was insufficient unity
among the Aranistas, state politicians and national political
leaders, meaning that the discriminatory ordinances could not
be consistently or persistently carried out to their logical conclusion. Second, the United States Government, through its
consular representatives, successfully applied pressure on high
echelon state officials not to cooperate with the campaign.
Third, the Chinese themselves did not stand idly by, but responded immediately with strongly worded protests to high
state and federal authorities, alerted their own government
and, more significantly,the American government, upon each
assault, and retained aggressive legal counsel. Frustrated in
turn by the Chinese ability to thwart their efforts at displacing
them, Aranistas charged that the merchants greased the palms
of corrupt Mexican officials with "el oro chino"- Chinese gold.
Such charges were difficult to substantiate, but they were entirely possible. Also, Chinese storekeepers reminded Mexicans
none too subtly that should they be forced out of business, local
and state treasuries would suffer drastic decline in revenues
with the abrupt cessation of Chinese taxes.39 Arana died in
1921 (one fantasy had him poisoned by the Chinese), thus depriving the movement of its original inspiration, its dynamic,
charismatic and demagogic leadership.
Undaunted by the setback, anti-Chinese forces vowed to
[295]

tryagain, no doubt goaded by the galling fact that after 1920,
the Chinese were in a stronger commercial position than ever
before. Neither the Revolution nor the campaign seemed to
have crippled their ability to prosper. In January, 1920, Martin
Wong, President of the Guaymas chapter of the Chinese Fraternal Union, acknowledged to U.S. Consul Bartley Yost that
"Chinese business has recently increased a hundred percent."
Yost himself added that "the trade in groceries, dry goods and
general merchandise in Sonora is largely controlled by
Chinese." In 1923, U.S. Trade Commissioner P. L. Bell noted
that, except for two old Spanish houses in Mazatln, the
Chinese entrepreneurs were the largest food dealers on the
Mexican West Coast. Moreover, they dominated the general
retail trade in large cities such as Guaymas, Hermosillo and
Nogales, and were becoming more influential in Culiacn and
Mazatln in Sinaloa.40
Another cause for alarm among the Mexicans was the resurgence of Chinese immigration into the country after a decline during the revolutionary period. From 1919 to 1921, more
than six thousand Chinese arrived, twice the number during
the years 1914 to 1918. In Sonora, the total Chinese population
had fallen from 4468 in 1910, to 3639 in 1920, but still composed the largest foreign colony.41 Nevertheless, in places
where the campaign had been particularly virulent, negative
consequences were definitely visible. Cananea, for example,
witnessed the mass flight of its Chinese residents, many of
whom had liquidated their properties and left town by 1920,
when only 400 out of a high of 2000 remained.42 The exodus
could also have reflected the slowed-down operations of the
copper company.
In May and June, 1922, and briefly in 1924, the Chinese
themselves provided Mexicans with a ready excuse to renew the
campaign. During those times, rival Chinese political factions
fought out their differences openly in the streets of Mexico.
The two parties contending for overseas support represented
ideological splits in revolutionary China: the republican
Kuomintang (KMT), and the Chee Kung Tong (CKT), an old
masonic order that followed the waves of Chinese immigration
in the nineteenth century. The KMT hired gunmen in an effort
[296]
Immigrants
hefelttheChinese
Arana!s map, drawntosymbolize
theaggressive
threat
posed.
[ 297]

to dislodge the older established CKT and they terrorized the
Mexicans and the majority of the Chinese community, most of
whom were not involved. The rash of shoot-outs and street
wars punctured the long, peaceful record of unarmed Chinese,
while adding to the stereotype that these chinacates were by
nature criminal and murderous. At the end of the tong wars in
1922, over twenty Chinese bodies were recovered from the
streets;43significantly,not a single innocent Mexican was killed.
The disturbances provided the pretext for the Sonoran
government to round up some 300 Chinese for deportation,
with charges that they were aliens engaging in illegal political
activities on Mexican soil. Obviously not all those jailed could be
implicated in the armed conflict. Yet Sonoran Governor Francisco Elias, an ardent anti-Chinese nationalist, wanted to expel
all of them as a prelude to the resumption of the interrupted
campaign. Fortunately for the Chinese, the federal government was still not secure or stable enough to support such a
movement. President and General lvaro Obregon, himself a
native Sonoran and undoubtedly sympathetic to the common
sentiments at home, was still waiting for U. S. recognition of his
regime, withheld pending proof of its sense of responsibility.
After dispatching a commission to investigate the tong wars,
Obregon decided on a compromise. He ordered the deportation of only the handful of known leaders, while releasing the
many arbitrarilyjailed, some of whom had been imprisoned for
over three months.44
As expected, when the crisis broke out in 1922, U.S. consuls on the Mexican West Coast immediately stepped forward
to protect the Chinese and represent their interests. Again, the
reasons were not simply humanitarian, but economic as well. As
Consul Yost made clear to the state department, the round-up
of innocent Chinese merchants was "proving injurious to
American trade, both in the sale of merchandise and collection
of accounts owed by imprisoned or threatened Chinese to
American export firms." In the 1920s, Chinese businessmen
had become the major clients of American exporters to the
Mexican West Coast. The ever alert Yost made another significant observation during the aftermath of the tong wars.
Certain Mexicans wanted to expel these Orientals from the
country, he remarked, "as the native merchants are incapable
[ 298]
Immigrants
of competing with them."45 The Mexicans' sense of economic
impotence had become more acute with time. Why native Mexicans could not compete effectively with the Chinese - and
hence felt compelled to eliminate them totally- was the crux of
the Chinese problem. Besides their legendary diligence and
frugality,the Chinese developed competitive business practices,
some culturally rooted, that the Mexicans found impossible to
emulate. While not illegal, the Mexicans believed that many of
these practices were ethically questionable. They even objected
to certain aspects of the Chinese lifestyle as promoting unfair
advantages.
Most of the immigrants were young and once they arrived
in Mexico, they readily found help from prominent members
of the established Chinese community to start them off financially in some very small business, most likely vending or hawking groceries on the street. They could find employment with
Chinese-owned enterprises, such as the truck farms and the
coarse shoe and clothing factories established in Sonora as early
as the late nineteenth century. American mine owners and railroad builders, while not inclined to hire Chinese for strenuous
or skilled labor, did favor them for service jobs as cooks, launderers and domestics. These workers received extremely low
wages, even by Mexican standards. One leading anti-Chinese
activist claimed that the Chinese worked for one-third the
wages of the poorest-paid Mexican.46 This led to charges such
as those voiced by the radical Mexican Liberal Party in 1906,
that these foreigners further debased the already severely
exploited Mexican workers.
Even more incredible to the Mexican was the Chinese
ability to save money from these abysmal wages and open up
their own stores. Mexicans quickly perceived that one Chinese
secret was to rely heavily on his family,relatives, co-villagers or
other Chinese for help, before he would consider hiring Mexicans. If the proprietor, his partners and employers were all
single men, they usually lived on the store premises, thereby
saving money on rent and other living expenses. Mexicans assailed both these customs - as unfair business practices, which
furthermore underscored the secretive, clannish, arrogant
Chinese character.
Another typical tendency of the Asian merchant was to
[299]

keep his store well stocked with a great variety of items, ranging
from fresh produce to imported luxury goods. Most Chinese
mercantiles were listed as variety or general merchandise outlets, but even the groceries, drugstores and bakeries, sold more
than just one type of product. Extra supplies were also crowded
into the store, rather than warehoused elsewhere, thus saving
on overhead expenses. All these practices that Mexicans found
deplorable enabled the Chinese businessmen to undersell their
Mexican competitors by offering lower prices, and to outsell
them by presenting more choices. For the Mexican consumer
then, shopping at Chinese establishments meant savings in time
and money.
Mutual aid societies were another secret to Chinese success. The Chinese Fraternal Union had several chapters in
Mexico and was connected to the headquarters in San Francisco. The same was true of the Chee Kung Tong. These associations served several functions: they provided a social and cultural oudet for the Chinese immigrants, as well as facilitating
cooperative business activities among themselves and between
Mexico and the United States. The reputable old Chinese firms
of San Francisco extended credit and financial capital to their
counterparts in Mexico. They also acted as clearing houses for
the Mexican stores. Merchants in Mexico purchased most of
their merchandise in the United States via the main offices of
their mutual aid or commercial associations, taking advantage
of the good credit ratings the California firms had built up over
time. To the Mexicans these international connections again
constituted another unfair advantage for the Chinese.
Even in the best of times Mexicans would have found it
difficultto compete in their homeland with any foreign group.
They lacked commercial experience, credit and business contacts. The Revolution and civil wars eroded what little chance
they had in the late-nineteenth century to improve their fortunes. Before the arrival and the entrenchment of Chinese in
local retail trade, Spaniards and Germans had dominated this
sector of the economy. After World War I, however, their contacts with suppliers in Europe were seriously disrupted. The
Chinese, who did most of their business with North Americans,
successfully closed in on the Europeans. In the process, Ameri[ 3 ]
Immigrants
can exporting firms extended their virtual monopoly over the
West Coast. Again, this mutually dependent relationship was
one major reason why Americans felt so responsible for
Chinese welfare.47
Sonorans launched their final and successful campaign
against the Chinese in 1929 during the Great Depression,
which had severe repercussions in northern Mexico.48 American investment in Sonora's key economic sectors - mining, cattle, commercial agriculture - all dropped sharply. Mexicans
who had previously found work in the United States were
thrown back across the border, exacerbating an already explosive unemployment crisis. The rebellions of Generals Manzo
and Topete in late 1929 intensified the desperate conditions in
the state. Ten years after the Revolution, the Mexicans' lot was
still miserable and they deeply resented the relative prosperity
of the alien Chinese. The continuous Asian presence became
absolutely insufferable.
In Governor Francisco Elias, the anti-Chinese forces in
Sonora found their most zealous supporter in the government.
Equally significant in finallyunifying local and national solidarity behind the movement was the Sonoran who held sway in
Mexico City, General Plutarco Elias Calles. If, during 1916,
when Calles was military governor, he had felt politically constrained, he rested assured in 1929 that conditions could not
have been more propitious to prosecute the campaign to its
conclusion.
The leaders of the revived movement realized that their
task was really quite a simple one: all they had to do was to dust
off the old discriminatory legislation. Consequently, among
Governor Elias' first acts was the resurrection of the "80 percent law." One of the campaign's most ardent and outspoken
promoters was Jos ngel Espinoza, one-time state senator and
publisher of El Nacionalista, a leading anti-Chinese propaganda
tabloid. According to him, there were 1 1,000 Chinese residents
in the state, 4000 of whom could be considered proprietors of
the 2000 or so businesses. The rest, or 7000, he concluded had
to be employees.49 Consequently, application of the law would
result in 5000 new jobs for needy Mexicans. Since other sources
never noted more than 4000 Chinese in the state, Espinoza
[301 1
.
Arana addresses
a crowdofenthusiastic
supporters
appears to have grossly exaggerated the figures; perhaps he
did so to make his point more forcefully,and to underscore the
gravity of the situation for Mexicans. In May, 1931, the governor amended the law to define all partners as employees, and
hence subject to the quota. This was in response to a perceived
Chinese practice of defining their compatriot employees as
"socios,"or partners, in order to circumvent the regulation.
Also revived were the equally infamous Cdigo Sanitaria
and the ban on Chinese-Mexican marriages. To enforce the
health code with more vigor, the state government created the
new General Public Health Agency in 1930. Admitting that its
vigilance concentrated "above all" on the Chinese, the agency
enacted restrictions on their establishments. They were to limit
their stores to selling one principal item - groceries, meats,
drugs, bread but not a mixture of these. To curtail the
Chinese ambulatory trade in foodstuffs, new sanitary laws
barred meat and vegetables from being sold other than in
properly inspected and licensed central market stalls. To
[302]
Immigrants
frugality and hence savings, other laws
prohibited anyone, even the proprietor, from sleeping on
the premises, while stipulating that stocks of merchandise
must be kept in rented warehouses, not jammed into stores
or residences.
Moving full steam ahead, in June, 1931, Governor Elias
directed all municipal presidents to fix a date for the Chinese in
their jurisdiction to comply with the Work Law. Most of them
set a limit of fifteen days to one month for all Chinese merchants to submit a list of employees, Mexican and foreign.
Another decree specified the amounts of fines for each infraction or delay in compliance.
During the 1929-1931 campaign, popular support was
more fully mobilized than ever before. Local juntas or ligas
antichinas organized loud and massive demonstrations; even
vigilante groups surfaced to terrorize Chinese storekeepers
to help enforce the law, according to these thugs. In the face of
international criticism and even some from Mexico City, this
time Governor Elias and his successor, Rodolfo Calles, did not
even flinch. Instead, they defended the campaign as entirely
legal, moral and in the highest national interest. For the first
time, Chinese appeals to both Mexicans and Americans were no
longer effective. Sympathetic Mexicans felt politically constrained to intervene on behalf of the Chinese. The United
States, on the eve of its new Good Neighbor Policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries,
insisted that the Chinese government must begin to take care of
its own nationals overseas.50
Unable to comply with the work and sanitary laws, intimidated by the ban on marriage and harassed by Mexican
immigration officials, the Chinese who had survived so many
persecutions in Mexico admitted defeat in 1931. In August,
they announced plans to abandon the state, as soon as they
could sell their goods, lands and properties. For fear that departing Chinese would drain all of Sonora's liquid wealth, the
state dealt them the coup de grace: they had to sell before a quick
deadline at wholesale prices, consequently at a great loss. Still,
some were able to withdraw savings from Sonora and Arizona
banks.51
undercut Chinese
[303]
toneofanti-Chinese
Thevenomous
forJos
propagandais apparentin theillustrations
Above, a cruelcaricature
El
de
Sonora.
ofChinesebusiness
AngelEspinomi ejemplo
a Juan Lung Tain storein
Below, Mexicansboycott
and livingconditions.
practices
the
"80
law."
of
percent
support
Immigrants
By October, 1931, with most of the Chinese out of the
state, new Governor Rodolfo Calles triumphantly declared the
campaign successfully concluded. Throughout early 1932,
however, vigilante groups rounded up remnant Orientals, took
them by the truckload to the border, and dumped them on U.S.
soil. As many as 225 Asians were counted in the Nogales,
Arizona, jail in March, 1932. Faced with this unexpected influx
of "illegal immigrants," the United States bore the heavy cost of
deporting them to China from San Francisco.52 Although
Sonoran and federal authorities denied that they expelled the
Chinese, by leaving them no choice but to abandon the state,
the persecution by legalistic means was tantamount to an expulsion. Internationally the Chinese exodus was certainly characterized as such.
It is difficult to trace the course of the dispersal. With the
Exclusion Act still in effect in the United States, that route was
legally closed; the number of Chinese who managed to slip
across the border cannot be easily counted. The United States
government did grant the refugees temporary transit visas to
cross from Mexico to San Francisco, there to catch the slow boat
to China. Some returned to their homeland with Mexican wives
and children, creating the curious Mexican barrios outside certain south China villages. Many probably fled to other parts of
Mexico, such as Mexico City, Sinaloa and Chihuahua although these other northern states were definitely not
hospitable and especially to the district of Baja California
Norte, which already had a sizeable Chinese colony. According
to one propagandist, 6000 of the 15,000 residents of Mexicali in
1932 were Chinese. For obvious reasons, this border town
picked up the anti-Chinese movement where the Sonorans had
left off, forming in 1932 a Partido Nacionalista Anti-Chino; the
campaign did not, however, end with the expulsion of the
Asians.53 Although the persecution spread momentarily, the
impact of the campaign in Sonora was sufficient to neutralize
any further Chinese influence on local Mexican economies.
For the Mexicans of Sonora, eliminating the Asians did
not instantly improve their conditions. The local economy, in
fact, went through a difficult transition period, during which
[305]
uniondemonstrate
In Cananea, members
againsttheChinese
ofa women's
It was notunusualforwomentobeat theforefront
oftheantipresence.
Chinesecampaign.
[306]
Immigrants
certain small communities were forced into a system of barter
when severe shortages of supplies, caused by the sudden closing of Chinese stores, became apparent. Also, just as the
Chinese had predicted and warned, the state treasury suffered
a drastic reduction in revenues when the destruction of
Chinese businesses cut off a lucrative source of taxes. Nevertheless, the Mexicans gradually moved into the vacuum and
nationalized the petitbourgeoisclass of local society.54
In the late nineteenth century, northern Mexico provided
exactly the kind of environment that attracted Asian immigrants. It was a frontier region in the process of rapid social
and economic development, made possible primarily by
foreign capital, technology and markets. On the top of this
relatively simple society was a landed elite, some of whom also
owned mines and engaged in commerce. For the most part
Mexican, its ranks included a number of Europeans and North
Americans. At the base of this society was the bulk of the population, Indians, peons, workers and landless peasants who were
the wage laborers. The subsistence agrarian culture was in a
time of transition toward a more modern cash economy, which
included expanded domestic and international markets and led
to population growth and urbanization. When the Chinese first
arrived on the scene, the niche they quickly occupied did not
entail displacing any well established social group, which would
surely have provoked violent reaction. Rather, they answered
the need to expand an incipient petit bourgeoisie- small
capitalists and businessmen - a class they dominated in a short
time.
If the Mexican population was unaware of what was happening at first,the 1910 Revolution woke them up and instilled in
them a much stronger sense of racial and national identity,and
they protested strenuously. Ironically, the very modesty of
Chinese economic success made them ready targets; unlike
large American and European capitalists, what the Chinese had
attained was within the grasp of most Mexicans by the 1930s.
After the Revolution had raised their hopes and their position
in society,it became socially feasible, if not politically expedient,
to displace and replace the Chinese, to sacrifice them for the
sake of Mexican nationalism. For the Chinese, theirs was a
small success storywith a tragic ending.
[307]

NOTES
Chineseimmigration
toSoutheast
AsiaandtoNorthAmerica
hasbeenrelatively
wellstudiedandthereare numerous
on themin specific
Asiancounmonographs
triesandwithin
theU.S. Theirexperience
in CentralAmerica,
and
theCaribbean
SouthAmerica,
hasnotbeenwellcovered.
Therearea fewworks
ofnote:
however,
AnitaBradley,
Relations
ofPacific
(NewYork:Institute
Trans-Pacific
ofLatinAmerica
A Study
inCuba
Relations,
1942);DuvonC. Corbitt,
, 1847-1947(WiloftheChinese
inPeru:A History
Chinese
more,Ky.:Asbury
College,1971);WattStewatt,
Bondage
of
theChinese
Coolies
inPeru,1849-1874(Durham,
N.C.:DukeUniversity
Press,1951);
Luis Millones
"Los
Chinos
en
el
Peru:
cuatro
de
Santagadea,
y
siglos migracin
en el areaandina,"
inMinoras
tnicas
enelPer
, Seriede Antropologa,
adaptacin
de CienciasSociales,
Pontifica
Universidad
CatlicadelPer(Lima:
Departamento
"TheIntroduction
ofChinese
Laborers
toLatinAmerica:
19/3);Arnold
J.Meagher,
the'CoolieTrade,'1847 1874"(Ph.D.Dissertation,
of California
at
University
in
"Chinese
LaborMigration
intoLatinAmerica
Davis,1975);E. Chang-Rodriquez,
theNineteenth
Revista
deHistoria
deAmrica,
Vol.46 (December,
Century,"
1958),pp.
375-397.
2Thepioneerstudyof theChinesein Mexico,specifically
theStateofSonora,is
CharlesCumberland's
"The SonoranChineseand theMexicanRevolution,"
HisHistorical
Vol.40 (1960),pp. 191-211.A morerecentand
Review,
panicAmerican
is Leo M.D. Jacques'
"TheAnti-Chinese
inSonora,
comprehensive
study
Campaign
of Arizona,1974).Fromthis
Mexico,1900-1931"
(Ph.D.dissertation,
University
dissertation
Jacquesderivedtwo articles:"The ChineseMassacrein Torren
Arizona
andtheWest,
Vol.16(Autumn,
(Coahuila)in 1911,"
1974),pp.233-246;and
"HaveQuickMoreMoneyThan Mandarins:
The Chinesein Sonora,"
of
Journal
Arizona
Vol. 17(Summer,
thesison
1976),pp. 208-218.Thereis a Mexican
History,
theChineseinTampico:BeatrizRamirez
"Loschinosen Mxico.Esbozo
Camacho,
de la comunidad
de Tampico,"
Universidad
NacionalAutnoma
de
thesis,
(Masters
toJacques,"Campaign,"
Mxico,1975).According
pp. 10-11,in the1860ssome
Chineseentered
MexicofromtheUnitedStatestoworkon northern
construction
and mines.Severalcolonization
alsodrewup plansto import
projects
companies
labortoMexico,
butthesenevermaterialized.
cheapChinese
inMexicoCity
Relations,.
3Bradley,
Trans-Pacific
pp. 1-12;H. H. Dubs,"TheChinese
in1635,"
FarEastern
Vol.1(1942),pp.387-389.
Quarterly,
4Ramn
Memoria
dela administracin
delEstado
deSonora,
a
Corral,
pblica
presentada
la Legislatura
del mismo
RamnCorral,2 vols.(Guaymas:Imporel Gobernador
de E. Gaxiola,1891),
Vol.1,pp.586-602.According
tooneobserver,
prenta
by1897
therewere56,741residents
in Sonora:JohnR. Southworth,
El Estadode Sonora,
Susindustrias,
Mexico.
comerciales
Arizona:Oasis
, mineras
y manufactureras
(Nogales,
and Publishing
House, 1897),withbilingualtext.By the end of the
Printing
nineteenth
therewereprobably
Chinesein everyMexicanstateand the
century,
federal
district
butmostweredefinitely
inthenorth
and
concentrated
(MexicoCity),
- where
In severalsouthern
thenorthwest.
states Veracruz,
ChiapasandYucatan
commercial
had takenhold,Chinesein considerable
were
numbers
agriculture
inas contract
laborers
ontheYucatan
seeJohnKenbrought
henequen
plantations;
nethTurner,
Barbarous
Mexico
ofTexasPress,1969).
(Austin:
University
45.
5Jacques,
"Campaign,"
p.
U.S.Department
ofCommerce
Hbid.,
pp.50-51,citing
figures.
orperhaps
failedto
7Southworth,
Sonora,
bias,Southworth
p. 47.Outofoversight,
takenoteofatleasttwootherChinese
commercial
housesalready
wellestablished
by
hissurvey:
FonQuiandJuanLungTain.
1897,whenhepublished
8Jacques,
"Campaign,"
pp.48-50.
9Thedefinitive
of
and American
frontier,
study thisimportant
mining
company
townhasnotbeenwritten
ofCananea,actually
a biography
ofColonel
yet.A history
who
built
the
Cananea
isC. L. Sonnichs
en'sColonel
Greene
Greene,
CopperCompany,
andtheCopper
ofArizona
(Tucson:University
Press,1974).
Skyrocket
[308]
Immigrants
"Albumio delEstadode
10Federico
Garciay Alva,Mexico
director
y susprogresos,
"
no
Sonora
Oficial,
1905-1907),
(Hermosillo:
pagination.
Imprenta
PreIntellectual
seeJamesD. Cockcroft,
nFora generalaccountofthe1906strike,
ofTexasPress,1968),
Revolution
cursos
, 1900-1913
(Austin:
University
oftheMexican
6.
chapter
toas
first
propaganda
12Jacques,
"Campaign,"
pp.54-56,traces
signsofanti-Chinese
to certain
Chinesealsosubscribed
whoemployed
earlyas 1890.NorthAmericans
"I ReMildred
raciststereotypes
oftheChinese.See,forexample,
YoungWallace,
Vol.20 (Spring,1979),pp. 35-46.Acmember
ofArizona
Chung,"
Journal
History,
her
allwhom
herfamily
hada seriesofmaleChinese
totheauthor,
servants,
cording
seeanypointbothering
alllookedalike,shedidn't
Sincethey
mother
called"Chung."
a more
Francisco
Bulnesespoused
tolearnnewnames.LeadingPorfirian
intellectual
termsand pseudo-historical
scientific
subtleracisttheorycouchedin pseudoLatino-Americanas
El Porvenir
delasNaciones
Bulnes,
See,Francisco
(Mexico,
analysis.
I: "Lastresrazashumanas,"
D. F.: El Pensamiento
Vivode Amrica,
n.d.),chapter
pp.9-42.
13
Cumberfigures.
immigration
"Campaign,"
pp.38,51,quotingMexican
Jacques,
feelsthata
U.S. StateDepartment
land,"SonoranChinese,"
figures),
p. 12(citing
didnottakeintoaccountthelarge
number
wouldbe 30,000,butsomehow
realistic
whoprobably
didnotstayinMexico.
ofChinese
population
14Thisis thecentral
"SonoranChinese";hismajor
themeofCumberland's
article,
in
Becauseof U.S. interest
are theU.S. consularreports.
sourcesof information
andChinesein northern
Americans
between
Chineseaffairs,
thecloserelationship
theChinese
inprotecting
theactiveAmerican
involvement
andlater,
Mexico,
during
on Chinese
and afterwards,
consularagentsreported
theRevolution
extensively
Mexicanrelations.The NationalArchivesin
activities,
holdingsand ChinesefromMexicoup to 1929.
thesedispatches
D.C., has microfilmed
Washington,
thatpertainto tneChinese
thebulkof thedispatches
it has collected
Moreover,
to
ofStateRelating
oftheDepartment
on onerollofmicrofilm:
"Records
question
cited
hereafter
frames
not
in
theChinese
numbered;
Mexico,
1910-1929,"
Question
asNA"Chinese
."
GeneralofImmigration
toCommissioner
ofEl PasoStation
(Depart15Supervisor
inM4"Chinese."
mentofLabor),Washington,
D.C.,May20,1914,
" therearenumerous
"Chinese
addressed
andAmericans
16InN>i
byChinese
requests
in theU.S. to harassedChinese.See,for
to [jrantasylum
to theU.S. Government
ChineseLegationin Washington,
D.C.,to StateDepartment,
requesting
example,
to Cd.Jurezon
ChinesefromOjinaga,Chihuahua,
forthirty-nine
transportation
ChineseLegationthat,
informs
theborder,October6, 1913;StateDepartment
toEl Paso,andthe
Chinesein Durangowouldbe evacuated
shoulditbe necessary,
theU.S. Gov400 at EnsenadatoSan Diego,April28, 1914.After1916,however,
cautious
toaidtheChinese;seeStateDepartment's
ernment
appearedmorehesitant
ofEl Paso,Washington,
10,1916,regardD.C.,November
replytoConsulEdwards
at
aidto200destitute
Chineserefugees
forfinancial
gathered
request
ingEdwards'
butincaseof"realneed,"will
Cd.
Staterepliedthatithadno"relief
fund,"
Jurez.
andtheirfellow
from
theSixCompanies
"endeavor
toobtainassistance
countrymen
intheU.S."
ofState,MexicoCity,
17U.S.Ambassador
toSecretary
April29,
HenryLaneWilson
toAlexander
1912;andGeorgeWiswall
April27,1912,inNA
Dye,consulatNogales,
of2000wasreported
"Chinese."
Thenighnumber
bytheChineseChargd'Affaires
as theChinese
in MexicoCityto Ambassador
Wilson;it maynotbe veryreliable,
In 1914,ConsulFrederick
inthenorth.
hadnoconsular
representatives
government
therewereabout
included
ofNogales,
whose
Cananea,reported
jurisdiction
Simpich
1500Chinese
in Cananea;ConsulSimpichto State,Naco,Arizona,
26,
February
weretruck
oftheseChinese
Besidesmerchants,
farmers,
1914,inNA"Chinese."
many
theirmulesand wagonscommandeered
whofrequently
byrevolutionary
reported
inNA"Chinese."
toState,Nogales,
seeSimpich
forces;
April21,1915,
[309]

toState,Concepcin
del Oro,January
19,1914,inNA
JohnSilliman
"18Vice-consul
."
Chinese
19Consul
toState,Naco,Arizona,
inNA"Chinese
26,1914,
Simpich
February
" thereare numerous
20In NA "Chinese
consularreportson Mexicanattackson
Chinesestores.
Soldiers,
YaquiIndiansandlowerclasswomen
appearedespecially
activeintheseraids.In somesmalltowns,
suchas Ccorit
intheYaquiRiverValley
andTorres,
a smallrailroad
whereChinese
merchants
town,
practically
monopolized
localbusiness,
theentire
hardon the
placewassacked.The year1915wasespecially
of
because
fortunes
of
Pancho
Asians,
probably
declining
revolutionary Villaandhis
inpaying
difficulties
hissoldiers.
ConsulLouisHostetSee,forexample,
subsequent
tertoState,Hermosillo,
toState,Nogales,
29,
May21,1915;ConsulSimpich
January
Associations
of Arizpe,Moctezuma,
1915;Chinesemercantile
Cumpas,Nacozari,
Fronteras
toChineseMinister,
onabusesagainst
themperpetrated
byMaytorenista
andVillista
March18,1915;ConsulSimpich
toState,Hermosillo,
7,
troops,
January
"
onsacking
ofCcorit
Alldispatches
andTorres.
."
areinNA Chinese
1915,
21ConsulSimpich
toState,Nogales,
inNA"Chinese."
31,1915,
July
Simpich
suspected
thattheChinesemerchants
theirlossesin orderto underscore
their
exaggerated
plight.
22Consul
toState,Hermosillo,
Hostetter
inNA"Chinese."
May23,1915,
85.
23Jacques,
"Campaign,"
p.
" contains
24NA"Chinese
numerous
on suchextortions.
Another
common
reports
abusewastoforceChinesemerchants
tosellatlessthancost,thusata loss.See,for
ConsulHostetter
to State,Hermosillo,
thatthe
example,
May23, 1915,reporting
ofHermosillo
ordered
toselltheir
Chinese
merchants
atmuchless
prefect
provisions
thanactualcost,and thatMaytorenistas
had imposednumerous
forcedloanson
thesemerchants.
" contains
2sna "Chinese
numerous
accounts
ofChinese
murdered
wantonly
byundisorfrustrated
soldiers
ofallrevolutionary
factions.
See,forexample,
ciplined,
hungry
ConsulSimpich
toState,Nogales,
killedbya
ona Chinese
June23,1913,
storekeeper
"Mexican
soldier"
overthepriceofcigarettes;
ConsulMarion
Letcher
toState,April
ofPabloWongofChihuahua
whoaccused
9, 1915,onexecution
byrevolutionaries
himofcirculating
counterfeit
toState,Nogales,April21,
money;ConsulSimpich
1915,on murderof twoChineseby Maytorenista
troopsat Ojo de Agua near
ofJoe
Cananea;ConsulHomerCoentoState,Mazatln,
April19,1915,on murder
ofAmerican
W.C. Casey,andhimself
ownerofa huerta
WongofDurango,
employee
ortruck
farm
within
thecity
walls.
26Fora moredetailedaccountoftheTorrenincident,
seeJacques,
"TheChinese
in Torren."
Massacre
The present
is basedprimarily
discussion
on consular
agent
andreport
on Torren,
transmitted
GeorgeC. Carothers'
lengthy
by
investigation
ConsulCharles
A brief
Freeman
ofDurangotoState,
inNA"Chinese."
June19,1911,
account
of
the
is
in
Tulitas
Tormassacre
contained
Tulitas
eyewitness
of
Jamieson,
ren:
Reminiscences
Press,1969),pp. 119-121.
(ElPaso:TexasWestern
ofLifeinMexico
27The
BancariaChinoy Mexicowasfounded
Chinese
Compaa
byK'angYu-wei,
monarchist
and reformer
who personally
carriedhis Save-the-Emperor-Society
as ChineseConstitutionalist
Hui,alsotranslated
Partyor ChineseRe(Pau-Huang
formAssociation)
to Mexicoin 1906,settling
on Torrenforspecialattention
becauseofitsinfluential
Chinese
colony.
K'angselected
leadingCoahuilabusinessman
tobe thebank'smanager.
anda
restaurants
WongFoon-chuck
Wongownedhotels,
the"Chinese
38 Chinese
whichemployed
Gardens,"
largetruckfarmin Torren,
workers
atthetimeofthemassacre.
andtranslator,
See,Jung-Pang
Low,editor
Kang
Yu-Wei:A Biography
and,a Symposium
ofArizonaPressforthe
(Tucson:University
Association
ofAsianStudies,1967),pp. 180-203.ConsulLutherEllsworth
toState,
"Chinese."
23,1913,inJV/i
July
in
Carothers'
onTorren,
inNA"Chinese."
28Speech
quoted
report
June10,1911,
88.
29Jacques,
"Campaign,"
p.
[310]
Immigrants
ina relatively
assaultresulting
onereport
hasbeenlocatedon another
large
30Only
ina raidona
Chinese
killedtwenty-three
count.InJuly,
1915,Yaquilooters
casualty
wrote
that
store.Admiral
HowardofU.S. NavytoChineseMinister,
largeGuaymas
datedJuly28, 1915,inNA
killedtwenty-three
Chineseat Guaymas,
soldiers
Yaqui
"Chinese
." Nofurther
details
areavailable.
3Consul Simpich
toState,Nogales,April10,1916;ConsulE. M. LawtontoState,
21,1917,inNA"Chinese."
Nogales,
September
inNA"Chinese."
32Consul
to
State,
Simpich
Nogales,
April10,1916,
33Consul
toState,HerFrancisDyertoState,July14,1919;alsoConsulHostetter
inNA"Chinese."
mosillo,
May9, 1916,
34Variouscorrespondence
inPapersofJosMara
toJosMaraArana,1917-1919,
citedas
ofArizona
Tucson;hereafter
Arana,SpecialCollections,
Library,
University
Arana
p. 132.
Papers.
Jacques,
"Campaign,"
inhisreport
toState,Nogales,
35Translation
September
byConsulLawton
provided
inM4"Chinese."
21,1917,
December4, 1917,in Arana
36Interim
Governor
Sorianoto Arana,Hermosillo,
Papers.
corresaboundinthevoluminous
andnegative
terms
37Such
stereotypes
derogatory
toandfrom
Arana,inArana
Papers.
pondence
BraufeltoArana,Moctezuma,
12,1917,inAranaPapers.Forthe
September
38Jos
ofFrancisco
IbezofNacozaritoArana,October
Moo-Acua
21,
case,see report
toArana,November
fromthebride'smother
9, 1917,and
1917,followed
byletter
letters
several
follow-up
byIbez,inAranaPapers.
ina handwritten
ofArana's
39These
bribes
and
threats
arecontained
history
alleged
butapparently
dated
anti-Chinese
written
byAranahimself,
campaign,
unsigned
deSonora
El ejemplo
April4, 1918,inAranaPapers;
JosAngelEspinoza,
Magdalena,
Yostof Guaymas
to State,
(Mexico,D.F.: 1932),pp. 34, 103-104;ConsulBartley
leadtodeclineofChinese
fearsthatshouldharassment
10,1920,voicing
February
in NA
businesses
and hencetaxes,thestaterevenueswouldshrinkdrastically,
"Chinese."
40ConsulYosttoChineseMinister
inWashington,
21,1920;
D.C.,Guaymas,
January
West
Coast
P.L. Bell,Mexican
YosttoState,Guaymas,
July10,1922,inNA"Chinese";
A Commercial
andIndustrial
D.C.: GovernandLower
(Washington,
California:
Survey
Bellcompiledthis
mentPrinting
Office,1923),pp. 32-34. TradeCommissioner
with
ontheMexican
WestCoast.
thehelpoftheU.S.consular
agents
survey
largely
camefromBaja
"Campaign,"
pp. 156-160.SomeoftheChineseprobably
41Jacques,
fieldsoftheMexihadsome5000Chineseworking
on thecotton
which
California,
in 1920,and manyChinese
caliValley.The bottom
felloutof thecottonmarket
of
theU.S.Fora briefhistory
wenttoSonora,
as they
werestillbarredfrom
probably
West
Coast.
inBell,Mexican
seesection
on"LowerCalifornia"
thecotton
plantations,
42ConsulDyertoState,
Nogales,
April20,1920,in "Chinese."
andreports
ofthe"tongwars"seeJacques,
43For
accounts
pp. 163-175,
"Campaign,"
Fora virulent
ofConsulsYostandDyertoState,May-June,
1922,inNA"Chinese."
1and2.
anti-Chinese
seeEspinoza,
pt.2,chapters
perspective,
Ejemplo,
44ConsulW.E. Chapman
toState,Mazatln,
December
13,1922,inNA"Chinese."
45ConsulYosttoState,Guaymas,
"Chinese."
July10,1922,iniV/4
46Espinoza,
national
censusofallforeign
to
the
1928
22-25.
According
Ejemplo,
pp.
to one.Jacques,
womenthirteen
in Mexico,Chinesemenoutnumbered
residents
p.202.
"Campaign,"
[3n

itsobvious
biases,is
47Jacques,
"Campaign,"
pp.202-242;Espinoza,
Ejemplo,
despite
stilla goodsourceof information
on Chinesebusiness
It alsocontains
practices.
a statesenator
andpublisher
copiesofthemajoranti-Chinese
legislation.
Espinoza,
ofEl Nacionalista
inthe1920sSonowasa keyfigure
, a leadinganti-Chinese
tabloid,
rancampaign.
Another
ofChinesebusiness
andrelationgooddiscussion
practices
West
Coast,
shipsisBell,Mexican
pp.32-34.
48In between
the"tongwars"andthe1929campaign,
therewereseveral
to
attempts
In thesummer
revivethepersecution.
of 1925,statesenatorEspinozafounded
Pro-Raza
committees
thestate.To givean idea of theseverity
of the
throughout
in NovemberwerereDecember,
1931,an estimated
37,000Mexicans
repatriation,
turned
toMexico;
Jacques,
"Campaign,"
pp. 191,246-247.
49Official
national
statistics
notedtheChinesepopulation
duringthetwenties
vary3500to3800;Jacques,
ingfrom
"Campaign,"
pp.201-206.
50Espinoza,
to U.S.
, pp. 50-109;SumnerWellsof U. S. StateDepartment
Ejemplo
Ambassador
toMexico
Daniels,
Josephus
enclosing
copyofhisnotetoChineseAminWashington,
bassador
"Chinese."
D.C.,April22,1932,inAf/i
248-249.
"Jacques,
"Campaign,"
pp.
52Consul
Yostto State,Nogales,March19, 1932,remitting
copyof articlefrom
Arizona
Star(Tucson)headlined"MexicoUnloadson UncleSam,"in NA
Daily
"
"Chinese.
53"Partido
Nacionalista
Anti-Chino
delDistrito
Nortede Baja California.
Programa
de Accin,"
22 September
ina
1932.Document
included
Mexicali,
Baja California,
collection
ofmaterials
thesuccessful
anti-Chinese
commemorating
campaign,
publishedbytheHermosillo
Chamber
ofCommerce
the
[1969?].Sincetheexpulsion,
Chamber
ofCommerce
hasissueda number
ofsuchvolumes.
54Includedinthebackofthecommemorative
volumes
isa listofMexican
businesses
inSonora,whichdoesnotincludea singleChinesename,demonstrating
howcomnative
Mexicans
havetakenoverthelocalbusiness
oftheeconomy.
sector
pletely
CREDITS- photographs
fromtheUniversity
of ArizonaLibrary
SpecialCollections,Tucson,appearon pages293 (top)and 297; fromtheArizonaHistorical
fromtheUniversity
ofCalifornia
at
(AHS),Tucson,on page293(bottom);
Society
onpage306;from
D. F.:
deSonora
(Mexico,
Berkeley
JosAngelEspinoza'sis/
ejemplo
1932),on pages302 and 304; fromFedericoGarray Alva'sMexico
ysusprogresos
Oficial,1905-07)on page 287 (copyat AHS); and from
(Hermosillo:
Imprenta
Albelardo
onpage280(copyatAHS).
Sonora,
JuanzLey,Hermosillo,
[31*]

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