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HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL

Volume 5, Winter 2007

Human Security and Political Philosophy in the Light of Judith Shklar’s Writing

Frédéric Ramel

This paper discusses "Freedom from Fear" from a philosophical standpoint, with specific reference to Judith Shklar's work, whose thinking provides new frames of mind to explain fear and human security as universal notions. The article therefore fits into the mainstream debate in international relations between universalism (human security as a tool which should be shared by everybody) and relativism (human security as a Western concept).

H uman security serves as a toolbox to

change political practices of leaders, as

suggested for example by the Harvard

Program on Humanitarian Policy

Conflict Research. But human security is also an object of international relations theory. According to Stanley Hoffmann, two kinds of theories must be distinguished: empirical (conceptual frameworks that explain or understand reality through empirical studies) and philosophical (based on human nature, conceptions of history or human action that produce normative judgements, and which imply more involvement from researchers). This paper aims to explore the second type of international relations theory with the understanding that human security is essentially a philosophical concept. More precisely, this concept (as discussed in this paper) will concentrate upon "freedom from fear", an

expression coined by the Canadian government to re-orient its foreign policy towards human security

but also developed originally by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’ political philosophy was above all else a reaction to war, with particular references to the English civil war. If the State wished to end wars, he argued, it must provide security. This paper will not attempt to delve into the mathematical foundations he used to develop this theory 1 but instead will highlight two elements of his philosophy that are of relevance even today. The first is Hobbes’ description of a "state of nature" (a fiction where all people live without political authority). 2 This phase, characterized by a quarrelsome people, is an allegory for a state of war which stands for "Hell on earth." This description allows Hobbes to point out that human beings are egoistic by nature, and all people are afraid of each other. Hobbes sought to emphasize the properties of fear, an individual and natural feeling on account of human behavior (Chapter XII of Leviathan). 3 How was it possible to overcome fear? The answer, for

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Hobbes, lies in creating a Leviathan. People decide

Shklar'S "freedom from fear": another

by Thatcher and Reagan, she became a pioneer

to end the state of war by alienating their natural rights to a sovereign that guaranteed security. This ‘social contract’ entered into between the people

of a new kind of liberalism during the 1980’s: the liberalism of fear. Unfortunately, her death ended her academic career just as she was to embark on

and the sovereign is a submissive one. And this

a

study of individuals' position in international

conception of fear and "freedom from fear" is a fundamental step in the modern era. 4 On the one hand, it must be borne in mind that Hobbesian thought has been responsible for formulating the

relations. It is probably why her colleague, Stanley Hoffmann, insists on qualifying her death as a "tragedy for political thought." 8

main function of a State. Yet simultaneously, this function has increasingly come to be questioned.

a philoSophy memory

baSed

on

emotion

and

Hobbes’ concept of security was fairly strict in its import. Since his time, new kinds of threats have evolved. Some of these are not a result of deliberate human action, but have developed

Shklar’s "liberalism of fear" can be summed up in four assertions:

unexpectedly. 5 Natural disasters are another kind

1.

Liberalism is above all a core of limitations

of threat that humans have to face. The second element of Hobbes’ philosophy of relevance is the gap between his conception of the State and contemporary reality. Hobbes trusted the State, but ab initio, certain behavioral characteristics of States could become a source of threat. This is the phenomenon Judith Shklar considers relevant, and is

(prohibiting interference with the freedom of others). Thus, it does not prescribe what to do so as to discover happiness. For Shklar, "liberalism does not have any particular positive doctrines about how people are to conduct their lives or what personal choices they are to make." 9

something human security studies may benefit from.

2.

The origins of liberalism lie in the religious wars

This paper is divided into two parts. The first

in

the sixteenth century: these events were full of

part presents Shklar’s reasoning and her "liberalism

cruelties committed with religious motivation. The

of fear." The second part discusses the trend to universalize the idea of fear and the ways to tackle it. This builds on and continues the arguments put

two primary branches of Christianity (Protestantism and Catholicism) provoked and confronted each other in bloody conflicts. It was eventually left

forward by Robert O. Keohane in his paper written

to

the school of liberalism to encourage tolerance

in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Keohane sets up links between the attacks on the United States and Shklar’s most fundamental argument: that a basic function of a liberal state is to protect its citizens from the fear of cruelty. 6

aSpect of Security

against such behavior in Europe. The "liberalism of fear" is located in this context and seeks to highlight cruelties that continued to occur, even up to the twentieth century. Unlike Emerson’s belief-system, this understanding of liberalism is not about hope but about the memory of such cruelties. 10 It focuses on the excesses of both power and administration.

Judith Shklar taught Political Science in Harvard from 1951 to 1992. She played a major role in political philosophy that is arguably comparable with the contributions of her colleague John Rawls. She left Europe during the turbulent years of the Second World War and tried to produce a political philosophy founded on the experience of exile. She "embodied" her philosophy of life against terror. 7 After a period of criticizing ultraliberalism, libertarian movements and the policies achieved

3. Shklar accepts the distinction between

positive and negative liberalism (Isaiah Berlin’s conception) 11 but according to her, it is impossible to separate negative freedom from the conditions, i.e., the political organization, etc., that allow such

freedom. All of these conditions can be drilled down to the sole condition of rejecting cruelty. The obvious question that is asked is: what does cruelty mean in this context? Shklar refers to Montaigne and Montesquieu – two theorists who did not set up links between cruelty and theology.

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HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL Volume 5, Winter 2007

They abandoned the idea of religious sin when defining cruelty. Not only did the French moralists refuse religion (in response to the failure of Spanish policies on the New Continent) but also the moral arguments made by Machiavelli. Cruelty was

instead a psychological feeling: "It is the deliberate infliction of physical, and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or group stronger ones in order to achieve some end, tangible or intangible, of the latter." 12 Public cruelty could

not be explained by sadistic trends because "it is made possible by differences in public power and it is almost always built into the system of

coercion upon which all governments have to fulfil their essential functions." 13 Fear thus is an emotion linked with the presence of power in modernity (or, in other words, the monopoly of legitimate physical violence). 14 Fear is a result of the cruelty created by power. Fear from cruelty is not anxiety (a normal fear against an external danger or about human condition) but "fear of fear itself" 15 which inhibits people; as a result of which they can neither express themselves, nor be free. 16 The idea underpinning the argument is that "cruelty [is] the summum malum, the most evil of all evils." 17

contribution to human Security

There are some clear implications of this thought on the discipline of human security, four of which are discussed here:

1. The Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy

Conflict Research, quoted at the beginning of this essay, defines human security as a people-centric concept. Similarly, Shklar, in her

inclination towards the centricity of the people rather than of power, tends to underline the function of politics as a process against the perversion of

"Fear is a result of the cruelty created by power ."

power in specific contexts. In political science, there are two different perspectives: top- down that insists on leaders and legitimation of power (e.g., Weber) 20 or bottom-up that deals with the obedience of the people (La Boetie’s discourse on servitude volontaire). 21 Shklar does not focus on "power centricism", but professes instead a "people centric" approach.

2. Several States put people in jeopardy, and

one has to be aware of some States that can clearly be a threat. Several analysts try to explain such accumulation of power by mobilising the liberalism of fear (e.g., Ignatieff; 22 Gourevitch). 23 There are some differences, though, which this paper believes are not of much relevance. For example, Shklar tackles strong States whereas Ignatieff and Gourevich handle failed States. For the latter, issues of ethnic warfare and culture are sources of fear while Shklar believes that it is

politics that creates fear. Of more interest, though, is the new dimension that Shklar introduces in Hobbes’ reasoning, as a result of which the reader is compelled to view the State as a source of fear. Shklar upholds the rule of law and rejects absolute and monarchical power. In this context, human security should be a "frame of mind" that has its closest equivalent in Claude Lefort’s concept of "savage democracy," 24 which demands that people ought to participate in civil debate.

4. Liberalism relies on an emotion (fear) and not on reason. It is an instinctive liberalism and not a rational one; it is "based on common and immediate experiences" 18 that all people could share. Such liberalism is strong, even if it is not deeply implanted in human nature conventionally defined by rational components. Shklar’s liberalism stems from Montesquieu and Tocqueville. The risks of terror justify rule of law, a fragmented power, tolerance, social pluralism and "a strong defense of equal rights and their legal protection." 19 This makes clear what Shklar meant by "freedom from fear." Politics relies on a struggle against terror created by the development of strong States that generate "fear of fear." While Hobbes sets up the idea of peace produced by social contracts of submission by society with the State, Shklar argues that the State could be a source of fear itself.

3. Shklar’s school of thought also articulates

the notion of injustice. 25 She makes a distinction between misfortune and injustice: misfortune is

linked with external forces of nature, akin perhaps

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to destiny; while injustice is linked with the action of ill-disposed people. Citing the example of the United States, she argues that people are unfair in a passive way. They are witnesses to stealing, rape, and other crimes and misdemeanors, but refuse to support victims by providing evidence to the police. Such unfair behavior on the part of people conveniently ignores, or even forgets, that everyone could be a victim. The feeling of injustice, therefore, is weak, and it is a feeling that has to be studied and dealt with. Rousseau underlined the impact of compassion, when he said that compassion was an instinctive feeling. 26 Liberalism has to integrate this feeling and defend the victim, and can be considered ‘universal’ only if it incorporates the concepts of victimization and political surveillance to prevent cruelty. Human security is ultimately a response to the injustice in the world.

4. Fear is a universal emotion. It allows Shklar

to qualify her liberalism as a universal one even though it could appear unconvincing (politics has to prevent cruelty). This paper attempts to develop this fourth consequence further.

"freedom from terror" and the problem of univerSality

Many political thinkers argue that Shklar developed a reductionist conception of "what ought to be politics." 27 But this paper believes otherwise: the main contribution of Shklar’s work to human security should be the understanding of universality. She consistently deals with the universal aspect of her liberalism:

"[O]f fear it can be said without qualification that it is universal as it is physiological. It is a mental as well as a physical reaction, and it is common to animals as well as to human beings. To be alive is to be afraid, and much to our advantage in many cases, since alarm often preserves us from danger. The fear we fear is of pain inflicted by others to kill and maim us, not the natural and healthy fear that merely warns us of avoidable pain. And, when we think politically, we are afraid not only for ourselves but for our fellow citizens as well. We fear a society of fearful people" 28 This underlines what is required of us in the future: all people can be victims. Therefore, people

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collectively have to prevent this summum malum. 29 These properties converge in a "cosmopolitan claim" 30 This claim is quite different from the arguments of Diogenes from Ancient Greece (cosmopolitanism monopolised by the wise man in exile) or from the pejorative discourses during the sixteenth century. Instead, this claim, inspired by Kant, is a critical position against relativism.

Shklar'S critiqueS of relativiSm

Relativists argue that such liberalism of fear is

a new kind of colonialism or occidental-centric

conception of politics. Shklar disagrees with this line of reasoning. Relativism is a dogmatic frame of mind that emphasizes local human aspirations and leads to a blindness of the truth:

we cannot help being involved against horrors of our world. "Liberalism of fear" does not have a

specific origin. 31 It does not result from a particular culture or tradition. "Freedom from terror" is a desirable end that is shared globally. All people refuse fear of fear, and proactively seek to reject the conditions of such a feeling, regardless of the times they live in, or their geographical locations. We can infer from Shklar’s criticism of relativism a philosophical foundation for human security. Several contemporary thinkers attempt to establish links between cultures in order to develop a common definition of security. For instance, Amitav Acharya sees a common cultural legacy that States become increasingly conscious of in intergovernmental organizations. 32 He also identifies a common trend: a "governing framework of security cooperation in the post-cold war era", even in Asia, a region where strategic issues are extreme and large (terrorism, natural disaster, nuclear tensions). 33 In 2005, he adopted

a title inspired by Shklar’s work although he did

not quote her: "Human Security, Identity Politics and Global Governance: From Freedom from Fear to Fear of Freedoms." 34 He acknowledges a new difficulty for the paradigm of human security after

the September 11 attacks because of the aggressive ‘war against terror’ that has fundamentally altered public rights. But such an atmosphere creates new possibilities for human security that cannot be "reversed in the near future", which is precisely the universal point of view defended by Shklar.

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HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL Volume 5, Winter 2007

It is interesting to find that the liberalism of fear as a philosophical wave infiltrates human security studies in spite of the fact that nobody has quoted Shklar explicitly. However, this universal ambition must be questioned.

"freedom from terror" as legitimating force

Corey Robin identifies the perverse effects of the liberalism of fear on societies, especially in the United States. 39 According to him, fear cannot represent a genuine foundation for liberal societies

when it creates "repressive fear." This point of view is interesting when applied to the international level. According to international law, the threat or the use of force outside of the context of self- defense or an action sanctioned by the United Nations under chapter VII of the UN Charter is not legal. However, ad hoc missions in the name of preventive action benefit from a discourse of legitimacy. 40 Fear plays an important role in such a process. The Kosovo intervention during 1999 benefited from the same reason especially in Llyod Axworthy’s discourse in the Group of Eight. As Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, he explained the legitimacy of resorting to force, even though the Security Council did not ratify such action, by arguing that there was a duty to protect the Albanian community who lived in "fear of terror." 41 The war against terror (which also raises the issue of the concept of war in modernity) 42 is defined in the same manner. It rests on an obsolete category dating back to the Clinton-era-rogue states. (Such classification was in fact

criticized at the end of the 1990’s by the US administration). These actors are transformed into enemies even though their strategic characteristics might make them appear

more like puppets than anything else (inferior in capacities and in culture) in the typologies of Marthan Cottam or Richard Herrmann. 43 For instance, the war in Iraq had been justified by a similar argument: to protect the population against Saddam Hussein (and also the American population against a "terrorist-

sponsored State)." In such a context, "freedom from terror" may be used as an argument to legitimise the resort to force. It is a rhetorical element of the State’s current "responsibility to protect". In the first Chapter of Ordinary Vices, Shklar deals with the perverse effects of victimisation.

a "liberaliSm from nowhere"

the "community" forgotten

Shklar’s research focuses on the individual level, because of which she could be criticised for increasing the excessive emphasis on atomism

in the public sphere. She forgets, like all liberals, that humans need to share common values and that society requests an acknowledgement of differences. A society is defined as a community of communities according to Amitaï Etzioni; a community that protects particular cultures. 35 Michael Walzer underlines another dimension that Shklar seems to overshadow. The struggle against the fear of terror implies something else in the bargain: "we are defending more than our lives, we are defending our way of life." 36 A singular culture is called into question by terror. The individual level (which the communautarists consider to be abstract) becomes a distortion of reality. T h e r e f o r e , t h i s

c r i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e against liberalism of fear supposes a conception of universality that does not rely on individuals but on communities.

A r e s p o n s i v e

communautarism such

as the one embodied by Etzioni aims at integrating security issues and human security, particularly in two ways. Upstream, new threats increase and affect the life of communities. Down stream, Etzioni is aware of new kinds of diplomatic methods that associate transnational actors, intergovernmental organisations and States (that he calls the "Global

Safety Authority" after 9/11) 37 in order to manage these new threats. Such Authority calls in question the imperialist order that is undesirable. It

tries to set up new political practices between

actors by sharing morals, power and costs. 38

"The struggle against the fear of terror implies something else in the bargain: "we are defending more than our lives, we are defending our way of life." A singular culture is called into question by terror."

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She acknowledges that victims of torture wait to exchange places with their torturers, which feeds into the idea of "cruelties without an end." However, she tackles inter-individual relations. She does not deal with an instrumental discourse relying on victims or studying a foreign policy that exceeds multilateral rules.

a negative conception of politics

Shklar is convinced that liberalism of fear is an ambitious project because of its purpose to prevent destruction of all people. Therefore, she sticks to a culture of barriers and of constraints against terror, which is the main lesson of the twentieth century. But this "negative" conception of politics (not to experiment destruction) seems to represent a minimalist thought of universality. Walzer and Etzioni underline this aspect. Walzer admires Shklar but he is sceptical about the substantive dimension of her liberalism. On the one hand, "what is defended, however, is always something, different in each case, even if the threat is similar in kind." 44 In parallel with negative freedom (Isaiah Berlin’s contribution to liberal thought), 45 there is always something that is protected. On the other hand, one has to go beyond Shklar’s ambition because she does not explain what ought to be the world order. A global architecture that goes beyond the presently international order is immediately required. According to Etzioni, a new kind of community is emerging. Liberalism of fear as a minimalist project cannot be a structural reference for humanity. It is too restricted. An imagined community at the world level compared with national ones that Benedict Anderson 46 studied must be defined in positive terms and not only in negative ones.

concluSion: political philoSophy aS a new field for human Security StudieS

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integrated into this research program. Therefore, this paper proposes a new field for human security studies: political philosophy and human security. This approach could be improved by an enhanced understanding of Hans Jonas and the hermeneutics of fear (the effects of human action on environment that gradually tend to a collective start), 48 or by Spinoza’s conception of peace (before Galtung, the philosopher produces a definition of positive peace). This may nourish human security (its properties and purpose) and continue to inspire new modes of action.

and purpose) and continue to inspire new modes of action. Security is a contested concept in

Security is a contested concept in empirical theories, as explained by Buzan. Human security is also a contested one, especially because of its "élasticité." We have to deal with human security not just as a toolbox but also as a philosophical notion. Political philosophy highlights several international issues. 47 Human security should be

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Volume 5, Winter 2007

Notes

1 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: its Basis and its Genesis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963).

2 On the state of nature as a “fiction”, see Pasquale Pasquino, “Thomas Hobbes : la condition naturelle de l’humanité” Revue Française de Science Poli- tique 2 (April 1994): 294-307.

3 See this study of fear in Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

4 The liberal interpretations of Hobbes underline this dimension because his philosophy aims at protecting above all else individuals and their rights even against the State when it does not respect its function of security. Jean-Jacques Roche uses this interpretation in order to see in Hobbes the first philoso- pher of human security. Jean-Jacques Roche, “Le réalisme face à la sécurité humaine”, in Jean-François Rioux, ed., La Sécurité humaine. Un nouveau concept des relations internationales (Paris, Montréal: L’Harmattan, 2003), 57-71. Upholding an absolutist interpretation of Hobbes, Bertrand Badie denies such fatherhood but he acknowledges the hobbesian influence on modern political practices in Europe and abroad. Bertrand Badie, Un monde sans souveraineté (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

5 Ulrich Beck has described this issue for several years.

6 Robert O. Keohane. “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the liberalism of fear” in Understanding 11 September, ed. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer, (New York: Social Science Research Council, September 2002).

7 Stanley Hoffmann, “Judith Shklar as a Political Thinker” in Liberalism Without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith N. Shklar, ed. Bernard Yack (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 86.

8 Ibid, 82.

9 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1989), 21.

10 Ibid, 26-27.

11 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 118-172. According to him, the definition of liberty is plural. Negative freedom is the mere fact of not beeing interfered with one’s business whereas positive freedom is a wish for self-expression “to be somebody, not nobody” (p. 131).

12 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”, 29.

13 Ibid.

14 This potentiality of modern power comes closer to Anthony Giddens’ explanation of totalitarism. Totalitarian regimes or systems are developed in mo- dernity by the possibility of surveillance (Michel Foucault’s notion) created by States. See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, (Cambridge:

Polity Press, 1987).

15 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”, 29. Julien Freund highlights the impact of imagination on this kind of fear. Julien Freund, “La peur de la peur”, Actions et recherches sociales, 21, no. 4, (1985): 20.

16 “Systematic fear is the condition that makes freedom impossible”. Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear”, 29.

17 Judith Shklar, “Putting Cruelties First”, Daedelus, (1982), 12.

18 Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”, 32.

19 Ibid., 37.

20 Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).

21 “Discours sur la servitude volontaire” in Etienne de La Boétie, Œuvres politiques (Paris: Ed. sociales, 1963)

22 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the new Nationalism (London, Vintage, 1994)

23 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (London: Picador, 1999).

24 Claude Lefort, Elements d’une critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Droz, 1971); Miguel Abensour, “Démocratie sauvage et principe d’anarchie”, Revue européenne des Sciences Sociales, 31, no. 97 (1993): 229-235.

25 Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven: Tale University Press, 1990).

26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 5 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), Book I.

27 For instance, see the debate between Robert Meister and Catherine Lu in Ethics and International Affairs, 16, no. 2 (2002). See also paper by Giorgio Baruchello, where he underlined a tradition of liberalism (especially in Beccaria) that conceived “cruelty” to be pertaining to the liberal organisation of society: Baruchello, “The Cruelty of Liberalism : An Essay on Judith Shklar, Richard Rorty, John Kekes and Cesare Beccaria”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 30, no. 3 (2004): 303-313.

28 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”, 29.

29 Ibid., 31.

30 Ibid., 29.

31 Ibid., 34.

32 Amitav Acharya, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Holga Hafterndorn and Robert O. Keohane (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 55.

33 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security East versus West”, International Journal, LVI, no. 3, (Summer 2001): 442-460.

34 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security, Identity Politics and Global Governance: From Freedom from Fear to Fear of Freedoms” (paper presented at the International Conference on Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion, Canberra, Australia, September 1-2, 2005), http://law.anu.edu.au/nissl/acharya.pdf (accessed 4 December 2007).

35 Amitaï Etzioni, “Communitarianism”, in Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World, ed. Karen Christensen and David Levinson, vol. 1, A-D (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 225.

36 Michael Walzer, “On Negative Politics” in Yack, Liberalism Without Illusions, 18.

37 Amitaï Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 160.

38 Intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 is an element of this new global architecture. Amitaï Etzioni, “Implications of the American Anto-Terrorism Coalition for Global Architectures”, European Journal of Political Theory, 1, no. 1 (2002): 9-30.

39 Robin, Fear.

40 For the mechanism of legitimation in international relations, see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2005).

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41 “Conclusions” (The G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Gürzenich/Köln, Germany, June 10, 1999), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/g8fmm-g8rmae/concl-en.asp (accessed 4 December 2007).

42 Noemi Gal-Or, Klaus-Gerd Giesen, “The Concept of War”, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 19 (2007): 149-156.

43 Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making. The Influence of Cognition (Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1986); Richard Herrmann, Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model. Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War”, International Organization , 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 415-450.

44 Michael Walzer, “On Negative Politics”, 18.

45 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”.

46 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections in the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006).

47 Frédéric Ramel, ed., “Philosophie et relations internationales. Regards contemporains”, Etudes internationales, XXXVIII, no. 1, (Mars 2007): 5-109.

48 For Jonas, fear is not a passion that resulted from current war but a feeling about future threats linked to technologic progress or natural disasters. Hans Jonas, The Imperative Responsbility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago: the Chicago University Press, 1984).

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