JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the
Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner
described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his
answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of
the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles,
her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to
feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes
on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper
at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other
hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie
down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual
intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on
the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he
warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her
and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until
5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor
of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of
Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the
neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat
made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after
August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his
coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while
her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p.
3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5,
1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment
as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the

record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine
affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal
liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth
birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had
reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last
intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had
sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his
house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she
could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her
foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed
the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she
(Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,
1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under
circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced
that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her
consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to
have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her
honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in
conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted
Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband
parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of
him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of
adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years
of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The
seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of
promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury
to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of
her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering
her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could
not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn
petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral
character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the
bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any
time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself
to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a
married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar
examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As
he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by
reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the
same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing,
respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other
misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he
appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe
to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render
judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office
as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense
that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said
complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and
that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128
of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive
the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the

parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to
submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven;
2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of
perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he
filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not
morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law
wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent
on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia
Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was
already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are
from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered
them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she
told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to
stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent
asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on'
(t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and
respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n.
26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and
wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat,
but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to
her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already
reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga
(t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told
her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then
went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n.
29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she
is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators,
March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later
date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16,
1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first
sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already
above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia
Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had

no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime
of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly
thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in
his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the
other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia
had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks
thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already
married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could
not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could
he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in
1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her
never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to
Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again,
telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed;
that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that
he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest
intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a
married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition,
because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the
fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a
man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he
first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent
concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954."
(Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts
on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after
he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the
respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on
April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual
relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore
him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with
Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent
has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that
the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among
those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a
lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is
not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper
administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the
power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a
fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958
ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that
the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted
doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of
creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of
the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for
other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our
system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and
professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and
its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional
or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of
this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral
depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before
complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual
intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared
and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking
her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of
the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant
was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy
over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed:
"He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina
Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering

her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant
reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction
for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by
these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute
sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the
ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the
following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing
the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of
good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
(Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so
would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment
from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do
not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in
effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to
the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and
character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if
he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not
controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of
decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the
respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in
that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse
for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to

extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the
complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means
he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then
free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married
woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct
therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his
authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and
perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally
charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at
the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against
the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his
findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated
unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the
Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he
shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence
introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent
shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint
with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense
charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment.
Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he
may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of
himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is
clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and
not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed:
An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character,
or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion

generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in

the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal
and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape
the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re
Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent,
therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the
fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not
render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his
immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a
member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein
respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-904

December 7, 1993

DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession,
filed with this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality
and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of
maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso. The
complainant and his wife were married on 10 December 1988 and their union
bore them three children, all boys, ages 3 years old, 2 years old, and 4 months
old, respectively. He alleges that their married life was peaceful and happy until
the discovery of the sordid affair, which came about in this manner:
Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from the wife
of the respondent who informed him that Sol and her husband (respondent)
have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love
letters of Sol which she wants to show to the complainant. Although he did not
believe the information and even berated Mrs. Juanson for trying to ruin his
family, he, nevertheless, told Sol about it. Sol assured him of her love and
concern for the family and claimed that the respondent was just a client of
her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch). Two weeks later, Mrs.
Juanson called him again to inquire if he had received the photocopies of Sol's
love letters to the respondent. He again scolded Mrs. Juanson and told her not to
call him up anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and Sol left for the United States of
America (USA) for a vacation. He stayed there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol

returned ahead of him on 10 July 1992. During his absence, specifically on 17

June 1992, Mrs. Juanson called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged
to the latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol. On 20 June 1992,
Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso photocopies of Sol's love letters to the
respondent. During their pre-arranged meeting on 25 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson
delivered the original copies of Sol's alleged letters to
Atty. Alfonso who was accompanied by the complainant's sister, Celestine A.
Barreto.
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided to hire
a private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged illicit affair
between Sol and the respondent. Through surveillance conducted by its private
investigators, the agency found that Sol had met with the respondent on 11 and
17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, and that they stayed inside the unit for two to three hours.
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after his arrival from
the USA, his sister Celestine told him about the illicit relationship between Sol
and the respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken by the private
investigators and the alleged love letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date,
in the presence of their respective parents, the complainant confronted Sol and
showed her the proofs; Sol still denied the affair and insisted that she was just
discussing some business with the respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30
a.m. in their house, Sol finally admitted to having an illicit affair with the
respondent since late 1983 when she was an employee of Banco Filipino (EDSA
Cubao Branch) and that before they left for the USA, she met with the
respondent at Unit 412-A Citihomes.
As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of the house. He
and Sol have been living separately since 26 July 1992. He also subsequently
discovered from the statement of the billing from Pacific Bell for overseas calls
which he and Sol made while they were in the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992
Sol had made calls to the respondent's office at the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office of
the judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative sanction
for immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In compliance with this Court's Resolution of 22 October 1992, the respondent
filed his Comment on 21 December 1992. He admits that he knows Sol and that
"they have been communicating with each other casually and innocently," but
denies that they are lovers and were having an illicit affair, that Sol has been
sending love letters to him, and that, except for the 11 and 17 July 1992
meetings, he and Sol had been going to the apartment situated at 130 San
Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and staying there for hours. He
asserts that he came to know Sol sometime in 1987 when she engaged his
professional services in connection with five criminal cases filed by her in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the in the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. In the course of their attorney-client relationship, Sol sought legal advice

from him and during those occasions they usually talked over the phone and not
in the office. In June 1992, he received an overseas call from Sol who was then in
the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem with her employer, the
Security Bank and Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that Sol would
see him upon her return to the Philippines. On 11 July 1992, shortly after her
arrival from the USA, he ad Sol met at the aforementioned apartment, which was
leased not by the respondent but by Celestino Esteban. After discussing her
problem, with Celestino and two other persons present, he and Sol left the
apartment and took a late lunch at Fastfood, Robinson. He reassures the
complainant "that his wife has always been faithful to him and that he would do
nothing as would tarnish their warm relationship, much less destroy the
complainant's family."
On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice
Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the hearings on 17, 18,
21 and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the parties submitted
testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October 1993, she submitted her
Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 1993. Pertinent portions of
her findings of facts read as follows:
As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso and
Sol Dinglasan were married at Sta. Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988
as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born of this
marriage, John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old, and the
youngest Jan Joseph, four (4) months old. Complainant and his family lived a
happy and normal life with their Sundays spent on outings after the Sunday
mass. (p. 9, tsn, June 29, 1993).
In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from a woman introducing
herself as a concerned friend telling that complainant's wife is having an illicit
affair with her said woman caller's husband. Said caller did not identify herself
but only said she was in possession of love letters of complainant's wife Sol to
said caller's husband. After two weeks, said "concerned friend" called up the
Complainant again to ask him if he had received said caller's registered mail.
Complainant after both calls asked his wife Sol about her having an affair with
another man, and in both instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls
stopped for the rest of the year 1991 and early part of 1992 although
Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to go out alone every Saturday.
On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to the U.S.A. for a vacation
but the latter decided to return to Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992
(Exh. "O"). Complainant followed in returning home only on July 19, 1992 (Exh.
"O-1").
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso
to his sister Celestine Barreto's house, and there his father showed him five (5)

love letters written by Complainant's wife Sol with envelopes addressed to Atty.
Modesto C. Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and pictures taken by
private investigators of Complainant's wife and respondent Judge in company of
each other
(Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized the handwriting
of his wife Sol in said love letters, specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by
Sol in her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of Complainant to his
patients. Likewise, in the pictures, Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a
"Payless" bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge holding the same bag later
on (Exh. "F-14"). In practically all the pictures, Complainant identified his wife
Sol and the respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge was no stranger to
Complainant as the latter knows said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of the
best friends of Complainant's parents-in-law and was even a sponsor in the
wedding of Complainant's sister-in-law. Both Complainant and Respondent Judge
had met thrice and talked with each other.
The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent Judge (Exh. "K") were
handed to Complainant's father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso by a lady who introduced
herself, as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in the presence of Complainant's sister,
Celestine Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto. Domingo
Church, Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City and proceeded to the City Diners
Restaurant in the same city where the three had a talk and where Mrs. Juanson
handed to Atty. Alfonso the five love letters with a picture, at about 10:30 to
11:30 a.m. in late June 1992. Prior to said meeting on June 17, 1992, at about
11:00 a.m. a "concerned woman" had called up Atty. Alfonso at his home and in
the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang ulo ng anak mo ng babaeng iyan"
referring to Complainant's wife. To clear Atty. Alfonso's doubt, the woman
promised to send proofs which Atty. Alfonso received by LBC in a parcel
containing the xerox copies of Complainant's wife's love letters to Atty. Modesto
C. Juanson.
After the meeting with the lady who identified herself as
Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an overseas call from Complainant that
his wife Sol was coming home to Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the
services of a private investigating agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc., to conduct
surveillance of the activities of Complainant's wife, Sol upon her arrival from the
U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did arrive on July 10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the
Truth Verifier System, Inc. through Marjorie Juinio and Edgardo Tamayo, licensed
private detectives conducted surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol Dinglasan and
respondent Judge Modesto Juanson. On said date of July 17, 1992, said private
detectives together with Raymond Tabangcura and Edgar Naquilla, saw, Sol
Dinglasan Alfonso go out of her house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight
at Lamayan St., walk towards Sta. Ana Church then board a taxicab. Following
said taxicab, the taxi stopped at City Homes, San Francisco Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went inside Unit 412-A Citihomes, and stayed
inside for about three hours. Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson came out first
of said unit, wearing blue walking shorts and light colored polo and carrying the
plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying earlier, and then followed by Sol. At
around 1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge and Sol were inside said Respondent's

Wrangler jeep on their way to Robinson Galeria at EDSA. The two ate at
Mongolian Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to Robinson's
Supermarket. Inside the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent Judge
put his arm on the shoulder of Sol, and they were also seen holding hands (pp.
23-26, tsn, June 21, 1993). Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the
Wrangler jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of Suter and Roxas
Streets and then boarded a tricycle while the jeep left. The formal report of the
Truth and Verifier System, Inc. has
been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the many pictures
taken of Respondent Judge and Sol were marked and offered as Exhibits "F-5" to
"F-22".
The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by Edgardo Tamayo
practically corroborated the findings of the Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report
marked and offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and pictures taken of Respondent
Judge and Complainant's wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-14"
were presented before the Investigator.
Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, he was invited
by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to Norbert's sister's house in San Juan, Metro
Manila. In the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso showed his son,
Norbert the love letters written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" to
"E"). Complainants recognized the handwritings of his wife Sol and even the
GAIN memo stationery which complainant was using as his prescription pad for
his patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in the
pictures taken by the private detectives. On said day, Complainant Norbert
Alfonso experienced the greatest shock of his life and wondered what happened
to his life. His father, Atty. Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol.
In that same party, Complainant showed Sol the pictures and the love letters
which made Sol turn pale and stammer when talking. Sol's own parents were
embarrassed and walked out of the party.
On the same night at about 10 in the evening, Complainant
Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife Sol as to the truth of her relationship with
Respondent Judge. Before the Investigator said Complainant made the following
testimony on direct examination:
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q
What else did your wife tell you during that confrontation, her exact
words ?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A
She took a deep breath again and told me, "Sweetheart, I am very, very,
very sorry, I made a mistake." I asked, "What mistake is that ?" She replied, "I
had sexual intercourse with the Judge."

xxx

xxx

xxx

What else, if any, happened during that confrontation?

A
I asked my wife "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with
the Judge"?
Q

Was there any response?

A
She answered five times and then right away I said, "Putangina mo, five
times lang. Alam mo ba kung ilan beses kitang naganyan? Tarantado ka." With
my voice not so loud because the door and the windows were opened. If I shout
the neighbors will hear and then the yayas will go down right away.
Q

What was your wife doing at that time?

A
My wife was crying and saying, "Sweetheart, I am very, very sorry.
Forgive me." She was kneeling before me and begging forgiveness. "Forgive me,
sweetheart, I love you."
I told my wife, "you do not love me, you love your stupid Judge."
Q
Is there anything else that you discussed during that confrontation aside
from the admission?
A
After that admittance of my wife having sexual relationship with the
Judge, reminiscing the past events when we were together I told my wife, "That's
why pala every Saturday umaalis ka dito. Sinong pinupuntahan mo?" And
definitely, she admitted to me, "To the Judge." (pp. 35-41, tsn, June 29, 1993)
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol ended at about 5:00
a.m. of the following day, July 16, 1992 with Complainant asking Sol to leave the
house.
Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on
December 26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge,
and records of the Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both Sol
Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via
Cathay Pacific plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December
29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and "P-1").
Also, Complainant received from his sister in California, U.S.A., a Pacific Bell
Statement of Telephone Calls reflecting two calls made by his wife Sol to Manila,
at numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is the country code while number 476120
is the phone number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where Respondent
Judge is the Presiding Judge.

As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife Sol live separately, and
their three children are alternately in the custody of Complainant or Sol for
certain number of days.
Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is denial as he advances
the position that Sol Dinglasan Alfonso was a former client when Respondent
Judge was still a practicing lawyer, and that from time to time Sol would consult
him regarding her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply
accompanied a former client who was looking for a house to buy in Hongkong
and as to the visit in the Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge claimed that he was
only visiting his godson George Zari who spent a vacation in the Philippines for a
month.
Some elaboration of the respondent's version is necessary. He is now 56 years
old. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were married in 1961 and
have two sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From
1967 to 1969, he was the Chief Legal Officer in the Office of the City Mayor of
Quezon City and from 1969 to 1982 he was the Second Assistant City Fiscal of
Quezon City. After that and until November 1990, when he was appointed Judge
of the Regional Trial Court at Urdaneta Pangasinan, he was in private practice of
law. In April 1992, he was assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 32). He first came to know Sol when she hired his
services as her counsel in six criminal cases involving dishonored checks she
filed against Santiago Maramag and Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In 1989,
he saw Sol at the wedding of her sister Jennifer to Romeo Dizon; he stood as
sponsor for the groom then. In June 1992, Romeo saw him at his office at the
City Hall in Manila and sought advice regarding the letter Sol had received from
the Security Bank requiring her to explain why she should not be declared
absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work without an approved leave of
absence. He told Romeo that he would not be able to give any advice unless he
saw the letter and talked with Sol. A few days later, he received an overseas call
from Sol who said that she left the Philippines sometime after 10 June 1992. He
told her that he could not give any written or oral advice until he read the letter
and talked with her. This overseas call might have been the 17 June 1992 call
referred to in the Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able to talk to
her in the second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three weeks
alter, he received local call from Sol who told him that she was back and that
she has the letter. Sol begged to see him at his office. He, however, told her that
he was busy; besides, it was already late in the afternoon. She got frantic and so
he told her that they could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes, at
130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was to meet his godson, George
Zari, in the said place. They did meet there at 11:00 o'clock in the morning the
following day
11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the Security Bank and
after interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a "reply." Present at that
time were Celestino Esteban, lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari,
and his live-in partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes later, he decided to go home.
Sol requested for a ride in his vehicle in order to alight at the place of her
employer along EDSA and Shaw Boulevard to which he obliged. While on their

way, Sol invited him for lunch and they went to the Mongolian Restaurant at
Robinson's where they had lunch. They had coffee nearby and then parted ways.
Thereafter, on separate days, Sol called him by phone to ask about the draft of
the reply. On the second call, he told her that since he would meet George Zari
on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A Citihomes, she might just as well meet him
there. She acceded and on that date he left his office at about 11:00 o'clock in
the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993,
25). Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her the draft of the reply and
instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then send it to her
employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to whom she should henceforth
communicate because he, respondent, is busy at his office. When he was
about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order to alight at
EDSA-Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did not meet Sol again.
(TSN, 9 July 1993, 3-15).
Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26 December 1989 and
having seen her in Hongkong. According to him, his traveling companion was
Cua Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993,
5-10). When confronted about the charge of immorality and unethical conduct
for having illicit relations with Sol, he answered: "I deny it very strongly, your
Honor." (Id., 32).
Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from two debilitating diseases
diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since 1987, and
prostatitis which have seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own words,
he "could hardly make it," and that he has "no erection whatsoever."
(Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and "12").
Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant's version for she
finds no reason not to believe the complainant. According to her, "[n]o man in
his correct mind would come forward and claim that his honor and good name
have been stained by an adulterous wife, doubt the paternity of his children, and
in the process destroy his family and home." She ruled that the testimonies of
the witnesses for the respondent Cua Sen, Celestino Esteban and former
Judge Zari do not inspire belief.
Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the respondent has
ruined two families his own and that of the complainant. Respondent "cannot
escape from the blame and sin of what he has caused Complainant's once happy
family." More pertinently she adds:
But beyond the domestic confines of these two families, Respondent Judge is no
ordinary mortal who can live the life he pleases having two women at the same
time his wife and worst [sic], another man's wife. He is a Judge who
symbolizes the law and the highest degree of morality in the community. The
citizens look up to him as the embodiment of justice and decency, as he decides
cases brought to his court. He can be no less.

And invoking our decision in Leynes vs. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 [1978] ) and
Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991] ) as precedent and moral compass, she
asserts that she has no other alternative but to find respondent "GUILTY as
charged of Immorality and Violation of Judicial Conduct" and to recommend his
"DISMISSAL . . . from office."
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her
recommendation for the imposition upon the respondent of the severest
administrative penalty dismissal from the service it is all the more
imperative to conduct as assiduous examination and evaluation of the records
and the evidence.
There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between
the respondent and the complainant's wife. For one, there are the cards or
notes, which the complainant and the Investigating Justice described as love
letters. These five "love letters" are marked as Exhibits "A." "B," "C," "D," and
"E," and dated 3 July 1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February 1988, 11 January 1989,
and 7 March 1989, respectively. For another, if we were to give full credit to the
complainant's testimony that during their confrontation Sol had admitted having
sexual intercourse with the respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 3940), it would appear that the relationship had developed into an extra-marital
liaison. It was furthermore established that both Sol and the respondent took the
same flights of Cathay Pacific aircraft to Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and
back to the Philippines on 29 December 1989. There is, however, no evidence
that they stayed together in the same hotel in Hongkong. On the other hand,
there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Cua Sen that he, a client of the
respondent, was the latter's travelling companion.
From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the
complainant were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed
from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Sol. Her marriage
to the complainant did not diminish Sol's love for the respondent, for even after
she committed herself to the complainant alone and made a vow of fidelity to
him till death at the solemn ceremony of marriage, she still sneaked out her love
notes to the respondent.
It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality
or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the
post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient
to prove that the respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. No love
notes written by her after November 1990 were presented in evidence. If she
did, they could have been kept with Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place
which was not, however, unknown anymore to the respondent's wife. Sol's
admission or confession to the complainant that she had carnal knowledge of
the respondent on five occasions made no reference to specific dates and is
hearsay. In his direct examination, the complainant's counsel exerted no further
effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates thereof. He perhaps realized its
futility because the narration by the complainant of the information clearly
indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to elaborate on the five illicit

sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the respondent carefully avoided

any entanglement with the details of the admission not only because it might
have provided an occasion for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but
because it would have operated as a waiver of his objection to the testimony as
hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic notes discloses that the counsel for
the respondent objected and entered a continuing objection to questions
directed to elicit or which tended to elicit statements or admissions supposedly
made or given by Sol on the grounds that any such statements or admissions
would be hearsay or otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice
Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection; hence, she allowed the answers to
be taken merely as part of the narration nut not as evidence of the truth thereof.
Thus:
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q.

What was her response to your exhortation?

A.
After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said, "Sweetheart,
patawarin mo ako, nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa iyo."
ATTY. BARLONGAY: At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register our
objection as to the issue of the truth of the statement as purported to be
answered by her wife for two reasons: One, it is hearsay. We have no opportunity
to cross-examine the . . .
COURT: As part of the narration.
ATTY. BARLONGAY: Yes, as part of the narration, but just for the purposes of
record we would like to register our objection as to the truth of the statement
itself. First, it is hearsay; second . . .
COURT: Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration.
ATTY. BARLONGAY: That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the inter-alia
[sic] rule, the admission of a party should not prejudice the rights of another.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q.

What was the exact statement of your wife?

xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Again, subject to the observation of this Honorable Court, we
would register our objections on these two grounds: Hearsay and res inter-alia
[sic] rule.

xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. BARLONGAY: Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . .

COURT: You have a continuing objection?
ATTY. BARLONGAY: Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want to say
that our objection is a continuing one. (TSN, 29 June 1993, 36-39).
If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the
narration," they should only be considered as independently relevant
statements, i.e., proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as proof
of the truth of facts revealed in the said statements or admissions. Elsewise
stated, the admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in
determining the issue of their truth. (FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court
in the Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual
intercourse admitted by Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be
deemed proven by the said admission or confession. While it is true that
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in administrative cases,
however, since the Investigating Justice herself had specifically allowed the
hearsay answers merely as part of the narration, or more specifically as
independently relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter
disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and competent
evidence against the respondent that he had illicit sex with Sol.
But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the
facts so admitted, considering, however, that Sol's admission that she engaged
in sexual intercourse on five occasions made no reference to specific dates, that
their affair antedated Sol's marriage, that their last proven tryst was in
Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence of positive and competent
evidence to show that any of the five acts of sexual intercourse took place after
the respondent's appointment to the judiciary , it cannot be safely presumed
that the respondent committed any of the sexual indiscretions after he became
a judge. Respondent is not charged for immorality committed before his
appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for
his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent may have undergone
moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have
completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a
public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1,
Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume
that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is
beyond reformation and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted
position of
a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that
honor his private and official conduct must at all times be free from the

appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the

lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have
solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of
impropriety. The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must
be proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases. This the complainant failed to do. The meetings of the
respondent and Sol at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do
not by themselves prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification.
Evidence was offered by the respondent to prove otherwise. However,
considering their prior special relationship, the respondent and Sol's meetings
could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the
concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. In short, the respondent
suddenly became indiscreet; he succumbed to the sweet memories of the past
and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal advice on a matter
which involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his
conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics which mandates that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the law must
comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice. (Dia-Aonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA
81 [1975] ). The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential
to the preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary. (Candia vs.
Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51 [1977] ).
It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent
left his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and
arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per
report of the private detectives (Exhibit "G"), the respondent and Sol left the unit
as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon on board a vehicle and that twenty-five minutes
later, Sol alighted near the crossing overpass at United Street. It is, therefore,
clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours
and, considering the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City
Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have
reached his office if at all he did proceed to it in time for the
commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon,
i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines
Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization of 1981). Thus, for
purely personal sessions, he violated the rule regarding the official sentence.
Such violation amounted to neglect of duty.
Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he not have sexual congress
with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and prostatitis. The
claim is both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to
prove the stage, extent or degree of seriousness of the diseases and their

effects on his capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly issued the
medical certificates did not testify thereon. Besides, immorality for which the
respondent is charged is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is
settled that:
immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751).
WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON is
hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and,
further, sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this
Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin
suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money.
Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066,
affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a
writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution
but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located
in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition
and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution
"to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold
the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners
Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson.
Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as
his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
(civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of
Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit
was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their
conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the
sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They
alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit,
that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only
against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's
venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and
which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the
respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and
from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the
Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On
November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it
had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the
respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners.
But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon
City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but
then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted
the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order
was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and
dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied
on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R),
praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed
the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t
We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending

decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without
unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1.
We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the
orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not
interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as
the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the
enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals
that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2.
Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in
one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their
conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago
similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their
conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the
present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos
deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business
venture.
3.
Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held
that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to halfinterest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court
assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her
husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with
her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of
the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by
the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that
a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to
issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the
issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold
have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or
of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the
time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4.
We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San
Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the
question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu
Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2)
the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3)
she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop

the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband
had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final
sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save
his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only
on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the
sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be
levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and
not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise
the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches
now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5.
The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal
infirmities.
(a)
It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago.
This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere
expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into
title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the
community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction
does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4
(b)
The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of
its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5
which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could
be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the
ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor
and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop
here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from
living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture
and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6.
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands
that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit,
must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for
fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold
tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position
as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he
finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise
the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to
his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
7.
In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for
purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the
disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts
but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil
case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that
(a)
the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but
trial on the merits has not even started;
(b)
after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they
impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c)
after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a
motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d)
the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental
complaint; and
(e)
the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants
an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)

We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental
complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the
reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal
properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied
was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into,
which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in
the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already
resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of
Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was
herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of
the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action
fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure
is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal
properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require
the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for
which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there
was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in
favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties
for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the
amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case
27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require
payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser
is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not
pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment."
(Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the
annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the
amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and
is moreover barred by prior judgment.

The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the
Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As
the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action,
which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily
fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was
unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the
services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a
preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the
properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20%
annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action
besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to
assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint,
the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction,
in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to
the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to
cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the
parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad
faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that
the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages
caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements
and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith
sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who
acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson
in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo
(40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties
are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity
of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action
of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their
rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the
agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the
sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and
sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied
upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have
already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original
complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint
is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action
in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside.
Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and
independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago
and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let
a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the
custody of the Clerk of Court.
G.R. No. 76549 December 10, 1987
CATALINA, ENRIQUE, ROSARIO, FLORDELIZA, RIZALAIDA AND SOCORRO, all
surnamed ROXAS as heirs of the late SEGUNDO ROXAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES ROXAS, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Petitioners seek the review of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
October 2, 1986 and November 5, 1986 in CA-G.R. CV No. 08119 declaring
appellants' Brief filed by herein petitioners to have been filed out of time and
denying their motion for reconsideration.
It appears that in Civil Case No. 3837-M, Branch 132 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff Segundo Roxas' complaint for
reconveyance of title against Andres Roxas and others.
On October 21, 1985, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. In the Resolution of
October 25, 1985, the court a quo directed the ventilation of the proceedings in
the Court of Appeals as the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary
period. On January 29, 1986, petitioners were notified by the respondent Court
of Appeals to pay the docket fee and on March 7, 1986, petitioners were required

to file appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, copy of
which was received by petitioners on March 18, 1986.
On April 28, 1986, petitioners filed their first motion for extension of time for
thirty (30) days counted from May 2, 1986 within which to file their brief. Said
motion was granted per Resolution of May 7, 1986, counted from notice thereof
copy of which was received by petitioners counsel on May 14, 1986. On May 29,
1987, petitioners filed a second motion for extension of time for another period
of thirty (30) days on the ground that petitioners' counsel is suffering from
asthma and hypertension and that their brief has not yet been completely
finished in draft form. Per Resolution of June 6, 1986, respondent court granted
the motion counted from notice thereof copy of which was received by
petitioners, counsel on June 23, 1986. Then, on July 21, 1986, two (2) days
before the expiration of the 30-day period granted, petitioners filed their last
motion for extension of time praying for fifteen (15) days counted from notice.
On August 25, 1986, before said motion was resolved, petitioners filed their
brief. On October 2, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
motion for last extension in the resolution which reads as follows:
Before Us for resolution is a "Motion For Last Extension" to file Appellant's Brief,
filed on July 21, 1986 praying for a 15-day extension from July 23, 1986 within
which to file appellant's brief.
It appears, however, that while the same remained unresolved, appellant filed
his brief only on August 25, 1986, or 18 days beyond the period of extension
prayed for by appellant. No other motion for extension was filed thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the appellant's brief is hereby considered filed out of time and is
ordered expunged from the record.
The appeal of plaintiff is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 1
On October 23, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of October 2, 1986, but it was denied per Resolution of November 5,
1986.
Hence this petition.
It is the position of the petitioners that respondent court erred in considering
their appellants' brief to have been filed out of time whereas it was filed before
their motion for last extension of time was resolved. Petitioners argue further
that since their motion which prayed for fifteen days extension counted from
notice is in line with the previous resolutions of the respondent court, then their
last motion for extension of time should not have been denied as there was no
intention on their part to delay or prejudice the appellees

Petitioners' argument is predicated upon the theory that whenever respondent

court grants their motion for extension of time it was always made to begin from
receipt of notice of the resolution despite their prayer that it be granted counted
from the date prayed for.
The argument is unmeritorious. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 46 of the Revised
Rules of Court, an "extension of time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed
except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed
before the expiration of the time sought to be extended." Allowance or denial of
motions for extension of time to file briefs is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. 2 There is no question that the discretion vested in the courts
whether to grant or not motions for extensions must be exercised wisely and
prudently, never capriciously, with a view of substantial justice. 3
In the case before Us, it is Our considered view and We so hold that the
Resolutions assailed by herein petitioners are products of respondent court's
sound exercise of its discretion, considering the peculiar circumstances of this
case. Reference is hereby made that from the time of the rendition of the
decision appealed from dated July 19, 1985, up to the time of filing of the
appellants' brief on August 25, 1986, a period of 402 days lapsed or counted
from March 18, 1986, the date of petitioners' receipt of notice requiring them to
file their brief up to the time of filing 160 days lapsed. Examining the brief filed
by herein petitioners it appears however that it consists of twenty-six (26) pages
only with simple narration of facts and discussions of the issues. 4 Any practising
lawyer knows that twenty (20) days is more than sufficient to complete the
printing of brief of such length including its proof-reading. 5 It is known among
every practising lawyer that the policy of the Court of Appeals is to limit the
second extension of time to file briefs to twenty (20) days. Said policy was
relaxed further by the respondent Court by giving sixty (60) days extension on
the basis of the plea of petitioners' counsel that he was suffering from asthma
even if said plea appears to be self-serving as it was not even accompanied by a
doctor's certificate. Petitioners abused the laxity extended them by the
respondent Court. They even prayed that the extension of fifteen (15) days be
counted from notice. Lawyers should not presume that the courts would grant
their motion for extension more so to expect that if ever granted it would always
be counted from notice thereof.
Thus, the petition to review the assailed resolutions must fail: Let this serve as
warning among members of the Philippine bar who take their own sweet time
with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does
no credit to their standing in the profession. More so when they do not file the
required brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. Not only should they
not presume that their motion for extension of time will be granted by the court
much less should they expect that the extension that may be granted shall be
counted from notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the
extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only themselves to blame if
their appeal or case is dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit.

receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and

affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

SO ORDERED.
March 23, 1929

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people
are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and
that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as
notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to
exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague.

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the
provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he
made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as
follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the
purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents
of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your
homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you
collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against
you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a
lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in
translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of
next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for
your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague,
to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my
residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but
will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with
you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the
Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary
public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that
you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people
in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my
desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If
the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other
lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing
to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal
provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived
related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the
Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by
adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine
Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of
character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced
by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring

newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of

the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring
up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common
law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or
runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who
bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate
policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in
influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek
his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves
upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the
part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between
individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this
offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to
reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at
the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason
behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession
and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself
or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman
[1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A.,
231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of
solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great
profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It
results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully
inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and
those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the
action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom
joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the

case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our
action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of
this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The
commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination
from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third,
his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of
suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations
which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular
instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions
of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that
the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as
an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
Present:
Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or
parts or passages of his writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and
passing them off as the product of ones own mind.[1]
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and
Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in
the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In
said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort
women to compel certain officers of the executive department[2] to espouse
their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government
for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World
War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent from their article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in
2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book,
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law published by the
Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, Breaking
the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western

Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism

centered on Justice Del Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and
erga omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea,
Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra
Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via,
Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo,
Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of
the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a
statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the
Courts decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the
UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the
resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of
plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation
not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary
sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those
of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice
Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the
Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the
comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to
educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as
well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for
even the most basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their
published statement reads,
But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution
for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on
misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on
polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing
to actually exercise its power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to

take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with
false sympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of
concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. (Emphasis
supplied).
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was
totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public
knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision
alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We
made it clear in the case of In re Kelly[3] that any publication, pending a suit,
reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the
counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining
a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary.[4] The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.[5]
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers
of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.[6] Their actions likewise
constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo
V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza,
Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo
Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L.
Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario,
members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are
directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for

violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting,
through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No.
162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En
Banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported
statement, entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and

Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Enclosed are copies of the said dummy
and signed statement, respectively, attached to the said letter dated August 10,
2010 and to the Compliance dated August 31, 2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan
Law Offices with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards.
Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.
Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named UP College of Law faculty
members be effected by personal delivery.
SO ORDERED.