Seminar Report 2009

Chapter 2
Quantum Cryptography
Fundamentals
Electromagnetic waves such as light waves can exhibit the phenomenon of polarization,
in which the direction of the electric field vibrations is constant or varies in some
definite way.

2.1

Photon

According to quantum theory, light waves are propagated as discrete particles known
as photons. A photon is a massless particle, the quantum of the electromagnetic field,
carrying energy, momentum, and angular momentum. The polarization of the light
is carried by the direction of the angular momentum or spin of the photons[7]. A
photon either will or will not pass through a polarization filter, but if it emerges
it will be aligned with the filter regardless of its initial state; there are no partial
photons. Information about the photons polarization can be determined by using a
photon detector to determine whether it passed through a filter.

2.2

Entanglement

Entangled pairs are pairs of photons generated by certain particle reactions[7]. Each
pair contains two photons of different but related polarization. Entanglement affects
the randomness of measurements. If we measure a beam of photons E1 with a polarization filter, one-half of the incident photons will pass the filter, regardless of its
orientation[5]. Whether a particular photon will pass the filter is random.

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Figure 2.1: Entangled photons

However, if we measure a beam of photons E2 consisting of entangled companions of the E1 beam with a filter oriented at 90 degrees to the first
filter, then if an E1 photon passes its filter, its E2 companion will also pass its filter.
Similarly, if an E1 photon does not pass its filter then its E2 companion will not.

2.3

Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle and Principle of Photon Polarization

The foundation of quantum cryptography lies in the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle,

which states that certain pairs of physical properties are related in such a way that
measuring one property prevents the observer from simultaneously knowing the value
of the other,and the principle of photon polarization which tells that an eavesdropper
cannot copy unknown qubits (quantum bits)[1].
In particular, when measuring the polarization of a photon, the
choice of what direction to measure affects all subsequent measurements. For instance, if one measures the polarization of a photon by noting that it passes through
a vertically oriented filter, the photon emerges as vertically polarized regardless of its
initial direction of polarization[4]. If one places a second filter oriented at some angle
q to the vertical, there is a certain probability that the photon will pass through the
second filter as well, and this probability depends on the angle q. As q increases, the
probability of the photon passing through the second filter decreases until it reaches
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0 at q = 90 deg (i.e., the second filter is horizontal). When q = 45 deg, the chance of
the photon passing through the second filter is precisely 1/2. This is the same result
as a stream of randomly polarized photons impinging on the second filter, so the first
filter is said to randomize the measurements of the second.
The principle of photon polarization states that, an eavesdropper
cannot copy unknown qubits, due to no-cloning theorem.

Figure 2.2: Polarization by a filter

Unpolarized light enters a vertically aligned filter, which absorbs
some of the light and polarizes the remainder in the vertical direction. A second filter
tilted at some angle q absorbs some of the polarized light and transmits the rest,
giving it a new polarization.A pair of orthogonal (perpendicular) polarization states
used to describe the polarization of photons, such as horizontal/vertical, is referred to
as a basis[4,6]. A pair of bases are said to be conjugate bases if the measurement of the
polarization in the first basis completely randomizes the measurement in the second
basis, as in the above example with q = 45 deg. It is a fundamental consequence of
the Heisenberg Uncertainity principle that such conjugate pairs of states must exist
for a quantum system.
basis
+

0
1

Table 2.1: Rectilinear and Diagonal bases

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Quantum mechanics (particularly quantum indeterminacy) says there

is no possible measurement that will distinguish between the 4 different polarization
states, as they are not all orthogonal[2]. The only measurement possible is between
any two orthogonal states (a basis), so for example measuring in the rectilinear basis
will give a result of horizontal or vertical. If the photon was created as horizontal or
vertical (as a rectilinear eigenstate) then this will measure the correct state, but if
it was created as 45 or 135 (diagonal eigenstates) then the rectilinear measurement
will instead return either horizontal or vertical at random[2]. Furthermore, after this
measurement the photon will be polarized in the state it was measured in (horizontal
or vertical), with all information about its initial polarization lost.

2.4

Bits vs Qubits

A classical computer has a memory made up of bits, where each bit represents either a
one or a zero. A quantum computer maintains a sequence of qubits. A single qubit can
represent a one, a zero, or, crucially, any quantum superposition of these; moreover,
a pair of qubits can be in any quantum superposition of 4 states, and three qubits
in any superposition of 8. In general a quantum computer with n qubits can be in
an arbitrary superposition of up to 2n different states simultaneously (this compares
to a normal computer that can only be in one of these 2n states at any one time).
A quantum computer operates by manipulating those qubits with a fixed sequence
of quantum logic gates. The sequence of gates to be applied is called a quantum
algorithm.

Figure 2.3: Bloch Sphere: representation of a qubit

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An example of an implementation of qubits for a quantum computer

could start with the use of particles with two spin states: down and up. But in
fact any system possessing an observable quantity A which is conserved under time
evolution and such that A has at least two discrete and sufficiently spaced consecutive
eigenvalues, is a suitable candidate for implementing a qubit. This is true because
any such system can be mapped onto an effective spin-1/2 system.
Qubits are made up of controlled particles and the means of control
(e.g. devices that trap particles an switch them from one state to another).
These characteristics provide the principles behind quantum cryptography. If an eavesdropper Eve uses a filter aligned with Alices filter, she can
recover the original polarization of the photon[5,6,7]. But if she uses a misaligned
filter she will not only receive no information, but will have influenced the original
photon so that she will be unable to reliably retransmit one with the original polarization. Bob will either receive no message or a garbled one, and in either case will
be able to deduce Eves presence.
Sending a message using photons is straightforward in principle,
since one of their quantum properties, namely polarization, can be used to represent
a 0 or a 1. Each photon therefore carries one bit of quantum information, which
physicists call a qubit[4,5]. To receive such a qubit, the recipient must determine the
photons polarization, for example by passing it through a filter, a measurement that
inevitably alters the photons properties. This is bad news for eavesdroppers, since the
sender and receiver can easily spot the alterations these measurements cause. Cryptographers cannot exploit this idea to send private messages, but they can determine
whether its security was compromised in retrospect.
The genius of quantum cryptography is that it solves the problem
of key distribution. A user can suggest a key by sending a series of photons with
random polarizations. This sequence can then be used to generate a sequence of
numbers. The process is known as quantum key distribution. If the key is intercepted
by an eavesdropper, this can be detected and it is of no consequence, since it is only a
set of random bits and can be discarded. The sender can then transmit another key.
Once a key has been securely received, it can be used to encrypt a message that can
be transmitted by conventional means: telephone, e-mail, or regular postal mail.

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Chapter 3
Quantum Key Exchange
Quantum communication involves encoding information in quantum states, or qubits,
as opposed to classical communications use of bits. Usually, photons are used for
these quantum states. Quantum cryptography exploits certain properties of these
quantum states to ensure its security. There are several different approaches to quantum key distribution, but they can be divided into two main categories depending on
which property they exploit.
Prepare and measure protocols
In contrast to classical physics, the act of measurement is an integral
part of quantum mechanics. In general, measuring an unknown quantum state will
change that state in some way. This is known as quantum indeterminacy, and underlies
results such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, information-disturbance theorem
and no cloning theorem. This can be exploited in order to detect any eavesdropping
on communication (which necessarily involves measurement) and, more importantly,
to calculate the amount of information that has been intercepted[4].
Entanglement based protocols
The quantum states of two (or more) separate objects can become
linked together in such a way that they must be described by a combined quantum
state, not as individual objects. This is known as entanglement and means that, for
example, performing a measurement on one object will affect the other. If an entangled pair of objects is shared between two parties, anyone intercepting either object
will alter the overall system, allowing the presence of the third party (and the amount
of information they have gained) to be determined.
These two approaches can each be further divided into three families
of protocols; discrete variable, continuous variable a nd distributed phase reference
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coding. Discrete variable protocols were the first to be invented, and they remain
the most widely implemented. The other two families are mainly concerned with
overcoming practical limitations of experiments. The two protocols described below
both use discrete variable coding.

3.1

BB84 protocol: Charles H. Bennett and Gilles

Brassard (1984)

The first published paper to describe a cryptographic protocol using these ideas to
solve the key distribution problem was written in 1984 by Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard. In it, Bennett and Brassard described an unconditionally secure quantum
key distribution system.
This protocol, known as BB84 after its inventors and year of publication, was originally described using photon polarization states to transmit the
information. However, any two pairs of conjugate states can be used for the protocol,
and many optical fibre based implementations described as BB84 use phase encoded
states[2,6]. The sender (traditionally referred to as Alice) and the receiver (Bob) are
connected by a quantum communication channel which allows quantum states to be
transmitted. In the case of photons this channel is generally either an optical fibre
or simply free space. In addition they communicate via a public classical channel, for
example using broadcast radio or the internet. Neither of these channels need to be
secure; the protocol is designed with the assumption that an eavesdropper (referred
to as Eve) can interfere in any way with both.
The security of the protocol comes from encoding the information
in non-orthogonal states. Quantum indeterminacy means that these states cannot in
general be measured without disturbing the original state. BB84 uses two pairs of
states, with each pair conjugate to the other pair, and the two states within a pair
orthogonal to each other. Pairs of orthogonal states are referred to as a basis. The
usual polarization state pairs used are either the rectilinear basis of vertical (0) and
horizontal (90), the diagonal basis of 45 and 135 or the circular basis of left- and
right-handedness. Any two of these bases are conjugate to each other, and so any two
can be used in the protocol.
The first step in BB84 is quantum transmission. Alice creates a
random bit (0 or 1) and then randomly selects one of her two bases (rectilinear or
diagonal in this case) to transmit it in. She then prepares a photon polarization state
depending both on the bit value and basis, as shown in the table to the left. So for
example a 0 is encoded in the rectilinear basis (+) as a vertical polarization state,

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and a 1 is encoded in the diagonal basis (x) as a 135 state. Alice then transmits a
single photon in the state specified to Bob, using the quantum channel. This process
is then repeated from the random bit stage, with Alice recording the state, basis and
time of each photon sent.
As Bob does not know the basis the photons were encoded in, all
he can do is select a basis at random to measure in, either rectilinear or diagonal.
He does this for each photon he receives, recording the time, measurement basis used
and measurement result. After Bob has measured all the photons, he communicates
with Alice over the public classical channel. Alice broadcasts the basis each photon
was sent in, and Bob the basis each was measured in. They both discard photon
measurements (bits) where Bob used a different basis, which will be half on average,
leaving half the bits as a shared key.
Alices random bit
Alices random sending basis
Photon polarization alice sends
Bobs random measuring basis
Photon polarization Bob measures
PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF BASIS
Shared secret key

0 1
1
0
+ + +

+

0

1
0


+

0
1
+

+ +

Table 3.1: Alice and Bob generating a shared secret key

To check for the presence of eavesdropping Alice and Bob now compare a certain subset of their remaining bit strings. If a third party (usually referred
to as Eve, for eavesdropper) has gained any information about the photons polarization, this will have introduced errors in Bobs measurements. If more than p bits
differ they abort the key and try again, possibly with a different quantum channel,
as the security of the key cannot be guaranteed. p is chosen so that if the number of
bits known to Eve is less than this, privacy amplification can be used to reduce Eves
knowledge of the key to an arbitrarily small amount, by reducing the length of the
key.

3.2

E91 protocol: Artur Ekert (1991)

The Ekert scheme uses entangled pairs of photons. These can be created by Alice,
by Bob, or by some source separate from both of them, including eavesdropper Eve.
The photons are distributed so that Alice and Bob each end up with one photon from
each pair.
The scheme relies on two properties of entanglement. First, the
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entangled states are perfectly correlated in the sense that if Alice and Bob both
measure whether their particles have vertical or horizontal polarizations, they will
always get the same answer with 100 % probability. The same is true if they both
measure any other pair of complementary (orthogonal) polarizations. However, the
particular results are completely random; it is impossible for Alice to predict if she
(and thus Bob) will get vertical polarization or horizontal polarization.
Second, any attempt at eavesdropping by Eve will destroy these
correlations in a way that Alice and Bob can detect.

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Chapter 4
Privacy Amplification and
Information Reconciliation
The quantum cryptography protocols described above will provide Alice and Bob with
nearly identical shared keys, and also with an estimate of the discrepancy between the
keys. These differences can be caused by eavesdropping, but will also be caused by
imperfections in the transmission line and detectors. As it is impossible to distinguish
between these two types of errors, it is assumed all errors are due to eavesdropping
in order to guarantee security. Provided the error rate between the keys is lower
than a certain threshold (20 % as of April 2007), two steps can be performed to first
remove the erroneous bits and then reduce Eves knowledge of the key to an arbitrary
small value. These two steps are known as information reconciliation and privacy
amplification respectively, and were first described in 1992.
Information reconciliation is a form of error correction carried out
between Alice and Bobs keys, in order to ensure both keys are identical. It is conducted over the public channel and as such it is vital to minimize the information
sent about each key, as this can be read by Eve. A common protocol used for information reconciliation is the cascade protocol, proposed in 1994. This operates in
several rounds, with both keys divided into blocks in each round and the parity of
those blocks compared. If a difference in parity is found then a binary search is performed to find and correct the error. If an error is found in a block from a previous
round that had correct parity then another error must be contained in that block; this
error is found and corrected as before. This process is repeated recursively, which is
the source of the cascade name. After all blocks have been compared, Alice and Bob
both reorder their keys in the same random way, and a new round begins. At the
end of multiple rounds Alice and Bob will have identical keys with high probability,
however Eve will have gained additional information about the key from the parity
information exchanged.
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Privacy Amplification is a method for reducing (and effectively eliminating) Eves partial information about Alice and Bobs key. This partial information
could have been gained both by eavesdropping on the quantum channel during key
transmission (thus introducing detectable errors), and on the public channel during
information reconciliation (where it is assumed Eve gains all possible parity information). Privacy amplification uses Alice and Bobs key to produce a new, shorter key,
in such a way that Eve has only negligible information about the new key. This can
be done using a universal hash function, chosen at random from a publicly known set
of such functions, which takes as its input a binary string of length equal to the key
and outputs a binary string of a chosen shorter length. The amount by which this
new key is shortened is calculated, based on how much information Eve could have
gained about the old key (which is known due to the errors this would introduce), in
order to reduce the probability of Eve having any knowledge of the new key to a very
low value.

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Chapter 5
Implementations
The highest bit rate system currently demonstrated exchanges secure keys at 1 Mbit/s
(over 20 km of optical fibre) and 10 kbit/s (over 100 km of fibre), achieved by a collaboration between the University of Cambridge and Toshiba using the BB84 protocol
with decoy pulses.
As of March 2007 the longest distance over which quantum key
distribution has been demonstrated using optic fibre is 148.7 km, achieved by Los
Alamos/NIST using the BB84 protocol. Significantly, this distance is long enough for
almost all the spans found in todays fibre networks. The distance record for free space
QKD is 144 km between two of the Canary Islands, achieved by a European collaboration using entangled photons (the Ekert scheme) in 2006, and using BB84 enhanced
with decoy states in 2007[3]. The experiments suggest transmission to satellites is possible, due to the lower atmospheric density at higher altitudes. For example although
the minimum distance from the International Space Station to the ESA Space Debris
Telescope is about 400 km, the atmospheric thickness is about an order of magnitude
less than in the European experiment, thus yielding less attenuation compared to this
experiment[6].
The DARPA Quantum Network, a 10-node quantum cryptography
network, has been running since 2004 in Massachusetts, USA. It is being developed
by BBN Technologies, Harvard University, Boston University and QinetiQ[2].
There are currently four companies offering commercial quantum
cryptography systems;id Quantique (Geneva), MagiQ Technologies (New York), Smart
Quantum (France) and Quintessence Labs (Australia). Several other companies also
have active research programmes, including Toshiba, HP, IBM, Mitsubishi, NEC and
NTT.
Quantum encryption technology provided by the Swiss company Id
Quantique was used in the Swiss canton (state) of Geneva to transmit ballot results
to the capitol in the national election occurring on Oct. 21, 2007.
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In 2004, the worlds first bank transfer using quantum cryptography

was carried in Vienna, Austria. An important cheque, which needed absolute security,
was transmitted from the Mayor of the city to an Austrian bank.
The worlds first computer network protected by quantum cryptography was implemented in October 2008, at a scientific conference in Vienna. The
network used 200 km of standard fibre optic cable to interconnect six locations across
Vienna and the town of St Poelten located 69 km to the west. The event was witnessed
by Gilles Brassard and Anton Zeilinger.

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Chapter 6
Attacks
6.1

Intercept and resend

The simplest type of possible attack is the intercept-resend attack, where Eve measures
the quantum states (photons) sent by Alice and then sends replacement states to Bob,
prepared in the state she measures.

Figure 6.1: Eve attempting to eavesdrop

In the BB84 protocol this will produce errors in the key shared
between Alice and Bob. As Eve has no knowledge of the basis a state sent by Alice
is encoded in, she can only guess which basis to measure in, in the same way as Bob.
If she chooses correctly then she will measure the correct photon polarization state
as sent by Alice, and will resend the correct state to Bob[5]. However if she chooses
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incorrectly then the state she measures will be random, and the state sent to Bob will
not be the same as the state sent by Alice. If Bob then measures this state in the
same basis Alice sent he will get a random result, as Eve has sent him a state in the
opposite basis, instead of the correct result he would get without the presence of Eve.
Alices random bit
0
Alices random sending basis
+
Photon polarization Alice sends

Eves random measuring basis

+
Polarization Eve measures and sends
Bobs random measuring basis
+
Photon polarization Bob measures

PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF BASIS

Shared secret key
0

Error in key

1
+

1
0
1
+

+ +

+

0
0
1
+

+ +

+ +

Table 6.1: Polarization change when Eve interrupts and resends

The probability Eve chooses the incorrect basis is 50 percent (assuming Alice chooses her basis randomly), and if Bob measures this intercepted photon
in the basis Alice sent he will get a random result, i. e. an incorrect result with
probability of 50pecrent. The probability an intercepted photon generates an error
in the key string is then 50 % x 50 % = 25 %. If Alice and Bob publicly compare n
of their key bits (thus discarding them as key bits, as they are no longer secret) the
probability they find disagreement and identify the presence of Eve is:
3
Pd = 1 ( )n
4

(6.1)

So to detect an eavesdropper with probability Pd = 0.999999999 Alice

and Bob need to compare n = 72 key bits.
Security Proofs
The above is just a simple example of an attack. If Eve is assumed to
have unlimited resources, for example classical and quantum computing power, there
are many more attacks possible. BB84 has been proven secure against any attacks
allowed by quantum mechanics, both for sending information using an ideal photon
source which only ever emits a single photon at a time, and also using practical photon
sources which sometimes emit multi-photon pulses. These proofs are unconditionally
secure in the sense that no conditions are imposed on the resources available to the
eavesdropper, however there are other conditions required:
1. Eve cannot access Alice and Bobs encoding and decoding devices.
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2. The random number generators used by Alice and Bob must be trusted and
truly random (for example a Quantum random number generator).
3. The classical communication channel must be authenticated using an unconditionally secure authentication scheme.

6.2

Man in the middle attack

Quantum cryptography is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack when used without authentication to distinguish friend from foe. As in the classical case, Alice and
Bob cannot authenticate each other and establish a secure connection without some
means of verifying each others identities (such as an initial shared secret). If Alice
and Bob have an initial shared secret then they can use an unconditionally secure authentication scheme (such as Carter Wegman) along with quantum key distribution
to exponentially expand this key, using a small amount of the new key to authenticate the next session. Several methods to create this initial shared secret have been
proposed, for example using a third party or chaos theory.

6.3

Photon number splitting attack

In the BB84 protocol Alice sends quantum states to Bob using single photons. In
practice many implementations use laser pulses attenuated to a very low level to send
the quantum states. These laser pulses contain a very small number of photons,
for example 0.2 photons per pulse, which are distributed according to a Poissonian
distribution. This means most pulses actually contain no photons (no pulse is sent),
some pulses contain one photon (which is desired) and a few pulses contain two or
more photons. If the pulse contains more than one photon, then Eve can split off the
extra photons and transmit the remaining single photon to Bob. This is the basis
of the photon number splitting attack, where Eve stores these extra photons in a
quantum memory until Bob detects the remaining single photon and Alice reveals the
encoding basis. Eve can then measure her photons in the correct basis and obtain
information on the key without introducing detectable errors.
Even with the possibility of a PNS attack a secure key can still be
generated, as shown in the GLLP security proof, however a much higher amount of
privacy amplification is needed reducing the secure key rate significantly (with PNS
the rate scales as t2 as compared to t for a single photon sources, where t is the
transmittance of the quantum channel).
There are several solutions to this problem. The most obvious is to

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use a true single photon source instead of an attenuated laser. While such sources
are still at a developmental stage QKD has been carried out successfully with them.
However as current sources operate at a low efficiency and frequency key rates and
transmission distances are limited. Another solution is to modify the BB84 protocol,
as is done for example in the SARG04 protocol, in which the secure key rate scales
3
as t 2 . The most promising solution is the decoy state idea, in which Alice randomly
sends some of her laser pulses with a lower average photon number. These decoy
states can be used to detect a PNS attack, as Eve has no way to tell which pulses
are signal and which decoy. Using this idea the secure key rate scales as t, the same
as for a single photon source. This idea has been implemented successfully in several
QKD experiments, allowing for high key rates secure against all known attacks.

6.4

Hacking attacks

Hacking attacks target imperfections in the implementation of the protocol instead of

the protocol directly. If the equipment used in quantum cryptography can be tampered with, it could be made to generate keys that were not secure using a random
number generator attack. Another common class of attacks is the Trojan horse attack which does not require physical access to the endpoints: rather than attempt
to read Alice and Bobs single photons, Mallory sends a large pulse of light back to
Alice in between transmitted photons. Alices equipment reflects some of Mallorys
light, revealing the state of Alices polarizer. This attack is easy to avoid, for example
using an optical isolator to prevent light from entering Alices system, and all other
hacking attacks can similarly be defeated by modifying the implementation. Apart
from Trojan horse there are several other known attacks including faked state attacks,
phase remapping attacks and time-shift attacks. The time-shift attack has even been
successfully demonstrated on a commercial quantum crypto-system. This demonstration is the first successful demonstration of quantum hacking against a non-homemade
quantum key distribution system.

6.5

Denial of service

Because currently a dedicated fibre optic line (or line of sight in free space) is required
between the two points linked by quantum cryptography, a denial of service attack can
be mounted by simply cutting or blocking the line or, perhaps more surreptitiously,
by attempting to tap it.

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Chapter 7
Prospects
The current commercial systems are aimed mainly at governments and corporations
with high security requirements. Quantum cryptography has the ability to detect any
interception of the key, whereas with courier the key security cannot be proven or
tested. Advances in processing power is also a relevant feature. Hence,the technology
has the potential to make a valuable contribution to the network security among
government, business, and academic environment.
QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) systems also have the advantage
of being automatic, with greater reliability and lower operating costs than a secure
human courier network. In few years, the technology might help to protect the security
of satellite television broadcasts.
Factors preventing wide adoption of quantum cryptography outside
high security areas include the cost of equipment, the lack of a demonstrated threat
to existing key exchange protocols and the lack of a security certification process or
standard for the equipment. However, with optic fibre networks already present in
many countries the infrastructure is in place for a more widespread use.
Quantum cryptography promises to revolutionize secure communication by providing security based on the fundamental laws of physics, instead of the
current state of mathematical algorithms or computing technology. The devices for
implementing such methods exist and the performance of demonstration systems is
being continuously improved. Within the next few years, if not months, such systems
could start encrypting some of the most valuable secrets of government and industry.

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References
[1] Mehrdad . S. Sharbaf, Quantum Cryptography : A New Generation of
Information Technology Security System , 2009
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs all?arnumber=5070885

[2] Quantum cryptography , Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum cryptography

[3] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail and J. Smolin, Experimental

Quantum Cryptography Journal of Cryptology vol.5, no.1, 1992.

[4] Toyran , M.Tubitak , Kocaeli , Quantum Cryptography , June 2007

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs all?arnumber=4298797

[5] Kurochkin .V. L., Meizvestny. I.G , Quantum Cryptography , July 2009
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs all?arnumber=5173960

[6] Richard J. Hughes, D. M. Alde, P. Dyer, G. G. Luther, G. L. Morgan and M.

Schauer, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Quantum Cryptography

[7] Overview of Quantum Cryptography,CSA

http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/crypt/overview.php

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