A ir B ridge Denial: A n International and

Interagenc y S uc c es s S tory.
Ezequiel Parrilla

2003 started strong for Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) moving their
illegal products by air in South America. US assistance in the air interception
of drug-trafficking aircraft in the area had been halted after an April 2001
incident in Peru that resulted in the death of two innocent American
missionaries aboard a civilian aircraft, mistaken for drug-traffickers (1).
In Colombia, still trying to recover from years of violence by DTOs and illegal
armed groups, many areas of the country lacked government presence, with
nearly 160 of the almost 1100 municipalities (county seats) lacking any police
presence. (2) DTOs were able to move in and out of airstrips to move drug
precursor chemicals, cocaine, and other related items. Some observers have
used the analogy of comparing Colombias size to a combination of California
and Texas. The California-sized area is located from the Andes to the west.
The mostly flat, Texas-sized area located east of the Andes, is home to less than
5% (approx 2.2 million) of the nations nearly 48 million people, and has a very
limited road network that made government access difficult (3). By the end of
2003, there were over 600 illegal flights over Colombia (4).

Most aircraft departed from known or suspected drug trafficking areas. The
runways used by the DTOs ranged from legal runways in towns with no
government presence to illegal, camouflaged landing strips with fake houses
and small mobile structures placed along the middle of the airstrip that were
removed when illegal aircraft came in and replaced when the runway was no
longer in use. Oftentimes the aircraft were moved to the tree line after landing
and camouflaged so that within minutes of landing there was no indication of
an aircraft at the location. At one point, the Colombian Air Force (COLAF)
estimated the number of illegal runways in the country at nearly 1,700 (5).
Aircraft would take off and weave their way through the then-limited radar
coverage in Colombia en route to their destination, more often than not
somewhere in Central America.

In August 2003, the Colombian Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program started
operations, following implementation of a bilateral US-Colombia agreement
that featured improved operational safeguards compared to previous
agreements(6). Whereas prior illegal flight intercept programs had US aircrews
flying radar-tracking aircraft with host nation riders monitoring operations in
their country, the new Colombia ABD program had Colombian Air Force
aircrews with a bilingual US government safety monitor aboard SR-560
Citation aircraft loaned by the US government. These planes were equipped
with an air-to-air radar and a forward looking infrared-equipped camera.
One key aspect of the new program was to have safety monitors whose only
duty was to monitor events to ensure checklist compliance and flight safety.
These monitors would be located at the Joint Interagency Task Force - South
(JIATF-S) operations floor in Key West, Fl, aboard the radar tracking aircraft,

and at the COLAF command center in Bogot. US contractors serving as safety

monitors and Colombian Air Force pilots and mission directors aboard the
Colombian Citation airborne tracker aircraft were all required to be bilingual(7).
This requirement addressed the language barrier problem that contributed to
the tragic Peru accidental shootdown in 2001. A radio network was
established for the exclusive use of the safety monitors, ensuring direct
communications were available throughout any event, in order to address
another problem that occurred during the Peru incident (8). A common
checklist was established so that when one participant mentioned a step
number from the checklist, all participants knew exactly what he was doing.
In order to have a continually improving program, all events were recorded and
then reviewed not only by each of the participant organizations, but by a joint
US-Colombian team.
The new program presented an international and interagency team to confront
the wide-ranging tentacles of the DTOs. On the US side, this included
personnel from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of
Justice, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). JIATF-S coordinated
the operations and provided information on unknown, assumed suspect
aircraft tracks obtained by the Relocatable-Over-The-Horizon-Radar from its
operations center in Chesapeake, VA. These aircraft tracks met agreed upon
criteria published in a bilateral letter of agreement and displayed behavior
consistent with drug-carrying aircraft such as not having a flight plan (which is
illegal in Colombia), flying at low nonstandard altitudes, flying without
communicating with air traffic controllers, etc. The USAF provided E-3
Airborne Warning and Control System surveillance aircraft that expanded the
coverage area and improved detection capabilities against low, slow-moving
aircraft. US Air Forces Southern coordinated in-country training for Colombian
aircrews. Additional training was conducted at the Inter American Air Forces
Academy at Lackland AFB, TX. The Customs and Border Protection Office of
Air and Marine provided P-3 aircraft coverage as well as training. The Drug
Enforcement Administration provided vital information. State provided
administrative oversight and funding, including aircraft and facilities, along
with a US contractor that provided logistics, training, and safety monitors.
Government of Colombia (GOC) team members included personnel from the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fiscalia (Office of the
Prosecutor General), the Aeronautica Civil (Colombias Federal Aviation
Administration equivalent), COLAF, Colombian National Police (CNP),
Colombian Navy (COLNAV), and Colombian Army (COLAR).

The program began operations with three SR-560 Citation aircraft based from
Apiay Air Base, near Villavicencio in Colombias Meta department. This was
the nearest base to an area of heavy drug traffic known as "The Dogs Head." In
eastern Colombia, an outline of the Brazilian border along the tri-border area
between Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia resembles a dogs head with the
eastern border forming the back of the head and the western edge resembling
the dogs open mouth around the Vaupes department of Colombia. Initially the
venerable A-37 played the interceptor role in most ABD events. As the DTOs
started to move their Dogs Head operations beyond the A-37s flying range,
other platforms such as the AC-47 Fantasma gunship and forward-deployed
AH-60 Arpia helicopter gunships were used. With most illegal trafficking
based in locations that had no GOC presence, many of the initial ABD events
ended with the COLAF destroying DTO aircraft on the ground.
The program also confronted a number of DTO initiatives to protect their illegal
operations:
Many of the drug carrying aircraft had falsified registration/tail numbers that
could be changed in minutes.
DTO aircraft carried extra fuel containers and improvised inflight refueling
systems including pumps that increased the aircrafts range.
DTOs took action to ensure they were informed when ABD program aircraft
took off. It was not unusual to see illegal aircraft change course shortly after
takeoff of an ABD tracker aircraft. Operations security became a key aspect of
daily operations.
During night operations from illegal runways, DTO personnel would
sometimes light large bonfires in a vain attempt to degrade night vision device
effectiveness.
On 1 February, 2004, a Colombian Military air assault of over 600 National
Police and Army soldiers seized the village of Caruru, in the Vaupes
department, marking the first government security force presence in Caruru in
18 years. (9) The Caruru airstrip is located on the north bank of the navigable
Vaupes River, making it a valuable transshipment point in Colombias remote
southeastern plains region, accessible only by air or river. This was part of the
GOCs wider strategic operation (2003-04) to establish presence throughout all
of the countrys 1100 municipalities. The GOC capitalized on its enhanced
airmobility, going from 24 helos in 1998 to 285 helos by 2004 (10).

As the GOC increased its ability to deploy ground forces by air and ground in
the southeast, illegal air operations from the Dogs Head area decreased
significantly. Conversely, illegal flight operations in northern Colombia
increased, with many aircraft crossing the border and landing on illegal
runways in the departments of Cesar and Norte de Santander in northeast
Colombia.
Increased government presence and increased mobility made it possible to do
more law enforcement events, involving CNP, COLAR, and the COLNAV in
addition to the COLAF. The event of 27 February 2005 showcased the
increased joint activity. While conducting an airborne patrol based on
intelligence information, a COLAF Citation SR-560 detected a Beechcraft 200
Super King Air just as a group of narcotics traffickers finished loading it with
drugs at an illegal airfield known to be used by DTOs in the Cesar department.
The Beechcraft 200 took off and the SR-560 guided in an A-37 interceptor. As
part of procedures to ensure safe use of weapons, the commander of the
COLAF had to approve each phase of the interception event. Phase I is making
warning calls on the radio and hand signals, Phase II is firing warning shots,
and Phase III is firing shots to disable the aircraft(11). After making warning
calls and firing warning shots in accordance with agreed procedures, the A-37
was cleared by the COLAF commander to open fire on the target aircraft. The
A-37 hit one of the planes fuel tanks and a large amount of fuel began leaking.
The firing stopped as it became obvious the aircraft would have to land. The
target plane returned to its departing runway, dropping packets of its cargo as
it went along. It landed shortly after dark and veered at high speed off the
runway in a spectacular cloud of dust. Its crew proceeded to offload some of
the cocaine packets. Warning shots from the A-37 drove the narcotraffickers
away from the aircraft. The nearest Colombian Army unit was notified and
sent a ground patrol. However, the limited transportation network in the area
made it difficult to estimate their arrival time. A COLAF "Rapaz" Bell 212
gunship arrived at the area escorting a COLNAV Bell 412 helicopter with four
COLNAV marines aboard. While the "Rapaz" provided cover overhead, the
marines disembarked from the helicopter, chased away the remaining
narcotraffickers, and loaded as many of the cocaine packages into the
helicopter as it could carry. As the helicopter gunship ran low on fuel, the
Super King Air with the remaining load was destroyed before the helicopters
departed in order to prevent the narcotics load from staying in the DTOs
hands. Shortly afterwards a COLAR and CNP unit arrived and confiscated
more cocaine packs found in the area.

On another occasion, an aircraft was located on an illegal runway. Phases I

and II of the intercept procedures were completed, but before the aircraft was
destroyed during Phase III, a Colombia CNP unit reported their approach to the
site and proceeded to impound the aircraft, finding hand-drawn maps of
runways with coordinates. When another aircraft departed from a nearby
illegal runway within days and headed to Central America, the COLAF passed
the coordinates to the destination country. Seven hours later, the suspect
aircraft landed at an illegal runway at the coordinates. A firefight ensued after
which five suspects were arrested and 420 kilos of cocaine were impounded.
The program grew to the point where it had five SR-560 aircraft and two SR-26
aircraft, with two more main operating bases at Barranquilla, in northern
Colombia, and Cali, in southwestern Colombia. Aircraft regularly deployed to
points throughout Colombia, including San Andres Island in the northwest
Caribbean, providing a refueling point when intercepting drug-carrying aircraft
in the Caribbean. The GOC also took steps to improve radar coverage
throughout the country, increasing the number of civilian and military radars.
As the presence of the GOC extended, additional measures were taken such as
destruction of illegal runways. These measures were conducted in
coordination with different entities such as the COLAF, COLNAV, Fiscalia, CNP,
and COLAR. Legal actions were also taken against owners of illegal runways
used regularly for narcotics trafficking. In earlier times, DTOs had been able to
repair destroyed runways practically overnight, but with the expanded
government presence repairs took longer and in some cases proved impossible.
An important part of the ABD program was improving control over airports,
aircraft, and pilots. With specific requirements (12) for operation of runways,
inspection requirements for aircraft, and security checks as a part of the pilot
licensing process, the Aeronautica Civil and Colombian National Police oversaw
the legal operation of aircraft over Colombia. Visits to civilian airports
throughout Colombia were scheduled to include ABD personnel meeting with
air traffic controllers and aircrews in order to verify the dissemination of ABD
information throughout the country. The CNP established a program to
inspect aircraft arriving or departing from airfields throughout the country.
The success of the program allowed its aircraft to be used to augment the
COLNAV's air arm with operations against illegal traffic overwater, the route
used most by the DTOs (13). Flight training of ABD aircrews was conducted by
US contractors, with the COLNAV providing their expertise on maritime
survival, and the DHS Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine

presenting a week-long course on maritime patrolling operations that provided

vital information on what to look for on suspect vessels. The additional
mission was a timely one, as the COLNAV and COLAF aircraft worked with US
P-3 and E-3 aircraft to locate a number of self-propelled semisubmersibles that
could carry tons of cocaine from Colombia to Central America, the latest
initiative of the DTOs.
The ability to operate in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific allowed ABD
aircraft to intercept illegal aircraft enroute to Central America and pass on a
description to law enforcement authorities of cooperating nations. This
cooperation made it easier for nations with limited air-to-air capabilities to
assign assets to intercept the illegal aircraft and complete a law enforcement
action. Now instead of just receiving information that a DTO aircraft was going
their way, countries could get specific information on aircraft type, registration
number, color, probable cargo, and crew aboard.
After five successful years and more than a 90% reduction in illegal flights over
Colombia, the program was selected to be the first in US security assistance to
Colombia to be nationalized (14). The aircraft and program assets were
transferred to the GOC. An extensive training program was established using a
train-the-trainer concept to ensure continued operations using Colombian
assets and personnel. Colombian maintainers were qualified to perform their
own maintenance on program aircraft and these duties were transferred from
US contractors to the COLAF maintainers. Mission training was provided to
Colombians assuming safety monitor duties. An English language training
program was setup to ensure positive communication with JIATF-S and any
international counterdrug assets. Colombian pilots took over the programs
flight instruction duties.
With cooperation between several countries and government agencies, the
COLAF has been able to exclude the DTOs from its air routes and exert control
over its airspace, forcing the DTOs to use alternative means of transportation
that are more time consuming and increase the exposure of their traffickers to
law enforcement authorities throughout the region. This change has also
improved the flight safety of legal aircraft operating in Colombian airspace.
Through coordination with the JIATF-S, Colombia can be an important partner
in the group of nations that form an international front against the DTOs. As
the program progresses in its nationalized phase, increasing engagement with
Caribbean and Central American nations is certain to deliver a hard blow to
the DTOs operating in the area.

Notes
1. Peru Investigation Report: The April 20, 2001 Peruvian Shootdown Accident, Released by the
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, August 2,
2001,http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/08/peru_shootdown.html
2. El regreso de la ley, Semana, 1 December 2003,http://www.semana.com/noticiasnacion/regreso-ley/75003.aspx
3. US Ambassador to Colombia, Air Mobility Key to Success in Colombia, diplomatic cable, 30
May 2008, 3.
4.Counternarcotics Strategy in Colombia. Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. Testimony before the House Foreign
Affairs Commitee Subcommitee on the Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC April 24, 2007, 2.
5. Q and A period, Air Bridge Denial Briefing by COLAF Commander, Key West, FL February
2007.
6. Juan Forero, U.S. backs Colombia on Attacking Drug Planes, New York Times, 19 August
2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/19/international/americas/19CNDDRUGS.html?scp=3&sq=u.s.%20backs%20colombia%20on%20attacking%20drug%20planes&s
t=cse .
7. Government Accountability Office, Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented
New Safeguards, but its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear (Washington, DC: Government
Accountability Office, September 2005), 7, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05970.pdf.
8. Ibid., 9
9. Here every day is Monday (Aqui todos los dias son Lunes). El Tiempo newspaper, Bogota,
Colombia March 23, 2004, 1,http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1505551.
10. US Ambassador to Colombia, Air Mobility Key to Success in Colombia. diplomatic cable,
30 May 2008, 3, 4.
11. Republic of Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Government improves ability to
eliminate air traffic in illicit drugs, 20 August, 2003, 2.
12. Aeronautica Civil home
page,http://portal.aerocivil.gov.co/portal/page/portal/Aerocivil_Portal_Internet/Inicio.
13. Department of Justice, Drug enforcement Agency. Drug Trafficking Report DEA factsheet,
2, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/state_factsheets.html.
14. Department of State, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy report 2010, Country
Report Colombia, 10,http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137194.htm.
Lt Col (USAF-Ret) Ezequiel Parrilla (BBA-University of PR;
MA, Central Michigan University; CAIA, Texas A & M
University) is the administrator of the Department of State's
Air Bridge Denial program at the US Embassy in Colombia.
He has been an instructor pilot in the B-52, B-1 and C-12
aircraft. While deployed during Operation Provide Comfort,
he was chief of flight safety for Air Combat Command, and
chief of training with the USMILGP
in Colombia. He is an adjunct instructor of regional
cultural studies for Air University's on-line Masters'
Program.