artificial intelligence expert Masahiro Fujita, at CSL.

Doi's friend, the

artist Hajime Sorayama, was enlisted to create the initial designs for
the AIBO's body. Those designs are now part of the permanent collections
of Museum of Modern Art and the Smithsonian Institution, with later
versions of AIBO being used in studies in Carnegie Mellon University. In
2006, AIBO was added into Carnegie Mellon University's "Robot Hall of
Fame".
Philosophy and ethics
Main articles: Philosophy of artificial intelligence and Ethics of
artificial intelligence
There are three philosophical questions related to AI:
Is artificial general intelligence possible? Can a machine solve any
problem that a human being can solve using intelligence? Or are there
hard limits to what a machine can accomplish?
Are intelligent machines dangerous? How can we ensure that machines
behave ethically and that they are used ethically?
Can a machine have a mind, consciousness and mental states in exactly
the same sense that human beings do? Can a machine be sentient, and thus
deserve certain rights? Can a machine intentionally cause harm?
The limits of artificial general intelligence
Main articles: philosophy of AI, Turing test, Physical symbol systems
hypothesis, Dreyfus' critique of AI, The Emperor's New Mind and AI effect
Can a machine be intelligent? Can it "think"?
Turing's "polite convention"
We need not decide if a machine can "think"; we need only decide if a
machine can act as intelligently as a human being. This approach to the
philosophical problems associated with artificial intelligence forms the
basis of the Turing test.[160]
The Dartmouth proposal
"Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be
so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it." This
conjecture was printed in the proposal for the Dartmouth Conference of
1956, and represents the position of most working AI researchers.[170]
Newell and Simon's physical symbol system hypothesis
"A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of
general intelligent action." Newell and Simon argue that intelligence
consists of formal operations on symbols.[171] Hubert Dreyfus argued
that, on the contrary, human expertise depends on unconscious instinct
rather than conscious symbol manipulation and on having a "feel" for the
situation rather than explicit symbolic knowledge. (See Dreyfus' critique
of AI.)[172][173]
Gdelian arguments
Gdel himself,[174] John Lucas (in 1961) and Roger Penrose (in a more
detailed argument from 1989 onwards) argued that humans are not reducible
to Turing machines.[175] The detailed arguments are complex, but in
essence they derive from Kurt Gdel's 1931 proof in his first
incompleteness theorem that it is always possible to create statements
that a formal system could not prove. A human being, however, can (with
some thought) see the truth of these "Gdel statements". Any Turing
program designed to search for these statements can have its methods
reduced to a formal system, and so will always have a "Gdel statement"
derivable from its program which it can never discover. However, if