Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36409

October 26, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for
plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance
of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal
mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions
its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking
due process, 1 a contention she would premise on what for her is
the teaching of People v. Fajardo. 2 If such a ground were far from
being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she
would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext

that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the
American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine
that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would,
in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion
that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. To state
the proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with
unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be
affirmed with the sole modification that she is given thirty days
from the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she
is required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower
court: The accused bought a house and lot located inside the
United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of
Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in
its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo
City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in
the City Mayors office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that
such building permit was not necessary for the construction of the
house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot
inspector of the City Engineers Office, Olongapo City, together with
Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force
apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the accused
and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police
headquarters for interrogation. After due investigation, Loreta
Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S.
of 1964 with the City Fiscals Office. 3 The City Court of Olongapo
City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series
of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as
well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on
appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such
municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of
P200.00 and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue
the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the
very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her
dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in
a resolution of January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question
raised, certified the case to this Court.

There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no

support in law for the stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units
are devoid of authority to require building permits. This Court,
from Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu, 4 decided in 1911, has
sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too late in the
day to contend that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed.
Even appellant, justifiably concerned about the unfavorable
impression that could be created if she were to deny that such
competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered
cities, had to concede in her brief: If, at all; the questioned
ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare clause
. 5 Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every
aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the well
being and good order of the community. 6

be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.

. Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor
had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of
land registered in Fajardos name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek . On
January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among
others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty
of the public plaza . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated
their request for a building permit , but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with
the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having
been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on
leased property. 8

It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations.

Certainly, if its exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then
its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability
to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is
settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due
process question may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its
oppressive character. She is led to such a conclusion, relying
on People v. Fajardo. 7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision
would not have led her astray, for that case is easily
distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the opinion follow: It
appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of
defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
question providing as follows: 1. Any person or persons who will
construct or repair a building should, before constructing or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. 2. A
fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building
permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. 3. [Penalty]-Any
violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make
the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than
P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24
days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall

Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was

oppressive. A conviction therefore for a violation thereof both in the
justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the
Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the
contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance.
Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she would assert in her
brief: The evidence showed that even if the accused were to
secure a permit from the Mayor, the same would not have been
granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit before
constructing her house would be an exercise in futility. The law will
not require anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in law or in
fact: . 9 It would be from her own version, at the very least then,
premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to
condemn an ordinance which certainly lends itself to an
interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable.
That kind of interpretation suffices to remove any possible question
of its validity, as was expressly announced in Primicias v.
Fugoso. 10 So it appears from this portion of the opinion of Justice
Feria, speaking for the Court: Said provision is susceptible of two
constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for
the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession
in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the

other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be
granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latters reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have
arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance
to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse
to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade
or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. 11 If, in a case
affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this
Court could construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to
avoid offending against a constitutional provision, there is nothing
to preclude it from a similar mode of approach in order to show the
lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance requiring a permit.
Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement
in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context,
considering the admitted oppressive application of the challenged
measure in that litigation. So much then for the contention that she
could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such
ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same
fate twice, once from the City Court and thereafter from the Court
of First Instance. The reason is obvious. Such ordinance applies to
her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence
of the rather novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part
of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said
against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and
authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval
bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power to govern.
Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such
thinking to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v.
Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 13 As
was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: By the
Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain

cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,

courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction
of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as
the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact
of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the
express provisions of the treaty. 14 There was a reiteration of such
a view in Reagan. Thus: Nothing is better settled than that the
Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it
has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
sovereignty. 15 Then came this paragraph dealing with the
principle of auto-limitation: It is to be admitted any state may, by
its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what
otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of
Jellinek, is the property of a state-force due to which it has the
exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction. A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence. 16 The opinion was at pains to
point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of
jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed
follow: Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory
no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded
from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so,
it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still
subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it
does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the

American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of

1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. 17
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a
turnabout, unwarranted and unjustified, from what is settled and
orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the
contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason as a
matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency becomes one of
obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely domestic in its
implications, devoid of any connection with national security, the
Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then
sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does
appellants thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact
that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national
government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is
the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation.
Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are
vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority and
therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the
national government, not to an alien country. What is even more to
be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made
by the American naval authorities, not that it would do them any
good if it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto anew: The
carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the
concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a
given case which by the treaty comes within the United States
jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a
matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other
words, the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure
solely to that country and cannot be raised by the offender. 18 If an
accused would suffer from such disability, even if the American
armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is
there for appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no
showing of any alleged grant of what is quaintly referred to as
administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough,
to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969
is AFFIRMED insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.

14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar
as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter
of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality
of this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only
upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision
requiring demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

DIGEST
Facts: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located
inside the US NavalReservation which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the
Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house
standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then
later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City
Engineers Office for violating a municipal order which requires her
to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the
City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She
appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a
Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval
Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States

Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction

of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as
the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the
exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo
does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the
US Naval Base.

Reid v. Covert
Posted on September 16, 2014 | Constitutional Law |
Tags: Constitutional Law Case Briefs
354 U.S. 1 (1957)

Facts: Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England.

Pursuant to a status-of-forces executive agreement with England,
she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial
under the UCMJ. She petitioned a writ of habeus corpus on the
grounds that the conviction violated her 5th & 6th Amendment rights
to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury.
Issue: Whether the executive agreement is restrained by
constitutional limitations.
Holding: Yes. The Constitution in its entirety applies to the trials.
Since their court-martial did not meet the requirements of Art. III 2
or the 5th and 6th Amendments the court was compelled to
determine if there is anything within the Constitution which
authorizes the military trial of dependents accompanying the
armed forces overseas. No agreement with a foreign nation can
confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.
In general, the president cannot contract away individual
constitutional rights. It is within the Presidents power to enter into
these agreements, however, but the agreement cannot conflict
with enacted statute or the constitution.

Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification

of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners
question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one
that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate
in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity ,
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality
be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial
relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the
United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right
under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a

legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership

should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not
be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as
the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable
forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative
is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their
free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his

application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the
hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash.
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government Of The USA V. Hon. Purganan (2002)

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as
there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due

Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion.
The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonableperiod within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the
Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez
was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001,
the Government of theUSA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition
praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section
6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.
Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before
it.
i.

YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that

accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and
the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get
a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of

the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for

hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that
a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the
more reasonableinterpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would
give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape
which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked
by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for
the issuance ofarrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In
Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the
presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate
must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee,
who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to

appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of

the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given
the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
ii.

Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the

Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonabledoubt. In extradition, the presumption of
innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating
that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only
to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited
are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him
one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to
judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by

the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional

liberty in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis,
and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice
and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and
won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.
Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled
against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving
him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him
to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition
Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may
negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to
mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of
the Petition for Extradition.
iii.

NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and

to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and
fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to
be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He
will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed,

available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the
full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested
the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel,
and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order
to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2)

The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to

have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its
treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal
case therein.
3)

The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the
state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal

case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while

a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory
upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts
may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance
through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4)

Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with

our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in
a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper
5)

There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the

accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of
herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations
and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of

implementation.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

posted in CONLAW2 cases
Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.

Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed
by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors

handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if
the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in
favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by
the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of

United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

Issue WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
RulingA potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of
human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.