G.R. No.

157537

September 7, 2011

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO,
PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and
ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior
liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not
yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any
rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square
meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or
on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,1 whereby he
affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased
the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the
petitioners.2On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina
B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio
(Servacio) for 5,686,768.00.3 On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property,4 but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve
the dispute,5 they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte
(RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal
property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community
property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.6
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had
purchased it with his own money.7
On October 3, 2002,8 the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr.
and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale
to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors
had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the
law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively

to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut
the legal presumption.9
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that: "xxx As long as
the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of
the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate
(sic) of other heirs, it is valid."10Quoting Tolentinos commentary on the matter as authority,11 the RTC
opined:
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says" [sic]
"Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell
any portion of the community property in order to pay outstanding obligation of the partnership, such
sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the
sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said
property affected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that
belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition. Pending the liquidation, the
disposition must be considered as limited only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the
particular property involved, but not to the corpus of the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or disposal of the
conjugal property without the required formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the law recognizes
their validity so long as they do not exceed the portion which, after liquidation and partition, should
pertain to the surviving spouse who made the contract." [underlining supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the provisions of the New Civil
Code and the Family Code on the alienation by the surviving spouse of the community property that
jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of
the community property is not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall
be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so,
because why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property that
will eventually be his/her share in the final partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it
would be absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-meter conjugal
lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually
get as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration13 prompted the petitioners to appeal directly to
the Court on a pure question of law.

Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that the sale by
Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito both argue that Article
130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not
render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted
to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as
heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that
the vendors were entitled to as heirs.14
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this
Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis
supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family
Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV
(Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the
conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were
married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was
properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas
death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil
Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
following its liquidation.16 The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of
the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the
conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. 18 Nonetheless, a co-owner
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.19Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and
Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights
of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a coowner of Martas share.20 This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest).21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on
dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the
sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already
acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,22 the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already received "a
certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions
adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not present any public document on the
allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did
they aver that the conjugal properties had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly,
pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the
property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided
with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial
partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,23 to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one

co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or coowners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra].
1avvphi1

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were
not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of
some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
xxx24
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in
respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice
Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the
surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after
liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out
that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the
conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the
husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only
at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is
not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the
surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased
spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for
the benefit of the husbands other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by
prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.) 25
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127406

November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160,
declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia
P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support
for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a
civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160,
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he
was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity
of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April
4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question
this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null
and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his
church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts
therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4,
1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also
appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April
4, 1982.1
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein
petitioner null andvoid ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision.
It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second
marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and
void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of
whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this
would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a
competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be
disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.
Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab
initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of

P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4,
1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the
Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY
OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED
BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL
EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before
a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over
applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the
second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent null andvoid for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private
respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v.
Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a
marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But
the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be
read into the provisions of law previously obtaining. 5

In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case.
Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the nowrepealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs
significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving
a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the
Family Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu.
Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death
of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage.
The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that
the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There
is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is
void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that
it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.

In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the
second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in
proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And
since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the
second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We
exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena
Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales
in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she
married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to
declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court,
expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of
judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code.20 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated
that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his
first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential."

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the
Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147,
148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely
forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage,
we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and
all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegeland the effectivity of the
Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that
despite private respondents "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could
benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony
wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in
the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner
claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a
marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license
issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred
when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She
argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due
consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of
marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and
private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was

used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof
in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not
only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside
this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue,
but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we
cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA
calls "his own deceit and perfidy."
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although the appellate
court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying
petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.26
1wphi1

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present
case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which
caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from
her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation.27 There are other remedies.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND
SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as
monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as
they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage

between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the

husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in JulianoLlave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to

capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in

keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing

the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose

laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new

status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.
1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187485

October 8, 2013

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196113
TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197156
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) in G.R. No. 187485, the
Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) in
G.R. No. 187485, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the CIR in G.R.No. 196113, and the
Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Taganito Mining Corporation (Taganito) in G.R.
No. 196113.

San Roque prays that the rule established in our 12 February 2013 Decision be given only a
prospective effect, arguing that "the manner by which the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Court of Tax Appeals(CTA) actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an operative fact
the effects and consequences of which cannot be erased or undone." 1
The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito Mining Corporation's (Taganito) judicial claim for
tax credit or refund was prematurely filed before the CTA and should be disallowed because BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
We deny both motions.
The Doctrine of Operative Fact
The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties.
Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well as its exception: "Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of
invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such
declaration.2 In Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,3 the application of the doctrine of
operative fact was discussed as follows:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source
of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the
fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap
of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution."
It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any
legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more
fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative
or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely
to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have

elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of
what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila
Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking
for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative or executive measure,"
meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the passage of such law
or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the court, the effects of the law or
executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as
valid. In the present case, however, there is no such law or executive issuance that has been
invalidated by the Court except BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
To justify the application of the doctrine of operative fact as an exemption, San Roque asserts that
"the BIR and the CTA in actual practice did not observe and did not require refund seekers to comply
with the120+30 day periods."4 This is glaring error because an administrative practice is neither a
law nor an executive issuance. Moreover, in the present case, there is even no such administrative
practice by the BIR as claimed by San Roque.
In BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003, the Department of Finances One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (DOF-OSS) asked the BIR to rule on the
propriety of the actions taken by Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc. (LBRDI). LBRDI filed an
administrative claim for refund for alleged input VAT for the four quarters of 1998. Before the lapse of
120 days from the filing of its administrative claim, LBRDI also filed a judicial claim with the CTA on
28March 2000 as well as a supplemental judicial claim on 29 September 2000.In its Memorandum
dated 13 August 2002 before the BIR, the DOF-OSS pointed out that LBRDI is "not yet on the right
forum in violation of the provision of Section 112(D) of the NIRC" when it sought judicial relief before
the CTA. Section 112(D) provides for the 120+30 day periods for claiming tax refunds.
The DOF-OSS itself alerted the BIR that LBRDI did not follow the120+30 day periods. In BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03, Deputy Commissioner Jose Mario C. Buag ruled that "a taxpayer-claimant need
not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of
Petition for Review." Deputy Commissioner Buag, citing the 7February 2002 decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hitachi Computer Products (Asia)
Corporation5 (Hitachi), stated that the claim for refund with the Commissioner could be pending
simultaneously with a suit for refund filed before the CTA.

Before the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003, there was no
administrative practice by the BIR that supported simultaneous filing of claims. Prior to BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03, the BIR considered the 120+30 day periods mandatory and jurisdictional.
Thus, prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIRs actual administrative practice was to contest
simultaneous filing of claims at the administrative and judicial levels, until the CA declared in Hitachi
that the BIRs position was wrong. The CAs Hitachi decision is the basis of BIR Ruling No. DA-48903 dated 10 December 2003 allowing simultaneous filing. From then on taxpayers could rely in good
faith on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 even though it was erroneous as this Court subsequently decided
in Aichi that the 120+30 day periods were mandatory and jurisdictional.
We reiterate our pronouncements in our Decision as follows:
At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory periods
were already in the law. Section112(C) expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to
decide the taxpayers claim. The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x x the Commissioner shall
grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of submission of complete documents." Following the verbalegis doctrine,
this law must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. The taxpayer
cannot simply file a petition with the CTA without waiting for the Commissioners decision within the
120-daymandatory and jurisdictional period. The CTA will have no jurisdiction because there will be
no "decision" or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner for the CTA to review. In San
Roques case, it filed its petition with the CTA a mere 13 days after it filed its administrative claim
with the Commissioner. Indisputably, San Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period,
and it cannot blame anyone but itself.
Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the decision
or inaction of the Commissioner x x x.
xxxx
To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against
the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is
compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with
the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the
effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again
reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional. 6
1wphi1

San Roques argument must, therefore, fail. The doctrine of operative fact is an argument for the
application of equity and fair play. In the present case, we applied the doctrine of operative fact when
we recognized simultaneous filing during the period between 10 December 2003, when BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03 was issued, and 6 October 2010, when this Court promulgated Aichi declaring the
120+30 day periods mandatory and jurisdictional, thus reversing BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
The doctrine of operative fact is in fact incorporated in Section 246 of the Tax Code, which provides:

SEC. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. - Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules
and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the rulings or
circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the
revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases:
(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any
document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially
different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or
(c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the
time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is
not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however,
be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A
mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere
administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if
not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only
by those within formal contacts with the government agency.
Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of the Tax Code how the doctrine of operative
fact should be applied, there can be no invocation of the doctrine of operative fact other than what
the law has specifically provided in Section 246. In the present case, the rule or ruling subject of the
operative fact doctrine is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003. Prior to this date,
there is no such rule or ruling calling for the application of the operative fact doctrine in Section 246.
Section246, being an exemption to statutory taxation, must be applied strictly against the taxpayer
claiming such exemption.
San Roque insists that this Court should not decide the present case in violation of the rulings of the
CTA; otherwise, there will be adverse effects on the national economy. In effect, San Roques
doomsday scenario is a protest against this Courts power of appellate review. San Roque cites
cases decided by the CTA to underscore that the CTA did not treat the 120+30 day periods as
mandatory and jurisdictional. However, CTA or CA rulings are not the executive issuances covered
by Section 246 of the Tax Code, which adopts the operative fact doctrine. CTA or CA decisions are
specific rulings applicable only to the parties to the case and not to the general public. CTA or CA
decisions, unlike those of this Court, do not form part of the law of the land. Decisions of lower courts
do not have any value as precedents. Obviously, decisions of lower courts are not binding on this
Court. To hold that CTA or CA decisions, even if reversed by this Court, should still prevail is to turn
upside down our legal system and hierarchy of courts, with adverse effects far worse than the
dubious doomsday scenario San Roque has conjured.
San Roque cited cases7 in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration to support its position that
retroactive application of the doctrine in the present case will violate San Roques right to equal
protection of the law. However, San Roque itself admits that the cited cases never mentioned the

issue of premature or simultaneous filing, nor of compliance with the 120+30 day period
requirement. We reiterate that "any issue, whether raised or not by the parties, but not passed upon
by the Court, does not have any value as precedent."8 Therefore, the cases cited by San Roque to
bolster its claim against the application of the 120+30 day period requirement do not have any value
as precedents in the present case.
Authority of the Commissioner
to Delegate Power
In asking this Court to disallow Taganitos claim for tax refund or credit, the CIR repudiates the
validity of the issuance of its own BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. "Taganito cannot rely on the
pronouncements in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, being a mere issuance of a Deputy Commissioner." 9
Although Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to interpret the provisions of this
Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner,
subject to review by the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code does not prohibit the
delegation of such power. Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him under
the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a
division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed under rules
and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner."
WHEREFORE, we DENY with FINALITY the Motions for Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power
Corporation in G.R. No. 187485,and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 196113.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No 176556

July 4, 2012

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,

vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.

DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children
are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without
regard to the message they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our
obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and
partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order2 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution
defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation in
accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to
Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond
shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and
Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent
spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the
remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;

5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos,
Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under
Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation. 6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution 7 which the trial court granted in
its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution
be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution 9 which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause
to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the
service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful
fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the
said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39,
Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.10
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the
amount ofP46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.11
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits
Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order 13 dated August 31, 2006,
which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts." 14 The Order
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. 15 The dispositive
portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the defendantrespondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 on
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order 18 dated November 8, 2006,
holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may
still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning
of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT
EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be
computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.20
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 21 praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, 22 the
trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration

whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31,
2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES
OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF
THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE
WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF
FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING
VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE
GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are wellaware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. 24 Thus, we are constrained to
resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently
discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion
for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." 26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution." 27 In other
words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the
trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes
the decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither
filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days
had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on
February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally,
when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days
had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the "net profits earned." From the
foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October
10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been
partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts
decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently,
no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify
a judgment that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of
the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void judgment is no judgment
at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation." 29 But what
precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words, a court, which does

not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties,
will issue a void judgment or acoram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court
has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an
RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide,
among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together.32 The Rule on Legal Separation33 provides that "the petition [for
legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner." 34 In
the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six
months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the
respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
both parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served
upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to
the Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the
questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not
void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same
cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.36 In fact, we have ruled that for "[as] long as the public
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal."37 Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was
erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period.
Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial
court's decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the
very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005
judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman
who is not his wife;38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita; 39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; 42

(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse;44
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and
pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage,
whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were
living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed; 47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated
and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these
properties;48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article
121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to
the income generated by these properties;49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate
properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family; 50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); 51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore
be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the
children's legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;53 and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss
the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation
is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code
applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can deduce
that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386)
and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner
and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. 55 Article 119
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the
petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation,
"the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry."56 The husband and wife also own in common all the property of
the conjugal partnership of gains.57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable
law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article
129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other law."58
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles
63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier adverted
to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in
common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application
to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family

Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains,
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of
gains is owned in common by the husband and wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the
properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said
properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under
the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested
right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,61we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to
the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected
against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or future
enjoyment of property.62 (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also explained:
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose
the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware
that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.65 In
fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October
10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the
trial court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 67 Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one
founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share
in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate
property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the
guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance
to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil
Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal
assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and
does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente
liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage,
when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. 69 (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10,
2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 70 The petitioner did not
file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from
questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
this Court.71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties
of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.

The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for
purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the
conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the absolute
community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations
between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed,
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said
Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the
Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net
profits "shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." 72 Thus,
without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the
difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the
conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners ofall the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then
the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets
and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be
delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall

be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject
to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.74
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market value
of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of
all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to
the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct
the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits. 75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if
we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate
properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the
properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such
debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value at dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the
absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at
the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be
returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the "net
profits." However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the halfshare of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case
(which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into
their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit."
As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both
the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63,
No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the
Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the

partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. 77
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the
same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in
accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In

case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the
spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's
conjugal properties and their separate properties.78 In the instant case, the trial court found
that the couple has no separate properties when they married.79 Rather, the trial court
identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the
marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; 81 and if the
community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a
restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made. 82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its
debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. 83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife
shall be returned to each of them.84 In the instant case, since it was already established by
the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,85 there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.86However, since the trial court
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership

is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned
to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any
property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court.
However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan
City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial
Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same
man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is
the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the
Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage
Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to
World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H.
Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on
26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left
his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that
Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died
in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina,

which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous - an action she sought to
protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially averring that
she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage
having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case
was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

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1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to
substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2)

Documentary evidence such as the following:

a.

chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
crallawlibrary

b.

Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; 6
crallawlibrary

c.

Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932; 7
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d.

Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO,
from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila; 8
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e.

Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f.

Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g.

Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h.

Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon,
Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

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crallawlibrary

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i.

Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by
the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido; 13
crallawlibrary

j.

Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;14]

k.

Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao
City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor
health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove
her claim for damages, to wit:
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1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the
date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as

single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had
a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all
surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte; 19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her
capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. 20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to
deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement
to damages and attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Teclas petition, as well as Peregrinas counterclaim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
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For The Foregoing, the petition for the DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGEfiled by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUAis hereby DENIED.
The COUNTERCLAIM filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitionerTECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged disregard of the evidence on
the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to
Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be
bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
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The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister
of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself;
and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate
the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1.

Whether or not the court can validly rely on the presumption of marriage to overturn the validity
of a subsequent marriage;

2.

Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of
the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original
document; and

3.

Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the
existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness
stand.26

Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure
to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as
useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of
marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by
the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
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Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit B) stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on
February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date,
except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could
not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla],
alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol. 27
chanRoble sVirtualawlibrary

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and
her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to
the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3
(a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the
existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the
trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to
the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its
appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate
Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
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While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be
accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
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It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as
secondary evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception
thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible.
Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a
matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation
for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
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xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its
authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol

evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect
the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that [t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually
kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been]
lost.
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was
shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown
by the evidence presented, secondary evidence-testimonial and documentary-may be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:

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In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the
testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and
by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the
NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence - testimonial and documentary - may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v.
TRIAS, the Supreme Court held that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister
of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself;
and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the
presumption:
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The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper - praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted fact of the birth within the cohabitation of Tecla and Eustaquio of four (4)
children coupled with the certificates of the childrens birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage

issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24, 2012
Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. 3Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on
October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and
Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to
file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that
[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are
under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio].6 Thus, the court a
quo decreed the following:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonios] prayer for recognition and
the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order
granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a.

Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name
of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of
Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of
said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;

b.

Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the
persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;

c.

Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties minor children
Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios] residence in
the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday
to Sunday evening;

d.

Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre
Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;

e.

Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of the
country, without the written consent of the other and permission from the court.

f.

Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis Grande
and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court
in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly
ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her
illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 114492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:
a.

The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City
are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in
the Register of Births;

b.

[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;

c.

[Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the children
out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and

d.

The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio]
and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his children,
the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of

reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived
of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected bestinterestofthechild clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
ANTONIO.11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did Antonio
express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the
minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial
right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children. 13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
Antonio. When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family
Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil
Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 14 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents prayer has
no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also
goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the
court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of
Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not.
It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. 16Respondents position that
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide
by its words. The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word may is
permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured
is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea
that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. InAlfon v. Republic,18 for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather
than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her
from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court,
upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second
only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his
circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to
use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his identity, his status
in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to
present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements.
After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is
entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always
recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him
join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his
recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the
father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.

7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shalluse the surname of the
father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father
upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the
father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the age of
majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of Live
Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the
Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant to RA
9255.
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall not be
changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or AUSF shall
be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live
Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original
surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255. (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. InMCC
Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a
mere administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the
construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority
to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies 24 when
found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the abovequoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it
provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of
his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word shall in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous,
and unequivocal use of may in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname
discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which
they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen
(15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to Antonio.26 However,
since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any
evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation
of the evidence of, the childrens choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 114492 isMODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:
a.

[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;

b.

[Antonio] shall have visitation rights 28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children
out upon the written consent of [Grande];

c.

The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio]
and 30% for [Grande]; and

d.

The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for
the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004
are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLASBERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated
February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision 4 dated
October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S
665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem
(Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug,
Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children,
namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on
August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.7

On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint)
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the Order 8 dated January 5, 1999 of the
RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and
Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were
students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3)
months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21
years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling
cockpits as kristo and bangkero sa hantak. When he decided to join and train with the army,12 Natividad
left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. 13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog
City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann
Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with
another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro
City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and
Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of
Natividads psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable. 17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of
summons.18 Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to
Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos claims. 19 Rodolfo also underwent the same
examination.20
In her twopage psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties
suffered from utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as]
deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct.22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also
observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another
woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the
celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that
the couples union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage.23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by
Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for
legal separation under the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that
Natividads emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of
personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties marriage but manifested only thereafter. It
likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is deeply
rooted within the makeup of her personality. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have
known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads personality traits
constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the
testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court. 28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to
psychological incapacity, their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently

established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform

her essential marital obligations.30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution 31 dated February 3,
2006, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 32 of the Family Code, should
refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others, 34 include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage);
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)incurability (i.e., it must
be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). 37 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein respondents emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to
discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the same light, the Court, in the case ofPesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca),
ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let
alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage,
significantly noting that the [e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity. In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the
petitioner therein had not established that her husband showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his
marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity
has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature.44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient
factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does
not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to
disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in
her report the root cause of Natividads condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties
marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividads behavior in relation to her failure to perform

the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsoss report. Further, the finding contained
therein on the incurability of Natividads condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis
and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even selfserving. In the same vein, Dr.
Zalsoss testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court
of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opinions furnished
by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight
by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence. 45 After
poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the
court a quos nullity declaration. To the Courts mind, Natividads refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume
her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise
to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties marriage. Indeed, to
be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform ones duties is
another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of
this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby
granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014

HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., REPRESENTED BY THEIR COHEIRS AND ATTORNEYSIN
FACT MERCEDES A. FAVIS AND NELLY FAVISVILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA GONZALES, HER
SON MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, ALL MINORS
REPRESENTED HEREIN BY THEIR PARENTS, SPS. MARIANO FAVIS AND LARCELITA D.
FAVIS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008 Decision 1 and 7 January 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 86497 dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment
of the Deed of Donation for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven
children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis, Consolacion FavisQueliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F.
Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, and Nelly FavisVillafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took
Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his commonlaw wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano).
When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one
of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four
children, named Ma. Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea D.
Favis.

Dr. Favis died intestate on 29 July 1995 leaving the following properties:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting an area of 898
square meters, more or less, bounded on the north by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on
the South by Bonifacio St., and on the West by Carmen Giron; x x x;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an assessed value of P126,000.00; x x
x;
3. A parcel of residential land located in Brgy. VII, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an area of 154 sq. ms.,
more or less, bounded on the North by the High School Site; on the East by Gomez St., on the South by
Domingo [G]o; and on the West by Domingo Go; x x x;
4. A house with an assessed value of P17,600.00 x x x;
5. A parcel of orchard land located in Brgy. VI, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an area of 2,257 sq. ma. (sic)
more or less, bounded on the North by Lot 1208; on the East by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217
and on the West by Lot 1211B, 1212 and 1215 x x x.3
Beginning 1992 until his death in 1995, Dr. Favis was beset by various illnesses, such as kidney trouble,
hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure, Parkinsons disease and pneumonia. He died of cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to multiorgan/system failure secondary to sepsis secondary to pneumonia.4
On 16 October 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation 5 transferring and conveying properties
described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners herein,
filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita
and their grandchildren as respondents.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties donated do not form part of the
estate of the late Dr. Favis because said donation was made inter vivos, hence petitioners have no stake
over said properties.6
The RTC, in its PreTrial Order, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of donation and whether or not
respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. 7
cralawre d

In a Decision dated 14 November 2005, the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the
corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with
illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation.
Holding that the subsequent marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of Mariano, the trial
court also declared Juana and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Deed of Donation dated October 16, 1994 is
hereby annulled and the corresponding tax declarations issued on the basis thereof cancelled. Dr. Mariano
Favis, Sr. having died without a will, his estate would result to intestacy. Consequently, plaintiffs Heirs of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr., namely Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo A. Favis, Consolacion F. Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr.,
Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, Nelly F. Villafuerte and the defendants Juana Gonzales now deceased and
Mariano G. Favis, Jr. shall inherit in equal shares in the estate of the late Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. which
consists of the following:
1.
A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, consisting an area of
89 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the
South by Bonifacio St., and on the West by Carmen Giron;
2.

A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an assessed value of P126,000.00;

3.
Onehalf (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,] containing an area of 2,257
sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by Lot 1208; on the east by Mestizo River; on the South by
Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot 1211B, 1212 and 1215.

4.
The accumulated rentals of the new Vigan Coliseum in the amount of One Hundred Thirty [Thousand]
(P130,000.00) pesos per annum from the death of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.8
Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial courts nullification, on
the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation in favor of herein respondents. The Court of
Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. However, it did so not on the grounds
invoked by herein respondents as appellant.
The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make
an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the
Family Code. The appellate court justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of
the trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not subject to compromise as it
involves future legitime.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners contention when it ruled that the prohibited compromise is that
which is entered between the decedent while alive and compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate
court observed that while the present action is between members of the same family it does not involve a
testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the subject properties cannot
be considered as future legitime but are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the death
of the decedent.
Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following arguments:
1.

The Honorable Court of Appeals GRAVELY and SERIOUSLY ERRED in DISMISSING the COMPLAINT.

2.
Contrary to the finding of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the verification of the complaint or petition
is not a mandatory requirement.
3.
The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously failed to appreciate that the filing of an intervention by
Edward Favis had placed the case beyond the scope of Article 151 of the Family Code.
4.
Even assuming arguendo without admitting that the filing of intervention by Edward Favis had no
positive effect to the complaint filed by petitioners, it is still a serious error for the Honorable Court of
Appeals to utterly disregard the fact that petitioners had substantially complied with the requirements of
Article 151 of the Family Code.
5.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot be construed as complying substantially with Article 151 of
the Family Code, still, the same should be considered as a nonissue considering that private respondents
are in estoppel.
6.
The dismissal of the complaint by the Honorable Court of Appeals amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction and a complete defiance of the doctrine of primacy of
substantive justice over strict application of technical rules.
7.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely and seriuosly erred in not affirming the decision of the Court a
quo that the Deed of Donation is void.9
In their Comment, respondents chose not to touch upon the merits of the case, which is the validity of the
deed of donation. Instead, respondents defended the ruling the Court of Appeals that the complaint is
dismissible for failure of petitioners to allege in their complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been exerted.
The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts decision
hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, viz:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to
dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which
specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim,
namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d)
prescription of action.10 Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin,11 cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr.,12 the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the
court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the
plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the
Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.
Under the new rules, a court may motu propriodismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or
evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations. x x x. 13
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept within the confines
of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit
between members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground
for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed within the time
for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. The time frame indicates
that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so
inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four
exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and
prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been
made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas14 cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management and
Development Corporation15 where we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only
supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu propio on any of the enumerated grounds. The
tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only
from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived

ground.
Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among members of the
same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza,16 a case for future support
which was dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of
Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a
complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required
allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state
thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment
seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied
with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subjectmatter
of the action remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,17 allowed an amendment which merely corrected a defect
in the allegation of plaintiffappellants cause of action, because as it then stood, the original complaint
stated no cause of action. We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v.
Bautista,18 that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x. (Italics
supplied).
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint
among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a
cause of action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where the conciliation
process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were described as a condition precedent for
the filing of a complaint in Court.19 In such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the
present Rule. Thus:
x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or
answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.20 (Underscoring supplied).
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners
was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of
the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no
mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no
motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the
trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court
of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the nonjurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to
respondent. If the respondents as partiesdefendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to
petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a
compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order
the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which provision as then Article
222 of the New Civil Code was described as having been given more teeth 21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of
the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a
compromise, has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made towards a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit
between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. 22
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the respondents were
concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a
motion to dismiss but on the respondents insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the
subject properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pretrial Order specifically limited the
issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of
Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments within the pretrial order; after losing their case,

their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of
vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis.
The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated the refusal by the respondents
to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the ground that it did not allege
what in fact was shown during the trial. The error of the Court of Appeals is patent.
Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely on the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals even
when petitioners came to us for review not just on the basis of such defective motu propio action but also on
the proposition that the trial court correctly found that the donation in question is flawed because of vitiated
consent. Respondents did not answer this argument.
The trial court stated that the facts are:
x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for annulment, the
mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the time of its execution must be taken into
account. Factors such as his age, health and environment among others should be considered. As testified
to by Dr. Mercedes Favis, corroborated by Dr. Edgardo Alday and Dra. Ofelia Adapon, who were all presented
as expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had long been suffering from Hiatal Hernia and Parkinsons
disease and had been taking medications for years. That a person with Parkinsons disease for a long time
may not have a good functioning brain because in the later stage of the disease, 1/3 of death develop from
this kind of disease, and or dementia. With respect to Hiatal Hernia, this is a state wherein organs in the
abdominal cavity would go up to the chest cavity, thereby occupying the space for the lungs causing the
lungs to be compromised. Once the lungs are affected, there is less oxygenation to the brain. The Hernia
would cause the heart not to pump enough oxygen to the brain and the effect would be chronic, meaning,
longer lack of oxygenation to the brain will make a person not in full control of his faculties. Dr. Alday
further testified that during his stay with the house of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (19921994), he noticed that
the latter when he goes up and down the stairs will stop after few seconds, and he called this pulmonary
cripple a very advanced stage wherein the lungs not only one lung, but both lungs are compromised. That
at the time he operated on the deceased, the left and right lung were functioning but the left lung is
practically not even five (5%) percent functioning since it was occupied by abdominal organ. x x x.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution of the Deed of Donation was already 92 years old; living with the
defendants and those years from 1993 to 1995 were the critical years when he was sick most of the time. In
short, hes dependent on the care of his housemates particularly the members of his family. It is the
contention of the defendants though that Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had full control of his mind during the
execution of the Deed of Donation because at that time, he could go on with the regular way of life or could
perform his daily routine without the aid of anybody like taking a bath, eating his meals, reading the
newspaper, watching television, go to the church on Sundays, walking down the plaza to exercise and most
importantly go to the cockpit arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology expert however, testified that a
person suffering from Parkinsons disease when he goes to the cockpit does not necessarily mean that such
person has in full control of his mental faculties because anyone, even a retarded person, a person who has
not studied and have no intellect can go to the cockpit and bet. One can do everything but do not have
control of his mind. x x x That Hiatal Hernia creeps in very insidiously, one is not sure especially if the
person has not complained and no examination was done. It could be there for the last time and no one will
know. x x x.
The Deed of Donation in favor of the defendants Ma. Theresa, Joana D. Favis, Maria Cristina D. Favis, James
Mark D. Favis and Maria Thea D. Favis, all of whom are the children of Mariano G. Favis, Jr. was executed on
[16 October] 1994, seven (7) months after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house of Dr. Favis, Sr. at Bonifacio
St., Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the latter and the defendants.
Putting together the circumstances mentioned, that at the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation, Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr. was already at an advanced age of 92, afflicted with different illnesses like Hiatal hernia,
Parkinsons disease and pneumonia, to name few, which illnesses had the effects of impairing his brain or
mental faculties and the deed being executed only when Dra. Me[r]cedes Favis had already left his fathers
residence when Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. could have done so earlier or even in the presence of Dra. Mercedes
Favis, at the time he executed the Deed of Donation was not in full control of his mental faculties. That
although age of senility varies from one person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all those medications
and treatment one have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his mind remains unimpaired, would be
unusual. The fact that the Deed of Donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes Favis left his fathers

house necessarily indicates that they dont want the same to be known by the first family, which is an indicia
of bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at that time had influence over the donor. 23
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only
on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial courts
factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to
have it reversed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is AFFIRMED.
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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., REPRESENTED BY
RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No.
90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application 4 with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified
as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm590D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and
20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondents application for registration
sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled initial
hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette,

April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 163116337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of Peoples
Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise
posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin
board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA,
which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondents application for registration. 10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondents application for registration, asserting
that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the
other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its
Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondents application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondents corporate secretary; Ronnie
Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for registration
with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer
Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic
survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and
Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors
ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land
long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador
(Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned
and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said
lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of
land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the
respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; 13 (2)
survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; 15 (4) Geodetic
Engineers Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; 17 and (6) certifications
dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist
of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for registration should be denied since
the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed
out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon
preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was
prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National DefenseBureau of Coast in
April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual
area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the
elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
subject properties, contrary to LLDAs claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot

No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from
12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondents application for registration
of title to the subject properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman
Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig, Metro Manila more particularly described
in the Technical Descriptions Ap04003103 and Swo00001769 respectively and ordering their
registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
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SO ORDERED.21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are
very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC pointed out that LLDAs claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is
hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey
on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on
March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the
elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey,
from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the
method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties, pointing out that:
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Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositors witness merely
compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the
said portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters
and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference
point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDAs witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was DPWH or
the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the [benchmark]
or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as
to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference point and he
only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF Cruz. 22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that
the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11)
of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is
at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land
that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are
already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject
properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and
waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the
respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
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The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, 23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16,
2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its name.
Appellees witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the subject lots, ably
proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its
highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion
of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are
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higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of
R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map dated
March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land
are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial
photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due
execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr.
Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be
considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that his findings were based
merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x. 24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR,
attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove,
through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
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Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May
16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondents application for registration
since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The
petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact
by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a longstanding policy of this Court
that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed
conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower
courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.25
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That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that
they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon
the respondent to prove, with wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts
finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court
nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the
subject properties.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927 , which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
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(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; andthird, that it is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications 30 issued by
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under Project No. 27B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,31the Court
clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. 32 (Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO
or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
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Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother to establish the status
of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she
complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. 34(Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration
are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a
true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the
failure of the respondent to prove by wellnigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.
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Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of

the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent
points out that its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by
the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of its ruling inT.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to
present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the
denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondents application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the
Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is
not antithetical to the rule of nonretroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is
elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was
originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the interpreted law carried into effect.35 Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a
new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a preexisting one.36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the
applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on October
22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the
application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by
the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this
Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for registration on the
ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the
subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since
1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold
the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and selfserving assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its predecessorsininterest; they do not constitute the wellnigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessorsininterest of
the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessorsininterest cultivated the subject
properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of
such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the
subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that are
planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly
planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessorsininterest have indeed

planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been
possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the
subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and
occupation required by law.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years.40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent
were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject
properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessorsininterest have been in possession of the subject
property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. While
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership.41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that
year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact
belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessorsininterest, contrary to Cerquenas testimony,
have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and that it and its predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondents
application for registration should be denied.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision
dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N
11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc.
in Land Registration Case No. N11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.
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SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 175279-80

June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting respondent's petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount
ofP500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in
several companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order 5 dated March 31, 2004 granting
support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00)
Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes
the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of
defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the
said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was
filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand should be
paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of the support pendente
lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from September, 2003 to
March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00)
Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court,
defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos
payable within the first five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of
Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances
may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the
main action for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with familys social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial
court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent
found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs
of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final and
executory since respondents motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for
violation of the threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. Respondent was
given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the court for
disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite. 8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondents contention that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without
evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed
Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua
versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new one is entered ordering
herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 beginning the
month of April 2005 and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the
number of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005,
respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to
petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount
of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by
him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of
receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 12 petitioner asserted
that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly
support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioners motion for issuance of
a writ of execution as it rejected respondents interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B.
Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order 14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second motion
for reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ
of execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support in
arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in
the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan
Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B.
Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and
Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages
filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Luas Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No. 01315.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a
new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a
total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to
his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of
PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by
him subject to the deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of
tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner)
as well. It held that respondents act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740 was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said
he just wanted the issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different
interpretation by the trial court of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also
noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their
children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF
INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT
OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE
CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER
AND THEIR CHILDREN.17

The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated
April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of
work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the
value of the two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not
indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive. She points out that in the
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the said items which it deemed
chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was fixed on the
basis of the documentary evidence of respondents alleged income from various businesses and
petitioners testimony that she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in
unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the
children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using
respondents credit card, totallingP594,151.58 for the period September 2003 to June 2005 were not
consumed by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and
BMW 316i respondent bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua,
respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upperclass society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place to
another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance are
indispensable to the childrens day-to-day living, the value of which were properly deducted from the
arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
to the needs of the recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment
of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of
its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 20

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was
determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the
amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente
lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioners testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?
A Presently, Sir?
ATTY. ZOSA:
Yes.
A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month for the food alone.
xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir.
Q How much other expenses do you incur?
WITNESS:
A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.
Q Why do you incur that much amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am having a
special therapy to straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a
driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still need
another househelp to accompany me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I cannot carry
anymore heavy loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx

Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned P40,000.00
to P50,000.00?
A Yes, for the food alone.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? You
mentioned of a driver, am I correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need another
househelp.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something
between P3,000.00 toP4,000.00. Thats quite
A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another which I will give a compensation
of P5,000.00.
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
A My clothing.
COURT:
How about the schooling for your children?
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that you
would like to add so I can tell my client, the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back because I
am scoliotic, three (3) times a week.

Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?

A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am also
taking some vitamins from excel that will cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Lets have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you for the
operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost P60,000.00 and the
other eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00 is P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q You talk of therapy?
A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around P5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the
subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his
children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite
this, respondents counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent was willing to grant
the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children and petitioner
as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how
much respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a
different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioners prayer for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding
the P75,000.00 monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the
monthly support pendente lite at P250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in millions of
respondent was based merely on the allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration
documents of various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents
and siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite to P115,000.00, which ruling was
no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondents compliance with the final CA
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum
of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance
and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that the deductions were
made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay
support pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and
their two childrens monthly support.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly
supported by receipts22:

Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne and Daniel Ryan -

Php1,350,000.00
613,472.86

Car Maintenance fees of Angelli Suzanne

51,232.50

Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan -

348,682.28

Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan -

118,960.52
Php2,482,348.16

After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be
considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the children 23:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan

11,500.00

Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

14,611.15

Credit card purchases of Angelli

Suzanne

408,891.08

Salon and travel expenses of Angelli

Suzanne

87,112.70

School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua

260,900.00

Cash given to Daniel and Angelli

121,000.00

TOTAL GRAND TOTAL -

Php 946,465.64
Php 3,428,813.80

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the
respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the
support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the absence of
petitioners contribution to the joint obligation of support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on
Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the
following rules:

(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the
spouses may be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time
as the court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the
marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking
support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse
not to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and
training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that
spouses future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative
financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor
market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to
the marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career
building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and
emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support,
taking into account that spouses earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets,
and standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of
the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following
factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child;
(2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the
standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the
parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either
party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as
relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in
arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He
complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all
money and items of personal property given by him to the children themselves, even though he
referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount

of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant)
was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to
credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the
children remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly
to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to
dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed
by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily
interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills
v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the
latter case the court said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have
been made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the
welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so
doing he would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her
allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them money,
especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not
treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a
divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special considerations of an equitable
nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such
can be done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments
become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra.
The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be
allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of
drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two
expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of
petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support
pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly
given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the
deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and
appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly
support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the
respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose
sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident
from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when
the trial court observed:

While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to
his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however,
devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for
nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical
and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support
unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support
fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondents financial resources, it is but
fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner
and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly
support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
1avvphi1

In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from
paying the expenses of their two (2) childrens schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars
and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs
of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private respondent that she
needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2)
children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit
cards he provided them in the amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly
support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount
of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs.
This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of P115,000.00 excludes the
amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable
upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support ofP115,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as the
circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the
proceedings for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal. 30 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the
accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1wphi1

Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan

11,500.00

Credit card purchases of Angelli

365,282.20

(Groceries and Dry Goods)

Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan

228,869.38

TOTAL

Php 648,102.29

As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of indirect
contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but
such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. 31 To constitute contempt,
the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. 32 The good faith, or lack of
it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by
the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondents act
was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of
his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering the full cost of their
education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the familys social status.
Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable
grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his
children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own
because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same
time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two children have finished
their education and are now employed in the family business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial
court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of
facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages
filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No.
01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346
entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and
instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the support
pendente lite in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of

PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by
him subject to the deduction aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner, v. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D.
ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, AND LEAH
ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 9, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino(Valino) was entitled to the
remains of the decedent.
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married
respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and
Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah
Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separatedin
fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as
husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their
children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending
Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of
Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried
and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit
against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross
Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty
(20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had
introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together,Valino admitted
that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took
good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed
that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States.
According to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus,
she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after
it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it
was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for
the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not
show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and
responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in
the Valino family mausoleum.4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano to
the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve
any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected. 5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty.
Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to
transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park
in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the
custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the
surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband.
For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty.
Adriano at the time of the latters death, notwithstanding their 30year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the good intentions
shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were in the United
States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue

The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty.
Adriano.
The Courts Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 6 of the Family Code, specifies the persons
who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance
with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better
right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent
of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner. In Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,7 a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana
Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his
residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio,
Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as
the commonlaw husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be
considered a spouse having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his commonlaw wife,
the Court ruled:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such form of coownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of
the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:

Be it noted, however, thatwith respect to spouse,' the same must be the legitimate spouse' (not
commonlaw spouses).
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term spouse embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a
couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner visavis Vitaliana was not a lawfullywedded spouse
to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 8 [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her
husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had,
in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any
other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.9 While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also
recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in
making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service
and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adrianos death in the
morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately
contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307
of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in their family plot is
being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such
claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano family
plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and
undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valinos favor, solely on
account of a longtime relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband when she
died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily
presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free
and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of
the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosarios keenness to exercise the rights and
obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children
in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at
the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
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Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence
of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the
form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the form of the funeral ritesthat
should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the
wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on
civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the
deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. 10 As Article 307 itself

provides, the wishes of the deceased must beexpressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as
from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once
more that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other
evidence was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not
absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
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The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law.
They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the
disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial,
or the ceremony to be observed.11 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil
Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right
and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their lovedone. As aptly explained by
the appellate court in its disquisition:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

The testimony of defendantappellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that
he be interred at the Floro familys mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of
the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila
Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with the remains to the wife,
in this case, plaintiffappellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to defendantappellee
Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may
have been very commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife
had, in this case at bench, been separatedinfact and had been living apart for more than 30 years. 12
As for Valinos contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty. Adriano, it
should be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs
counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects
the family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his livein partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law
recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and
for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasiproperty
right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a
family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano during his
final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual
or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
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The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendantappellee Fe Floro Valino, who,
having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care
of the wellbeing of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his remains when he had
died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffsappellants are not entitled to actual damages. Defendantappellee Fe
Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife
and family were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffsappellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be
recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages
and its causal connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although incapable of
pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and
actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffsappellants, nor was any intended by anyone in

this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his
right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements
to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately established by
plaintiffsappellants.
As regards the award of attorneys fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code
demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have searched but
found nothing in plaintiffsappellants suit that justifies the award of attorneys fees. 14
Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the funeral of a
deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity which
should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such controversies that the Code
Commission saw it best to include the provisions on Funerals.15
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial
Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519CEB.
The assailed Decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybars petition for cancellation of entries in the
latters marriage contract; while the assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at
the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied
having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave
her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6 Respondent also presented as witness a
certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune
was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract
was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L.
Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the
alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the
wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration couched in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners counsel, and all
concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction
of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES
SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE
CONTRACT, IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the
entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal circumstances. 15 In directing
the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared
the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders
of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when
the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of
the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in
a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry,
to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation
of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the

parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.20 An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary.
The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected
by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their
opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as
long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage
was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled
that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a
certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage
certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as partiesrespondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different
from respondents signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court
thus made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 021110SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction
of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.25
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial
court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.

Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court
Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519CEB, areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184148, June 09, 2014

NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN AND ELVIRA B. CALALANG, Petitioners, v. ROSARIO CALALANGGARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE, AND CARLITO S. CALALANG, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated December 21, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
72531. The CA modified the Decision3 dated July 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of
Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 370-M-91.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:

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In a Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
on June 10, 1991, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S.
Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. CalalangParulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified
as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2 nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of
Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through
succession as the latters compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The
first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their
parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio.
Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On

June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave
birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during
this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of
Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over
the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. As a result, on
September 22, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P28715 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly, the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 in the
name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989, 7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two grounds. First, the respondents argued that
the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who
were co-owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio, the respondents
claimed that they acquired successional rights over the land. Thus, in alienating the land without their
consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro indivisoshare in the property. Second, the
respondents claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the
capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,8 the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the second marriage of
Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated that it was issued in
the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]. Thus, the property belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. The petitioners likewise denied
the allegation that the sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was gainfully
employed in Spain at the time of the sale. Moreover, they alleged that the respondents did not have a valid
cause of action against them and that their cause of action, if any, was already barred by laches, estoppel
and prescription. By way of counterclaim, the petitioners also sought the payment to them of moral and
exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of the clearly unfounded suit.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads as follows:
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the
following manner:
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1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful share to three-fourth (3/4) of
one-half (1/2) or a total of 474.75 square meters at 158.25 square meters for each of the three plaintiffs,
namely: Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito all surname[d] Calalang, of the real property covered by TCT No.
283321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the conjugal estate of the late
Encarnacion S. Calalang [sic];
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages; P50,000.00 for
attorneys fees and another P50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first
marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on
June 7, 1942, the corresponding shares to the disputed property were acquired by the heirs of the decedent
according to the laws of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the disputed property to
Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal partnership and allocated the other half to the three respondents
and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial court then ordered all of Pedros share to
be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the

application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro
Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the case to the CA which rendered the assailed
Decision on December 21, 2007. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the defendants in the
following manner:
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1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful share to the property owned
by their common father Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one-half (1/2) portion of the whole area or 633
square meters to be divided equally by the three plaintiffs, namely: Rosario, Leonora and Carlito, all
surnamed Calalang, each getting an area of 211 square meters of the property covered by TCT No.
2883321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the property of their late
father Pedro Calalang;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages; P50,000.00 for
attorneys fees and another P50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10

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The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and
exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the
first marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-2871. It held that although the free
patent was issued in the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang] this phrase was
merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the registration of the disputed
property. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7,
1942, the respondents did not acquire any successional rights to the parcel of land which was exclusively
owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules of succession, Pedros heirs namely, Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and
Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the
petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the
sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad
faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
As regards the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten years. Since the property was registered in the name of Nora in
1984 and the action for reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet prescribed.
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their
motion in its Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:

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Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its December 21, 2007 Decision modifying the
July 10, 2001 Decision of the trial court, and in issuing its July 25, 2008 Resolution denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2008.11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed
property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was issued to
Pedro Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On the other hand, the
respondents claim that the disputed property was transferred by their maternal grandmother, Francisca

Silverio, to their parents, Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latters marriage. Thus, the
respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with
Encarnacion Silverio.
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case requires a reevaluation of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties in order to trace the title of the disputed property. What is
involved is indeed a question of fact which is generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve in a
petition for review on certiorari .12 However, a recognized exception to the rule is when the RTC and CA
have conflicting findings of fact as in this case.13 Here, while the trial court ruled that the disputed property
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio, the
court a quo declared that the evidence proved the sole and exclusive ownership of the disputed property of
Pedro Calalang.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is
the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish that Lot 1132, Cad. 333 originated from the
parents of Encarnacion, and therefore said property either became property of Encarnacion in her own right
or jointly with her husband Pedro Calalang in 1936. In so ruling, the trial court relied on the testimony of
Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her parents built a nipa house on the subject lot and lived there before and
after World War II. The trial court further noted that Rosarios testimony was corroborated by her cousin
and adjacent neighbor Manolo Calalang.14
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show that the
records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents
maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such
as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can
remember and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal
grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she
able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her
parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it
was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents submission that the
subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the disputed property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that the
title was issued in the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang].
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree:
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SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate of title shall set forth the
full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land, including their civil
status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and
postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names
of both spouses.
A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira
Berba [Calalang] merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered owner Pedro
Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is conjugal. InLitam v. Rivera,15 we declared:
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Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are
the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of
Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This circumstance indicates that the properties in question belong
to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles
covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words
married to Rafael Litam written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles

are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered
by said titles.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, 16 applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the
land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut
plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. But he
applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already married to Elvira B.
Calalang. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after
the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became
private property and formed part of Pedro Calalangs exclusive property.17 It was therefore excluded from
the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. 18
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that
Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated
the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New
Civil Code provides that [t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.,19 we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:
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The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessors death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent
died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the
inofficiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid
only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after
that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the
sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro
Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by
valuable consideration (in effect an inofficious donation inter vivos), the respondents have no right to
question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective
shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere
preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 20 The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
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WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21, 2007
and Resolution dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or the Complaint for Annulment of Sale
and Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos,
Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 01558MIN which affirmed the order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 31325,
declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantors husband, presumptively dead under Article
41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in
their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the
couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondents inability to reach sexual climax
whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerrys expression of animosity toward the
respondents father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw
him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the respondent filed
before the RTC a petition4 for her husbands declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case

No. 31325. She claimed that she had a wellfounded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that
she had inquired from her motherinlaw, her brothersinlaw, her sistersinlaw, as well as her neighbors
and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed,
proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a wellfounded belief that her husband was
already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any news about the
latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is
presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
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The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6 filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the
petitioners petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed
the latters order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order
dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.
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The Petition
The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family
Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appealable under Article
247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a wellfounded belief to justify the declaration of
her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent
search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Courts attention to the attendant
circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search conducted and the respondents
resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a wellfounded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Courts Judgment in the Judicial Proceedings for Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory.

Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
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For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions
and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even
as against the courts.8 Modification of the courts ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible.
The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained
in Republic of the Phils. v. BermudezLorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately final and executory. It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republics appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
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An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of

law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, the right to appeal is
not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not
granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the Decisions, Judgments or Final Orders of Trial Courts in a
Summary Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us
that no appeal can be made from the trial courts judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not
automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy
of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we
held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary
proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
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Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW,
establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of
the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise governsummary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final
and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should
be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioners resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question the RTCs order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of WellFounded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the Family
Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a wellfounded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
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1.

That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;

2.

That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3.

That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4.

That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.12

The Present Spouse Has the Burden of Proof to Show that All the Requisites Under Article 41 of
the Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family
Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death,
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with
him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the Family Code Imposes a Stricter
Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a wellfounded belief that the absentee isalready dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same
observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family
Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes astricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of
the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
isgenerally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or ispresumed dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as well
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founded belief that the absentee isalready dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the
present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of wellfounded belief
which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honesttogoodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouses whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of WellFounded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by wellfounded belief. It depends upon the circumstances of each
particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a casetocase basis. To be able to comply with
this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result ofdiligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of diligent and reasonable search required by the law, an analysis of the following
relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present spouse
failed to prove that he had a wellfounded belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his
petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his inlaws house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captains aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a parttime taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged earnest efforts, the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court found
that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wifes
absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a wellfounded belief under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a wellfounded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
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Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her wellfounded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present spouse
alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouses whereabouts.
The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse,
as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did
not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
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testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these
relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have
sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she
failed to explain these omissions.
iii. Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had
been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
The Court ruled that the present spouses investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was
already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv. The present case
In the case at bar, the respondents wellfounded belief was anchored on her alleged earnest efforts to
locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
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(1) She made inquiries about Jerrys whereabouts from her inlaws,
neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through
the patients directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the stringent standard and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that
her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients directory therein were unintentional. She did
not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor
primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief
that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look
for him. While a finding of wellfounded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present
spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose
spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to
the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate
her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even
named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouses bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his
absent spouses whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were
not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she conducted a
diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a wellfounded belief other than
her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and inlaws about her husbands whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a passive search where she relied
on uncorroborated inquiries from her inlaws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent
search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a wellfounded belief that her husband was
already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22[w]hether or not the
spouse present acted on a wellfounded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to

be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.
Strict Standard Approach Is Consistent with the States Policy to Protect and Strengthen
Marriage
In the abovecited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the strict standard approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently
circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the
abovementioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly
complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even
possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and voidunder Article 36 of the Family
Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the States policy to
protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. 24 Since marriage serves as the familys foundation25 and
since it is the states policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, 26 marriage
should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41,
this is the underlying rationale to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The] protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the
State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under Article 41 of the Family Code Is for the Present Spouses
Benefit
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The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the
application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouses benefit. It is intended to
protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which
might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the courts declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouses
good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court
constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is
effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent
standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Courts attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the
instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts
are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City,
South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182839, June 02, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. JOSE GARCIA AND CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE
GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA AND JIMMY GARCIA AND HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY:
CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA,
GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA AND JANE GARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 dated September 26, 2007 and the
resolution3 dated May 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71356.
These challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
23, Roxas, Isabela, dismissing Civil Case No. Branch 23-500-96 for lack of cause of action.
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its improvements (subject property)
located in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela. The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T44422 under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject propertyduring his

marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.

The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the following children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all
surnamed Garcia, who are the respondents in the present case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from
the petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank), initially for P150,000.00. The loan was secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The spouses Garcia increased their
loan to P220,000.00 and eventually to P600,000.00. As security for the increased loan, they offered their
property covered by TCT No. 75324 and the subject property covered by TCT No. T-44422.
Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject property as additional collateral
security for the latters increased loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs)
dated April 14, 1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly authorizing the Spouses Garcia to apply
for, borrow, or secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey and transfer the subject property by
way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner
bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All of
these transactions, however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children.
On maturity of the loan on April 20, 1994, the spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank
despite repeated demands.
On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank.
They claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents Nora, Jose
Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the contract.
The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his deceased
spouse, Ligaya, as they acquired the subject property during their marriage; that upon Ligayas death, Jose
Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners pro indiviso of the
subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for not including Jose Sr. as payee to the check
representing the loan despite its knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to the real estate mortgage; that
the real estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their consent
or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real estate mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he
never benefitted from the loan.
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to them in the amount of
P133,800.00. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject property as additional
security for their (the Garcias) loan to the petitioner bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made in good faith and for value,
and maintained that the respondents complaint stated no cause of action against it. It alleged that the real
estate mortgage over the properties was duly registered and inscribed on their titles and was thus binding
on the whole world.
In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
authorizing Jose Sr. to act as their attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The court held that the subject property was a
conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his marriage with his now deceased wife. As a
conjugal property, it is presumed that upon the death of his spouse, one-half of the property passed on to
Jose Sr., while the other half went to Jose and his children as co-owners and as forced heirs of his
deceased spouse. Without the consent of the children, the trial court ruled that the conjugal property could
only be transferred or encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.s share in the conjugal partnership, plus his
share as an heir in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased spouse.
The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA executed by Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy in this
suit, they are already estopped from questioning the mortgage and from alleging lack of consent or
knowledge in the transaction. It held Jose Sr. liable as an accommodation party and upheld the petitioner
banks right to collect the debt.

The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal.

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The Ruling of the CA

On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal, but
reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it declared valid and binding the Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage between the petitioner bank, on one hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other
hand, with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy. Relying on the Courts ruling in Nufable
v. Nufable,4 the CA ruled that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire conjugal property, without his
childrens conformity, was null and void because a mere part owner could not alienate the shares of the
other co-owners.
The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be liable to the extent of Jose Sr.s shares; Jose
Sr.s acts could not affect his childrens pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. It disagreed with the trial
courts estoppel theory and held that their execution of the SPA should not be construed as acquiescence to
the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not escape liability from the mortgage since he
voluntarily bound himself as the Spouses Garcias accommodation mortgagor.
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The petition
The petitioner bank disputes the CAs finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature. It argues
that, as can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422, the subject property was registered in the name of Jose
Sr. alone, who was described in the title as widower and not married. The petitioner bank posits
that as a mortgagee in good faith, it had the right to rely on the mortgagors certificate of title; in the
absence of any indication that could arouse suspicion, it had no obligation to undertake further investigation
and verify whether the property was conjugal or was acquired during marriage or thereafter.
Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as petitioner bank as mortgagee was concerned,
Jose Sr. had the right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to mortgage it without the consent of his children.
Accordingly, the mortgage in its entirety should be declared valid.
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The Comment
The respondents state that the issues raised by petitioner bank are essentially factual; hence, they are
beyond the competence of this Court in a petition for review. They submit that in a certioraripetition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be entertained because the Court is not a trier of
facts.
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The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petition before us raises both questions of fact and of law. Whether petitioner bank is a mortgagee in
good faith and for value and whether the subject property was conjugal, are factual issues that this Court
cannot look into as our examination would entail going into factual matters and records of the case. In Rule
45 petitions, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. 5
Although there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition forcertiorari,
the petitioner bank failed to show that this case falls under any of the established exceptions. Too, since the
CA partially affirmed the findings of the trial court and absent any indication that these courts committed a
serious error in its findings, this Court is bound by these courts findings. 6
Moreover, even if we were to review the factual issues raised by the petitioner bank, we still find no reason
to depart from the CAs ruling.
The Subject Property is Conjugal
a. All property acquired during marriage
is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations

were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired the land through sale, he was already
married. The material portion of his testimony is as follows:
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Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Upon the death of your wife did you and your wife ever own a
piece of land?
Yes, sir.
Where is that land situated?
In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela.
Is that land titled in your names?
Yes, sir.
xxxx
You and your wife acquired that piece of land?
Yes, sir.
xxxx
May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did you acquire this
parcel of land presently embraced and covered by TCT No. T-44422?
I purchased that piece of land from the Baniqued Family during my
incumbency as Municipal Mayor, sir.
What was your civil status at the time you purchased that
piece of land?
I was already married, sir. (Emphasis ours, TSN, July 24, 1997,
Jose Garcia Sr.)7

Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that the subject property was acquired during
the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with
Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject propertys acquisition during the
subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. 8
b. Registration of the subject property in
the name of one spouse does not destroy
the presumption that the property is conjugal
The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider that the subject property was registered in the
name of Jose Sr. alone. Likewise, it raises the argument that Jose Sr.s change of status in the subject
propertys title from married to widower prior to the constitution of the real estate mortgage showed that
the property was no longer conjugal.
We do not consider this argument persuasive.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.What is
material is the time when the property was acquired.9 The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to
be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was
acquired for valuable consideration during marriage. 10 It retains its conjugal nature.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the petitioner must present strong, clear
and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. 11 The burden of proving that the
property belongs exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the party asserting it.
In the present case, aside from its allegation that the subject property is no longer conjugal and its assertion

that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the petitioner bank offered no evidence, convincing to this Court, that
the subject property exclusively belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier, the petitioner bank failed to
overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property was conjugal. Thus, the conclusion of both lower
courts that the subject property was conjugal property holds. Factual findings of the CA affirming those of
the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.12
The conjugal partnership was converted
into an implied ordinary co-ownership
upon the death of Ligaya
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and
terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, 13 and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as
provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that [t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the
surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.14 This resulting ordinary coownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which reads:
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Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
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Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and may,
therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner
alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to
the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.15 In Carvajal v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court said:
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While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment,the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the coowners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other coowners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without
any physical adjudication.3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial
decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in
the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. 4 What a co owner may dispose of is only his
undivided aliquotshare, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition.
[emphasis supplied].
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the death of
Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code,
even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he
could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his childrens consent. As correctly emphasized
by the trial court, Jose Sr.s right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal
partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the estate which is his deceased
spouses share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of
his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the transaction. 17
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property
without his co-owners consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as
mortgagee is limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division
and liquidation of the subject property.
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision dated September 26, 2007of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71356. Costs against petitioner Philippine National Bank.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 168992-93

May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial

court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she
married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own,
petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents.
The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle
was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1
August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel
Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under Republic
Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April
2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court
docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent.8 Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent 9 for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle
was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were
unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court
ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order
dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any
of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was
not even made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the
joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose

of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has
remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court
and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner
argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that
joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no
other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between
the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second,
the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must
meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he
must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt
in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise
be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree

of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children
of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have
been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. 13 The father and
the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. 14 Even
the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless
the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. 15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 17 However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates
the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee
and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee
as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of
the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and
adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates
parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional
rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits
to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of

society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled inRepublic v.
Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare
of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather
than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on
the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)
1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the
petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could
no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in
the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of
no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate
our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259.
Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202932

October 23, 2013

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution2 dated 3 August 2012 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October
2009 and affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated 24 November 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-Manila).

The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although
Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages:
Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was
the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she
married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and
Crispin was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960.
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492
State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was
thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf sometime in 1970. 4 The Vitas property
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres." 5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property). 6
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).7 According to Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan
and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the two (2)
properties situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were
considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and she shouldered
his medical expenses.8
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus,
Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTCManila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature
on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros
prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither
Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and
respondents.9
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the
beginning.10 Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban and
Socorro were married, provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void.
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura
(Conchita). In her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a seaman, had been missing
and unheard from for 35 years. However, Conchita recanted her earlier testimony and executed an
Affidavit of Retraction.11
The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect the status of the
union. It applied our ruling in Nial v. Badayog:12
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which [the] fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts.13
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional
to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in the properties. It
found that:
with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila covered
by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline]
declared that part of it was first acquired by her father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when he

purchased the right of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x x x bought the right to one-half of
the remaining property occupied by Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey of the National
Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be registered in her fathers name. As proof thereof,
she presented Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x. These documents prove that that she has been an occupant
of the said property in Vitas, Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June,
1980.14
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, x x
x Evangeline professed that in 1978, before her father met Socorro Torres and before the
construction of the BLISS Project thereat, her father [already had] a bodega of canvas (lona) and a
sewing machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she
was also operating Vangies Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was
evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on 09 November 1998
x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980, the property became known as Units D-9
and D-10. At first, her father [paid] for the amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he
got sick with colon cancer in 1993, he asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x
x x. [Evangeline] paid a total of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of receipts x x x
and the aggregate amount ofP188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as evidenced by 36 receipts x x x. 15
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the
properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over
the Vitas and Delpan properties.16
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the court a quo
STANDS.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code,
and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions
between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals,19 and held that the foregoing provision
applies "even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code."20 The CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the
purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to provide any documentation
evidencing Socorros alleged contribution.21
On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 22 which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated 3 August 2012.23
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be
based on the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v.
Descallar24 in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.25
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is
evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is
co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11
December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was
issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."26

We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
"married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro
co-owned the property.27The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over
the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does
not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt
of our ruling in Borromeo:
1wphi1

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively
and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to
respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. 28 Thus, the law presumes
that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. 29 Furthermore, even if payment
of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on
behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid
as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the
Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s
alleged monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
1wphi1

settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here
it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he
miserably failed to do so.30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202370

September 23, 2013

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 16 March 2012 Decision2 and the 28 June 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed the 26
September 2008 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil
Case No. 787.
The Facts

On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila
(Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months
later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their
daughter.
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no
conjugal properties whatsoever."5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff
narrated that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the
petition.6
On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and
Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, if any."8
On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion 9 stating that she discovered: (a) two
200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a
108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No.
243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The registered owner of the Discovered Properties is
"Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September
2007. However, Salas notice of hearing was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To
Receive."
On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance10 requesting for an
Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and
no conjugal property was involved.
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguilas manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and
the state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone
informed her of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information
and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that
Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas common-law wife.11
On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation12 alleging that there is no
conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguilas petition. According to Salas, Aguilas statement
was a judicial admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila
waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly
waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements located in Sugar Landing
Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego
Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting
toP200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively,
"Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby
directed to partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following
properties, without prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas:

(1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas
located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as
Exhibit "A" and its improvements;
(2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina C. Salas
located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497 marked as
Exhibit "B" and its improvements;
(3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas
located in Tondo and covered by TCT No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its
improvements.
Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties, and such partition,
together with the Order of the Court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds
of the place in which the property is situated.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,14 even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of
marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal
partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that
the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed
between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence of the
Waived Properties.
On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina
Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal
properties; (3) Salas did not contribute money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no
permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in
the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he
was not well-versed with legal documentation, he registered the properties in the name of "Juan S.
Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas."
In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The
RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to
third persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the
registered owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at
fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.15 The CA ruled that Aguilas statement in
her petition is not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October
2003, but Aguila found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of
the RTC decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it
would be unfair to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she made the
admission. The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the opportunity to refute Aguilas
allegations in her manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held
that Rubina cannot collaterally attack a certificate of title.

In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,16 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration17 filed by Salas.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision ordering the partition of
the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as
well as the property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and
respondent.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision in not allowing Rubina C.
Cortez to intervene in this case18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership. 19 Thus, the
settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action.20
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
preponderance of evidence.21 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no
conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the
RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the
Waived Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly
registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this
Court cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case. These are the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered
in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T105443 in the name of Joan Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas,
registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal
Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement)
listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. x x x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name of [Aguila], certified
true copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a
presumption that properties registered in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment
Roll for taxation purposes.22

On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their
marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas name
were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered
on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage. In
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,23 we held that the question of whether the properties were acquired
during the marriage is a factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA,
are binding on us, except under compelling circumstances not present in this case. 24
1wphi1

On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of
Aguilas manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity
to be heard. We hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the
manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal.
On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise
find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is
the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence
of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and
regularly issued.25 The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his
opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubinas
statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties,
she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action."27
In Dio v. Dio,28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article147 of the
Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the

respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. 29 In the
present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of
marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of
the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by coownership.30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the
CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 16 March 2012 and the
Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326

January 30, 2013
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3692-RTJ)
GEOFFREY BECKETT, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu
City, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules
and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and
existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent
choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that
choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development.1 x x x
The Case

This case arose from a complaint filed by Geoffrey Beckett charging Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, with gross ignorance of the law,
manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty allegedly committed in relation to Sp. Proc. No.
18182-CEB, entitled Geoffrey Beckett v. Eltesa Densing Beckett, while pending before that court.
The Antecedent Facts
Geoffrey Beckett (Beckett or Complainant), an Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa
Densing Beckett (Eltesa), a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born on June 29, 2001, Geoffrey
Beckett, Jr. (Geoffrey, Jr.).
In his Complaint-Affidavit,2 Beckett alleged that their union was, from the start, far from ideal. In fact,
according to him, they eventually separated and, worse still, they sued each other.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, otherwise
known as the Violence against Women and Children Act, followed by a suit for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB -32254. Both cases ended in the sala of
Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. (respondent or Judge Sarmiento). For his part, Beckett commenced
criminal charges against Eltesa, one of which was for adultery.
The couples initial legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento, on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case
No. CEB-32254, rendered judgment3 based on a compromise agreement in which Eltesa and
Beckett agreed and undertook, among others, to cause the dismissal of all pending civil and criminal
cases each may have filed against the other. They categorically agreed too that Beckett shall have
full and permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the visitorial rights of
Eltesa.
Thereafter, Beckett left for Australia, taking Geoffrey, Jr. with him. As with his three other children
from previous relationships, so Beckett alleged, he cared and provided well for Geoffrey, Jr.
Moreover, as agreed upon, they would come and see Eltesa in Cebu every Christmas.
In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in Australia. This notwithstanding, the yearly
Christmas visits continued. In the 2010 visit, Beckett consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa
even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011. January 9 came and went
but Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltesa, prompting Beckett to file a petition against Eltesa for violation
of RA 7610. Docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB,4 this petition was again raffled to the sala of
Judge Sarmiento. And because Geoffrey remained in the meantime in the custody of Eltesa, Beckett
later applied in Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Beckett further relates that, during the March 1, 2011 conference on the application for habeas
corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct,
shouting and crying, not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total
stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order 5, dated March 1, 2011,
directing inter alia the following: (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett; and (2) Beckett to bring
the child in the pre-trial conference set for March 15, 2001.
For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett did not materialize.
Beckett also alleged that while waiting for the March 15, 2011 pre-trial conference to start, he saw
one Helen Sy, purportedly a close friend of Eltesa, enter Judge Sarmientos chambers. Then, during
the conference itself, Eltesa moved for reconsideration of the courts March 1, 2011 Order, praying

that it be set aside insofar as it directed her to return the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett. To this
partial motion, Beckett requested, and was granted, a period of five (5) days to file his
comment/opposition. Additionally, Beckett sought the immediate implementation of the said March 1,
2011 Order. But instead of enforcing said order and/or waiting for Becketts comment, Judge
Sarmiento, in open court, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr.
and at the same time directing the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to
conduct a social case study on the child.
Weeks later, or in the March 30, 2011 setting, Beckett moved for the reconsideration of the judges
March 15, 2011 Order, on the main contention that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional
custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement. Also, according to
him, during this March 30 proceeding, respondent judge conversed with Eltesa in Cebuano, a dialect
which neither the former nor his counsel understood, and which they (respondent and Eltesa)
persisted on using despite requests that they communicate in English or Filipino. Becketts lawyer
then asked that he be allowed to confer in private with his client for a few minutes but when they
returned to the courtroom, the proceedings had already been adjourned.
As his motion for reconsideration had remained unresolved as of June 13, 2011, Beckett filed on that
day an urgent motion to resolve. Several hearings on the case were postponed because of the
belated submission by the DSWD of the case study report requested by respondent judge.
It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Beckett has instituted the instant complaint, docketed
as A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3692- RTJ, later redocketed as A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. As argued,
respondent is liable for (1) gross ignorance of the law for granting Eltesa provisional custody over
Geoffrey Jr.; and (2) partiality by committing acts of serious misconduct and irregularities in the
performance of official duties, such as but not limited to allowing one Helen Sy to enter his chambers
before the March 15, 2011 hearing, his habit of conversing with Eltesa in the local dialect and for
adjourning a hearing while he was conferring with his counsel in private. Beckett predicates his
charge of dereliction and neglect of duty on respondents alleged failure to resolve his motion for
reconsideration of the March 15, 2011 order giving provisional custody of his child to his mother.
In his answer in response to the 1st Indorsement dated July 14, 2011 of the Office of the Court of
Administrator (OCA), respondent judge denied complainants allegations of partiality and of being
biased against the latter, particularly describing his order granting Eltesa provisional custody as
proper. In this regard, respondent judge averred that, per his Order of March 30, 2011, he deferred
action on Becketts motion for reconsideration of the courts March 15, 2011 Order pending
submission of the Social Case Study Report, while the June 21, 2011 Order denying Becketts said
motion for reconsideration was based on that Social Case Study Report 6 of Social Welfare Officer
Clavel Saycon, DWSD- Region VII, who recommended that Geoffrey, Jr. be in the care and custody
of the mother. As an added observation, respondent judge stated that Beckett did not cry "Bias"
when he (respondent) approved the compromise agreement in Civil Case CEB 32254 and when he
later urged Beckett to commence habeas corpus proceedings. Attached to the letter-answer are the
case study reports submitted by the DSWD regional office, one of which was prepared by
psychologist Christine V. Duhaylungsod,7 who elicited from Geoffrey, Jr. the following information:
that (1) complainant always leaves him to the care of his older half-brother or his fathers girlfriends;
(2) he was at one time sent out of the house by one of complainants girlfriends and he had to stay in
the garage alone; and (3) he never wanted to stay with complainant whom he feared and who once
locked him in his room without food. In their respective reports, Dr. Obra and Dr. Saycon, a
psychiatrist, both strongly recommended that custody over Geoffrey, Jr. be given to Eltesa.
Respondent judge also denied knowing one Helen Sy adverted to in the basic complaint and
explained in some detail why he spoke at one instance to Eltesa in Cebuano. He closed with a

statement that he issued his assailed Orders in good faith and that he had, as sought by
complainant, inhibited himself from further hearing SP Proc. No. 18182-CEB.
In the Agenda Report dated March 8, 2012, the OCA regards the complaint meritorious insofar as
the charges for gross ignorance of the law is concerned given that respondent judge issued his
March 15, 2011 Order granting provisional custody in favor of Eltesa despite the existence of the
judicial compromise. The OCA, thus, recommended that respondent judge be adjudged liable for
gross ignorance of the law and fined with stern warning. The inculpatory portions of the OCAs
evaluation report pertinently read:
x x x A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is
normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more
than a mere contract binding upon the parties. x x x It has the force of and effect of any other
judgment. x x x Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court
attains the effect and authority of res judicata x x x.
xxxx
The pertinent portion of the judgment on Compromise Agreement x x x, which granted and
transferred permanent custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to the herein complainant is unequivocal. Moreover,
the same order even allowed complainant to bring with him Geoffrey, Jr. to Australia. Thus, in
granting Geoffrey, Jr.s custody to his mother in an Order issued on 15 March 2011 on a mere Motion
for Partial Reconsideration, respondent judge violated a basic and fundamental principle of res
judicata. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After
all, judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.8
The OCA, however, effectively recommends the dismissal of the charge of manifest partiality and
other offenses for want of sufficient substantiation, noting that the complainant has failed to adduce
substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of judicial duties.
Anent the charge of Manifest Partiality, this Office finds the same not supported by substantial
evidence. In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by
substantial evidence, the averments in his complaint. Complainant failed to present substantial
evidence to show the alleged partiality and ignorance of respondent judge, Mere suspicion that a
judge is biased is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear
showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice without fear or favor.9
The Court also notes that, contrary to complainants pretense, respondent judge had acted on his
motion for reconsideration of the contentious March 15, 2011 Order.
The OCAs recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint insofar as it charges respondent
judge with manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duties is well-taken. The Court cannot
presume partiality and serious misconduct and irregularities based on circumstances alleged in the
complaint. Moreover, for serious misconduct to obtain, the judicial act/s complained of should be
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or persistent disregard of well-known legal
precepts.10 Nothing in the records tends to suggest that respondent judge was actuated by malice or
corrupt motives in issuing his disputed March 15, 2011 order granting Eltesa custody of Geoffrey, Jr.
despite the adverted compromise agreement.
The Issue

The remaining issue then boils down to whether or not respondent Judge Sarmiento is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
The Courts Ruling
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity with
simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public
trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. Not to know the law as basic,
almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of established rule of law as if he
were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is excused, especially an
RTC judge.11
Complainant has charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law. He states in this regard
that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own Decision of September 25, 2006 which
constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jrs. custody, granted, via
his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to
refers to the judgment on compromise agreement.
The Court cannot go along with complainants above posture.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother, Eltesa,
did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation
engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be
returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord
primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to borrow from
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,12 "is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and
adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, 13 a custody agreement
can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of
the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would
no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody
of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled
rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. 14 And if already over 7 years of age, the childs
choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless the
parent chosen proves to be unfit.15 Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals,16 We held that in custody
cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in
no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that "in all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration."17
In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise, the
preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected.
Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to
reiterate, permanent. In Espiritu,18 We ruled that:
x x x The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody
suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re1wphi1

examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of
the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. x x x
As Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu in Espiritu,19 Geoffrey, Jr., at the time when he persistently refused
to be turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As such, he was very much capable
of deciding, based on his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay. Noteworthy too are the
results of the interviews which were reflected in the three reports previously mentioned, excerpts
from which are hereunder quoted, to wit:
x x x In so far as Geoffrey, Jr.s account of experience, being with his fathers custody is something
that he is afraid of and something he does not want to happen again. However, being with his
mother is the one (sic) he is looking to (sic) and aspires.20
xxxx
x x x Being in the custody of his mother is something (sic) he feel (sic) secure and protected and this
is manifested in the childs craving for his mothers presence all the time and the desire to be always
with her that even (sic) he sleeps he wants his mother to embrace and hug him and cries when he
wakes up and he cannot see his mother.21
xxxx
x x x He locked me in the room. He always leave (sic) me. x x x they keep fighting, Daddy and his
girlfriend ... they'll get angry with (sic) me ... I'm scared with (sic) Daddy.22
xxxx
Meanwhile, Ms. Barbo (the caregiver or yaya of Geoffrey, Jr.), expressed peculiarities, "Sa Daddy
niya, he dd (sic) not fear his mom. Sa mommy niya, he fear (sic) his dad." 23
With these, We see no reason to sustain the charge against respondent judge for gross ignorance of
the law. For clearly, absent any evidence to the contrary, Geoffrey, Jr. chose to live with his mother
for a reason, which respondent judge, consistent with the promotion of the best interest of the child,
provisionally granted through the issuance of the disputed March 15, 2011 Order. In fact, in issuing
the disputed Order, respondent judge rectified an error previously made when he handed out the
Judgment on Compromise Agreement in 2006.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.
269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-inlaw arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not
go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads
as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed
by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993,
and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to
any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that
office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin
to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license,
and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity
of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A

MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS

ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005
and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil
Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY

INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND

CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209,
or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply
to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and
Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The

presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or

failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption
must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where
the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by
the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
1wphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him,
as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 164201

December 10, 2012

EFREN PANA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the
spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims' heirs.
The Facts and the Case

The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder
before the. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233. 1
On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision 2 acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced
them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and
P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but modified the
penalty toreclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the
award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of
evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of
temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim to
be paid solidarily by them.3 The decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001.4
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a notice of sale on execution8 were issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. 9 On
September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion.10 The spouses moved for reconsideration but the
RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.11
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed a
petition forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 29, 2004 the CA dismissed the
petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
assailed orders.12 It also denied Efrens motion for reconsideration,13 prompting him to file the present
petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal
properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
Ruling of the Court
To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses property relations.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute
any prenuptial agreement.14Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the
Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it was the system of
absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia. The reasoning goes:
Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact does not
prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family Code because their property regime

is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds support in Art. 256 of the Family
Code which states:
"This code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each over the
properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-spouse may properly be
charged against the community as heretofore discussed.15
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren and Melecias property relation was
admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave
its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property relation
between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter code now
prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of property for all marriages unless the parties entered
into a prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia had no prenuptial agreement. The CA
agreed with this position.17
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each
spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in
specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and
automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains
that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except
prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made
before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that
marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their
former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the
family;20 (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a
petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code,
the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work
or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide

equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their
separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who
got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code
took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses loose admission that absolute community of
property governed their property relation since the record shows that they had been insistent that
their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial
agreement between them has been presented.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law
on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under
the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede
the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code
states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws,
as provided in Article 256."23
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the
conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on
Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property
or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of
the Family Code have been covered.25Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either
spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administratorspouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of
them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the
conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational,
or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
1wphi1

Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed
on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states
that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is
required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
above-mentioned."
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao
City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties
of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment

on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169766

March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO,Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano)
as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
legitimate children with Zorayda,5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred
that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under
the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is
void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or
legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and
he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by
invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was
never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda)
did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for
an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and again, another
15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted. 10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on February 20, 1995
where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the
Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines

(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity.13Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA 14 which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can
be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an
answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their
evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were
postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the
proceedings16 in view of the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining
it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603. 19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July
9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement. 22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case
for decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the
ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603. 24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the
reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. 28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article
35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the
late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the
second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code. 30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer
after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry
her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly,
she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the
deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that Estrellita can no
longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita
cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is
void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is
Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence
of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article 48 of the
Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties
had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been
joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to
our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the
issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas
marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to
file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her
marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to
dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court
is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC
hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet,
the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months
before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998. 37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion,

this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an
answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter
was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under
Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested
to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased. 38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses
that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for
certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says
that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that
obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing
to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any
proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib
have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the
Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has
not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did
not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared
void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of
Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer
and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the
complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint.
Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent
Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001,
issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided
for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her
of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x
x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing
in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the
trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it
denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial
court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for
the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However,
in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not
suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action
which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In
fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered
judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only
to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of
the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor
should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the
propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 0211-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages.
It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there
is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of
any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of
report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure
lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 51 which was not availed of during
its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce

wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites." 53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless
the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article
186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically,
the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment. 54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with nonMuslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register
their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil
and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status
since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity
of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition
for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) 56 thereof, only the husband
or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore
only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion
of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage. But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for
nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code,
such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003.58
1wphi1

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which
no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real
party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way
that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus
find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13,
2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177728

July 31, 2009

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then
19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife

without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B.
Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie,
who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office
of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of
Live Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed,
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. 4 Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie
attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS
COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN,
TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED
JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO
AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN
LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANTAND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS
ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent),denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,
Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family
Code of the Philippines"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by
the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use
the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and
the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity
to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was
raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the
childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of
paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted
provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was
declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her commonlaw relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he
had acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominiques handwritten Autobiography

(Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief. 12 Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T.
Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as
the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father
may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly
signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
1avvphi1

Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal
issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF
PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID
MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS SURNAME.15(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that
the private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be
signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is
sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the
admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlierquoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the childs paternity.17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents position, as
affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenies pregnancy
but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial
approval is necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father.
This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code
which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signedby the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O.
No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of
Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of
the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his
statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MYWIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to
be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by
the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall
be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on
various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the
putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts
extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law
spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after
his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is
Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving
questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.23 (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner
minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and
enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediatelyenter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname
of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the

marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her
to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed

to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN
JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise,
the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard
is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity
or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding
that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld
such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage
for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter
into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further
their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
1wphi1

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if
it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES

AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE
the same.

The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than March 7, 2003
March 4, 2003
Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te
complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. (a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriage based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the
period herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute
parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the
age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person
having legal charge of the contracting party , at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the
death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue
influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence
disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue influence
having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability continues and
appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in
the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and
other matters similarly requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The
petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of
the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and
other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may be
filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days
from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
and by the following rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may order
In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on the respondent at his last known
address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the
following data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal
grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to
answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any
other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in
an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by
publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorneyin-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order
the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report for
hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and
submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a
case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. (1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall
set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the
report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial
briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party
at least three days before the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels
as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the
pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer.
In case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer,
notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed
by law, indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and
authorities;

(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal
issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally,
the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court
and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the
pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the
respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating whether his
non-appearance is due to any collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the
court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the
merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement
on matters not prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good
reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pretrial conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other makers as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination
of the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up
In the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except
as to the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the
parties on any of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or
agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to
Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be
presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the
State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the
proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other
than those stated in the pre-trial order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest
injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections
or modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters,
such as the following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members
of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the
court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify in open court would not
enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability
to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the right of
a party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts
thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of
the court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of
their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only
after compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is
filed by any of the parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree
if the parties have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21
of this Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was
recorded and In the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.
Section 20. Appeal. (1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has
filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery
of their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of
appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family
Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their

presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The
court shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated
and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound
securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and
attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall
order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of
the children affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing
party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was
registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National
Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this requirement within
thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the
publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the
properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes
delivered to their common children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a
party dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the
case closed and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings
in the regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be
binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the
regular courts.
Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.

Republic Act No. 9225

August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN

CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:

Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate

JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally
passed by the the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003,
respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: August 29, 2003

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

Republic Act No. 8552

February 25, 1998

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF

FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that
every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. Only
when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child's
extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her
parental authority over his/her child;
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s);
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and custody
over his/her adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or
judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as "legally available for adoption"
and his/her custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to
any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be
authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child;
(iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive
environment for adoption;
(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector agencies to
handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications, and offer adoption-related
services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling; and
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and culture in his/her
native land, and only when this is not available shall intercountry adoption be considered as
a last resort.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as:
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing
or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his/her biological parent(s) or
guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.
(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly relinquishes
parental authority to the Department.
(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial,
continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.
(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or
whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and
has been judicially declared as such.
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial
relationship.
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to
provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving
applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents, and preparing the
adoption home study.
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that
provides twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected,
or voluntarily committed children.
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her biological mother,
causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
ARTICLE II
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES
Section 4. Counseling Service. The Department shall provide the services of licensed social
workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the
birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before
the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological
parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the

decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to
the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all
alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars,
among others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible
adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she
understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on
adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.
Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). It shall be the duty of the Department or the childplacing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
Section 6. Support Services. The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program which shall
include, among others, the above mentioned services.
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
Section 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However,
that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially
declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of
legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings
shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).
Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with
said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE
Section 10. Hurried Decisions. In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that
the biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried
decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain that all measures to
strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own
home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
Section 11. Case Study. No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social
worker of the Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing
or child-caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as
the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the matter to the court
hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall confirm with
the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was
not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the concerned social worker to
ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and that
the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s)
shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case
studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and
records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by the Department.
Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the
adopter(s) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months
within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and
establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in
the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to
be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However,
for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial custody except for those
enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a
pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with the
prospective adopter(s).
Section 13. Decree of Adoption. If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been
complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the

case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the
court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would redound to
the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of
the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies
before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is to be known.
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil
Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. The original certificate of birth shall be
stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place
and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee
shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. All hearings in adoption cases
shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes
connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the
court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may
be used.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Section 16. Parental Authority. Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Section 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
Section 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s)
and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and
restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of
judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Section 21. Violations and Penalties. (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper
material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a
person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).
Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall
cooperate in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein prescribed
and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of
records, documents, and communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or
a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves

two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall
merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the
unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided, shall be in addition to any
other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other laws, ordinances,
executive orders, and proclamations.
When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and
perpetually excluded from entry to the country.
Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the
provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the aboveprescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until
the resolution of the case.
Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this
Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of
birth was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered
and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for
correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the
procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the
Department.
ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. There shall be established an Adoption
Resources and Referral Office under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor the
existence, number, and flow of children legally available for adoption and prospective adopter(s) so
as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information and educational campaign on
domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption proceedings; (d) generate resources to help childcaring and child-placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in
collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be
manned by adoption experts from the public and private sectors.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. Within six (6) months from the promulgation
of this Act, the Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil Registry
General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, and two (2) private individuals
representing child-placing and child-caring agencies shall formulate the necessary guidelines to
make the provisions of this Act operative.
Section 25. Appropriations. Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law and thereafter.

Section 26. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.
Section 27. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in any newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
Approved: February 25, 1998

Republic Act No. 9523

March 12, 2009

AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND

DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS
A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that alternative
protection and assistance shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned, surrendered, or
neglected. In this regard, the State shall extend such assistance in the most expeditious manner in
the interest of full emotional and social development of the abandoned, surrendered, or neglected
child.
It is hereby recognized that administrative processes under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development for the declaration of a child legally available for adoption of
abandoned, surrendered, or neglected children are the most expeditious proceedings for the best
interest and welfare of the child.
Section. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency charged to
implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority to issue the certification
declaring a child legally available for adoption.
(2) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or a person over eighteen (18)
years of age but is unable to fully take care of him/herself or protect himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of physical or mental disability
or condition.
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or
whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least three (3) continuous months,
which includes a founding.
(4) Neglected Child refers to a child whose basic needs have been deliberately unattended
or inadequately attended within a period of three (3) continuous months. Neglect may occur
in two (2) ways:
(a) There is physical neglect when the child is malnourished, ill-clad, and without
proper shelter. A child is unattended when left by himself/herself without proper
provisions and/or without proper supervision.
(b) There is emotional neglect when the child is maltreated, raped, seduced,
exploited, overworked, or made to work under conditions not conducive to good
health; or is made to beg in the streets or public places; or when children are in moral
danger, or exposed to gambling, prostitution, and other vices.

(5) Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a child in whose favor a certification was
issued by the DSWD that he/she is legally available for adoption after the fact of
abandonment or neglect has been proven through the submission of pertinent documents, or
one who was voluntarily committed by his/her parent(s) or legal guardian.
(6) Voluntarily Committed Child is one whose parent(s) or legal guardian knowingly and
willingly relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly accredited child-placement
or child-caring agency or institution.
(7) Child-caring agency or institution refers to a private non-profit or government agency duly
accredited by the DSWD that provides twenty-four (24) hour residential care services for
abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(8) Child-placing agency or institution refers to a private non-profit institution or government
agency duly accredited by the DWSD that receives and processes applicants to become
foster or adoptive parents and facilitate placement of children eligible for foster care or
adoption.
(9) Petitioner refers to the head or executive director of a licensed or accredited child-caring
or child-placing agency or institution managed by the government, local government unit,
non-governmental organization, or provincial, city, or municipal Social Welfare Development
Officer who has actual custody of the minor and who files a certification to declare such child
legally available for adoption, or, if the child is under the custody of any other individual, the
agency or institution does so with the consent of the child's custodian.
(10) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD or his duly authorized representative.
(11) Conspicuous Place shall refer to a place frequented by the public, where by notice of the
petition shall be posted for information of any interested person.
(12) Social Case Study Report (SCSR) shall refer to a written report of the result of an
assessment conducted by a licensed social worker as to the social-cultural economic
condition, psychosocial background, current functioning and facts of abandonment or neglect
of the child. The report shall also state the efforts of social worker to locate the child's
biological parents/relatives.
Section 3. Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts necessary to establish
the merits of the petition and shall state the circumstances surrounding the abandonment or neglect
of the child.
The petition shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Social Case Study Report made by the DSWD, local government unit, licensed or
accredited child-caring or child-placing agency or institution charged with the custody of the
child;
(2) Proof that efforts were made to locate the parent(s) or any known relatives of the child.
The following shall be considered sufficient:

(a) Written certification from a local or national radio or television station that the
case was aired on three (3) different occasions;
(b) Publication in one (1) newspaper of general circulation;
(c) Police report or barangay certification from the locality where the child was found
or a certified copy of a tracing report issued by the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC), National Headquarters (NHQ), Social Service Division, which states that
despite due diligence, the child's parents could not be found; and
(d) Returned registered mail to the last known address of the parent(s) or known
relatives, if any.
(3) Birth certificate, if available; and
(4) Recent photograph of the child and photograph of the child upon abandonment or
admission to the agency or institution.
Section 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. The petition shall be filed in the regional
office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient in form
and substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the petition conspicuous place for five
(5) consecutive days in the locality where the child was found.
The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation not later than five
(5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of his/her
recommendation and records to the Office of the Secretary within forty-eight (48) hours from the
date of the recommendation.
Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. Upon finding merit in the petition, the
Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally available for adoption within seven (7)
working days from receipt of the recommendation.
Said certification, by itself shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local civil
registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil registrar shall
transmit the founding certificate to the National Statistic Office (NSO).
Section 6. Appeal. The decision of the Secretary shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
within five (5) days from receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the same shall be final
and executory.
Section 7. Declaration of Availability for Adoption of Involuntarily Committed Child and
Voluntarily Committed Child. The certificate declaring a child legally available for adoption in
case of an involuntarily committed child under Article 141, paragraph 4(a) and Article 142 of
Presidential Decree No. 603 shall be issued by the DSWD within three (3) months following such
involuntary commitment.
In case of voluntary commitment as contemplated in Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
certification declaring the child legally available for adoption shall be issued by the Secretary within

three (3) months following the filing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment, as signed by the
parent(s) with the DSWD.
Upon petition filed with the DSWD, the parent(s) or legal guardian who voluntarily committed a child
may recover legal custody and parental authority over him/her from the agency or institution to which
such child was voluntarily committed when it is shown to the satisfaction of the DSWD that the
parent(s) or legal guardian is in a position to adequately provide for the needs of the child: Provided,
That, the petition for restoration is filed within (3) months after the signing of the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment.
Section 8. Certification. The certification that a child is legally available for adoption shall be
issued by the DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus making the entire process administrative in
nature.
The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally
available in a domestic adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8552 and in an intercountry adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8043.
Section. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DSWD, together with the Council for
Welfare of Children, Inter-Country Adoption Board, two (2) representatives from licensed or
accredited child-placing and child-caring agencies or institution, National Statistics Office and Office
of the Civil Registrar, is hereby tasked to draft the implementing rules and regulations of this Act
within sixty (60) days following its complete publication.
Upon effectivity of this Act and pending the completion of the drafting of the implementing rules and
regulations, petitions for the issuance of a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption
may be filled with the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.
Section 10. Penalty. The penalty of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person, institution, or agency who shall
place a child for adoption without the certification that the child is legally available for adoption
issued by the DSWD. Any agency or institution found violating any provision of this Act shall have its
license to operate revoked without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of its officers and
employees.
Violation of any provision of this Act shall subject the government official or employee concerned to
appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including suspension and/or dismissal
from the government service and forfeiture of benefits.
Section 11. Repealing Clause. Sections 2(c)(iii), 3(b), (e) and 8(a) of Republic Act No. 8552,
Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 8043, Chapter 1 of Title VII, and VIII of Presidential Decree No. 603
and any law, presidential decree, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or
regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby reprealed, modified or
amended accordingly.
Section 12. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 13. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.

Approved,

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES

Speaker of the House of
Representatives

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2391 and House Bill No. 10 was finally passed by
the Senate and the House of Representatives December 17, 2009.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General
House of Representives

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary of Senate

Approved: MAR 12, 2009

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines