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Documente Cultură
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Varughese v. Mount Sinai Medical Center et al
In Forma Pauperis
LL.IPlaintiff
[ljAppellant/Petitioner
MOVING ATTORNEY:
OPPOSING PARTY:
Defendant
Appellee/Respondent
pending
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------------------------
position on motion:
D Yes llJ No
D Yes llJNo
Sig_n.Lre
or:!~1Jtorney:
---'<-~c:=:J<]~qo...._.~""'-~~--===-=_,,,,_-_Date: 09/06/2015
------ -------
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Varughese v. Mount Sinai Medical Center SDNY 12cv8812, 2nd Cir. 15-1538, is a prima
facie case of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment with torts, and with
questions of violations of FMLA, which was called "a blockbuster lawsuit" as per New York
Post "Mt. Sinai docs drank on job: axed resident" article on December 16, 2012 by Kathianne
Boniello, and see the memorandum of law from the motion to dismiss. Varughese v. Mount Sinai
Medical Center, US Dist Ct, SD NY, 2012 Civ 8812, Not Reported in F. Supp.2d, McMahon, J.,
2013 WL 1385015.
I am a woman physician of Indian Nation Origin. I submitted the motion for in forma
pauperis where I signed an affidavit with the risk of penalty of perjury, I am disbelieved by the
court with reference to marital status as indicated in the motion for in forma pauperis. (Exhibit 1)
I am not married.
declarations to dispel any current false beliefs on our marital status, and on matters that are true
to his personal knowledge with regard to me. (Exhibit 2)
I am unemployed.
I also have
significant student loans 1 in the hundreds of thousands of dollars that are increasing daily with
interest. I recently applied to what seemed to be an excellent opportunity for me but they now
require a letter from "program director" from the former employer, Mount Sinai Medical Center
that I am litigating against2, and again, here is the problem of my being barred from appropriate
employment opportunities because of my civil rights activities and because of wrongful
termination from a former employer.
employer changes the criteria for hiring after I apply, deviating from their standard practices to
exclude me, as recently as in the past three months. I have deposition testimony from Dr. Billie
Fyfe who testified to my "superior" qualification as an employee candidate but I was excluded
because of the Defendants' interferences with prospective business relations, an ongoing tort, by
their refusal to provide my employment records. Varughese v. Mount Sinai Medical Center
12cv8812, electronic document ID 10459039, 10459937, 10465646, submitted 115-1/6, 2015.
The Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted erroneously.
"In
determining whether or not summary judgment is appropriate, we must resolve all ambiguities
and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party." See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), quoting Tolbert v. Smith, 14-1012, 2nd Circuit
June 24, 2015./ Summary judgment must be denied where dispute of genuine material fact can
lead a reasonable jury to return the verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Judges are not to weigh the evidence or
evaluate the credibility of the parties or to make credibility assertions at the summary judgment
Injunction to obtain the record of work where I completed the first 3 years of my residency training in
Anatomic and Clinical Pathology from Mount Sinai Medical Center from a competent professional doctor
in the field, a party other than the involved and named Defendants, such as the current program director,
Adolfo Firpo-Betancourt MD. He was involved in several federal litigation prior to his commencing his
employment at Mount Sinai Medical Center. I was informed that I was on their "final warning" on July
14 or 15, 2011, which is a date that falls within my 4th and final year of my residency, and the program
director at this time was Patrick Lento MD. The Defendants ignored my legal counsels for several
months with regard to my legally protected complaints, as much as they ignored my own legally protected
complaints, until this date, when they alleged that I had been "unprofessional" also known as pretext for
discriminatory conduct, and a pattern with the Defendants in retaliating against me.
stage, that's the jury's duty. id. at 248, 255. Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. School Dist. No. 7,
691 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir.2012). The standard to defend against the summary judgment is not
onerous, and only requires that there are disputes of facts to support the causes of actions on
which the lawsuit was brought are contained in the depositions, evidence, and declarations3 The
U.S. Supreme Courts' prior decisions such as in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144
(1970) "may not have uniformly recited the same language in describing genuine factual issues
under Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the summary judgment stage
the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial" quoting 477 U.S. at 249.
The Defendants did not meet their burden of production. In discrimination cases, the
employers "burden of production" revolves around them articulating non-discriminatory reasons
for termination of the employee by the Defendants having acted in a nondiscriminatory manner,
such as treating comparators as equals.
genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some
employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from Young's. In other words,
Young created a genuine dispute of material fact as to the fourth prong of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis." Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 575 U.S., 2015 U.S.
L.E.X.I.S. 2121 (2015) at 1355.
protected class but employees whose situation or duties cannot be reasonably distinguished from
mme.
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questions of discriminatory practice by employer such as with "Evidence relating to companywide practices may reveal patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing the
likelihood that an employer's offered explanation for an employment decision regarding a
particular individual masks a discriminatory motive." quoting Hollander v. American Cyanamid
Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 -85 (2nd Cir.1990).
12cv8812, the discovery was voluminous but not broad as it should have been, because it was
severely limited with Magistrate Francis's rulings on discovery to limit key elements such as
various comparator performance records 4 , in addition, to lack of the court's action with issues
with delays in production and the ongoing redactions and removal of various pieces of key
evidence, and spoliation, relating to evidence on retaliation and hostile work environment, as
well as problems with my own legal counsel with regards to his unethical conduct during the
proceedings of my case. (Varughese v Mount Sinai Medical Center et al 12cv8812, electronic
record of docket prior to Motion for Summary Judgment).
4 I have considered this particularly troubling because Magistrate Francis was informed by Rory McEvoy
that I had no performance issues at the meet and confer on July 11, 2012.
McDonnell Douglas ruling set the standard for indirect legal testing for discrimination in
cases of pretext, meaning appearance of neutral reasons, as masking the unlawful discrimination
against the Plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.
2d 668 (1973).
observed in my case, to ignore the disputes of factual issues and equivocate these factual
elements to attack the character and reputation of the Plaintiff at the summary judgment stage or
any other stage in litigation. Varughese v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 12-CV-8812, 2015 WL
1499618, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015).
Invariably, pretext consists of "circumstantial evidence" such as timelines, the
inconsistencies and shifting reasons for termination or the Plaintiff becoming a "moving target"
as reasons for termination and adverse employment actions are refuted with evidence by
Plaintiff, the implausibility of Defendants' explanations weighed against the Plaintiff's evidence,
are various methods that allow for dealing with the impermissible problem of bigotry,
discrimination, and retaliation in American workplaces5 as alleged in lawsuits. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133 (2000), Postal Service Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 714, n. 3 (1983). In 2003, the US Supreme Court ruled on a mixedmotive discrimination case, where it "recognized that evidence that a defendant's explanation for
an employment practice is "unworthy of credence" is "one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination."" 530 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added). "The reason for
treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: "Circumstantial
5 Proof of Pretext: A Review of case authority and strategy from a plaintiff's perspective By John F.
Beasley, 2011 at htt.p://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor law/meetings/2011/
ac2011103 3 .authcheckdam.pdf
evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than
direct evidence." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 508, n. 17 (1957)" quoting
from Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003) with
internal citations and quotations included.
In my case, I defended the motion for summary judgment with an extensive review of the
documents with exhaustive listing and referencing of documents, depositions, and declarations to
meet the standard required to rebut the paltry evidence proffered by Defendants to support their
obviously farcical, unbelievable, defense that their pre-textual conduct was not motivated by
racism, bigotry, sexism, retaliation, and unlawful ill motives and I preserved the objections to
affidavits and submissions by Defendants for appeals.
overwhelming evidence of fraud against me prompted me to also write to the court to meet with
me, with the Defendant's lawyers6, with specific issues in mind with regard to my case, an
attorney would have been given this audience, but as a pro se Plaintiff, I was not. In the sum of
text and decisions of the summary judgment, I was not provided with any injunctive and
declaratory relief? but further denigrated.
Judge McMahon failed to recognize me as a reasonable person with my filing the Motion
in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
admissible on a number of grounds for a trial, these should give rise to the inference of
discrimination, and the evidence of retaliation, and hostile workplace as it has sufficiently
responded to any of the Defendants motion for summary judgment. The Defendant Institution
In the course of this litigation, I requested several meetings with the court, but not ex parte meetings, to
discuss my concerns with regard to the egregious conduct of my former employer against me but that was
not granted. see footnote 3.
6
see footnote 2
was a workplace where I was threatened with physical violence, verbally abused, subjected to
nonstandard working conditions, subjected to derogatory comments by leadership personnel
since 2009, the Defendants' various false allegations against me amounting to adverse
employment action immediately started following the incidents in December 2010, despite the
admissions of guilt by the perpetrator, Samuel McCash about his conduct (whether Filipino or
Caucasian or both, he is squarely outside of my protected class), speaking to the Caucasian
Adrienne Jordan was apparently considered a problem even though no one asked me not to speak
to her but she was informed that she was not to speak to me, Jordan was promoted, despite being
less qualified than me to a materially advantageous position, my work was sabotaged, my
reviews were based on the conduct of others not in my protected class, who were harassing me,
rather than the fact that I did all my work without error, culminating to at least 15,000 patient
cases over the years that I was employed by the Defendant Institution, the fact that my legal
counsels were ignored by the Defendants, and the fact that other coworkers who were not in my
protected class and who were engaged in far more egregious and detrimental conduct were not
reprimanded at all. Varughese v. Mount Sinai Medical Center 12cv8812, Electronic document ID
10459039, 10459937, 10465646 submitted 1/05-1/06/2015.
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In addition, there were also unjustified allegations made to appear as though I only made
conclusory statements in the Rule 56 statement of facts, which if one were to review the Rule 56
statements of facts and/or submitted declarations, it is obvious that this allegation is untrue and
unjustified.
Defendants alleging there are conclusory statements made by Plaintiff does not
remove the burden of production or demerit a prima facie case of discrimination as "it is not
enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a
conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). at 328.
his article for American Bar Association about evidence of pretext used as proof of
discrimination, " ... the Supreme Court has articulated some broad categories: instances in which
persons outside the protected class were treated better; the treatment the plaintiff received while
employed; other acts of discrimination and responses to other legitimate civil rights activities ...
and best or better practices that may have avoided discrimination .. .implausible or fantastic
justifications (see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338-39 (2003)(quoting Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765 (1995))(in the context of jury selection); and qualifications evidence as an
additional level of comparator scrutiny (Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006))."8
In addition, I submitted direct evidence of discrimination through documentary evidence such as
incidents of name calling, relevant derogatory commentary, and relevant directed specific acts
accompanied by the smoking gun statement such as it's because "she is" a woman of Indian
Origin who is making things "ugly" making legally protected complaints, and direct reference to
my gender as "female" as an instructional on the expectations of me by named Defendants and
other high level proxies for the Defendant Institution. Varughese v. Mount Sinai Medical Center
12cv8812, Electronic document ID 10459039, 10459937, 10465646, submitted 1/5 - 1/6/2015.
With regards to the termination letter from Defendants on September 21, 2011, I could
not voice my concerns about these specific issues because I was not informed about many of the
listed issues during my employment as an issue for termination, or if I expressed my concern,
then I was "unprofessional" is an infringement on my employment rights. Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984). It was well known that I contested my grievances directly
with the Defendants with regard to unlawful treatment and unlawful discrimination and on any
matter that concerned my employment, so the Defendants also intentionally segregated me from
important meetings, and threatened me directly during meetings where I made protected
complaints.
discrimination and EEO violations that the courts have allowed to proliferate to the detriment of
minorities and women.
minorities, minority women, and other protected classes of people, all reasonable United States
citizens, as we do our jobs in a workplace that is very polarized by race and gender, the
corporation is representative of Caucasian interests from Boards of Trustees to administrative
personnel with minimal minority representation, if any, and so where even in cases of egregious
unlawful conduct, the specific Caucasians and the Caucasian organization cannot be held
accountable to the law or intent of the law in largely Caucasian courts, to afford people like me
the legal protections from harm and inequitable attacks on our prosperity and freedoms. It's as if
my success is seen as a personal failure for the larger Caucasian population, not just the
Defendants who likely fear my success in my profession after all the obviously false allegations
they made to pretextually terminate my employment , destroy my reputation, and end my career
through unlawful discrimination against me.
The concepts of equality are logical, sound, and rational, yet it's impossible to engage in
a reasonable manner on issues of importance to minorities, as seen with the events during the
course of my employment with Defendants, and during this litigation.
stated that the reasons for the termination of my employment consisted of the six specific reasons
that they provided in the termination letter, I successfully rebutted the Defendants proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination of my employment, meeting the standard required to
succeed at the summary judgment stage. The court is incomprehensibly arguing that it can cast
aspersions on my character and employment performance by comparing myself to myself, rather
than comparing my performance to others not in my protected class. Judge McMahon is arguing,
and not with subtlety, that I need be a "model minority"9 to enjoy legal protections, not that I
need to be like others not in my protected class 10 I cannot meet standards of the unrealistic
discriminatory ideologies of perfection expected of Asian minorities by courts and whites, as the
defense against discrimination in hostile courts in prima facie cases litigated under Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the New York State Human Rights Law or NYC Human Rights Law
at any stage of the litigation11,l2.
Cheryan, Sapna, and Galen V. Bodenhausen. "When positive stereotypes threaten intellectual
performance: The psychological hazards of "model minority" status." Psychological Science 11.5 (2000):
399-402.
10 Suzuki, Bob H. "Revisiting the model minority stereotype: Implications for student affairs practice and
higher education." New directions for student services 2002.97 (2002): 21-32.
11 Bijlani, Jagdish J. "Neither here nor there: Creating a legally and politically distinct South Asian racial
identity." Berkeley La Raza LJ 16 (2005): 53 at 58, 60-63.
Dhingra, Pawan H. "Being American Between Black and White: Second-Generation Asian American
Professionals' Racial Identities." Journal ofAsian American Studies 6.2 (2003): 117-147 at 132-133.
12
The evidence that I presented to defend my case, when weighed against the moving party,
the Defendants, it is impossible to have awarded the summary judgment to the defendants and I
preserved many objections for appeals as a litigant.
challenge by submitting evidence in the form of genuine factual issues "that can be resolved only
by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party" 477 U.S. at
251. "Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. This conclusion is mandated
by the nature of this determination. The question here is whether a jury could reasonably find
either that the plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the
governing law or that he did not". quoting Liberty Lobby., Inc., 477 U.S. at 254.
Judge
McMahon's decision also contained de novo allegations that are farcical and untrue, and then,
she "flipped out" that she does not want me to appeal, because of these ongoing fraudulent
actions against me, that the Circuit Court will find shocking and impermissible. To be sure,
Judge McMahon's analysis of the evidence, disputes of fact, and application to the causes of
action were wrong in Varughese v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 12-CV-8812, 2015 WL 1499618,
at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015), as was her labeling me "lazy", which the records clearly argues
against, as well.
I think that the federal courts act to normalize segregated systems 13 where I, a woman
physician oflndian National Origin, a professional with extensive education who is licensed with
New York State Department of Health, with years of training in Anatomic and Clinical
Wei, Virginia W. "Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to
Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin." BCL Rev. 37
(1995): 771at780-812
13
Pathology, can be callously subjected to the "ire" of coworkers who routinely consume alcohol at
work contrary to hospital rules with leftover alcohol at work for them on standby, the creation of
false allegations against me by my supervisors that when contested was met with allegations that
I am "unprofessional", where I am disciplined for the conduct of others and even with updated
knowledge of their involvement and their admissions of guilt, the Defendants continued to
fabricate various allegations against me, I am excluded from certain material advantages with
increased pay and responsibilities, rather I am marginalized through whatever means they can
employ, my accounting of the events that occurred to me are unjustifiably criticized and my
statements and I am again described as "unprofessional" 14 because I do not take responsibility
for actions of the guilty parties, and I am subjected to further "final warnings" that are
disciplinary actions, and in closed meetings, I felt a degree of threat against my person with the
demeanor, threatening language and tone of the individual Defendants and it's specific proxies
that had been an ongoing theme of terror for me as a petite woman who is 5ft1 in and 110-116lbs,
and my professional medical license is put into jeopardy and though, I am in good standing, I am
excluded from every job, and my professional career beyond residency are going to be filled with
long discussions on the events of the wrongful termination of my contracted employment, these
are illegal activities given the protections afforded in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 per
Hishon v. King & Spalding. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
14 Professionalism and the medical professional's code of conduct is a specific criteria, the definition of
which is provided in the Motion in Opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
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As discussed above and in my previously filed motion for pro bono counsel, I have a
meritorious and important case that I can argue effectively as a Pro Se litigant 15 or with the
assistance of a pro bono counsel who is knowledgable, intelligent, ethical/professional,
experienced, capable, and preferably, a labor and civil rights attorney. In federal courts with
employment civil rights cases, there is a significant issue of inadequate legal representation
available to professional minorities and Asian American Plaintiffs 16, despite our cases being
meritorious on both substantive questions of law and the relief sought from litigation on
egregious violations of our civil rights protections by private parties. I do not want the current
trend of underrepresentation by legal counsels of professional minorities such as myself, through
no fault of mine, to disadvantage me from a case management and mediation program known as
Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) in the Second Circuit that is currently unavailable to
Pro Se litigants 17 . Alternatively, if the court cannot afford to waive the fees for me and/or it does
not assign me with a pro bono counsel, I will borrow the money to pay the fee and proceed with
the appeals from that point onwards.
15 Rosenbloom, Jonathan D. "Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases:
A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York." Fordham urban law journal 30.305
(2002). There is no extensive research to support the prevailing notion of negative effect of pro se
litigants in the courts and there is evidence that represented case are more time consuming and had the
most docket entries at 312-314, 358-359
16 Myrick, Amy, Robert L. Nelson, and Laura Beth Nielson. "Race and representation: racial disparities in
legal representation for employment civil rights plaintiffs." NYUJ Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 15 (2012): 705 at
712-715
17 Laural L. Hooper, Dean Miletich, and Angelia Levy. Case management procedures in the Federal
Courts of Appeals. Washington, DC: Federal Judicial Center, 2011 at 37-41.
Exhibit 1
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--
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v.
Afwv{:
Instructions
Signed:L ~
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Date: _ _ _
1.
For both you and your spouse estimate the average amount of money received.from each
of the following sources during the past 12 months. Adjust any amount that was received
weekly, biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate. Use
gross amounts, that is, amounts before any deductions for taxes or otherwise.
Income source
Average monthly
amount during the past
12 months
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monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.)
Employer
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employment
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monthly pay
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3.
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4.
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Below, state any money you or your spouse have in bank accounts or in any other
financial institution.
Financial Institution
Type of Account
Amount your
spouse has
qyou are a prisoner seeking to appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding, you must
attach a statement certified by the appropriate institutional officer showing all receipts,
expenditures, and balances during the last six months in your institutional accounts. Ifyou
have multiple accounts, perhaps because you have been in multiple institutions, attach one
certified statement of each account.
5.
List the assets, and their values, which you own or your spouse owns. Do not list clothing
and ordinary householdfurnishings.
Home
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Motor vehicle #1
(Value)$
(Value)$
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6.
State every person, business, or organization owing you or your spouse money, and the
amount owed
7.
State the persons who rely on you or your spouse for support.
8.
Relationship
Age
Estimate the average monthly expenses ofyo11 and your family. Show separately the
amounts paid by your spouse. Adjust any payments that are made weekly, biweekly,
quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate.
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----- ----
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Other:
Taxes (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage
payments) (specify):
Installment payments
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Other:
Other (specify):
Motor Vehicle:
----~-------------
--- ---
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9.
so
Do you expect any major changes to your monthly income or expenses or in your assets
or liabilities during the next 12 months?
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10.
Have you spent- or will youl''fpenl'nJ-any money for expenses or attorney fees in
connection with this lawsuit?
Yes
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11.
Provide any other information that will help explain why you cannot pay the docket fees
for your appeal.
12.
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#9. I have student loans that have been compounding interest for extensive periods of
time on which I cannot afford to make a payment. I have tried to obtain various
employment in my profession and I cannot because of the illegal actions of the
Defendants to destroy my career and employability in my profession through falsified
allegations, discrimination, retaliation, and hostility towards me for being a woman of
Indian descent, and engaging in legally protected activity.
-----------~
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Exhibit 2
13. I recommend immediate injunctive relief be granted to Dr. Varughese so she can advance in
her chosen profession, obtain her Board certifications, and begin practicing. The State of NY
has investigated Dr. Varughese and they found no evidence of wrongdoing on her part, after
multiple investigations. Dr. Varughese has a valid NY State medical license and NY State
has apologized to her and they have encouraged her to fmd gainful employment immediately
to mitigate her losses.
14. In my opinion, it is in the interest of the federal government and public that Dr. Varughese
completes the final year of her residency program in Anatomic and Clinical Pathology with
an organization other than her former employer, because she was obviously wrongfully
terminated after she completed the labor intensive Anatomic Pathology work for Mount
Sinai Medical Center in NewYork, NY.
Rajit B. Malliah MD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
et al
Exhibits 1, 2
Hand delivery
on the following parties (complete all information and add additional pages as necessary):
Rory McEvoy
NY
NY
Name
Address
City
State
Zip Code
Name
Address
City
State
Zip Code
Name
Address
City
State
Zip Code
Name
Address
City
State
Zip Code
September 6, 2015
Today's Date
10174
*If different methods of service have been used on different parties, please indicate on a separate
page, the type of service used for each respective party.