72156-2 Evacuation and Ventilation

KOTI Korea Transportation Institute
Metropolitan Express
Railway
Evacuation and ventilation
November 2009
COWI A/S
Parallelvej 2
DK-2800 Kongens Lyngby
Denmark
Tel +45 45 97 22 11
Fax +45 45 97 22 12
www.cowi.com
KOTI Korea Transportation Institute
Seoul Metropolitan Express

Railway
Evacuation and ventilation
November 2009
Document no.
72156-2
Version
1.0
Date of issue
2009-11-23
Prepared
JK/MF
Checked
PON
Approved
PON
Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation
Table of Contents
1
Introduction
Summary and conclusion
Basis - project description
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Safety considerations, general

Qualitative risk analysis
Risk acceptance
International standards
Train fires
ALARP principle
10
10
11
11
12
15
5
5.1
Ventilation considerations - general

Tunnel ventilation system
17
17
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
Basic option
Description of the option
Tunnel ventilation
Safety consideration incl. evacuation
19
19
20
22
Option: Emergency corridor with frequent

access
Tunnel ventilation
26
26
27
29
Option: Short distance between ventilation

shafts
Tunnel ventilation
31
31
32
34
7.1
7.2
7.3
8
8.1
8.2
8.3
P:\57050Z\188 (Korea deep railway tunnel)\Report Evac and Vent\72156-2 Evacuation and ventilation.docx
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
Option: Dividing wall

Tunnel ventilation
37
37
39
41
10
Comparison
44
11
References
48
Introduction
SUNJIN is performing feasibility studies of the Seoul Metropolitan Express

Railway. In relation to these studies SUNJIN has commissioned COWI to recommend on evacuation facilities on the basis of information of the envisaged
tunnel layout, train vehicle, expected size of fire etc. Furthermore SUNJUIN
has commissioned COWI to recommend on the tunnel ventilation including
distance between emergency shafts and size of ventilation.
The evacuation facilities and the tunnel ventilation are closely related. Hence,
the present report provides the results of both studies.
The basis for the work carried out is described in section 3.
General considerations regarding safety including evacuation and regarding
ventilation are presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
On the basis of these general considerations it seems relevant to consider modifications to the present design by SUNJIN, which is referred to as the "Basic
option". In this option the passengers will in an emergency escape to emergency shelters below the tracks.
The modifications lead to the following alternative options:
Emergency corridor with frequent access

This concept is based on the principle that passengers in an emergency situation escape to a corridor (safe area) under the railway tracks. The corridor leads to emergency exit shafts. Via these emergency exit shafts it is
possible to go to the ground surface.
Short distance between ventilation shafts

In this concept it is assumed that there are sufficient exhaust ventilation
shafts to make escape possible via the walkways at track level.
Dividing wall
In this concept it is assumed that the two railway tracks are separated by a
fire proof dividing wall. The dividing wall has emergency doors at close
distance. This concept will require a larger tunnel diameter than in the other options.
The basic option and the modifications are considered in sections 6, 7, 8 and 9,
respectively covering:
A description of the option
Ventilation
Safety considerations including evacuation

A comparison of the options considered is provided in section 10.
Summary and conclusion
COWI has regarding safety and ventilation considered the basic option as
well as some modified options for the Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway.
The accident considered is a train on fire stopped in the tunnel. The conclusion
is, that the concept is not so much governed by considerations of ventilation
system capacity, as by considerations of safe passenger evacuation and safe
access for the fire brigade.
The basic option with a two track tunnel has been considered. This option
can in theory, with a distance of maximum 500 m between entrances to safe
spaces in shelters, fulfill international standards. This concept is however depending on a satisfactory detailing of the access to the shelters and of the shelters themselves (they need to accommodate a lot of passengers and the width of
the access seems to be limited to less than required in international standards).
In addition to the shelters we have considered a distance of 2500 m between
shafts for fire brigade access (and evacuation of passengers not going to the
shelters) and 1250 between ventilation shafts. This is deemed a satisfactory solution for fire brigade safety and safety of other trains in the tunnel even
though the more shafts the better.
According to the information we have received, the passenger density in the
system is very high. This means that evacuation time may be too long even
though the width of the walkways in the tunnel fulfills normal standard requirements. The evacuation time should be studied using appropriate models
such as EXODUS, as opposed to the very rough estimates that could be included in this report.
In order to suggest on some improvements to the basic concept we have considered three modified options:
Option: Emergency corridor with frequent access

Option: Short distance between ventilation shafts
Emergency corridor
We think that the use of an emergency corridor below the tracks rather than
shelters is a better solution, as it allows the passengers to evacuate completely
from the tunnel rather than having so many passengers waiting in a relatively
congested space during an emergency situation. By frequent access to the

emergency corridor the evacuation time is reduced.
The concept is depending on a satisfactory detailing of the access to the emergency corridor. (The width of the access seems to be limited to less than required in international standards).
Short distance between ventilation shafts
The use of closely spaced ventilation exhaust shafts (500 m distance) rather
than emergency exits relies on very accurate knowledge of the location of the
train on fire. It is vulnerable to wrong operation or malfunction of the ventilation system in an emergency situation. Also it is noted that this option will formally not meet international standards, as walking past a ventilation exhaust
shaft can hardly be considered to provide the same safety as walking into a
shelter. Finally the access of the fire brigade in this option is more complex
than in the other two options considered above.
The advantage of this option is that the passengers need not use the space below the tracks, which would require complicated design of stairs etc.
Dividing wall
In general it can be said that two track tunnels are more difficult than single
track tunnels to operate in a safe and fail-proof way that ensures that the smoke
during a fire does not endanger passengers, fire brigade or other trains in the
tunnel.
This means that we see the option with a dividing wall as an improvement, as it
allows the tunnel to work as two single track tunnels with unidirectional traffic.
Also this option has advantages regarding fire brigade access, which, due to the
larger tunnel diameter, is possible in the space under the track and independent
of the traffic tunnels.
The design of the fire brigades access from this space to the tracks will have to
be further studied in order to finally establish whether this solution is feasible.
This tunnel option can be constructed without shafts between the stations. This
means that the additional costs, due to the bigger tunnel diameter necessary in
order to contain the dividing wall, will more or less be compensated by the savings of having no shafts.
Conclusion
The basic option can fulfill normal international standards provided that the
shelters or emergency corridors and access to them can be designed satisfactory
for this big number of train passengers. We think there is considerable uncertainty regarding this point. Furthermore the time required for safe evacuation
may be too long.
The option with a diving wall is considered to be the best from a safety point of
view. This option is therefore recommend if there are no or only insignificant
additional costs involved compared to the other options. Even if the additional
costs are larger, this option should be preferred, as long as the additional costs
are not disproportionate with the value of the reduction in risk.
We hope that the description and evaluation of ventilation concept and evacuation facilities provided in this report for the "basic option" and three modified
options will provide a valuable basis for the feasibility study for Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway.
Basis - project description
There are several proposals for the alignment of the Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway. For the purpose of this report we have been looking at the
alignment from Song-do (new development area at Incheon) to Cheong-ryangri (North of the Seoul City Centre), please see the illustration on the next page.
The information on the considered system has been received through drawings,
sketches, questions and answers exchanged in e-mail correspondence with
SUNJIN.
Alignment and stations
The planned express railway system is all underground and with underground
stations. Distance between stations varies between 2.9 km and 9.3 km. The stations are closest in the city centre and more distant around Incheon. On the
Cheong-ryang-ri to Song-do express railway line, which is approximately 50
km long, there are 9 stations. The stations will be highest standard and
equipped with platform screen doors.
The tunnels are typically located at a depth of 30 50 meters below ground surface.
Rolling stock
The trains for the express railway system are expected to be electrical trains
with overhead catenary.
138 m long (6 carriages each 23 m long)
Train cross section area 7.8 m2
Speed 200 km/h
Pressure tightness coefficient =15 sec corresponding to a train with excellent sealing.
Number of passengers in each train: 898 man (Entrainment rate: 100%) to

1,140 man (Entrainment rate: 150%)
Design train fire 15 MW.
10
Safety considerations, general
4.1
Qualitative risk analysis
As part of the basis of the design of an underground railway system, the risk to
the passengers shall be identified, such that appropriate precautions can be taken against these risks. A brief identification is carried out here, pointing on the
following risks to the passengers of the Metropolitan Express Railway:
Risks when moving or standing inside stations including station platforms
Risks when moving to and from the trains on station platforms
Risk in the trains not related to train accidents (e.g. stumbling when moving in the train or falling as the train brakes)
Risks related to train accidents including:

-
Train collision
Train derailment
Train hitting obstacle on the track
Train fire
Train fire caused by other accidents
Fire in tunnel and station installations
Explosion in a train (sabotage)
Collapse of structures
In general the risk is reduced to an acceptable level as follows:
Prevention of the occurrence of the accidents
11
Mitigation of the accidents consequences including among others:

-
Evacuation of the passengers
Intervention by the fire brigade including rescue of passengers and fire

fighting
For the design of evacuation and rescue facilities the fire accidents are of most
concern, as the time aspects here are very important. These accidents will also
be a major contribution to the overall risk of the train passengers. Hence train
fires are the focus of this report.
Train fires following accidents can have even larger consequences than train
fires not caused by such other accidents, as passengers may be injured in the
initial accidents and therefore not able to escape from the fire. Furthermore in
train collisions there will be two trains involved, such that number of passengers having to escape will be approximately doubled. However, it follows from
the list of tunnel fires presented in Ref. /4/ that there are recorded very few of
such fires (since 1980 only the derailment 13. Jan. 1982 in the Washington DC
underground railway/metro; some more in the earlier records).
Hence only a fire in a single train, stopped in the tunnel between stations, is
considered in this report. This accident is further discussed in section 4.3.
4.2
Risk acceptance
An acceptable level of risk in an underground railway system may include the

following elements:
Design of the tunnel according to applicable codes and standards.

Requirements from international standards related to evacuation and rescue
are presented in section 4.3.
Establishing of risk acceptance criteria and documentation that these are

met by means of quantitative risk analysis.
The general consideration of fire accidents in section 4.4 may be considered as a first small step in this process.
Risk reduction is implemented according to the ALARP principle, see section 4.5.
4.3
International standards
A brief review of major international standards for railway tunnels has been
carried out regarding requirements to escape routes and access of the fire brigade. The standards covered are:
12
The American NFPA 130 (Ref. /1/)

The Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Union (Ref. /2/)
The code 779-9 of UIC (the International Union of Railways, ref. /3/)
The results are shown in the table below. It is noted that if cross passages are
provided, then it is not required also to have exits to open air. It is further noted
that UIC 779-9 indicates that the requirements for width of access routes is only
for single bore tunnels (one or two tracks). In UIC 779-9 it is indicated that the
safety measures are to be seen as guidelines but not as strict rules.
Width of walkways
Paragraph
Height of walkways
Paragraph
Distance between cross passages
Paragraph
Distance between exits
Paragraph
Width of escape doors
Paragraph
Height of escape doors
Paragraph
Width of cross passages
Paragraph
Height of cross passages
Paragraph
Width of escape stairs
Paragraph
Width of access routes
Paragraph
Table 4-1
4.4
NFPA 130 2001/16/ UIC 779-9

EC
0.76
0.75
0.7
6.2.1.11
4.2.2.7
I-40
2.25
4.2.2.7
244
500
500
6.2.2.3
4.2.2.6.4
I-43
762
1000
1000
6.2.2.2
4.2.2.6.3
I-43
1.4
4.2.2.2.6.3&4
2.0
4.2.2.2.6.3&4
1.12
1.5
2.25
6.2.2.3.2
4.2.2.2.6.4
I-46
2.1
2.25
2.25
6.2.2.3.2
4.2.2.2.6.4
I-46
1.2
I-44
2.25
2.25
4.2.2.11
I-45
Requirements in international standards for railway tunnels
Train fires
The risk from train fires is generally reduced by the following measures:
Minimizing the amount of flammable material in the trains. As explained

in section 3 it is understood that the maximum size of fire will be 15 MW.
The trains will be equipped with fire extinguishers, such that minor fires
inside the train may be extinguished. (Our assumption in accordance with
current practice).
13
Any train on fire will attempt to drive to the next station if at all possible,
as the risk to the passengers will be much less, when the train is stopped
here, than if the train should stop in the tunnel. (Our assumption in accordance with current practice).
There will be fire detectors on the trains, such that a fire will be detected
early. This will improve the possibilities of the train on fire reaching a station. (Our assumption in accordance with current practice).
In spite of these precautions, a train on fire may stop in the tunnel between stations. This is the situation which is considered further in this report, as this accident scenario will be governing for the safety design of the tunnels.
The critical issues in the event of such an accident are:
The passengers shall be able to escape from the burning train to a safe location (self rescue of the passengers). Here the capacity of the evacuation
routes and the distance to the safe location is of concern.
Passengers of other trains in the same tunnel shall be protected against the
smoke from the burning train, either by the train driving out of the tunnel
or by the ventilation system ensuring fresh air to these other trains. A situation where passengers from other trains than the burning train will have to
evacuate in a smoke-filled tunnel should be avoided.
The fire brigade has good access to the accident location, such that they
can rescue passengers not able to escape and fight the fire.
Comments to the above points:

Passenger escape
The adequacy of the means for passenger escape should be investigated as

follows:
The fire accidents scenario is established including the number of passengers in the train, the fire curve, how far the fire is developed, when the
train stops, the time from train stop till evacuation of the passengers is established and the envisaged operation of the emergency ventilation.
The smoke spread and resulting temperatures in the tunnel are established.
The escape of the passengers is modeled using appropriate models such as

EXODUS.
Comparison of the above results to establish whether passengers will be

able to reach safe areas before being seriously affected by smoke and/or
high temperatures.
This work is part of the risk analysis work mentioned in section 4.2.
14
Here a very rough and simplistic calculation of evacuation time has been carried out using the method prescribed in NFPA 130, Ref. /1/, for documenting
the adequacy of escape routes from station platforms. In order to be able to use
this method in the tunnel the following simplifications have been made:
The escape from the train to the walkway along the train has not been considered.
The prescribed deduction of 300 mm sidewalls and 460 mm at open platform edges has not been taken into account, as this would reduce the width
of the walkway to be used in the calculation to close to zero.
The numbers from NFPA used in the very rough calculation of evacuation time
are:
Other trains
Capacity of walkway: 0.0819 persons per mm and minute
Capacity of stairs: 0.0555 persons per mm and minute
Travel speed at walkway: 38 m/minute.

(This is a low value, which presumably reflects the reduced speed in a
crowded situation).
Travel speed at stairs: 15 m/min

To be used for the horizontal length of the stairs
Trains on the same track as the train on fire:
A train ahead of the burning train will continue to the next station
A train behind the burning train will have to stop. It may drive backwards
to the station from where it came, but reversing the train traffic may take
some time. Possibly, the fire may burn down the catenary overhead line
before this is done.
If the tunnel contains only a single track, then air flow will be in direction
of the running trains and thus preventing smoke from reaching the train
behind the burning train. This direction of the air flow will be maintained
by the ventilation systems, such that the passengers can escape in smokefree air, if it is not possible to drive the train back to the previous station.
In case of a tunnel with two tracks, as is the case here, there will be no distinct airflow protecting a train behind the burning train. A longitudinal
ventilation system is not suitable for protecting the train in this situation, as
it may adversely affect trains in the other track on the opposite side of the
fire. The train may be protected if smoke can be extracted at a location between the burning train and the stopped train.
15
Trains on the other track:
A train, that has passed the burning train, will continue to the next station.
For a train, that has not yet passed the burning train, may attempt to drive
past the burning train, but this may be dangerous, as the fire may burn
down the catenary overhead line, stopping the train close to the fire. If the
passengers have already started evacuation from the burning train, driving
past the burning train is not an option.
If the train instead is stopped, then it may drive back to the station from
where it came, but as described above this may be prevented by the burning down of the catenary overhead line. A stopped train may be protected
if smoke can be extracted at a location between the burning train and the
stopped train.
Access for the fire

brigade
The access of the fire brigade in a railway tunnel may generally be by one of
the following means:
Through a station or emergency access shaft and then along the tunnel.
Movement in the tunnel may be along an emergency walkway or along the
tracks by means of a small trolley, which is located in a room at the stations and in the bottom of the emergency shafts.
Using an emergency train. Emergency trains located at each end of the line
would not be able to drive to the scene of the accidents, due to the trains
stopped in the system in an emergency. Having an emergency train located
at a side track at each station would be a very costly option.
Using dedicated vehicles driving in a space underneath the tracks. This

option has to our knowledge not been used previously for railway tunnels,
but it has been used for road tunnels. It is considered for the option with a
dividing wall, see section 9.3.3.
4.5
ALARP principle
The ALARP principle (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) was established in

the UK for design of nuclear power plants, Ref. /5/. The principle is illustrated
in Figure 4-1. At the top of the figure, above the risk acceptance criteria mentioned in section 4.2, is the unacceptable region, where the risk shall be reduced
regardless of the costs. In the bottom of the figure is the broad acceptable region. Risks falling in this region need little attention, as indicated in the figure.
In between is the ALARP region. Here additional safety measures shall be implemented unless the costs are disproportionate with the risk reduction
achieved.
16
High risk
Unacceptable
region
Tolerable only if risk reduction is

impracticable or if its cost is
grossly in disproportion to the
improvement gained
ALARP/
ALARA
region:
Tolerable if cost of reduction would

exceed the improvements gained
Broadly
acceptable
region Negligible risk
Figure 4-1
Risk is intolerable and cannot be

justified even in extraordinary
circumstances
No need for detailed studies. Check

that risk maintains at this level
ALARP principle
17
Ventilation considerations - general
The ventilation consists of the following systems:

Tunnel ventilation system, which has the following purpose:
During normal as well as congested operation, to obtain acceptable environmental conditions for the passengers in the trains.
In case of fire in the tunnel, to control the smoke either by longitudinal

ventilation (tunnels with single track) or by local smoke extraction (tunnels
with two tracks) in order to enable the passengers to escape and the fire
brigade to approach the scene of the fire.
During maintenance and repair works in the tunnel to ensure an acceptable

working environment,
Pressurization systems, which have the following purpose:
5.1
During fire accidents to ensure smoke-free escape routes via the escape
corridor, the shelters and the stairs. In the option with dividing wall, to ensure smoke-free corridor under the tracks for fire brigade approach to the
scene of the fire.
Tunnel ventilation system
5.1.1 Environmental conditions

In railway tunnels with single tracks the piston effect created by the trains will
normally be sufficient to obtain acceptable environmental conditions in the
tunnel.
Only during congested operation or trains stopped in the tunnel, it will be necessary to supply fresh air to the tunnel.
In the "Basic option" trains are running in both directions in the same tunnel
tube. This will influence the air movements and the accumulation of heat and
creation of piston effects (air exchange in tunnel) to an extent that will require a
thorough study. The train time schedule, the location and size of ventilation
shafts, openings to stations etc. influence the piston effect. We suggest use of a
18
1-dimensional simulation program, e.g. SES).

Therefore it may be necessary, in this case, to supply fresh air both during normal as well as congested operation.
5.1.2 Emergency conditions (Fire in the tunnel)

In case of fire in the tunnel the ventilation system shall be able to control the
smoke in order to ensure smoke-free escape routes for passenger evacuation.
In tunnels with one track, longitudinal ventilation is normally used to obtain the
critical velocity in the tunnel tube and thereby prevent backlayering of smoke.
As it is possible to have other trains trapped behind the burning train, the preferred ventilation direction is in the train direction. This will make smoke-free
escape routes behind the burning train.
In tunnels with two tracks ("Basic option"), longitudinal ventilation cannot be
used, as there may be trains trapped both ahead of the burning train (in the other track) and behind it.
Therefore, a semi-transverse ventilation system, with extraction at certain
points and supply from the one end of the tunnel section, shall be used.
5.1.3 Pressurization system

The pressurization system is not used during normal conditions. Only during
emergency conditions the escape corridor, the shelters and the stairs will be
pressurized to supply fresh air and avoid smoke ingress during the evacuation.
19
Basic option
6.1
The cross section of the basic option is single tube tunnel with two railway
tracks. The tunnel has an internal diameter of 11.060 m.
The tunnel is equipped with ventilation as described below. The jet fans are
used as supplementary fans for the tunnel ventilation.
On each side of the two railway tracks there is a 0.8 m wide emergency walkway.
Jet fans
Walkway
Walkway
Ventilation of
emergency shelter
Utilities
Shelter
Figure 6-1
Cross section of basic option
20
In an emergency situation the trains can be evacuated via the emergency walkway to the evacuation shaft. Furthermore under the tracks there are shelters
which are accessible through emergency hatches located between the railway
tracks.
The shelters can resist the design fire. They are equipped with a separate system for fresh air supply and they have signboards with instructions for evacuated passengers. Also they are equipped with intercom and cameras connected to the railway system control center, so the passengers will be able to
communicate with the staff of the control center in an emergency situation.
The distance between big shafts, i.e. shafts with both stairs and ventilation is
assumed to be 2500 m. This distance is chosen as a reasonable distance for fire
brigade emergency access for the tunnel. In between the big shafts there are
small ventilation shafts (5 m2 or around 3 m diameter). These shafts can be
used for smoke exhaust to make sure that the route to and from big shafts, as far
as possible, is free of smoke in an emergency situation. The exact location of
the shafts can vary in order to accommodate the actual distance between stations.
The main features of the basic option are summarized in the Table 10-1.
6.2
Tunnel ventilation
The tunnel ventilation is divided in sections: from station to station. Only for
one typical section the tunnel ventilation system is described in the text and
shown in Figure 6-1.
6.2.1 Description of Tunnel ventilation system

The system comprises the following components:
At stations:
- Reversible ventilation plant for supply/extraction.
- Piston effect shafts.
At shafts (2500 m from the station and 2500 m between shafts):

- Ventilation plant for air supply to the tunnel.
- Ventilation plant for air supply/pressurization of shelters and corridor.
- Ventilation plant for pressurization of the staircase.
At ventilation shafts (1250 m from stations and shafts):

- Ventilation plant for extraction.
In the tunnel:
- Jet fans to be used as booster fans for the tunnel ventilation in particular
cases.
21
2500
L
1250
2500
1250
1250
1250
Emergency
Exit
Smoke
exhaust
Emergency
Exit
Smoke
exhaust
Station
Shelte
Shelte
Shelter
Shelter
Shelter
Shelter
Stopped train
Jet Fan
Fresh air supply
Smoke exhaust
Smoke exhaust
Escape route
Figure 6-2
Basic option, ventilation principle
6.2.2 Operation of the tunnel ventilation

Normal conditions
During normal conditions it may be possible to create sufficient ventilation
(Fresh air supply) by the piston effect via piston effect shafts and extraction
shafts. In case the above recommended 1-dimensional simulation shows, that
this will not be possible, it will be necessary to supply fresh air with the tunnel
ventilation system. Some of the supply plants and some of the extraction plants
may be used. How many and at which location shall be determined based upon
new simulations.
During congested operation it will be necessary to supply fresh air to the tunnel
from the supply plants next to the location of the stopped train. The polluted air
can be extracted through the extraction shafts.
Emergency conditions (Fire in the tunnel)
In case the burning train stops at station platform, the smoke will be extracted
by the ventilation plant at the station.
If the burning train stops between two stations, the smoke will be extracted
through the smoke exhaust shaft next to the burning train.
Fresh air can be supplied from emergency shafts or stations. See Figure 6-2.
22
The ventilation plants for pressurization of shelters, corridor and staircases will
be started when a fire occurs.
Because there are two tracks, there may be trains trapped in front of the burning
train on the other track and behind it on the same track. Therefore longitudinal
ventilation can not be used during the evacuation.
As shown in Figure 6-2 the trapped trains on both side of the fire site can be
free of smoke. The fresh air supply from stations and emergency shafts create a
flow with a velocity vCritical. The jet fans can be used to maintain the velocity.
After the evacuation, the Fire Brigade can change to longitudinal ventilation, to
get smoke-free access to the fire site from the one side. The Ventilation plants
shall therefore have the necessary capacity to maintain an air flow with critical
velocity. During this operation, it may be necessary to use the jet fans.
6.3
6.3.1 Evacuation of passengers from the burning train

The passengers will escape to the walkway immediately adjacent to the train.
(Escape to the other side of the train and across the other track to the walkway
on the other side of the tunnel is not considered here, as this would be difficult
if the tunnel is not specifically designed for this).
The passengers may escape in both directions. However, it is likely that the
passengers will not be able to walk past the fire. If the fire is in one end of the
train, then all passengers will have to walk in one direction. On average the fire
may be considered to be in the quarter point of the train, such that 3/4 of the
passengers will have to walk in the same direction.
From the end of the train the passengers will walk on the walkway towards the
nearest shelter.
The 0.8 m width of the walkway is in accordance with the international requirements, see Table 4-1.
We have not been informed on the distance between the shelters. It follows
from Table 4-1 that according to UIC and European standards the distance between cross passages should be about 500 m. Going into a shelter is comparable to going into a cross passage leading to an other tunnel tube. Hence a distance between entrances to shelters of 500 m is assumed here.
In order to be able to accommodate all passengers from a train the shelter
should be rather large. There should be more room per passenger in the shelter
than in the train. As the width of the shelter seems to be only about 2.6 m (deducted from Figure 6-1), which is less than the width of the train, then the
23
length of the shelter should be several times the length of the train. The layout
of the shelter requires further consideration taking into account:
How the passengers are to be accommodated in the shelter. Preferably the

passengers should be seated, as they may have to remain in the shelter for
several hours.
How the passengers shall spread along the very long shelter from the
access stairs.
Location of communication means, supplies, toilets etc.
Considering the small width of the shelter, it may be difficult to establish a design that will work in an emergency. E.g. the first passengers entering the shelter may stop immediately within the shelter, such that the following passengers
will not be able to enter the shelter.
It follows from Figure 6-1 that the width of the staircases leading down to shelter is in the order of 0.8 m. This is less than the widths indicated in Table 4-1
(1.12 m width of cross passage indicated by NFPA 130, and 1.4 m width of escape door indicated by 2001/16/EC). However, with the present tunnel diameter it is hardly possible to make a wider staircase.
The evacuation capacity of a staircase of a certain width is less than the evacuation capacity of a walkway of the same width. Even though the passengers initially may only walk on one of the walkways away from the burning train they
may later spread on both walkways. There should therefore be three stairs at
each end of the shelter in order to provide a capacity corresponding to the two
walkways. (According to NFPA 130, Ref. /1/, the capacity of a walkway is
0.0819 persons per mm and minute and the capacity of stairs 0.0555 persons
per mm and minute).
The design of the entrances to the staircases need further considerations regarding how the lid down to the stairs will open and how handrails preventing the
passengers from falling down into the staircase hole are arranged.
A rough calculation, using NFPA 130 as described in section 4.4, of time for
the passengers to reach safety within the shelters gives the following results:
The number of passengers in the train is assumed to be 898 (100 %)
The number of passengers walking in one direction is 3/4898 = 674
The time for the passengers to walk past the end of train on one walkway is
estimated at 674 / (0.0819 min-1 mm-1 0.8 m) = 10.3 min.
The time to walk from the end of the train to the entrance to the shelter will
be maximum 500 m will be 500 m / 38 m/min = 13.2 min.
Time to walk down the stairs: 3 m / 15 m/min = 0.2 min.
24
The total time until the last passenger is within the shelter is thus 24 min.
The ventilation system will extract the smoke from the ventilation shaft nearest
to the train. Hence, there will be a probability of 0.5 that the train is located
such that the evacuation, described above of the 674 passengers, will be in a
smoke-filled tunnel.
The estimated 24 minutes in the smoke-filled tunnel seems to be a high figure,
considering that the fire may develop in the full 15 MW fire within the order of
15 minutes (general assumption stated in paragraph 2.2.1 of Ref. /2/), of which
a few minutes may have passed before the train stops.
Hence, even though the 24 minutes are calculated using a very rough method, it
seems as if the evacuation facilities will have to be improved. This could be
done by increasing the internal diameter of the tunnel, such that the walkway
becomes wider, which would also allow an increase of the width of the emergency shelter.
Another possibility will be to design the tunnel such that the passengers can
also escape form the other side of the train and go to the walkway along the
other side of the tunnel. However, this will to some extent conflict with the location between the tracks of the stairs to the emergency shelters.
The distance between entrances to the emergency shelters could also be reduced, but this would lead to that there will be a continuous emergency shelter
under the tracks, and then the option described in the next section may be better.
It is noted that to our knowledge the concept of having escape to the room below the railway track has not yet been used in any railway tunnel. The concept
has been used in road tunnels, but using it in a railway tunnel may be more difficult due to the large number of passengers that can be onboard a train, and the
smaller dimensions of railway tunnels compared to road tunnels.
6.3.2 Protection of other trains in the tunnel

With the envisaged ventilation concept there will at maximum be 1250 m (the
maximum distance between the train and the nearest smoke exhaust) of tunnel
filled with smoke.
Any train on the opposite track stopped here will be seriously endangered.
Hence, the procedures in the event of a fire in a train would be to operate the
trains on the other track, such that this situation is avoided.
The next train on the same track will presumably be further than 1250 m behind
the burning train, such that it will be protected against the smoke from the burning train. If this concept is chosen then this should be further investigated.
25
It is noted that if the emergency exits and stations are also used for smoke extraction, then the maximum length of smoke-filled tunnel would be reduced to
1250 m / 2 = 625 m, but this would have adverse consequences for the ability
of the fire brigade to intervene, see below.
6.3.3 Access for the fire brigade

The fire brigade will go to the tunnel via the nearest emergency exit from where
they can proceed towards the burning train in a tunnel that is nearly free of
smoke, as the smoke is extracted from the smoke exhaust at the other side of
the train. The fire brigade will at maximum have to travel 1250 m to the burning train.
Only if the fire is exactly at the location of an emergency exit will the distance
to be travelled be longer, i.e. the 2500 m from the next emergency exit.
It is noted that if the emergency exits and the stations were also used for smoke
extraction, then the fire brigade would not be able to use the nearest emergency
exit in half of the fire scenarios, such that the fire brigade in these scenarios
would have to travel maximum 2500 m.
26
Option: Emergency corridor with frequent

access
7.1
The cross section of this option is the same as the basic option, with the exception that under the tracks, it is assumed that there is an emergency corridor instead of shelters.
The tunnel is equipped with ventilation as described below. The jet fans are
used as supplementary fans for the tunnel ventilation.
In an emergency situation the trains can be evacuated via the emergency walkway to the nearest hatch to the emergency corridor. The hatches for the emergency corridor are located between the railway tracks. Via the safety corridor
the passengers can walk to the nearest emergency evacuation shaft.
The emergency corridor below the railway tracks can resist the design fire. It is
equipped with a separate system for fresh air supply.
The location of big shafts with stairs and ventilation and small ventilation
shafts is the same as for the basic option, please see section 6.1.
The main features of this option are summarized in the Table 10-1.
27
Jet fans
Walkway
Walkway
Ventilation of
emergency corridor
Utilities
Emergency
corridor
Figure 7-1
7.2
Cross section of option with emergency corridor with frequent access
Tunnel ventilation
The tunnel ventilation for this option is almost identical to the ventilation for
the basic option with the exception that there are no shelters, but the corridor
under the tracks will be used as escape corridor.

At stations:
At emergency shafts (2500 m from the station and 2500 m between shafts):
28
- Ventilation plant for air supply/pressurization of the escape corridor.

At ventilation shafts (1250 m from stations and shafts):

In the tunnel:
cases.
2500
L
1250
2500
1250
1250
1250
Emergency
Exit
Smoke
exhaust
Emergency
Exit
Smoke
exhaust
Station
50 50
Emergency
hatches
Emergency
hatches
Jet Fan
Fresh air supply
Smoke exhaust
Smoke exhaust
Escape route
Figure 7-2
Fire scenario, Option with emergency corridor

Normal conditions
shafts. In case the above recommended 1-dimensional simulation show, that
new simulations.
29
In case the burning train is stopped at station platform, the smoke will be extracted by the ventilation plant at the station.
If the burning train stops between two stations the smoke will be extracted
through the smoke exhaust shaft next to the burning train.
The ventilation plants for pressurization of escape corridor and staircases will
As shown in Figure 7-2, the trapped trains on both side of the fire site can be
get smoke-free access to the fire site from the one side. The Ventilation plants
7.3

The passengers will escape from the burning train in the same way as described
in section 6.3.1 above, but instead of going to an emergency shelter below the
tracks they will go to an emergency corridor below the tracks. In this emergency corridor, they will proceed to the nearest emergency exit, which is maximum
1250 m away. The emergency exit shaft should be located beside the tunnel and
there should be a connection directly from the emergency corridor to the emergency shaft.
The stairs down to the emergency corridor could be as shown in Figure 6-1. It
is envisaged that the distance between these stairs is only 50 m.
Hence, the distance which the passengers will have to walk after having
reached the end of the train will at maximum be 2 times 50 m (two staircases
will have to be used, as one staircase will not provide the same capacity as one
walkway). Hence, the length, which the last passenger will have to walk after
30
having passed the end of the train, will be maximum 100 m as opposed to the
maximum 500 m considered in section 6.3.1. This will take 2.6 minutes using
the model of NFPA 130, and the total time until the last passenger is within the
emergency corridor becomes 13 minutes as opposed to the 24 minutes in section 6.3.1.
This is still a long time considering that a very rough method has been used,
and depending on the results of a proper evacuation analysis it may be required
to increase the tunnel diameter in order to increase the width of the walkway.
As indicated in section 6.3.1 the width of the stairs leading down to the emergency corridor may be considered not to meet the requirements stated in Table
4-1.
As noted in section 6.3.1 the concept of having escape to the room below the
railway track has to our knowledge not yet been used in any railway tunnel.
The concept has been used in road tunnels, but using it in a railway tunnel may
be more difficult due to the large number of passengers that can be onboard a
train, and the smaller dimensions of railway tunnels compared to road tunnels.

As in section 6.3.2.

As in section 6.3.3.
31
Option: Short distance between ventilation

shafts
8.1
The cross section of this option is the same as the basic option with the exception that it is assumed that the only path of evacuation is via the emergency
walkways.
The tunnel is equipped with many small ventilation shafts, around 3 m diameter. These ventilation shafts with relatively small diameter are assumed to be
constructed using a shaft boring machine or raise boring.
As for the basic option and the option with emergency corridor, see section 6
and 7, it assumed that the distance between big shafts with stairs and ventilation
is 2500 m. The distance between small ventilation shafts is 500 m. This distance makes sure that the distance to a smoke-free area is the same as to cross
passages as required from common international standards, see Table 4-1.
In an emergency situation the trains can be evacuated via the emergency walkway to the nearest emergency exit shaft. The protection of the passengers during emergency evacuation relies on the use of intensive ventilation with advanced control.
32
Jet fans
Walkway
Walkway
No specific
use
Figure 8-1
8.2
Cross section of option with short distance between ventilation shafts
Tunnel ventilation
The tunnel ventilation for this option is almost identical with the ventilation for
the basic option with the exception that there is short distance between ventilation shafts (500 m in stead of 1250 m) and that smoke extraction will normally be from two exhaust shafts as opposed to one. With the short distance between smoke exhaust the extent of the smoke plume will be reduced.

At stations:
33
At emergency shafts (2500 m from the station and 2500 m between shafts):
- Ventilation plant for air supply/pressurization of the escape corridor.
At ventilation shafts (500 m from stations and shafts and 500 m between
ventilation shafts):
In the tunnel:
cases.
2500
500
2500
500
Emergency
Exit
Emergency
Exit
Smoke
exhaust
Station
Jet Fan
Fresh air supply
Smoke exhaust
Smoke exhaust
Escape route
Figure 8-2
Fire scenario, Short distance between ventilation shafts
34

Normal conditions
shafts. In case the above recommended 1-dimensional simulation show, that
new simulations.
In case the burning train stops at station platform the smoke will be extracted
by the ventilation plant at the station.
If the burning train stops between two stations the smoke will be extracted
through the smoke exhaust shafts next to the burning train.
The ventilation plants for pressurization of escape corridor and staircases will
As shown in Figure 8-2, the trapped trains on both side of the fire site can be
get smoke-free access to the fire site from the one side. The ventilation plants
8.3

The passengers will escape from the burning train in the same way as described
in section 6.3.1 above, but instead of going to an emergency shelter below the
tracks they will continue on the walkway until the next emergency exit in their
walking direction.
35
The smoke will be extracted at the two ventilation shafts adjacent to the burning train. Hence, the passengers escaping from the train will walk in a smokefilled tunnel until they have passed the first ventilation shaft, and then the conditions on the walkway will be significantly improved, as the exhaust ventilation should be designed, such that very little smoke is spread to the other side
of the ventilation shaft.
The 2500 m distance between emergency exits is clearly not in accordance with
the requirements to such exits stated in Table 4-1. The 500 m distance between
the ventilation shafts is in accordance with the requirements for distances between cross passages from UIC and 2001/16/EC. However, the conditions on
the other side of the ventilation shaft can hardly be considered to be as safe as
in a cross passage, such that formally the requirements in the table cannot be
considered to be met.
Most of the smoke will be extracted by the shaft that is closest to the fire.
Hence, if the train is located such that the passengers will have to walk the
maximum distance of 500 m to the nearest ventilation shaft, then they will walk
in a tunnel that is nearly smoke-free. Hence, for comparison with the other options, the situation where the fire is located with 250 m to both ventilation
shafts, such that the passengers will be exposed to half of the smoke from the
fire, is considered.
the passengers to reach safety within the shelters gives the following results:
The number of passengers walking in one direction is 674 as indicated in

section 6.3.1.
The time for the passengers to walk past the end of train on one walkway is
estimated at 10.3 min. as indicated in section 6.3.1.
The last passenger will have to walk 250 m - 103 m = 147 m from the end
of the train to reach the ventilation shaft in accordance with the assumption
on the location of the fire. (The 103 m is the distance from the fire to the
end of the train). The time to walk this distance will be 147 m / 38 m/min =
3.9 min.
The total time until the last passenger has walked past the ventilation shaft
is thus 14 min.
This is still a long time considering that a very rough method has been used,
and depending on the results of a proper evacuation analysis, it may be required
to increase the tunnel diameter in order to increase the width of the walkway.
Another possibility will be to design the tunnel such that the passengers can
also escape form the other side of the train and go to the walkway along the
other side of the tunnel. However, this will conflict with the location between
the tracks of the stairs to the emergency corridor.
36
As opposed to the options considered in sections 6 and 7, this option does not
include the concept of escape to a room below the track. Here, the critical issue
is instead the design of the ventilation shafts, such that spread of smoke beyond
the shafts used for smoke extraction is prevented. The reliability of the smoke
extraction shall be very high as the safety of the escaping passengers relies on
this system.

With the envisaged ventilation concept there will be smoke in 500 m of the
tunnel, which is less than the maximum 1250 m that may be smoke-filled in the
options described in sections 6 and 7.
Any train on the opposite track stopped within the 500 m will be seriously endangered. Hence, the procedures in the event of a fire in a train would be to operate the trains on the other track, such that this situation is avoided.
The next train on the same track will presumably be further than 500 m behind
the burning train, such that it will be protected against the smoke from the burning train. If this concept is chosen then this should be further investigated.

As long as there are still passengers within the 500 m zone between the two
ventilation shafts used for extraction, the mode of operation cannot be changed.
Hence, the fire brigade will have to walk in a partly smoke-filled tunnel in order to proceed towards the burning train before the passengers have escaped.
The fire brigade may go to the tunnel via the nearest emergency exit from
where they will at maximum have to travel 1250 m to the burning train. If they
know the exact position of the train they may use this information to select their
direction of approach, selecting either a short distance with a relatively large
amount of smoke or a longer distance with less smoke. Such choice may lead to
selection of an emergency exit, which is more than 1250 m from the burning
train.
If the fire is exactly at the location of an emergency exit, the distance to be travelled could be the 2500 m from the next emergency exit.
The fire brigade can change the operation of the ventilation plant, such that they
can approach the fire in a nearly smoke-free tunnel, as explained in section
8.2.2, when it has been established that this change will not adversely affect the
escaping passengers.
37
9.1
For this option it is assumed that there is a fire proof dividing wall between the
two railway tracks. Due to the wall it will be necessary to increase the diameter
of the tunnel by around 2 m. This means that the internal diameter will be
around 13 m.
The wall between the two railway tracks will divide the tunnel into two separate half rooms, which will be independent regarding ventilation.
The dividing wall has closely spaced emergency doors. Through these doors
the passengers can escape to the opposite tunnel, which will constitute a safe
area in case of fire in one half of the tunnel.
As the tunnel diameter is larger for this option, there will be more available
space below the railway tracks. This available space is so big, that it is possible
to have special emergency vehicles here, that can be used for fire brigade
access.
Because the opposite tunnel constitutes a safe space and because there is ample
space for fire brigade access in the space below the tracks, there are no shafts
between the railway stations.
The concept with a dividing wall corresponds to the concept for the Green
Heart Railway Tunnel in The Netherlands. Please see the illustration below.
The spacing of the emergency doors is considered to be 150 m, which is the
distance used for the Green Heart Tunnel. The width of the emergency walkway will at minimum be the 0.8 m used for the other options, but the tunnel
diameter described above should allow a walkway with a width of 1.5 m along
each side of the dividing wall as in the Green Heart Tunnel, Ref. /6/.
38
Figure 9-1
Cross section with dividing wall (Green Heart, Netherlands)
A variant of this option will be to include shafts for emergency exit and access
as in the other options, if it is found that using the space below the tracks for
access of the fire brigade is considered not to be feasible.
Jet fans
Dividing
wall w.
emergency
doors
Walkway
Walkway
Space for fire brigade access.
Special vehicle
Ventilation of
fire brigade
access
Figure 9-2
Cross section of option with dividing wall, principle (not to scale)
39
9.2
Tunnel ventilation
This option is very different from the other options as a dividing wall between
the two tracks is introduced.
With the tunnel divided into two tubes with a single track longitudinal ventilation can be used for environmental as well as for smoke ventilation. Therefore
the ventilation shafts (smoke extraction) can be omitted.

At stations:
- Reversible tunnel ventilation plant for supply/extraction.
- Ventilation plant for air supply/pressurization of the corridor
(for fire brigade approach and maintenance).
In the tunnel:
- Jet fans with sufficient capacity to maintain an air velocity in each tunnel
tube vCritical.
As a variant of this option in case emergency shafts are necessary:

Emergency shafts with:
- Ventilation plant air supply to the tunnel.
40
Smoke extraction
Station
Train stops
Jet Fan
Fresh air supply
Smoke exhaust
Escape route
E
Figure 9-3
Emergency door
Fire scenario, Option with dividing wall

Normal conditions
During normal conditions it will be possible to create sufficient ventilation
(Fresh air supply) by the piston effect via piston effect shafts.
in the traffic direction from station to station (the push-pull principle).
In case the burning train stops at the station platform the smoke will be extracted by the ventilation plant at the station.
If the burning train stops between two stations, the smoke will be pushed by the
jet fans in the traffic direction to the next station and exhausted by the ventilation plant.
The exhaust/supply grills can be located directly above the track at the platform
or before/after the station.
41
Jet fans in operation

(Stopped jet fans not shown)
Burning train
Station
Track II
Station
Track I
Evacuation from tunnel tube with

burning train to safe tunnel tube.
Pressure in safe tunnel tube shall
be slightly higher to prevent smoke
ingress
Figure 9-4
Jet fans in operation

(Stopped jet fans not shown)
Creating higher pressure in the safe tunnel than in the injured
As shown in Figure 9-3 trapped trains behind the burning train can be free of
smoke. The jet fans create a flow with a velocity vCritical of fresh air supplied
from stations and emergency shafts.
To avoid smoke ingress through the emergency doors during the evacuation it
will be possible to create a slightly higher pressure in the safe tunnel than in the
injured tube by operating the jet fans in a way so the smoke is sucked away in
front of the train and the fresh air is blown through the safe tunnel tube. The
principle is shown in Figure 9-4.
9.3

The passengers will escape from the burning train to the walkway along the
dividing wall. They will then walk along the walkway to the nearest door
through the dividing wall to the other track. Here they will walk towards the
nearest station. However, as this can be a rather long distance, they should be
picked up by one or more trains. These trains will be ordinary trains emptied
for their passengers at the nearest station. They will of course have to drive
very slowly, when approaching the part of the tunnel, where there are escaping
passengers on the walkways.
The 150 m distance between doors in the dividing wall clearly meets the requirements regarding distance between cross passages stated in Table 4-1.
The most adverse situation will be a train with a fire exactly at the location of a
door through the dividing wall, such that this door cannot be used.
42
the passengers to reach safety on the other side of the dividing wall gives the
following results:
The number of passengers walking in one direction is 674 as indicated in

section 6.3.1.
The time for the passengers to walk past the end of train on a 0.8 m wide
walkway is estimated at 10.3 min. as indicated in section 6.3.1.
The last passenger will have to walk 150 m - 103 m = 47 m from the end
of the train to the door in the dividing wall. The time to walk this distance
will be 47 m / 38 m/min = 1.2 min.
The total time until the last passenger has passed the dividing wall is thus
12 min.
If the width of walkway is increased to 1.5 m then the time to walk past the end
of the train will be reduced to 5.5 minutes and the total time until the last passenger has passed the diving wall is reduced to 7 minutes.
It is noted that this scenario, where the fire is exactly at a door in the dividing
wall, is very unfortunate. With other locations of the fire the total time to reach
safety will be reduced.

All trains on the opposite track will be protected from the fire by the dividing
wall.
For the trains on the same track as the burning train the following applies:
The train in front of the burning train is driving past the next station.
The trains behind the burning train will be protected by the longitudinal
ventilation.

The fire brigade is assumed to be using dedicated vehicles driving in the space
underneath the tracks. Whether there should be one such vehicle located at each
station, or fewer vehicles would be sufficient would require further study taking
into account the location of the fire brigades along the railway.
The access stairs from the space under the tracks to the railway tubes should be
located with short intervals, e.g. with same spacing as the doors in the dividing
wall. These stairs will have to be further studied in order to finally establish
whether this solution is feasible. The arrangement should be such that the fire
43
brigade's use of the stairs will not seriously disturb the evacuation of the passengers.
The fire brigade will approach the fire in the train from the upstream side protected by the longitudinal ventilation.
It is noted that the concept of using the room below the railway track for transport of the fire brigade has to our knowledge not yet been used in any railway
tunnel. The concept has been used in road tunnels, but using it in a railway tunnel may be more difficult due to the smaller dimensions of railway tunnels
compared to road tunnels. From the size of the tunnel considered here there
should be sufficient space under the tracks, but whether there is sufficient space
to arrange appropriate access stairs for the fire brigade has not yet been established.
44
10
Comparison
The main features of the options considered are indicated in Table 10-1.
In the basic option there is assumed to be smoke extraction to the nearest ventilation shaft, which will be within 1250 m of the burning train. This implies that
the location of the train shall be known.
With a maximum distance between entrances to the emergency shelters being
500 m, the roughly calculated evacuation time is estimated at maximum 24 minutes (reference is made to section 4.4 regarding the very rough assumptions
made). This seems to indicate that the evacuation facilities should be improved
in this option.
Considering the small width of the emergency shelter, it may be difficult to establish a design that will work in an emergency. E.g. the first passengers entering the shelter may stop immediately within the shelter, such that the following
passengers will not be able to enter the shelter.
The option "emergency corridor with frequent access" has the same ventilation
concept as the basic concept. As there are doors to the emergency corridor below the tracks every 50 m, the roughly calculated maximum evacuation time is
reduced to 13 minutes.
As the passengers entering the emergency corridor shall walk to the nearest
emergency exit maximum 1250 m away it is less likely that the first passengers
entering the corridor will block the access of following passengers than in the
basic option.
In both the basic option and the option "emergency corridor with frequent
access" the design of the entrances to the stairs need further consideration. It
may be difficult to find a suitable solution.
It is noted that to our knowledge the concept of having escape to the room below the railway track has not yet been used in any railway tunnel. The concept
has been used in road tunnels, but using it in a railway tunnel may be more difficult due to the large number of passengers that can be onboard a train, and the
smaller dimensions of railway tunnels compared to road tunnels.
45
In both of the above options other trains will be protected against smoke from
the fire except for maximum 1250 m of the tunnel.
The fire brigade will have to proceed at maximum 1250 m in a tunnel to reach
the fire in both the above options. The ventilation system should ensure that the
tunnel here is smoke-free.
Tunnel option
1
Basic option
2
Option:
Emergency corridor with frequent access
3
Option:
Short distance
between ventilation shafts
4
Option:
Dividing wall
One tunnel,
two tracks
Internal D 11.06m
One tunnel,
two tracks
Internal D 11.06m
One tunnel,
two tracks
Internal D 11.06m
One tunnel,
two tracks separated
by wall
Internal D ~ 13 m
V every 1250 m
E every 2500 m
A every 2500 m
V every 1250 m
E every 2500 m
A every 2500 m
V every 500 m
E every 2500 m
A every 2500 m
None
Evacuation to emergency shafts or to

shelters under the
tracks.
Evacuation via safety

corridor under the
tracks. The evacuation corridor has
access hatches every
50 m
Evacuation via normal walkways at track

level.
Dividing wall between

the tracks and emergency doors per 50m.
Evacuation safety is
controlled with many
vent shafts
Evacuation to opposite half of the tunnel.

Then evacuation with
train.
Fire brigade access
Access via stations

and A shaft
Access via stations

and A shaft
Access via stations

and A shaft
Access with special

emergency vehicle
under the tracks
Ventilation
concept
Jet fans
Jet fans
Jet fans
Jet fans
Fresh air to shelters
Fresh air to emergency corridor

Smoke exhaust via
multiple small size V
shafts
No smoke exhaust
between stations
Overall
Concept
Shafts
V: Ventilation
E: Evacuation
A: Fire brigade
access
Emergency
evacuation
Smoke exhaust via V

shaft
Table 10-1
Smoke exhaust via V

shaft
Main features of tunnel investigated options
In the option "short distance between ventilations shafts the passengers shall
walk away from the fire to the nearest evacuation shaft maximum 2500 m
away. As there are 500 m between smoke exhaust shafts and the smoke is ex-
46
tracted at the exhaust shafts at both sides of the train, the passengers will only
have to walk a limited distance in smoke. The rough calculation of maximum
time for the passengers to reach a smoke-free part of the tunnel results in 14
minutes, i.e. the same order of magnitude as for the option "emergency corridor
with frequent access".
The concept is however depending on a very accurate knowledge of the location of the tunnel fire in order for the system to function as intended. The weak
point is this advanced detection system and the control systems which opens up
for human errors in programming and operation of the system.
It is also noted that this option will formally not meet international requirements, as walking past a ventilation shaft can hardly be considered to provide
the same safety as walking into a cross passage.
Furthermore the access of the fire brigade to the burning train is more difficult
than in the above two options as there will be smoke on both sides of the train.
The operation of the ventilation system can be changed to provide access in a
smoke-free tunnel, but such change cannot be done until it is certain that it will
not adversely affect escaping passengers in the tunnel.
The advantage of this option is that the passengers need not use the space below the tracks requiring complicated design of access stairs etc.
All of the above options could be improved by providing facilities allowing the
passengers also to leave the train on the side facing the other track and go to the
opposite walkway. However, in the first two options this will conflict with the
access stairs located between the tracks.
The option with dividing wall allows the passengers to escape to the opposite
part of the tunnel. This solution results in the shortest time for passenger evacuation roughly estimated at maximum 12 or 7 minutes depending on whether the
emergency walkway is 0.8 m wide as in the other options or 1.5 m wide, which
it should be possible to include in this option due to the larger tunnel diameter.
We consider this solution for the evacuation to be more reliable than the basic
option and the option with emergency corridor, which require careful consideration of the detailed solution for access hatches for the shelter or corridor.
Regarding fire brigade access the option with dividing wall will, due to the
larger tunnel diameter, allow a separate space under the tracks which can be
used for access with special vehicles. The design of the fire brigades access
from this space to the tracks will have to be further studied in order to finally
establish whether this solution is feasible. The arrangement should be such that
the fire brigade's use of the stairs will not seriously disturb the evacuation of the
passengers.
Regarding operation of the ventilation, the dividing of the tunnel allows a more
robust solution which is easy to control, as there is only one option for the direction of the smoke ventilation.
47
The main disadvantage of this option is the additional costs due to the increased
diameter. However, this may be more or less balanced by the savings as no
shafts are needed.
The option with a diving wall is considered to be the best from a safety point of
view. This option is therefore recommend if there are no or only insignificant
additional costs involved compared to the other options. Even if the additional
costs are larger, this option should be preferred, as long as the additional costs
are not disproportionate with the value of the reduction in risk, cf. the description of the ALARP principle in section 4.5.
48
11
References
/1/ NFPA 130. Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems. 2010 Edition.
/2/ Directive 2001/16/EC - Interoperability of the trans-European conventional
rail system. Aspect: 'Safety in railway tunnels'.
Published in the Official Journal of European Union 7.3.2008 under the
heading "Commission decision of 20 December 2007 concerning the technical specification of interoperability relating to 'safety in railway tunnels'
in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail system.
(2008/163/EC)"
/3/ International Union of Railways: UIC code 779-9. Safety in railway tunnels. 1st edition, August 2003.
/4/ COWI: Metropolitan Express Railway. Report on records of tunnel fire
accidents. Doc. No. 72156-1, 2009-11-20.
/5/ Health & Safety Executive, UK: The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations. 1988, revised 1992. ISBN 0 11 886368 1.
/6/ Homepage of HSL Zuid:
http://www.hslzuid.nl/hsl/uk/lijn/Safety/Safety_in_tunnels/Safety_of_Groe
ne_Hart_tunnel/index.jsp

72156-2 Evacuation and Ventilation

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

72156-2 Evacuation and Ventilation

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

KOTI Korea Transportation Institute

KOTI Korea Transportation Institute

Seoul Metropolitan Express

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Summary and conclusion

Basis - project description

Safety considerations, general

Ventilation considerations - general

Option: Emergency corridor with frequent

Option: Short distance between ventilation

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Option: Dividing wall

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

SUNJIN is performing feasibility studies of the Seoul Metropolitan Express

Emergency corridor with frequent access

Short distance between ventilation shafts

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

A description of the option

Safety considerations including evacuation

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Summary and conclusion

Option: Emergency corridor with frequent access

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

congested space during an emergency situation. By frequent access to the

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Basis - project description

138 m long (6 carriages each 23 m long)

Train cross section area 7.8 m2

Speed 200 km/h

Number of passengers in each train: 898 man (Entrainment rate: 100%) to

Design train fire 15 MW.

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Safety considerations, general

Qualitative risk analysis

Risks when moving or standing inside stations including station platforms

Risks when moving to and from the trains on station platforms

Risks related to train accidents including:

Train hitting obstacle on the track

Train fire caused by other accidents

Fire in tunnel and station installations

Explosion in a train (sabotage)

In general the risk is reduced to an acceptable level as follows:

Prevention of the occurrence of the accidents

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Mitigation of the accidents consequences including among others:

Evacuation of the passengers

Intervention by the fire brigade including rescue of passengers and fire

An acceptable level of risk in an underground railway system may include the

Design of the tunnel according to applicable codes and standards.

Establishing of risk acceptance criteria and documentation that these are

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

The American NFPA 130 (Ref. /1/)

NFPA 130 2001/16/ UIC 779-9

Requirements in international standards for railway tunnels

Minimizing the amount of flammable material in the trains. As explained

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Comments to the above points:

The adequacy of the means for passenger escape should be investigated as

The escape of the passengers is modeled using appropriate models such as

Comparison of the above results to establish whether passengers will be

Seoul Metropolitan Express Railway, Evacuation and ventilation

Capacity of walkway: 0.0819 persons per mm and minute