SHORT REPORT

Developing the Frith-Happe Animations: A Quick and Objective Test

of Theory of Mind for Adults with Autism
Sarah J. White, Devorah Coniston, Rosannagh Rogers, and Uta Frith
It is now widely accepted that individuals with autism have a Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing deficit. This has
traditionally been assessed with false-belief tasks and, more recently, with silent geometric animations, an on-line ToM
task. In adults with milder forms of autism standard false-belief tests, originally devised for children, often prove
insensitive, while the Frith-Happe animations have had rather better success at capturing the on-line ToM deficit in this
population. However, analysis of participants verbal descriptions of these animations, which span scenarios from
Random to Goal-Directed and ToM, is time consuming and subjective. In this study, we developed and established
the feasibility of an objective method of response through a series of multiple-choice questions. Sixteen adults with
autism and 15 typically developing adults took part, matched for age and intelligence. The adults with autism were less
accurate as a group at categorizing the Frith-Happe animations by the presence or absence of mental and physical
interactions. Furthermore, they were less able to select the correct emotions that are typically attributed to the triangles
in the mental state animations. This new objective method for assessing the understanding of the animations succeeded
in being as sensitive as the original subjective method in detecting the mentalizing difficulties in autism, as well as being
quicker and easier to administer and analyze. Autism Res 2011, 4: 149154. & 2011 International Society for Autism
Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Keywords: autism; Theory of Mind; mentalizing; triangle animations; classification; test sensitivity

It is now widely accepted that a cognitive deficit in

Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing can explain a
number of core social impairments in autism; these
individuals have difficulty in the intuitive understanding
of others, as well as their own, mental states. This ToM
deficit was originally detected using false-belief tasks,
such as the Sally-Ann test [Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,
1985], but such tasks have proved insensitive with older
and more able individuals. A number of other methods
for assessing mentalizing ability have therefore been
devised, which are suitable for use with adults who have
only mild forms of autism. One such method uses silent
animations of geometric shapes moving around the
screen, based on a study by Heider and Simmel [1944]
in which it was established that people often attribute
human character traits to shapes in motion, and sometimes even attribute mental states.
Heider and Simmels original animations were never
intended to signify specific mental states and the
sequence of events could be sufficiently described in
terms of a goal-directed (GD) action. The Frith-Happe
animations therefore consist of three novel sets of
geometric animations representing three different types
of motion: random, GD, and ToM. The random set
is intended to depict purposeless movement and no

interaction between two triangles, GD animations are

intended to depict an interaction consequent upon the
physical action or behavior of one of the triangles, while
the ToM animations are intended to depict an interaction involving one triangle reacting to the others
mental state. In the first experiment, participants
watched the animations and afterwards they were asked
for a verbal description of what they thought had
happened [Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000]. Both children
and adults were found to be predominantly correct in
their use of action terms for the random animations,
interaction terms for the GD animations, and mentalizing terms for the ToM animations. However, children
with autism gave less appropriate mentalizing descriptions and even children with autism who had successfully passed both first and second-order false-belief tasks
were unable to appropriately describe the ToM animations. These animations have since successfully been used
in a growing number of experiments to investigate ToM
and agency attribution in individuals with and without
autism [Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004;
Campbell et al., 2006; Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith,
2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Corden,
Critchley, Skuse, & Dolan, 2006; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky,
Minshew, & Just, 2009; Klein, Zwickel, Prinz, & Frith,

From the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom (S.J.W., D.C., R.R., U.F.)
Received March 29, 2010; accepted for publication November 12, 2010
Address for correspondence and reprints: Sarah J. White, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London
WC1N 3AR, UK. E-mail: s.white@ucl.ac.uk
Grant sponsors: Medical Research Council, and Economic and Social Research Council; British Academy; Grant numbers: PTA-037-27-0107; PDF/2009/213.
Published online 5 January 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com)
DOI: 10.1002/aur.174
& 2011 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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Autism Research 4: 149154, 2011

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2009; Knickmeyer, Baron-Cohen, Raggatt, Taylor, &

Hackett, 2006; Koelkebeck et al., 2010; Lawrence et al.,
2007; Moriguchi et al., 2006; Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori,
Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007; Rosenbaum, Stuss, Levine, &
Tulving, 2007; Russell, Reynaud, Herba, Morris,
& Corcoran, 2006; Salter, Seigal, Claxton, Lawrence, &
ller, 2009], as
Skuse, 2008; Zwickel, 2009; Zwickel & Mu
have a number of other sets of similar animations [Berry
& Springer, 1993; Bowler & Thommen, 2000; Klin, 2000;
Klin & Jones, 2006; Montgomery & Montgomery, 1999;
Oatley & Yuill, 1985; Rime, Boulanger, Laubin, Richir, &
Stroobants, 1985; Springer, Meier, & Berry, 1996].
In all the above experiments, the responses to the
geometric animations were analyzed with a subjective
method of scoring: participants gave a verbal description
after each animation, which was scored by several
markers who were highly familiar with the animations
and scoring system. This is an extremely time-consuming
process, which is subjected to bias and variability
between markers. Motivated by the limitations of this
subjective method of scoring, this study focuses on
devising an objective administration and scoring procedure for use in experimental studies involving the
geometric animations. The aim was to develop an
objective method that was as sensitive as the subjective
method in detecting ToM deficits at a group level in
autism, while being quicker and easier to administer and
analyze by providing participants with multiple-choice
questions (MCQ) about each animation.

Method
Participants
Ethical approval for the study was received from the Joint
UCL/UCLH committee on the Ethics of Human Research
and, before the test session, written informed consent
was sought and received from all participants. Sixteen
adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and 15
typically developing adults took part, matched for age
(t(29) 5 0.97), gender (w2(1) 5 0.11), verbal IQ (t(29) 5 0.65),
and performance IQ [t(29) 5 0.85; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS III-UK, Wechsler, 1997]. The participants
in the ASD group had all received previous diagnosis from a
qualified clinician and all but two also met criteria for an
ASD on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
[ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000]. The two remaining participants
were not excluded as their ADOS scores revealed a degree of
communication and social difficulty, which was felt to be
more obviously evident in their daily lives; indeed they both
had an Autism-Spectrum Quotient score [AQ; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001] above the
recommended cut-off of 32. Furthermore, one of these
participants met criteria in the social domain but had a
physical disability that made it impossible to score the two

150

gesture items in the communication domain. In addition,

removal of these participants data made no difference to
the results from the animations. As expected, AQ scores for
the ASD group were significantly greater than for the
comparison group (t(28) 5 5.82, Po0.001; see Table I).
Materials
The 12 animations originally used in Abell et al.s [2000]
study were the stimuli, divided into three sets of
animations: random, GD, and ToM. Each set contained
four animations. See http://sites.google.com/site/utafrith/
research for examples of the stimuli.
Procedure
Testing took place individually in a quiet room at the
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL. A battery of
standard ToM tasks was administered to assess each
participants explicit mentalizing ability independently
from the animations. These included five first-order
[Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Luckett, Powell, Messer,
Thornton, & Schulz, 2002; Perner, Frith, Leslie, &
Leekham, 1989; Wellman & Liu, 2004] and two secondorder false-belief tasks [Bowler, 1992; Perner & Wimmer,
1985] (total score of 7) as well as Happes mental state
Strange Stories [Fletcher et al., 1995].
The participants were then instructed that, while watching the animations, they were to give a concurrent verbal
description of what they thought was happening. At the
end of each animation, they would be asked to categorize
it as one of three types: no interaction (random),
physical interaction (GD), and mental interaction
(ToM) (referred to hereon as MCQ-categorization). The
following definitions of these three types were provided
during practice.
Table I.

Participant Characteristics

N (male:female)
Age (yr)
Verbal IQ
Performance IQ
AQ (cut-off 32)
Clinical diagnosis

ADOS

ASD

Comparison

16 (12:4)
33.00 (10.31)
111.25 (12.74)
106.44 (12.75)
37.06 (8.47)
14 AS
1 HFA
1 ASD
7 Autism
7 Autism Spectrum
2 None

15 (11:4)
36.53 (9.86)
114.13 (11.97)
110.47 (13.71)
19.64 (7.84)

Note. Values are given as mean (SD) unless otherwise stated. Asterisks
indicate when groups significantly differ from one another. ASD, Autism
Spectrum Disorder; AS, Asperger syndrome; HFA, high-functioning autism;
AQ, Autism-Spectrum Quotient.
Po0.001.

White et al./Objectively testing theory of mind in autism

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No interaction: There is no obvious interaction between the triangles and movement

appears random.

Physical interaction: An interaction between

the triangles in which actions are directed
toward each other in order to achieve specific
goals.

Mental interaction: An interaction between

the triangles involving the manipulation of
the emotions and thoughts of one triangle
by the other.

Participants were also informed that after some animations there would be further questions. They were then
presented with two practice animations (GD and ToM)
for familiarization to ensure that they understood the
task. Feedback was given on the practice trials.
In the experimental phase, participants were shown
one animation at a time in a pseudo-randomized order.
The verbal descriptions that participants gave were
recorded for later transcription and scoring. After each
animation, participants were presented with a list of
MCQ-categorization types to choose from. If they
correctly identified a ToM animation, they were then
presented with additional questions (MCQ-feelings) to
test their understanding of the mental states depicted in
the animation. For the MCQ-feelings task, participants
could choose between one of five listed adjectives to best
match the feelings of each of the triangles at the end of
the animation; a separate list was provided for each
triangle in each animation (see Appendix A). In all other
conditions, no additional questions were asked. Throughout the experimental phase, no feedback was given.
Scoring
Objective scoring. Participants could score a total of
12 for the MCQ-categorization. This was divided into a
maximum of 4 for each of the three animation types. For
the MCQ-feelings, a maximum of 8 points could be
scored, corresponding to two possible correct answers for
each of the four ToM animations.

background ToM tasks. An alpha level of 0.05 was

selected. P-values are also reported for results between
0.05 and 0.10.

Results and Discussion

The groups significantly differed in their performance
on the background ToM tasks. Scores for the ASD
group were significantly worse on both the false-belief
tasks (t(17.1) 5 2.3, P 5 0.036) and Happes mental state
Strange Stories (t(24) 5 3.1, P 5 0.005; see Table II).
For the objective scoring, Figure 1 and Table II reveal
that the ASD groups performance was consistently worse
for the MCQ-categorization compared to the comparison
group across all 12 animations (U 5 198.5, P 5 0.001).
However, when looking at the three types of animation
separately, this group difference was only significant for
the ToM animations (U 5 59.5, P 5 0.009). For the MCQfeelings, the comparison groups mean score was again
significantly greater than that of the ASD group
(U 5 28.5, Po0.001).
For the subjective scoring, two independent markers
(one blind to group, the other DC) rated the participants
verbal descriptions of the animations for intentionality
and appropriateness. Agreement between the markers
was high for intentionality (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) 5 0.83, Po0.001; 96% of responses rated as
identical or 1 point apart on a 6 point scale) and for
appropriateness (ICC 5 0.70, Po0.001; 76% of responses
rated as identical or 1 point apart on a six-point scale)
and therefore the average of the two markers scores was
taken. There was no significant difference between the
two groups on the intentionality scores for both the
Table II. Test Scores for Background, Objective, and Subjective Tasks
Task (maximum score)

ASD

Comparison

6.27 (1.03)
12.17 (1.85)

6.91 (0.30)
14.07 (1.27)

7.94 (1.95)
2.38 (2.00)

10.00 (0.93)
5.47 (1.30)

0.26 (0.57)
2.24 (0.41)
3.02 (0.49)

0.47 (0.66)
2.21 (0.39)
3.62 (0.60)

4.51 (0.59)
3.04 (0.90)
1.71 (0.70)

4.48 (0.54)
3.45 (0.66)
2.66 (0.98)

Analysis

Background
False-belief tasks (7)
Strange stories (16)
Objective
MCQ-categorisation total (12)
MCQ-feelings (8)
Subjective
Intentionality
Random (5)
Goal-directed (5)
ToM (5)
Appropriateness
Random (5)
Goal-directed (5)
ToM (5)

Given the low range of possible scores on all measures of

the animations, non-parametric tests were conducted on
these data, whereas parametric tests were used for the

Note. Values are given as mean (SD) unless otherwise stated. Asterisks
indicate when groups significantly differ from one another.
Po0.05; Po0.01; Po0.001.

Subjective scoring. The verbal descriptions were

analyzed for appropriateness and intentionality, using
a similar scoring system to Castelli et al. [2000].
This involved scoring the use of mental state terms
(intentionality score) and the correct inference of the
underlying scenarios (appropriateness score), both on a
six-point scale [see Zwickel, White, & Frith, 2010 for
further details].

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4
ASD
Comparison

Accuracy (4 max)

Random

Goal-Directed

ToM

Figure 1. Performance on objective categorization of random,

goal-directed, and ToM animations by ASD and comparison groups.
ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; ToM, Theory of Mind.
random (U 5 143.5) and GD animations (U 5 97.5) but
the intentionality score for the ASD group was significantly lower than that of the comparison group for the
ToM animations (U 5 188.0, P 5 0.007). Similarly the
appropriateness scores for the ASD group were significantly lower than those of the comparison group for the
ToM animations (U 5 186.5, P 5 0.008), but did not differ
for the GD (U 5 150.5) or random animations (U 5 113.0;
see Table II).
In the ASD group, the MCQ-categorization total score
was weakly related to the false-belief tasks (r 5 0.488,
P 5 0.065), and the MCQ-feelings measure was weakly
related to the intentionality score on the ToM animations
(r 5 0.478, P 5 0.061). These correlations were not significant in the comparison group however, most probably due to ceiling effects in this groups performance.
The novel objective method presented in this study for
administering and analyzing participants responses to
the Frith-Happe animations therefore successfully detected mentalizing difficulties in this group of highfunctioning adults with autism. The mentalizing
difficulties revealed by this novel method were in line
with their impaired performance on standard ToM tests
and their impaired verbal descriptions of the animations,
despite this objective method providing more explicit
information about the animations. However, the new
method required only a fraction of the time necessary for
the original subjective method to be scored.
The ASD groups performance was indicative of a
general difficulty with identifying whether interactions
were occurring and whether these involved mental states.
Nevertheless, this difference was only significant for the
ToM animations, supporting the widely held belief of a
mentalizing impairment in autism. Interestingly, the ASD

152

group did manage to correctly categorize approximately

two-thirds of the 12 animations. Further investigation
revealed that, even when they correctly categorized these
animations, the ASD participants had more difficulty in
understanding the mental states depicted in the animations, correctly identifying the feelings of the triangles
in only about a quarter of the ToM animations; in fact, all
but four participants in the ASD group fell below the
comparison group range of scores on this measure. This is
reminiscent of previous studies in which individuals with
ASD did use some mental state language to describe these
animations but often gave inappropriate mental states
[Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2002].
In conclusion, this novel objective method of administering and analyzing responses to the Frith-Happe
animations was found to be as sensitive as the traditional
subjective method in demonstrating the well-established
mentalizing impairment in autism. We hope that the
ease and speed at which this method can be administered
will make the animations an even more useful and
objective research tool with high-functioning children
and adults.

Appendix A
MCQ-categorization
Which of these 3 categories best fits the film clip you
have just seen?

(a)

No interaction

(b)

Physical interaction

(c)

Mental interaction

MCQ-feelings
(correct answers in bold)
Coaxing:
How do you think the Little Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) Proud; (b) No feelings; (c) Secure; (d) Annoyed;
(e) Unsure
How do you think the Big Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) Frustrated; (b) Loving; (c) Tense; (d) Frivolous;
(e) No feelings
Mocking:
How do you think the Little Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) No feelings; (b) Fulfilled; (c) Anxious; (d) Mischievous; (e) Devious
How do you think the Big Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) Aggravated; (b) Puzzled; (c) Lonely; (d) Satisfied;
(e) No feelings

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Seducing:
How do you think the Little Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) Lost; (b) Cunning; (c) Scared; (d) Composed;
(e) No feelings
How do you think the Big Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) Excited; (b) Eager; (c) No feelings; (d) Cheerful;
(e) Foolish
Surprising:
How do you think the Little Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) Provoked; (b) No feelings; (c) Bored; (d) Pleased;
(e) Lucky
How do you think the Big Triangle feels at the end of
the clip?
(a) No feelings; (b) Terrified; (c) Delighted; (d) Disappointed; (e) Uneasy

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