Marijuana Neg

Cyber Security

1NC Frontline
Laundry list of alt causes to FBI hiring policy
Zelidon 14 (Elizabeth, writer for the State Hornet, Federal Bureau seeks Sac State students for
service, The State Hornet, 10/8/14, http://www.statehornet.com/news/federal-bureau-seeks-sac-statestudents-for-service/article_4f14150e-4f21-11e4-a30e-001a4bcf6878.html)//kjz
Sacramento State students

with limited leadership positions, language skills or who download content off
the Internet may not be eligible for the FBIs recruitment standards. On Monday, Sac States Career Center
welcomed the FBI for an informational on its paid internship program where applications are now being accepted . One of the highly discussed
topics in the presentation was the list of potential traits that disqualify applicants. This list included failure
to register with selective services, illegal drug use including steroids, criminal activity, default on
student loans, falsifying information on an application and illegal downloading music, movies and
books. FBI employee Steve Dupre received questions ranging from the use of cell phone apps to download free music , to Spotify
and other means of retrieving music. If youre doing that, stop doing it. Dupree said. He explained how the FBI will ask
people during interviews how many songs, movies and books they have downloaded because the
FBI considers it to be stealing. During the first two phases of interviews, everything is recorded and
then turned into a report. This report is then passed along to a polygraph technician to be used
during the applicant's exam, which consists of a 55-page questionnaire. If an applicant is caught
lying, they can no longer apply for an FBI agent position. If you are accepted to intern at FBI and
fail the polygraph you can no longer apply to FBI again. Dupre said. Dupre listed law, accounting, computer
science, engineering and languages as the types of leadership positions and majors that are specifically sought out for. Grades are not an end all
but get a 3.0 and get involved in campus. Hold a position in a club, community service, and be careful with your social media, Dupre said. These
are the leadership skills that distinguish an applicant from most competitive to least. Students must also demonstrate experience in oral and
written communication, initiative and motivation, adaptability and flexibility, and organizing, planning and prioritizing. Dupre ended the
presentation by mentioning how two Sac State students, whose identities could not be released, were recently hired into the program. One was a
psychology major and the other government. Although it is a long process into the FBI, Dupre encouraged students to apply to the internship
program and start changing their actions now so it can benefit them in the future.

No incentive to join FBItime, college degree, money

Horwitz 3/12 (Sari, staff writer for the Washington Post, As U.S. pushes police to diversify, FBI
struggles to get minorities in the door, The Washington Post, 3/12/15,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-us-pushes-police-to-diversify-fbi-strugglesto-get-minorities-in-the-door/2015/03/12/01bd5806-c753-11e4-b2a1-bed1aaea2816_story.html)//kjz
Officials say one of the biggest challenges in diversifying the force is the competition for talent
particularly in high-demand fields like cyber, a growing focus for the FBI. The bureau requires
candidates to have a college degree and to have worked for a few years before entering the force . But
by that time, many potential minority candidates have been hired by private firms. The average age
of incoming agents is 29. Thats a point Comey made when responding to another students question after his speech last month at
Georgetown University. If youre as good as you probably are, because you go to school here, Coca-Cola is
going to be after you, Microsoft is going to be after you, Apple is going to be after you, Exxon Mobil
is going to be after you, and theyre going to throw all kinds of dough at you, he said. And then
when youre 29, you're thinking, Yeah, not so much go work for the government. So, Im trying to
figure out how do I get people in earlier, Comey said. If I get my hooks in you before the private sector puts the gold handcuffs on people, I
think I can change my numbers. Because I agree with the premise in your question. I have to change the numbers. Those numbers are
disappointing to FBI officials in various ways. While the proportion of special agents who are African American or Hispanic are low, the
percentages have also been in decline in recent years. Tiny slivers of the special agent population are made up of Asians (4.3 percent) or
American Indian or Alaska Natives (0.39 percent.) James Turgal, the assistant director of the human resources division of the FBI, said the bureau
is working aggressively to improve the numbers meeting with organizations including the National Urban League, the Congressional Black

Caucus, the National Bar Association and the National Society of Hispanic MBAs. Im trying everything I possibly can, Turgal said, to get
minority candidates in the door.

Cant solve anywaysFBI technology bad now

Currier and Marquis-Boire 7/6 (Cora, a journalist with a focus on national security, foreign
affairs, and human rights. As a reporting fellow at ProPublica, she covered national security and finance,
and Morgan, a researcher. In addition to being a contributing writer to The Intercept, he acts as the
director of security for First Look Media; LEAKED DOCUMENTS SHOW FBI, DEA AND U.S.
ARMY BUYING ITALIAN SPYWARE, The Intercept, 7/6/15,
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/06/hacking-team-spyware-fbi/)//kjz
The FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Army have all bought controversial software that allows users
to take remote control of suspects computers, recording their calls, emails, keystrokes and even
activating their cameras, according to internal documents hacked from the softwares Italian
manufacturer. The company, Hacking Team, has also been aggressively marketing the software to other
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, demonstrating their products to district attorneys in New York, San
Bernardino, California, and Maricopa, Arizona; and multi-agency task forces like the Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation in Florida and
Californias Regional Enforcement Allied Computer Team. (We do not use this product nor are we currently considering a proposal from the
vendor/manufacturer to purchase it, Jerry Cobb, a spokesperson for the Maricopa County Attorneys Office said.) The company was also in
conversation with various other agencies, including the CIA, the Pentagons Criminal Investigative Service, the New York Police Department,
and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. The revelations come from hundreds of gigabytes of company information, including emails and
financial records, which were released online Sunday night and analyzed by The Intercept. Milan-based Hacking Team is one of a handful of
companies that sell off-the-shelf spyware for hundreds of thousands of euros a price point accessible to smaller countries and large police
forces. Hacking Team has drawn fire from human rights and privacy activists who contend that the companys aggressive malware, known as
Remote Control System, or RCS, is being sold to countries that deploy it against activists, political opponents and journalists. Even in the U.S.,
where the software would presumably be used only with a judges approval, the tactic is still controversial. Just last month, Sen. Chuck Grassley,
R-Iowa, wrote to the director of the FBI asking for more specific information about the FBIs current use of spyware, in order for the Senate
Judiciary Committee to evaluate serious privacy concerns. The leaked emails show that the FBI has been using Hacking Teams software since
2011, apparently for the secretive Remote Operations Unit. Its long been reported that the FBI has deployed malware in investigations, but
details on the agencys efforts are thin, with the tactic only surfacing rarely in court cases such as one instance last year when the FBI spoofed
an Associated Press article to get a target to click on a link. The FBI reportedly develops its own malware and also buys pre-packaged products,
but the relationship with Hacking Team has not been previously confirmed. Hacking Teams spokesperson, Eric Rabe, said in a statement that
we do not disclose the names or locations of our clients and we cannot comment on the validity of documents purportedly from our company.
The director of the Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation in Florida told The Intercept that it does not have plans to purchase any product from
Hacking Team. The Manhattan District Attorneys office said, It would be an overstatement to say that our office is planning to purchase this
type of software. This

company is one of several in the industry whom weve requested meetings with in
order to keep pace with rapid technological advancements in the private sector.

1NC Cyber Security

Status Quo solves the FBI is one of the best in fighting cybercrime
Clayton 13 (Mark; November 18, 2013; Christian Science Monitor; FBI as cyber crime sleuth: Is it
any match for computer bad guys?; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1118/FBI-ascyber-crime-sleuth-Is-it-any-match-for-computer-bad-guys)//CC
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which after 9/11 shifted focus almost overnight from fighting
organized crime to combating terrorism, is scrambling to again remake itself to be positioned to counter a
rising threat: cyber attackers. Its evolution into a cybercrime-fighting agency isn't as sudden or as
dramatic, but over time the change will be just as profound, experts say. Indeed, the transformation is
already well under way, with 1,000 cyber specialists specially trained agents, analysts, and digital
forensic examiners who run complex undercover operations and gather digital evidence deployed
to all 56 of the FBIs field offices nationwide. The urgency of the shift was underscored last week by
FBI Director James Comey, who told a congressional committee that cyber threats are expected soon to
rival terrorism as the primary danger facing the United States. We anticipate that in the future, resources
devoted to cyber-based threats will equal or even eclipse the resources devoted to non-cyber-based
terrorist threats, Mr. Comey said at a Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing, echoing comments
by his predecessor, Robert Mueller. The FBI launched its New York-based Cyber Division in 2002.
Since then, its investigations into "computer intrusions" break-ins by hackers (state-sponsored,
criminal, or individuals) to exploit vulnerabilities in US-based computer networks and software
have jumped 84 percent. When I first got in, there wasnt even a cyber program, and now its a
full division, which is pretty amazing, says a former FBI cyber investigator who spent more than a
decade with the bureau, who asked for anonymity because he still works with law enforcement. But
really, Comey is right. Theres now so much going on in cyber that it is going to overtake terrorism and
counterintelligence work. I dont think were seeing a shift as massive as the one right after 9/11 from
organized crime to terrorism. Terrorism is still going to be very much on everyones mind. But now its
cyberterrorism. Among the FBI's adversaries are cyberspies from nations trying to obtain US intellectual
property; organized crime gangs stealing people's identities, credit-card data, and money; and terrorists
aspiring to attack the US power grid, water supply, and other critical infrastructure. Hacktivist groups
trying to make a political statement by wrecking websites or hacking company networks also qualify. The
bureau also leads the National Cyber Investigative Joint Tax Force, a group of 19 intelligence,
military, and law-enforcement agencies that share information to target current threats and prevent
future attacks. The FBIs Next Generation Cyber Initiative, launched last year, will focus on
penetrating the bad guys' computers and networks, as opposed to primarily identifying and
dismantling cybercriminal operations. Though the FBI cyber capability has been building for a
decade, experts say the bureau has only in recent years hit its stride as a world-class cyber
investigative agency that poses a serious threat to cyber bad guys. They werent that good to begin
with, and I was pretty critical of them, says James Lewis, a cyber conflict expert at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. Today, I think the FBI is one of the best in
the world in investigating cybercrime. Theyve really improved in just the last five to six years.
Beside developing strong in-house cyber capabilities, he says, the bureau also has a close
partnership with the National Security Agency something that did not exist before 9/11 regarding
information-sharing on threats and investigations. Its been a natural progression for the FBI to move
into this field, says Shawn Henry, president of CrowdStrike Services, who recently retired as FBI
executive assistant director responsible for cyber programs and investigations worldwide. Cyber is really
a tool being used by more people to commit their criminal activity, their espionage, and their attacks, he
says. Its a technology that makes them able to do a lot more damage in a much broader way. At the

same time, were seeing more and more companies using technology, pushing everything they own to the
network their corporate strategy, intellectual property. The value of the information there is really
immeasurable and the adversaries know it. As for terrorists, they trying to disrupt the power grid,
trying to have same impact on the Western world as they did on 9/11, wanting to wreak havoc and calling
for electronic jihad, Mr. Henry notes. Although terrorists' own cyber skills have not been shown to be
terribly sophisticated, the reality of it is that this capability can be purchased, it can be rented, he says.
You can go to an underground chat room and find someone willing to sell their skills. Recent successes
show the bureau is gaining some ground on cybercriminals, he and others say. In 2011, for instance,
the FBI took down Rove Digital, a company founded by a ring of Estonian and Russian hackers to
commit massive fraud over the Internet. By infecting more than 4 million computers in at least 100
countries with malware that secretly altered those computers' settings, the Rove hackers were able to
digitally hijack Internet searches, rerouting those computers to certain websites and ads. The company
received fees when users clicked on those websites or ads some $14 million in fraudulent income, the
FBI reported.

Cant solve for cyberattacks even with plan

Ashford 6/29 (Warwick, security editor at Computer Weekly, Internal threat among biggest cyber
security challenges, says former FBI investigator, ComputerWeekly.com, 6/29/15,
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/4500248908/Internal-threat-among-biggest-cyber-securitychallenges-says-former-FBI-investigator)//kjz
One of the biggest cyber security challenges for business is that there is no patch for careless,
greedy or stupid, said former FBI Computer Intrusion Unit head Don Codling But savvy, wellmeaning employees can be fooled into doing something to allow attacks access to company
networks, he told a Storm Guidance seminar in London. Few people, he said, would not click on an email that
appeared to be a subpoena sent by their personal lawyer but that would be enough to let attackers
into their company network. Once on the network, Codling said the most common tactic by
attackers is to seek out privileged users to compromise their accounts and use their credentials to
move freely in the network. In this way they are able to circumnavigate all firewalls and other
security controls to map the network and carry out reconnaissance , he said. Next, attackers will either
locate and exfiltrate the data they are targeting or identify employees with financial authorisation
capabilities. If attackers are after money, we have seen them identify and compromise key employee credentials to make unauthorised
payments to accounts they control in ten minutes, said Codling. Hackers coerce employees In one case, the attackers had arranged for a series of
transfers to bank accounts around the world in seconds of the money arriving in attempt to make the funds untraceable. But in this particular case,
said Codling, FBI investigators apprehended the cyber criminal behind the operation as he arrived from Ukraine in the Seychelles, where the
money had ended up. Read more about internal cyber threat Organisations are underestimating the threat of internal IT security breaches, a study
has revealed. Internal threats are not a high priority for UK firms despite 1,000+ internal data breaches a day. Accidental or inadvertent leakage of
IP accounts for around 95% of internal IP leaks. As long as cyber criminals operate and remain in countries that have no extradition treaty with
the country where the crime is taking place, they are untouchable, he said. Another tactic is to coerce employees of target organisations into
providing credentials by threatening them or their family members. Codling said that, in one case, the attackers had coerced an employee into
helping them by sending an employee in the target organisation a copy of their childs private school bus timetable. Cyber risk calculation

Attackers are becoming increasingly adept at using all the information they can collect from social
media to coerce people into co-operating with them, he said. Mitigating the cyber threat from malicious insiders In other
cases, Codling said the FBI saw how cyber criminals used mobile sniffing tools that cost just 150 to monitor everything their targets do on their
device; or pay hackers just 400 to get access to the accounts of someone negotiating a deal with 1.2bn. Despite

a huge and growing

arsenal of tools available to cyber criminals, with the barriers to entry being lowered all the time
through service-based models, he said some companies are failing to take adequate precautions
because they think they are insured against loss and that they are unlikely to be targeted. It is
essential to assess the risk properly by creating a cyber risk calculation framework that is
underpinned by an understanding of data assets and the business, said Codling. Businesses should also subscribe

to cyber threat intelligence feeds, he said, so they know who is likely to target them; what they are likely to target and why; and how they are
likely to do it.

Cyberattacks impossible empirics and defenses solve

Rid 12 (Thomas Rid, reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of
"Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", March/April
2012, Think Again: Cyberwar,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full)
"Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us." No way. "Cyberwar is coming!" John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since then, it
seems to have arrived -- at least by the account of the U.S. military
establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the
fight. Cyberspace is "a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights," Air Force
Secretary Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy
defense secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is "just as critical to
military operations as land, sea, air, and space." In January, the Defense
Department vowed to equip the U.S. armed forces for "conducting a combined arms
campaign across all domains -- land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace."
Meanwhile, growing piles of books and articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare,
cyberterrorism, and how to survive them. Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still
more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be
potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The
cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't
meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in
1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive
cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that
the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a
monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the
explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet
pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged
the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had
doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S.
National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004
book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. But did it
really happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB
head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took
place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that
confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the
Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did
happen, but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account
relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of
Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort
to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not
confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the
Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a
successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are

even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came

in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the

Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive
distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked
computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58
Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest
bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or
airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and
newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his
analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an
emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not
even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the
next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing
Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true
for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record . Indeed, there is no known
cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever
injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least
potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical
violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to
distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet
those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A
Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a
cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions
have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades , and some
scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a
cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism
czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes
falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding,
poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that
would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is
less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example
available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in
2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in
an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about
are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a
remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to
highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after
midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a socalled "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a
transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the
bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the
malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose,
and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians,
but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had
been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously
poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems
to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the

energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on
the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which
was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the
catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how
difficult a devastating attack would be to mount . The plant's washout was an
accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events.
Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for
insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a
daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber
Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath.
"Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National
Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious
software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that
more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United
States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,'
which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including
against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a
simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly
separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's
more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact,
potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more
difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy
and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut
down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system,

say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start
looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have
to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the
malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy.
That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take
Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just
crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the
worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's
networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values
from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code
with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the
worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to
circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate
the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely
detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and
the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes,
"convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems
software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend
has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily
and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more
complex, not less.

1NC Financial Crimes

Asset misappropriation is 69% of financial crime and is episodic plan cannot
overcome
Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force solves financial crime not FBI
SEC 9 (US Security and Exchanges Committee, from a 2009 Press Conference, SEC, President Obama
Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm // CW
WASHINGTON Attorney General Eric Holder, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Shaun Donovan, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro today announced that President Barack Obama has established by
Executive Order an interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to strengthen efforts to
combat financial crime. The Department of Justice will lead the task force and the Department of
Treasury, HUD and the SEC will serve on the steering committee. The task force's leadership, along
with representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities and inspectors general,
will work with state and local partners to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes,
ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, address discrimination
in the lending and financial markets and recover proceeds for victims.

SEC using data to solve for financial crimes

Patterson 14 (Scott Patterson - a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, where he covers financial regulation
from Washington, D.C. He has also written two books about advanced computerized trading: Dark Pools
and The Quants, 12/17/14, Meet the SECs Brainy New Crime Fighters, Wall Street Journal,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-secs-brainy-new-crime-fighters-1418601581
But other troves of computerized data are becoming more available, such as bank-account data,
digitized regulatory filings and new submissions required by the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial overhaul,
SEC officials say. They add that the units quantitative approach, plus the explosion of new data
provided by computerized markets and digital filings by public companies, have made them more
able than ever before to sniff out fraud and other financial crimes. The origins of Ms. Walshs unit
date to the revelations in late 2008 and 2009 that the SEC had for years missed multiple tips that Bernard
Madoff had been stealing from investors in his hedge fund. As part of a broader restructuring of the
enforcement unit, the SEC in 2010 created the Office of Market Intelligence to screen tips and other
information for enforcement cases. Ms. Walsh, who holds a doctorate in financial economics from
Pennsylvania State University, briefly led the unit in 2012. In July 2013, she took charge of the Center for
Risk and Quantitative Analytics, which began with three employees. Funded in part by a $50 million
technology reserve fund established by the Dodd-Frank financial legislation, it has been looking into
everything from accounting fraud to insider trading to scams in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act,
a 2012 law passed by Congress that loosens restrictions on how small firms can raise cash. Ms. Walshs
group has built a database of trades from small-stock pump-and-dump schemes the SEC has prosecuted in
the past in order to find patterns that can help them uncover new schemes. It also tracks the performance
of hedge funds and ties them to underlying holdings at the funds, looking for whether managers are
accurately reporting performance results. The unit is developing new methods to get financial data,
Ms. Walsh says. Big banks used to report a great deal of data, such as bank-account holdings, in
hard copy. In recent months, members of Ms. Walshs group have been pressuring banks to supply the
data in computer-readable format. That can make it easier to detect frauds such as Ponzi schemes,

SEC officials say, since it lets investigators track cash flows and see whether firms are actually
investing the cash.

Economic decline doesnt cause war.

Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa , 2K (Interdisciplinary Science
Review, v 25 n4 2000 pingenta connect)
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty
and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such
events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a
violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by
finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According

to a study under- taken by

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be
any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two
countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the
conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of
economic crisis as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth bore no relationship to the collapse of
regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the
Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of

ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

2NC Alt Causes to Hiring

Alt causes state laws, worker compensation, liability issues, and termination
policies
Lam 3/4/15 (Bourree Lam is an associate editor at The Atlantic. She was previously the editor of
Freakonomics.com, The Atlantic, Are Companies With Drug Tests Weeding Out Great Candidates?
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/are-companies-with-drug-tests-weeding-out-greatcandidates/386447/) CW
It doesn't help that federal and state laws are frequently at odds . "Thats the big quandary, a lot of
companies are scratching their heads," says Thomas Ryan, lead researcher for workers compensation
market at Marsh, advises businesses on risk management. Ryan explains that marijuana legalization
affects a wide range of considerations for employers including worker's compensation, liability
issues, and termination policies. For example, worker's compensation can be denied if an employee
is injured at work while intoxicated. In states where recreational use is legal, termination due to a
positive drug test, while legal, could be trickyit might require further evidence that the employee
was impaired while at work. (This is all in addition to the ongoing debate about whether employees
should be drug tested at all.) Thomas Ryan also suspects that companies phasing out strict drug policies
will do so quietly. The ways in which companies have adaptedor failed to adapttheir hiring
policies in response to the legalization of medical marijuana have shown how fraught hiring
processes might become after widespread legalization. Since 1996, twenty states have passed laws
legalizing the use of medical marijuana, but even in legalized states, employers can enforce zerotolerance policies in the workplace. The case of Brandon Coats, who is currently awaiting the result of
his Colorado Supreme Court case on being fired from Dish Network for using medicinal marijuana,
highlights this tension. "In states with strong disability or medical marijuana laws, penalizing
medical marijuana users when they are not impaired could be a huge legal and political issue," says
John Sullivan, a professor of management at San Francisco State University. "With more jurisdictions
being added, human resources leaders can no longer postpone updating their drug, alcohol, and
impairment policies and methods of testing and enforcement." As marijuana appears to shift further
and further toward mainstream acceptance, Cappelli suspects that employers that are having trouble
hiring because of strict drug policies will ease up enforcement, quietly taking them off the rulebook
when the political climate is right. Some agencies already treat marijuana differently from other
Schedule I drugs: For example, police recruiting in New Orleans will disqualify applicants for the use of
any illegal drug within the 10 years prior to application. With marijuana, it's only two years. Thomas
Ryan also suspects that companies phasing out strict drug policies will do so quietly. There are the very
verbal, vocal, communicative employers that will say, 'We have a zero tolerance policy in-house thats
enforced,'" explains Ryan. "And the alternative would be that there wouldnt be any mention of it at all."
Although relaxed marijuana policies could be used to draw young and creative candidates, few companies
appear to be using this tactic yet. For now, it looks like companies are choosing to play it safeor at least
play it quiet.

Foreign Governments are an alt cause

Clayton 13 (Mark; November 18, 2013; Christian Science Monitor; FBI as cyber crime sleuth: Is it
any match for computer bad guys?; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1118/FBI-ascyber-crime-sleuth-Is-it-any-match-for-computer-bad-guys)//CC

But the pursuit of cybercriminals abroad is still problematic. The problem is that they can only enforce
the law in places that agree to enforce the law, says the CSIS's Mr. Lewis. If youre in the US, theyll
catch you. In Russia and China, they dont have a chance. What they need is for the Russians to
cooperate and the Russians wont do that. The cyber ramp-up that the FBI's Comey says is coming
makes sense, say many analysts. Just as bank robber Willie Sutton was reputed to say he robbed banks
because thats where the money is, so, too, the FBI must follow criminals into their cyber lairs.

Several alt causes to the plansalary, security clearance, women

Augenbraun 14 (Eliene, was a SciTech reporter at CBS Interactive, Hackers wanted: U.S. needs
more cybersecurity workers, CBS News, 6/19/14, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hackers-wanted-u-sneeds-more-cybersecurity-workers/)//kjz
Want to be paid $200,000 a year to think like a hacker? Then Uncle Sam wants you. According to the newly released RAND report, "H4cker5
Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market", there is a shortage of highly trained cybersecurity workers, especially in the federal
government, with potential negative consequences for national security. hackers-wanted-cover.jpg Cover of RAND report on a shortage of
cybersecurity workers RAND CORPORATION "It's largely a supply-and-demand problem," said Martin Libicki, lead author of the study and
senior management scientist at RAND, in a press release from the nonprofit research organization. "As

cyber attacks have

increased and there is increased awareness of vulnerabilities, there is more demand for the
professionals who can stop such attacks. But educating, recruiting, training and hiring these
cybersecurity professionals takes time." For those with the expertise to help secure essential networks and combat
cyberattacks, it's a lucrative job market. "The cybersecurity manpower shortage is primarily at the high end of the capability scale, commanding
salaries of more than $200,000 to $250,000," Libicki said. For the moment, ma ny

large organizations are dealing with the

crunch by providing training and promoting from within. But the federal government is especially
short-handed in this field. One reason is salary. Experts working for private companies can
command double the highest salary a federal agency is permitted to offer. Another challenge for
government agencies is that many of the positions require security clearance and are limited to
people who have lived and worked in the country for at least five years. In and out of the
government, few women are entering or working in the field . According to the RAND report, "the percentage of
women within the upper tier of the cybersecurity profession is well within single digits." So what do the experts think we should do? Don't panic.
For the most part, the authors contend the labor market will correct itself, although it may take a number of years. "The difficulty in finding
qualified cybersecurity candidates is likely to solve itself, as the supply of cyberprofessionals currently in the educational pipeline increases, and
the market reaches a stable, long-run equilibrium," the report states. RAND

recommends a few things the federal

government could do to help: Relax some federal hiring rules when hiring hard-to-find cybersecurity experts Invest in
cybersecurity education programs Refine ways to identify non-traditional candidates likely to
succeed Attract more women into the profession The number of cyberattacks may be on the rise. Fortunately, the number of
computer science majors is too.

2NC Squo Solves

Status quo solves
Libicki et al 14 (Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate
School, David Senty is a retired Major General in the United States Air Force, Julia Pollak is a Ph.D. candidate at the Pardee RAND
Graduate School and an assistant policy analyst at RAND, Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market,
published on RAND, a nonprofit global policy thinktank, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html) aj

Key findings: Sudden demand creates scarcity, competition, and crisis Whenever rapid
demand increases hit a profession with nontrivial skill and/or education requirements,
economic theory suggests that rapidly rising compensation packages and strong competition for
workers can be expected. Educational initiatives are already addressing the
cybersecurity demand In response to earlier indications of burgeoning demand for
cybersecurity professionals , there has already been a large increase in education,
notably government-supported education, but also an increase in the number of
computer science majors. It's normal for the labor market to lag demand and education
initiatives Theory suggests and experience confirms that the market may take a long time
to respond to unexpected increases in demand. In the short term, many large
organizations have found innovative ways of meeting the demand for
cybersecurity professionals through internal recruitment and training, as our
interviews have found. Theory suggests and our interviews confirm that even
organizations that can meet most of their needs internally still face difficulties in
recruiting or retaining cybersecurity professionals in the upper tier. The best steps
may already have been taken The difficulty in finding qualified cybersecurity
candidates is likely to solve itself, as the supply of cyberprofessionals currently in
the educational pipeline increases , and the market reaches a stable, long-run equilibrium.

2NC Cant Solve Cyber

Cooperation with international law agencies to fight cyber criminals is necessary
Kenyon 11 (Henry, a staff writer covering enterprise applications for Government Computer News,
FBI goes international to fight cyber criminals on their home turf, GCN, 12/12/11,
http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/12/12/FBI-international-cyber-crime-partnerships.aspx?Page=2)//kjz
Criminals know no borders in cyberspace. Online malfeasance is big money, with organized gangs
of hackers working in Eastern Europe and Asia to target businesses and government agencies for
money and data. To counter this far-reaching threat, the FBI is working closely with international law
enforcement agencies to fight cyber criminals on their own tur f, said Shawn Henry, executive assistant
director of the FBIs Cyber Response and Services Branch. Speaking at the recent Cybersecurity Conference and Exposition in
Washington D.C., Henry said cyber crime is a global issue that tops the lists of many other nations threats, which is why the bureau is
embedding agents in law enforcement organizations around the world. There are currently FBI personnel working in Estonia, Ukraine and the Netherlands, he added.
Related coverage: How international cyber crime threatens national security Cost of cyber crime rises sharply This

overseas cooperation has

netted some major victories. One example is Operation Trident Breach, in which the FBI worked
with international law enforcement agencies to arrest a gang of hackers targeting international
financial transactions. After an investigation conducted with the United Kingdom and the Ukraine, Henry said, more than 90 people were arrested in
connection with the hacking scheme. Another FBI action was Operation Core Flood , where the bureau worked with the private sector
to disable a botnet that infected more than 2 million computers worldwide. The FBI was able to gather the address and domain names of the infected computers and
rerouted command messages to effectively put the network to sleep, he said. The

FBI worked with the Estonian police to arrest six

individuals involved in the Ghost Click scam, which was generating illicit fees from bogus online advertising. Partnership
with industry and the broad private sector is vital to stopping cyber crime , Henry said. For example, the FBI
has worked with the financial sector to look for weaknesses in the industrys computer networks.
Based on this data, the bureau released a joint document to alert the industry to threats, h e said.

Even if the plan passes, FBI still cant fight cybercrime effectively
Kenyon 11 (Henry, a staff writer covering enterprise applications for Government Computer News,
FBI goes international to fight cyber criminals on their home turf, GCN, 12/12/11,
http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/12/12/FBI-international-cyber-crime-partnerships.aspx?Page=2)//kjz
But despite the bureaus efforts, there

continue to be major challenges in cyberspace. The FBI is redoubling its

efforts to educate both industry and the public about cyber crime. This is a human issue, and
human beings are the solution, Henry said. Companies must evaluate how they transmit data. Henry said
lax security must not be tolerated, adding that many firms have good security policies but do not implement them properly. If its
not conducted by the leadership of the company, then shame on them, he said. Firms must also be open with law
enforcement when there are illicit intrusions on their networks. Many firms delay when they report
an incident out of fear of angering their shareholders. But if companies are timely in their reports,
it will put them in better standing with regulators. Most everyone will be breached at some time or another, he said.
Even if a company is unaware of an intrusion, the FBI will often find out before the company does. This usually happens during the course of an
investigation when seized data leads back to companies that had been unknowingly breached. The bureaus first priority in these situations is to
alert the victims, he said. The primary responsibility of the FBI with regard to cybersecurity is to work with private industry to protect
commercial networks, Henry said. There

are many challenges, including security flaws dating from the birth
of the Internet that favor criminals. He challenged industry to develop alternate technology
environments with built-in authentication and other defenses because new steps are necessary to
counter cyber crime. They want our money, property, information, and some even want to physically harm us, he said.

2NC Cyber ! D
Defenses are improving and the threat is decreasing
Libicki 13
MARTIN C. LIBICKI is a Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a
Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Foreign Affairs, August 16, 2013,
"Don't Buy the Cyberhype: How to Prevent Cyberwars From Becoming Real Ones",
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-c-libicki/dont-buy-thecyberhype
These days, most of Washington seems to believe that a major cyberattack on U.S.
critical infrastructure is inevitable. In March, James Clapper, U.S. director of national
intelligence, ranked cyberattacks as the greatest short-term threat to U.S. national
security. General Keith Alexander, the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, recently
characterized cyber exploitation of U.S. corporate computer systems as the
greatest transfer of wealth in world history. And in January, a report by the
Pentagons Defense Science Board argued that cyber risks should be managed with
improved defenses and deterrence, including a nuclear response in the most
extreme case. Although the risk of a debilitating cyberattack is real, the
perception of that risk is far greater than it actually is . No person has ever
died from a cyberattack, and only one alleged cyberattack has ever crippled a piece
of critical infrastructure, causing a series of local power outages in Brazil. In fact, a
major cyberattack of the kind intelligence officials fear has not taken place in the 21
years since the Internet became accessible to the public. Thus, while a cyberattack
could theoretically disable infrastructure or endanger civilian lives, its effects would
unlikely reach the scale U.S. officials have warned of. The immediate and direct
damage from a major cyberattack on the United States could range anywhere from
zero to tens of billions of dollars, but the latter would require a broad outage of
electric power or something of comparable damage. Direct casualties would most
likely be limited, and indirect causalities would depend on a variety of factors such
as whether the attack disabled emergency 911 dispatch services. Even in that case,
there would have to be no alternative means of reaching first responders for such
an attack to cause casualties. The indirect effects might be greater if a cyberattack
caused a large loss of confidence, particularly in the banking system. Yet scrambled
records would probably prove insufficient to incite a run on the banks. Officials also
warn that the United States might not be able to identify the source of a
cyberattack as it happens or in its immediate aftermath. Cyberattacks have neither
fingerprints nor the smell of gunpowder, and hackers can make an intrusion appear
legitimate or as if it came from somewhere else. Iran, for example, may not have
known why its centrifuges were breaking down prematurely before its officials read
about the covert cyber-sabotage campaign against the countrys nuclear program in
The New York Times. Victims of advanced persistent threats -- extended intrusions
into organization networks for the purpose of espionage -- are often unaware for
months, or even years, that their servers have been penetrated. The reason that
such attacks go undetected is because the removal of information does not affect
the information in the system, so nothing seems amiss. The exfiltration of

information can also be easily hidden, such as in the daily flow of web traffic from
an organization. But since everything is becoming increasingly dependent on
computers, could levels of damage impossible today become inevitable tomorrow?
As it happens, all of the trend lines -- good and bad -- in cyberspace are rising
simultaneously: the sophistication of attackers, but also that of the defenders; the
salience of cyberattacks as weapons, but also the awareness of the threat they
pose; the bandwidth available for organizing larger attacks, but also the resources
to ward them off. It is bad news that Iran is beginning to see cyberwar as a deniable
means of exploiting easy targets. And it is good news that software companies are
now rethinking the architectural features of their systems that permit such
vulnerabilities to exist in the first place.

Countermeasures solve
Bailey, science correspondent Reason Magazine, 1/18/ 11
(Ronald, http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/18/cyberwar-is-harder-than-it)

Brown and Sommer observe that the Internet and the physical
telecommunications infrastructure were designed to be robust and selfhealing, so that failures in one part are routed around. You have to be
cautious when hearing from people engaging in fear-mongering about huge
blackouts and collapses of critical infrastructures via the Internet, says
University of Toronto cyberwarfare expert Ronald Deibert in the January/February
2011 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. There is a lot of redundancy
in the networks; its not a simple thing to turn off the power grid. In
addition, our experience with current forms of malware is somewhat
reassuring. Responses to new malware have generally been found and made
available within days and few denial of service attacks have lasted more
than a day. In addition, many critical networks such as those carrying financial
transactions are not connected to the Internet requiring insider information
to make them vulnerable.

They dont have the expertise

Lindsay 13
Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist with the University of California
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), located at UC San Diego. He
holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an
MS in computer science from Stanford University, and he has served as an officer in
the US Navy, Security Studies, August 1, 2013, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber
Warfare", http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122

Stuxnet therefore suggests that the asymmetry argument of the Cyber Revolution
thesis has it backward. Cyber warfare is not a weapon of the weak . Weaker
actors face steep barriers to weaponization for causing meaningful damage, and

they are vulnerable to punishing retaliation if they somehow do succeed in injuring

the strong. Strong states, by contrast, have the resources and risk tolerance to
wage cyber warfare against relatively weaker targets like Iran. These barriers to
entry will tend to price weaker actors out of strategic cyber warfare. The technically
and organizationally sophisticated level of play required for cyber warfare is
generally beyond the capacity of a lone hacker , a small group of amateurs, or
even organized criminals, some of the favorite bogeymen of cyberwar discourse.75
There are cheaper and more reliable ways for resource-poor terrorists or states
to cause damage. While the potential global reach of cyber warfare would appear
attractive for limiting the exposure of terrorists, that same distance forms a
formidable barrier for intelligence preparation and operational control of targeted
destructive attacks, without which the risks of operational failure become a serious
liability for the weak. This emphatically does not mean that weak actors are priced
out of irritant attacks for criminal gain, espionage, or political expression; on the
contrary, the desirability of maintaining ability to engage in sub rosa exploitation is
a big reason to avoid more severe forms of cyber attack that would mobilize
unwanted attention. The difference in scale between strategic cyber warfare and
cheaply available cyber irritants will become more apparent in the matter of offense
dominance.

Cyber is too hard for terrorists

Ditz 13
Jason Ditz is news editor at Antiwar.com, March 14 , 2013, "Cyberwar Expert: AlQaeda Too Stupid to Launch Cyber Attacks",
http://news.antiwar.com/2013/03/14/cyberwar-expert-al-qaeda-too-stupid-to-launchcyber-attacks/
British cyberwar expert Dr. Thomas Rid testified to the British Public Accounts
Committee today, downplaying the chances of a sabotage cyber-attack from
abroad. Al-Qaeda are too stupid and China doesnt want to do it , Rid said,
noting that China is almost entirely interested in cyber espionage, not trying to
damage overseas infrastructure just because it can. As for al-Qaeda, Rid claims the
group lacks the formal book-learning to actually use potential exploits to
not only get in to internet connected infrastructure but actually do it
serious harm. It requires intelligence about the targets you are trying to
penetrate, Rid noted, though whether al-Qaeda can gain that capability remains an
open question, and one that is likely to be used to justify ongoing spending hikes on
cyber defense.

Alternatives are easier

Jarvis, senior lecturer in International Security University of East Anglica,
Macdonald, professor of law Swansea University, Nouri, political and cultural
studies Swansea, 14
(Lee, Stuart, and Lella, The Cyberterrorism Threat: Findings from a Survey of
Researchers, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 37, Issue 1, p. 68-90)

One of the reasons offered for the argument that pure cyberterrorism constitutes
a relatively less significant risk is that cyberattacks are comparatively
unattractive to terrorists. In addition to the fact that they lack
theatricality,35 Giacomello, for example, offers a cost/benefit analysis of
cyberterrorism to argue that traditional methods of terrorism and weapons
remain more effective at killing people, and thereby growing the desired
political capital.36 These accounts frequently contrast the possibility of
cyberattack with other terrorist uses of information technology that are regarded as
a pressing and largely overlooked threat. Attention, then, should be given to the
wider use of the Internet by terrorists, including for recruitment,
financing, networking information gathering [and] sharing information37 all of
which enhance the efficiency and reach of terrorist groups.38 On this view, the
nightmare scenarios associated with cyberterrorism should be replaced by
a focus on this broad spectrum of activities, with a range of political, policing,
and civil society stakeholders having a role in countering them.39

The impact is hype

Valeriano 13
BRANDON VALERIANO is Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of
Glasgow, RYAN MANESS is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Illinois at Chicago,
The Ducks of Minerva, January 29, 2013, " Perceptions and Opinions of the Cyber
Threat", http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/01/perceptions-andopinions-of-the-cyber-threat.html

Cyberwar is a pressing international security problem. The news media breathlessly

covers any potential attack before the facts are in. Policy briefs and reports are
produced on all levels of government and private industry. It would then behoove us
to take a step back and examine opinions about the cyber security threat according
to perceptions among policymakers, academics, and cyber security experts in order
to understand how the threat emanating from the cyber security realm is
constructed in the public discourse. Each constituency has its own view on the issue
and how these views manifest is critical to perceptions about the wider societal
threat coming from cyberspace.
According to Allisons bureaucratic model of politics, where you sit in government
determines where you stand or what opinions you have. Through surveys we can
see that process play out. It is in the interest of cyber security experts to
inflate the cyber threat. It is also in the interests of the news media to
breathlessly hype up cyber fears to gain more page views. The threat of
cyberwar is a real and pressing threat, but constrained by institutions and
systems that limit the damage the tactic can do. Just how serious this threat is
perceived can be predicted by ones institutional setting and standard operating
procedures.

On January 30, 2012, technological experts from around the globe were surveyed
by McAfee and the Security and Defense Agenda (SDA) about the issue of cyberwar.
Fifty-seven percent of these practitioners believe that states are currently engaged
in a cyber arms race. It is unclear what a cyber arms race really is in this
context (the raw data from the survey is not online) but the general idea is that
capabilities and the threat from this issue area are increasing at all levels. Other
findings in the survey are just as troubling and mystifying. Forty-three percent
believe the worst case scenario, damage and disruption to a states critical
infrastructure is also the most likely. A further forty five percent believe that cybersecurity is just as pressing an issue as border security. Apparently, the great powers
such as the US, UK, and Germany are lacking in their cyber-readiness when
compared to smaller states such as Israel and Sweden mainly because they fail to
share information internally rather than having any specific deterrent capabilities, at
least according to the McAfee report.
With these opinions in mind, the SDA asked respondents which actions should be
taken to curb this newest threat to international security. Opinions on the next
course of action are just as troubling as the survey results. Apparently, a global
information sharing network should be established by states. This is an odd
perspective in that cyber threats are not uniform across states and centralizing the
network could put states in a more vulnerable position. The next idea is to provide
financial incentives for improvements in security in both the private and public
sectors. An interesting proposal advocating bribery to improve networks much in
the same way a parent bribes a child to do their homework. Finally, diplomats need
to start addressing this issue with more urgency, with the help of cyber security
experts (the subjects of the survey) of course. I would guess the next step is for a
color coded cyber terror warning indicator (I suggest the highest threat be the color
of Mountain Dew in order to honor the true cyber warriors teenage hackers and
computer programmers).
Why would the majority of cyber security practitioners argue for such
expensive, expansive, and urgent measures when the biggest attack,
arguably Stuxnet, required a physical injection of software to take effect?
Clearly there is an interest to promote this threat in the cyber security
community.
In contrast, the TRIP survey asked a sample of academics from U.S. universities
What are the top foreign policy problems facing the United States? They were
pitted against practitioners within the U.S. government who work within the national
security apparatus (PDF). Academics deemed cybersecurity the least pressing
foreign policy problem with only eight percent suggesting it is a top problem. This
falls right behind the fear of oil reliance (12%) and global poverty (12%).
Policymakers rank cybersecurity nearly as low as academics with 17 percent finding
this a top foreign policy problem right above the issue of climate change (eight
percent), global poverty (three percent), and oil reliance (four percent).
Academics find cybersecurity one of the least pressing threats in the system and
policymakers tend to agree generally. So why is cybersecurity such a pressing issue

according to the news media and cyber security practitioners? One might argue that
cyber security practitioners know the reality better than academics and
policymakers; suggesting their warnings about the coming cyber threat is just a
harbinger to the future. Using the bureaucratic politics model, others might
conclude that the cyber security industry is a biased party whose interests
lie in promoting the cyber threat. The news media just parrots these
perspectives because the quotes come easy and the news stories prey on
the fear the average citizen holds towards technology. The danger in
declaring cyberwar a top threat comes from distracting our attention
from more pressing problems like collapsing states, human rights abuses,
the proliferation of terrorism and WMDs, and internal violence in the form of civil
war. Cyberwar is a dangerous issue in contemporary security politics, but it is
nowhere near the top threat facing the United States.

Their authors are biased

Rid 13
Thomas Rid, Reader in War Studies at King's College London, His most recent book
is Cyber War Will Not Take Place, also a non-resident fellow at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, PhD in political science from Humboldt University of Berlin, OC
Register, March 15, 2013, "Thomas Rid: Hype, fear-mongering hurts cyberwar",
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/systems-499977-cyber-control.html

LONDON The White House likes a bit of threat. In his State of the Union address,
Barack Obama wanted to nudge Congress yet again into passing meaningful
legislation. The president emphasized that America's enemies are "seeking the
ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions and our air traffic
control systems." After two failed attempts to pass a cybersecurity act in the past
two years, he added swiftly: "We cannot look back years from now and wonder why
we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy."
Fair enough. A bit of threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is
something else: counterproductive. Yet too many a participant in the cybersecurity
debate reckon that puffery pays off.
The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by
warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left
the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, "Resilient
Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat." The paper seemed obsessed with
making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the
task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the
Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from
cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added,
gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A
reminder is in order : The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone
fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to

survivors of Hiroshima. After all, a bit of fear helps to claim or keep scarce
resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report
recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone,
protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of
weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors.
Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are
keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And
hype is the means to that end . Which leads to the next point: The media want to
sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline
writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar,"
shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the abovementioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on
it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in
a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption."
The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack
that has actually created physical damage Stuxnet was actually executed by the
United States government.
Finally, the intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and
CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly
catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational
choice.
This means that the quality of the public debate suffers, as experts as well as
journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of sometimes
questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to
assess.

Military networks are safe

Manzo 13
Vincent Manzo is a Fellow in the Defense and National Security Group at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, The National Interest, April 3, 2013, "A
Cyber-Survivable Military", http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cyber-survivablemilitary-8296
Whether the threat warrants this tradeoff is unclear. The DSBs analysis raises
questions about whether a disarming cyber strike, synchronized with other combat
operations just as a war erupts, is feasible. An adversary would need to infiltrate
and study secure U.S. military networks as well as the communication, intelligence,
and weapons systems they connect and operate. Then the attacker must customize
code to manipulate them, and for air-gapped targets, covertly gain physical
access. Even if adversaries succeed in planting cyber weapons throughout U.S.
systems, their goal would be to affect the targets only when a war is imminent, so
they would not have the luxury of attacking immediately. Weeks, months
or years could pass before a conflict, during which time U.S. officials might detect

and remove the virus, upgrade to more effective security software, or reconfigure
their network architectures. Ensuring that deployed cyber weapons are poised for
wars that will start at an unspecified time in the future would require consistent
surveillance.

2NC SQUO Solves Financial Crimes

Status Quo Commissions sufficient
FinCen 15 (FinCEN leading informatant for law enforcement in fighting financial crime, quoting
Director James H. Freis, Jr. speaking to the ABA/ABA Money Laundering Enforcement Conference, last
updated: 2015, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF),
http://www.fincen.gov/fraudenftaskforce.html) // CW
President Obama established the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) in November
2009 to hold accountable those who helped bring about the last financial crisis, and to prevent
another crisis from happening. The task force is improving efforts across the government and with
State and local partners to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and
effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, recover proceeds for victims, and
address financial discrimination in the lending and financial markets. With more than 20 Federal
agencies, 94 U.S. Attorneys Offices and State and local partners, its the broadest coalition of law
enforcement, investigatory, and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud. FinCEN has
been actively involved in these efforts, as Suspicious Activity Reports are one of the best sources of
lead information for law enforcement in fighting financial crime, and because of FinCENs ability to
build upon our existing network of support to law enforcement at the Federal, State, and local levels and
the financial regulators. Of the three Task Force committees enumerated in President Obamas Executive
Order, FinCEN serves together with the Justice Departments Executive Office for United States
Attorneys as co-chair of the Training and Information Sharing Committee.

SQ solvesFinancial Fraud Enforcement Task Force increases coordination and

utilizes resources
SEC 09 (President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 11/17/09, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009249.htm)//kjz
President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force WASHINGTON Attorney General Eric Holder, Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Shaun Donovan, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro today announced that President Barack Obama

has established by Executive Order an interagency

Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to strengthen efforts to combat financial crime. The
Department of Justice will lead the task force and the Department of Treasury, HUD and the SEC will serve on the steering
committee. The task force's leadership, along with representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities and
inspectors general, will work with state and local partners to investigate and prosecute significant
financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, address discrimination in the lending and
financial markets and recover proceeds for victims. Additional Materials Executive Order: Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement
Task Force Remarks of SEC Enforcement Director Robert S. Khuzami at Department of Justice Press Conference Fighting Financial Fraud:
Securities and Exchange Commission Fact Sheet The

task force, which replaces the Corporate Fraud Task Force established in 2002, will
build upon efforts already underway to combat mortgage, securities and corporate fraud by
increasing coordination and fully utilizing the resources and expertise of the government's law
enforcement and regulatory apparatus. The attorney general will convene the first meeting of the Task Force in the next 30
days. "This task force's mission is not just to hold accountable those who helped bring about the last financial meltdown, but to prevent another
meltdown from happening," Attorney General Eric Holder said. "We will be relentless in our investigation of corporate and financial wrongdoing,
and will not hesitate to bring charges, where appropriate, for criminal misconduct on the part of businesses and business executives." "Through
the Financial Fraud Task Force,

we are making clear that the Obama Administration is going to act

aggressively and proactively in a coordinated effort to combat financial fraud," said Treasury Secretary
Geithner. "It's not enough to prosecute fraud only after it's become widespread. We can't to wait for problems to peak before we respond. We're

seeking comprehensive financial reform to create a more stable, safer financial system and stepping
up our enforcement strategy. Doing so will help to stop emerging trends in financial fraud before they're able to cause extensive,
system-wide damage to our economy." "To give American families the protection and peace-of-mind they need, it's clear the federal response
must be as interconnected and multi-dimensional as the challenges we face," said HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan. "No one agency is going to be
able to stop financial fraud. This Task force will build upon many of the inter-agency collaborations already underway to protect consumers and
restore confidence." "Many

financial frauds are complicated puzzles that require painstaking efforts to

piece together. By formally coordinating our efforts, we will be better able to identify the pieces,
assemble the puzzle and put an end to the fraud," said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro. The task force is composed of
senior-level officials from the following departments, agencies and offices: the Department of Justice; the Department of the Treasury; the
Department of Commerce; the Department of Labor; the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Department of Education; the
Department of Homeland Security; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Federal Trade
Commission; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Housing Finance
Agency; the Office of Thrift Supervision; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; the Small Business Administration; the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; the Social Security Administration; the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations; the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network; the United States Postal Inspection Service; the United States Secret Service; the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
relevant Offices of Inspectors General and related Federal entities, including without limitation the Office of the Inspector General for the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board and the Office of the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program; and such other executive branch departments, agencies, or offices as the President may, from time
to time, designate or that the Attorney General may invite. In addition, the attorney general will invite representatives of the National Association
of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys Association and other state, local, tribal and territorial representatives to participate in the
task force through its Enforcement Committee.

SQ solvesFINCEN
FINCEN no date (What We Do, no date, United States Department of Treasury Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/)//kjz
FinCEN is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The Director of FinCEN is appointed by the Secretary of
the Treasury and reports to the Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence . FinCENs mission is to
safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering and promote national
security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic
use of financial authorities. FinCEN carries out its mission by receiving and maintaining financial
transactions data; analyzing and disseminating that data for law enforcement purposes; and
building global cooperation with counterpart organizations in other countries and with
international bodies. FinCEN exercises regulatory functions primarily under the Currency and Financial Transactions Reporting Act of
1970, as amended by Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and other legislation, which legislative framework is commonly referred to as
the "Bank Secrecy Act" (BSA). The BSA is the nation's first and most comprehensive Federal anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financing (AML/CFT) statute. In brief, the BSA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations requiring banks and other financial
institutions to take a number of precautions against financial crime, including the establishment of AML programs and the filing of reports that
have been determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings, and certain intelligence
and counter-terrorism matters. The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated to the Director of FinCEN the authority to implement, administer, and
enforce compliance with the BSA and associated regulations. Congress has given FinCEN certain duties and responsibilities for the central
collection, analysis, and dissemination of data reported under FinCEN's regulations and other related data in support of government and financial
industry partners at the Federal, State, local, and international levels. To fulfill its responsibilities toward the detection and deterrence of financial
crime, FinCEN: Issues and interprets regulations authorized by statute; Supports and enforces compliance with those regulations; Supports,
coordinates, and analyzes data regarding compliance examination functions delegated to other Federal regulators; Manages the collection,
processing, storage, dissemination, and protection of data filed under FinCEN's reporting requirements; Maintains a government-wide access
service to FinCEN's data, and networks users with overlapping interests; Supports law enforcement investigations and prosecutions; Synthesizes
data to recommend internal and external allocation of resources to areas of greatest financial crime risk; Shares information and coordinates with
foreign financial intelligence unit (FIU) counterparts on AML/CFT efforts; and Conducts analysis to support policymakers; law enforcement,
regulatory, and intelligence agencies; FIUs; and the financial industry. FinCEN serves as the FIU for the United States and is one of more than
100 FIUs making up the Egmont Group, an international entity focused on information sharing and cooperation among FIUs. An FIU is a central,
national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analyzing, and disseminating to the competent authorities disclosures of
financial information: concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism or required by national legislation or
regulation in order to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. As one of the world's leading FIUs ,

FinCEN exchanges
financial information with FIU counterparts around the world in support of U.S. and foreign
financial crime investigations. The basic concept underlying FinCEN's core activities is "follow the money." The primary motive of
criminals is financial gain, and they leave financial trails as they try to launder the proceeds of crimes or attempt to spend their ill-gotten profits .
FinCEN partners with law enforcement at all levels of government and supports the nation's

foreign policy and national security objectives. Law enforcement agencies successfully use similar techniques, including
searching information collected by FinCEN from the financial industry, to investigate and hold accountable a broad range of criminals, including
perpetrators of fraud, tax evaders, and narcotics traffickers. More

recently, the techniques used to follow money trails

also have been applied to investigating and disrupting terrorist groups, which often depend on
financial and other support networks.

2NC Econ ! D
No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data
Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
October 2012, The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_TheIrony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border
conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead
states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict , there were genuine concerns that the global
economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the
disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise ,
however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a Global Peace Index annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from
the 2012 report is that The

average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.38

Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis as have military
expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any
increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers
Brubaker concludes, the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic
exclusion that might have been expected.40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly.
Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis
levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to
the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the
Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One
financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of contained depression.41 The key word is contained, however.

Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great
Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive . As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth
Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II
and not even worse must be regarded as fortunate.42

No escalation of conflicts
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and
Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p.
403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful
world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one
example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a

worsening of the current economic difficulties,

which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggarmy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts
could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not
so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states that were more
internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more
extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited , it is hard to see how
without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their
countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become
severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this
argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis , an optimist could reply
(correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without

anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater
economic conflict , it will not make war thinkable .

Ignore history warrants world order has changed

BARNETT 09 senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing
editor/online columnist for Esquire
[Thomas P.M, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, 8/25/9,
http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx]

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary
predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to
world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets
-- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly
worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the
more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global
recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the
economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts
listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August
was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most
important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long
struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar
picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the
recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to
one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the
United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our
involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the
economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with
pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally
pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond
advising and training local forces.

2NC AT: Diversionary Theory

Diversionary theory is crap---180 empirics disprove it
Gelpi 97 (Christopher, Center for International Affairs @ Harvard, "Democratic Diversions," Sage)
Students of international politics have often argued that state leaders initiate the use of force internationally to divert
attention away from domestic problems. The author contends that these arguments concerning relationship between domestic
unrest and international conflict are not supported empirically because they focus too narrowly on the incentives
state leaders have to use external force as a diversionary tactic without considering alternative solutions to quieting
domestic unrest. It is hypothesized that democratic leaders will respond to domestic unrest by diverting attention by using force
internationally. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders are expected to repress the unrest directly, and these acts of
repression will make them less likely to use force internationally. An analysis of the initiation of force by
the challenging states in 180 international crises between 1948 and 1982 strongly supports these hypotheses. The
results of the analyses and their implications for the literature on diversionary conflicts and the rapidly growing literature on democratic peace are
discussed.

No evidence backs diversionary theory.

Reiter 9Dan Reiter is professor and chair of political science at Emory University [Aug 17, 2009,
How Wars End, ch. 2, Bargaining, Information, and Ending Wars, pg. 9-10, Princeton University Press]
Irnportantly, the assumption that Wars are always on balance costly for each side is not uncontroversial. Some feminist approaches contend that
states may fight for the sake of lighting, as wars serve patriarchy by reinforcing gender identity.3 A more mainstream

critique is that
leaders go to war for domestic political reasons, such that a war-avoiding bargain might not be
reachable even when both sides knew who would win, as lighting itself provides domestic political benefits from a war to
both win- ner and loser.4 Under some conditions, especially if a state is undergoing democratization or if a national leader is
experiencing domestic political problems such as unrest or economic downturn, a state may see war
as a way to rally the public around the leader and stave off domestic political challenges .5 The
proposition that leaders go to war when facing domestic difficulties is often called the
"diversionary" hypothesis.
However, the evidence that leaders choose war to solve internal political problems is thin . The underlying assumption
is that going to war en- genders a rally round the flag effect that boosts the popularity of leaders,
but leaders reap this benefit only under very narrow conditions (which often cannot be controlled by the attacking
state), and even the biggest rallies are short-lived .6 Importantly, there is almost no smoking gun historical
evidence of a leader launching a war primarily as a means of solving domestic political problems. At
most, politicians have occasionally speculated about diversionary action, such as Secretary of State William Seward's (ignored) April 1861
suggestion to President Abraham Lincoln that the United States provoke crises with European powers as a means of staving off civil war between
the Union and the seceding southern states.7 A Russian minister is famously thought to have declared just after the outbreak ofthe 1904-O5
Russo-japanese War that, "We need a little, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution," but the story is likely too good to be true.8 Leaders
sometimes see indirect relationships between starting war and reaping domestic political benefits, such as the possibility that Lyndon Johnson
escalated the Vietnam War in 1965 to protect his Great Society program from domestic political attack.9 Some

quantitative studies
have found that the presence of internal problems like declining economic growth, rising inflation,
partial democratization, or declining leader popularity are correlated with a n (often slightly) increased
likelihood in the use of force. However, these relationships are often limited in scope, occurring only
under certain economic or political conditions.10 Any possible diversionary effects might in turn be
moderated by the tendency of states to avoid provoking other states that might have diversionary
incentives.11

No empirical support for diversionary war.

Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas, El Paso
and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth and Violent
International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol. 21(3), June, pp. 249268,
EBSCO]
In contrast, studies of diversionary theory make state-level (monadic) or dyadic arguments. Most studies to date have been monadic and only a
few have examined strategic diversionary behavior from a dyadic perspective. Of central importance to this study are those theories of
diversionary conflict arguing that economic crisis induces foreign conflicts. However, while

diversionary theory has been

popular, the bulk of extant research examines the foreign policy of the United States (Ostrom and Job,
1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; DeRouen, 1995; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Wang, 1996; Fordham, 1998; Mitchell
and Moore, 2002; Foster, 2006). Meernik (1994) and Meernik

and Waterman (1996) find no evidence of diversionary

behavior.

Prefer our evbest data set.

Boehmer 7Charles R. Boehmer received his Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University in 2002
and is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at The University of Texas at El Paso. [December, 2007,
The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate
Interstate Conflict, Politics & Policy, Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 774809, accessed online through
Wiley]
Studies of diversionary conflict typically claim that lower rates of economic growth and domestic
unrest increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict . Research shows that these factors are also related to regime
changes. Lower rates of economic growth and domestic conflict should increase the risk that governments are overthrown. This article
investigates the comparative risk of economic growth and domestic turmoil on militarized interstate
conflict and regime changes on a sample of over 100 countries from 1920-92. I find that higher rates
of economic growth are related to violent militarized interstate conflicts and reduce the risk of regime changes.
Democracy and economic development likewise provide internal stability and interstate peace. Yet the risk of regime change increases rapidly
relative to involvement in an interstate conflict for states affected by high levels of domestic conflict, suggesting that

strategies are a risky gambit that have a high chance of failure.

any diversionary

2NC AT: Royal

Royal votes neg
Royal, your author, 10director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the
Problem of Economic Crises, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books, AL)

There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in
cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level reduces the ability of the state to coalesce a
sufficiently strong political base required to undertake costly balancing measures such as economic costly signals.
Schweller (2006)builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with
decisions not to balance against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for
states to 'underbalance'.Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats
in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly
constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives ; they will be least likely to enact bold and costly
policies even when their nation's survival is at stake and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

PTX Links

1NC
Marijuana policy is a divisive issue
Hudak 3/22 (John, a fellow in Governance Studies and Managing Editor of the FixGov blog, 2016
Will Be the Marijuana Election, Newsweek, 3/22/15, http://www.newsweek.com/2016-will-bemarijuana-election-315472)//kjz
Why Republicans want to talk about marijuana There are a variety of substantive reasons marijuana policy is an appealing topic for someif not
allRepublican hopefuls. However, there is a central political basis for it: presidential primaries. In many ways, the GOP is in lock-step on a
variety of major issues: health care, budget deficits, taxes, executive power, international trade, etc. As a result, it is hard to find daylight between
the candidates. For evidence of this, re-watch some of the 2012 GOP presidential debates. At times, they looked more like a church choir eager to
find harmony than a group of adversaries trying to win a race. Marijuana

is different. Views diverge among

Republicans. Some candidates, like Rand Paul, have come closer to embracing legalizationat least those efforts
at the state levelin an effort to connect to younger and libertarian voters. Others have been far more open-minded about
medical marijuana, either endorsing such systems or appearing comfortable with a hands off approach. Still others, like Jeb Bush
and Marco Rubio, have taken a more hardline, war-on-drugs approach to the topic. This diversity is a
magnificent thing for Republicans and Republican voters. Among (prospective) candidates who, at times, seem to be policy clones,

marijuana offers voters the ability to distinguish positions. As a result, candidates must have positions on the topic.
Beyond political necessity, there are substantive policy reasons why this issue matters to the GOP. Federalism is often popular
with the GOP base, and hailing states rights is often times a safe bet on uncomfortable issues.
Criminal justice reform has its staunch GOP supporters, particularly among the libertarian wing, and Rand Paul has both taken up
that torch within the party and even outside the party to connect with voters on the issue of
marijuana. On the flip side, values voters still have a loud voice within the partyparticularly in the primary electorateand some
Republicans have carved out firm opposition to marijuana , suggesting that for pot policy their administrations
position will be simple: Just say no.

2NC
Only medical marijuana is popular in Congressthe plan needs to change
recreational policy
Angell 3/24 (Tom, founded Marijuana Majority to help more people understand that marijuana
legalization is a mainstream, majority-supported issue and that no one who wants to end prohibition
should be afraid to say so, Medical Marijuana Gains Momentum in Congress, Marijuana, 3/24/15,
http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/2015/03/medical-marijuana-gains-momentum-in-congress/)//kjz
Bipartisan medical marijuana legislation is picking up steam on Capitol Hill. On Monday, Rep. Steve
Cohen (D-TN), joined by Rep. Don Young (R-AK), introduced a bill that would effectively end the federal
governments war on medical marijuana. The legislation, dubbed the Compassionate Access, Research Expansion, and
Respect States Act of 2015 or CARERS Act, is identical to a Senate bill of the same name that was introduced by a bipartisan trio of lawmakers
earlier this month. The proposal would reschedule marijuana, allow banks to provide financial services to state-legal cannabis businesses, lift
restrictions on marijuana research, allow for the interstate importation of CBD-rich strains and allow V.A. doctors to recommend medical
cannabis to military veterans, among other changes. In remarks submitted for the Congressional Record, Cohen

referred to polls
showing that an overwhelming majority of Americans supports medical marijuana. 86 percent of
Americans rarely agree on anything It is long overdue for our federal law to reflect the common sense views of 86 percent of Americans and
stop adding to the suffering of those with horrible illnesses. In a press release, Young said, The topic of medical and recreational marijuana has
always been an issue of states rights for me, a position based upon a strong belief in the 10th Amendment and the principals of federalism
established by our Founders. Since the Senate bills introduction by Sens. Cory Booker (D-NJ), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Rand Paul (RKY), it has picked up two additional sponsors, Sens. Dean Heller (R-NV) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA). There were at least 15 separate pieces of
marijuana reform legislation introduced in the U.S. House during the last Congressional session, and many of those bills narrowed in on one

CARERS, by contrast, is comprehensive

and aims to eliminate most of these federal hurdles, at least for medical cannabis, in one fell swoop.
roadblock or another the federal government has erected in the way of state marijuana laws.

Funding CP

1NC
Text: The FBI should reallocate funding to substantially increase the salary of cyber
security employees. The FBI should end its fitness test requirement and polygraph
testing.
Solves the aff better Majority of hackers are weed free and salaries are the key internal link
Brewster 14 (Thomas; May 23, 2014; Motherboard; Money Is the Reason the Government Can't
Hire Decent Hackers, Not Weed; http://motherboard.vice.com/read/money-is-the-reason-thegovernment-cant-hire-decent-hackers-not-weed)//CC
Comeys comments, though apparently a joke, oddly revived a stereotype that many thought was
dead: that of the pot-head, hoody-wearing, pale-faced social outcast sitting in a dark room whacking
away at the keyboard. That stereotype is long gone. There are some like that but those involved get
their kicks more out of what they do rather than drugs. That's not to say a certain number dont
partake in drug taking but it's not a majority, Brian Honan, who set up Irelands first Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT), told me. The persistence of the clich may just be a problem at
the FBI, according to security consultant and co-founder of Xiphos Research Labs, Michael Kemp. The
FBI have always considered things in stereotypes, he said. He thinks that the public perception of
hackers has shifted, however, because of high-profile surveillance operations, like those being carried
out by the US and China. People with cyber skills are no longer caricatures. Honan said the real
problem around luring talented hackers into law enforcement largely comes down to one thing. And
thats money. The problem faced by law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, is the salaries
that are on offer. Many talented hackers can demand high salaries in the private sector or indeed
even more from criminal gangs, he said. A sub-100k ($170k) per annum salary isnt worth bothering
with for many, given a hacker can make that kind of money in one go by selling a zero-day exploit (code
that targets unpatched, unknown vulnerabilities in software). Its down to them whether they want to hand
their zero-day to a legitimate exploit broker, who tend to have big contracts with governments and law
enforcement anyway, or to a criminal organisation, which could use it for nefarious purposes like stealing
money from internet users. If the government cant increase their salaries, they may be better off boosting
training and resources to improve skills amongst the existing workforce, whilst trying their best to
convince technically gifted youngsters that law enforcement is the place to be, added Honan.

Polygraph testing prevents FBI from hiring qualified applicants

Wells 13 (Tish, reviewer, web editor, researcher at McClatchyDC, FBI turns away many applicants
who fail lie-detector tests, McClatchey DC, 5/20/13, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/specialreports/article24749254.html#storylink=cpy)//kjz
Thousands of job applicants come to FBI offices all across the country every year, eager to work for the top law enforcement agency
in the U.S. But many of them have their hopes dashed, and its not because of their work experience or education or criminal records.
Theyre turned down because theyve failed their polygraph tests. The FBIs policy of barring job
candidates who fail their polygraph tests clashes with the view of many scientists that government
agencies shouldnt be relying on polygraph testing to decide whether to hire or fire someone .
Experts say polygraph testing isnt a reliable indicator of whether someone is lying especially in
employment screening. Further, a little-known technical glitch in one of the leading polygraphs that the
bureau and many other government agencies have used could give applicants who fail polygraphs even more

reason to assert that they were inaccurately and unfairly labeled liars. I was called a lazy, lying, drug dealing
junkie by a man who doesnt know me , my stellar background or my societal contributions, wrote one black applicant in Baltimore, who said he
was told he qualified for a job except for his polygraph test failure. Just because I am young and black does not automatically denote that I have
ever used any illegal drugs. Government agencies use polygraph testing not only to weed out job applicants but also to question criminal

polygraph testing
is controversial, many scientists are highly critical of its use in job screening, saying its especially prone to inaccuracies
because the questions are often more vague than they are in criminal investigations and therefore
theyre more likely to provoke reactions from the innocent that might seem like deception. Adding to
suspects and to determine whether sex offenders are complying with psychological treatment or probation. Although all

the skepticism, polygraphers have documented problems with the measurement of sweat by the LX4000, a polygraph that the FBI and many other
federal agencies and police departments across the country have used, McClatchy found. Polygraphers also interpret measurements of respiration
and blood pressure for their decisions on whether someone is lying, but many see the sweat measurement as especially indicative of deception.
The manufacturer of the LX4000, Lafayette Instrument Co. Inc., describes the problem as rare but it isnt able to specify what that means. The
company also points out that other polygraphs that use the same technology might have the problem as well. The potential for occasional
differences to be observed was already clearly described in the published literature, not limited to the Lafayette polygraph system, and anecdotal
experience confirms it is an occasional occurrence, the company said in a statement to McClatchy. But Gene Iredale, a San Diego lawyer, said
the problem could mean that agencies such as the FBI are making decisions in criminal cases and are taking away security clearances on the
basis of completely inaccurate information. The polygraph is speculative to begin with; thats why its not admissible in court. A spokeswoman
said the bureau, which has polygraphed applicants since 1994, continues to find it a relevant and necessary tool in both employment and
operational related matters. The spokeswoman, Kathleen Wright, said the bureau wouldnt respond to questions about the LX4000 nor reveal the
number of people who failed each year, although she acknowledged that if an applicant doesnt pass a polygraph then the applicant is normally
not hired. Records obtained by McClatchy show the FBI polygraphs about13,000 people a year for job screening, criminal investigations and
national security inquiries. According

to records, the bureau has at least a 30 percent failure rate in its job
screening. As many as 40 percent of special agent applicants dont get the job because of their
polygraph test results.

Cyber Candidates cant pass fitness tests

Cooper 14 (Daniel; December 31, 2014; The Army may ditch fitness tests for unfit, 'ponytailwearing' hackers; Engadget; http://www.engadget.com/2014/12/31/army-fitness-tests/)//CC
It's a truth, often forgotten, that no-one can be perfect at everything. We may laud Justin
Timberlake's musical, dancing and acting ability, but he's probably a terrible plumber. It's a problem that
the Army is beginning to understand, since the sort of people who can successfully fight in a cyber
war are more likely to be bad at assault courses, climbing ropes and carrying heavy objects. It's with
this in mind that Lt. Gen. Robert Brown, head of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, says
that the US Army may relax its fitness requirements for digital soldiers. Speaking at the New America
Foundation, the Telegraph reports that the officer said that the best cyber soldiers "are not natural
candidates for a military career." He went on to add, delightfully, that these teens "grew up on Google
and wear ponytails," and they're probably listening to some of that gosh-darn it loud rock and roll
music, too. Of course, this is an off-hand remark from a single officer, although it's a sentiment that's
been uttered before, most recently by Maj. Gen. Allen Batschelet in October. Still, it looks as if all those
hours of Uplink may just get you out of having to do the regulation 100 pushups, 100 sit-ups and 2-mile
run.

AT: Perm do both

Links to the NB
Perm is intrensic, it Adds the whole function of the CP
1. Destroys our ground if the aff gets intrinsic permutations well never be
able to win counterplan competition because they can always perm out of our
net benefit by adding new parts to the plan. Without counterplans the neg is
stuck defending a morally repugnant status quo and always loses.
2. That puts the aff in a double bind either they lose because their permutation
is horribly abusive or they lose because their case has no advantage now that
we can make intrinsicness arguments to all their harms. Either way you vote
neg.

Links to the NB
No the CP reallocates money the spending links do not apply because there is no
increase in spending

2NC Polygraph Solves

Polygraph testing hinders recruitment
Evans 14 (Zenon, a former Reason staff writer and editor, Ever Pirate Music? The FBI Probably Won't
Hire You.,Reason.com, 10/16/14, https://reason.com/blog/2014/10/16/ever-pirate-music-the-fbiprobably-wont)//kjz
Wait! Before you illegally download that copy of Justin Bieber's latest hits, you've got to know something: It could cost you a gig with the FBI.
TorrentFreak, a blog dedicated to all things copyright- and piracy-related, reported last week: Monday this week Sacramento State's Career
Center welcomed the FBI for a visit concerning recruitment of students for its paid internship program. One of the topics discussed were
historical actions that could exclude applicants from the program. In addition to drug use, criminal activity and even defaulting on a student loan,

students were informed that if they had illegally downloaded content in the past, that could rule
them out of a position at the FBI. It appears that to the agency, downloading is tantamount to
stealing. The student-run State Hornet spoke with an FBI representative, Steve Dupre, who says there's no point in lying about
it: During the first two phases of interviews, everything is recorded and then turned into a report.
This report is then passed along to a polygraph technician to be used during the applicant's exam,
which consists of a 55-page questionnaire. If an applicant is caught lying, they can no longer apply
for an FBI agent position. "If you are accepted to intern at FBI and fail the polygraph you can no longer apply to FBI again." Dupre
said. This policy isn't terribly surprising, since the FBI has gone after high-profile file-sharing sites
like MegaUpload. Though, that doesn't mean it's a policy that makes much sense. While the agency considers piracy "a growing threat,"
several studies have shown that musicians and entertainers actually benefit from the illicit distribution of their art. A 2012 survey found that 46

By barring young
people who participate in an increasingly common activity, the FBI is limiting its own pool of
technologically curious and savvy potential employeesjust as it's doing by not hiring marijuana users. Whether the
percent of all Americans illegally download copyrighted material, and among people aged 18-29, it's 70 percent.

policy even works is up for debate, since it's been documented just how much members of the FBI (and Congress and the Department of Justice)
like to snatch free copies of their favorite shows and movies, too.

T Substantial

1NC
Interpretation:
Substantial must be at least 2%
Words & Phrases 60
'Substantial" means "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable." Bequest to charitable institution, making
1/48 of expenditures in state, held exempt from taxation; such expenditures constituting "substantial" part of its activities. Tax
Commission of Ohio v. American Humane Education Soc., 181 N.E. 557, 42 Ohio App. 4.

Only 70,000 FBI applicants every year

CNN 09 (FBI gets 270,000 applications for 3,000 jobs, CNN, 3/17/09,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/17/fbi.hiring/index.html?eref=ib_us)//kjz
What happened next caught many at the FBI by surprise. More than 270,000 people applied over about six weeks. The

FBI said about

70,000 people seek positions in a normal year. Video Watch the applications pile up at the FBI

35,000 people work at the FBI

FBI no date (Frequently Asked Questions, FBI, no date, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs)//kjz
35 How many people work for the FBI? The FBI employs nearly 35,000 people, including special agents and support
professionals such as intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, and information technology specialists. Learn how you can join us at
FBIJobs.gov.

The US population is three hundred and eighteen million eight hundred and fifty
seven thousand and fifty-six people
U.S. Census Bureau15 (US Census Bureau derived data from: Population Estimates, American
Community Survey, Census of Population and Housing, State and County Housing Unit Estimates,
County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners,
Building Permits, Last updated: 6/8/15, USA http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html) CW
(from graph below)
People QuickFacts

Population, 2014 estimate

USA

318,857,056

Violation: At best, the aff affects .033% of the people who are surveilled in the US
T is a voter:
1. Neg Ground the affirmative will always no link out of all the DA because of
the minimal people affected this takes out specific DAs and core neg ground
like politic and terror which kills argument innovation and clash
2. Limits moves out of predictable literature making the negative have an
unfair research burden because they must search for every small aff like the
presidents dentist should stop being surveilled

Advantage Counterplan

1NC
Text: The United States federal government should update the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, adopt Data Breach Notifications, and increase information sharing with
the private sector.
The counterplan solves the cyber security advantage
Cooney 14 (Internally cites Joseph Demarest the assistant director of the FBIs Cyber Division;
Michael; December 11, 2014; Networld; FBI: The top 3 ways Congress could help fight tenacious cyber
threats; http://www.networkworld.com/article/2858651/malware-cybercrime/fbi-the-top-3-wayscongress-could-help-fight-tenacious-cyber-threats.html)//CC
Demarest suggested three ways Congress could help evolve with that cyber threat. In particular:
Update the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) constitutes
the primary federal law against hacking, protecting the public against criminals who hack into computers
to steal information, install malicious software, and delete files. The CFAA was first enacted in 1986, at a
time when the problem of cyber crime was still in its infancy. Over the years, a series of measured,
modest changes have been made to the CFAA to reflect new technologies and means of committing
crimes and to equip law enforcement with the tools to respond to changing threats. The CFAA has not
been amended since 2008, however, and the intervening years have again created the need for the
enactment of modest, incremental changes. The Administration has proposed several such revisions to
keep federal criminal law uptodate with rapidlyevolving technologies . Cyber threats adapt and
evolve at the speed of light, and we need laws on the books that reflect the most current means by
which cyber actors are committing crimes. Updating the CFAA to reflect these changes would help
strengthen our ability to punish, and therefore to deter, the crimes we seek to prevent. Data Breach
Notifications. We believe there is a strong need for a uniform federal standard holding certain types
of businesses accountable for data breaches and theft of electronic personally identifiable
information. Businesses should, for example, be required to provide prompt notice to consumers in
the wake of a certain cyber attacks. Such a standard would not only hold businesses accountable for
breaches, but would also assist in FBI and other law enforcement efforts to identify, pursue, and
defeat the perpetrators of cyber attacks. Information Sharing. Although the government and the
private sector already share cyber threat information on a daily basis, legislation can enhance the value
and benefit of these information sharing relationships. The government and the private sector both
have critical and unique insights into the cyber threats we face, and sharing these insights is
necessary to enhance our mutual understanding of the threat. Similarly, the operational collaboration
required to identify cyber threat indicators and to mitigate intrusions requires the exact type of sharing we
seek in the first place. As such, the FBI supports legislation that would establish a clear framework
for sharing and reduce risk in the process, in addition to providing strong and straightforward
safeguards for the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. U.S. citizens must have confidence that
threat information is being shared appropriately, and we in the law enforcement and intelligence
communities must be as transparent as possible. We also want to ensure that all the relevant federal
partners receive the information in real time.

CISA Pltx NB
Counterplan doesnt link to politics CISA has bipart support
Robinson 6/12 (Teri Robinson; June 12, 2015; SC Magazine; Senate vote falls short of approving
defense act with CISA amendment; http://www.scmagazine.com/democrats-chided-for-not-supportingdefense-authorization-act/article/420500/)//CC
Calling Senate Democrats out for a 56-40 vote Thursday that failed to garner enough support to more the
Defense Authorization Bill forward, and with it the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), that
Republicans had attached to the bill, Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn, R-Texas, said the refusal
to move forward with this legislation, particularly the cybersecurity part of this discussion, is just
unconscionable. CISA had enjoyed bipartisan support, easily passing the Senate Intelligence
Committee in a 14-1 vote in March, although it continued to draw criticism from privacy groups. After
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed a data breach that is now believed to have
exposed the social security numbers and personnel information on every federal worker, Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., tried to attached CISA to the Defense Authorization Bill and fast
track its passage. Prior to the vote and amid Republican criticism, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid
noted that Democrats had been trying for five years to pass a cybersecurity bill but it was
consistently blocked by Republicans.