Sec. 18.

1. RAUL DAZA V LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

FACTS:
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

After the May 1987 Congressional Elections, the House of Representatives

proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on
Appointments (COA) among the several political parties represented in the
chamber, as pursuant to Article 6, Section 18 of the Constitution. Herein
Petitioner Daza was among those chosen and listed as representative of the
Liberal Party (LP).
However, on 16 September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
reorganized which resulted to political realignment in the House; 24 members
of LP resigned and joined LDP, thereby swelling the formers number from
159 to 17.
Due to such, the House revised its representatives in the COA by withdrawing
the seat of Petitioner and giving it to the newly LDP, respondent Singson.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint in the Supreme Court on the ground of his
removal from the COA. Consequently, the Court issued a TRO to prevent both
petitioner and respondent from serving in the COA.
Petitioner contends that he cannot be removed because his appointment is
permanent, citing a ruling in Cunanan v. Tan, and asserting that the
rerganization of LDP is not based on permanent political realignment since
LDP is not a duly registered pol. party.
On the other hand, respondent avers that the question raised by petitioner is
political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, he
invokes that nowhere in the Constitution requires that a political party be
registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the COA.

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political

realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission
on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to
the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the
CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson.
Daza questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the
composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress
to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently
thereto NOT the court.
2. GUIGONA V GONZALES, October 20, 1992
HRETs Composition Rounding Off
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed
to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No.
of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDPLABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party
because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent
the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen
Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP,
one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKASNUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in
the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no
other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional
half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5
to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the

political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and
reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the
NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the
CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member
senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may
coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially
since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)
In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27,
1992 and respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo
on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated
October 20, 1992, on the following grounds:
Senator Taada alleges that:
1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual
precedents;
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter
and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions;
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent
Taada to the Commission on Appointments.
In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:
1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases
of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 1and Daza vs. Singson. 2
2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to
enable it to function as a constitutional body.
3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all
political parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission
on Appointments.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system
which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of
any party in the Commission.
Sec 19
Sec 20
Sec 21
1. ARNAULT V NAZARENO, 87 Phil 29 (ml phil ng)
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the
sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum
and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his
two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates
respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought
the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company.
In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete
his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the
Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank,
from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the
latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special
committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee
created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought
to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying
to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two
estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to
him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new
account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he
deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he
drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account
of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of
P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of

the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this
resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name
of
the
person
to
whom
he
gave
the
P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being
questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to
make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation
to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time
to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the
power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for
life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might
thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which
is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His
insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would
incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is
unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony which is
obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according to
the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him.
2. VIRGILIO GARCILLANO V HOUSES OF REPRESETATIVES COMMITTES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION ET AL.
FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes,
allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of
public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument
that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to
the present Senate of the 14 th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.
Issue: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation through the Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.
Held:The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling
which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7)

days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other
form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the
due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A
person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through
the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or
an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has
to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
3. SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO DE LA PAZ & MARIA FE DE LA PAZ V
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2009
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Jurisdiction and Publication
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to
attend an Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled
GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the
departure area for he was carrying with him 105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also
carrying with him 45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is
carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De
La Paz and his group was later released but the s were confiscated by the Russians.
Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the
Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of
the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate
the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in
paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They
further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued
the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of
respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the
same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the
basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution states: Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This
provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the
Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by
petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is
within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political
question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the
Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with
the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation.
Power of the Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation distinguish said power
with its power to call department secretaries, etc., during question hour
4. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April
20, 2006
5 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well
as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and

arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments
who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress
without first securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval,
Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made
to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to
each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which
is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution,
the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of

legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited
to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
When the power of inquiry in aid of legislation is not allowed.
BENGZON, JR. VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, NOV. 20, 1991
203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That
they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother
in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country
including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa
took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the
matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or
the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the
committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise
refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically
denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted
to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional
rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the
Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of
legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since
the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during
the pendency of this case.
ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she

directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later
refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704
504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No.
455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within
its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered
performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by
Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered
more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is coextensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the
right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation.
2. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA
421
155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an
investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric
Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before
the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of,
alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the

National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of
Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the
SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the
power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena
and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said
power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the
performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would
run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC
explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the
power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative
body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that
the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order
complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt
power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the
subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
Sec 22
Sec 23
d. ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369
84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was
the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal
from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no
legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon
Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines;
he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from
49-50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold
the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative
and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and
intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts
were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved
in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
- the second emergency powers cases.
92 Phil. 603 Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952,
the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and
the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing
funds pursuant to said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note
that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke
CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his

perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared
inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA
671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or
calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without
such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared
cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the
repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to
contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier
for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not,
and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of
agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot
be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to
keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the
agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
Sec 24.
TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE (The E-VAT Law)
235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue
Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as
the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article
6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the
3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text
of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes
the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and copetitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Sec 25
DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
48 SCRA 208 Political Law Transfer of Funds Power of the President to Realign
Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to
prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed
the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but

likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
There is no transfer from one department to another here.
ARAULLO V BENIGNO AQUINO III
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment
Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program , Power of the Purse
Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that
if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency,
the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these
funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in
favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed
that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the
Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province,
P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of
the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD: I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VIf the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds
were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations
for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be
an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because

funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to
an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by
the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to
it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive
is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good.
The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked
to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Sec 26.
1. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It
is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional
requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical
construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the
DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of
the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition
of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and
the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout
the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video
industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the
motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is

unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the
body of the DECREE. 7
2. DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of
Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan.
De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful
business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls
they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras
however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that
Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras
ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De
la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in
pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can
be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved
could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit
the business of cabarets
3. INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
104 SCRA 710 Political Law One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill
Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest
concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the
operation of its forest concession. In 1956, Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5
thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation
of forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of
P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC
is not covered by such provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its
enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to
the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a
forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to
forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And
out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in
logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08
because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid
during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence,
ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of
the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is An Act
to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the
subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act
deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this
partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not
expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a
decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC.
HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that
there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and
proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in
Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said
proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the
general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision
is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.
But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings
bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete
subject was held by Congress which passed it.

4. LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

The case questions the law entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill"?
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through
the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared
that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court."
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under
one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in
the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of
local application, originated.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined
in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2)
it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

ALALAYAN V NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered
One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and
Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power
Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for
the supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed
the said provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included
in the title of the amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main
purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al
believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
6)
CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418
6 SCRA 418 Political Law One Title, One Subject Rule Tenancy Act
Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of
indigent tenant Vicente Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana
in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify
Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation
by counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of
the Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During
pendency of the appeal Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, was passed. This law, particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof, amended
the previous law and now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants
and it is also the basis of the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a
Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot
and academic. Cabatuando countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of
the amending law nor in the amended law hence void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and
whether or not to allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants
should be allowed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question
is satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title of the bill.The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as
the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural
Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as
valid. To declare sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the
transfer of the duty of representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the
Department of Labor to the trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity
of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the intention
of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of
Justice.
7. TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330
Political Law One Title One Subject Rule Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream
Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may
import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or
domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities
and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He
claims that section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates the one title one rule of Sec 26, Art 6 of
the Constitution. Section 5 (b) provides:

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff
duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%)
and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil
and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided,
That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be
amended only by an Act of Congress.
The inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 not because it violated the one
title one subject rule but rather because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. The SC emphasized that the provision of Sec 5 (b) of RA 8180 does not
violate the one title one subject rule. The SC, as a policy, has adopted a liberal
construction of the one title one subject rule. The SC also emphasized that the title
need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law
having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The SC held that section 5(b)
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is
the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on
imported petroleum.
Sec 27
a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912
68 Phil. 912 (299 U.S. 410) Political law Bill Veto Veto a Bill
Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law.
He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 An Act to provide for the payment of
retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the
service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the
justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like
Bengzon but that provision has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the
veto is beyond the power of the governor-general hence he filed a petition for mandamus
to compel the Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement
Gratuity Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his
power; for this is also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic
Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of
a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it
provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the
Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative
purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.
Read full text
NOTE: Quite interestingly, while I was doing some research on this, it appears that this
case was further appealed (via certiorari) to the U.S. Supreme Court (299 U.S. 410). That
was allowed then because the Philippines was under the Commonwealth regime. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision. You can read it here. It was ruled that the
Governor-General did not have the power to veto such item in the said law because in
truth and in fact, the said law was not an appropriations law. hence, no line item veto can
be had.
b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
11 SCRA 486 Political Law Veto Power Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate
and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned
by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their

permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs continued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been
violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the
records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence,
since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and
they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president
vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally
veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990
Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred
the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she
vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section
25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is
also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by
the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and
rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to
veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as
items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.
d. Bengzon v Drilon
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never
repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which
were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due
to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill
(GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment
for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB
is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question
the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by
then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has
no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the
others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not
at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case,
the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely
vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the
other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY '89] hereinafter), which was
vetoed by the President, reads:
SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended
Appropriations Disapproved and /or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation
recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article
VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall
be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by
augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in
the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act.
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:
The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this
Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President,
but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A careful review of the legislative
action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies
as recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted
consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in
cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of
essential public services and infrastructure projects.
I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the
Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No.
6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations
in the Executive Branch of the Government.
e. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506
235 SCRA 506 Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Countrywide Development Fund
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the
president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality
of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds
but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that
is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of
1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators
Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of
1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National
Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and
that the CDF is constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions
and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales
vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of
1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may
be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot
validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the
president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact
the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing
Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed
special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there
were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et
al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant
to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of
contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing
contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by
Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in
the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate
the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed,
shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be
covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section
29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings
is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The
SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of
separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation
of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only
lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective
or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the
heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the wellestablished principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the
conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In
the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Sec 28.
Sec 29.
1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219
211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5%ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil

products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to
9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that
crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a
representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they
violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within
specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff
and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789
24 SCRA 789 Political Law Uniformity in Taxation
In 1960, Ordinance No. 110 was passed in Butuan. It was later amended by Ordinance
122. This Ordinance imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of
24 bottles of Pepsi- Cola. Pepsi operates within Butuan and it paid under protest the
amount of P4.926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40
from January 1 to July 30, 1961 pursuant to said ordinance. Pepsi filed a complaint for the
recovery of the total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that it may later
on pay until the termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as
amended of the City of Butuan is illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is
unconstitutional. Pepsi averred it is unconstitutional because of the following reasons:
1. it partakes of the nature of an import tax because the tax shall be based and
computed from the cargo manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases
not sold;
2. it is highly unjust and discriminatory because some dealers engaged in selling of
carbonated drinks are exempt while others are covered and such exemption is not justified
in the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.
HELD: No, it is invalid. The tax prescribed in said Ordinance, as originally approved, was
imposed upon dealers engaged in selling soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would
seem that the intent was then to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As
amended by Ord No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed only upon any agent and/or
consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in
selling . . . soft drinks or carbonated drinks. As a consequence, merchants engaged in the
sale of soft drinks or carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents
and/or consignees of another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one
engaged in business outside the City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such
agent and/or consignee, if less than 1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to
him every month.
When we consider, also, that the tax shall be based and computed from the cargo
manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases not sold but received by
the taxpayer, the intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and
carbonated drinks brought into the City from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed
from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond
defendants authority to impose by express provision of law. It is true that the uniformity
essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality
under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation.
The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be
reasonable and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose
of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions,
but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the
classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These conditions
are not fully met by the ordinance in question.

Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or
carbonated beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by dealers other than agents
or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be
exempt from the tax.
2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
107 SCRA 104 Political Law Exemption From Taxes The Church
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of
Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side.
Hernando ruled that there is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by
the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued,
Inc. Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually,
directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious
or charitable purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries are required that for the exemption of
lands, buildings, and improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also
actually and directly used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case, there is no showing that the said
properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil. 547
71 phil. 547 Political Law Exemption From Taxation Assessment
In 1937, an ordinance (Ordinance No. 137: Special Assessment List, City of Baguio) was
passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to assess properties of property
owners within the defined city limits. The Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP), on the
other hand, is a religious corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to
the ordinance, it paid a total amount of P1,019.37 in protest. APMP later averred that it
should be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious institution, it has a
constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No. In the first place, the ordinance was in the nature of an assessment and not a
taxation.
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in
the Constitution. Based on Justice Cooleys words:
While the word tax in its broad meaning, includes both general taxes and special
assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an assessment is a tax,
yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined to local
impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its
immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed.
The differences between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special
assessment can be levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in most
states) be made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a special assessment is
based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is exceptional both as to time and
locality. The imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area,
is a tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a
street or highway. A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special
assessment rather than a tax notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax.
In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because the assessment is not
taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of the city.
4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He
claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said
Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate
that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully
enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then
prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought,
donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does
not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property
was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing

power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed
belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose,
and, hence, was null and void.
MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987
Dr. Francisco Perez, the City Health Officer of San Pablo City, was named Outstanding
Health Worker in 1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a salary increase
pursuant to Letter Of Instruction 562. The Ministry of Health submitted to the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for Perez salary. The SP
however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or
officials of the national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not
covered. Upon appeal, the Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is
a national government employee hence he is entitled to such increase. However, Manuel
Alba the Minister of Budget refused to recognize Perez right to such increase because
he averred that the constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Perez then filed a mandamus case
against Alba. The trial court judge granted the petition for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per the said LOI.
HELD: Yes. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government
officials irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of
health is a national service. Besides, Perez is an employee of the Ministry of Health and
not of the city of San Pablo. Also their positions are partially funded by the national
government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the
other one-half from local funds. Others are wholly paid by either the local or the national
government.
There is no basis in Albas allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the
appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of
the Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government
official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the
Health Ministry wherein Perez is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus
becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment.
Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.
Sec 30.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial Bodies
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business
with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin.
Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to
the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case
was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
Certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court
Issue: Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?
Held: Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent as provided under Section 30, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. As explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS. CA,
237 SCRA 519, the aforesaid constitutional provision was intended to give the Supreme
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court.
Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by Section 27 of RA
6770 shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
Sec 32.
ARTICLE VII
Sec 1.

1) L.S. MOON & CO. VS. HARRISON, 43 Phil.38

The Petitioner resisted to implement the law enacted by the Congress because he thought
it was unconstitutional.
SC: The President is encroaching the power of the judiciary to interpret laws. He has to
implement the same regardless of his belief that said law is unconstitutional.
Section 5 of Article VII cannot be use as a defense, as the President alleged that
whenever a law causes injustice, he must do his part to restrain such. The court ruled that
if the President sees a law to be injustice, it is like he is interpreting the law, which is not a
power provided for by him by the Constitution.
The Remedy is to file a case before the Supreme Court so as to question the
constitutionality of the enacted law.
2) GOV'T. VS. SPRINGER, 50 Phil. 529, read also the separate opinion
50 Phil 259 Law on Public Officers Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which
divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The
EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who
is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but
does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as
the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the GovernorGeneral, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC.
Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against
Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly
elect the Board Members of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of
powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it
has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a
public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled
corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it,
through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is
already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed
there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill
offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.
BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, ET AL. G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 199
Facts:On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM.
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a
Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO)
through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .
The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:
1.
The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines;
2.
The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO
is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to
appropriate funds for such expenditure; and
3.
The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution.
Held:
1.
The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and
therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by
an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is
supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts,
AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose
of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO

308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of
legislative power.
2.

The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies
through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the
application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a
biological data. It is the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint,
retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government
offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be
gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these
informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access
the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential
to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The computer
linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO
CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE
ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER
SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY,
CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE,
MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal
information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby
violating the citizens right to privacy.
Sec 2- 12 PET
Macalintal v Presidential Electoral Tribunal (November 2010)
Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a
National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1.
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can
be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2.
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1.
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee
voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an
absentee voter.
2.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of
Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in
the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean
that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and
proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged
in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.
Tecson vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of
and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under
Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992
categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not
of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule
again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
ATTY. PORMENTO V JOSEPH ESTRADA AND COMELEC August 31, 2010
I. THE FACTS
Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic
of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted
[resigned according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R.
No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C.
Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and filed a petition for the latters disqualification,
which was however denied by the COMELEC 2 nd Division. His motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules
of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order
or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not
even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the
position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest
number of votes.
II. THE ISSUE What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution: [t]he President shall not be eligible for any re-election?
III. THE RULINg [The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by
the Supreme Court.]
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010
elections]. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will
be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there
is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists.
There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before
it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President
who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true
today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President
for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical
and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738,
March 2, 200
353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto President
Arroyo a de jure president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria MacapagalArroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and
accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos

from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19,
Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On
January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of
the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
5. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec., February 22, 1991
194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet
Singularity of Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such
law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid
down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which
cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
Sec 14 and 15
1) AYTONA VS. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1
4 SCRA 1 Political Law Appointing Power Midnight Appointments
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during
the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central
Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No.
2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as
the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding
claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was

validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents
appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of
which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have
the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as
he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president.
Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and
is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is
qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his
appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is
not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.
2) PAMANTASAN VS. IAC, 140 SCRA 22
140 SCRA 22 Law on Public Officers Ad Interim Appointment
In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the VicePresident for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Estebans
appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM Board of Regents
was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later discovered
that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment.
He then requested Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however,
appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was
terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a
favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.
HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the
term ad interim as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to temporary. In
this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment. This was
explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:
an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,
Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued.
In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates
while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the
President is authorized to issue ad interimappointments. Such appointments are
permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the
appointees term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at
bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however
did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring
relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of
temporary appointment.
3) IN RE JUDGE VALENZUELA & VALLARTA, 298 SCRA 408
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta[A.M. No. 985-01-SC, November 9, 1998]Facts:
1.Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC
of Bago City and CabanatuanCity, respectively.
2.These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of theConstitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from
making
any appointments
twomonths
immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, excepttemporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
publicservice or endanger public safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution, thePresident is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution two months
immediately before the nextpresidential elections and up to the end of his term the
President is neither required to make appointments tothe courts nor allowed to do so; and
that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is requiredto fill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art.
VII.
Thisprohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.The
appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of

the ban. Theycome within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While
the filling of vacancies in the judiciaryis undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no
showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify themaking of the appointments
during the period of the ban

3.

4) ARTURO DE CASTRO V JBC, GR NO. 191032 March 17, 2010.

FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court.
The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and
submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional
provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle
of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or
abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE: 3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.
HELD: 3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were
not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their
intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen,
Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt
with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII.
Sec 18
SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, et al., vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.,
472 SCRA 587
On July 26, 2004, Congress commenced its Regular Session. On August 25, 2004, the
Commission on appointments was constituted. While Congress was in session, the
President issued appointments as Acting Secretaries. On September 8, 2004, the
petitioners questioned said appointments as Acting Secretary as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
since Congress was in session and it was an act of circumventing the power of the
Commission on Appointments confirm the said appointments. They claimed that while
Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a
vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
without first having obtained its consent. On September 22, 2004, Congress adjourned its
session. On September 23, 2004, the president issued ad-interim appointments to the
above-named appointees to the departments to which they were previously appointed in
an acting capacity.
Thereafter, the respondents moved for the dismissal of this case on the ground that it is
now moot and academic considering the issuance of ad-interim appointments and
subsequent submission of the appointments of the above-named members of the cabinet
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
I s s u e s: 1. Shall the case be dismissed since it is already moot and academic?
2. Do all the petitioners have the personality to sue?
3. Were the temporary appointments made while Congress was in session to
positions subject of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments unconstitutional?
H e l d:
1.
While it is a rule that courts should not decide moot cases, the courts,
as an exception, will rule on it if it is capable of repetition yet evading review
(TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438; ACOP VS. SECRETARY
GUINGONA, 383 SCRA 577; VIOLA VS. HON. ALUNAN III, 277 SCRA 409;
ALUNAN III VS. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA 501).
2.
Only those members of the Commission on Appointments have the
personality to sue and not the other petitioners who are not. While it was held in
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 421 SCRA 656 that members of
Congress have the personality to sue if the Presidents act has the effect of
impairing the powers of Congress, the same is not applicable in this case. This is so
because the Commission on Appointments is independent from Congress itself.
President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session
impairs no power of Congress.

4.

The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is

essentially executive in nature and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity
is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited
time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy
in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office. Congress, through a law cannot impose on the President the
obligation of automatically appointing the Undersecretary as her alter ego. He must
be of the Presidents confidence and provided that the temporary appointment does
not exceed one (1) year.
There is a need to distinguish ad interim appointments and
appointments in an acting capacity. While both are effective upon acceptance, ad
interim appointments are extended only during the recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time that there is a vacancy. Moreover,
ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission
on appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily circumventing the
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

1. CALDERON VS. CARALE, April 23, 1992

208 SCRA 254 Political Law Appointment List of Appointees Requiring COA
Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor
Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and
other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as
the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were
however not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in
violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted
that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained
in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required
exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the
members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the other
officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose
appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution
would have said so by adding the phrase and other officers required by law at the end of
the first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments at
the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to
provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the
Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the
president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may

be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for
such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law.
1-a) ULPIANO SARMIENTO III VS. SALVADOR MISON, G.R. No. 79774, Dec. 17,
1987, 156 SCRA 549
156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers
Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was
appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon
Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,
and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it
appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the
unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of
those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987
Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require
confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation
by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong
to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.
2. MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
April, 13,1989
172 SCRA 150 Political Law Appointments Commission on Human Rights Security
of Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as
the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made
the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA)
requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the
COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga,
and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require
confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA, Cory designated
Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered
Bautistas appointment as ad interim.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COAs actions. She impleaded
Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the
appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left
the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be
allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of
the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the
second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because
they are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint. The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the
CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautistas appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely
political in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR
should be made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Corys act of submitting the
appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for
the latters approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of
submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant as at that
time, Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautistas appointment as ad interim.
Since the position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA
confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad
interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of
the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus,
EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and
the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the
Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is
guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause
and with the observance of due process.
2-A TERESITA DELES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS,
September 4, 1989
177 SCRA 259 Political Law Appointment of Sectoral Representatives
Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral
representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in
session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the
Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that
their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not
need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to
qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to
the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or
the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. All other appointments by the
President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. The provision of the Constitution which provides power
to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section
5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
3 RAFAEL VS. EMBROIDERY AND APPAREL CONTROL BOARD, 21 SCRA
336
21 SCRA 336 Political Law Appointments When Not Bypassed by a Law
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board
shall be composed of:
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by
the Secretary of Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by
the Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman;
and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery
and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against
Cecilio Rafael but the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA
3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who
shall be appointed therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be appointed by the
President in accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act

prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB should come from specified
offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed,
thereby infringing the constitutional power of the President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed the appointing power is theexclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress,
except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to
the given appointive office.
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department
Heads. They are merely going to be designated hence whoever was designated was
merely sitting as an ex officio member. It must also be noted that Congress took care to
specify that the representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank,
Department of Commerce and Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious
reason must be because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have
a direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into
embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no
attempt in RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments. The law
is not unconstitutional.
OLIVEROS-TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272;
58 SCRA 272 Political Law Appointments Appellate Jurisdiction of the President
Rule on Next-in-Rank
Vicenta Oliveros-Torre and a certain Virginia Barros were both fighting over the position as
the Chief Drug Inspector (CDI) of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Both are more
than qualified.
Rosario Capistrano was the incumbent CDI. Barros was the next in rank as she was the
Supervising Drug Inspector and even at that point she is also contesting the position with
Capistrano. Capistrano went on leave and Torre was appointed as the acting CDI.
When Capistranos leave expired the Secretary of Health extended Torres appointment
until Capistranos return. The said office was given due course by the Office of the
President. Barros then filed a protest before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) claiming
that she has the right to the office because she was next in rank. CSC initially declared
Barros to be the rightful person to the contested position. Torre then relinquished her office
to Barros but Torre appealed to the CSC and the CSC reversed its earlier decision. Barros
appealed to the CSC and was denied hence she went to the Executive Secretary (Office
of the President). Through Under Secretary Flores Bayot, the Executive Secretary granted
the appeal by Barros and the CSC decision was reversed. Torre appealed to the Supreme
Court arguing that the Office of the President cannot review and reverse the decision of
the CSC regarding appointments; she argued that under the Civil Service Act the decision
of the CSC Commissioner shall be final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has appellate jurisdiction to review and
reverse decisions promulgated by the CSC when it comes to appointments.
HELD: Yes, the President can. Under Sec 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code and
Sec. 37 of Act 4007, the President as department head can review, modify or revoke
decisions or actions of the chiefs of bureaus, offices, divisions or service under his
department as well as exercise the power expressly vested by law in such chief or head of
the bureau, office, division or service. The appellate jurisdiction of the President on
disputed appointments is also expressly affirmed by Sec. 693 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides that
A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or office, or the Auditor General,
may apply for, and the Commissioner of CSC shall render, a decision upon any question
as to whether a position is in the unclassified or in the unclassified civil service, or whether
the appointment of any person to a classified position has been made in accordance with
law, which decision, when rendered, shall be final unless reversed by the President of the
Philippines on appeal.
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction on the
President, he can at any time by virtue of his power of control over executive departments,
bureaus and offices, expressly vested in him by the 1935 Constitution, review, modify,

alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this powermotu propio without need of any
appeal from any party.
Torre argued that the power of control granted by the Constitution to the President over
executive departments, bureaus, offices and services, should be limited to a review of
administrative acts, not to decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service on contested
appointments; this untenable for the law makes no distinction as to what administrative
acts and the acts of the CSC where there is no distinction made by law, the Court must
not distinguish.
TARROSA VS. SINGSON, May 25, 1994;
232 SCRA 553 Political Law Appointments Congress Cant Expand the Appointing
Power of the President
Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by
then president Fidel Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said
appointment and he argued that Singson cannot perform such position without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to the
confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An
appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot
by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
NIERE VS. CFI, 54 SCRA 165
54 SCRA 165 Political Law Appointments Residual Power to Appoint
La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585 in 1965.
In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the City Engineer.
In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City Engineer of the same
city (La Carlota). Quiambaos appointment was pursuant to the Decentralization Act
(effective January 1968). Sec 4 thereof provides that the position of the city engineer
must be filled in by the appointment of the President. Niere relinquished the office but it
was in protest and so he filed aquo warranto case before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case and so he filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the charter of La Carlota provides that it is the City
Mayor who should appoint the City Engineer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.
HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a provision which
authorizes the mayor thereof to appoint the city engineer. In fact, the deliberations in
Congress when La Carlotas charter was being drafted revealed that it was the intention of
the lawmakers to exclude the position of city engineer from among those local officers
whom the mayor can appoint.
Since the city mayor, under La Carlotas charter, is without authority to appoint the city
engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines, who,
under Section 10(3) of Article 7 of the [1935] Constitution, shall nominate all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for;
because when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, the
appointment must be made by the President (residual power of appointment).
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President.
Consequently, any diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal.