CON COM

COMMON PROVISIONS

1. Aruelo v. CA
G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
Quiason, J.
Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of
summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when
Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the
five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
Issue:
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent
Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art
VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
2.

3. Acena v Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623 (1991)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems
Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was
assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor
on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a Masters Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the
same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College
President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his
desire to keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latters appointment was withdrawn. He also
filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security
of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for
review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion
of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the
MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue.
ISSUE: WON the CSC acted in grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: The court held that respondent Estolas filed a petition for review beyond the prescriptive period of 15 days where the
decision of the MSPB can be made appealable with the CSC. Beyond this reglementary period, the decision of the MSPB renders to be
final and executory. The petition was also filed at the wrong forum (to the office of the Pres.). The court finds the CSC to have an

excess of jurisdiction of entertaining the petition and made a reversible error of setting aside the MSPB order which has long become
final and executory. The court granted the petition of the petitioner while setting aside the decision of the CSC.

5. FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in
the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed
for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case which the court
granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award
of contract arising from its invitation to bid
Ruling:
No. The lower court has no jurisdiction over the ruling of the COMELEC but the complainant can file a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or
rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as
an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a
"final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the
COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising
from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court
as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition to be without merit aside from being moot and academic, the same is hereby DISMISSED

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

8. Tupas v. NHC 173 scra 33

FACTS: National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized in under Executive Order No. 399 of the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government from its incorporation under Act 459,
the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the National Investment and
Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a
certification election with DOLE Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC.
It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by the medarbiter holding that NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join
or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in turn, reversed the med-arbiter and ordered a
certification election to be conducted. However, the same was reversed in the MR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a certification election may be conducted among the NHC employees
HELD: Yes. Under the present (1987) Constitution, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations
with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and
pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but
by the Labor Code. Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside the point. The right to
unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private
sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This guarantee is reiterated in the second

paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of
all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2,
Article IX-B which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The rationale for this is
that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such that it is also an employer in the true sense of the
term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation.
9. Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976
Facts:
On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On
March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the
same office. On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as confidential agent have been
terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation
of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by
the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position. On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the
Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was
taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to
her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First
Instance.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2)Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence,
and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Held:
(1)The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.
There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
(1)When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the provision of
Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise
directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2)
Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in
violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of
officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution.
This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of
the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed
or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of
the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the
expiration of said term.
13. SSS Employee Asso. Vs. CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the implementation of their CBA.
SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal
strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court
made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service
laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to
organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in
the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government
employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A.
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting
strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the
general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate

15. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DETORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS:
Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September1, 1986 to
August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural
Development for Asia and [the] Pacific(CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the
UPLB for an extension of said leave, but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he
would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work. After almost five years of absence without leave,
Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence
of any approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr.
DeTorres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed
His earlier stand and notified DeTorres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he
may report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the
employment status of Dr. DeTorres. The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that DE Torres was already on AWOL
beginning September 1, 1989since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres' absence from work
was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before
September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the
service. The CA upheld the decision of the CSC.
ISSUE
WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is
valid.
HELD:
The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The
provision states:
"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any
reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically
separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence
without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be
dropped from the service."
UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty.
This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein,however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by
the University. In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP.
He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the
service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from
the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the
roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board
of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to

exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ. Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even
promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more
precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent
CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling
upon the latter's constitutionally enshrine

17. CSC VS PEDRO DACOYCOY

GR NO. 135805, dated 29-Apr-1999
FACTS: Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational school administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades in Northern
Samar. After formal investigation by the CSC, he was found guilty of nepotism on two counts. CSC imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from the service. Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the the argument that he was not the appointing
or the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution ruling that the respondent did not appoint his 2 sons, therefore he is not
guilty of nepotism. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism. DECISION: Yes. The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines
nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the 1. appointing or 2. recommending authority,
or of the 3. chief of the bureau or office, or of 4. the persons exercising immediate supervision over him. The word "relative" and
members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. CSC found respondent
guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver and Ped, a utility worker, as they are under his immediate
supervision and control as the school administrator.
Source: http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2015/04/csc-vs-pedro-dacoycoy.html
18. De Los Santos v Yatco (106 PHIL 745)

Facts:
Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel
of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by Fernando Mendoez with an agreement to pay in
installment the said land to the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be
forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoez for failure to pay as per agreement of both
parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoez moved for postponement to give both
parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that
Mendoez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their
agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution,
Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
RULING:
The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him especially when it was improvidently
issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal
agreement that amended the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent ability of the
defendant to meet his obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies the courts refusal to eject him from the premises by an
execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
RULING:
The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him especially when it was improvidently
issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since
the defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that amended the compromise hence the
execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent ability of the defendant to meet his obligations by securing a
GSIS loan also justifies the courts refusal to eject him from the premises by an execution.
COMELEC

3. Lindo v COMELEC 194 SCRA 25

FACTS:
This petition for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order assails the decision dated June 6, 1990 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), First Division, in EAC No. 6-90 entitled "Octavio D. Velasco, Protestant versus Conrado C. Lindo, Protestee,"
reversing the decision of the trial court and declaring private respondent Octavio D. Velasco the duly elected mayor of the municipality
of Ternate, Cavite; and the resolution dated August 23, 1990 of the COMELEC, En Banc denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private respondent Octavio D. Velasco were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Ternate,
Cavite, in the January 18, 1988 local elections. After canvass, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate proclaimed petitioner
Lindo as the elected mayor of Ternate on January 19,1988.
A physical examination of the ballots and a recount of the votes from Precints Nos. 1, 1-A, 2, 2-A, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-A, 5, 6, 8-A and 10-A
were conducted before the trial court without any controversy. On August 2, 1988, the ballot boxes from precints Nos. 6-A and 8 were
presented to the court for examination and recounting. It was observed that the ballot boxes from these precincts did not have selflocking metal seals and the envelopes containing the valid ballots were partially opened. As the ballots were examined, Lindo objected
to thirty-three (33) ballots from precinct No. 6-A and fifty-seven (57) ballots from precinct No. 8, alleging that these ballots were
spurious. The contested ballots were sent to the NBI for examination (p. 95, Rollo of G.R. 88337).
On February 12, 1990, counsel for Lindo, Atty. Amado Montajo, was served a copy of the decision while attending the hearing of
another case. Velasco's counsel was also served a copy of the decision by mail which he received on February 16, 1990.
Velasco filed a Notice of Appeal to the COMELEC on February 17, 1990. His main argument was that the winner in an election protest
case should be determined not only on the basis of the results obtained from the contested precincts but from the results of both the
contested and uncontested precincts. Lindo, on the other hand, filed a Notice of Appeal on February 26, 1990, claiming that he knew of
the decision only on February 22, 1990.
On February 26, 1990, the trial court gave due course to the appeal of Velasco and denied due course to Lindo's appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time. It likewise directed its clerk to forward the records of the case to the COMELEC.
On March 26, 1990, a month after the trial court denied due Course to his notice of appeal, Lindo, filed a motion with the COMELEC
praying that respondent trial court's order denying due course to his notice of appeal be set aside (p. 8, Rollo). Velasco's appeal and
Lindo's motion were consolidated in one case and docketed as EAC No. 6-90 of the COMELEC.
On June 6, 1990, after hearing the arguments of the parties and after the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the COMELEC
(First Division) rendered its decision on Velasco's appeal and Lindo's motion.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULE
32, SEC. 3 AND RULE 35, SECS. 20 AND 22; AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS EFFECTIVELY DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN HIS NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS
CONSIDERED "FILED OUT OF TIME" AND THEREFORE "HAS LOST HIS STANDING TO QUESTION A DECISION WHICH,
AS TO HIM, HAD BECOME FINAL AND BEYOND THE REMEDY OF APPEAL," NOTWITHSTANDING THAT, THE
PETITIONER HAS FILED HIS NOTICE OF APPEAL EVEN BEFORE ANY "PROMULGATION" WAS EVER MADE AS
REQUIRED BY THE COMELEC RULES. (p. 13, Rollo)
RULING:
1. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the
clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27,
1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc
Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of
the process of promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioner's contention that there was no promulgation of the trial court's
decision.
2. As long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were
sufficiently met.-The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in the election protest
cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the
judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them (of) due process to the deviation by
the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in the case were afforded an opportunity
to be heard. As long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard, before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process
were sufficiently met.
3. Petitioners notice of appeal clearly filed out of time.-Petitioners protestations of denial of due process when his notice of appeal was

denied for having been filed out of time must also fail. The records show that petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Amador Montajo,
received a copy of the decision on February 12, 1990. The five-day period for petitioner to file his appeal from the decision of the trial
court commenced to run from such date. Petitioners notice of appeal was filed with the trial court only on February 26, 1990, fourteen
(14) days after his counsel was served a copy of the decision. Clearly, his notice was filed out of time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated October 25, 1990 is hereby LIFTED..
5. Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690, April 27, 1995
Facts: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor in
the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the
petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos,
found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the
petitioner.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the trial court. The petitioner
then filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution
pending appeal despite the opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter,
the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which was later on denied. The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC granted the petition on February 9, 1995, ordering the petitioner Rosita Cumba is
ordered restored to her position as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such
jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881).
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
Held: The COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all
prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior
election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. This being the case, the Court
painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter. It found none. In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now
does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
6. Edding vs COMELEC
Facts: During the May 1992 elections, petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the
office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte.
After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over Edding by 212 votes. Unconvinced and alleging
massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June 9, 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Upon termination of the protest proceedings and recounting of the ballots, the RTC rendered judgment on July 2, 1993 proclaiming
Edding as the winner of the election for the mayoralty seat of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, and declaring as null and void the election
of respondent Bernardo.
On July 8, 1993, Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal while Edding moved for the immediate execution of the July 2, 1993 decision.[4]
Bernardo opposed Eddings motion, claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, and invoked Section
17 of Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which allows execution only if the judgment has become final.
On July 12, 1993, the RTC approved Bernardos Notice of Appeal. On the next day however, July 13, 1993, the RTC granted Eddings
Motion for Immediate Execution, and ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the COMELEC.Thereafter, Edding replaced
Bernardo, and assumed office on July 15, 1993.
On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as SPR No. 5-93 seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting execution
pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due course to the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order on July 19, 1993. Finally, the
COMELEC issued the assailed Order on September 23, 1993, which Edding received on October 12, 1993.
The SC Resolution dated October 21, 1993, we granted petitioner Eddings prayer for a temporary restraining order and ordered

respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from further proceeding with SPR No. 5-93. At the same time, they required respondents
COMELEC and Bernardo to submit their Comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent COMELEC filed its Comment on
December 8, 1993,[9] which Bernardo opted to adopt as his own.
Petitioner filed Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Restraining
Order, assailing the Order of the COMELEC dated September 23, 1994 issued in SPR No. 5-93 entitled Pablo S. Bernardo vs.
Honorable Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 9, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Norbi H. Edding, which ordered as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and as prayed for, the Commission En Banc hereby ORDERS the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon the petitioners filing of a cash bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in favor
of private respondent and conditioned for the payment of damages which private respondent may suffer by reason of issuance of the
writ should the Commission finally decide that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory
order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.
Held: Yes. The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election cases remains in full
force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Ratio: This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code
to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter. It found none.
The present rule therefore established by the aforecited Relampagos case is as follows:
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases.
We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, article IX-C of the
Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
But notwithstanding the aforementioned pronouncements, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when
it enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioners motion for immediate execution. Private respondents
petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction before the COMELEC is anchored on the formers claim that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in granting execution despite the filing of a
notice of appeal by private respondent within the reglementary period.
It appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent filed his notice of appeal with the RTC, petitioner in
turn filed his motion for immediate execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably filed within the five-day reglementary period for
filing an appeal since the decision of the RTC was promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993.
The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve
pending incidents.[24] Where the motion for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an
appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of no moment and does not
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because the court
must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the
motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the
opposing party.[25]
Considering however that the term of office for the disputed mayoralty seat will already expire on June 30, 1995, in addition to the fact
that the election for the next term of office for the contested post has recently been concluded, the instant petition has therefore become
moot.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
7. GALIDO vs. COMELEC
193 SCRA 78
Facts: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayor of GarciaHernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protest before the RTC. After
hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First

Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots
in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court
and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for dismissal, citing
Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable.
Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial courts decision involving marked ballots, be brought to the
Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?
Held: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are
final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under
Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated, Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. We do not, however, believe
that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
questioned decision. The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice,
and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests
on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DIMISSSED.
10.PEOPLE vs. DELGADO Case Digest
189 SCRA 715, 1990
Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private
respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private
respondents for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC
through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may
review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.
Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of
the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before
the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The
COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court

18. SANIDAD VS COMELEC 181 SCRA 529

FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebiscite for its ratification (original schedule
was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad: 1.Unconsitutional as it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the
press because of its penal provisions in case of violation Responses of COMELEC -Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media
during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does
Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express
his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)
ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional . TRO
made permanent due to the following reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. Affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
10.PEOPLE vs. DELGADO Case Digest
PEOPLE vs. DELGADO
189 SCRA 715, 1990
Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private
respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private
respondents for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC
through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may
review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.
Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of
the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before
the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The
COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court
16. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R.
NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the
other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881
which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which
shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free
of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of
charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it
suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and
1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide
free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free
air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issues: (1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without
due process of law and without just compensation.
Held:Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign.
Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege
may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising
them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and
magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of
the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast
industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations
do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

17. ADIONG v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit
their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition
unduly infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the
freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation
strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which
in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed
by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined
by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The
burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as
regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of
decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence,
the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
19. SWS vs Comelec
Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to
the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election
survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint. Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media, valid and constitutional? Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression
is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression

of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
1. Guevarra v Gimenez 6 SCRA 813
FACTS
In 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work and detailed estimate for the reconstruction of the Sorsogon
Central School building. Specifications consisting of five pages were likewise prepared. The Cost of painting was left out in the detailed
estimate and specifications. The papers weresubmitted to the Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved
with an authorized appropriation of P40,000.00"provided that painting shall be included" Where upon, the specification for painting
was accordingly made and appended to the specifications as page six. In August 1954 the District Engineer advertised an invitation to
bid for furnishing of all materials, labor and plant, for reconstruction project. Fernando Guevaras bid of P37,500 was declared lowest
and the contract was awarded to him. Eighty five days after completion of the project, Guevarra file with the Director of Public Works a
written claim for the payment of P4,620.00 representing cost of painting not covered by the contract. After hearing, Secretary of Public
Works and Communications denied the claim and two motions for reconsideration were also denied. On appeal, the Auditor General
also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to CA 327
.ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract for the reconstruction of the school building included the painting.
HELD:
Yes. Testimonies of the employees' should be given more weight than those of the contractors. These government employees testified as
to what transpired in the performance of their duties. The presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed.[Note:The main
issue of the case has nothing to do with COA. However, note that, claims anddisbursements of public funds should have be coursed to
COA.
2. Orocio v s . COA 213 SCRA 109
FACTS:
On accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of the National Power Corporation (NPC) where two individuals suffered injury
Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, and Domingo Abodizo, a casual employee OPLGS, the janitorial contractor of the NPC. The two
injured personnel were brought to the hospital. NPC initially advanced the amount for hospitalization expenses for the treatment of
Abodizo, and set up this as an account receivable from OPLGS deducted on a staggered basis from the latter's billing against the NPC
until the same was fully satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of the total amount deductedfrom their billings representing
payment of the advances made by the NPC. In the light of the favorablerecommendation of the NPC legal counsel, the amount of
hospitalization expenses was refunded to thecontractor OPLGS.The Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit disallowed the refund of
the hospitalizattion expenses of Abodizo contending that under the contract, there is no employee-employer relation between the NPC
and theOPLGS employes. Hence,NPC is not answerable for such expense. General Counsel asked for a reconsideration of the said
disallowance but was denied. The COA Regional Director, herein respondent, confirmed the disallowance. NPC General Counsel
submitted a second request for reconsideration and justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec 15-A of RA 6395 (NPC Charter)
which provides that ... all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation...
ISSUE:
Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion of the legal counsel of the NPC (quasi- judicial function) is within the scope
of the auditing power of the COA?
HELD:
The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures
or uses of funds and property pertaining to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The matter of allowing in audit a disbursement account is not a ministerial function, but
one which necessitates the exercise of discretion. Besides, the OPLGS, Abodizo's employer, admitted that the incident was purely
incidental.
But whether petitioner acted with malice, bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction is a matter respondent Agustin
cannot dispose of unilaterally and summarily without infringing on the petitioner's right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged 5th indorsement of the General Counsel of the respondent
Commission on Audit, dated 21 May 1986, Memorandum of respondent Agustin of 30 June 1986, insofar, as it holds petitioner
personally liable for the disallowed disbursement and the Debit Memo, dated 22 July 1986, of the Manager of the Accounting
Department of the National Power Corporation, are hereby set aside for being null and void.

3. Osmena vs. COA

FACTS: The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna
Spouses. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately died that night. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would
not have died were it not for the ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff of the
Medical Center.
The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the RTC of Cebu City a civil action, for recovery of damages, based Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Medical
Center. The City of Cebu which, according to the complaint, operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu City Medical Center, was
impleaded as defendant on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it was vicariously responsible for the latters
negligence since it failed to exercise due care and vigilance over the doctors while acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, to
prevent them from causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code provision relied upon by plaintiffs, pertinently reads as follows:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an amicable settlement were commenced, which culminated in an
agreement designed to put an end to the controversy in a manner acceptable to the parties.
Since the compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City of
Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City. The sanggunian authorized the City Budget Officer
to include in Supplemental Budget of the City . . .the amount of P30,000.00 for financial assistance to the parents of the late
Reynaldo de la Cerna
The agreement was also submitted to the RTC which rendered a judgment (f)inding the same to be in conformity with law, morals and
public policy and enjoining the parties to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.
About 11 months later, however respondent COA disallowed the financial assistance thus granted to the spouses de la Cerna, saying
that no real or substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare of the community can be perceived from the act of
giving such financial assistance.
The City of Cebu filed an MR, and the same denied due course by respondent Commission. Respondent ruled that the motion was
filed more than a year after receipt by the City government of notice of its Decision and therefore the decision had already become final
and executory.
In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Osmea has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA and its Members in
so disallowing the citys appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the
City, embodied in due course in the Trial Courts judgment.
Hence this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the payment of P30,000.00 for the compromise agreement
between the parties herein involved.
HELD: Petition granted. The assailed COA decisions are hereby nullified and set aside. Respondent COA is ORDERED to approve and
allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00 of Cebu City approved in connection with the judicial compromise executed by it in the
Civil before the RTC of Cebu City
There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent COA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code and is therein
dealt with in some detail. A compromise, declares Article 2208 of said Code, is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises,
it in fact encourages them in civil actions.
The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a
compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit
in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.
That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement
was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and
procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as
a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the

obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.

Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the antecedents of the provision in the
supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not
merely for the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, and constituted one of the reciprocal concessions
which the law considers the very heart and life of every compromise.
By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in the civil case before the trial court put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to
all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted
against it in connection with its operation and management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken by it in its
proprietary (as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held liable ex contractu or ex
delito, for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or business functions.
It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the judgment of, the Court, which pronounced it to
be in conformity with law, morals and public policy and enjoined the parties to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.
23
This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as
above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have
been approved as a matter of course.
NOTES:
Article 2029 of the Civil Code states:
The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise. And in line with this policy, the
Code directs
(a) the suspension, pursuant to the Rules of Court, of every civil action or proceeding:
(1) if willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties, or
(2) if it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible compromise
but the other party refused the offer, as well as
(b) the mitigation of the damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere desire for a compromise.
The law regards compromises as standing on a higher plane than ordinary agreements, for it declares them, once entered into, to
constitute res judicata, although judicial execution thereof is permitted only with respect to judicial compromises.
4. ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA
G.R. NO. 92279 JUNE 18, 1992
FACTS:
An agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela and ECS Enterprises for the purchase of 300 units of
wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set of radio communication equipment. Out of the items delivered, a partial delivery was
made. The Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% pending receipt of reply to the query to Price Evaluation Division of
COA.
A second delivery was made and payment of 50% was allowed by the Provincial Auditor. Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation
Division of COA, there has been an overpricing. The President/GM of ECS Enterprises made no comment on the overpricing but
instead proposed a 10% deduction on the unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor forwarded the matter to the COA Regional Director
who formally endorsed the stand of the Provincial Auditor.
ECS Enterprises appealed to COA, which denied the appeal. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Provincial Auditor and the Regional Director?
HELD:
No. In the exercise of its regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, COA adheres to the policy that government funds and
property should be full protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds

owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities (Article IX (D-1) Section 2(1),
1987 Constitution) . That authority extends to the accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in any
accountable capacity. (Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal
responsibility that rests directly with the head and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition is dismissed.

5. BUSTAMANTE VS. COMMISSIONER ON AUDIT

(G.R. NO. 103309, NOVEMBER 27, 1992)
CAMPOS, JR. J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the Northern Luzon Regional Center covering
the provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was issued a government vehicle. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board
Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of
government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. Ppetitioner received an Auditor's Notice to
Person Liable from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation
allowance.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Regional Auditor denied. Petitioner appealed to COA, which denied the appeal. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Did the COA grave abuse of discretion in its denial to give due course to the petitioners appeal? Did the COA, in the exercise
of its constitutional powers, usurp the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors?
HELD:
No. It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the denial of the appeal is within the power of the Commission on Audit as it is
provided in the Constitution:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period vouchers pertaining
thereto; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds and property. . . . (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution)
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution,
usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a
government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been
ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle
accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned and
controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property.
WHEREOF, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
6. Saligumba v COA (117 SCRA 669)
Article IX (D), Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts
of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining
thereto. (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,

including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the COA regarding the Administrative case filed by petitioner against Leonardo
Estella, Auditing Examiner III of the Auditors office of Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped Editha
Saligumba on several occasions. The COA dropped the administrative complaint due to insufficient evidence. Saligumba petition the
court to review such action taken by the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizant of the case.
RULING:
The court dismissed the petition as it held that the power of the Supreme Court to review COA decisions refers to money matters and
not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel and even assuming that it does have jurisdiction to review decisions
on administrative matters as mentioned above, the court cannot do so on factual issues since its power to review is limited to legal
issues only.
7. Rebecca Barbo vs. COA (October 10, 2008)
Facts:
Petitioners are official of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and designated members of the Interim Board of Directors
of the San Fernando Water District (SFWD).
On December 4, 1995 and February 12, 1996, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995 and No.
39, Series of 1996 respectively. These Board Resolutions authorized the Board of Directors of SFWD to receive reimbursable
allowances in the form of Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA), Travel Allowance, and Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expense (EME); Christmas Bonus; Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance; Medical and Dental Benefits; and Productivity
Incentive Bonus.
Pursuant to the said Board Resolutions, petitioners received EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas Bonus, and PIB from SFWD during
calendar years starting 1994 to 1996.
On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit Team of COA regional Office No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga audited the financial accounts of
SFWD for the period covering January 1, 1994 to July 15, 1996. The COA Special Audit Team disallowed the payment of the abovementioned benefits and allowances received by petitioners after the same were found to be excessive contrary to Sec. 228, 162 and 163
of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) and to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 954073 in
relation to Sec. 13 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973) as amended. Petitioners were directed to
refund the benefits and allowances subject to the disallowance.
Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to declare whether or not LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 are consistent
with Sec. 13 of PD No. 198, as amended, on matters pertaining to the compensation and other benefits of the Directors of the LWD.
This is allegedly the function of the courts.
The Regional Director affirmed the disallowance. Petitioners elevated the matter to COA. COA declared that the subject bonuses and
allowances received by petitioners constituted additional compensation or remuneration. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent has the jurisdiction to declare LWUA Resolution No. 313, S. 1995 as amended by Resolution No. 39,
S. 1996 to be totally in conflict with Sec. 13 of PD No. 198 as amended.
2. Whether or not Sec. 13, PD 198, as amended, prohibiting petitioners entitlement to RATA, EME, Bonuses and other Benefits and
Allowances.
Ruling:
The Court has already settled this issue in a myriad of cases. Particularly, on Rodolfo S. de Jesus vs. COA, the court upheld the
authority and jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a water district and declared
that such power does not conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA. Citing Sec. 2, Subdivision D, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution, the Court declared that it is the mandate of the COA to audit all government agencies, including governmentowned and controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to
determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of government funds. The independent constitutional body was tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the governments, and ultimately the peoples, property.

As to the second issue, a water district is a government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter since it is created
pursuant to a special law, PD 198. It is undeniable that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of RATA, EME and bonuses to members of
the Board of Water Districts.

8. PAL VS COA
FACTS:
PAL was then a governtment controlled corporation which majority of its shares of stock was owned by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), a government corporation. To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL
adopted a system of bidding out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL awarded to the lowest bidder sixty
percent (60%) of its fuel requirements and to the second lowest bidder the remaining forty percent(40%), provided it matched the price
of the lowest bidder.
But Department Order No. 19, s. 1974 of the defucnt Department of General Services as implemented by COA Circular No. 78-84,
Memorandum No. 498 and Memorandum No. 88-565 required PAL (also all government agencies) to purchase its fuel requirements
solely from Petron Corporation (Petron).
ISSUES:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in holding the Dept. Order No.
19 applies to PAL.
RULING:
The court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. PAL's corporate complexion having changed during the pendency of the
petition from government-controlled to private ownership, it is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
Had it not been for this supervening event, COA was correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a government
agency at that time, it nonetheless gravely abused its discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom.
COA has the exclusive authority, subject to limitations, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefore. COA can adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation,
already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit
jurisdiction.
The reasons given by PAL for seeking exemption from the operation of Department Order No. 19 were, to our mind, meritorious. They
far outweigh the policy enunciated in Department Order No. 19 of giving preference to government sources in the filling of the needs of
the government for supplies. Thus, PAL's bidding requirement conformed to the accepted policy of the government to subject every
transaction/contract to public bidding in order to protect public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open
competition and to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public contracts.
Its multiple supplier set-up was designed precisely to meet every contingency that might disrupt its fuel supply. It bespoke of foresight,
careful planning and sound business judgment on the part of PAL. As a business operation heavily dependent on fuel supply, for PAL to
rely solely on a single supplier would indeed be impracticable. To compel it to do so would amount to a grave abuse of discretion on its
part as this might well lead to irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures, the very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of
the COA.
9. BAGATSING VS COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos noted that t]he privatization program has proven successful and beneficial to the economy in terms of
expanding private economic activity, improving investment climate, broadening ownership base and developing capital markets, and
generating substantial revenues for priority government expenditure, but there is still much potential for harnessing private initiative to
undertake in behalf of government certain activities which can be more effectively and efficiently undertaken by the private sector.
Secretary Ramon R. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on Privatization endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC
to privatize 65% of the stock of Petron, open to both foreign as well as domestic investors. The Petron Privatization Working
Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20%
to the general public through the initial public offering and employees stock option plan.
Public aution took place and ARAMCO was declared as a winning bidder. Petitioner sought nullify the bidding conducted for the sale
of a block of shares and the award made to ARAMCO as the highest bidder.

ISSUES:
Whether or not that the said public bidding is null and void.
RULING:
Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are non-complying
or unacceptable. While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for
technical reasons,not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be
disqualified.
Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and that it can not be said that there was a competition on an equal footing. But
the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were disqualified.
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by government offices and corporations, had
upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight
than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.
Petition was dismissed.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF OFFICERS

4.Garcia v. Mojica
G.R. No. 139043 September 10, 1999
Facts: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to
the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery.
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the
contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. Respondent
Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as
INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against
petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation
Issues: 1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable. 2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the
Local Government Code.
Held: 1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed
during his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by
petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so
the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. Petitioner
can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E.
Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to
the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner
may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under
the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the
contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does
not mean the total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The
ruling is now limited to the question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day
suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the
Deputy Ombudsman.

5. Santiago vs Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636

Facts:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad
faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a
violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were
allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional
liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for
the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes, it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err
in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would
indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits
proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
6. FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REP
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the
House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first

complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue:
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
Held:
The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As
indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was
given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar
on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards
in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

7. COCOFED vs Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55
levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of
the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared
by the PCA. Cocofund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller.During the Martial Law regime, then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry. The most relevant among these is
P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the
distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2). Thus, the PCA acquired the
First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding capital
stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers. The rest of the
Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were given their
corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a large number of the
coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private individuals.Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went
directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years. After the EDSA
Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies.
PCGG was empowered to file casesfor sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock
in the UCPB registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the
sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment thatthe Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and

2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional. The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via
Petition for review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that the sequestration amounted to taking
of private property without just compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.
ISSUE: What is the NATURE of the Coconut Levy Fund?
RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the REPUBLIC. To begin with, the Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the States
inherent power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature of TAXES. The Funds were generated by virtue of
statutory enactments by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.The Funds were collected to advance the government
avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. The SC took judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the great
economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the countries export
products.Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and
the stabilization of a threatened industry ,which is so affected with public interest .