How would you win a war?

This essay will answer the question How would you win a war? by assuming the role of one
state, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and by limiting the analysis at a possible conflict
scenario in the South China Sea, between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States
of America and its allies in the region, i.e. Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia. The answer will
draw upon the offensive structural realism approach to international relations, Sun Tzus
philosophy in The Art of War, Chinese historical pragmatism and modern warfare strategies
and capabilities of the actors involved, with a particular emphasis on cyberwarfare, Special
Operations Forces (SOFs) and espionage.
The underlying argument of this essay is that the PRC would win the war by staying true to
the teachings of its most famous philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, who said that when you wage war,
you must first have the money in hand and then [] subjugating the enemys army without
fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence (Sun Tzu, 1993, p.105). Which means that firstly,
economic prosperity must be assured and secondly the aim is to avoid an actual military battle.
In order to achieve this, the tactics will make use of deception, information superiority,
diplomacy, opportunistic timing and psychological shocks and thus, obtaining victory at the
level of grand strategy (Scobell, 2005, p.118).
The following analysis will rest on a few assumptions: the international system is anarchic;
great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, and can damage each other;
states are uncertain about other states intentions; great powers fight for survival and act
rationally (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.30-31 cited in Elman and Jensen, edited by Williams, p.22).

With regard to these, it is evident that states fear each other and can only rely on themselves for
their security, therefore the best course of action is maximization of relative power (Ibid. p. 3236, Ibid, p.22). Furthermore, increasing military power can improve a states security without
triggering a counteracting response (Mearsheimer, 2001, Ibid, p.23). Last but not least, this paper
will assume that there can be no nuclear WMD threats in this scenario by either side, since states
are rational and such actions would be disproportionate and inconsistent with the desired
outcome of all actors involved. Moreover, it assumes PRCs economy is growing at a stable rate
and is equal to the U.S.As in terms of Purchasing Power Parity.
The conflict in South China Sea is a dispute over maritime territory and energy resources
between China and mostly members of ASEAN and their common ally, the U.S.A. The main
consideration is securing energy resources, however, rival claims may escalate into military
involvement.
When studying The Art of War, a better understanding can be accomplished by keeping
in mind the ancient concept of Yin-Yang and also by comparing it with Clausewitzs On War
as they are essentially quite similar both in terms of the holistic perspective and the complexities
of war. According to Villacres and Bassford (1995, cited in Yuen, 2008, p.184) Clausewitz refers
to three elements in his trinity, emotion, chance and reason and then he connects them to the
people, the army, and the government. They propose that a better terminology would be irrational
forces, non-rational forces, and rationality. This allows for a general theory of strategy and
explains how both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz consider overcoming uncertainty to be the priority
when dealing with the complexities of war. Nonetheless, a key difference is that Sun Tzu is able
to provide solutions without borrowing a concept, i.e. genius that lies outside the trinitarian
framework (Clausewitz, 1976, p.89). This is why he has the freedom in the Art of War to

consider these forces not necessarily separate. Thus, he intends not to only overcome uncertainty
for his side, but to maximize the enemys uncertainty. John Boyd (2002, p.322, cited in Yuen,
2008, p.191) identifies two essential differences. Firstly, where Clausewitz seeks to bring the
enemy to a decisive battle, Sun Tzu seeks to decipher the enemy before the actual battle.
Secondly, while Clausewitz calls for great commanders to minimize their own friction, he does
not recommend anything further, unlike Sun Tzu who calls for commanders to also maximize the
enemys friction Know thyself, know thy enemy (Sun Tzu, 1993, p.106). From this analysis
we can conclude that creating advantageous conditions before the battle or outside the battlefield
is of utmost importance.
Hence, the first step the PRC would do is acquire a budget large enough to support the
pursuit of its goals. This is evident when we look at the figures from SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database (1988-2013) and find that China spent in the year 2013 approximately 190 billion USD
adjusted for inflation with base year 2011. This amounts for nearly 8.5% of the government
expenditure. The Chinese economy (GDP) has been growing in the past four years at an average
growth rate of 8.4% per year according to statistics from the World Bank (2014). This is the
economic foundation for the modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army, which strives to be
the strongest in Asia by 2020 (Ponamarev, 2008, p.59). This evolution creates unrest and concern
among rivals who fear the possibility of an assertive China and attracts an intensification of U.S
military presence in the region (The Economist, 2014).
Having a strong economy, the next step would be to gain information advantage or superior
intelligence. This will be a decisive factor in winning the war and it makes use of cyberwarfare.
The main focus is to extract as much data as possible which gives strategic and military utility
(Manson, 2011, p.123) during peacetime and then destroy the enemys ability to acquire,

transmit, process, and use information while protecting your own system (Yoshihara, 2001,
cited in Ponamarev, 2008, p.60). Offensive actions such as planting information mines, changing
network data, releasing clone information, applying information deception and establishing
network spy stations are key to assure a strategically superior position that allows other forces to
have the operational initiative and the element of surprise. PRC would also make use of its role
as an IT hardware global provider and infiltrate compromised components such as routers and
servers in the information infrastructure of the U.S.A (Manson, 2011, p.123). Finally, due to the
vulnerability of the United States internet structure (Manson, 2011, p.124-126), China may
engage in lacing power grids systems, water utilities, the financial system or traffic control with
malicious software creating major damage in the logistics of the enemy. This approach is
consistent with Sun Tzus philosophy and scheme of controlling the system. Attacking the
enemys plans can be practiced in both peacetime and wartime, but a good strategy may go
undetected and therefore not countered. The Yang side of this approach is of course, increasing
your own defensive capabilities against similar threats. The PRC internet is a government-run
operation and while at first the idea behind it was to control the domestic traffic, it has now
developed a strong cyberdefense capacity (Manson, 2011, p.124). The most extraordinary is the
isolation of the mainlands entire network from the global web by filtering all incoming and
outgoing Internet traffic through monitored server farms (Ibid.) which, in case of emergency, can
shut down the gateways and render the majority of cyber-attacks ineffective. Cyberwarfare is
desired because of its unparalleled attack attribution impossibility. This poses a new challenge
for military and elected officials who requisite attack attribution before taking in consideration
any response. It is a Herculean task because attackers may launch attacks from foreign servers,
bounce attacks across servers in many nations before their intended target and thus deceiving

the target into believing the attack is conducted by another actor. In the unlikely event that
victims can pinpoint the source of attack, the Government of the PRC may simply blame citizen
hacktivists and do nothing (Manson, 2011, p.129-130).
The next logical step is the deployment of spies. They complement the cyberwarfare and
contribute to the informational advantage. We must take notice of the use of spies, both to gather
information on the enemy as well as to protect the domestic system from foreign agents. From
Sun Tzus chapter XIII in the Art of War we get a general idea of how this should work. China
will recruit spies from the native population of the enemy, the enemy officials, and the enemys
spies. Some of these will be given false information to deceive the opponent, while some will
have to return with information. This system can function effectively only with secrecy, where
none of the agents involved know the modus operandi of the others involved. Together, these
agents comprise a mechanism far greater than any sole individual, the divine skein. By no
means this is enough to ensure victory, however, it greatly increases the probability of winning,
while ignoring espionage puts one at a great disadvantage (Warner, 2006, p.489). The state now
has two out of three parts of the intelligence required: information sources gained through
cyberwarfare and secrecy locus gained through espionage. The third part is the spring for activity
and it is gained through Special Operation Forces. These units will be equipped to meet the
requirements of very specific missions that mostly rely on surprise attacks where they are least
expected. Another central feature of these SOFs is the capacity to engage in unconventional
warfare, winning hearts and minds of a targeted population (Wey, 2014, p.135-136). China
would use such forces to infiltrate enemy territory and provide aid (food supplies, medical
supplies, construction supplies etc.) to the local people and then use them to obtain valuable
intelligence on enemy movements and weaknesses. In fact, there is a general consensus among

Chinese military officials who claim that information dominance is a requirement before moving
to naval and air superiority in local conflicts (Manson, 2011, p.127 ; Chang Mengxiong cited in
Rajagopalan, 2008, p.1023). Of course, one cannot dismiss the importance of military forces. It
is known that the United States of America favours force projection i.e. war from sea against
the land (Ponamarev, 2008, p.61). This is why the Beijing government shifted the emphasis on
modernizing the PLA Navy, especially the acquisition of submarines and aircraft carriers that
will act as tactical hubs for the whole military. Practice is backed by theory and therefore these
measures are in accordance with PRCs goal to Complete National Reunification (Ibid), or in
other words to establish control over disputed island territories in the South China Sea and East
China Sea: the Paracels, Spratly archipelago, and Senkaku. All the countries who have rival
claims count on the U.S as their protector against any Chinese threats.
The technology plays a crucial role and the army will focus on developing stealth capabilities,
long-range precision weapons, [] ultra-sonic weapons, laser weapons, ultrahigh frequency
weapons, and electromagnetic guns (Rajagopalan, 2008, p.1027). Maximizing these forces will
not go unnoticed and the enemy might prepare against them, however, PRC would publish
ambiguous or incomplete reports on its military situation and may deceive opponents by
commending their military capabilities e.g. U.S.A aircraft carriers (Rajagopalan, 2008, p.1025),
but in fact, it would secretly develop malware software to target exactly this type of vessels
(Wortzel, 2007 cited in Manson, 2011, p.127); by encouraging the egotism of the opponent, you
weaken him, basic example of deception from Sun Tzus Art of War (Sun Tzu, 1993, p.101).
Whenever using all these tactics, Sun Tzu advises generals to try and control what the enemies
can learn from their mistakes. Even if you cannot stop them from adapting, the actions should be
carried out in a way that delays, distorts or deprives the enemies from getting any feedback. At

the same time, controlling the adversarys feedback may accelerate victory; such is the case
when one becomes prisoner of his own wishful thinking to the extent that he no longer can
readjust himself to the true reality (Yuen, 2008, p.197). The plan outlined contradicts
Clausewitzs idea of engaging the foe in a decisive battle simply because such course of action
is foolish for a state that fights from an overall position of disadvantage in conventional
capabilities. When dictating the terms of the battle, the PRC can match the strength of any
military force.
The algorithm presented above would ensure that the United States of America and its
allies are constantly being evaluated- this enables better understanding of Chinas own capacity
and where to strengthen your position; then, attacking their plans- this will give the attacker the
possibility to use simple strategies in order to control the positive and negative feedback of the
opponent by giving the impression of easy, unexceptional victories (Ibid.). Moreover, this
strategy emphasizes geopolitical criteria as the primary basis for evaluating military success.
Although risk assessment and calculations are being made when deciding to use force, the PRC
is not reluctant to the use of force; operational initiative is desirable but may be forfeited if there
are strategic gains to be made. Finally, technology must be used in order to gain the edge in any
conflict (Scobell, 2005, p.122).
The Peoples Republic of China coup de grce rests on handling diplomacy and
economic ties with the countries involved in the conflict. Elleman (cited in Scobell, 2005, p.118)
affirms that diplomacy is war and perhaps the level at which war can be won without troops on
the battlefield, or what Sun Tzu calls the true pinnacle of excellency.
China is becoming more and more dependent on energy imports (Hong, 2013, p.32) and
ultimately this means that its economic security is endangered. The problem is, PRC is not the

only actor who is increasingly assertive in the search and exploitation of new energy sources.
Vietnam and the Philippines also claim their rights in the South China Sea, but the Beijing
rhetoric on the matter is that negotiations should be carried bilaterally and any
internationalization of the issue would only worsen the situation. This allows China to negotiate
from a position of greater bilateral strength (Scott, 2012, p. 1035). The increasing power of PLA
Navy aims to secure the historical Chinese sovereignty that was taken away in the 19th Century
by the British and the French and establish an Exclusive Economic Zone. By following Sun
Tzus work, the Chinese diplomacy will focus on disrupting alliances and forging new ones,
especially by increasing trade. The PRC official discourse will encourage stronger cooperation,
mutual trust and advocate the use of international authority bodies such as the U.N (where China
has veto power the in the Security Council and may impair any decision making process) and the
implementation of international law (BBC, 2014). It will engage in peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions in order to support regional security. Since the United States intervention
policy is highly influenced by just war thinking (Butler, 2003, p.234) (just cause, competent
authority, right intention), the Chinese peace rhetoric is likely to reduce the U.S concern and
avoid conceding any Chinese claims at the same time. On the one hand, the annual White Papers
that the Beijing government will release desensitize its trading partners and reassure the
international community about its intentions. On the other hand, it will strongly affirm what they
see as their rightful possessions and warn against any actions that might sabotage them. When
negotiating with the Philippines, China should resolve disputes amicably if they are minor
compared to the overall geostrategic goal. The alliance between Indonesia and the United States
can be disrupted by signing agreements whereby the PRC officially recognizes Indonesias
sovereignty over Natuna Island, which is the primary concern of Indonesia. Ironically, the

country with the most rival claims towards the 9-dash line map, Vietnam, may be the easiest
one to handle due to the economic complementarities between the Chinese and Vietnamese
economies (Hong, 2013, p.39). Following the economic crises of 2008, most ASEAN member
states have China as the largest foreign investor and trade partner. This economic reality, coupled
with the rising search for resources in the South China Sea amplifies the uncertainty of PRCs
rivals. Even the United States of America is susceptible, the Chinese government being the
largest foreign owner of U.S public debt (U.S Treasury, 2014). The shape of the diplomatic arena
at present, when analyzed through Sun Tzus principles, calls for the implementation of
deterrence by the PRC. The Chinese official discourse makes clear what is desirable for Beijing
and leaves the overt act to its rivals. But since PRC is viewed in the world as a peace-loving
state, any such action would make China the victim and legitimate its potential military
retaliation. Since deterrence has no time constraint and the threat may be carried out whenever
the adversary steps in a wrong direction, the PRC has time to further increase its power. The role
of the White Papers is to ensure that those concerned receive the message undistorted, thus
creating a sense of terror, a psychological effect that mainly consists, in Alfred Hitchcocks
words (cited in Freedman and Raghavan, edited by Williams, p. 210) in the anticipation of it[the
bang]. This would be a clear example of a direct attack on the enemys mind, very much
encouraged by Sun Tzu. The specific strategy pursued with deterrence is coercion by denial.
Given the economic leverage that China has in relation to ASEAN member states, the
information superiority relative to the U.S.A, and the maneuverability to counter most foreign
threats, it renders any agressors capacity to engage in battle very low and wins the war before it
even starts.

To summarize the answer to How would you win a war? in the scenario created I will
borrow the term used by Holmes (2001, p.8), constrained maximization. Sun Tzus Art of War
is a guide to create a stronger state, economically and militarily, without provoking any regional
or global responses that could interfere with the growth of power. In this case, a stronger PRC
means increased control over the maritime zone in South China Sea and this will be achieved
without any battle, showcasing the strategic prowess of using traditional Chinese war philosophy.

Word count: 3009

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