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Criminal Law
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
Impossible Crimes
4. Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119
Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was
not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual
situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
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12.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the
victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal
by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was
what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts
are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the
minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered
principals by direct participation.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of
closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing
Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police
officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and
Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is
decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to
retaliate.
13.
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It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the
general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the
general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be
made and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the
defraudation
cannot
be
committed
and
successfully
consummated. Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets
and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
17.
Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December 19,
1989
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department
secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all
chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or
chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the
last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed
their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more
knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who
is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
Continuing Crime
18.
People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be
characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the
accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the
accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking
of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes of theft.
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19.
Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266 December 2,
1993
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny"
doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the
same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but
one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of
each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has
the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407,
1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion"
(State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
20.
Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29,
1994
The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the
one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other,
are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different
criminal
intents,
committed
under different
modes
of
commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different
acts, consummated ondifferent occasions, and caused injury
to different parties.
Compound Crime/Complex Crime
21.
Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L10376, March 31, 1958
There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of
the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless
imprudence by acts without which it could not have been
accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to
exculpate him from liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to
defraud the offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining
the
purpose
sought
by
the
culprits,
appellant's
participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the
commission of the offense completed all the necessary for the
perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial document
22.
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In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of
serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person
who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that
causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other
person may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a
window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result,
she
suffered
serious
physical
injuries,
specifically
a
broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more
than ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly
convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime of rape with
serious physical injuries.
23.
People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel,
and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to
the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel,
causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same
time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1
Bundang and SN1 Domingo.The crimes of murder and attempted
murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty
to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while
attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.
24.
People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be
that for the graver offense which is parricide.This is in accordance with
the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, x x x.
25.
People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand,
and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand.
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in
a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one
offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a
composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is
specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a
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28.
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(SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has
been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court
is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of
a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser
offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment
of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall
be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
41.
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA
9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot
and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if
the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his
notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became
effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having
been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as
opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.
- Accident
42.
Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004
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Mitigating Circumstances
-Praeter Intentionem
44.
People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different
from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a
felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son
Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a
felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he
expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is
thus clear.
-Immediate vindication of a grave offense
45.
People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense, the same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant
case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that
the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees. The established rule is
that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when
the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case
at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe
and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for
which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of
the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days
thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out
the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a
period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the
accused-appellant could have regained his composure and selfcontrol. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in
favor of the accused-appellant.
- Sufficient Provocation
46.
Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009
Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good
sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still
ensued, suddenly ending when petitioners lucky punch found its mark.
In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and
killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the
Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the
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passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way
for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body
both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind
him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed.
There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to
his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself.
56.
Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his
death, treachery exists.
57.
In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the
exact manner of the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately
after hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did not, testify as to
how the attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing
behind some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself
sufficiently establish that the method of execution gave the latter no
opportunity for self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and
consciously adopted by the former without danger to himself.
58.
People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997
The Revised Penal Code provides that "(t)here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make." In the case at
bench, the presence of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing
to murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the
manner by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the
stabbing of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter
was totally surprised by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to
raise any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not have
expected, while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and
fatally assaulted by knife-wielding attackers. The victim was
defenseless during the attack as his hands were restrained by the
accused-appellant to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other
perpetrators. It is well-settled that "(a)n unexpected and sudden attack
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December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of
such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accusedappellants drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight
bottles of gin prior to the rape incident.
III. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Principal
61.
People v. Janjalani et. al. G.R. No. 188314, January 10,
2011
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats coinducement was the determining cause of the commission of
the crime. Such command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized.
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of
the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because
Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and
because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor
was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. The same
finding must be applied to the case at bar.
62.
People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a
principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal
purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in
the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA,
from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied
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AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own
services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being
raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in
the crime of rape. While this Court does not find appellant to have
committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610,
or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act
Accomplice
63.
People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to
Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was
community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of
ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer,
and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with
the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to
have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the
accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the
crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable
cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida
are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and
second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual
intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even
without Idas consent.
Accessories
64.
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11,
1994
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held
liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is
obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of
the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article
60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement
agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government
and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have
become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the
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67.
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being
no
other
mitigating
circumstance
nor
aggravating
circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the
penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion
perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible
penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.
75.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that
persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
- Probation Law
76.
Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim,index
animi
sermo,
or
speech
is
the
index
of
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
77.
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79.
Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is
granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it
provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
(6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and
one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have
been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became
applicable.
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the information on the last working day before the criminal offense
prescribes.
82.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the
running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be
gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines
as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
83.
People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years
in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive
period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.
In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all
fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP
Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency
of the investigating agencies.
84.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No.
169588, October 7, 2013
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this
already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent
People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to
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other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that
the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court
and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period.
85.
86.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended
during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section
19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily
applied under Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution
No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
87.
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BOOK II
Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123)
- Treason
88.
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of
the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
89.
People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314
7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting,
apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and women against
their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes
of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or
men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not
treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to
make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was
not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if
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summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accusedappellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
92.
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the
arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful
and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an
essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first.
93.
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be
of
an
by
and
i.e.
or a
the
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The following are the links that must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
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112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a
shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.
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The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling
to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not
even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters
passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is
questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is
true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the
crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent
or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it
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This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public
funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused
received public funds or property and that he could not account for
them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a
reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public
officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a
shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to satisfactorily
explain.
In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by
the prosecution, petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not
promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable
explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount.
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public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the
public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his
or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which
the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged
in the information.
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The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal
were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost
income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use
of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end
with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private
property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory,
washroom, and waste disposal site.
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131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan
relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on
the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the
standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis
tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2)
survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street
sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit
team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement
Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of
Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the
documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to
Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed
out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price
quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact,
even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the
other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by
the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by
the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing,
should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 19961998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases
were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so
manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 3019.
132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508
An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as
long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with
another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial
or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.
-Anti-Plunder Act
133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001
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Murder
138.
People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with
the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide.
139.
Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013
Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the
elements of murder namely: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide are, in all reasonable
likelihood, present in Dangupons case. As to the first and second
elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet.
Anent the third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Tetets killing in view of
the undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and
thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth
element, Tetets killing can neither be considered as parricide nor
infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is
related to Dangupon.
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140.
People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013
Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant
circumstance of treachery, the other proven circumstance of evident
premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused
who were "riding in tandem" hatched the means on how to carry out
and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed
while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative
of cool thought and reflection on their part that they clung to their
determination to commit the crime; hence evident premeditation is
duly proved.
Homicide
141.
Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds
intent to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly
and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal
intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things,
the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.
142.
Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013
The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even
after he was hit.
Anti-Hazing Law
143.
Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now
retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter
dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or
the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 AntiHazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was
not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt
on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
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146.
Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010
Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the
latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the
victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to
petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted
upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical
injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor
who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10)
days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the
following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries
only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny
person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as
serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party
for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance
for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."
Rape
147.
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ because although the offender has commenced the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was
performed.
148.
People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants
body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is
because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape,
albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.
149.
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009
Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the
following elements: 1. that the accused had carnal knowledge with a
woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These
elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not
rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary.
150.
De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14,
2007
Petitioner insists that a finger does not constitute an object or
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153.
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the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case
of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this
issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older,
the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against
double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice
to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
154.
155.
A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any
physical force or intimidation because in rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence or intimidation.
Anti Child Abuse Law
156.
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AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that
he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual
abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise
of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA
into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.
157.
Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in
prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a
child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse"
when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult.
Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
Kidnapping
158.
People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the
accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(d) the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecutions
evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide.
159.
People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.
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160.
People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13,
2011
Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted
to because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and
that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury,
cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to
exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an
enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping
case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender
forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a
place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the
freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom
remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It remains
undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he
did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so
happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw
an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place where appellant
left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of
the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going
to his place of residence.
161.
In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the
latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her
hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he
refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside
the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people
outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant
tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of
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162.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the
offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs,
otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In
People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible
abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes
committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as
much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape;
and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate
count of rape.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
163.
People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with
the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of
Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that
Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody
of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how
long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the
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one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first
element of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6,
1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez.
Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a
minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother,
shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this
case.
Grave Threats
164.
Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may
or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling
incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias
husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165.
Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to
cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon
his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is
not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in
the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will
is sufficient.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and
cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by
the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything
to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of
petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex
and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the
petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all
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lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards
in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they
failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is
that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for
the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the
petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
166.
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The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to
robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the
accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of
another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery.
Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the
owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his
will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article
497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a
man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the
law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was
due him. Animus furandi was lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168.
Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26,
2006
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the
contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station,
the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the
crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present
when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that
the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or
disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed,
by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and
prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the
business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from
January 21, 1997.
Anti-Wire Tapping Act
169.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112
(1986)
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
170.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28,
1995
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173.
174.
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personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason
that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of
attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of asportation must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly
established, accused should be held liable only for the crime of
attempted robbery with homicide.
Robbery with Rape
175.
People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be
shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of
a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation
where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to
gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on
the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case at bar,
the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the
victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
176.
If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was
also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with
rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit rape
but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery
because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be
viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the
complainant was raped by the accused, the latter threatened to kill her
if she did not give watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from
her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes of rape and
robbery.
177.
People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002
Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery
only under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to
appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he
should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape,
under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Theft
178.
Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner
received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under
the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the
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merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without
the owners consent constitutes gain.
182.
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accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under
paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law
that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single
offense has multiple modes of commission.
186.
Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012
the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of
confidence
or
(b)
means
of
deceit. The
acts
constituting estafa committed
with
abuse
of
confidence
are
enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse
of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or
deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. In this case, the
charge against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was
for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not
necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an
element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged with.
187.
Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013
Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa
under paragraph 2(a) of that provision does not require as an element
of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the
swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary
damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the
fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its
evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment
payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share.
Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.
188.
Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20,
2013
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere
filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the
dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be
evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents
termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the
accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal
justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were
also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.
189.
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender,
like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable
Criminal Law
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks
tendered by Milla could not have novated the original transaction, as
the checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million
the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced
and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover,
the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or
conversion, but was committed through Millas falsification of public
documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere
novation.
BP 22
191.
People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that
appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer.
She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor
of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her
lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that
presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at
the Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter
supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by
appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant
cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice
violated appellants right to procedural due process. It is a general rule
that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the
notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of
proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the
quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
192.
Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes.
A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the
elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored.
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193.
Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28,
2005
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is
thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of
dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The
notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check
will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.
The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the
drawer or maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent
criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the
check has not been paid.
194.
Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a
worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of
the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or
issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the
check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence
to her incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
195.
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2,
2001
The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions
(1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements
for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the
check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the
conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the
account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment
within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6)
months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks
157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be
considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or
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constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant
to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is
intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope
and intendment.
-Arson
199.
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or
arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion
of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed
is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular
person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.
200.
Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013
Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions. Having affixed their signatures on the
disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein,
petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in
approving the "ghost" purchases. Their participation in facilitating the
payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of
the government.
201.
Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here.
However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally
burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
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- Malicious Mischief
202.
Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution
had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing
elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner
was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of
the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara
pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable
than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which
moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or
angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and
dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV
backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to
control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of
damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the
petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated
encounter between him and the private complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the
prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of malicious mischief.
Crimes Against Chastity
-Qualified Seduction
203.
People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it
does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the
Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who,
in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified seduction
even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge
was voluntary on the part of the virgin.
204.
Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November
29, 1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and
Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin,
and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18)
years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two
common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended
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party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the
offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with
lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be
committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2)
the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205.
Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation
be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent
to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room
together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a
grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint,
what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was
subjected to such atrocity.
206.
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Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his
finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to
various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of
the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle
that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime
of rape through sexual assault.
-Forcible Abduction
208.
People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article
342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is
taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a
woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was
intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her
tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist
considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have
been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be
demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering
that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as
probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly
prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that
makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence
shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected
in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
209.
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(except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the
neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that
order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we
cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape.
Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
210.
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002
There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape.
Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as
separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should
be detached from and considered independently of the forcible
abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts
of rape.
- Anti Sexual Harassment Act
211.
Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts
covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of
petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or
stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision
calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is
not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may
be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The
CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from
petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to
constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA
7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or
apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner
touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its
ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the
evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding
of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative
agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon
the Court.
212.
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The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
215.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February
18, 2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
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218.
Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable
from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not
necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters
of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which
others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the
latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those
knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person
referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule
that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized
or could identify the party vilified in the article.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a
sufficient description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In
short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one
and the same person.
219.
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Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager
of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he
was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the
matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person
who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in
the publication of the offending article is not required.
220.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous
articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no
participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject
articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of
authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in
the publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill
his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply
say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their
responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a
newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management,
conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the
owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory
that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the
contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot evade
responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is
immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of
the publication.
221.
Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where
the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business
offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.
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