BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL LAW

QUESTION:
DOES THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES
SHIFT TO THE ACCUSED?
According to Osborns concise Law Dictionary,1 The team Burden of
proof can be defined as the evidence, which satisfies the court as to the
truth of a fact. This simply means what the court has to look at and be
convinced that an act was committed or not. It can also be further
defined according to H.H Denis2, as the legal obligation on a party to
satisfy the fact finder (who happens to be a judge, jury, or magistrate) on
a specified standard of proof that certain facts are true.
Generally speaking in criminal law the burden of proof lies on the
prosecution and the prosecutor in this case holds the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, and if there are left any
doubts in the mind of the judge, jury or magistrate then the court will
have no other option but to acquit the offender. The fact that the
prosecution holds the burden of proving the guilt of a person is further
brought about by the fact underlined in the constitution of this country. It
should be noted that Article 28 subsection 3, part (a) of the constitution of
Uganda 3 states that: Every personWho is charged with a criminal offence be presumed to be
innocentuntil proved guilty or until that person has pleaded guilty.
Again this under scores the fact that the prosecution holds the onus of

providing the guilt of an offender beyond reasonable doubt. A good, case

to elaborate this issue is the one of WOOLMINGTON Vs. D.P.P 4
Woolmington was charged for murdering his wife by shooting, he
admitted that she was killed by a bullet fired from a riffle which he was
handling, but said that he squeezed the trigger, involuntarily, while
1 Roger Bird, Osborns Concise Law Dictionary
2 H.H.Denis; Law of evidence
3 Article 28, subsection 3 part (a) constitution of Uganda 1995
4 [1935] AC, Pg 462.
endeavouring to induce her to return to live with him by threatening to
shoot himself, Woolmington was convicted. An appeal to the court of
appeal was dismissed but a further appeal to the House of Lords,
succeeded, and Woolmingtons conviction was quashed. In the House of
Lords, LORD SANKEY said: . throughout the wave of the English
criminal law, one golden thread is always to be seen that is the duty of
the prosecution to prove the persons guilt the principle that the
prosecution must prove the guilt of the prison is part of the criminal law
of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.
There fore the rule that the prosecution must prove the accused guilt,
beyond reasonable doubt means that in principle the prosecution must
prove to nothing any defence raised by the accused. This clearly under
scores the fact that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused, heavily
lies on the prosecution. Its they who have to show to court that such an
accused cannot be left to go unpunished for his /her crime because he /
she bares the utmost criminal responsibility and must show the evidence

thereof;
To further drive the point home, I yet have another case to discuss, this
issue, its the one of OKEITH OKALE and others Vs. REPUBLIC5. In
this case, 4 appellants were convicted of murder, and the issue before
court was identification and the prosecution case consisted of evidence
from the widow of the deceased, and that of dying declaration. In this
case the Judge held a prosecution case, and then cast on the appellants the
burden of disproving it or raising doubts about it. It was held, the burden
of proof in criminal proceedings is throughout on the prosecution, and its
duty of the trial Judge to look at the evidence as a whole, so the appeal
5[1965] E.A Pg. 555
was allowed conviction squashed and death sentences set aside. The
point to note here is that the right decision should be that the burden of
proof should lie on the prosecution and not on the accused. Its the
prosecution who have the burden of proving the guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Further still we yet still have another case supporting the fact that the
burden of proof shifts on the prosecution, its the case of SEKITOLEKO
Vs. UGANDA6. In this case the appellant was charged with robbery
contrary to section 272 and punishable under section 273 of the penal
code7. His defence was Alibi8. Alibi according to dictionary of Law,
This is evidence tending to show that by reason of the presence of the
accused at a particular or in a particular area at a particular time he
was not or was unlikely to have been at the place where the offence is
alleged to have committed at the time of the alleged commission. In the

course of his Judgement the learned magistrate said that the burden of
proving Alibi lay on the appellant, he was convicted and sentenced to 3
years imprisonment, he appealed and it was held that as general rule of
law the burden on the prosecution of proving the guilt of a person beyond
reasonable doubt never shifts whether the defence set up an Alibi or
something else. It was further held that the burden of proving and Alibi
doesnt lie on the prisoner and the trial magistrate had misdirected
himself. So the appeal was allowed and conviction and sentence
squashed. This again casts a very fine picture of the fact in Alibi cases;
the burden of proof falls on the prosecution.
6 (1967) EAR 531
7 Section 272 and 273 of the penal code of Uganda, Laws of Uganda. Cap. 106
8 Dictionary of Law 6th Edition Pg. 18

Whereas its a rule that the prosecution must prove the accused guilt,
beyond reasonable doubt, this has been watered down by the fact that in
many offences, the accused has the burden of proving something,
although his defence when he holds the burden is lighter than that borne
by the prosecution in proving guilt, for he as the accused only proves the
facts on the balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt.
An accused to begin with, according to Roger Bird9, is one charged with
an offence, and here discussed below are some of the instances when the
burden of proof shifts to the accused.
The Burden of proof will shift to the accused when a person pleads a
defence of insanity. The correct definition of the term insanity is base

upon the rules base in MNAUGHTONs case10, the case provides that a
defendant must establish that one is suffering a defeat of wisdom arising
from a disease of mind, resulting in the defendant being unaware of the
nature and quantity of his act. The leading statement was brought forth in
the MNAUGHTONs case that everyone is proved sane until the
centrally is proved to be the satisfaction of the Jury or the court. This
MNAUGHTONs rule is incorporated in section 1111 and section 1212 of
he penal code;
Every person is presumed to be of sound mind, and to have been
of sound mind at any time which comes in question until the
contrary is proved.
And section 12; A person is not criminally responsible for an act or
omission if at a time of doing the act or making the omission, he is
through any disease affecting his mind, incapable of under standing what
he is doing, or of knowing that he ought not to do the act or make the
9 Roger Bird; Oborns concise Law dictionary.
10 (1843) 8 E.R. Pg. 718.
11 section 11 of the penal code cap. 106 Laws of Uganda.
12 Ibid, section 12.
omission but a person may be criminally responsible for an act or
omission, although his mind is affected by disease if such disease does
not in fact produce upon his mind one or other of the affects afore
mentioned in reference to that act or omission.
It should be noted that under section 12 of the penal code, its the accused
to set up a defence of insanity, the prosecution is not allowed to state that

the accused committed the offence because he was insane. In Uganda,

statutes like mental treatment Act Cap 27, the magistrate court Act
amended 1970 section 111 up to 116, the trial of indictment decree of
1971 section 43 up to 47 and the penal code of Uganda section 11 & 12
deals with insanity, so when the accused pleads that he committed a
crime because he was insane section 11 and 12 of the penal code laws of
Uganda cap 106 will apply and usually the defence of insanity applies at
two stages, i.e. before the trial and at the trial. Its expected for the
accused to set up a defence of insanity and not the prosecution or the
Judge, so that if the denies having committed the offence, then the issue
of insanity could be pre judicial, and it can further be noted that in this
case the Burden of proof is not beyond reasonable doubt, rather verdict
reached on the basis of balance of probabilities.
Further more still under the insanity clause we yet have another fact
called irresistible impulse, when the burden of proof shifts to the accused,
a case for consideration is one of SHEKANGA Vs. R (1948)13 15
E.A.C.A 158, his defence was insanity after being accused of murder, he
acclaimed that the devil had been arguing him for 1 month to kill and he
gave into the temptation, I this case the Burden of proof lies on him to
prove to court based on the balance of probabilities try and prove
13 (1948)15 EACA, 158
otherwise. Also another division still under insanity is the case when one
pleads diminishing responsibility; this fact is provided for under section
18814 (A) (1) of the penal code, which states as follows;
Where a person is found guilty of the murder of being a party to

the
murder of another and the court is satisfied that he was suffering
from
such abnormality of mind. (Whether arising from a condition of
arrested
or retorted development of mind or any inherent causes or induced
by
disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental
responsibility for his
acts and omissions in during or being a party to the murder, the
court shall make a special finding to the effect that the accused was
guilty of murder but with diminished responsibility.
The principle discussed in the case of R Vs. BYNE15 where the appellant
admitted struggling a girl and mutilating her dead body, it was discovered
by medical evidence that the killing was under sexual desire, he would
suffer from violent sexual desire finding it hard to control his lust and yet
when not under the influence of the perverted sexual desire he would be a
normal person. It was noted that at the time the accused killed the girl, he
was suffering from perverted sexual desire. It was considered that though
he was considered that he was not insane in sexual technical terms of
insanity as laid down in the MNAUGHTONs rule case, the issue was
that at the time of killing was he suffering from any abnormality of mind?
14 Section 188 (4) (1) of the penal code, cap. 106 Laws of Uganda.
15 (1960) 2 ALL ERI (1960) 3 ALL ERI
The holding was that the verdict of murder be reduced to manslaughter.

Here again we see a typical example of when the burden shifts to the
accused to prove basing on balance of probability that he can commit the
felony in his rightful mind.
Another major area of concern when the burden of proof shifts to the
accused is in the case of when one pleads intoxication. However it
should be noted that under section 3 (1) of the penal code, laws of
Uganda, says;
Save as provided in this section, intoxication shall not constitute a
defence to any criminal charge.
Except, as indicated in part 2;
Intoxication shall be a defence to any criminal charge if by reason
there
of the person charged at the time of the act or omission complained
of did not know that such act or omission was wrong or did not know
what he
was doing and ..
This means that intoxication is not a defence but only when the
intoxication or drunkenness is involuntary, when one becomes insane due
to drunkenness or when one does not know if he is doing wrong in
drinking, and lastly when the mensrea has been affected by the
drunkenness. It should be noted however that a person can become
intoxicated, either through his own voluntary intake of drugs, or being
forced either by trickery in taking of drugs or alcohol.
When relying on the defence of intoxication, its paramount that one has
to prove to court that he was incapable of forming a specific intent and

did not so because of the alcohol or even though capable of forming the
method of intent did not do so before intoxication, so here again we see
the onus is on the accused to prove based on the balance of probability.
In the case of MANTARA Vs. R16, it was argued as follows;
Its of course correct that if the accused seeks to set up a defence
of insanity by reason of intoxication the burden of establishing that
defence rests upon hi in that he must at least demonstrate the
probability of what he seeds to prove, but if the plea is really that
the accused was by reason of intoxication incapable of forming the
specific intention required to constitute the offence charged, its a
misdirection of forming the specific intention required to constitute
the offence charged, it a misdirection if the court lays the onus of
establishing this upon he accused.
This can further be supported with the case of HILL Vs.
BAXTER17, where Lord Deblin said In any crime involving
mensrea,
the prosecution must prove guilty intent but if the defence
suggests
drunkardness they must offer evidence of it, indeed didnt
have to prove it .
Again this under scores the very basic idea of the burden of proof shifting
to the accused in case of intoxication.
Another case to drive the point further is that of CHEMININGWA Vs.
R18, here again it was categorically stated that;
the accused seeks to set up a defence if insanity by reason of

intoxication, the burden establishing that defence, rests upon him,

16 [1955] E.A.C.A 502
17 42 C.A.R 1957
18 (1956) 23 E.A.C.A 451
in that he must at least demonstrate a probability of what he seeks
to prove but if the plea is merely that the accused was by reason of
intoxication incapable of taking the specification required to
constitute the offence charged. Its misdirection, if the trial court
lays the onus of establishing this upon the accused.
Its also important to point out the fact that if a person does something
while drunk, that he would not have done while sober will not itself give
rise to the defence of intoxication, that is to say a drunk and intent in
nevertheless intent.
Another case to support the issue of intoxication, as one of the instances
when the burden of proof shifts to the accused is that of D.P.P. Vs.
BEARD19 in this case Beard was accused of murdering a girl of 13 years,
during the process of having carnal knowledge. He suffocated her to
death in bid of preventing her from escaping. The defence laid forth was
that the verdict should be man slaughter and not murder on the ground
that there was no intention on the part of Beard to cause death, and
further more, claimed that he was too drunk to know that what was doing
would eventually inflict serious injury and consequently cause death.
The issue before court therefore was that the accused was intoxicated, and
had to be entirely incapable of causing intent of murder.
It was held by Lord Birken head that; in cases under this

holding, the Mnaughtons rules should be applied and if its found that
the accused was in such a state that he did not know, the nature and
quality of the act or that the act was wrongful, his act would be excusable
on the ground of insanity and a special verdict of guilty but insane
recorded. there was no evidence that the accused was too drunk to
19 [1920] A.C 494
form the intent of committing rape. Under these circumstances, it was
proved that death was caused by an act of violence done in furtherance of
the felony of rape. Such a killing amounted to murder therefore the
appeal by the DPP was allowed and a conviction of murder restored
Further more, we can also cite the case of WREH (or DEE) Vs R20. In
this case the appellant was charged with murder, for stubbing and killing
the deceased after he intervened in a quarrel between himself and another
person. However prier to the incident the defendant had been drinking
and actually spoke rationally to the police after being arrested, and
showed no signs of intoxication when examine by a doctor a few hours
later. He however said he was so drunk at the time of the incident, and by
next morning he couldnt remember what had happened. It was held in
this case;
Drunkardness will not amount to the defence unless there is
evidence
that renders the accused incapable of forming specific intent,
necessary to constitute the offence charged and rebults the
presumption that the man intends the natural consequences of his
acts.

The above question can be interpreted to mean that the drunkardness

would have proceeded to such a degree as to produce actual insanity. So
he appeal was allowed and a conviction of manslaughter substituted.
Also in CHEMININGWA Vs. R21, It was stated that;
If the accused seeks to set up a defence of insanity by reason of
intoxication, the burden of establishing that defence rests upon him
20 (1950 56) ALR SL 153
21 (1956) 23 E.A.C.A 451
in that he must at least demonstrate a probability of what he seeks
to prove, but if the plea is merely that the accused was by reason of
intoxication incapable of forming the specific intention required to
constitute the offence charged, its a misdirection if the trial court
lays the onus of the burden of establishing this upon the accused.
Lord Denning is quoted to have said that;
If a drunken person is so drunken person is so drunk that he
doesnt know what he is doing, he has a defence to any charge
such as a murder or wounding with intent in which a specific intent
is essential, but he still liable to be convicted by manslaughter or
unlawful wounding for which no specific intent is necessary.
Lord Denning further on says that;
A drunken man is said to have capacity to form the specific intent
necessary to constitute the crime unless evidence is being given
from which it can reasonably be in furred that he was incapable of
forming it.
And so intoxication only acts an instigating factor and may be considered

in sentencing the convicted person.

The leading case in intoxication is the one of A.G. of NORTHERN
IRELAND Vs. GALLANGER22. In this case before drinking the liquor,
he defendant had intended to kill his wife, a trial judge directed the jury
to apply the Mnaughtons test, to the time when the liquor was taken,
and not to the time of killing, the court of appeal allowed the appeal from
the conviction of murder. The appeal was allowed subject to very limited
exceptions that drunkenness is no defence nor is it a crime produced by
22 [1963] AC 369

drunkenness. Sir Mathew Hale said, effect of reasonIn defence of

intoxication the following factors has to be considered;
1. Self-induced intoxication, can be raised where a defendant charged
with a crime of specific intent but not where the change involves
the crime of basic intent, a basic intent crime is where the mensrea
does not exceed the actus rus.
2. Dutch carriage, this was emphasised by Lord Dinnings in the case
of AG of NORTHERN IRELAND Vs. GALLANGER23. He stated
that a defendant who deliberately gets himself drunk in order to
overcome his nerves or inhibitions in committing a specific intent
crime cannot relay on his intoxicated state at the time of the
offence as evidence of negativating mensrea. He stated that
evidence of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn
him, coupled with the act which he intended to do and did.
Still under intoxication, a defendant may seek to raise a defence of

intoxication on the basis of his being forced to take intoxicant or having

been deceived to consume it. This is called involuntarily intoxication, in
this case it should be noted that a person must not be reckless, as was
discussed in the case of R Vs. ALLEN24. In this case the appellant
consumed a quantity of wine without realising that it had an exceptionally
high alcoholic content, he could not contend that he is consuming a low
or non alcoholic content, he could not contend that his resulting
intoxication was involuntary i.e. the defendant who honestly believes that
he is consuming a low or non alcoholic drink should be able to contend
that he did not act recklessly in consuming it. Further the court has to
consider whether a drink was administered by another. It was discussed
23 1963 AC 39
24 [1988]CRMLR 698
in the case of R Vs. KINGSTON25. In this case the defendant was a
sexual paedophile, who committed an indecent assault on a 15-year-old
boy. He claimed that prior to these acts, he had been drugged by his co
defendant and therefore he couldnt recall the incident, the court of appeal
held that if there were evidence that his inhibitions had been affected by
the drug supertutiously administered by a third party with a result that he
acted upon an intention to commit an act that he would not have had, but
for the effect of drugs should not bare criminal responsibility for his
action.
So far we have seen two instances in which the burden of proof shifts to
the accused i.e. in the case of insanity and in the case of intoxication, and
now we will look at a third issue, this is in case of express statutory

provision. Its a common fact for the statute to provide that it shall be for
the defence to prove certain facts, for example in section 285;
1. Where three or more persons are found loitering, wondering,
moving about or concealing them selves, whilst any of them is
armed with an article to which this section applies, with the
intention of committing an offence relating to property or an
offence against the person, every such person shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years.
2. In a prosecution for an offence under this section, proof that the
accused was so found and so armed shall be sufficient evidence
that the accused had an intention to commit an offence relating to
property or an offence against the person unless the accused gives
an explanation of his conduct which satisfies the court that he had
no such intention. Also evidence Act cap 43 section 101 up to
105.
25 (1993) 3 WLR 519
It can be clearly shown from the above that this section of the penal code
casts the legal burden of proof upon the accused. In R Vs.
PATTERSON26. It was held that; It seems to the court that in the first
instance, the prosecution must prove that the prisoner was found in
procession (by night) of either an implement which can properly be
described as one of those specifically named, or or an instrument capable
of in fact being used as house breaking implement from its common
though not exclusive use for that purpose of from a particular
circumstances of the case in question, once possession of such an

implement has been shown the burden shifts to the prisoner to prove on
the balance of probabilities that there was no excuse for his possession of
he implement at the time in question and place. Therefore the legal
burden is placed upon the accused to prove basing on balance of
probabilities.
Further still in the case of D. KAYONGO Vs. UGANDA27, where justice
Phadke clearly state; the burden of proof lay upon the accused to show
lawful excuses for possession of keys found on him. He could fulfil this
burden on the balance of probabilities.
Also section 299 (1) of the penal code act, When any police officer has
stopped, searched or detained any vessel, boat, aircraft, vehicle or person
under he provisions of section 20 of the criminal procedure code or
searched any building, vessel, carriage, box, receptable or a place
pursuant to a search warrant issued under section 69 of the magistrates
court act, 1970, and has seized anything which may reasonably be
suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained, and if the person
26 (1962) 1 ALLER 340
27 CRIMINAL CASE 29 (1971
in whose possession such a thing was found shall not give on account to
the satisfaction of the court of how he came by the same, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanour.
The above statute also casts a legal burden of proof upon the accused.
Further more automatism as a defence, is also an instance when the
burden of proof shifts to the accused, its a defence if an act or omission
ora given event with which the accused is charged was involuntary. For

example it can be argued that in the case of WOOLMINGTON Vs.

D.P.P.28, an act or omission or event on the part of the accused is
involuntary where its beyond his control.
The concise oxford dictionary 9th edition defines automatism as the
performance of actions unconsciously or sub consciously or involuntary
action. One of the best examples of involuntary action is one done with
compulsion i.e. where its compelled by external physical force. e.g. in the
case of HILL Vs. BAXTER29. It was stated that a man couldnt be said to
be driving where at the material time he was attached by a swam of bees,
and was prevented from any directional control over the vehicle. Any
movement on his arms, and legs being solely caused the action of the
bees involuntary acts are done by muscle without any control of the mind.
In law automatism is limited to cases where there is total destruction of
voluntary control, i.e. its the same as loss of consciousness, impaired or
reduce awareness. E.g in the case of A. Gs REFERENCE 2/199230. The
case where the accused argued that there was psychiatric evidence that D
had been in condition known as driving without awareness and that
this amounted to a state of automatism, however on appeal by the AG, the
28 (1935) AC462
29 (1958) 1 Q .B 277, or (1958) 1 ALLER 193
30 [1994] Q. B. 91 (1993) 4 ALLER 683
AG referred the case of the court of appeal on a point of law namely,
whether the psychiatric evidence for the defence could amount to
evidence of automatism. It was held that for automatism there had to be a
total destruction of voluntary control on his part, impaired control wasnt

enough. Lord Denning is a gain quoted having said that the accusers own
word will rarely be sufficient unless its supported by medical evidence.
It also be noted that Bonafide claim of right instance when the burden of
proof shifts to the accused, this defence is provided for under section 8 of
the penal code A person is not criminally responsible in respect of an
offence relating to
property, if the act done or omitted to be done by him with respect
to the
property was done in the exercise of an honest claim of right and
without intention to defraud.
In this issue the case the case, which may be cited maybe CHIBIJANA
Vs. R31
Another issue to consider in which the burden of proof shifts to the
accused is in the mistake of fact defence, if a person raises the defence of
mistake of fact, if he adduces this evidence, the case will proceed as if the
facts were true, the facts he adduces must convince the court that he acted
honestly and reasonably. Under section 10 of the penal code A person
who does or omits an act under an honest
and reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of
things is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any
greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as he
believed to exist.
31 12 EACA 104.
Mistake of fact is a defence because it shows luck of mensrea, mistake of
fact means in section 10 that a person dues or omits to do, or when an

accused commits the unlawful act he was mistaken as certain material

fact/ facts. It must however not be mistake of law or the consequences of
law.
A case in citation is one of R Vs. SULTAN MAGINGA32. In this case
the deceased person, a woman were lying in a vice field, after sexual
intercourse, Sultan was going to guard against wild pigs and saw the
grass shaking and he called up to ask whether it was an animal or people
and there was no reply, Sultan threw a spear and killed a human being
thinking it was a pig. In this case the charge of murder was not sustained
because the killing was accidental. In the defence of mistake of fact, the
test of reasonable person is appealed. Here again we see the burden of
proof shifting to the accused in proving his innocence.
Also another issue in which the burden of proof shifts to the accused is
when there rises the issue of self defence or probably defence of property,
defence of a person, or public interest, here in this issue, according to
section 17 of the penal code, Subject to any express provisions in this
code, or any other law in force in
Uganda, criminal responsibility
(a) Further the use of force in the defence of a person and
property and
(b) In respect of rash, recklessness, negligent acts, shall be
determined according to the principles of English law.
And under section 372 of the penal code; Every person who, knowing
that a person designs to commit or is committing a felony,
32 (1969) HCD, 33

fails to use all reasonable means to prevent the commission or

completion there of, is guilty of a misdemeanour.
In other words every person has a duty of preventing a committed felony
by the other, when a person attempts to commit a felony against the other
its a duty of every person to defend the other, even by use of force.
However in case a person kills another, when trying to prevent the
commission of an offence, before she/he may plead, but before a person
can plead self defence he or she must show that he has Bonafida belief
(utmost food faith). Here again the onus is on this person to prove or
show that Bonafide belief in court. Therefore in this case the burden of
proof will have rested on the accused. See the case of A.G. of NYASA
LAND Vs. JACKSON 1957 R &MR 443.
In conclusion therefore, the fact that the burden of proof lies on the side
of the prosecution in criminal cases is a well-established fact, and the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt as Smith and Hogan
rightly puts it; Its a general
Principle of criminal law that a person may not be convicted of a
crime unless the prosecution have proved beyond, reasonable
doubt.
This rule of general application, however it, should be pointed out that
there are exceptions when the burden of proof shifts to the accused in
cases of when one raises the defence of insanity, intoxication,
automatism, statutory provisions, Bonafide claim of right, mistake of fact
and self defence and in such cases where the onus of proof is put upon the
above instances, the accused satisfies it if he proves his case on a balance

of probabilities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Smith and Hogan; CRIMINAL LAW, 9th Edition, Butter Worths,
London,
Edinburg, Dublin 1999.
2. Penal code of Uganda; cap, 106 Laws of Uganda.
3. Evidence Act cap 43, Laws of Uganda.
4. Roger Bird, Osborns concise law dictionary.
5. H.H. Denis Law of evidence.
6. Criminal cases; 8th Edition Edited by Leshire Rutherford and Sheila.
7. Florence Nakachwa; class room notes.