ODELIA S. FUNGO, Petitioner, vs.

LOURDES SCHOOL OF MANDALUYONG

and FR. SERVILLANO B. BUSTAMANTE, OFM, CAP., Respondents.
G.R. No. 152531
July 27, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal when she was forced to resign and
accept her separation payment. According to the petitioner, Fr. Bustamante urged
her to tender her resignation within 30 minutes from when she was summoned to
his office. He threatened her that if she would not resign, her separation pay would
be forfeited. Before her dismissal, Fr. Bustamente required the petitioner to explain
in writing why she should not be dismissed from employment for wilful breach of
trust reposed on her when she retrieved some documents from the filing cabinet
wherein she was given a duplicate key to. These documents contain the summary of
efficiency ratings of all the teachers, including her husbands who was dismissed
from service due to an alleged low performance rating. The LA found that petitioner
was constructively dismissed. This was reversed by the NRLC holding that petitioner
voluntarily resigned. When her motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
went to CA which dismissed the petition. With her motion for reconsideration being
denied, petitioner elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was constructively dismissed from the service.
RULING:
There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it
would foreclose any choice by him except to forego her continued employment.
An examination of the records of this case convinced us that petitioner was indeed
made to resign against her will with threat that she will not be given her separation
pay should she fail to do so. Clearly, her consent was vitiated. Indeed, it is very
unlikely that petitioner, who worked in the school for almost fifteen (15) years,
would simply resign voluntarily. Her receipt of the benefits could be considered as
an act of self preservation, taking into consideration the financial predicament she
and her family were then facing.
Thus, we rule that petitioner was constructively dismissed from her employment.
WENSHA SPA WELLNESS CENTER Inc. Vs. Loreta T. Yung
G.R. No. 185122
FACTS: Respondent was hired as personal assistant to Mr. Xu, president of Wensha.
Sometime in august 2004, respondent was asked to leave her office because Mr. Xu

and feng sui master was exploring the premises. Later that day, Xu asked loreta to
go on leave with pay for one month.
When she returned, Xu and his wife asked her to resign because according to the
feng shui master, her aura did not match that of Xu. Loreta refused but was
informed that she could no longer work at Wensha. That same afternoon, Loreta
went to the NLRC and filed a case for illegal dismissal against Xu and Wensha.
Wensha and Xu denied illegally dismissing Loretas employment. They claimed
those to months after Loreta was hired, they received various complaints against
her from the employees. They advised her to take a leave of absence for one month
while they conducted an investigation on the matter. Based on the result of the
investigation, they terminated Loreta based on loss of trust and confidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not dismissing an employee based on the advice of a feng sui
master is legal.
Held: No. To be a valid cause for termination of employment, the act or acts
constituting breach of trust must have been done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely and they must be founded on clearly established facts. The Court find
Loretas complaint credible as there is consistency in her pleadings and evidence.
In contrast, Wenshas pleadings and evidence, when taken as a whole, suffer from
inconsistency. Moreover, the affidavits of employees pertain only to petty matters
that, to the Courts mind, are not sufficient to support Wenshas alleged loss of trust
and confidence.

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES CORPORATION ET. AL. VS.

JUEBER P. SIAZAR and THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 177970

August 25, 2010

This case dwells on circumstances that spell dismissal from work although the
company insists that such circumstances indicate abandonment of work.
Facts:
, Siazar discovered that his company was not remitting much of his SSS premiums
although the computations appeared on his pay slips. When he told his coemployees about it, they made their own inquiries, too. On Siazars arrival at work
on June 17, 1997, the company guard refused him entry and handed him two notes
from the management: one said that he was not to report for work; the other said
that he was to report after two days on June 19, 1997 to Atty. Rodriguez at his office
in Binondo. The latter told Siazar that the company had decided to abolish his
department because of redundancy and he could no longer work.

On July 3, 1997 respondent Jueber P. Siazar (Siazar) filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner Agricultural and Industrial
Supplies Corporation (AISC) and others before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

NLRC, which ruled to uphold the Labor Arbiters finding that the company did not
dismiss him from work and that, misunderstanding its action, he ceased to report
for work. It was all a misunderstanding, said the NLRC, and each party must bear his
own loss to place them on equal footing. The NLRC sustained the award of
separation pay to be reckoned the time Siazar worked for AISC. The NLRC also
affirmed the grant to him of his unpaid salary and proportionate 13th month pay.
Siazar asked for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it.
The CA thus ordered the company to reinstate Siazar and pay him full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time of his dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Two issues are presented:
1. Whether or not the Siazars dismissal was valid.
Courts Ruling
No. From an examination of the record, the Court has ascertained that the evidence
supports the CAs finding that the company dismissed Siazar from work.
The company did not adduce any evidence to prove that Siazars dismissal had
been for a just or authorized cause as in fact it had been its consistent stand that it
did not terminate him and that he quit on his own. But given that the company
dismissed Siazar and that such dismissal had remained unexplained, there can be
no other conclusion but that his dismissal was illegal.
However, under Article 279 of the Labor Code, separation pay may be awarded to
an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement when continued
employment is no longer possible where, as in this case, the continued relationship
between the employer and the employee is no longer viable due to strained
relations between them and reinstatement appears no longer practical due to the
length of time that had since passed.

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL)

v.MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION494 SCRA 195 (2006), THIRD
DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

An ordinary striking worker cannot be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal

strike unless there be a proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike.
Facts: The Diamond Hotel Employee's Union (the union) filed a petition for
Certification Election before the DOLE seeking certification as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its members. The DOLE denied said petition as it failed
to comply with the legal requirements. The Union later notified petitioner hotel of its
intention to negotiate for collective bargaining agreement( CBA). The Human
Resource Department of Diamond Hotel rejected the notice and advised the union
since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not
be recognized as such. Since there was a failure to settle the dispute regarding the
bargaining capability of the union, the union went on to file a notice of strike due to
ULP. In the meantime, Kimpo filed acomplaint for ULP against petitioner hotel. After
several conferences, the union suddenly went on strike. The following day, the
National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
(NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly extended its support to the union. The
NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directing the strikers to
immediately "cease and desist from obstructing the free ingress and egress from
the Hotel premises. During the implementation of the order, the striking employees
resisted and some of the guards tasked to remove the barricades were injured. The
NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the union officers and members
who participated were terminated on the grounds of participating in an illegal strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the union members is valid on the grounds of
participating in an illegal strike
HELD:
Yes. Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where
the means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation,
restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the
rights to property renders a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to
the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when
accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute
nuisance.
As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for
staging and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of
the Labor Code which provides that ". . .any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status. . ." An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be
dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed

by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act

during a strike.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY - DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION (FEU-NRMF)
and LILIA P. LUNA. M.D., Petitioners, versus FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (FEU-NRMFEA-AFW), et al Respondents., G.R. No.
168362; October 12, 2006
(Strike, Requisites for a Valid Strike)
FACTS:
In 1994, petitioner FEU-NRMF (a medical institution organized and existing
under the Philippine laws), and respondent union (a legitimate labor organization
and is the duly recognized representative of the rank and file employees of
petitioner), entered into a CBA that will expire on 30 April 1996. In view of the
forthcoming expiry, respondent union sent a letter-proposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF
stating their economic and non-economic proposals for the negotiation of the new
CBA.
Petitioner FEU-NRMF rejected respondent unions demands and proposed to
maintain the same provisions of the old CBA reasoning that due to financial
constraints, it cannot afford to accede to a number of their demands. In an effort to
arrive at a compromise, subsequent conciliation proceedings were conducted before
the NCMB, but the negotiation failed. Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike
before NCMB on the ground of bargaining deadlock. Union staged a strike.
Petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for
Certification of Labor Dispute with the NLRC. Secretary of Labor granted the petition
and an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute was issued, thereby
prohibiting any strike or lockout and enjoining the parties from committing any acts
which may exacerbate the situation.
Striking employees continued holding a strike, claiming that they had no
knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over the
pending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the AJO.
Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing all the striking employees
to return to work and the petitioner FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. A Return to Work Agreement was
executed by the disputing parties.
Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending
that respondent union staged the strike in defiance of the AJO, hence, it was illegal.
LA declared the strike illegal and allowed dismissal of union officers for conducting
the strike in defiance of the AJO. Respondent union filed an Appeal before the NLRC.
NLRC affirmed in toto the Decision of the LA. Respondent union filed MR, it was

denied. Respondent union brought a Petition for Certiorari before CA. CA granted
the Petition and reversed the Resolutions of NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether the service of the AJO was validly effected by the process server so
as to bind the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed
subsequent to the issuance of the said Order.
RULING:
The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was
rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike
area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised
Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order AJO could not be taken for granted considering the adverse effect
in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by such Order. Defiance
of the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has
assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for the loss of employment status of any
striking union officer or member. Employment is a property right of which one
cannot be deprived of without due process. Due process here would demand that
the respondent union be properly notified of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order of
the Secretary of Labor enjoining the strike and requiring its members to return to
work. Thus, there must be a clear and unmistakable proof that the requirements
prescribed by the Rules in the manner of effecting personal or substituted service
had been faithfully complied with.
Merely posting copies of the AJO does not satisfy the rigid requirement for
proper service outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of
service made by the process server was invalid and irregular. Respondent union
could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not
properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent
union was valid under the circumstances.

NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES,INC., Vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT

FACTS:

A labor dispute between Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. (Nissan Motors) and
BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock
resulted in (1) the filing of four (4) notices of strike. The Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. In it,
the DOLE Secretary expressly enjoined any strike or lockout and directed the
parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might exacerbate the
situation, and for the Union to refrain from engaging in any disruptive activity.
Eventually, the DOLE Secretary issued a decision which contained names of union
officers and members whom Nissan Motors dismissed for defying the directives
contained in the assumption order.
The DOLE Secretary subsequently issued a resolution affirming with modification
its previous decision. The modification consisted in the deletion from the list of
dismissed Union officers the names of three (3) employees previously identified.
The CA, acting on the separate petitions for certiorari of Nissan Motors and the
Union, effectively affirmed the aforementioned decision, as modified, of the
DOLE Secretary.
ISSUES: Wheteher or not the decision of CA in reinstating some union members
after their previous dismissal is valid.
HELD:Yes. The Union engaged in work showdown which under the circumstances in which
they were undertaken constitute illegal strike. The company is therefore right in dismissing the
subject Unionofficers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in
illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary.
However, the members of the Union should not be as severely punished. Dismissal is a harsh
penalty as surely they were only following orders from their officers. Besides, there is no
evidence that they engaged or participated in the commission of illegal activities during the said
strike. They should thus be reinstated to their former positions, but without back wages.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, et al. v. COURT OF

APPEALS, et al. 502 SCRA 219 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment
status by mere participation in an illegal strike.
Facts: The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the
exclusive bargaining representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of
Arellano University, Inc., filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the University with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP).
After several controversies and petitions, a strike was staged.Upon the lifting of the
strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the
NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC issued a Resolution holding
that the University was not guilty of ULP. Consequently, the strike was declared
illegal. All the employees who participated in the illegal strike were thereafter
declared to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere
participation in an illegal strike
HELD: Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, an ordinary striking worker may not be
declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike. While the University adduced photographs showing
strikers picketing outside the university premises, it failed to identify who they were.
It thus failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test applicable in dismissal
cases. With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere
participation in the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.
BILFLEX PHIL. INC. LABOR UNION et al. v. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL ANDMANUFACTURING
CORPORATION AND BILFLEX (PHILS.), INC.511 SCRA 247 (2006), THIRD DIVISION
(Carpio Morales, J.)
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status.
Facts: Biflex Philippines Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing
Labor Union are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of the
sister companies Biflex and Filflex which are engaged in the garment business. They
are situated in one big compound and they have a common entrance. The labor
sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest against oil price hike; the unions staged a
work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting the companies to file a
petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural

requirements. The Labor Arbiter held that the strike is illegal and declared the
officers of the union to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE: Whether or not the staged strike is illegal and a ground for the lost of
employment status of the union officers
HELD: Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his
employment status if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike and in this case,
the strike is declared illegal by the court because the means employed by the union
are illegal. Here, the unions blocked the egress and ingress of the company
premises thus, a violation of Article 264 (e)of the Labor Code which would affect the
strike as illegal even if assuming arguendo that the unions had complied with legal
formalities and thus, the termination of the employees was valid. The court said
that the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal
formalities but also by means by which it is carried out.
SUKHOTHAI CUISINE and RESTAURANT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150437

July 17, 2006

FACTS: This case originated from a complaint for illegal strike filed with the NLRC by
the petitioner against private respondents due to an alleged "wildcat strike" and
other concerted action staged in the company premises. Private respondent Union
filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on
the ground of unfair labor practice, and particularly, acts of harassment, faultfinding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. In a
conciliation conference, the representatives of the petitioner agreed and
guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents
during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management
prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of
company policies. The petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission
Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice the
subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote for voluntary
arbitration with a view to prevent the strike.
During the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the petitioner
terminated the employment of the union vice president and two other union
members. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a "wildcat strike."

The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private
respondents, seeking to declare the strike illegal, and to declare respondents, who
participated in the commission of illegal acts, to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE: Whether or not strike is illegal, hence private respondents have lost their
employment status.
Held:Yes. Article 264 of the Labor Code provides: No strike or lockout shall be
declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
The alleged dismissals of the union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat
strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the
private respondents. Private respondents should have availed themselves of
alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure,
specifically, the holding a wildcat strike and because of the fact that the Union was
fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be
invoked as a defense. For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings
by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article 264
of the Labor Code, and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale,
this Court declares that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal.

MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and its members vs. MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 154591

March 5, 2007

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision,1dated 31 October 2001, promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated 5 April 2000, declaring
that the strike held by the petitioner Manila Hotel Employees Association (MHEA), herein
represented by Ferdinand Barles, is illegal. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
modified the Decision rendered by the NLRC and ruled that both incumbent officers and
members of MHEA involved in the illegal strike lost their employment status.
MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in
against Manila Hotel on the grounds of unfair labor practices. Upon the petition of Manila
Hotel, the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Specifically,
the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist
from committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation. The parties and their counsels
were served copies of the said Order. MHEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the

validity of said Order. The case was set for mandatory conference. During the conference,
the parties were advised of the certification order, which prohibited them from taking any
action that would exacerbate the situation. However, MHEA subsequently conducted a
strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE.
The NLRC issued an directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the
hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment. The NLRC
received a copy of the Compliance filed by Manila Hotel, manifesting that only six striking
employees complied with the return-to-work Order and were reinstated. The other striking
employees had openly defied the said Order.
The NLRC issued another, ordering MHEA to refrain from putting up a blockade or
barricade or any mode of preventing the free ingress to and egress from the hotel.
Parenthetically, it also ordered Manila Hotel to respect the right of the striking workers to
peacefully picket in a designated area outside the hotel. Manila Hotel moved for the
Reconsideration of the said Order on the ground that the picket, which they were ordered to
respect, was an unlawful activity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged is illegal and as a consequence terminated the employment status of the employees.

HELD:Yes.

Aside from its procedural defects, the petition is also substantially infirm. MHEA members seek their reinstatement after participating in an illegal strike, that is,
a strike that was conducted after receiving an Order of assumption by the SOLE certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Worse still, the
strikers failed to comply with the return-to-work Order, issued by the NLRC, despite receipt thereof.

The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter,
affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the courts compulsory power of arbitration, and
therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but
indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be
affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned.

The Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring the strike conducted by the MHEA as illegal and, thus, resulting in the loss of
employment status of the union officers and members who participated in the said strike.

Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee Union vs Coca Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc.
GR 164302-03
Facts: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the
monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers

Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. Upon the expiration of the
CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. No
agreement was reached, thus, an impasse ensued. The Union filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB. The Union officers and members held a picket along the
front perimeter of the plant. All of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of
the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also
absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day
shift. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases
versus budget. The Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal
Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.
Held: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional
term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common
course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. Picketing involves merely the
marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the
display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor
dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a
means of
peaceable persuasion.
The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in
front of the
companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted
activity
which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity
constituted a
strike.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of
the Labor
Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the
intended
date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by
a majority

of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret
ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least
seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the
failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that
petitioners totally
ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
Petition denied.

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOC. (TMPCWA) NLRC, TOYOTA

MOTOR PHIL CORP et al
G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789
October 19, 2007
FACTS: The Union filed a petition for certification election among the Toyota
rank and file employees with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
The Med-Arbiter denied the petition, but, on appeal, the DOLE Secretary granted
the Unions prayer, and, through an Order, directed the immediate holding of the
certification election.
After Toyotas plea for reconsideration was denied, the certification election was
conducted. The Med-Arbiter's Order certified the Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees. Toyota challenged
said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary.
-STRIKEIn the meantime, the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota, but the latter
refused to negotiate in view of its pending appeal. Consequently, the Union
filed a notice of strike with the NCMB based on Toyotas refusal to bargain. In
connection with Toyotas appeal, Toyota and the Union were required to attend a
hearing on before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). The February 21, 2001
hearing was cancelled and reset to February 22.
STRIKE 1: On February 21, 135 Union officers and members failed to render the
required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of the
BLR office. The Union, in a letter of the same date, also requested that its

members be allowed to be absent on February 22 to attend the hearing and instead

work on their next scheduled rest day. This request however was denied by Toyota.
Despite denial of the Unions request, more than 200 employees staged mass
actions on February 22 and 23 in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest
the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota. Due to the deliberate absence of a
considerable number of employees on February 22 to 23, Toyota experienced acute
lack of manpower in its manufacturing and production lines, and was unable to
meet its production goals resulting in huge losses.
On February 27, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring
them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their
obstinate defiance of the companys directive to render overtime work on February
21, for their failure to report for work on February 22 and 23, and for their
participation in the concerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed the
plants operations. These letters specifically cited Section D, paragraph 6 of the
Companys Code of Conduct, to wit:
xx
Inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions
detrimental to [Toyotas] interest.
1st offense dismissal.11
xx

On the next day, the Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union
busting amounting to unfair labor practice.
On March 1, the Union nonetheless submitted an explanation in compliance with
the February 27 notices sent by Toyota to the erring employees. Consequently, on
March 2 and 5, Toyota issued 2 memoranda to the concerned employees to clarify
whether or not they are adopting the March 1, 2001 Unions explanation as their
own. The employees were also required to attend an investigative interview, but
they refused to do so.
On March 16, Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees for
participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for
misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
STRIKE 2: In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union
went on strike on March 17. Subsequently, from March 28 to April 12, the Union
intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyotas Bicutan and Sta. Rosa
plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the
plants.
On March 29, Toyota filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a

TRO with the NLRC. It sought free ingress to and egress from its Bicutan and Sta.
Rosa manufacturing plants. Acting on said petition, the NLRC issued a TRO against
the Union, ordering its leaders and members as well as its sympathizers to remove
their barricades and all forms of obstruction to ensure free ingress to and egress
from the companys premises.
Meanwhile, Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC
arbitration branch, , and prayed that the erring Union officers, directors, and
members be dismissed.
On April 10, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. In
said Order, the DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at
their regular shifts by April 16. On the other hand, it ordered Toyota to accept the
returning employees under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the
strike or at its option, put them under payroll reinstatement. The parties were
also enjoined from committing acts that may worsen the situation.
The Union ended the strike on April 12. The union members and officers tried to
return to work on April 16 but were told that Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement
authorized by the Order of the DOLE Secretary.
STRIKE 3: Meanwhile, on May 23, despite the issuance of the DOLE
Secretarys certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union
staged a protest rally in front of Toyotas Bicutan Plant bearing placards and
streamers in defiance of the April 10 Order. Then, on May 28, around Union
members staged another protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same
time, some payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plants
main entrance, and were later joined by other Union members.
On June 5, notwithstanding the certification Order, the Union filed another notice of
strike.
-In the meantime, the NLRC ordered both parties to submit their respective position
papers on June 8. The union, however, requested for abeyance of the proceedings
considering that there is a pending petition for certiorari with the CA assailing
the validity of the DOLE Secretarys Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
Thereafter, on June 19, the NLRC issued an Order, reiterating its previous order for
both parties to submit their respective position papers on or before June 2, 2001.
Only Toyota submitted its position paper. During the August 3, 2001 hearing, the
Union, despite several accommodations, still failed to submit its position paper.
Later that day, the Union claimed it filed its position paper by registered mail.
NLRC decision

Subsequently, the NLRC, in its August 9 Decision, declared the strikes staged by the
Union on February 21 to 23 (as the Union failed to comply with the procedural
requirements of a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code) and May 23 and
28 as illegal and Declared that the dismissal of the 227 who participated in the
illegal strike on February 21-23 is legal. Lastly, award of severance compensation
was given to the dismissed Union members
After the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the Toyota dispute on April 10,
the Union again staged strikes on May 23 and 28. The NLRC found the strikes
illegal as they violated Art. 264 of the Labor Code which proscribes any strike or
lockout after jurisdiction is assumed over the dispute by the President or the
DOLE Secretary.
The NLRC held that both parties must have maintained the status quo after the
DOLE Secretary issued the assumption/certification Order, and ruled that the Union
did not respect the DOLE Secretarys directive.
Accordingly, both Toyota and the Union filed MRs, which the NLRC denied.
Consequently, both parties questioned the Resolutions of the NLRC in separate
petitions for certiorari filed with the CA. The CA then consolidated the petitions.
[In its February 27, 2003 Decision, the CA ruled that the Unions petition is defective
in form for its failure to append a proper verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping, given that, out of the 227 petitioners, only 159 signed the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping. Despite the flaw, the CA proceeded to resolve the
petitions on the merits and affirmed the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution with
a modification, however, of deleting the award of severance compensation to the
dismissed Union members.
However, in its June 20, 2003 Resolution, the CA modified its February 27, 2003
Decision by reinstating severance compensation to the dismissed employees based
on social justice.]
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are
illegal strikes; and
(2) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who
participated in the illegal strikes.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789 are DENIED
while those in G.R. Nos. 158798-99 are GRANTED.
The June 20, 2003 CA Resolution restoring the grant of severance compensation is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The February 27, 2003 CA Decision which affirmed the August 9, 2001 Decision of
the NLRC but deleted the grant of severance compensation, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
1. YES, THERE IS ILLEGAL STRIKE
A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute, in
turn, includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of the employer and the employee
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal
strike, viz:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by
employees performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the
Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer
to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a
widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art.
264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263
of the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or
conclusive arbitration clause
Petitioner Union contends that the protests or rallies conducted on February 21 and
23 are not within the ambit of strikes as defined in the Labor Code, since they were
legitimate exercises of their right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The Unions position fails to convince us.
Applying pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, we rule that the protest
actions undertaken by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23 are
not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for
redress of their complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. The
Unions position is weakened by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold

"rallies." Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of

work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately
failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the
BLR and DOLE offices on February 21 to 23. The purported reason for these protest
actions was to safeguard their rights against any abuse which the med-arbiter may
commit against their cause. However, the Union failed to advance convincing proof
that the med-arbiter was biased against them. The acts of the med-arbiter in the
performance of his duties are presumed regular. Sans ample evidence to the
contrary, the Union was unable to justify the February 2001 mass actions. What
comes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days was designed and
calculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes obvious
that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally
acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a
legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of
grievance.
It is obvious that the February 21 to 23 concerted actions were undertaken
without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the
Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of
strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and
(3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of
a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal.
The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote
report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the
attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. As they failed to
conform to the law, the strikes on February 21, 22, and 23 (STRIKE 1) were illegal.
With respect to the strikes committed from March 17 to April 12 (STRIKE 2), those
were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. However, on March 28 to
April 12, the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and
blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. Toyota
employees, customers, and other people having business with the company were
intimidated and were refused entry to the plants. As earlier explained, these strikes
were illegal because unlawful means were employed. The acts of the Union officers
and members are in palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of
violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress
from the company premises. Undeniably, the strikes from March 28 to April 12

(STRIKE 2) were illegal.

Petitioner Union also posits that strikes were not committed on May 23 and 28
(STRIKE 3). The Union asserts that the rallies held on May 23 and 28 could not be
considered strikes, as the participants were the dismissed employees who were on
payroll reinstatement. It concludes that there was no work stoppage.
This contention has no basis. It is clear that once the DOLE Secretary assumes
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certifies the case for compulsory arbitration
with the NLRC, the parties have to revert to the status quo ante (the state of things
as it was before).
This was not heeded by the Union and the individual respondents who staged illegal
concerted actions on May 23 and 28, in contravention of the Order of the DOLE
Secretary that no acts should be undertaken by them to aggravate the "already
deteriorated situation."
2. Anent the grant of severance compensation to legally dismissed union members:
The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an
employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to
separation pay.
As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is given
even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in
applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In
one case, the Court laid down the rule that severance compensation shall be
allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or
that which reflects adversely on the employees moral character.
Explicit in PLDT ase are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not
grant separation pay based on social justice:
1. serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. 282) or
2. acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee.
Considering that the dismissal of the employees was due to their participation in the
illegal strikes as well as violation of the Code of Conduct of the company, the same
constitutes serious misconduct. A serious misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful
in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
Based on existing jurisprudence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials
and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained.
NOTES:

1. The Union contends that the NLRC violated its right to due process when it
disregarded its position paper in deciding Toyotas petition to declare the strike
illegal.
We rule otherwise.
It is entirely the Unions fault that its position paper was not considered by the
NLRC. Records readily reveal that the NLRC was even too generous in affording due
process to the Union. It issued no less than 3 orders for the parties to submit its
position papers, which the Union ignored until the last minute. No sufficient
justification was offered why the Union belatedly filed its position paper. In Datu
Eduardo Ampo v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, it was explained that a party cannot
complain of deprivation of due process if he was afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so. If he does not avail himself of the
chance to be heard, then it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee. Thus, there was no violation of the Unions right to due
process on the part of the NLRC.
2. CIVIL PROCEDURE GUYS! HEHE
On a procedural aspect, the Union faults the CA for treating its petition as an
unsigned pleading and posits that the verification signed by 159 out of the 227
petitioners has already substantially complied with and satisfied the requirements
under Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the ROC.
The Unions proposition is partly correct.
Sec. 4 of Rule 7 of the ROC states:
Sec. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation.30 This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance with the requirement does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal and not a
jurisdictional requirement.
In this case, the problem is not the absence but the adequacy of the Unions

verification, since only 159 out of the 227 petitioners executed the verification.
Undeniably, the petition meets the requirement on the verification with respect to
the 159 petitioners who executed the verification, attesting that they have sufficient
knowledge of the truth and correctness of the allegations of the petition. However,
their signatures cannot be considered as verification of the petition by the other 68
named petitioners unless the latter gave written authorization to the 159 petitioners
to sign the verification on their behalf. Thus, in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,
we ruled that the petition satisfies the formal requirements only with regard to the
petitioner who signed the petition but not his co-petitioner who did not sign nor
authorize the other petitioner to sign it on his behalf. The proper ruling in this
situation is to consider the petition as compliant with the formal requirements with
respect to the parties who signed it and, therefore, can be given due course only
with regard to them. The other petitioners who did not sign the verification and
certificate against forum shopping cannot be recognized as petitioners have no
legal standing before the Court. The petition should be dismissed outright with
respect to the non-conforming petitioners.
In the case at bench, however, the CA, in the exercise of sound discretion, did not
strictly apply the ruling in Loquias and instead proceeded to decide the case on the
merits.
3. Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike. Art.
264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
lawful strike.
4. The rule is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the labor
tribunal, when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally accorded great
respect, even finality
5. Members liability depends on participation in illegal acts. Art. 264(a) of the Labor
Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal
act "during a strike." While the provision is silent on whether the strike is legal or
illegal, we find that the same is irrelevant.
Now, what are considered "illegal acts" under Art. 264(a)?
No precise meaning was given to the phrase "illegal acts." It may encompass a
number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as the following:
(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation
or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares";
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike;54

and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary
or NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order
under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other
breaches of existing laws.
However, There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and
the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified.
But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available
under the circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal, may suffice.
6. Noted labor law expert, Professor Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., traced the history
relating to the liability of a union member in an illegal strike, starting with the "rule
of vicarious liability," thus:
Under [the rule of vicarious liability], mere membership in a labor union serves as
basis of liability for acts of individuals, or for a labor activity, done on behalf of the
union. The union member is made liable on the theory that all the members are
engaged in a general conspiracy, and the unlawful acts of the particular members are
viewed as necessary incidents of the conspiracy. It has been said that in the absence
of statute providing otherwise, the rule of vicarious liability applies.

Even the Industrial Peace Act, however, which was in effect from 1953 to 1974, did
not adopt the vicarious liability concept. It expressly provided that:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or
organization participating or interested in a labor dispute shall be held responsible or
liable for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon
proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts or of ratifying of
such acts after actual knowledge thereof.

Replacing the Industrial Peace Act, the Labor Code has not adopted the vicarious
liability rule

G.R. No. 160058

June 22, 2007

PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES
II, GEORGE L. DE LEON, LECEL M. FIDEL, AUGUSTO C. FRANCISCO, OLIVER B.
ANTONIO, RONALDO B. CORONEL, CHRISTOPHER L. HERRERA and GEM
TORRES, respondents.

x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 160094

June 22, 2007

PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES

II, GEORGE L. DE LEON, and GEM TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PILIPINO TELEPHONE
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions seeking review of the decision 1 and resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799 which modified the decision 3 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by affirming the illegality of the strike
conducted by Pilipino Telephone Employees Association (the Union) but reducing the
penalty against union officers Pelagio S. Briones II, George De Leon, Lecel M. Fidel and
Gem Torres from dismissal to suspension for six (6) months.
First, we unfurl the facts.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation (the Company) was due to expire on December 31, 1997. On October 30,
1997, the Union submitted to the Company its proposals for the renegotiation of the nonrepresentation aspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several issues, the parties
submitted their dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for
preventive mediation.4 The conciliation proceedings before the NCMB failed.
On July 13, 1998, the Union filed a Notice of Strike 5 with the NCMB for unfair labor practice
due to the alleged acts of "restraint and coercion of union members and interference with
their right to self-organization" committed by the Company's Revenue Assurance
Department (RAD) Manager Rosales and its Call Center Department Manager, Manny
Alegado, to wit:
1. Requiring employees to execute undated resignation letters prior to regularization
as a condition for continued employment.
2. Preventing employees from displaying Union flags and CBA's slogans.
3. Prohibiting employees from conducting and preventing employees from
participating in Union activities.

4. Requiring employees to render forced overtime to prevent them from attending

Union meetings and activities after office hours.
5. Using vulgar and insulting language such as "Kahit sa puwet n'yo isaksak ang
mga banderang yan!"
6. Threatening employees who join concerted Union activities with disciplinary
action.
7. Discouraging employees from participating in Union activities by branding the
activities illegal and prohibited by law.
8. Abuse of Company Rules and Regulations to prevent the free exercise by the
Union and its members of their right to self organization and free expression (e.g.
issuing show cause memos for refusal to render overtime and vandalism).
9. Utilizing security guards to harass employees who participate in Union activities by
requiring the guards to take down the names of employees who participate in the
Union activities.6
The Company filed a petition for Consolidated Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of
the Secretary of Labor. On August 14, 1998, then Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over
the entire labor disputeat Pilipino Telephone Corporation pursuant to Art. 263(g) of
the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined.
Furthermore, the parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from
committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation.
To expedite the resolution of the dispute, the parties are hereby directed to file their
respective position papers and documentary evidence within TEN (10) days from
receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphases supplied.)
On September 4, 1998, the Union filed a second Notice of Strike 8 with the NCMB on the
grounds of: a) union busting, for the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union
funds; and b) the mass promotion of union members during the CBA negotiation, allegedly

aimed at excluding them from the bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation. On the same
day, the Union went on strike.
On September 9, 1998, Secretary Laguesma directed the striking Union officers and
members to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order and for
the Company to accept all strikers under the same terms and conditions of employment
prior to the strike. The Union and its members complied.
On December 7, 1998, the Company filed with the NLRC a petition 9 to declare the Union's
September 4, 1998 strike illegal. On August 16, 1999, Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog
issued a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 4, 1998 strike conducted by
PILTEA is declared illegal.
Accordingly, the following union officers of PILTEL/MKP, namely: George de Leon,
Pelagio S. Briones, Nelson C. Pineda, Rolando U. Sta. Ana, Elna E. Escalante, Gem
P. Torres, Ma. Rica D. Hilotin, Gerald Joseph P. Tayas, Lecel M. Fidel and Jose
Rudylin R. Gamboa are declared to have lost their employment status.
While the following members, namely: Romeo Anonuevo, Jonathan Molaer, Cris
Herrera, Edgar Alan Aquino, Aris Ablis, Dorothy Zulieta, Ronald Cornel, Arnel Garcia,
Ranelio Mendoza, Oliver Antonio, Alvin Usman, Augusto Francisco, Celia Mogol and
Erlinda Madrid are hereby suspended for six (6) months without pay.
SO ORDERED.10
The Labor Arbiter found the strike illegal for having been conducted in defiance of Secretary
Laguesma's August 14, 1998 assumption order and for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements for the conduct of a strike under the Labor Code and its implementing rules.
The Labor Arbiter cited Scholastica's College v. Ruben Torres11 which ruled that a strike
undertaken despite the issuance of an assumption or certification order by the Secretary of
Labor is a prohibited activity, hence, illegal under Article 264 of the Labor Code. He found
that the grounds relied upon by the Union in its second notice of strike were substantially
the same as those set forth in its first notice of strike. Moreover, he held that the Company's
alleged refusal to turn over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable issue as it was
not a gross and blatant violation of the economic provisions of the CBA. He also held that
the mass promotion of the Union's members was not tantamount to dismissal, hence, did
not constitute union busting. The staging of the strike was likewise found to suffer from fatal
procedural defects, to wit: a) the notice of strike was filed on the same day that the strike
was conducted; b) the fifteen (15)-day cooling-off period was not observed; c) the Union
failed to conduct a strike vote within the time prescribed by law; and d) the result of the
strike vote was not furnished to the NCMB at least seven (7) days prior to the intended

strike. Certain illegal acts were likewise found to have been committed during the strike,
among which were the following: 1) striker Manny Costales prevented the Company's
Director, Lilibeth Pasa, from entering the Bankers Centre Building; 2) union officers Judilyn
Gamboa and Rolly Sta. Ana physically blocked the front entrance of the same building; 3)
striker Aris Ablis drove a company vehicle and used it to block the driveway of PILTEL
Centre II, thus, the cars inside the building were prevented from going out. The tires of said
company vehicle were found deflated the following day; 4) strikers Dorothy Zulieta and
Ronald Cornel prevented the Warehousing Manager assigned at the PILTEL Metropolitan
Warehouse from going out of his office; 5) the strikers, led by Nelson Pineda, blocked the
Detachment Supervisor of Protection Specialists and the uniformed company guards from
delivering food to the non-striking employees trapped inside PILTEL Call Center at the
Manila Memorial Park Building; 6) in General Santos City, some union members tied the
entrance doors of the PILTEL Building and tied the company vehicles together; 7) Fe
Carandang, Estrella Anonical, Zaldy Logos and Jovencio Laderas blocked the main
entrance of the Boac, Marinduque office of the Company; 8) strikers Edna Carrion, Celia
Mogol, Erlinda Madrid, Raul Montalan, Rolly Miraflor, Zaldy de Chavez and Dina Madla of
the Company's office in Boac, Marinduque were also heard telling the Company's clients
not to transact business with the company; and 9) strikers Zaldy Logos, Rizaldy de Chavez,
Raul Montalan, Rolly Milaflor and Jovencio Laderas were seen preventing the free ingress
and egress of the Company's office premises in Boac, Marinduque. The Labor Arbiter ruled
that since the September 4, 1998 strike was illegal, the Union officers were deemed to have
lost their employment status. He further ruled that the illegal acts committed during the
strike were not serious enough to merit the dismissal of the erring Union members as they
were merely acting at the order of their leaders. Hence, the erring union members were
merely suspended for six (6) months.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.12 The Union, its
dismissed officers and its suspended members filed a motion for reconsideration, to no
avail.13
The Union, its officers Briones, De Leon, Fidel and Torres, and its members Francisco,
Antonio, Coronel and Herrera filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the NLRC.14 On September 20, 2002, the CA modified the ruling of the NLRC
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 is
MODIFIED. Petitioners Pelagio S. Briones, George L. De Leon, Lecel M. Fidel and
Gem Torres shall be suspended for six (6) months without pay instead of being
dismissed. If already dismissed, petitioners shall be reinstated back to their former
positions, or, if already filled, then to any other equal positions and shall be entitled to
backwages computed from date of dismissal until date of actual reinstatement less
the pay for the six (6) months suspension they were supposed to serve. The

suspension of petitioners Augusto C. Francisco, Oliver B. Antonio, Ronaldo B.

Coronel and Christopher L. Herrera for six (6) months without pay and the finding of
illegality of the September 4, 1998 strike STANDS.
SO ORDERED.15
Both parties filed their respective partial motions for reconsideration - the company assailed
the CA decision decreasing the penalty of the union officers while the Union and its
dismissed officers assailed the decision declaring the strike illegal. Both motions were
denied.16
Hence, the instant petitions.
In G.R. No. 160058, the Company raises the issue of:
[WHETHER] THE ASSAILED 20 SEPTEMBER 2002 DECISION AND 17
SEPTEMBER 2003 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.17
It prays that the September 20, 2002 Decision and September 17, 2003 Resolution of the
CA be reversed in part and judgment be rendered affirming in toto the February 29, 2000
Decision of the NLRC.
In G.R. No. 160094, the Union and Union officers Briones, De Leon and Torres raise the
issue of:
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN UPHOLDING NLRC'S FINDING THAT THE 4 SEPTEMBER 1998
STRIKE HELD BY PILTEA WAS ILLEGAL AS IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
EXISTING LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.18
They pray that this Court modify the September 20, 2002 Decision and September 17, 2003
Resolution of the CA and: a) declare the Union's September 4, 1998 strike as legal; b)
nullify the six-month suspension imposed on Briones, De Leon and Torres; and c) order the
Company to pay them backwages covering the period of their suspension.
The twin issues to be resolved are: a) the legality of the Union's strike and b) the penalty to
be imposed on the Union officers, if any.
First, the legality of the strike.
The Union and its officers maintain that their September 4, 1998 strike was legal. They
allege that the Company was guilty of union busting in promoting a substantial number of

Union members and officers to positions outside the bargaining unit during the period of
CBA negotiations. Allegedly, said Union members and officers maintained the same jobs
and duties despite their promotion. They also capitalize on the CA's finding that the
company was guilty of unfair labor practice in refusing to turn over the deducted
contingency fees of the union members to the union. Citing Bacus v.
Ople,19 Panay Electric Company v. NLRC20 and PNOC Dockyard and Engineering
Corporation v. NLRC,21 they contend that this finding of unfair labor practice precludes the
CA from ruling that the strike was illegal and that the Union was in bad faith in conducting
the strike.
These arguments do not sway.
Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715, 22 and Rule
XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following
procedural requirements for a valid strike:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE,
specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the
union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual
execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15)
days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the
union's existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.
xxx xxx xxx
4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret
balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike
requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned.
5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. 23
It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith
renders the strike illegal.24
In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice
of strike. The Union violated the seven-day strike ban. This requirement should be observed
to give the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether
the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. 25

Moreover, we agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the
non-observance of the cooling-off period. To constitute union busting under Article 263 of
the Labor Code, there must be: 1) a dismissal from employment of union officers duly
elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws; and 2) the existence of the
union must be threatened by such dismissal. In the case at bar, the second notice of strike
filed by the Union merely assailed the "mass promotion" of its officers and members during
the CBA negotiations. Surely, promotion is different from dismissal. As observed by the
Labor Arbiter:
x x x Neither does that (sic) PILTEL's promotion of some members of respondent
union constitutes (sic) union busting which could be a valid subject of strike because
they were not being dismissed. In fact, these promoted employees did not personally
come forward to protest their promotion vis--vis their alleged option to remain in the
union bargaining unit of the rank and filers. 26
This is consistent with our ruling in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez27 that a
promotion which is manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous
speculation that it was made to deprive the union of the membership of the benefited
employee.
The contention of the Union and its officers that the finding of unfair labor practice by the CA
precludes the ruling that the strike was illegal is unmeritorious. The refusal of the Company
to turn over the deducted contingency funds to the union does not justify the disregard of
the mandatory seven-day strike ban and the 15-day cooling-off period.
The Union's reliance on Bacus v. Ople,28 Panay Electric Company v. NLRC29 and PNOC
Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC30 is likewise unavailing.
Nowhere in Panay Electric Company and PNOC Dockyard and Engineering
Corporation did the Court rule that the procedural requirements for a valid strike may be
dispensed with if the striking workers believed in good faith that the company was
committing acts of unfair labor practice. In both cases, the striking union members complied
with the procedural requirements for a valid strike. It is correct that this Court, in Bacus, held
that "a strike staged by the workers inspired by good faith does not automatically make the
same illegal," but said case was decided before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715 on March
21, 1989. We have ruled that with the enactment of R.A. No. 6715, the requirements as to
the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, and notice given to the DOLE are mandatory in
nature.31
Moreover, we agree with the NLRC that the subject strike defied the assumption order of
the Secretary of Labor. The NLRC correctly affirmed the Labor Arbiter that the second
notice of strike was based on substantially the same grounds as the first notice of strike.
The Union and its officers and members alleged that the mass promotion of the union

officers and members and the non-remittance of the deducted contingency fees were the
reasons for their concerted activities which annoyed the Company's RAD Manager and
made him commit acts of unfair labor practice, eventually leading to the Union's filing of the
first notice of strike. Clearly then, the issues which were made as grounds for the second
notice of strike, viz, the mass promotion of the union members and officers and the nonremittance of the deducted contingency fees, were already existing when the Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute between the Company and the
Union on August 14, 1998.
Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, we shall now determine the proper penalty
to be imposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC imposed the penalty of dismissal on the striking union
officers after finding that: a) the strike was illegal for having been conducted in defiance of
Secretary Laguesma's August 14, 1998 Order of assumption of jurisdiction and for noncompliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike under the Labor
Code and its implementing rules; b) the grounds relied upon by the Union in its second
notice of strike were substantially the same as those set forth in its first notice of strike; c)
the Company's alleged refusal to turn over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable
issue as it was not a gross and blatant violation of the economic provisions of the CBA; d)
the mass promotion of the Union's members was also not tantamount to dismissal, hence,
did not constitute union busting; and e) certain illegal acts were found to have been
committed during the strike.
On the other hand, the CA reduced the penalty of the union officers from dismissal to
suspension for six months after finding that the "supreme penalty of dismissal" imposed on
union officers Briones, De Leon, Fidel and Torres was "so harsh" considering that the Union
did not defy the Secretary of Labor's Assumption Order and that the Company did not have
"clean hands" when it filed the instant case for having committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to turn over the union dues to the Union.
We find that the CA committed a reversible error in modifying the rulings of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC.

For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be proven to have acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.32 "Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as "a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 33
We note that although the CA modified the ruling of the NLRC, nowhere in its decision did it
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC. And rightly so.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. x x x
Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x
We have explained the meaning of this provision as follows:
The effects of illegal strikes, as outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a
distinction between ordinary workers and union officers who participate therein.
Under established jurisprudence, a union officer may be terminated from
employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike. The fate of union
members is different. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground
for termination of the services of the union members. The Labor Code protects
ordinary, rank-and-file union members who participated in such a strike from losing
their jobs provided that they did not commit illegal acts during the strike. 34
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC,35 the Court held that "[t]he law, in
using the word may,grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment." Thus, in a number of
cases,36 proof that an employee who knowingly participated in an illegal strike is a union
officer was enough to warrant his dismissal from employment.

This rule was relaxed in the case of PAL v. Brillantes37 where the Court "invoke[d] its
judicial prerogative to resolve disputes in a way to render to each interested party the most
judicious solution, and in the ultimate scheme, a resolution of a dispute tending to preserve
the greater order of society." In said case, the Court dismissed the petition of PAL seeking
the termination from employment of certain Union members and officers who staged a strike
in violation of the Secretary of Labor's return-to-work order. The Court found that both
parties contributed to the volatile atmosphere that emerged despite the Secretary of Labor's
status quo order as PAL terminated en masse the employment of 183 union officers and
members. It noted the finding of the Acting Secretary of Labor that PAL "did not come to this
office with 'clean hands' in seeking the termination of the officers and members of PALEA
who participated in the 16 June 1994 strike." 38
This Court exercised this judicial prerogative sparingly in Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor.39 In said case, the Court also found Nissan equally guilty of
exacerbating the situation after the assumption order of the Secretary for suspending a
substantial number of Union officers and members with threat of eventual dismissal and
perceived illegal lockout and union busting. However, while it affirmed the ruling of the
Secretary of Labor suspending the union members who participated in the illegal strike, the
Court sustained the dismissal of the union officers, viz:
While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect
to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction
between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or
union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. 40
The Court further explained the reason:
x x x Thus in Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC, 41 we
held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike,
is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal
only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor,
albeit formulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service,
Inc. vs. NLRC.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, we do not find any reason to deviate from our rulings in Gold City
Integrated Port Service, Inc. and Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. It bears emphasis that
the strike staged by the Union in the instant case was illegal for its procedural infirmities and
for defiance of the Secretary's assumption order. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter
were unanimous in finding that bad faith existed in the conduct of the subject strike. The
relevant portion of the CA Decision states:

x x x We cannot go to the extent of ascribing good faith to the means taken in

conducting the strike. The requirement of the law is simple, that is1. Give a
Notice of Strike; 2. Observe the cooling period; 3. Observe the mandatory seven day
strike ban; 3. If the act is union busting, then the union may strike doing away with
the cooling-off period, subject only to the seven-day strike ban. To be lawful, a strike
must simply have a lawful purpose and should be executed through lawful
means. Here, the union cannot claim good faith in the conduct of the strike
because, as can be gleaned from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, this was an
extensively coordinated strike having been conducted all through out the
offices of PILTEL all over the country. Evidently, the strike was planned. Verily,
they cannot now come to court hiding behind the shield of "good faith." Be that as it
may, petitioners claim good faith only in so far as their grounds for the strike but not
on the conduct of the strike. Consequently, they still had to comply with the
procedural requirements for a strike, which, in this case, they failed to do so. 43
Thus, in imposing the penalty of dismissal, the NLRC correctly held:
x x x the point We wish to stress is that the [open, blatant] and willful defiance by the
respondents of the Order emanating from the Secretary of Labor and Employment in
this labor dispute only goes to show that the respondents have little or no regard at
all for lawful orders from duly constituted authorities. For what their officers and
members have suffered they have no one else to blame. 44
It cannot be overemphasized that strike, as the most preeminent economic weapon of the
workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor
and capital, exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and
management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic wellbeing of the State.45 This weapon is so critical that the law imposes the supreme penalty of
dismissal on union officers who irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike and union
members who commit unlawful acts during a strike. The responsibility of the union officers,
as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members as the union officers
have the duty to guide their members to respect the law.46The policy of the state is not to
tolerate actions directed at the destabilization of the social order, where the relationship
between labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one party's bargaining
prerogative, to the extent of disregarding not only the direct order of the government to
maintain the status quo, but the welfare of the entire workforce though they may not be
involved in the dispute. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is a
natural consequence, considering the interest of public welfare. 47
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition in G.R. No. 160094 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No.
160058 is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799
dated September 20, 2002 and September 17, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and the

Decision and Resolution of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 and April 28, 2000,
respectively, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, G. R. No. 160303

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
TITO S. INFANTE, MELOR VELASCO, JR., JJ.
BORBO, and DANILO CASTAEDA,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
September 13, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision[1] and resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71472 dated 27 June 2003 and 8 October
2003, respectively. The assailed judgment reversed and set aside the decision [3] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Acting Executive Labor Arbiter for Adjudication Melquiades Sol D.
Del Rosario (Labor Arbiter) dated 31 May 1999. The Labor Arbiter had ordered G
& S Transport Corporation (petitioner) to pay respondents Tito Infante (Infante),

Melor Borbo (Borbo) and Danilo Castaeda (Castaeda) separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement without backwages.
Petitioner was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) from 1 February 1989 to31 January 1994 by virtue of
a five-year concession contract awarded by the Manila International Airport
Authority. Under the terms of the contract, the coupon taxi units assigned to
service arriving plane passengers would be dispatched from the garage located at
the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA, whereas units assigned to service
departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage
dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after taking
arriving passengers to their destination.[4]
Respondents in the employ of petitioner had been drivers since 1 February
1989. At the time of their dismissal, they were assigned at
the Domestic Airport from 16 to 31 May 1990 on two (2) the shifts: morning shift
which starts from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and the afternoon shift from 4:00
p.m. to 1:00 a.m. Castaeda was assigned to the morning shift[5] while Infante and
Borbo were assigned to the afternoon shift.[6]

On 5 May 1990, petitioner claimed to have received from the NAIA Airport
Taxi Service Employees Union-TUPAS (Union) a letter-memorandum demanding
the dismissal from employment of Ricardo Gonzales (Gonzales) and Ephraim
Alzaga (Alzaga), both drivers of petitioner on the ground that they were found
guilty of committing acts of disloyalty, conduct unbecoming of a union member
and acts inimical to the interest of the Union. The Union based its action on a
petition filed by said employees calling for a local election. [7] On 9 May 1990, the
two employees were terminated by petitioner.[8]
Upon learning of the incident, several drivers of petitioner stopped driving
their taxi cabs apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues. Petitioner

alleged that the work stoppage constituted an illegal strike at the work
premises. Furthermore, petitioner averred that various illegal acts, such as
stopping, barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work
premises, were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of
petitioners business operation.[9]
Petitioner ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of the
drivers, including respondents, refused to do so. On22 May 1990, petitioner filed
an action for illegal strike before the Labor Arbiter against thirty-seven (37)
drivers. Two days later, said drivers filed a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioner.
In a Joint Affidavit dated 18 October 1990, Infante and Borbo denied joining
the alleged strike. They narrated that they reported to work at the domestic airport
on 16 May 1990 before 4:00 p.m. but did not find their taxi in the area. They
proceeded to the garage at the Duty Free shop. The dispatcher and the counter sales
clerk were likewise not around. Thereafter, they learned about the protest of their
co-workers over the dismissal of Gonzales and Alzaga. They soon found out that
the management had stopped company operation that afternoon but they stayed on
until 1:00 a.m. They did not report for work on the following day because it was
their day-off. On 18 May 1990, they did report for work but were refused entry by
the guard because their names did not appear on the list of drivers allowed by
petitioner to work on that day. They soon received a copy of the complaint filed by
petitioner charging them with illegal strike.[10]
Castaeda, in his Affidavit dated 17 March 1995, stated that he was on sick
leave from 11 to 15 May 1990. He reported for work on 16 May 1990 but was not
able to perform his duties because of the protest staged by his co-workers. He
reported back to work on the following day but he was not allowed entry by the
guard for having allegedly participated in the illegal strike.[11]

Out of the 37 complaining drivers, only seven remained as complainants

when the case reached the Labor Arbiter, namely: Gener Mendoza (Mendoza),
Eduardo Dacanay (Dacanay), Norman Sabiniano (Sabiniano), Mario Daramayo
(Daramayo), Borbo, Infante, and Castaeda. Others executed their respective
affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to dismiss. [12]On 31
May 1999, the Labor Arbiter declared respondents concerted action as a form of an
illegal strike, thus:
Anent the issue of illegal strike, the records show that there was a
stoppage of work on May 16, 1990 at the premises of the garage of G &
S Transport located at the Duty Free Shop just fronting the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), brought about primarily by the
dismissal of Messrs. Gonzales and Alzaga, on the account of acts of [sic]
[inimical] to the interest of G & S union. As pointed out by complainant
G & S Transport, its Taxi drivers undertook those collective action
without filing any notice of strike and taking a strike vote, and in
violation of no strike-no lockout clause embodied in the CBA thus
making their action as illegal activity.
xxxx
Actually when the stoppage of work occurred, there seemed to be
no labor disputes but merely a protest of the dismissal of respondents
leaders. Under Article 212 (D) any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees must be a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. No industrial or labor dispute, however, was existing on May
16, 1990, since there was no pending case in any legal forum then. [13]

However, finding that Mendoza, Dacanay and Sabiniano had not

participated in the strike, the Labor Arbiter declared their dismissal as illegal and
ordered petitioner to pay them backwages and separation pay, in lieu of
reinstatement, since petitioner had already stopped its operations on 31 January
1995. On the other hand, respondents Daramayo, Borbo, Infante and Castaeda,
though found to have participated in the illegal strike, were not meted out the
penalty of dismissal; instead, petitioner was ordered to pay them separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement but without backwages.[14]
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
In a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondents assailed
the NLRC decision affirming the Labor Arbiters findings: (1) that respondents had
joined the illegal strike; (2) that petitioner was no longer in operation and hence,
reinstatement could not be ordered; and (3) that respondents were not illegally
dismissed, but were not entitled to reinstatement and backwages.[15]
On 27 June 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is GIVEN

DUE COURSE. The assailed Resolution and Order of the National
Labor Relations Commission are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
matter is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of
backwages and such other monetary benefits awarded in accordance
with this Decision.[16]

The appellate court scored the Labor Arbiter because the latter failed to
categorically rule on the validity of respondents dismissal and instead stood

content in simply stating that respondents should not have been meted out the
severest penalty of dismissal for their inadequacies and wrongful actions. [17] The
appellate court went on to declare respondents dismissal as illegal.
Relying on a certification from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) that petitioner was then still operational, the Court of Appeals further held
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC gravely abused their discretion in ordering
the grant of separation pay instead of reinstatement.[18]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision. On 8 October 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying said
motion for lack of merit. [19]

In the instant petition, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
when it acted as a trier of facts and ordered the reinstatement of respondents and
payment of backwages.[20] Petitioner insists that the appellate court erroneously
substituted its decision with that of the Labor Arbiter, whose finding and
conclusion are in accordance with judicial precedents.[21] Petitioner reiterates that
extensive trial on the merits was held before the Labor Arbiter wherein the parties
had been afforded the opportunity to present their respective witnesses and
documentary evidence. Petitioner stresses that findings of the Labor Arbiter,
therefore, were all based on facts and substantial evidence.[22]
Respondents, for their part, argue that by virtue of the Courts
pronouncement in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[23] the Court of Appeals is
clothed with plenary authority to reverse the factual findings of the NLRC or other
quasi-judicial bodies particularly when the latters judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts when it manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts,

which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion, or when it

erroneously misapplied a law as is obtaining in the case at bar.[24]

A petition for certiorari is available when any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As a general rule, factual issues are not proper subjects for certiorari
which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. [25] It does
not include an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was
the basis of the labor agency in reaching its conclusion. Neither is it for the Court
of Appeals nor this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of an administrative body
which has gained expertise in its specialized field.[26]
One question therefore arisesdid the NLRC commit grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter? While
only questions of law may be entertained by this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari, there are, however, well-recognized exceptions such as the
instant case where the factual findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are
contradictory. A re-evaluation of the records of this case is necessary for its proper
resolution.[27]

The issues presented before the Executive Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
the very same issues proffered by the parties before this Court, which may be
summed up as follows: (1) whether respondents participated in the illegal strike
and (2) whether the order for the payment of separation pay, in lieu of
reinstatement without backwages, is proper.

Petitioner maintains that respondents knowingly and deliberately

participated in the illegal activities in the course of an illegal strike by the mere fact
that they resolutely defied the order directing them to report back to work and
continued to stay outside the premises, barricading the gates, heckling and
intimidating employees who were returning to work.[28]
Respondents however aver that there was no iota of evidence that would
show that they have trooped the line of the illegal strikers.
[29]
Assuming arguendo that they participated in the illegal strike, respondents
argue that they should not be dismissed because there was no proof that they
committed illegal acts during the strike.[30]
In its Reply, petitioner refutes respondents argument and submits that
evidence, such as photographs, affidavits of witnesses, and memoranda/telegrams,
were presented during trial to prove that respondents joined the illegal strike.

Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. A valid strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute. The
strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike, or more aptly
termed as a sympathetic strike, where the striking employees have no demands or
grievances of their own, but they strike for the purpose of directly or indirectly
aiding others, without direct relation to the advancement of the interest of the
strikers.[31] It is indubitable that an illegal strike in the form of a sit-down strike
occurred in petitioners premises, as a show of sympathy to the two employees who
were dismissed by petitioner. Apart from the allegations in its complaint for illegal
strike filed before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner presented the affidavits and
testimonies of their other employees which confirm the participation of
respondents in the illegal strike. Petitioner has sufficiently established that
respondents remained in the work premises in the guise of waiting for orders from

management to resume operations when, in fact, they were actively participating in

the illegal strike.
The office telegram sent to individual respondents informing them to return
to work went unheeded. Respondents failed to satisfactorily explain their
conspicuous absence following the day of the purported illegal strike. No record
whatsoever was presented by Borbo and Infante to prove that 17 May 1990 was
their day-off. It was convenient to pass the buck on petitioner by alleging that
proof of their alibi is in petitioners file.[32] Castaeda could not even present a sick
leave form to attest to his absence from 11-15 May 1990. [33] Moreover, the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals appeared unanimous in sustaining the findings of the
Labor Arbiter with respect to respondents participation in the illegal strike. The
appellate courts decision dwelt on the fact that no illegal activities were committed
by respondents in the course of the illegal strike, hence, reinstatement is proper.
Respondents participation in the illegal strike having been established, we
shall now determine the effects of their proscribed acts.
Article 264 of the Labor Code, in providing for the consequences of an
illegal strike, makes a distinction between union officers and members who
participated therein. Thus, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid
ground for termination of employment of a union officer. The law, however, treats
differently mere union members. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a
sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.
The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who
participated in such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not commit an
illegal act during the strike.[34] It can be gleaned from the aforecited provision of
law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for
mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the commission of
illegal act must be identified. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required.

Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may

justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.[35]
In the case at bar, this Court is not convinced that the affidavits of petitioners
witnesses constitute substantial evidence to establish that illegal acts were
committed by respondents. Nowhere in their affidavits did these witnesses cite the
particular illegal acts committed by each individual respondent during the strike.
Notably, no questions during the hearing were asked relative to the supposed
illegal acts.
Interestingly, the Labor Arbiter, the proximate trier of fact, also made no
mention of the supposed illegal acts in his decision, thus:
As adverted to earlier, no matter by what term the respondents
complainants used in describing their concerted action, i.e. [,] protest,
sympathy or mere expression, their joint action have successfully
paralyzed the operations of G & S Transport, and this is considered a
strike.
If at all, what mitigates respondent action is their honest albeit
wrong belief that the course of action they have taken is correct because
this is the only way they can show their oneness with their dismissed
leaders. But as already held, their action is not the correctremedy
because they failed to execute their course

of action within the ambit and parameters of the law. Respondents

complainants should not have been meted out the severest penalty of
dismissal for their inadequacies and wrongful action. Had G & S
[T]ransport been still operational[,] the four respondents, namely[:] Melo
Borbo, Tito Infante, Mario Daramayo and Danilo Castaeda, would have
been ord[e]red to return to work sans backwages (the period of time that
lapse without wages being considered as penalty). But since, the
company is no longer operational, then in lieu of reinstatement, said
complainants respondents should be paid a months salary per year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered one year.[36]

It can now therefore be concluded that the acts of respondents do not merit
their dismissal from employment because it has not been substantially proven that
they committed any illegal act while participating in the illegal strike. Petitioner,
however, disavows that it terminated respondents employment. It explained that by
filing a complaint for illegal strike before the NLRC, it was merely seeking a
declaration that respondents have lost their employment status.[37]
Respondents dismissal from work could not be any clearer than the refusal
of petitioner to admit them back as they signified their intention to go back to
work. In fact, this very act of petitioner precipitated respondents filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a fair days wage for a fair days
labor remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no
work performed by the employee there

can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to
work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally
prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their
intention to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in this
case. In Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia Maritima,[38] as affirmed
in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees
Union,[39] the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the
strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.
Under the circumstances, respondents reinstatement without backwages
suffices for the appropriate relief. If reinstatement is no longer possible, given the
lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, the award of
separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of
reinstatement, is in order.
The Court of Appeals, in ordering reinstatement, relied on the SEC
certification that petitioner was then still operational, viz:
Petitioners in this petition attached a certification from the
Securities and Exchange Commission that private respondent is still
operational as of August 6, 1999. Private respondent did not deny the
certification. Since petitioners employment with private

respondent was not conditional on private respondents concession at the

NAIA, it is grave abuse of discretion for the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC to order the grant of separation pay instead of reinstatement. [40]

Petitioner asserts that the belated certification issued by the SEC bears no
value to respondents reinstatement because the employment of respondents was
conditioned on the subsistence of petitioners concession with NAIA but which had
already been terminated in 1995.[41]
Respondents counter that petitioner and Avis Coupon Taxi are one and the
same company and that it is of public knowledge that Avis Coupon Taxi still
continues to be the exclusive concessionaire of NAIA at that time. Moreover,
respondents deny that their employment was conditioned on petitioners concession
with NAIA.
The SEC has certified that G & S Transport Corporation was registered on 5
January 1972 for a period of fifty (50) years and as of 6 August 1999, no document
showing its dissolution had been filed.[42] Furthermore, the personnel manager of
petitioner verified that Avis Coupon Taxi and G & S Transport Corporation are one
and the same.[43] These documents pointedly indicate that petitioner has not
ceased operations. Petitioner cannot seek refuge behind the mere

assertion that respondents employment is conditioned on the five-year concession

with NAIA. No employment contract was presented to support such fact. Petitioner
in fact even admitted that it obtained another concession from NAIA in 2000.
It is of no moment that petitioners concession was no longer exclusive. No
evidence exists that the employment of respondents was in any way conditioned on
petitioners obstention of an exclusive contract from NAIA. The fact remains that
petitioner still operates a taxi concession in NAIA and that logically requires the
service of taxi drivers, the same position held by respondents back in 1990. Section
4, Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book VI of the Labor Code provides:
SEC. 4. Reinstatement to former position.(a) An employee who is
separated from work without just cause shall be reinstated to his former
position, unless such position no longer exists at the time of his
reinstatement, in which case he shall be given a substantially equivalent
position in the same establishment without loss of seniority rights.

The above-quoted rule enunciates reinstatement as the standard

relief. However, in this case, seventeen (17) years have elapsed since respondents
were illegally dismissed. In Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines
v. NLRC [44], where more than eight (8) years have passed since the petitioners
therein staged an illegal strike and were found to have been unlawfully terminated,
an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, in lieu of reinstatement, was deemed more practical and appropriate to all
the parties concerned. We adopt the same tack in this case.
In sum, the resolution and order of the NLRC, which adopted the findings of the
Labor Arbiter, are in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals erred in granting respondents petition for certiorari, there being
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 27 June

2003 and Resolution dated 8 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71472 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 15 October
2001 of the NLRC, which affirmed that of the Labor Arbiter, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND

ALLIED INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ISSUE: Should employees on probationary status at the time of the
certification elections be allowed to vote?
DOCTRINE:
As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This
principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
"labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees
in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective
bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant
CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining
unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The
Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for
eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to
"all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to
support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."

Calamba Medical Center, Inc. vs National Labor Relations Commission

571 SCRA 585 Labor Law Labr Relations Labor Standards Strike
Managerial Employees Control Illegal Dismissal
Ronaldo Lanzanas and Merceditha Lanzanas are doctors employed by Calamba
Medical Center, Inc. They are given a retainers fee by the hospital as well as shares
from fees obtained from patients.

One time, Ronaldo was overheard by Dr. Trinidad talking to another doctor about
how low the admission rate to the hospital is. That conversation was reported to Dr.
Desipeda who was then the Medical Director of the hospital.
Eventually Ronaldo was suspended. Ronaldo filed a case for Illegal Suspension in
March 1998. In the same month, the rank and file employees organized a strike
against the hospital for unfair labor practices. Desipeda eventually fired Ronaldo for
his alleged participation in the strike, which is not allowed under the Labor Code for
he is a managerial employee. Desipeda also fired Merceditha on the ground that she
is the wife of Ronaldo who naturally sympathizes with him.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no Illegal Suspension for there was no
employer-employee relationship because the hospital has no control over Ronaldo
as he is a doctor who even gets shares from the hospitals earnings.
The National Labor Relations Commission as well as the Court of Appeals reversed
the LA.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship?
HELD: Yes. Under the control test, an employment relationship exists between a
physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the
process by which the physician is to accomplish his task. There is control in this
case because of the fact that Desipeda schedules the hours of work for Ronaldo and
his wife.
The doctors are also registered by the hospital under the SSS which is premised on
an employer-employee relationship.
There is Illegal Dismissal committed against Rolando for there was no notice and
hearing held. It was never shown that Rolando joined the strike. But even if he did,
he has the right to do so for he is not a part of the managerial or supervisory
employees. As a doctor, their decisions are still subject to revocation or revision by
Desipeda.

There is Illegal Dismissal committed against Merceditha for the ground therefor was
not mentioned in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
When is Control (One of the Four Tests of Employer-Employee Relationship)
Absent?
Where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure
and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is compensated
according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, the element of
control is absent.

Jackbilt Industries, Inc. vs Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU

Labor Law Labor Relations Illegal Strike
In 1997, Jackbilt Industries forced some of its employees to go on a six-month leave
as it was experiencing financial difficulties due to the 1997 financial crisis.
In March 1998, the Jackbilt Employees Workers Union staged a strike without
following the procedural requirements of Article 264 of the Labor Code. During the
said strike, they prevented private vehicles from entering and exiting the premises of
Jackbilt.
Eventually in May 1998, Jackbilt dismissed employees who joined the strike.
In July 1998, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that the March
1998 strike was illegal.
In October 1999, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Jackbilt is guilty of illegally dismissing
the striking employees on the ground that it terminated their services without first
petitioning for the declaration of illegal strike against the union (lack of due process).
ISSUE: Whether or not Jackbilt needs to have the union strike be declared illegal
first before dismissing the striking employees.

HELD: No. In the case at bar, there is already a finding by the NLRC in July 1998
that the March 1998 strike was illegal for it was attended by the use of illegal means
i.e. preventing vehicles from entering/exiting the Jackbilt premises. Such judgment is
conclusive upon the Labor Arbiter who issued the October 1999 decision. In short,
the filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was unnecessary even though the
May 1998 dismissal actually came before the July 1998 NLRC declaration.

G.R. No. 164032 January 19, 2009LOLITA A. LOPEZ, et. al.

petitioner,vs.
QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB, INC.,
respondents.
FACTS:
The Kasapiang Manggagawa sa Quezon City Sports Club (union) averred
that it wasordered to submit a new information sheet. It immediately wrote a
letter addressed to thegeneral manager to inquire about the information sheet,
only to be insulted by the latter. Themembers of the union were not paid their
salaries on 30 June 1997. On 4 July 1997, the unionwrote a letter to the
management for the release of the members salaries and grant of
wageincreases mandated by the CBA. When its letter went unanswered, the
union filed a notice of strike and fter conducting a strike vote, it staged a
strike on 12 August 1997. On 16 August1997, the QCSC placed some of its
employees under temporary lay-off status due toredundancy. The Kasapiang
Manggagawa sa Quezon City Sports Club (union) filed a complaintfor unfair
labor practice against QCSC on 12 November 1997. Labor Arbiter Joel S.
Lustriapromulgated a decision finding QCSC guilty of unfair labor practice
and ordering it to pay theaffected employees their separation pay, backwages,
and salary increase, totalingP27,504,864.46. QCSC filed an appeal and a
motion for reduction of the appeal bond toP4,000,000.00. NLRC ordered the
posting of an additional P6,000,000.00 bond and rendered adecision granting

the appeal and reversing the Lustria decision. Petitioners appealed to

theCourt of Appeal but it was also denied.
ISSUE
: (1) Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the motion to reduce the
appeal bond andposting of the reduced amount of bond within the
reglementary period for appeal constitutesubstantial compliance with Article
223 of the Labor Code? (2) Whether or not the decision of the NLRC is
valid?
HELD:
On the first issue, the Court ruled that the posting of the amount of
P4,000,000.00simultaneously with the filing of the motion to reduce the bond
to that amount, as well as thefiling of the memorandum of appeal, all within
the reglementary period, altogether constitutesubstantial compliance with the
Rules. it is provided on Article 223 of the Labor Code andSections 4(a) and 6
of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended,
thatappeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance
with the followingmandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal
fees; (2) filing of the memorandum of appeal; and (3) payment of the
required cash or surety bond; and that no motion to reduce shallbe entertained
except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a
reasonableamount in relation to the monetary award. Furthermore, based on
existing jurisprudence, thebond requirement on appeals involving monetary
awards had been and could be relaxed inmeritorious cases such as: (1) there
was substantial compliance with the Rules; (2) thesurrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond; (3) aliberal
interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or (4) the appellants, at the
very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial
bond during the reglementary period.On the second issue, the Court ruled that
the NLRC erred in setting aside the Lustrias decision,as well as in deleting

the award of backwages and separation pay, despite the finding that
theaffected employees had been constructively dismissed. In the notice of
strike, the union did notstate in particular the acts which allegedly constitute
unfair labor practice. By virtue of the "no-strike no lockout" provision in the
CBA, the union was prohibited from staging an economicstrike. However,
while the strike by the union was held illegal, only the union officers
weredeclared as having lost their employment status. In effect, the other
union members who had merely participated in the strike but had not
committed any illegal acts were not dismissed fromemployment. The grant of
backwages and separation pay, in Lustrias decision, not premised onthe
declaration of the illegality of the strike but on the finding that these affected
employeeswere constructively dismissed from work, as evidenced by the
layoffs effected by the company.Therefore, the Lustria decision should be
upheld and therefore reinstated except as regards thefour petitioners who
were declared having lost their employment status.

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR

ASSOCIATION (PILA) G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010 Ponente: J. Brion
FACTS: PHIMCO Industries is engaged in production of matches while
PILA is the ABU of daily paid workers. There ensued a bargaining deadlock
between the company and union due to disagreements on salary increases and
benefits. The union staged a strike which prompted the Secretary of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over the case and later on issued a return to work order.
The company after accepting its employees, terminated the services of 36
union members. Company also filed a complaint for illegal strike and
claimed that strikers prevented egress and ingress from Phimco compound
thereby paralyzing its operations. The Labor arbiter declared the strike illegal.
The illegal dismissal case and illegal strike case were consolidated before the
NLRC. The NLRC ruled in favor of the union which was later on upheld by
the CA. The company assailed the decision of CA by way of petition for
certiorari. The Union submitted that issues before the SC are factual in nature
that cannot be touch in a petition for review.
ISSUE: What is the basic approach that should be followed in the review of
decisions of Court of Appeals in labor cases? LAW: Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court Rule 65 of the Rules of Court Citing the case of Montoya vs. Transmed
Manila Corp. 597 SCA 334 (2009)

RULING: The Supreme Court has to view the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it. The SC have to examine the CA decision from the prism of
whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the
NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In this case the decision
of Labor Arbiter in declaring the strike is illegal was upheld by the SC but
they were awarded with nominal damages in pursuant to Agabon Doctrine
because they were not accorder with due process. OPINION: I adhere to the
approach laid down by the Supreme Court in reviewing decisions of the
Court of Appeals in reviewing of labor cases. I agree that petition for review
on certiorari before the CA, as governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is
different from review on appeal and therefore the correct question to be
answered by the CA is that Did the NLRC gravely abuse its discretion in
deciding the case?. On appeal, the case is subject to review in the
perspective that as if there is no decision previously rendered while if it is on
review by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the decision will be premised on the
findings on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
deciding the case.
Escario vs NLRC (pero sa full text, its Olisa vs Escario)
G.R. No. 160302

September 27, 2010

FACTS: The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent

Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a corporation engaged in manufacturing and
selling food seasoning. They were members of petitioner Malayang Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union).
At 8:30 in the morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members
of the Union walked out of PINAs premises and proceeded to the barangay office
to show support for an employee and officer of the union who was charged with
oral defamation by a manager of the company. All officers and members of the
union went back to work afterwards.

As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union
because of the March 13, 1993 incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union
after a month.
On April 14, 1993, PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) and
damages. LA ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout constituting ULP; and
that all the Unions officers, except Caete, had thereby lost their employment.
Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting
through the constructive dismissal of its officers. Union held a strike vote, at which
a majority of 190 members of the Union voted to strike.
PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment of work,
stating that they had violated provisions on strike of the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA).
On September 30, 1994, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). On November
29, 1994, the NLRC granted the writ of preliminary injunction.
The LA rendered decision declaring the strike as illegal.
NLRC sustained, but held that there was no abandonment on the part of the
employees.
CA sustained the NLRC and explained that they were not entitled to full back
wages as only instance under Article 264 when a dismissed employee would be
reinstated with full backwages was when he was dismissed by reason of an illegal
lockout; that Article 264 was silent on the award of backwages to employees
participating in a lawful strike; and that a reinstatement with full backwages would
be granted only when the dismissal of the petitioners was not done in accordance
with Article 282 (dismissals with just causes) and Article 283 (dismissals with
authorized causes) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON they are entitled to back wages during the illegal strike

HELD: Petitioners not entitled to backwages despite their reinstatement.

A fair days wage for a fair days labor.
Back-wages are not granted to employees participating in an illegal strike simply
accords with the reality that they do not render work for the employer during the
period of the illegal strike.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair days wage for a fair days
labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no
work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course,
the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working.
Under the principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor, the petitioners were
not entitled to the wages during the period of the strike (even if the strike might be
legal), because they performed no work during the strike. Verily, it was neither fair
nor just that the dismissed employees should litigate against their employer on the
latters time.