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33
"
the last
passedthrougha " generalcrisis duringthe I7th century,
froma feudalto a capitalisteconomy.
phaseof thegeneraltransition
Since 1300 or so, whensomething
clearlybeganto go seriouslywrong
withEuropeanfeudalsociety1
therehavebeenseveraloccasionswhen
partsof Europe trembledon the brinkof capitalism. There is a
" revolutionabout 14thtaste of " bourgeois" and " industrial
centuryTuscany and Flanders or early I6th-centuryGermany.
Yet it is only fromthe middleof the I7th centurythatthis taste
medievalor feudal
becomesmorethana seasoningto an essentially
dish. The earlierurban societiesnever quite succeeded in the
revolutionsthey foreshadowed.From the early i8th century,
"
checks.
however," bourgeois societyadvancedwithoutsubstantial
The I7th centurycrisisthus differsfromits predecessorsin that
which had
a solutionof the difficulties
it led to as fundamental
previouslystood in the way of the triumphof capitalism,as that
systemwillpermit. In thisarticleI proposeto marshalsomeofthe
evidenceforthe existenceof a generalcrisis,whichis stilldisputed
ofit. In a subsequentarticle
bysome,and to suggestan explanation
I proposeto discusssomeofthechangesit produced,and howit was
overcome. It is veryprobablethata greatdeal of historicalwork
willbe doneonthissubjectandperiodinthenextfewyears. Indeed,
lately historiansin various countrieshave tentativelysuggested
somethinglike that " general check to economic development"
or generalcrisiswithwhichthispaperdeals.2 It maytherefore
be
convenientto take a bird's eye view of the field,and to speculate
if onlyto stimulatebetter
about some sortof workinghypothesis,
work.
ones,or further
Evidencefor a generalcrisis
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After I650,
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In discussingtheI7th century
crisiswe arereallyaskingone ofthe
fundamentalquestionsabout the rise of capitalism:why did the
into
expansionof the laterI5th and i6th centuriesnotlead straight
the epoch of the i8th and I9th centuryIndustrialRevolution?
What,in otherwords,were the obstaclesin the way of capitalist
are bothgeneraland
expansion? The answers,it maybe suggested,
particular.
The general argumentmay be summarizedas follows. if
of feudalor agrarian
capitalismis to triumph,the social structure
societymustbe revolutionized.The social divisionof labourmust
is to increase;the sociallabour
be greatlyelaboratedif productivity
fromagriculture
to industry
forcemust be radicallyredistributed
while this happens. The proportionof productionwhich is
exchangedin the supra-localmarketmust rise dramatically.So
so long as most
long as thereis no large body of wage-workers;
men supplytheirneeds fromtheirown productionor by exchange
ofmoreor less autarchiclocal markets
whichexist
in themultiplicity
evenin primitive
societies,thereis a limitto thehorizonof capitalist
whatwe maylooselycall
profitand verylittleincentiveto undertake
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IN I7TH
CENTURY
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seems less apt for the period I540-I640 than for the Germany of
which evolved the printing press, effectivefire-arms,
I450-I520
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7TH CENTURY
43
narrowfieldwhichremainedforthemonceone leftasidethemajority
of the populationof Europe as " economicallyneutral." If they
it may have been
spent vast amountsof capital non-productively,
simplybecause therewas no more room to investit progressively
on any scale withinthe limitsof this " capitalistsector." (The
I7th centuryDutch palliateda similarglutof capitalby multiplying
householdgoods and worksof art29
thoughtheyalso discoveredthe
more moderndevice of a speculativeinvestment
boom). Perhaps
the Italians would have been shockedinto different
behaviourby
economicadversity;thoughtheyhad made moneyforso long by
providingthefeudalworldwithitstradeand financethattheywould
not have learnedeasily. However,the generalboom of the later
I6th century(like the " Indian summer" of EdwardianBritain)
and thesuddenlyexpandeddemandsofthegreatabsolutemonarchies
whichreliedon privatecontractors,
and the unprecedentediuxury
of their aristocracies,postponed the evil day. When it came,
it left Italian
bringingdecay to Italian trade and manufacture,
financestill upright,thoughno longerdominant. Again, Italian
industrymightwell have maintainedsome of its old positionsby
switchingmore completelyfromits old high-quality
goods to the
shoddierand cheapernew draperiesof the North. But who,in the
greatperiodof luxurybuyingfrom1580-1620 would guessthatthe
futureof high-quality
textileswas limited? Did not the courtof
Lorraine,in thefirstthirdof thecenturyuse moretextilesimported
fromItalythanfromall othernon-Frenchcountriesput together
?30
(One would like to reservejudgmenton the argumentthat Italy
lost groundbecause of higherproductioncosts forgoods of equal
evidenceforit is broughtforward
or untilwe
quality,untilstronger
have a satisfactory
explanationforthe failureof Italianproduction,
afterpromisingbeginnings,
fromtowns
to shiftas wholeheartedly
to countryside
as did thetextileindustries
ofothercountries.3
1)
The case of Italyshowswhyparticular
countrieswentdownin the
consider
crisis,notnecessarily
whyit occurred. We must therefore
thecontradictions
oftheveryprocessof i6thcentury
expansion.
The contradictionsof expansion: Eastern Europe
The comparative
townson trade
specializationof west-European
and manufacture
was to some extentachievedin the I5th and i6th
centuriesby the creationof a sizeablesurplusof exportablefoodin
EasternEurope and perhapsby ocean fisheries.32But in Eastern
on a large
Europethiswas achievedbythecreationofserfagriculture
offeudalism. This, we maysuggest,
scale; i.e. a local strengthening
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45
wasimmensely
stimulated
gainsfromthis. Generalbusinessactivity
as wellas capitalaccumulated;but our exportsof manufactures
were
on the whole not greatlyexpanded. Colonial powers- in good
- followed a policy of systematic
medieval business tradition
of outputand systematicmonopoly. Hence therewas
restriction
no reasonwhyexportsof homemanufactures
shouldbenefit.
The benefitwhichEurope drew from these initial conquests
was thusin thenatureofa singlebonusratherthana regulardividend.
When it was exhausted,crisis was likelyto follow. Among the
colonialpowerscosts and overheadsrose fasterthan profits. In
threestages: thatof easy
both East and West we may distinguish
thatof crisis,and withluck eventuallythatof a stableand
profits,
moremodestprosperity.In theinitialphaseconquestor interloping
at low costs. In the East,
broughttemporarily
unchallenged
profits
whereprofits
restedon themonopolyof a restricted
outputof spices
and the like,the crisiswas probablybroughton by the steep rise
in " protection
costs" againstold and newrivals;risingall themore
the
the colonialpowertriedto screwup the monopoly
more
steeply
price. It has been estimatedthatthe Portuguesespice tradebarely
paid its way forthese reasons.38In the West, wheretheyrested
on the cheap bulk productionof bullionand otherraw materials,
protectioncosts probablyplayed a smallerpart,thoughtheyalso
rose with piracyand competition.However,therethe technical
" rat-hole" miningoftheSpaniardsweresoon
limitsoftheprimitive
reached(even allowingforthe uses of the mercuryprocess),and
workedto death,being
verypossiblythe labourforcewas virtually
treatedas an expendableasset.37 At any rate American silver
exportsdiminishedafterI6IO or so. Eventually,of course,in the
East colonialpowersadjustedthemselvesto the new level of overheadsand perhapsfoundnewsourcesoflocal taxationto offset
them.
In the Westthe familiarstructure
of quasi-feudallargeestatescame
into beingin the I7th century.38Since the economicbasis of the
theresults
Spanishcolonialsystemwas broaderthanthePortuguese,
of crisiswould be morefar-reaching.Thus the early emigration
to theAmericastemporarily
stimulated
theexportof goodsfromthe
homecountry;but as, inevitably,
manyofthecolonists'wants came
to be suppliedlocally,the expandedmanufactures
of Spain had to
pay the price. The attemptto tightenthe metropolitan
monopoly
worseby discouraging
thedevelopment,
merelymadematters
among
otherthings,of the potentially
revolutionary
plantationeconomy.39
The effectsof the influxof bullioninto Spain are too well-known
to need discussion.
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46
It is thereforeunderstandable
that the " old colonial system"
on the general
passed througha profoundcrisis;and thatits effects
Europeaneconomywere far-reaching.A new patternof colonial
exploitationwhich produced steadily rising exports of manufactures
fromEuropedid indeedreplaceit. (Actinglargelyon their
own the sugarplantersof NorthernBrazilhad shownthe wayto it
fromtheendofthei6thcentury). Yet thelureof theold monopoly
wasirresistible
to all thosewhohada chanceofcapturing
them.
profits
Even the Dutch remainedresolutely" old-fashioned"in their
colonialismuntilthe i8th century,thoughtheirentrepotposition
in Europesavedthemfromthe consequenceof colonialinefficiency.
Old colonialismdid notgrowoverintonew colonialism;it collapsed
and wasreplacedbyit.
The contradictions
of thehomemarkets
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47
- -
was second
also increasingly
rural.50
only to that of the domesticoutworkers,
Expansionundertheseconditionsbred crisis.
Whathappenedin thenon-agricultural
sectorsdependedlargelyon
the agricultural. Costs of manufacture
may have been unduly
raisedby the morerapid rise of agrarianthan of industrialprices,
of manufacturers.51
thus narrowingthe profit-margin
(However,
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48
manufacturers
usedthecheaplabourofruraloutworkers,
increasingly
who were again exploitedto the point of debility.) The market
also had its difficulties.The ruralmarketas a whole must have
proved disappointing.Many freeholding
peasants benefitedfrom
the price-riseand the demandfortheirgoods, providedtheyhad
evenin bad years,a regularsurplus
enoughland to feedthemselves
forsale,and a goodhead forbusiness.52But ifsuchyeomenbought
much morethan before,theyboughtless thantownsmenof equal
The experienceof i9th
standing,being more self-sufficient.53
centuryFranceshowsthata middleand richpeasantryis about as
a marketformassmanufactures
as maybe found,and does
univiting
not encouragecapitaliststo revolutionizeproduction. Its wants
are traditional;mostof its wealthgoes intomoreland and cattle,or
intohoards,or intonewbuilding,or evenintosheerwaste,likethose
gargantuanweddings,funerals,and other feastswhich disturbed
continental
princesat the turnof the i6th century.54The increase
in the demand fromthe non-agricultural
sector (towns, luxury
demandetc.) mayfora timehave obscuredthe
market,government
factthatit grewless rapidlythanproductivecapacity,and that the
in the iong
persistentdecline of the real income of wage-earners
inflation
mayactually,accordingto Nef,have stopped" the growth
of the demand for some industrialproducts."55However, the
slumpsin the exportmarketsfromthe late i6ios on broughtthe
facthome.
Once the decline had begun, of course, an additionalfactor
of manufacture:
the rise in labour costs.
increasedthe difficulties
For thereis evidencethat-- in thetownsat least -- the bargaining
powerof labourrosesharplyduringthe crisis,perhapsowingto the
in townpopulations. At any ratereal wagesrose
fallor stagnation
saw the
in England,Italy,Spain and Germany,and themid-century
in most western
formation
of effective
organizations
journeymen's
countries.56This may not have affectedthe labour costs of the
industries,as theirworkerswere in a weakerposition
putting-out
to benefitfromthe situation,and theirpiece-ratewagesweremore
factor. Moreover,
easilycut. However,it is clearlynota negligible
the slackeningof populationincreaseand the stabilization
of prices
further.
musthave depressedmanufactures
These different
aspectsof the crisismay be reducedto a single
formula:economicexpansiontook place withina social framework
whichit was notyetstrongenoughto burst,and in waysadaptedto
it ratherthanto the worldof moderncapitalism. Specialistsin the
whatactuallyprecipitated
the crisis:
Jacobeanperiodmustdetermine
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49
Birkbeck
College.
A NOTE ON PRICE
HISTORY
NOTES
1Perroy,Boutruche,Hilton have discussed this in recentyearsin the Annales
and elsewhere. See also the discussion among Dobb, Sweezy, Takahashi,
Hilton and Hill in Science and Society I950-53, and the general survey by
(I am indebted to the Polish
Malowist in Kwartainik HistoricznyI953, I.
Institute,London for a translationof this).
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51
Zuckers,
1929).
16 For a comparisonof its size in 1641 and 1667, J. Saintoyant,La ColonisationEuropeenne,1947,27 I1-3.
17 B. Porshnev in Biryukovitch,Porshnev, Skazkin etc., Novaya Istoriya
1640-1789 (Moscow 1951), 444. This follows a suggestionof Marx in 1850
(Sel. Essays, ed. Stenning,1926, 203). The coincidence has oftenbeen noted,
Revolutions,1938.
e.g. Merriman,Six Contemporaneous
18 Merriman, op. cit., Porshnev, Narodnie vosstaniya vo Frantsii pered
Frondoi 1623-1648 (Moscow 1948); 0. Schiff,D. deutschenBauernaufstaende
1525-1789 (Hist. Ztrschr. CXXX 189 ff). Feller, Gesch. Berns II (I953),
cap. iv and v.
19J. Lemoine, La revoltedu Papier Timbre,1898 printsnumerousdocumetts.
20
Marczali, Hungaryin the i8th C., 1910, p. xxxvii; Bretholzloc cit. 57-61.
21 A. Nielsen, Daenische WVirtschaftsgeschichte,
1933, 94-5.
22 R. Mousnier, La venalitedes offices
sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 1945;
K. W. Swart, Sale ofoffices
in the 17 c., 1949.
23 See the Note on Price
History.
24 V. I. Lenin, The Developmentof Capitalismin Russia, cap. I (conclusions),
II
VIII
(the formationof the Home Market). Capital
cap.
(conclusions), cap.
I (1938 ed.) 738, 772-4. That Marx did not think primarilyof the actual
accumulation of resources is shown, I think, by a preparatorydraft to the
"
Critique of Political Economy: Eigen ist dem Kapital nichtsals die Vereinigung von Haenden und Instrumenten,die es vorfindet. Es agglomeriertsie
unterseinerBotmaessigkeit. Das ist sein wirklichesAnhaeufen;das Anhaeufen
von Arbeitern auf Punkten nebst ihren Instrumenten." (Formen die der
Produktionvorhergehen,
pp. 49-50, Berlin 1952).
kapitalistichen
25 Capital III pt. IV (Merchant's Capital); and esp. vol. II, 63. See also
R. H. Hilton, " Capitalism,What's in a Name " (Past and PresentI, 1952).
26J. Meuvret, " Circulation monetaire et utilisation economique de la
monnaie dans la France du i6e et du I7e s. " (Etudes d'Histoire Moderne et
Contemp,tome I, 1947, 14-29); R. Latouche, La vie au Bas-Quercy, 1923;
E. Koehler, Der Einzelhandelim Mittelalter,1938, 55-60.
27 A. Fanfani, Storia del Lavoro in Italia dalla fine del secolo XV agli inizii
del XVIII, 1943, 42-9.
28 R. S. Lopez, " Economie et architecturemedievales " (Annales Oct.-Dec.
1952,443-8).
29G. Renier, The Dutch Nation, 1944, 97-9.
30H. Roy, La vie, la modeet le costumeau I7e s., 1924, printsa fulllist of all
the types of textileused at this court.
31Cipolla, The declineof Italy (loc cit.) forthe high-costargument.
32 M. Malowist in
des SciencesHistoriquesI,
Reportof IX CongresInternational
1950,305-22.
"
33 For the extent of this
increasingexploitation,J. Rutkowski, Le regime
agraire en Pologne au I8e s. " (Rev. Hist. Econ. and Soc. 1926 and 1927, esp.
1927, 92 ff); J. Rutkowski," Les bases economiques des partagesde l'ancienne
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52
Pologne " (Rev. Hist. Moderne N.S. IV, I932); J. Rosdolsky, " The distribution of the agrarian product in feudalism" (Journ. Econ. Hist. I95I, 247 ff),
For unimportance of cash payments, Rutkowski I927.
7I. Rutkowski
I926, 501; Malowist, 317 ff. An example of townimproverishment
due to this,
F. Tremel, Handel d. Stadt Judenburgim I6 Jh. (Ztschr.d. hist. Vereinsfuer
Steiermark,1947, I03-6).
An expansion of the total area of serfexportingagriculture- e.g. in the
Black Sea area might have offsetthis. But this did not take place until the
i8th century,possibly owing to Turkish strengthand grain policy earlier.
D. Ionescu, Agrarverfassung
Rumaeniens,I909, I0-I9, A. Mehlan, " D. grossen
Balkanmessen in der Tuerkenzeit" (Vierteljahrschrift
f. Soz. und Wirtsch.
Gesch.I938, 2-7).
35Cal. St. P. Col. I66I-8, 266.
36 F. C.
Lane, " National Wealth and ProtectionCosts " (in Clarkson and
Cochran ed., War as a Social Institution,I94I, 36 ff).
37C. G. Motten, Mexican Silver and theEnlightenment,
I950, caps. 2-3.
38Thus fromthe end of the I7th centurythe Dutch East India Company
expanded the income fromcolonial taxes, previouslyabout 9% of its revenue,
much more rapidly than tradingprofits. Lannoy and Linden op. cit. 266-7.
F. Chevalier,La formationdes grandsdomainesau Mexique. Terreset Societe au
XVI-XVIIe s., I952. I have only seen the summary of this in Rev. Hist.
I953, 376 ff.
428,
39For
the ending of sugar-plantationsin the early I7th century,E. 0. v.
Lippmann,Gesch.d. Zuckers,I929.
40 Cf. the importH. Aubin, " D. Anfaenged. grossenschlesischenLeineweberei " (Vierteljahrschr.
f. Soz. und Wirtsch.Gesch.XXXV, I54-73).
41 Raveau: L'agriculture. . . en HIaut-Poitouau I6 s., I27;
Marc Bloch,
Caracteres Originaux de l'histoireruralefranfaise,I48-9); but the " gentil"
homme campagnard is not ipso factoa capitalistfarmer.
42 Bloch
op. cit. Braudel 624 ff.
43Bloch, op. cit. I45-6; P. Raveau, op. cit.,249 ff;A. Kraemer,D. wechselnde
. . . Bedeutungd. Landbesitzesd. Stadt Breslau (I927) for systematicbuying
of land 1500 - ThirtyYears' War.
A4 Baasch, Hollaend. Wirtschaftsgeschichte,
50; Roupnel op. cit.
45 Marx,
Capital iII, xlvii, sec. v on metayage;G. de Falguerolles,Decadence
de l'economie agricole a Lempaut (Languedoc) (Annales du Midi 53, I94I,
I42-)
an important
article.
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IN I7TH
CENTURY
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