Liwayway Vinzons Chato v Fortune Tobacco 575 SCRA 23

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against
Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less
than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule,
reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus,
when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of
the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no
cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her
official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely
as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of
malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the
case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not
act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code

HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which
a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the
affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer
is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad
faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate
public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may
be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not
so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the
office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2)
where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special
law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is

determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial.
The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not
render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is,
liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
Aberca v Ver 160 SCRA 590

ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al.

L-69866
April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver
to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the
raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the 20
petitioners. Petitioners were arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the
courts. For some period after their arrest, they were arrested without denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel,
through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City
against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Respondents, in their motion to
dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving
credence to petitioners detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a
cause of action against respondents.

On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case. A
motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On May 11, 1984, the trial court, without
acting on the motion to set aside the Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said
Order against petitioners. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC,
petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985, seeking to
annul and set aside the respondent courts resolutions and order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution;
(2)
Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit for acts done in
the performance of official duties and functions;
(3)
Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat superior, be
answerable for damages jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person
whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
HELD:
(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (PWHC) does
not destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil
Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of
the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any
public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from martial law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought
within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends petitioners right
of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents

confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to
counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and
against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the PWHC
had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of Proclamation No. 2
on March 25, 1986.
(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely
responding to their duties, as they claim, to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of
Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance
of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged CT underground
houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission
untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and protected by the Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employees, or
any private individual, liable in damages for violating the constitutional rights and
liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges
are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their
assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to protect the Philippines from its
enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy
or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What is meant is
that in carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be
observed; otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of
competing ideologies, the struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The
linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.

(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case. It has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant
relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the military and their
subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil
Code; the law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it
is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly

responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.

Bermudez V Melencio Herrera L 32055 2/26/88

Beltran V People 334 SCRA 106

BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE

334 SCRA 106

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at
the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
2. After 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon
City, Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
3. In her Answer to said petition, petitioners wife alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
4. She then filed a criminal case for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61.
5. Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
case.
6. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
7. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
8. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders
issued by Judge Cervantes.
9. The RTC denied the petition also a Motion for Reconsideration.
10. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage?

HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
It has two (2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import
of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable bases for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioners argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of

concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even
a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.
Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in
DONATO VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: xxx Assuming that the
first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not
be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage

before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case of concubinage.

Prejudicial Question

After 24 years of marriage and four children, Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity
of marriage due to psychological incapacity. In answer to the said petition, petitioners
wife Charmaine Felix complained of concubinage and subsequently filed a criminal case
against the husband. Petitioner now argues that pendency of the declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the petitioners marriage is a

prejudicial question.

HELD: The court averred that petitioners contentions are untenable. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The
pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners of marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case because the facts in the latter case are not
based on the former for the guilt of the petitioner-accused is determined.

Alejandro Raz v Hon. Jainal Rasul 100 SCRA 125

RAS v RASUL
100 SCRA 125 TEEHANKEE; September 18, 1980
NATURE
P e t i t i o n t o r e v i e w a n d s e t a s i d e t h e o r d e r o f respondent Judge
d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 7 8 o f criminal case in CFI
Basilan denying petitioner'smotion as accused therein to suspend
proceedingsdue to the existence of a prejudicial question in CivilCase of the same
court
FACTS
- A p r i l 2 7 , 1 9 7 8 - L u i s P i c h e l f i l e d a C O M P L A I N T against Alejandro Ras
and Bienvenido Martin beforeCFI Basilan praying for the nullification of the deed of sale
executed by Ras in favor of Martin and for
thed e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e p r i o r d e e d o f s a l e a l l e g e d l y executed in his favor by
the defendant Alejandro Rasas valid.- RAS ANSWER> they never sold the property to
Pichel> the signatures appearing in the deed of sale in favor of plaintiff Pichel
were forgeries> therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel's
favors o u g h t t o b e d e c l a r e d v a l i d w a s f i c t i t i o u s a n d inexistent- September
5, 1978 - while Civil Case was being TRIED before CFI Basilan,
the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed an INFORMATION
for Estafa (criminalcase) in the same court against Ras arising from
thes a m e d o u b l e s a l e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e c i v i l complaint filed by Luis
Pichel.- November 6, 1978 - petitioner filed a MOTION
FORS U S P E N S I O N O F A C T I O N i n s a i d C r i m i n a l C a s e claiming that same
facts and issues were involved
inb o t h t h e c i v i l a n d c r i m i n a l c a s e a n d t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e
issues in the civil
c a s e w o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y b e d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f t h e g u i l t o r innocence of
the accused.- December 4, 1978 - Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filedhis opposition
on- D e c e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 7 8 - r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e s a w
n o p r e j u d i c i a l q u e s t i o n a n d a c c o r d i n g l y d e n i e d t h e motion
ISSUE
WON civil case would be prejudicial to the criminalcase given that they would
discuss same facts andissues
HELD
YES- there appears to be a prejudicial question in thecase at bar,
considering that Ras' defense in CivilCase of the nullity and forgery of the
alleged priordeed of sale in favor of Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and
complaining witness in the criminal case)

isb a s e d o n t h e v e r y s a m e f a c t s w h i c h w o u l d b e necessarily
determinative of Ras' guilt or innocenceas accused in the criminal case.
Ratio
A prejudicial question is defined as that whicharises in a case the resolution of
which is a logicalantecedent of the issue involved therein, and thecognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. Theprejudicial question must
be determinative of thecase before the court but the jurisdiction to
try andresolve the question must be lodged in another courtor tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact
distincta n d s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e c r i m e b u t s o i n t i m a t e l yc o n n e c t e d
w i t h i t t h a t i t d e t e r m i n e s t h e g u i l t o r innocence of the accused.
Reasoning
- For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to acriminal action as to cause
the suspension of thecriminal action pending the determination of thec i v i l ,
i t m u s t a p p e a r n o t o n l y t h a t t h e c i v i l c a s e involves the same facts upon
which the criminalprosecution is based, but also that the resolution of t h e
i s s u e s r a i s e d i n s a i d c i v i l a c t i o n w o u l d b e necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.- If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is
void orfictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be
innocent of the offense charged.A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed
toproceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and wouldhave to be set aside if it
were finally decided in thecivil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of salewas a
forgery and spurious.
Dispositive
Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case dated December 12, 1978 is hereby
set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Courton May 16, 1979 is
hereby made permanent andrespondent judge is enjoined from proceeding
withthe arraignment and trial of the criminal case unlessthe civil case shall have
been finally decided andterminated adversely against petitioner

Quimiging vs. Icao 34 SCRA 142

Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force
and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant

despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.

Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The
complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack
of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they
were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children
as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens
rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

BPI Express Card v CA

Orbecido V. RP 472 SCRA 144

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT, ManilaFIRST DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO IIIG.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
UnitedChurch of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was

blessed with ason and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.In
1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. Afew
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorced e c r e e a n d t h e n m a r r i e d a c e r t a i n I n n o c e n t S t a n l e y. S h e , S t a
n l e y a n d h e r c h i l d b y h i m currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invokingParagraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in thepetition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not applicable tothe instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebratedbetween a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file apetition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law thatgoverns respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination
ISSUE
:Whether or not respondent can remarry citing Article 26 paragraph 2 of the family Code.
HELD:
The petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decisiondated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave,Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
RATIONALE:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were aforeigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
tosanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact andl i t e r a l i m p o r t w o u l d l e a d t o m i s c h i e v o u s r e s u l t s o r c o n t r a v e n
e t h e c l e a r p u r p o s e o f t h e legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within theliteral meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:1.There is a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen anda foreigner; and2.A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of themarriage, but their
citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spousecapacitating the latter to remarry.In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was stilla valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, thenaturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.Clearly, the

twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present inthis
case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.H o w e v e r , c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t p e t i t i o n t h e r e i s n o
s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents
bare allegations thathis wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and hadremarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration couldonly be made properly upon respondents submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor