G.R. No.

L-12792

February 28, 1961

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Ledesma, Puno, Guytingco, Antonio and Associates for defendant-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew
plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta.
Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of
approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP.
Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda
College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been
able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the
present expropriation proceedings.
On May 27, 1957 the trial court, upon application of the Government hereinafter
referred to as appellant issued an order fixing the provisional value of the property in
question at P270,000.00 and authorizing appellant to take immediate possession thereof
upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of
Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to
place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.
On June 8, 1957, as directed by the Rules of Court, the herein appellee, in lieu of an
answer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds:
I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use
and therefore is not subject to expropriation.
II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.
III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site
which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not
necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.
IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is
discriminatory.
V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its
project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff
to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be only to needlessly
deprive the latter of the use of its property.".
The government filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal,
pp. 30-37) while appellee filed a reply thereto (Id., pp. 38-48). On July 29, 1957, without
receiving evidence upon the questions of fact arising from the complaint, the motion to

dismiss and the opposition thereto filed, the trial court issued the appealed order
dismissing the case.
The appealed order shows that the trial court limited itself to deciding the point of
whether or not the expropriation of the property in question is necessary (Rec. on Ap., p.
50) and, having arrived at the conclusion that such expropriation was not of extreme
necessity, dismissed the proceedings.
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that appellant
needs, among other properties, the portion of appellee's property in question for the
purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and that paragraph VII of the
same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with Section 64(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru
condemnation proceedings, of the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as
evidenced by the third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary,
Office of the President of the Philippines, a copy of which was attached to the complaint
as Annex "C" and made an integral part thereof. In denial of these allegations appellee's
motion to dismiss alleged that "there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation".
Thus, the question of fact decisive of the whole case arose.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use
and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is
justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of
the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a
genuine necessity therefor (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349; Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957).
Upon the other hand, it does not need extended argument to show that whether or not
the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the
daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon
the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on other
factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of
evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the parties should have been given an
opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that
might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved,
namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic
congestion on Legarda street.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Without costs.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Paredes
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. 155065. July 28, 2005]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25, PETRONA O. DILAO, FEDIL T. OSMEA, ISABEL T.
OSMEA, CELESTINO O. GALON, POTENCIA O. BATUCAN, TRINIDAD T. OSMEA, LULIA T. OSMEA,
LOURDES O. DAFFON, VICTORIA O. BARRIGA and JUAN T. OSMEA, JR., and ESTEFANIA
ENRIQUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated June 6, 2002, as well as its Resolution[2] dated August 30, 2002,
affirming the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the complaint for
expropriation filed by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) against herein respondents 'Petrona
Dilao et al. are being assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed on March 19, 1996 before the Regional
Trial Court of Danao City a complaint for expropriation[4] of parcels of land situated at Baring and Cantumog,
Carmen, Cebu[5] against the following defendants:
NAMES' ADDRESS
1. Petrona O.[6] Dilao Poblacion, Carmen, Cebu
2. Fidel T. Osmea -do3. Isabel T. Osmea -do4. Celestina O. Galon -do5. Potenciana O. Batucan -do6. Trinidad T. Osmea -do7. Lulia T.Osmea -do8. Lourdes O. Daffon ' -do9. Victoria O. Barriga ' -do10. Juan T. Osmea, Jr. -do11. Estefania Enriquez Marijoy Realty Corp.
Natalio Bacalso Ave.
Mambaling, Cebu City[7]
(Underscoring supplied)
The complaint covers (a) 7,281 square meters of the 25,758 square meters of land co-owned by herein
respondents Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and the above-listed defendant Nos. 2-10 who are her siblings, and (b)
7,879 square meters of the 17,019 square meters of land owned by Estefania Enriquez (Enriquez).
[8]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A day after the complaint was filed or on March 20, 1996, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance
of writ of possession of the lands.
Dilao filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996.[9] Enriquez did not.
[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of the RTC Danao, issued an Order[11] granting NPC's motion for the issuance of
writ of possession. It then appointed a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.
[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The commissioners submitted on April 15, 1999 their report[13] to the trial court containing, among other
things, their recommended appraisal of the parcel of land co-owned by defendants Dilao and her siblings at
P516.66 per square meter.
To the Commissioners' Report, the NPC filed its Comment/Opposition[14] assailing the correctness of the
appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395 (AN ACT REVISING THE CHARTER
OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION), as amended, specifically Section 3A[15] thereof which
provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement (for which that portion of the Dilao property is
being expropriated) shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. The traversed
land, NPC asserted, could still be used for agricultural purposes by the defendants, subject only to its easement.
It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines.
[16]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By Decision of November 10, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision on the complaint, adopting the
commissioners' recommended appraisal of the land co-owned by Dilao and her siblings. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered condemning the property of Petrona Dilao et al. which has been
affected by 7,281 square meters in favor of plaintiff; declaring in favor of defendants for plaintiff to pay the
fair market value of said area affected at P516.66 per square or a total of P3,761,801.40 plus P250,000.00 for
the value of the improvements affected by herein expropriation.
SO ORDERED.[17] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Copy of the decision was received by NPC on November 18, 1999.[18]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
NPC filed a Notice of Appeal[19] but the trial court, by Order of January 17, 2000, denied the same for NPC's
failure to file and perfect it within the reglementary period, it having failed to file a record on appeal.[20] To the
Order, NPC filed a motion for reconsideration,[21] contending that a record on appeal was not required as the
trial court rendered judgment against all the defendants including Enriquez as shown, so it claimed, by the
dispositive portion of the decision referring to 'Petrona Dilao et al.
By Resolution[22] of March 7, 2000, the trial court denied NPC's motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the
reference to 'Petrona Dilao et al. in the dispositive portion of its decision was meant to cover only Dilao and her
co-owner-siblings.[23]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
NPC subsequently filed before the trial court a petition for relief from the denial of its appeal on the ground that
its failure to file a record on appeal was due to honest mistake and excusable neglect, it having believed that a
record on appeal was not required in light of the failure of the other defendant, Enriquez, to file an answer to the
complaint.[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The trial court denied NPC's petition for relief for lack of factual and legal basis.[25]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 17, 2001, the trial court granted Dilao et al.'s motion for execution of judgment.[26] NPC thereupon
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction[27] assailing the trial court's order denying its appeal and other orders related thereto, as
well as the order granting Dilao et al.'s motion for execution. The appellate court, however, denied NPC's
petition,[28] it holding that under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a record
on appeal is required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as in an action for
expropriation in which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate and the subsequent
adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the subject of separate appeals.
[29]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Aggrieved, NPC challenged the appellate court's decision via the present petition,[30] it contending that the trial
court's questioned orders 'effectively deprived it of its constitutional right to due process.
NPC argues that a complaint for expropriation is a Special Civil Action under Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, not a 'special proceeding as contemplated under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
that there is no law or rules specifically requiring that a record on appeal shall be filed in expropriation cases;
and of the two sets of defendants in the present case, the Dilaos and Enriquez, the first, while they filed an
answer, did not appeal the trial court's decision, while with respect to the second, there is no showing that
summons was served upon her, hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her and, therefore, no
appeal could arise whatsoever with respect to the complaint against her. Ergo, petitioner concludes, no
possibility of multiple appeals arose from the case.
The petition fails.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, clearly provides:
SEC. 2. 'Modes of Appeals. '
(a) Ordinary appeal. ' The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or
these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, the above-quoted rule requires the
filing of a record on appeal in 'other cases of multiple or separate appeal.
Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation.[31]
The case of Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[32] vividly expounds on the matter, viz:
1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it
finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an
order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the
Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or
heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and
leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may
believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously,
too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom. (Underscoring
supplied).

Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no less than two appeals
are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted from notice
thereof and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general.[33] As such, the complaint
falls under the classification of 'other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require
in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal is required
to be filed and served.
Respecting NPC's claim that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other defendant, Enriquez, there
being no evidence that summons was served on her and, therefore, no appeal with respect to the case against her
arose, the trial court's Order[34] of May 9, 1996 belies said claim:
xxx
In the letter-appeal by defendant Estefania V. Enriquez addressed to the Court, defendant did manifest
no opposition to the right of plaintiff to the use of her land but only wich (sic) that payment be based on the
actual market value of the property sought to be expropriated. In comment to said letter-appeal, plaintiff stressed
that the amount deposited was purely to secure a writ of possession as provided under PD 42. It agreed with
defendant that the fair market value or actual market value shall be the basis for the just compensation of the
property.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the defendant Enriquez did not file an answer to the complaint did not foreclose the possibility of an
appeal arising therefrom. For Section 3 of Rule 67 provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. ' If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his
property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating
or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons.
Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense
to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall
specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent
of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent
pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit
amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial
of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may
present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the
distribution of the award. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In other words, once the compensation for Enriquez property is placed in issue at the trial, she could, following
the third paragraph of the immediately-quoted Section 3 of Rule 67, participate therein and if she is not in
conformity with the trial court's determination of the compensation, she can appeal therefrom.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have filed a record on
appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial court's decision. The trial court's dismissal of its appeal, which
was affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.

En passant, glossing over NPC's failure to file record on appeal, its appeal would still not prosper on
substantive grounds.
NPC anchored its appeal[35] on the alleged overvalued appraisal by the commissioners of the compensation to
be awarded to Dilao et al., the commissioners having allegedly lost sight of the already mentioned 10% limit
provided under Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395.
In National Power Corporation v. Chiong,[36] petitioner similarly argued therein that the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in upholding the RTC order requiring it to pay the full market value of the expropriated
properties, despite the fact that it was only acquiring an easement of right-of-way for its transmission lines. It
pointed out, as it does in the present case, that under Section 3A of RA No. 6395, as amended, where only an
easement of right-of-way shall be acquired, with the principal purpose for which the land is actually devoted is
unimpaired, the compensation should not exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property.
Upholding the trial court and the Court of Appeals's approval of the commissioners' recommendation in that
case, this Court declared:
In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had
considered the reports of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. This includes the
fair market value of P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the respondents. This valuation by owners
of the property may not be binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it should at least set a
ceiling price for the compensation to be awarded. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to
be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of the
land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the
landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the owner's valuation of P1,100 per square meter but only
P500 as recommended in the majority report of the commissioners.
xxx
In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before
it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority report's
valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any
showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this
Court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term 'expropriation. As
explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[37] viz:
The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that 'x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only
after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant
higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed
through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter
shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way
where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public
use (See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals,
102 SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that:

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of
right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
From the Commissioners' Report[38] chronicling the following findings:
xxx
1. The parcel of land owned by the defendant PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. is very fertile, plain, suited for
any crops production, portion of which planted with coco trees and mango trees, portion planted with
corn, sometimes planted with sugar cane, the said land has a distance of about 1 kilometer from the
trading center, about 100 meters from an industrial land (Shemberg Biotech Corp.) adjacent to a
Poultry Farm and lies along the Provincial Road.
xxx
IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTED
Per ocular inspection made on lot own by PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. traversed by a transmission line of NPC
and with my verification as to the number of improvements, the following trees had been damaged.
1. 55 coco trees productive
2. 10 mango trees productive
3. 30 cacao trees productive
4. 110 bananas
5. 400 ipil-ipil trees
x x x,[39]
it cannot be gainsaid that NPC's complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines
over Dilao et al.'s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission
lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably
restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupant's life and limb.
The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function,[40] this Court
finds the commissioners' recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court,
to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.
In fine, the appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and substantive grounds.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Garcia, J., no part.

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and
HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili,
Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN
SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No.
20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this
Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian
Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year
Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory
centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of
plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other
progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the
necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in
Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government
employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by
purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;

WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present

Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-1989 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V.
Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of
possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of
P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that
private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended
motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b)
that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated
December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the
order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to
dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court
from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the
authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General
stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed
the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use
as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying
the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to

suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall
have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to nonagricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the
dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the
compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did
it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of
the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be
expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is
valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public
purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The
old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general
public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or
housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable information and
technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of
the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of
eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that
the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of
whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the
"Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of
the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less
than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation
patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was
"no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior
or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it
upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing
that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and
reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as
superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines
Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by
delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester,
28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67
L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and
institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must
first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest
provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its
award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for,
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner,
with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may

authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:

Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands
previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5)
years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive
Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department
of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the
purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules
vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be
broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E.
2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve
a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform
to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same
being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest.
Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms
are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject
thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA
1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as
holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in
general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation
declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared
as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation
cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the
assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA
305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules
for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the
just compensation for their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the
trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the
PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by
DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No.
3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land
situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued
broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines
project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the
premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations
thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being
the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after
the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order
-chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to 3842-M
located at KM 43, MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by several transfer
certificates of title appearing in the Commissioners Appraisal Report consisting of the
total area of 544,980 square meters, as indicated in plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff, also
marked as Exhibit I for the defendants, and as Appendix A attached to the
Commissioners Appraisal Report, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its
complaint;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property
which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos
(P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully
paid; andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaid fees of
commissioners, Atty. Victorino P. Evangelista and Mr. Pablo
Domingo."[1]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property
previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which
forms part of the expropriated area. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later,
or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for
the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the
heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on
the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof.
When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial
court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of
P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the
expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial
court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22,[2]
transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for
the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the
propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained
unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner
filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of
P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis
Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time,
the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to
adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979
decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the
alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000,
the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of
prescription -chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 no longer
enforceable, execution of the same by either a motion or an independent action having
already prescribed in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"2) denies the plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff to Deposit in Court
Payment for Expropriated Properties dated September 16, 1999 for the reason stated in
the next preceding paragraph hereof; andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his
heirs conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs.
Vda. De Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which the parties may
deem appropriate to institute in relation with the amount already paid to herein
oppositors and the purported transfer of a portion of the said realty to the Bulacan State
University pursuant to Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph
Ejercito."[3]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly
denied. It would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in
due time after filing of the judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of the
sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and that if a motion for
reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only within the
remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event, reckoned
from the notice of such denial. The reglementary period, however, was later modified by
A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now reading thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to all
cases still pending with the courts at the time of its effectivity.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Narzoles vs. NLRC,[4] the Court has said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion
resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because,
historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file
a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about by Circular No.
39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court
deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. x x
xchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the
Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000,
two newspapers of general circulation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65, can only be
described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are
applicable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal
requirements. (Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629
[1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils.
They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed
or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the
enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with.
(Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes,
therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive. (Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs.
Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 [1994].)[5]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the
expropriated property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has
resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its
merits.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a
motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions
subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted
the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore,
petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of
P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and
effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court.[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26
February 1979, within five years after it had become final and executory, rendered it
unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as
the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by the provincial
treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period,
since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing
party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to
them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court
was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the
property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. Respondents
further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to
the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to
be finally settled.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose.[7] Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no
recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory
of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the
hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even
that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the
State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of
individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting

upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it.[8]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the
expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting
interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves
notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts
title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking.[9]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for
public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the
property.[10] These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the
necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and
private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording
protection to the latter.[11] In determining public use, two approaches are utilized - the
first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public
advantage or benefit.[12] It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant
growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so
increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may
be devoted.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA,
a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan
State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line
with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the
utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use
differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.
The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its
expropriation. Surely, Petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is
well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being
that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where
the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property
there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal
government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but
merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain
to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being
the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of
government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling
law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of
eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain
or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
[16]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the private landowners had remained unpaid
ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled
-chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of
an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to
demand the fair market value of the same. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may
be deemed just and equitable under the premises'."[18]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City[19] where
the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid
landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first
instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his
property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the
State.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings
provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but
likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as
well as their privies, are bound.[20] Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents
and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The
exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a
partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of
bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their
property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the
expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the
remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts
upon the property.[21] After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a
new and independent title;[22] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all
the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
[23]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the
same argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted
proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979
judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel
payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule
that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should have
commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted
in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.
[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller
in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the
fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.[25] Thus, if property is taken

for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over
the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.[26] In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but
not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
[27]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the
zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of
interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum[28] should help eliminate
the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.
[29] Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or
deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation
shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has
strict application only to contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual
agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to
alter the value of the currency.[31]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority
left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to
the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid
award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26
February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the
due amount shall have been fully paid.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January
2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision promulgated
on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-49439 June 29, 1983
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PASTOR P. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge (on detail),
Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City,
QUIRINO AUSTRIA and LUCIANO AUSTRIA, respondents.
Lazaro, Aldana & Tan Law Office for petitioner.

Jacinto Dominguez for private respondent.

Natividad Dizon for respondent Judge.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The undisputed fact that in this certiorari proceeding against respondent Judge for failure
to comply with the provision of the Presidential Decrees as to the amount to be paid by
petitioner to entitle it to a writ of possession in an expropriation proceeding, no question
was raised as to their validity, calls for the grant of the remedy sought.
The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, against private respondents,
for the expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an
area of 25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent Quirino
Austria, and needed for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project. 1 Then
came from petitioner about a year later a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.
2 Petitioner was able to secure an order placing it in possession. 3 Thereafter, private
respondent Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amount of
P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the value of the property assessed for
taxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 42 . 4 There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing
Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. 464 which states: "Basis for payment of just
compensation in expropriation proceedings. In determining such compensation when
private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed
the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest
in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower." 5 Petitioner's submission is that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which is
lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondents'
property, respondents thus being precluded from withdrawing any amount more than
P1,400.00. 6 Respondent Judge, however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978 which,
according to petitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws. 7
There was a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 1978. 8 Its basis is the provision in
Presidential Decree No. 1224: "In the determination of just compensation for such private
lands and improvement to be expropriated, the government shall choose between the
value of the real property and improvements thereon as declared by the owner or
administrator thereof or the market value determined by the City or provincial assessor,
whichever is lower, at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint. " 9 It was then
submitted that under the aforequoted statutory provision, the owner's declared market
value at P1,400.00 which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is the just
compensation of respondent Quirino Austria's property sought to be expropriated. The
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
On January 4, 1979, the Court issued the following resolution: "Considering the
allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction with prayer for a restraining order,
the Court Resolved without giving due course to the petition to require the respondents
to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court
further Resolved to issue a temporary restraining order, effective as of this date and

continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court." 10 The comment was thereafter
submitted by private respondents Quirino Austria and Luciano Austria.
Private respondents stress that while there may be basis for the allegation that
respondent Judge did not follow Presidential Decree No. 76 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 464, as further amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259,
the matter is still subject to his final disposition, he having been vested with the original
and competent authority to exercise his judicial discretion in the light of the
constitutional provisions. 11 There was a comment likewise submitted by counsel on
behalf of respondent Judge but again, there was no question raised as to the validity of
the aforementioned Decrees. Such comments were considered as answers. The case was
originally submitted to the Second Division, and in a resolution of February 21, 1979, it
referred this case to the Court en banc.
Under the state of the pleadings as submitted to this Court, it is evident why, as noted at
the outset, certiorari lies.
1. One of the basic postulates in constitutional law is the presumption of validity of
legislative or executive acts. In Angara v. Electoral Commission 12 the leading case on the
subject until now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of judicial review, made clear that it is not
for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."
13
His landmark opinion continues: "More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. " 14 As pointed out in Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association,
Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila: 15 "Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity ..." 16 As of this stage in this particular case, there is
a failure to challenge the validity of such legislation. Both public and private respondents
in their comments considered as answers raised no such constitutional question. Even
for it, therefore, as of this stage of litigation, and under the conceded facts, there should
be a recognition that the law as it stands must be applied. The Decree having spoken so
clearly and unequivocally calls for obedience. It is repeating a common place to state
that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, the Court
has no choice except to yield to its command.
2. Nor is there any choice for petitioner National Housing Authority for precisely it was
created for the laudable purpose of "urban land reform." 17 The first whereas clause
speaks of the "magnitude of the housing problem of the country" which "has grown into
such proportions that only a purposeful, determined, organized mass housing
development program can meet the needs of Filipino families" for decent housing. 18
Moreover, the Presidential Decree is mandated by the Constitution which requires the
State to "establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the field of ...
housing ..." as well as "to guarantee the enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of
living." 19 The very first section of the Decree speaks of the following: "Pursuant to the
mandate of the New Constitution, there shall be developed a comprehensive and
integrated housing program which shall embrace, among others, housing development
and resettlement, sources and schemes of financing, and delineation of government and

private sector participation. The program shall specify the priorities and targets in
accordance with the integrated national human settlements plan prepared by the Human
Settlements Commission. " 20 In view of the urgency of the housing problem the various
decrees mentioned earlier were issued for the purpose of assuring that the government
would be in a financial position to cope with such basic human need which in the
Philippines, under the welfare state concept, and according to the express language of
the Constitution, is an obligation cast upon the State. The memorandum for petitioner
submitted by Government Corporate Counsel, now likewise the Presidential Legal
Assistant, Justice Manuel M. Lazaro, pursues the matter further in prose impressed with
force and clarity: "The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus involves the
application of a rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that
not only promotes social justice but also ends the baneful and one-sided practice abetted
by the collusive acquiescence of government officials and employees, of under declaring
properties for the purpose of taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same
properties are to be acquired by the government for public purposes. Put to the test,
therefore, is the power of the government to introduce rationality in the laws and to
discourage a deceitful practice that is not only ruinous to the government coffers but
also undermines its efforts at awakening a democratic responsiveness of the citizenry
toward good government and its economic and social programs. The courts should
recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees
does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just
compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his
property." 21
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of July
13, 1978 is hereby nullified and set aside. The restraining order issued by this Court on
January 4, 1979 is hereby made permanent. The case is remanded to the lower court for
further action conformably to law and to the above opinion. No costs.
Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Makasiar, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., Aquino, J., De Castor, J., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.