The "original position" (which includes the "veil

of ignorance") is a hypothetical device intended

to draw out our intuitions about fairness and
impartiality. Does it succeed? Discuss one reason
for your response.
NINA MAO
SID: 440172932
TUTORIAL: THURSDAY 12PM
WORD COUNT: 550

The "original position" (which includes the "veil of ignorance") is

a hypothetical device intended to draw out our intuitions about
fairness and impartiality. Does it succeed? Discuss one reason for
your response.
Rawls theory of political philosophy uses a thought experiment called the
original position to formulate rules which can be endorsed and followed
by each citizen in Rawls ideal democracy, which he characterizes as a
fair system of social co-operation1. I argue that the assumptions of the
original position, namely, that citizens are free and equal and that citizens
do not know their comprehensive doctrine, conflict with each other.
Rawls original position uses a veil of ignorance to prevent any unfair
advantages from affecting the negotiation of rules. He states that citizens
do not know their social positions, comprehensive doctrines,
ethnic[ity], sex or endowments such as strength and intelligence2.
Stripped of these attributes, Rawls believes we are nothing more and
nothing less than free and equal citizens. Equal, in that we have a sense
of justice and can desire ends or goals, and free in that we recognise each
others right to desire and pursue different conceptions of the good.
However, is it possible to have a conception of the good without a
comprehensive doctrine?
Comprehensive doctrines inform our thought and conduct3 as well as, I
argue, our conceptions of the good. Rawls cites utilitarianism as an
example, which quite clearly states what the conception of the good is
supposed to be (happiness). Yet Rawls also suggests there are intuitive
ideas about fairness and impartiality in democratic society that can be
arrived at if citizens pursue their own self-interest or goals conceptions
of the good in the original position, and that these can be arrived at
1 J Rawls, Fundamental Ideas in PHIL2635 Reader, 2015, p. 12
2 Rawls, Fundamental Ideas, p. 17
3 J Rawls, On the Idea of an Overlapping Consensus in PHIL2635 Reader,
2015, p. 31

without reference to the ends stipulated by comprehensive doctrines.

However, Rawls does not clarify exactly what these goals are or what
pursuing our self-interest entails.
Perhaps Rawls what veil of ignorance means to do is strip away our
learned behaviours and assumptions. Then am I naturally predisposed
towards the fairness and impartiality fundamental to democratic regimes?
Is cooperation in our nature, or is it nurtured? The idea that citizens should
have the right to free speech seems fairly integral to democracy. If we
assume the veil leaves behind only our natural instinct to survive, it is
difficult to see how I can then conclude that free speech is a right. My
conception of the good seems to be limited to the most basic of needs for
myself only survival, physical comfort, and the like. It seems unlikely
that this mindset will yield principles of fairness and impartiality central to
Rawls system of social cooperation.
Perhaps a more accurate interpretation of Rawls is that he believes we can
have conceptions of the good similar to those in comprehensive doctrines
without having a doctrine. Rawls also states that his theory applies only to
existing democracies, so it may be the case that there are some learned
assumptions that Rawls veil does not preclude, and these lead us to
desire more goals than our continued survival. However, it is difficult to
understand the distinction Rawls draws between the comprehensive
doctrines we must not take into account in the original position, and the
public political culture4 that we do. So long as comprehensive doctrine
has monopoly over what our conception of the good is, Rawls original
position seems flawed.

4 Rawls, On the Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, p. 31