Strategic narratives without strategy

After the attacks of November 13 President Hollande vowed a pitiless war against ISIS
and committed additional French resources in order to wage war against the organisation.
While other Western nations have supported an increased aerial bombing campaign
against ISIS, the development of any kind of actual solution to the crisis on the ground
has been missing. The response thus far has largely focused on tackling symptomatic
problems stemming from previous inaction in Syria. For the time being, the war being
waged is from the air and through the airwaves.
On a different but related front, Russian activity in Syria poses yet another challenge in
light of recent events with Turkey. Since 2014 Russia has been probing the fringes of
NATO and testing Western responses, exemplified by the invasion of Ukraine. The latest
incident threatens to once again expose fault lines in the Alliance and potentially test
member states commitment to Article V. With Russia, as with ISIS, the West has been
caught on the back foot, continuously forced to respond to events rather than leading
them.
There has been ongoing discussion of the importance of the narrative or the strategic
narrative of the conflicts in Syria and with Russia and how, in many ways, the West has
been outmaneuvered by adversaries that have been far more effective in communicating
its message. Indeed, if we build on Lawrence Freedmans contention that a strategic
narrative is deliberately constructed in order to shape behaviours and achieve a desired
end-state, taking Iraq and Afghanistan as other recent examples; Western countries have
been pretty miserable on this score.1
Since 9/11 it has been hard to pin down a singular, compelling narrative that has defined
Western military interventions, in part due to the lack of overarching strategy that
established their objectives. An inconclusive decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan
has left the electorates of Western countries wary of further interventions built on tenuous
or conflicting strategic goals. The narrative of the previous campaigns changed frequently
over the years ranging from regime change to counter terrorism to state building and so
on; ultimately leaving the reasons for these interventions clouded and unclear. The failure
of strategic thinking has engrained a deep level of scepticism towards Western military
interventions creating a vacuum into which other actors such as ISIS and Russia could
create compelling and effective counter-narratives.
ISIS has thus far proven itself relatively adept at being able to utilise social media as a
method by which to project its message to receptive followers as well as create avenues
for recruitment. In part, this is due to the fact that they have a clear end-state. Similarly,
Russia has had a much clearer vision about what it aims to achieve strategically,
specifically, the restoration of Russias international power and clear influence over the
countries in its immediate neighbourhood. As Anne Applebaum observed, it has
effectively used historical tactics in conjunction with its media to threaten and intimidate
1 See Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, IISS Adelphi Paper
379, Routledge: London, 2006.

its neighbours. Similarly, Russian media outlets and Putin have cast Russia as a victim of
relentless Western oppression that has sought to deny Russia its place in the world.
Countering the narratives coming from both ISIS and Russia remain challenging in large
part due to the current state of conflict and whether it is possible to articulate a strategic
narrative in the absence of Western strategy. In Syria, the US has stated the dual aim of
seeing the Assad regime removed from power while also degrading and destroying
ISIS. European members of the coalition have largely focused on bombing ISIS with less
to say about Assad. Indeed, the British debate expanding its air campaign over Syria
framed the mission more in terms of the duty to allies and to ideals rather than outlining
any clear conditions for victory.
Similarly with Russia, NATO and its member states need to continue to exert pressure on
Russia, given the continued unrest in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, Russian intervention in
Syria has also raised the possibility of an inadvertent military contact between NATO and
Russia similar to the previous Turkish incident. NATO member states and other Western
states need to avoid their previous tepid response to Russias annexation of another
states territory and be able to quickly seize the narrative while simultaneously forcefully
countering competing ones.
Fundamentally, it is impossible to articulate an effective strategic narrative without an
ultimate achievable goal. In this environment it becomes a serious challenge to
adequately articulate a strategic narrative of success, let alone sufficiently sell the public
on the need for overseas intervention. Social media and the Internet are particular areas
which need to be better understood and utilised, as this is the main area where counternarratives are likely to emerge.
This should not be read as a rejection of overseas diplomatic or military action, but
instead a call to reframe how we discuss, rationalise and ultimately, narrate these
operations. Moreover, it is a plea for a clear-headed, proactive approach to strategy
coupled with effective leadership. In doing so Western governments can take practical
steps against state and non-state adversaries while also articulating what they aim to
achieve through these actions and how these actions fit into wider narratives about these
states.
Given the rapidly changing media landscape, adaptation is necessary. Strategy and
narrative can no longer be treated as separate elements; neglecting one can now
effectively condemn the other.
Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, Kings College
London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy behaviour.
He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him at @Zachwol.